LORD CAMPBELLrose to call attention to the Protocols of Conferences held in London respecting the Treaty of 30th March, 1856, and to move for any consular reports of the steps which the Russian Government are taking to form the Maritime and Military Arsenals which Clause 13 had prohibited. The noble Lord said he would, in the first place, point to the fact, that a debate of some kind on that subject was inevitable. The Protocols upon the Conference had been delivered before Easter, and it was necessary that a short interval should follow to give the Opposition time, if they deemed fit, to institute a Motion. The moment, therefore, was not an improper one for now adverting to the subject. During the autumn the foreign policy of the Government had been frequently and seriously questioned. The resignation of the Under Secretary (Mr. Otway), because he was not able to defend it, might be regarded as the climax of the discontent it had occasioned. At the same time, he (Lord Campbell) was ready to acquit the Government on some points where the arraignment had been strong, and where, as yet, they had been rather feebly defended. He did not blame them as regarded the origin of the war, or the refusal to interfere during its progress; or the mission of Mr. Odo Russell to Versailles; or even the adoption of the Conference. He would not go along with the more limited assailants who condemned them because the Conference had ended in giving up the best results of the Crimean War, if it could be shown that a 783 bonâ fide, honourable effort to maintain them had occurred. Whether it had or not, the Protocols would tell them. No doubt could exist as to the duty of Great Britain in the Conference—namely, to make a strenuous exertion to preserve the restrictions of the naval power of Russia in the Black Sea, by which the security of Turkey was upheld after the war in the Crimea. It became clear, at least, on those considerations. The noble Earl the Secretary of State, Mr. Odo Russell, and Count Bismarck, all at different times, insisted that the Conference could only be accepted on the condition of perfect freedom to deliberate; perfect freedom to accept; perfect freedom to reject; perfect freedom to reduce or modify the Russian proposition. But, unless there was a real debate, before it was embraced, a foregone conclusion would be apparent on the surface, and the Government would be thus condemned by its own language. Besides that, it was in order to effect a limitation of the Russian naval force in the Black Sea that the second campaign—for there were two distinct campaigns—was undertaken against Russia. The despatch of Lord Clarendon when Turkey was evacuated; the Conferences at Vienna in 1855, which broke off on this point; the debates in Parliament which followed; the terms of pacification Austria threw out, in which these restrictions were included, would all convince impartial minds upon the subject. The fact was, men differed as to whether it was wise to go into Russian territory, and to convert the war from defence to aggression; but they agreed as to the object of such a line if it were taken. There were two great modes of thinking at the period. One held that the war should finish because Turkey was delivered; the other recommended perseverance in it, that Turkey might always be secure. None said—"Go into the Crimea for ephemeral and transitory purposes." None said—"Sebastopol ought to be destroyed, that in 15 years it might rise again, at once a menace and a satire." None said—"We ought, if we land, to leave no traces of our arms, beyond, the tombs of those who gloriously carried them." Such a view would have been scouted, by those who leant to peace, for its inhuman recklessness of bloodshed; by those who leant to further sacrifices, for its pusillanimous indifference to the objects further sacrifices might entail. 784 To effect the limitation of Russian power in the Black Sea it would be correct to say, therefore, that the slopes behind the Alma were ascended, the horrors of Inkerman sustained, and, after efforts which deserved Homeric illustration, Sebastopol eventually taken. To accomplish that result the Earl of Aberdeen was driven from his office to oblivion; the Duke of Newcastle pursued with popular reproaches, until he sought a refuge among the battlefields which he had recently directed; and Lord Palmerston, who had been relegated to a kind of penal servitude in the most obscure offices of the State, became a general dictator. If in pursuit of that object, the British public went on with unflagging zeal and with indomitable spirit through such heroic feats and perilous vicissitudes, what was the clear duty of those who had to represent it at the Conference? It was to guard the limitation; to array the other Powers in its favour; or if that was too high a task, to modify and alter, without entirely renouncing it; and should concession be inevitable, to yield gradually and firmly, like skirmishers retreating on a line, or outposts falling back on an encampment, in such a manner as to show that no alternative was possible. The question to be examined was, how far that duty was fulfilled. As the Conference met only six times, the examination needed not to be a long one. On the first day, a principle was laid down with regard to the inviolability of treaties, and much credit had been taken for it; but its reality or hollowness depended entirely on the subsequent proceedings. There was no withdrawal of the Circular of Prince Gortchakoff, by which Europe had been startled, although Mr. Odo Russell had before assumed the necessity of such a measure. Prussia, at that meeting, distinctly stated her intention to uphold the Russian claim. It