Lords Sitting of 28 March 1871

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Oyster and Mussel Fisheries Supplemental* (62); Workshop Regulation Act, 1867, Amendment* (63).
Second Reading—Poor Law (Loans)* (50); Consolidated Fund (£162,580 9s. 11 d.)*.
Committee—Lunacy Regulation (Ireland) * (47).

RESERVE FORCES—THE LORDS LIEUTENANT.

  MOTION FOR A SELECT COMMITTEE.
  LORD VIVIAN, rose to move for a Select Committee to inquire into the state of law respecting the control of the Reserve Forces in the several Counties of Great Britain. The noble Lord said that the object of his Motion was to ascertain what was in point of law the power of Lords Lieutenant of counties in regard to the appointment of officers of the Militia. He need hardly remind the House that when, a few evenings since, he brought forward the case of his own appointment of an officer to the Royal Cornwall Rangers, which had been disallowed by the Secretary for War, the noble and learned Lord (Lord Cairns), and the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack had given two different interpretations of the clause of the Act of Parliament which regulated those appointments. This difference was one reason for an inquiry. Another was that since the recent discussion he had made further inquiries, the result of which

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  had been to confirm his opinion of the inexpediency of appointing Major Trelawny to the command of the West Cornwall Rangers, and he had therefore informed the Secretary for War of his intention to adhere to the appointment of Lieutenant Colonel the Hon. Charles Edgcumbe, which appointment he should have gazetted but for that gentleman's indisposition, notwithstanding the view taken by the War Office. He had, in return, received what was vulgarly called a "snub," the Secretary of State having informed him that he saw no reason for approving the appointment, and that he must again signify Her Majesty's disapproval of it. He thought it was another reason that he should ask for inquiry, that a very able and deserving officer had suffered both in character and position through the slur cast upon him by the rejection of his nomination to the command of the Militia regiment in question. He wished, then, to know whether that disapprobation applied to Colonel Edgeumbe personally, or whether it was simply on account of the officers of the regiment being passed over? He could not help thinking there was some personal feeling mixed up in the opposition of the Secretary of State to the appointment—he could not account for his continued opposition on any other ground. While giving the Secretary of State every credit for capability, he could not understand how he could judge of the character of the officer of a Militia regiment 400 miles from London better than himself, who lived in the county, and knew all the circumstances. He presumed that the right hon. Gentleman acted either on the opinion of the Inspecting Officers, who simply went down for a few hours, and had no opportunity of knowing the general character of Militia officers, or on that of other persons quite unknown to himself. Who would be responsible for the regiment, now about to go into the field without a lieutenant-colonel, and commanded by an officer whom he held to be disqualified through want of popularity, and whom he therefore had declined to appoint? The Secretary for War, not thinking it right apparently to take his advice upon any matter whatever, had given him snub No. 2. It had been customary for the Secretary to write to the Lord Lieutenant, suggesting a date for the calling out of the Militia, and
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  asking him, if he had any objection to it, to name another day. A circular issued by the War Office last year—which he believed to be waste paper, as it had never been laid before Parliament—directed that the Reserve Forces should be under the joint authority of the General Officers commanding within the districts and of the Lords Lieutenant, who were to consult as to the time of calling out the Militia. On the General Officer of the Western District asking him (Lord Vivian) what time he proposed, he suggested, instead of the 1st of May, the usual date, the middle of June. His reason for this was the irregularity and want of discipline attending the billeting system, which induced him last year to suggest that the Militia should be quartered in the forts. The War Office objected that these would not give half space enough; whereupon he (Lord Vivian) suggested that the force should encamp under canvas in the vicinity of the forts; but to this it was replied that the medical officer objected to an encampment under canvas as early in the season as May. He, accordingly, suggested this year the middle of June. Major Trelawny, he understood, at first fell in with this proposal, but afterwards asked him to re-consider the point, on the ground that the date would interfere with the hay harvest. He (Lord Vivian), however, believed that this would be completed by that time, and saw no ground for altering his opinion. The result had been an intimation from the Secretary of State that the regiment would be called out on the 1st of May—which he could only regard as another snub. He could cite other grievances; but he did not choose to receive any more of these little courtesies, especially as he did not believe that in any other case had a Lord Lieutenant been so treated, the War Office having in several similar instances given away. He presumed the War Department would continue to struggle against him, and he should seek to struggle on against it, not being disposed to submit to the Secretary of State's dictation in a matter which he himself could better understand. He thought, besides, that the Secretary of State had exceeded his powers, for he maintained that his disapproval, not being given within the 14 days prescribed by the Act, was invalid, yet the right hon. Gentleman still persisted in setting

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  the appointment aside. He was anxious for an inquiry which would settle the meaning of the Act, and would enable Lieutenants of counties to know what their duties were.
  Moved, "That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the state of the law respecting the control of the Reserve Forces in the several counties of Great Britain."—(The Lord Vivian.)
  LORD NORTHBROOKsaid, he wished, in the first place, to explain that not the slightest disregard was intended towards the noble Lord in fixing the proper time for calling out the regiment in question. It had nothing whatever to do with the disputed appointment; and the existing arrangement had been made on the recommendation of the general officer of the district, by an officer subordinate to the Secretary of State, to whom it was not considered necessary to refer. There had been no intention of "snubbing" the noble Lord in the matter; and he thought it very inconvenient that every such detail should be brought before the Secretary of State. With regard to the main question, the noble Lord asked for an inquiry into the state of the law respecting the control of the Reserve forces in the several counties of Great Britain; but a Committee of their Lordships' House was hardly the proper tribunal to decide on the interpretation of an Act of Parliament. With respect to the statement of the noble Lord that, since he first brought the subject forward in their Lordships' House, he had received further information confirming his opinion with regard to the unfitness of Major Trelawny for the command of the regiment, the noble Lord had communicated to the Secretary of State no further information on the subject, though he should have brought under his notice any information likely to affect his decision. He would not again trouble their Lordships with the reasons which induced the Secretary of State to recommend Her Majesty to disapprove the appointment of Colonel Edgcumbe. As to what was stated about Major Trelawny not being popular, no Militia officer would be safe if his promotion were to be stopped on the allegation of unpopularity—a very vague term at best. Some of the best officers in the service had been "unpopular." The Duke of Wellington was, at one time, by no means popular; and, in the sister service,
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  Lord St. Vincent was by no means popular. Major Trelawny had received a regular military education at Sandhurst, where he had won both his commission and a certificate; he had served three years in the 36th Foot, and eight in the Inniskilling Dragoons, seven years as an Adjutant of Militia, and 10 years as Major of the Royal Cornwall Rangers. He was, moreover, in other respects, both as regarded his family and position as a magistrate and deputy Lieutenant of the county, undoubtedly, in every way, fit to be put in command of the regiment. Besides which, he ventured to say that the Reports of the Inspecting Officers spoke of him in terms not exceeded by the encomiums applied to any officers in the service; in fact, an officer on the Staff of Sir Augustus Spencer had authorized him to say that, in the opinion of that distinguished officer, he was one of the best officers he had ever seen in command of a battalion. He hardly supposed that the noble Lord desired to refer the question of the fitness of Major Trelawny to a Select Committee. The noble Lord had asked whether the disapprobation of Her Majesty of the appointment of Colonel Edgcumbe, communicated on different occasions, was, or was not, a personal disapprobation. He should have thought the noble Lord, who was contending for the rigid interpretation of an Act of Parliament, would have been careful not to ask such a question; because the Act of Parliament simply required the Crown to express disapproval of any appointment of which it did not approve, and the Act of Parliament had been strictly followed. As to the command of the regiment, he believed it devolved, in the absence of the colonel, upon the next senior officer; and this officer was Major Trelawny. He could assure the noble Lord that nothing could have been further from the wish of the Secretary of State than to cast a slur on anyone in the course which he had felt called on to pursue. The Secretary of State gave the noble Lord full credit for honesty of purpose, and he asked, in return, credit for equally upright motives in the performance of a painful duty. He assured the noble Lord that no private communications had passed between him and anyone else relative to this appointment, excepting the noble Lord himself and a near relative of Colonel

