§ PART IX.—Trials of Issues of Fact.
§ Clause 62 (Disputed questions of fact to be tried by a jury).
THE BISHOP OF WINCHESTERobjected to the provision, on the ground that it was an inconvenient arrangement, and would add to the expense of the proceedings.
THE BISHOP OF LONDONsupported the clause, thinking that trial by a jury was by far the most satisfactory mode of settling the question of fact in these cases. A case had occured in his former diocese, in which a clergyman had been accused of immorality by a girl in a union. The clergyman foolishly resigned; but on a careful investigation before the Court of Arches the charge was considered by the Judge to be groundless; yet public opinion still accused the clergyman—whereas if the case had been tried by a jury, the acquittal would have been held to be satisfactory proof of his innocence. The proposal had been objected to on the ground of the increased expense that it would occasion, by the employment of attorneys, counsel, &c., but it was evident that in any case that expense could not be avoided. Moreover, the Bill proposed that in verdicts on points of fact there should be no appeal to a higher Court, thus placing those trials on the same level as those in the ordinary Courts, and by the provision prohibiting appeal in cases of fact the expenses would be considerably diminished.
§ LORD CAIRNSthought a jury of any sort a most unfit instrument for trying such cases. The jury gave no reasons for their conclusion; whereas the most satisfactory course was to appoint a competent Judge able to weigh the facts, and require him to state the grounds of his opinion, so that if his decision were appealed from, it could be reviewed more easily.
§ Clause struck out.
§ Clauses 63 to 70 struck out.