was, therefore, with a foregone conclusion that Prussia proposed the Conference, and entered it. Everything most decisive appeared in the next Protocol. Russia desired to put an end to the limitation of her naval power in the Black Sea, in terms which showed a conscious weakness in the argument put forward. The only reason given was, that Russia and Turkey were both affected by the limitation in their sovereignty. But as soon as Turkey, through her Plenipotentiary, insisted on the advantage of the limitation, and disclaimed the indignity 785 connected with it, which must be common to both Powers if it fell on either, the Russian case was seen to vanish altogether. Turkey was ready to give up the limitations if she was alone; to maintain them if she was supported. Having given her opinion in favour of the Treaty as it stood, she disclaimed responsibility, and left the question for the other Powers to determine. Great Britain transformed such a hesitating, contingent, and reluctant declaration into "the definite resolution of the Porte," when no such resolution had been hinted at. The other Powers followed the line adopted by the British Representative. The reproach of yielding was thrown by Turkey on the Powers, and by the Powers upon Turkey. Everyone must admit such a circle was logically vicious; but that phrase would not denote the moral hue of the transaction. The noble Earl the Secretary of State could only act on the instructions of the Cabinet who sent him. It was not with any view to personal reflection, he inquired, could international hypocrisy go further than to employ, as reasons for not upholding Turkey in her object and her argument, the concessions which Turkey was prepared to make in the event of being deserted? Without any further struggle or exertion, on the ground of the Turkish Declaration, which never sanctioned such a course, which, on the contrary, explained its inconveniences, the substantial clauses of the Treaty were abandoned. Maritime and military arsenals might rise again upon the coasts of the Black Sea, the whole fleet of Russia re-appear upon its waters. In the next meeting there occurred the only semblance of debate which happened in the Conference. The Turkish Plenipotentiary desired to extend the power of calling foreign fleets into the Bosphorus, so that they might come from the Black Sea, or from beyond it. To explain the view of Turkey on that point would require a longer detail than he wished to go into at present. He alluded to it, only that the noble Earl the Secretary of State might not lose whatever praise he was entitled to. With proper firmness he resisted a dangerous proposition. In the fourth meeting, the new clauses were adopted. In the fifth, which was most critical, the French Ambassador arrived and found that everything had been settled in his absence. He simply 786 concurred in the irrevocable, while he disapproved it. It was true that from the moment Turkey acquiesced, he thought it right to acquiesce. But Turkey only gave her acquiescence on the ground of being alone; had the French Ambassador been there, her isolation might have been averted. The last Protocol he need not dwell upon at all, as it was merely ceremonial. It might excite the blushes of the noble Earl the Secretary of State, to hear again the various acknowledgments his courtesy elicited. The tone of general congratulation which ran through the proceedings, would seem nearly to imply that the object of an European Conference was, with the greatest possible despatch, to sacrifice the interest of Europe. The Protocols suggested most forcibly these questions—Why was Turkey unsupported in her answer to the Russian statement and her vindication of the Treaty; why was her forced submission cited as if it had been genuine and voluntary; why was the whole bent of the Conference a systematic register of the foregone conclusion which was previously disclaimed? Above all, why was the decision come to before the Due de Broglie had arrived? There was no ground for hurry, and there was a reason for delay. Why was no middle term, if possible, insisted on? The naval power of Russia in the Black Sea might have been limited, although not to the extent to which the Treaty of 1856 reduced it. Unless he was deceived, Her Majesty's Government would show but little inclination to reply to questions of that nature. They would be rather apt to dwell on the equivalents they had obtained, as an atonement for everything damaging the history of the Conference exhibited. No doubt, by the new arrangements, Turkey had the power of calling friendly fleets into the Dardanelles, should the Treaty seem to be endangered, although war had not been declared. The shortest comment on the value of that privilege resided in a single fact, which must have once been known to their Lordships. During the disaster of Sinope, which arose from the collision of Turkish and Russian fleets in the Black Sea, the vessels of France and England were in the waters of the Dardanelles. Of what advantage was their presence there? The right to enter the Dardanelles was one thing, the opportunity of reaching the Black Sea was 787 another. The vice of the equivalent was, that it only began to work where Russia had already fixed her counsels for aggression, whereas the former Treaty stopped them altogether. It might, to some extent, be a security to Constantinople against Russia; but it was no security to Western Europe against a war for its defence. Again, the country had a right to ask—Could not an advantage so precarious and limited have been obtained before they went to the Crimea, when Silistria was relieved? If it could, men, horses, guns, blood, treasure, reputation, had