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  Edgcumbe. He hoped the noble Lord would not press his Motion.
  LORD LYTTELTONsaid, that as a Lord Lieutenant of many years' standing, he should like to know what the law really was. It was his experience that Lords Lieutenant, on making recommendations, always received notice in a few days in the form prescribed by the Act in case of approval or disapproval. They were authorized to take silence for consent, and if 14 days passed, without an intimation that the Crown disapproved a recommendation, the officer would have a right to the appointment, and would be entitled to complain if it was not gazetted. It was objected by the Government on the last occasion, that to write a simple letter of recommendation was not to "certify" within the meaning of the Act; but such a letter was surely an official intimation; and when was disapproval to be signified by the Secretary of State, if not after the receipt of it? Surely not after the appointment had been gazetted. The other night, when the matter was before their Lordships, a noble Duke (the Duke of Buccleuch) stated that he had always been in the habit of writing to the Secretary of State, stating the person whom he proposed to appoint, and if he heard nothing to the contrary, he concluded that the appointment was allowed. This was the course usually adopted, except that, as he (Lord Lyttelton) had said, Lords Lieutenant received express intimation of approval from the Secretary of State before completing the appointment. It seemed that under the new organization of our military forces, Lords Lieutenant were to have nothing more to do with these appointments—for which he did not in the least care; but during his short remaining term of official existence he should continue, unless otherwise advised, to write letters recommending certain persons, and if no disapproval were signified within 14 days he should proceed to gazette the appointments; this being not merely what he was empowered, but required by the Act to do. If this were not so, he should be glad to be informed; and unless some other mode of ascertainment was suggested, he should be glad if the Committee were granted.
  EARL GREYsaid, he hoped the noble Lord would not press his Motion, for a Committee, as pointed out by the noble
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  Under Secretary (Lord Northbrook), could not give an authoritative construction of an Act which, as was evidenced by the discussion the other evening, was not very well laid down or very clear. On the other hand, it was quite clear what the true interpretation of the Act was in accordance with the spirit of our Constitution, for whatever might be the technical meaning of the section, it was certainly the intention of Parliament that the Lords Lieutenant should act under the direction of the Crown in these matters. And it was not only the right of the Crown to exercise a complete control over its Lieutenants; it was also armed with ample authority for the purpose. The Lords Lieutenant held office during pleasure, and if they declined to submit to the decision of the Crown, signified to them by the proper authority, the Secretary of State would have only to inform them that Her Majesty had no further need of their services. That was the remedy, in the event of a difference of opinion arising, which ought not to be the case, for, whatever the technical construction of the Act, he should feel it his duty—and he thought that the noble Lord, on reflection, would see the matter in the same light—to act under the express direction of the Crown, signified by a responsible Minister. While, however, fully admitting the power of the Crown and the duty of Lords Lieutenant to obey the commands of the Sovereign, he admitted the full right of any Member of the Legislature to question the discretion with which Her Majesty had been advised to exercise the power committed to her. If any noble Lord should think there had been something wrong in the manner in which an appointment had been checked, it was open to him—and it was open to any Member of the other House—to move an Address to the Crown praying the withdrawal of her disapproval. That seemed to him the proper and formal way of raising the question.
  THE DUKE OF RICHMOND: My Lords, I regret to find myself differing entirely from the noble Earl who has just sat down (Earl Grey), and upon a point in reference to which his authority is so valuable. The noble Earl states that the proper course on an occasion like the present—and I think he implies that it is the only constitutional course—is, that an humble Address should be

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  presented to Her Majesty begging that she will withdraw her disapprobation of the appointment. Now, my Lords, I venture to think that would be begging1 the whole question; because the point raised by the noble Lord opposite (Lord Vivian) will have no effect whatever if the disapprobation of the Crown be signified within the proper time. And when the noble Earl says that the noble Lord ought to move an humble Address to the Crown, he is implying that which has not been admitted, even for a moment, in the course of the former or the present discussion—namely, that the Secretary of War has acted according to the powers as contained within the four corners of the Act of Parliament. It appears to me that the silence of the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack on this occasion affords a strong ground for inducing your Lordships to appoint a Committee to investigate the question before the House; for I cannot but think that during the time which has elapsed since the former discussion took place, the noble and learned Lord must have been so occupied as not to have looked again into the various Acts of Parliament bearing upon this question.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORintimated that he had done so.
  THE DUKE OF RICHMOND: I am very glad to hear it; and I can only, therefore, hope that, having informed himself as to the Acts which have been expressly quoted on this subject, the noble and learned Lord considers that this is not the proper place for discussing the question, and that we could better discuss it in Committee of your Lordships' House. The noble Lord the Under Secretary for War (Lord Northbrook) says that a Committee of this House is not a competent tribunal to decide a disputed interpretation of a law. But this is a very simple matter. If your Lordships will examine the Act of George III. you will at once see that its requirements have not been complied with in this case. The intimation given by the noble Lord (Lord Vivian) was clearly the legitimate mode of announcing the appointment, for in the very same letter another gentleman was recommended to the command of a company, and that appointment has been gazetted. I will not go into the question whether Major Trelawny was popular or unpopular in the view of the Government; whether he
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  was educated at Sandhurst; whether he was brought up in the Army, or whether the experience he obtained in the cavalry was likely to make him a good field officer of infantry; for with these questions the Secretary for War, or the Lord Lieutenant, are much more competent to deal than I am; but I may remind my noble Friend the Under Secretary that he has not answered one point put by the noble Lord opposite—whether the objection the Secretary for War made was personal as regards the fitness or unfitness of Colonel Edgcumbe for the command of the regiment, or whether he considered that Colonel Edgcumbe should not be appointed because the Major ought not to be passed over? That is a question to which it is very easy to give an answer; it is a question to which we have a right to expect a distinct answer, about which there can be no mistake whatever. I have not the honour myself of holding the commission of Lord Lieutenant, therefore I may be supposed to speak purely from disinterested motives, and on public grounds alone; and I do say that there is much ground for complaining that the Lords Lieutenant of counties should be treated in the manner which, according to the noble Lord's (Lord Northbrook's) own showing, the Lord Lieutenant of Cornwall has been treated. We have always been taught to look up to the position of Lord Lieutenant of a county. He holds a high position in his county—he represents, if I may say so, the Sovereign, and is frequently expected to convene, and generally to preside over, meetings of the county in regard to any public matters. What do we find is the conduct of the War Department? According to the Instructions issued by the Secretary for War under the Act of 1856, the Lord Lieutenant is to consult with the general commanding the district as to the times at which the Militia shall be called out. The noble Lord opposite, as Lord Lieutenant, considered that it would be much better to call them out in the summer, than to billet them in towns at the earlier period of the year; and he conveyed this view to the general commanding the district, with whom, according to the Order issued by the Secretary for War, he was to put himself in communication. The first thing the noble Lord ascertained was, that the arrangements made were entirely in opposition to the view he had

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  expressed; and now the answer he receives, by way of consolation, is that the subject of the recommendation of the Lord Lieutenant was considered to be of such small importance that it was looked upon as a mere matter of detail to be dealt with by a subordinate in the War Department; that, in point of fact, the opinion of the Secretary for War was not given at all. Surely that is not the proper manner in which Lords Lieutenant of counties ought to be treated by a public Department like that of the War Office. We all know with regard to the billeting of the Militia in towns that the system is not healthful for the morals of the men, and that it is a system which ought to be avoided as much as possible. Yet this opinion, expressed by a Lord Lieutenant, was dealt with by a subordinate, and not by the Secretary for War. There is a somewhat extraordinary coincidence connected with this which I ought to mention—if, indeed, it really is a coincidence—the time selected for calling out the Militia, as decided by the subordinate in the War Office, happens to be exactly that recommended by the major of the regiment, whose opinion ought not to have prevailed in the matter at all, because the major is not the person indicated in the rules who should make a recommendation. Under these circumstances, I quite agree with the noble Lord opposite that there is a grievance of which he has every right to complain; and I venture to hope that the Lords Lieutenant of this country will not, in future, be treated by the Secretary for War in the way the Lord Lieutenant of Cornwall has been treated on the present occasion.
  EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, I cannot help thinking that the question before the House, so clearly stated by the noble Earl on the cross Bench (Earl Grey), has been somewhat mystified by what has fallen from the noble Duke opposite. The question is—
  "To move that a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the state of the law repecting the control of the Reserve Forces in the several counties of Great Britain."
  In dealing with this question, it is quite true the noble Duke (the Duke of Richmond) has given his own construction of the law—and I have no doubt his opinion upon it is as good as that of any other layman; but the whole question is one
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  which arises purely from the ill-drawing of the Act of Parliament, which is differently interpreted by two of the most eminent Law Lords in this House; and I think it is quite impossible that, in opposition to the opinion stated by the noble Earl (Earl Grey), your Lordships should refer to a Committee of the House a question of the legal construction of an Act of Parliament. The noble Duke has complained of the manner in which the Lord Lieutenant of Cornwall has been dealt with by the Secretary for War. For my own part, I do not think, after hearing the statement of the Under Secretary, that the Secretary for War could have adopted a different course from that which he has pursued, under the circumstances of the case. Some years ago a Commission was appointed, of which one of the most eminent Members was the noble Duke's Father, who perhaps took a more than usually active part in performing the duties of Lord Lieutenant—especially with regard to questions affecting the Militia and Reserve forces; and it was on his suggestion that the Commission made the recommendation which they did, to the effect that promotion, as a general rule, should be by seniority; and that in the event of any proposed deviation from this principle, it should be made known to the War Department, with a statement of the reasons for the deviation. A circular to the same effect was issued by Mr. Sidney Herbert. If that circular meant anything, it meant that the Secretary for War was bound to exercise his discretionary judgment upon the reasons so submitted to him. It has been objected that this circular was not a legal document; but I think the objection entirely fails, since it ignores the Secretary for War as an Adviser of Her Majesty, and as the head of the Executive Department, dealing with the matters committed to it. The noble Duke then goes on to encourage the noble Lord to consider it a snub that his recommendation had not been followed with regard to the particular time at which the Militia should be called out. The answer which the noble Lord (Lord Northbrook) gave, as I understand him, was an answer to the charge the noble Lord (Lord Vivian) brought against Mr. Cardwell, that the right hon. Gentleman had shown animus towards him, and my noble Friend has properly answered that no animus existed