all been squandered on the cemetery which they founded. Those results would, he thought, be attributed to the Conference, by anyone who took a fair and steady view of the transaction. A triumph had been gained where none ought to have happened, and the Russian Circular had been crowned with a success which ought to have been wanting to it. The risk of war was greater than it was from co-existing fleets in the Black Sea, and the revived ambition of St. Petersburg. A new and grave expenditure was fastened upon Turkey. The Western Powers would be obliged to keep considerable fleets about the Archipelago. The Supplemental Treaty of April 15, 1856, by which France, Austria, and Great Britain guaranteed the substance of the former one—now that substance was impaired—had received a blow which weakened, perhaps effaced, its validity. And as that Supplemental Treaty was an instrument for solving many difficulties Europe might present, and among the brightest trophies we derived from the Crimea, by that result and by the others, the prestige of the country had been lowered. But a great authority in that House had recently contested the utility of prestige. In a speech which had been widely noticed, the noble and learned Lord upon the Woolsack had proposed to banish the word from their vocabulary, in order to put an end to what it represented in their system. The noble and learned Lord had even questioned its existence, and challenged all who ventured, to believe in it. Among them, he should view prestige as the unseen and unexerted power which the memory of great actions and the possession of great resources furnished to States, or, even, individuals. It formed the very essence of a Monarchy, 788 when it had ceased to be despotic, and ought not to be lightly questioned by one who guarded the conscience of a Sovereign. It enabled the Executive by some hundred thousand constables to keep millions in tranquillity. It gave to the First Napoleon the secret of advancing without an army upon Paris after Elba. Was there not, therefore, an existence, in that subtle atmosphere of immaterial authority, by which force might be subdued, and even empires recovered? But if there was, to what State was it more important than to one which could not put 100,000 men upon the Continent of Europe, whose fleet was unequal to that of Russia and America united, while she was bound to defend Belgium by engagements, the Netherlands by policy, and the long and vulnerable line of Canada, because it was her own. But when a Government disparaged prestige, in point of fact, it most ingeniously avowed a conduct which had lowered it. If the language of the first reply to Prince Gortchakoff had been sustained; if no one had selected Count Bismarck; if a Conference had not been granted to the menaces of Russia, or had it ended in the vindication of the Treaty, would the noble and learned Lord have been permitted to go out among the fishmongers, and rob them of the last illusion which they cherished as a body? If dinner was not as inconsistent with debate as debate was found to be too frequently with dinner, that shrewd and business-like assembly might have told him that a Government which happened to give up the Isle of Wight, or any similar possession, could hardly be an unsuspected judge of its importance, and that public men were not in a condition to appraise and estimate prestige, unless they had succeeded in upholding it.
§ Moved, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for any consular reports of the steps which the Russian Government are taking to form the Maritime and Military Arsenals which Clause XIII. of the Treaty had prohibited.—(The Lord Campbell.)
§ EARL GRANVILLEMy Lords, I wish in the first place to protest against the excuse which the noble Lord made for carrying on a discussion on an important subject of this kind at so late an hour as 20 minutes past 6 o'clock; but I own I feel somewhat embarrassed how to continue this debate on a matter which has given me cause of anxiety of 789 a very peculiar kind. Though anxious to go into the whole of the circumstances connected with the Black Sea question, I hardly feel it fair to trespass at great length upon the attention of the very few of your Lordships now remaining in the House. Certainly they have not been driven away by the speech of the noble Lord. The noble Lord mentioned several things in respect to which he disagreed from the criticisms which have been made on the foreign policy of the Government, and for that statement I am obliged to him. Among other things the noble Lord said with respect to the Conference that it would have been a right thing if it could have been shown that it was for the purpose of avoiding war. Having considered all the alternatives which were possible on this occasion, we could not help seeing that, with the exception of one of them, they involved very considerable risks of war. What were these alternatives? One was to immediately acquiesce in, accept, and even give a sanction to the declaration made in the Circular of Prince Gortchakoff. One of the embarrassments I feel in discussing this question now is, that the Conference having been concluded, and certain results arrived at—wrongly as the noble Lord thinks, rightly as I believe—a friendly agreement having been come to between the great Powers of Europe, co-signataries of the Treaty of 1856, and friendly relations having been restored which threatened to be broken by the Russian Circular, it would be difficult, were I to go at any length into the subject, to avoid irritating topics; and I must, consequently, refuse to follow the noble Lord into many of the details raised by his speech. As to one question—the