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  in the case at all on the part of Mr. Cardwell. The noble Duke then regards it as an intolerable slight upon the Lords Lieutenant that this case should not have been determined immediately by the Secretary for War himself. I think your Lordships will readily admit that in a large Office, where there is much red tape and mere matter of detail, it is impossible that the Secretary for War can himself personally attend to every matter appertaining to the Department without neglecting the essential duties attaching to him as a Minister. I think that the noble Duke, in his anxiety to do justice to the position of Lords Lieutenant, has, in some degree, confounded the duties which attached to them as the heads of the counties with those which properly belong to another class of functionaries—the high sheriffs. At the same time, I do not in the least question the high honour and position of Lords Lieutenant; and I am quite sure that the more anxious they may be to give example to those placed under their superintendence, the more anxious they must be to act in perfect accordance with the Crown, when properly advised by those who are bound to advise them. I certainly do enter my strong protest against your Lordships entertaining this Motion, which I really think is absolutely without precedent, being a Motion to refer to your Lordships' Committee a discussion between two of the Law Lords as to what is the real construction of an Act of Parliament.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I do not think it worth your Lordships' while to refer this legal point to a Committee. The course that has been adopted in the case of the Lord Lieutenant of Cornwall is so manifestly wrong, that I think it would be a work of supererogation for a Committee to inquire into the matter. To ask a Committee to investigate the subject would be practically to ask them to determine whether a fortnight was a month, and that, I think, is hardly a proper subject to submit to the meditation of a Committee. But the question which has given rise to the question now before us, and to a debate which has already taken place, appears to me to throw considerable light upon the probable effect of the legislation on military affairs with which we are threatened. Two cases have been brought forward—two cases of "snubbing," to use the strong and
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  just vernacular of the noble Lord—for the consideration of the House. With regard to the first case, we have heard that under the present state of things the control of military affairs is so intensely centralized, that when a Lord Lieutenant brings a certain matter relating to county policy and morality under the notice of the Secretary for War, so heavy is the business of his Department that the Minister of the Crown finds it impossible to attend to the matter personally, and the Lord Lieutenant is left to be snubbed by any underling. That appears to me to be treatment most unworthy of the dignity and position of a Lord Lieutenant. I do not blame the Minister of the Crown in this case, because I believe he knew nothing of the affair—neither do I blame the Office; but I ask your Lordships to note the results of that centralization into which we are rushing. It is the inevitable result of placing so much work upon one responsible Minister of the Crown that he had more to do than he can personally accomplish, and the result is that the duty is transferred to persons who are unknown, and who have no responsibility. The second snub which has been put upon the noble Lord is a rather awkward circumstance, because the neglect to lay the matter before the Secretary of State succeeded in point of time the displeasure of the War Office which the Lord Lieutenant had been unfortunate enough to incur, which rather gave ground for the suspicion that if anyone was bold enough to challenge the decision of the War Office, or so unfortunate as to incur the displeasure of that mysterious tribunal, he would find his access to the Secretary of State not so easy as before. But there is a much more serious question at the bottom of this matter. Why are these two officers passed over? Is it true that one of these officers is a Member of Parliament and that the other is not?
  EARL GRANVILLE: That is not the case.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I was informed that such was the fact. However, I do not stand up for the purpose of making personal imputations upon anyone. My object is to point out the enormous danger that is likely to result from the unrestrained system of selection which it seems to be the intention of Her Majesty's Government

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  to introduce. If such a system be adopted, your statesmen may be as pure and as free from party bias as possible; but, as long as officers of the Army are Members of Parliament, or are selected from the class from which Members of Parliament come, and their interests have to be decided upon by the Secretary of State, so long will cases of this kind crop up, and your whole military administration will be tainted with suspicion. I entirely agree with the noble Lord that Colonel Edgcumbe has been hardly treated in this matter, and also that the Lord Lieutenant has been hardly treated; but what is proved by this case is the utter incapacity of our military system to bear either a great increase of centralization, or to allow the invidious and onerous duties of unrestrained selection to be placed in the hands of a political officer.
  THE EARL OF DALHOUSIEsaid, he was of opinion that the dignity of the Lords Lieutenant of counties had been somewhat neglected in the present case. He held it to be the law that the whole responsibility for the well-being of a Militia regiment rested mainly with the Lord Lieutenant of the particular county to which it belonged; and in accordance with that responsibility the noble Lord the Lieutenant for the county of Cornwall had intimated to the War Office his recommendation of the appointment of a certain officer to the lieutenant-colonelcy of the Royal Cornish Rangers. What struck him as being somewhat singular in the case was, that before communicating with the War Office his noble Friend informed Major Trelawny that it was his intention to make a recommendation, the effect of which would be to pass him over, and that Major Trelawny entirely approved of that course on account of his want of knowledge of the new drill, that he considered the appointment of Colonel Edgcumbe to be a good one, and that had he himself been appointed he would have been as a square block in a round hole. After that Major Trelawny wrote to the War Office, stating he was about to be passed over—which seemed to be playing a double game. Colonel Edgcumbe, it appeared, in anticipation of being appointed to the command, had been induced to resign his commission in the Grenadier Guards; and no doubt, with his full knowledge of all the new
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  military duties required of him, he would have been a most valuable commander of any Militia regiment; but he afterwards received an intimation that the recommendation which the Lord Lieutenant believed had been accepted by the Crown had, for reasons which were not given, not been approved by the Crown. That was not the way to enable a Lord Lieutenant to maintain his position in his county; and from what had appeared, the noble Lord's recommendations had been set aside without any reason assigned, and the command of the regiment allowed to fall into the hands of an officer who acknowledged himself incompetent to discharge the duties. How could a Lord Lieutenant who could not be trusted to appoint an officer to the command of a regiment be fit to take charge of the affairs of a county? The question of popularity was one that never ought to have mentioned, and it was one that ought not to weigh in considering the qualifications of an officer. It would be a dangerous thing either to select officers to command regiments, or to reject them on account of their popularity or unpopularity. The simple question ought to be, who was the best man to command a regiment? The danger of principle of selection had been exemplified in this case; and what alarmed him was, that when the principle came to be carried out it would often be challenged, and would have to be argued out in Parliament. But he did not think the Motion would have any effect in settling the construction of the Act; and, under the circumstances, he would ask his noble Friend to be content with the discussion, and not press his Motion to a Division.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: I was certainly surprised to hear the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) state his intention of supporting the Motion, on the ground that the Government had acted in this matter on the principle of what he was pleased to term unrestrained selection. He has overlooked that the Secretary of State—whether he has acted rightly or wrongly—has stood up for seniority, and therefore shown that he is not likely to exercise in an unrestrained manner the principle of selection. He must have forgotten that in the present case it is the Lord Lieutenant who has adopted the principle of

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  unrestrained selection, while the Secretary for War has strictly followed the principle of seniority. The noble Marquess also stated that the Lord Lieutenant had received more than one "snub;" that he had been turned over to a subordinate officer of the War Department, and that the matter of the calling out of the Militia regiment had been decided by an underling. But who is this "underling" who signed this appointment? Why, he is the Inspector General of the Militia. And I must ask the House whether it is possible for the War Office administration to be properly conducted, if it is to be said that a matter of this kind is not to be decided by a general officer, who, in all probability, is a much more competent person to determine such a question than the Secretary for War himself would be. Quite apart from this particular case, the whole discussion is a very apt illustration of the necessity for the military reforms which have been proposed by the Government. If the country has made up its mind upon one thing more than another, it is that our Army organization should be made practical and real. Much as I respect Lords Lieutenant and the Militia service, and the laudable desire of country gentlemen to belong to that force, and that they should be treated with respect by the Government, it is far more important that the Militia should be made real regiments, and form part of the general organization of the Army, and not be regarded as a kind of civilian portion of the Army. If it is so regarded, it is impossible for the Secretary of State for War not to take the opinion of competent general officers and officers commanding the districts, in preference to the recommendations of Lords Lieutenant, and as a part of the new system we are about to introduce, Militia regiments to be more efficient must be absolutely more and more under the control of the Secretary of State for War and the officers of the Army. As regards the particular case which has arisen in the county of Cornwall I do not wish to say anything, for enough has been said about it already; but, however much the unfortunate position in which Colonel Edgcumbe has been placed may be regretted, I cannot but think that the county of Cornwall has not been ill-treated in having Major Trelawny placed in command of this ex-
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  cellent regiment. I hope your Lordships will not agree to the appointment of the Committee.
  THE EARL OF MOUNT EDGCUMBEsaid, that some remarks which fell from his noble Friend the Under Secretary for War in a former debate would lead to the impression that Colonel Edgcumbe had resigned his commission in the Guards with the full knowledge that his appointment to the Royal Cornwall Rangers was extremely uncertain, in consequence of the claims of another officer having been put forward. The noble Lord referred to a warning which he had conveyed through him (the Earl of Mount Edgcumbe); but he was not at the time aware that the conversation to which he alluded was held more than a fortnight after Colonel Edgcumbe's resignation had been sent in. In point of fact, at the time Colonel Edgcumbe resigned, he had not the slightest reason for apprehending that the power of veto would be exercised against his appointment, nor was it until it was too late to recall the step he had taken that he had any intimation whatever of Major Trelawny's intention to protest. Referring to a remark that had fallen from the noble Earl on the cross Benches (the Earl of Dalhousie), he felt sure that Major Trelawny was not a man capable of any double dealing, although it was to be regretted that the letter referred to was not more explicit.
  EARL COWPERsaid, he should be sorry if it was thought that all Lords Lieutenant were opposed to the proposed change as regarded the Militia, for their position in that respect certainly was not a very comfortable one. For himself, his belief was, that when the new system was established by which the Reserve forces of the different military divisions of the country were to be brigaded and drilled from time to time with the Regular troops, the most perfect machinery would exist for finding out what officers were good and what were not, so that good men could be put in command. That was a very difficult matter now. What could the Lord Lieutenant of the county know in regard to the discipline of a regiment, except from the officers in command, and what he might gather from his own observation and from the general feeling of the country? He did not think any of these were a good means of forming a

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  judgment. He was himself the Lord Lieutenant of a small county, and although, if a vacancy occurred in the command of the Militia there to-morrow, he might not experience a great difficulty in recommending an officer to fill it, because the officer who was second in command was a good man, yet he could well understand that in such cases a Lord Lieutenant might have great difficulty in finding out who was the best man; and at present, even after that difficulty should have been overcome, and the Lord Lieutenant had had the misfortune of quarrelling with many people in consequence of his selection, his decision might be thrown over—he did not say wrongly—by the War Office. Surely, if after all the trouble he had taken, the Lord Lieutenant was not certain that his recommendation would be attended to, the sooner that state of things was put an end to the better. The discussion of that evening would have convinced him, if he had not been convinced before, that the Lord Lieutenant would be in a more pleasant position, and the service of the country be better carried on under the proposed new system than was the case at present. He had no desire to find fault with the present authorities of the War Office; but he was afraid that anybody who had anything to do with that Department had occasion sometimes to complain that it allowed his letters to remain unanswered.
  THE DUKE OF NORTHUMBERLANDsaid, that the position of the Lords Lieutenant, in regard to the appointment of Militia officers, appeared not to be understood by many noble Lords. The reason why the Lord Lieutenant had vested in him the appointment of these officers, subject to the approval of the War Office, was that he was cognizant of the persons in his county who were best fitted for such positions, which the authorities of the War Office could not be supposed to be. It must be recollected that hitherto the Militia had been a voluntary force; that it had belonged to the county, had been raised in the county, and was officered by gentlemen of the county, inasmuch as it was supposed that the gentlemen of the county had more influence in obtaining men to fill the ranks than any other class of persons. It would seem that now, however; if he rightly understood the remarks of the noble Earl (the Earl of
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  Kimberley), the Lord Lieutenant was to be superseded altogether; that he was not to be consulted in any way, not only as to officering the Militia, but even as to the best and most suitable time and place for assembling the men for training—matters which, in the case of a local force, depended less on military considerations than on the season for taking the men from their ordinary labour and occupations with the least inconvenience to them. If, therefore, those questions were to be taken out of the hands of the Lord Lieutenant, who was most acquainted with them, and transferred to the Inspector General of Militia, who knew nothing about them, very great injury would be done to the Militia itself. Manifestly, the first object they should have in view was to fill the ranks of the regiments, and as long as they maintained a local force and officered it from the county, and as long as the leading persons in the county, or any person in the county, took an interest in that force, so long the Lord Lieutenant ought to have a voice in all questions that concerned it.
  On Question? Resolved in the Negative.

ARMY—MILITARY EDUCATION.

  ADDRESS FOR RETURNS.
  LORD STRATHNAIRN, who had given Notice to move an Address for Returns respecting Garrison Instructors, and for Copies of Instructions on the Military Education of Officers, issued consequent to the Report of the Commissioners, said—My Lords, the interests of the country are so intimately concerned in the unfortunate state of affairs on the Continent, and the country relies so much for the protection of its rights and position on the efficiency of the Army in the art of war, that I consider it my duty to bring to your Lordships' notice, with the view to their amendment, serious deficiencies in our military training and education, and especially in its first requisite, strategy; and yet it is strategy, my Lords, which, in an incredibly short time, has made Prussia mistress of the destinies of France, as 65 years ago it placed Prussia and her independence at the mercy of France. We ought not to be blind to the lessons which recent Continental events are so well fitted to teach. We ourselves have had warnings to