noble Lord spoke of the resignation of a political Friend and Colleague of mine (Mr. Otway). It was certainly a remarkable circumstance, and attracted much attention at the time, in a sense somewhat adverse to Her Majesty's Government. It took me by surprise when made. Mr. Otway told me in the most straightforward and honourable manner that, though he was of course not responsible for our entering into the Conference, he felt that he could not fully defend that step, and having views of his own of a very spirited character, but the practicability of which I could not admit, he took a course which I believed 790 unnecessary, though it was certainly most honourable and disinterested—that of resigning his office, so that he might not be called on to defend a measure which he could not entirely approve. Now, what were the other alternatives, if we did not sanction and acquiesce in the declaration of Prince Gortchakoff? There was a middle course, in favour of which some arguments might be used. We might have waited and said to Russia—"You have made this declaration upon paper; we, on the contrary, have declared that we will not admit it. We will wait to see whether you carry your declaration to any practical result. If so, we shall then be prepared to take the necessary measures to oppose it." That is one of the alternatives to which we might have resorted, but it is one which combines great disadvantages. In the first place, taking for the moment an anti-Russian view of the case, it would have been a course singularly agreeable to Russia. It would have left her declaration unquestioned. She would have been able to answer that she was perfectly free from those engagements. I do not know that even now she has any intention to create a fleet in the Black Sea; but that alternative, had we adopted it, would have left her free to postpone her intention to the time most convenient to herself, and therefore most inconvenient for Turkey and her allies to oppose it. Meanwhile, not only would the diplomatic and commercial relations between Russia and Turkey have been disturbed, with immense disadvantage to both countries, but this festering Eastern question would have produced immense uneasiness in Europe. Turkey would have been placed at the greatest possible disadvantage, for there would have necessarily arisen a feeling of disquietude and uncertainty, and she would have been involved in financial burdens of a severe character caused by the doubt whether there was to be war or not. Such a state of things would have been intolerable, even in this country. The people would have said—"Better go to war at once than be left in such suspense, and remain always liable to war." Then there was another alternative. We might have declared war. Certainly a casus belli might have been made on this occasion. Turkey, in fact, said if we wished it she would go to war. But then we must have supported 791 her credit; we must have supplied her with arms and have given her assistance in other ways; while as to an offensive war against Russia, that country enjoys much the same exceptional position that we ourselves occupy, from geographical and other reasons, as to facilities for defence. Another scheme was strongly pressed upon us. We were to go to Prussia; we were to ask for a categorical answer to the question—"Are you with us or with Russia?" And if that answer was not perfectly satisfactory in the sense we desired—if she answered she was not with us—we were then to conclude an offensive alliance with France, Austria, Italy, and Turkey, for the purpose of checking Russian ambition in the East and Prussian ambition in the West. Such a course appeared to me not only absolutely and entirely impracticable, but unjustifiable. What right had we to go to a country like Prussia and make such a demand in terms of such insolence? Is it likely that a powerful ruler like the King of Prussia, very sensitive upon a point of military honour, or that a statesman like Prince Bismarck, certainly not wanting in moral courage—is it likely that they, at the head of victorious armies, representing 40,000,000 people, powerful both physically and intellectually, and in the full current of their military success, would have given any other answer than one of an offensive character, or perhaps an utter refusal to answer such a question? But Prussia had already given an answer to a question that had been put to her, and what Prussia in effect said was this—"We agree with you in regretting, and in being surprised at, the mode in which the Russian proposal has been put forward, though we think, in common with the great majority of the co-signataries of the Treaty of 1856, that this particular condition could not be permanently maintained against Russia." That being so—when France, Austria, and Prussia had at different times expressed this opinion—an opinion held by many eminent statesmen even in this country, not merely by Colleagues of my own, by Earl Russell, by eminent lawyers like Sir Roundell Palmer, by Mr. Layard, but even by the historian of the war, Mr. Kinglake—I say that for us to have involved this country in all the horrors of war for the purpose of maintaining a condition which in its essentials had 792 been denounced by other countries parties to the Treaty, and by persons of great authority in this country, would have been, indeed, most unstatesmanlike and unwise. I wish now to say one word more about Prussia. The noble Lord (Lord Campbell) talks about the six meetings of the Conference. But very much more of the business of a Conference is carried on outside the room in which it meets than in the Conference itself. It would, perhaps, surprise some of your Lordships to