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  which we ought not to turn a deaf ear; protracted and not always successful operations in our Colonies against uncivilized insurgents, reverses which checkered brilliant successes in the Crimea, and threw a shade over our imperishable recollections of the Peninsula and Flanders, and an Empire all but lost in India. Before going further, I will explain the nature of the deficiencies in our training for war. They arise from our Regulation Book of Instruction, which teaches the mechanism of movements, but not their strategical object or adaptation to the varied features of ground for troops; they, therefore, are taught peace, not service movements; they move, but do not manœuvre. I am fully alive to the importance of skilfully executed movements—the best devised plans of strategy have often been spoilt by faulty movements. The mistake is to teach movements, but to omit their object. They should be inseparable. In the examination of officers for promotion, the same error is committed. Since I held the command of a Bombay division, in 1857, to the end of my command in Ireland, I have never ceased, in Reports to my superiors and instructions to those under my command, to correct this misprision of the first element of an Army's education. I stated this also fully, and other shortcomings, to the Commission on Military Education, as well as their remedy, and I am glad to see, in a new Book of Instruction of October last, that some of them, have been adopted; but these improvements are few and partial, and they omit the great desideratum in the instruction of young officers and soldiers of combining drill from its first stages with reason and object, so that, the mind once directed in the right way, an ordinary capacity may gradually become a good service officer, and a genius may wing his flight to elevations now, unfortunately, tenanted only by Count Moltke and his strategical Staff. All those simple and important manœuvres which figured in the late Prussian successes are also omitted in the new Book. The last of my thoughts in bringing this Motion before your Lordships is to make the smallest pretension to superior capacity; I do so under the sense of duty in critical times, which tells me that if a British Army be obliged to take the field, it should do so second to none in fitness for war. If, however, I do
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  not lay claim to superior capacity, I do lay claim to some experience in two matters which lie at the roots of this question—strategy, and the state of instruction in the Army. As regards the latter, it has fallen to my lot to have commanded, or to have inspected, nearly every battery and regiment in Her Majesty's service. I conduct my inspections in a manner which makes my Staff and myself personally acquainted with the nature and condition of the instruction imparted in almost every regiment in the service. The remarks, favourable or otherwise, are sent to commanding officers, and copies of them kept as records in the Adjutant General's office. The experience I have thus acquired enables me to say that, both as regards officers and men, our Army has almost none of that kind of instruction on which I set a high value. As regards strategy, peculiar circumstances made me acquainted with it from my earliest days. My father was Her Majesty's Envoy at Berlin, where I had a military education, of which strategy was the chief element. In those days Prussia was in the full tide of her noble and patriotic efforts to retrieve the disasters which a mistaken art of war had entailed on her, and the wrongs which it had done in 1806 to her gallant Army and a resolute people. It is a singular coincidence that mistaken training should, but in a more aggravated, form, have been the same error as our own at present—peace, but not service movements. The map and the tactics of Frederick the Great had been replaced by the plummet and the pace-stick. But in my days there was a re-action, and everything in Prussia was strategy. The atmosphere was strategical, and I imbibed some of its influences. In the Crimea I witnessed the results of good or mistaken strategy; and in India, if I had not been assisted by troops of whom Lords Canning and Elphinstone said, in telegrams and general orders—"that they had marched from Bombay to the Jumna and Gwalior, from success to success, without a check, under hardships heroically borne, although seldom endured even in India," and if I had not invariably had recourse to strategical precautions and manœuvres, I could not have overcome the difficulties of overwhelming numbers which cut off my base as I advanced, of an unknown country, and a line of

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  operations some 700 or 800 miles long, defended by forts. In 15 actions and sieges I was obliged to reconnoitre night and day, to use turning movements, feints to cover a real attack, concentration of fire on a weak or given point, and so forth, none of which are in our old or new Book. The result of my twofold experience has taught me that, as regards officers and men, the English Army is without equal. They are a rare combination of ardour when it is required, and of steadfastness when it is necessary; but, in consequence of the want of strategical education, they are so deficient in strategical knowledge that if, unfortunately, we were involved in war, the odds would be in dangerous proportion against them in the field. I, of course, except officers of superior talents, with strategical instincts, and who have had other means of instruction. Nor would it be fair to place the responsibility of our system on present proper names or Governments. It dates from our forefathers, and, in fact, it has its origin in our insular position, habits, and distaste for preparations for Continental wars. I beg your Lordships' indulgence while I adduce a few illustrations of the want of strategical education of a simple description from the first to the last pages of the Book. In consequence of no object being assigned, the young officer or recruit is not acquainted with the reason of the numerous points and parries in the bayonet exercise, nor does he learn that part of it which makes him more than a match for cavalry. He is equally untaught as to the advantage of early or the danger of delayed fire. As regards evolutions of a regiment, when I ask an officer the object of a change of front, as a rule he assigns any but the service one, and I have to explain to him that the service object is to oppose an attack on his weakest point—his flank, or vice versâ. He is equally uninformed as to the firing which should cover the movement, and I show him that early and successive fire from the company of formation will check the enemy and cover the formation, while delayed fire may cause its destruction. A first-rate Artillery officer of long standing performed a diagonal change of front on the two centre guns of his brigade, but delayed his fire till the flank guns were in the new alignment. I told him the mechanism of the
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  movement was perfect, but that I could not say as much of its strategy; that if he had opened fire from his guns of formation, he might have killed a general or thrown his assailant into confusion, as well as covered his defenceless guns, throwing up to and retiring into the new aligument. And, my Lords, when we hear of batteries captured and formations cut up by cavalry, it is only too often caused by delayed fire. And yet this simple instruction and these words, "early and delayed fire," are not in the book. On another occasion, for the sake of practice, I requested an officer of 40 years' standing, commanding a regiment during the Fenian period in Ireland, when constant depositions and intercepted letters showed intentions to attack barracks, blow up their garrisons, and burn them with Greek fire, to defend his barracks against an attack by the road. Two loopholed defences, with banquette, gave a cross fire on the road. The officer threw his battalion into order—the skirmishers with their face against a wall 20 feet high, with no means of defence—but did not place a man in the loopholed defences. As regards field days and movements of large bodies in India and Ireland, there was no system of instruction or camps of instruction in India or in Ireland. The general officer stationed at the Curragh informed me that he had never heard of a second line; and yet an order of battle for attack or defence without a second line is forbidden by every principle of war. It invites a disaster. The field days were characterized by constant changes of front at too large an angle against a supposed enemy, so constant that no power of locomotion could have enabled an enemy to change to such distant positions—flanks were exposed; and as there was no combination between the three arms, collisions and firing into each other ensued. All arms, individually and collectively, frequently took up positions on the top of a height or rising ground, which exposed them, instead of in the rear of it, which would have covered them. And if in former days defeat often, and loss of life always, followed on neglect of cover, or of turning movements, use of ground is now indispensable in these days of improved arms. In England I have seen field days in which the same defects occurred; and we all read in the newspapers an account of

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  a remarkable field day at Wimbledon Common last year, written by a noble Lord commanding a brigade, whose better judgment appears to have been overruled, of which I will say no more than that it was not a representation but a ridicule of the realities of war—and that, too, at a time when, on account of events in Europe, a display of such military inefficiency was to be regretted. It is apposite to observe here that the instruction of the Militia and Volunteers is the same as that of the Army. I now beg to adduce a few service examples of the unfavourable results of mistaken military education in the Crimea and India. As regards the Crimea, I do not wish to ring the changes on Balaklava. I will merely observe that, although nothing could be greater than the devoted gallantry of the troops, yet that the charge with a brigade of cavalry, with the Feduchine Heights with artillery and riflemen on their left line, and a masked battery to their right front, a large force of all arms in front, was a thing never heard of before, and could only end in the loss of most valuable life. Then, on account of neglect of ground and other rules for outposts, pickets and guards of trenches were only too often surprised and driven in. But in justice to a noble Earl (the Earl of Lucan) I am happy to say that I was told by very competent authority that he always evinced both zeal and ability, with the best results, in placing his outposts and sentries. In-kermann, though a great victory, was a surprise, which rendered a retirement necessary in the first instance and caused loss of life. In October, 1855, the day of the general and final attack on Sebastopol, Marshal Pelissier sent me to tell the English Commander-in-Chief that the French had taken the Malakhoff. General Simpson requested me to tell the French Commander-in-Chief that his troops had been unable to take the Redan. Now, my Lords, the cause of this failure was an attack in one line without a second line in support. As regards India, the sieges of Delhi and Lucknow, two main operations against the insurgents, were both caused by misprision of strategy. If the commanders at military stations had by simple strategical arrangements prevented mutinous garrisons from leaving their stations, they would not have formed a nucleus at Delhi. The siege of Lucknow was ushered in by the defeat
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  of its garrison at the strong village of Chiwhut, one march from Lucknow, where they went to attack a large force of mutinous regiments. In disregard of strategical foresight, the left flank of the English troops was posted on the village, which was neither occupied nor watched. Fatal volleys at close range into the English left were the first intimation of the dangerous flank attack. It was followed by a retreat to Lucknow, with a loss of artillery and the arrival of the enemy before the city as besiegers. An advance in light infantry order against a fort held by a few mutineers, without reconnoitering or a turning movement, was the cause of the check of one of the finest brigades of all arms that ever took the field in India, with a large loss, including that of a general officer of the highest promise. I now beg, my Lords, to close my statement of deficiencies in our education and training for war, its causes, and results. I regret the necessity which has compelled me to notice military failings; but I should have been guilty not only of false and culpable delicacy, but of the greatest dereliction of duty of which an officer can be capable if I had silenced convictions which told me British troops had already sustained reverses, in consequence of mistaken training; and that for the same reason they would certainly encounter fresh—perhaps irretrievable—disasters were they to take the field against an Army perfected in the art of war: more especially when in the last few months we have witnessed one of the best and most successful armies in the world fall in collapse, not from any want of their often proved gallantry, of which I have on so many occasions been witness, but from a neglected art of war. I think that when vast and cardinal changes are announced which point to a great evil, although that evil is not known by bad results, it may be an advantage to the Government and Parliament that they have now before them a plain statement of facts, proving the existence of our military shortcoming; and I venture to think that when your Lordships have heard the simple remedies which I suggested to the Commission on Military Education, you will agree that they are as simple as the evil is palpable. I venture to think that another advantage of my statement is that it removes the impression which exists in some quarters that the blame

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  of reverses I have alluded to attach to officers. The statement places the saddle on the right horse. A faulty education is alone to blame.
  Moved that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for, Returns of the number and statements of service of garrison instructors, and copies of instructions given to them for the execution of their duties by the Secretary of State for War, as well as copies of any instructions given by him or of communications made by the Royal Commission on the military education of officers of Her Majesty's army consequent on the Commissioners' report on that subject.—(The Lord Strathnairn.)
  LORD NORTHBROOKsaid, he would gladly admit that not only had the noble and gallant Lord who had just sat down (Lord Strathnairn) earned a high reputation by his distinguished services in the field, but also by the thoroughness with which he had performed the less conspicuous duty of inspection of the troops in peace. The subject the noble and gallant Lord had brought under their Lordships' notice was one of the highest importance, and any information which the Government could furnish would be readily given. There would, therefore, be no objection to furnishing the Returns for which the Motion had been made. The whole of this subject was referred, several years ago, to a Royal Commission, of which he had himself the honour of being a Member, and which had the advantage of receiving the evidence of the noble and gallant Lord. The general result of the inquiries of the Royal Commission with respect to the state of the education of our officers entirely confirmed the statement which his noble and gallant Friend had made that evening. Those inquiries showed that great deficiencies existed in almost every branch of military education; and that no fault could rest upon our officers for not acquiring an education for which no adequate provision had been made. But the subject would again come before their Lordships, when the measure now before the other House was before them, when the whole subject might be fully discussed. Meanwhile, he was happy to inform their Lordships that considerable progress had been made in the education of officers after they had joined the service. Since the Report of the Commission, almost all the different branches of education in the Army had been dealt
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  with by the Secretary of State. The Commission recommended, among other things, that officers should be appointed qualified to instruct other officers in certain points described in the General Order issued by the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, in August, 1870. Those officers—the garrison instructors—had now been at work some time, and the Report which had been made at the close of last year was most favourable to the progress of the system. The Report showed that there had been the greatest desire evinced, not only by the junior officers, but by officers of long standing in the Army, to take advantage of the means of instruction furnished them; and that their number was steadily increasing. The number of officers at present receiving instruction at the hands of the garrison instructors was between 300 and 400, and quite recently the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief had issued an order permitting a certain number of officers of each regiment to be excused regimental duty while attending the instruction of the garrison instructor. He trusted, therefore, it would be evident to their Lordships that the subject had not been lost sight of. He felt quite sure that there was no one connected with the administration of the military affairs in this country—no one even who had paid any attention to the events which had recently occurred on the Continent of Europe—who did not feel with the noble and gallant Lord who had just addressed the House, and who was not desirous that the officers of the British Army should have an opportunity of acquiring such a thorough knowledge of their profession as that which was possessed by the officers of the Prussian Army; for nothing had been more remarkable throughout the late war than the superior qualities and training of the Prussian officers. In giving these Papers, he had only to add that the Secretary of State for War was fully alive to the importance of the subject, and that his attention was steadily directed to the importance of affording every facility to officers of the Army for acquiring a complete military education.
  THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE: My Lords, I should be sorry to detain the House if I did not feel called upon to make one or two observations upon the Motion which has been brought for-