know what a mass of negotiations, conversations, and confidential and other communications passed between all the Powers interested, and led to the actual result. I can only say that, although there is no doubt Prussia in one way or the other was probably not unwilling to secure the neutrality of a great military nation like Russia in the contest then raging, by assisting her to remove restrictions which both the Emperor and the whole nation thought humiliating, we do not know that any engagements further than this existed between the two Powers; and I am bound to say that in all the principal points on which we were concerned in the Conference—in the Protocol ad hoc, in the prolongation of the Commission of the Danube, to which Russia had been always opposed, or with regard to the compensation to Turkey and her Allies for the de-neutralization of the Black Sea—Prussia did cordially co-operate and support us, and I cannot think that, as practical men, we should have thrown aside this sort of assistance from such a nation when we wished to arrive at a peaceful solution of a great question. The noble Lord assumes that Austria and Italy would have followed us had we been willing or anxious to go to war on this question. It is true that Austria said, very honourably, that she was ready to execute the tripartite Treaty; and on mentioning the subject to the Austrian Plenipotentiaries—Count Apponyi and his colleague—they said that Austria entirely agreed with us in our view of the Russian Circular and in the steps we had taken, not to admit or give any sanction to the assumption which appeared to be embodied in it; but, speaking from an intimate knowledge of the policy of the Austrian Government, both Plenipotentiaries said their desire was for a peaceful solution of this Eastern ques- 793 tion, and not to adopt any course which might lead to the risk of war. And I may add that Count Beust, in reference to an expression in a speech of Mr. Gladstone's, declared that Austria had no wish or intention to go to war with Russia. I wish also to make a remark with respect to France, as the noble Lord has alluded to that country. Now, France never from the very beginning said otherwise than that the Conference was a good thing; nor did she ever say otherwise than that it would be an advantage to her to be represented in it. It is quite true that certain delays occurred owing to the difficulty attending the coming to this country of M. Jules Favre, the person whom she selected to represent her; but I defy anyone who reads these Protocols to show that I did not use every effort to secure that France should be represented in the Conference, and I was at length, I am happy to say, successful in attaining that object towards the conclusion of our labours; while I must bear my testimony to the dignified manner in which the Duke de Broglie acted in the part which he took at the close of our proceedings. As to there being any inconsistency exhibited by us, or any negligence shown in the discharge of the responsible duty which devolved on the representative of Her Majesty's Government, I would refer your Lordships to the despatch of the 10th of November; and I wish to draw attention to that despatch more particularly because, except one or two criticisms which have been passed upon it, I am not aware that any objection has been made to it. That answer, which was addressed by me to Sir Andrew Buchanan, comprises the arguments by which we attempted to show that the assumption contained in the Protocol of Prince Gortchakoff was totally inadmissible. We said—
This statement is wholly independent of the reasonableness or unreasonableness on its own merits of the desire of Russia to be released from the observation of the stipulations of the Treaty of 1856 respecting the Black Sea; for the question is, in whose hands lies the power of releasing one or more of the parties from all or any of these stipulations. It has always been felt that that right belongs only to the Governments which have been parties to the original instrument. The despatches of Prince Gortchakoff appear to assume that any one of the Powers who have signed the engagement may allege that occurences have taken place which, in its opinion, are at variance with the provisions of the Treaty, and, 794 although this view is not shared nor admitted by the co-signatory Powers, may found on that allegation, not a request to these Governments for the consideration of the case, but an announcement to them that it has emancipated itself, or holds itself emancipated, from any stipulations of the Treaty which it thinks fit to disapprove.Then, after following up this argument further, the despatch goes on to say—The question therefore arises, not whether any desire expressed by Russia ought to be carefully examined in a friendly spirit by the co-signatory Powers, but whether they are to accept from her the announcement that, by her own act, without any consent from them, she has released herself from a solemn covenant.We then proceeded to show that it was "impossible for Her Majesty's Government to give any sanction on their part to the course announced by Prince Gortchakoff," and lastly and intentionally we left a door open, should Russia wish to avail herself of it, for the purpose of arriving at a peaceful solution of this vexed question. Now, the proposal of a Conference, I contend, carried out this view completely, and as soon as Russia consented to join in a Conference we got the most formal declaration that there was to be no foregone conclusion. I absolutely refused to enter into the slightest question with respect to any portion of the Treaty until the Protocol ad hoc was signed by the Russian Envoy, together with the other Plenipotentiaries, carrying out what appeared to me to be exactly the doctrine which we had laid down in our answer to the Circular of Prince Gortchakoff. I am bound to add that Russia, having made up her mind to enter the Conference with the conditions attached, signified her readiness to agree to some such Protocol; there being, I believe, as many as thirteen versions of it before we arrived at a definite conclusion as to its terms. This very delay in my opinion, shows that it was our desire to make it complete, and I am not sure that it was not worded even a little more strongly than on abstract grounds we might be entitled to expect. But be that as it may, we did go into the Conference, and we made concessions voluntarily, and with the approval of the other co-signataries to the Treaty, following the initiative of Turkey. There were also other points of the greatest importance with which we had to deal. There was one, for instance, which was of great importance to Europe, not so much, perhaps, in a political as in a 795 commercial point of view. I allude to the prolongation of the commission with respect to the Danube, to which Russia was always opposed, but which she consented to accept; and Prussia co-operated strongly in persuading Russia to agree to it. I would also remind your Lordships of the use, when the Article relating to the neutralization of the Black Sea was inserted in the Treaty of 1856, which Russia had just made of her naval supremacy over Turkey. The state of things is now, however, entirely reversed. Turkey has a most formidable fleet, while Russia has no fleet whatsoever. By the arrangement, too, which has been made, instead of the Dardenelles being closed in time of peace, it can be opened at the will of the Sultan with the view only of maintaining the stipulations of the Treaty of 1856, which is now confirmed and maintained, not under the pressure of war, but by all the Powers of Europe of their own free action. Another advantage which Turkey now has, owing to this arrangement, is that in the event of their being danger of war, she would be able to add to her own naval resources immensely by drawing upon the dockyards and arsenals of other countries which might be disposed to give her assistance, while Russia would have to rely on ships constructed in her own arsenals and dockyards. There has hardly, I believe, my Lords, ever been a treaty made with respect to which there has not been grumbling on both sides, and, accordingly, very soon after the labours of the Conference had been brought to a close, there appeared an article in The Moscow Gazette—written, I believe in opposition to the Russian Government—the pith of which was that owing to the Machiavellism of England—and I suppose I must take the compliment as applying more or less to myself—the result of the Conference had been to confirm the predominance of Great Britain in the East, while it bound the hands of Russia in the Black Sea. What was the answer of the Russian Government to the charge? A fair one. They contented themselves with publishing in The St. Petersburg Gazette the spirit of articles written and speeches delivered in this country, in which Her Majesty's Government are represented as having excited the disgust of all Europe by the course which they 796 adopted. And now, my Lords, I would observe that such a course is, in my opinion, one which primâ facie ought to be followed, except under peculiar circumstances. There may be instances in which the country should not be called upon to take any line beyond that which its own honour and interest dictate. But primâ facie it is a merit in a particular course of action that it enables you to arrive at a pacific solution of European questions by getting all the Powers of Europe to meet together and consider how that may be done and war avoided. There are a great many small points to which I should like to have referred, but I shall not dwell upon them on this occasion. I believe the country does not, as the noble Lord seems to think, blame us for the course which we took—and I have some right to say so after the result of the debate in the House of Commons. I know, indeed, that many of your Lordships are individually opposed to our views on the subject, but the appearance of your Lordships' House leads me to suppose that you do not very much dissent from the opinion which the other House has pronounced.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI cannot allow the statement with which the noble Earl concluded his speech to pass without a few remarks. I do not believe the thinness of the House on this occasion is due to the fact that your Lordships approve the conduct of the Government with respect to these transactions; it is due, I should say, rather to the feeling that what is done cannot be undone, and that it is useless to discuss the question. But I would remind the noble Earl that when we sought to discuss it when it was matter of practical interest we received from him very severe rebukes for our imprudence. The noble Earl is somewhat like the man who, undergoing a flogging, did not like it whether he was hit high or hit low.
§ EARL GRANVILLEI did not deprecate discussion on the present occasion.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYThe noble Earl, at all events, condemned discussion very strongly indeed when the subject was brought forward on a former evening. At all events, the noble Earl has hardly made out a case for the very exceptional mode in which he has proceeded. It is not true that if we disapproved the alteration of the Treaty of 1856 our only choice was between imme- 797 diate war, summoning a Conference, or submission.
§ EARL GRANVILLEI did not say so.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYNo—but the noble Earl implied it very strongly. But there was an intermediate course, which the noble Earl just glanced at to put aside—a course which was not without precedent. The noble Earl, perhaps, will recollect a similar outrage upon treaties perpetrated not by Russia, but by Austria, when the Republic of Cracow was suddenly suppressed. That was a breach of a Treaty to which we were a consenting party. It was a casus belli, and we might have gone to war on that account if we had thought fit. What did Lord Palmerston do on that occasion? Did he summon a Conference to approve the violation of the Treaty? He did nothing of the kind, nor did he go to war. But he wrote a most able despatch, pointing out the wickedness of the course pursued by the Austrian Government, protested in the strongest language against it, and left his protest on record for diplomacy to deal with, leaving it open to take any course that might seem necessary at a future time. Again, take the case of the Americans with regard to the Alabama claims. It was not convenient for them to go to war with England when they thought themselves injured; but they did not summon a Conference to condone the matter—they simply recorded their protest, which might have been taken up on a future occasion if necessary. For my part, I prefer that course to the one which the noble Earl has pursued, which is but a flimsy and transparent veil of submission, and which, I believe, does nothing but injury to the credit of this country. The explanation of the foreign policy of the noble Earl, however, is not very far to seek. There is a large proportion of the people of this nation who object to foreign policy altogether, who would shut up the Foreign Office for good, or, at all events, degrade it from its present position. That is an influential part of the nation, and the noble Earl has to take its wishes into account. On the other hand, there is a part of the nation which believes in a foreign policy, which thinks that our power is as great as ever it was, and would be quite ready to go to war whenever the honour or interest of England might 798 appear to require it. The consequence is that the noble Earl has to invent a policy which shall not displease those in favour of inaction, and shall not too much offend the traditional feelings of those who prefer a strong foreign policy. And that accounts for the Machiavellian line of action which the noble Earl was so proud as to attribute to himself. Indeed, he has shown in this case the peculiar talents displayed by Caleb Balder-stone on a similar occasion. Knowing that he has not at his back an army able to fight any great European Power with the least possible chance of success, he is able by his skilful management to maintain in European politics a very good place, which until you probe it and see how hollow it is underneath appears not unworthy the distinguished statesman whom he has succeeded. I do not blame the noble Earl. I cannot conceive a more difficult position than that of a Foreign Minister who is obliged to have recourse to almost anything rather than bring into conflict the two opposing tendencies to which I have referred. But still I feel that it is the duty of the Government to bring home to the people of this country the position in which they stand, for I hold that those flimsy pretences are really dangerous, because they hide from us our real weakness. What the noble Earl has done in this case is exactly as if a man stopped on the road by a highwayman should say—"I should be delighted to give you up my watch, only I request you first to repeat the Eighth Commandment." We required from Russia a verbal confession that that which she did was wrong, and that seems to me nothing better than a flimsy concealment of submission on our part. As I have said before, I do not condemn the noble Earl, but I condemn what has been done on this ground that it is a transparent device arising from a mistaken tenderness for the feelings of the people of this country, and that it would be wiser to bring home to them a real sense of the weakness to which our policy has reduced them. I wish, however, to suggest—what is not sufficiently seen from these despatches—the position in which Turkey finds herself. It is a singular feature in these proceedings that Turkey is to be seen eagerly struggling for that which would be beneficial and agreeable to Russia alone. Instead of trying to make the terms disagreeable 799 to Russia, she strives to make them agreeable, by admitting Russian as well as all other ships into the Dardanelles. I cannot help noticing the sundry reports I have heard of the sudden pacific attitude of Russia towards Turkey, and I confess I cannot help suspecting that the noble Earls knows also that Turkey has come to the conviction that the assistance of the Western Powers is a broken reed that will pierce her hand—for what with the impotency of France, and the irresolution of England, Turkey has come to the conviction that it is cheaper to purchase the goodwill of Russia, and that it will be safer for her to become a feudatory of Russia, and more honourable than to become a despised and rejected suppliant for Western assistance. If that is her policy, and it is a very natural one for both, it is one of the most dangerous policies that could have been adopted towards this country, because it will close far more effectually than Russian aggression all our influence over those countries which form the highway to the East. I will not enter into the details of the subject, not because we approve of the conduct of the Government, but because it is our duty to protest, and to assure the noble Earl that the feeling which the conduct of England has produced amongst Englishmen is one of very deep disapprobation.
THE DUKE OF ARGYLLMy Lords, I wish to point out that the course which the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) has recommended would be infinitely more dangerous and would have been much more likely to result in the abolition of the Foreign Office than that pursued by my noble Friend. The noble Marquess says that we should have been content merely to do what Lord Palmerston did in the case of Cracow—simply to have written a despatch against it. But, my Lords, there was the greatest difference between the the two cases. The case of Cracow was totally unconnected with European politics and was not likely to recur. But this question of the Black Sea, and the whole question of the Treaty of 1856, has over and over again come up at frequent intervals, and if you had accepted the Russian declaration with merely a protest, and without securing any agreement on the part of the European Powers, you would have been only postponing 800 a difficulty to which you would be liable at any time. I was a humble member of the Government that concluded the Treaty of 1856, and it so happened that I attached more importance to the clause in question than anybody else. But I never concealed from myself that it was a clause imposing a very violent and unnatural limitation on the power of Russia over her own territory. It was forbidding Russia to have fleets on her own waters, to build fortresses on her own soil, and nothing but a disastrous defeat could have induced Russia to accept at the hands of the other Powers such conditions. It is a clause which, if not supported by the general opinion, of Europe is in the nature of things of a temporary character, and the termination of which was foreseen by Lord Palmerston, who knew that it must come to an end sooner or later. During the years which have elapsed since 1856 it is quite evident that the opinion of the great Powers of Europe has materially changed with respect to the clause, and that they no longer attribute to it the importance which they did at first. Accordingly, repeated suggestions have been made by some of the Great Powers, including those most interested in its maintenance, that the clause should be re-considered, and the whole question of the neutrality of the Black Sea re-opened. Now, although one of those who attached very great importance to the clause at the time it was agreed to, and though I still think it very valuable, I do say this—that great exaggeration has been used by those who speak of it as my noble Friend (Lord Campbell) has done, as if the neutrality of the Black Sea was the one great object of the Crimean War. That is a great exaggeration. It was a clause, and not an unimportant one in that settlement, but there were others infinitely more fundamental. In the first place, there was the liberation of Turkey from all this long series of most damaging and embarrassing engagements between Russia and herself, which gave to Russia the power of perpetual interference with Turkey. One of the main objects of the Crimean War was to set Turkey free from those engagements, which were a source of embarrassment to her, and gave to Russia frequently the most legitimate and always the most facile means of stepping gradually on in the path of 801 her supposed ambition; the Crimean War abrogated those treaties, and the result has been important as regards the maintenance of the Turkish Empire. One very important consequence of the war with Russia used to be expressed by the absurd phrase of "attaching Turkey to the European equilibrium." That was an extraordinary diplomatic phrase, but it went through all the despatches of that time, and it was attempted to be done by a new joint guarantee on the part of the European Powers that Turkey should be upheld. Nothing has been done to alter that, but, on the contrary, my noble Friend has procured a Protocol in this Treaty by which that is renewed and reiterated. Another matter which is not unimportant related to the continuance of the condition as to the navigation of the Danube—a matter on which Russia has always been extremely jealous, to which Austria naturally attaches considerable value, and in which all the other States of Europe have a great interest. It would have been futile for my noble Friend to have been contented with a mere protest against the conduct of Russia, for it was absolutely necessary to come to some new arrangement, and to see whether the Powers of Europe would unite with us in re-arranging the treaties which had been disturbed by the conduct of Russia. The noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) has referred—almost in the tone of contempt—to the power of Turkey to call up the fleets of the Western Powers in the Black Sea, not in the event of war, but if she became alarmed at the attidude of Russia. Had my noble Friend been intimately conversant with the negotiations that occurred in 1856 he would have known that there was no point of greater delicacy than the mode of dealing with the Western fleets in the Black Sea, and jealousy and suspicion were always manifested by Russia about that power. Of course, times have changed, and in the course of years Russia may possess a considerable fleet, but at the present moment Turkey is infinitely more powerful than Russia in that respect, and, if she is able to call up the Western fleets even in a time of danger and suspicion, she may at any time command in the Black Sea a power much greater than Russia is likely to possess. Without speculating upon the future of Turkey, and speaking 802 for myself alone—because in such a matter as the Crimean War members of a Government might join, although they entertained different views—I would add that I never believed in the ultimate permanence of Turkey in Europe, and never regarded the Crimean War as one merely to uphold the Turkish Empire. It was, in the first instance, a war to uphold that Empire, but the greater object was to prevent Russia from taking to herself the great inheritance of Turkey. We are not called upon as a Government to express any opinion as to the future condition of Turkey; all we have to say is whether or not it is desirable that she should continue in Europe, and that is rather a matter to be dealt with by political philosophers like my noble Friend opposite. The practical question with us was whether it was right to allow Russia to engage Turkey by treaties, and so help herself to the Turkish Empire. Whatever may be the future of Turkey, the great principle involved in the Crimean War was to protect the interests of all Europe, and we felt that Russia alone had no right to take such steps as would enable her to have exclusive dominion over some of the fairest regions of the earth.
§ EARL GRANVILLEexplained that the Motion could not be agreed to because there did not exist any such papers as those which had been moved for.
LORD CAMPBELLsaid, as the information he had moved for had not reached the Foreign Office, he could not urge them to produce it. If he had done nothing more to-night than elicit the remarks which had fallen from the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury), the Motion would not be an useless one. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Earl Granville) and the noble Duke the Secretary of State for India (the Duke of Argyll) had taken much pains to defend the policy of going into the Conference, which he (Lord Campbell) had refrained from questioning that evening. But neither of them had attempted to shake the fundamental propositions which he had brought before their Lordships—namely, that in the Conference a specific duty fell upon Great Britain, and that if the Protocols were accurate that duty had been wholly unfulfilled.
§ On Question, Resolved in the Negative,