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  ward by my noble and gallant Friend (Lord Strathnairn). I hope the House will distinctly understand that this subject of military education has been under consideration for a long period; that it is not now discussed for the first time, but has been under consideration ever since I took the position which I have the honour to hold. And my noble and gallant Friend, I trust, will admit, that during the period which I have held that position, and also during the tenure of my predecessors, alterations have by degrees been introduced into the Army system, all tending in the direction which has of late exhibited itself in such a marked degree in the Continental armies. But your Lordships must bear in mind that military questions in former days were not considered of that interest and importance which now attach to them in the eyes of this country, and that it was a matter of very great difficulty to get the public to appreciate the importance of technical education and other qualifications which tend to make a good officer. I trust the period has now arrived when these matters will be viewed in a different spirit; indeed, there is reason to believe that such will be the case from the fact that they have been taken up so warmly and energetically by the country. I am as convinced, as I am of the fact that I am now addressing your Lordships, that every officer of the Army is as desirous and anxious to advance this question of military education as either my noble and gallant Friend or myself. But, in truth, the officers of the British Army are exposed to enormous difficulties. We have never been allowed to collect large bodies of troops together, as is constantly done upon the Continent; and though theory may be very well in its way, it is valueless unless combined with opportunities for practice. And let me fairly tell your Lordships that it is much more difficult in this country to carry out combined movements of troops, such as take place upon the Continent, than your Lordships generally may imagine. I have frequently attended reviews abroad, and I can assure your Lordships that I was surprised to see the injury that is done without the slightest consideration, the fields passed over and the property destroyed, in a manner that would never for an instant be tolerated at home. If we are really to apply to this country the
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  practice of foreign nations, we must be prepared for something of the same sort—something which will entail a very considerable outlay; for you cannot expect that a landed proprietor, great or small, will submit to all these inconveniences without receiving large compensation. I know that even upon the Continent the cost attending these concentrations is very considerable. If, however, the country is prepared to engage in that sort of expenditure, I shall be only too glad, militarily, that we should have the benefit of availing ourselves of the opportunities thus afforded. There may certainly be tracts of land in this country—and I hope they will be found—where the concentration of bodies of troops will be possible: possibly upon Crown lands, which in ancient days were forests, and are still unenclosed, such combinations may be practicable, But I am still of opinion that, with every desire to carry out the Continental principle, it will be very difficult to do so upon a large scale in this country. At the same time, I am fully justified in stating, after what my noble and gallant Friend has just said, that it is the intention and desire of the Government to carry out this year some concentrations of troops upon a scale commensurate with the circumstances of this country. My noble and gallant Friend, who no doubt has had opportunities of judging, has stated that occasionally he has had to find fault with officers, and that they did not come up to the standard that he expected. For my part, however, and I am not now speaking of the conduct of the British officer in action, but of his performance of ordinary daily duties in time of peace, I have always found the greatest zeal, energy, and willingness on the part of the British officer; and I have found, moreover, that he carried with him the good feeling and the confidence of the men with whom he had to deal. Of course, there may be instances, among large bodies of men, of want of intelligence, that I freely admit; but I put it to your Lordships whether the same thing may not be found in almost every avocation of life. And though there may have been occasions when my noble and gallant Friend has had to find fault with officers under his authority, I am sure that he must have had many more opportunities of praising what came to his notice. With regard to the

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  question of instruction—the garrison instructors are of novel introduction. It was thought desirable, and indeed essential, that officers, having now to pass a much more stringent examination than was the case before, should have opportunities of acquiring that knowledge, which it was impracticable for them to acquire in civil life, and without which it was impossible for them properly to satisfy the requirements of these examinations, and therefore these garrison instructors were appointed to afford such information. I am happy to endorse what has fallen from my noble Friend the Under Secretary, that a very large body of officers—more, in fact, than we have been able to deal with, so far as we have gone—have come forward to obtain the benefit of the instruction that is now afforded. And not alone has this interest in the subject been evinced by officers who have still to pass their examinations, but by officers who have no further examination to pass. I can only repeat that, if opportunities of acquiring professional information are given to British officers, I feel convinced they will be only too glad to avail themselves of such facilities. Perhaps I may be allowed to point out that when I first entered upon the duties of my present position, the system of examination for promotion was carried out to a very limited extent only; but during the time that I have been connected with the Horse Guards, and owing to the support which I have received from successive Secretaries of State, the system of examination has been largely increased in connection with promotion from the junior to the senior grades. No doubt much remains to be done; but this will be facilitated by the introduction of these garrison and regimental instructors, by whom the officers will be assisted in acquiring military knowledge. I am sure that no subject of greater importance could be brought forward than this question of the military education of officers. My noble and gallant Friend himself has testified to the zeal and energy of British officers; and, for my own part, I am glad that I have been afforded an opportunity of speaking of what I have seen and known of the energy and real devotion of British officers during the whole period that I have had the advantage of being connected with the Army.
  VISCOUNT HARDINGEsaid, he felt much satisfaction at the prospect of manœuvres by flying columns during the present year, and hoped it would be found practicable to brigade some of the Reserve forces with the Regular troops. The more that could be done the more advantageous would be the result. He also hoped that the flying columns and divisions would march fully equipped, with their ambulances and Control Staff, so that an opportunity might be afforded for judging of the merits or demerits of the Control system—for though no doubt the system could only be fully tested in time of war, he personally had a strong opinion in its favour, though he believed there had been in practice somewhat too great a tendency to centralization. Regimental carts for small-arm ammunition might also accompany the division; but as to these, though the Commission over which his noble and gallant Friend (Lord Strathnairn) presided reported on the subject three years ago, he believed that nothing practical had since been done. He had listened with much pleasure to the opinions expressed by the illustrious Duke the Commander-in-Chief, as to the officers of the British Army, whose efficiency it had been the custom to disparage of late since the purchase question was raised in the other House. Some critics even had gone the length of saying that the British officers were simply rich and incompetent. Their Lordships might possibly not be aware that the examination for promotion offered, in the opinion of the Commissioners, a very fair programme to test the efficiency of an officer: they had to pass an examination that included a knowledge of drill, of the Queen's Regulations, of the interior economy of a regiment, of the art of fortification, and of reconnoitreing—and although the Commissioners added that in some instances the examinations had been loosely conducted, yet that was not the fault of the purchase system or of the officers themselves, but of those who were responsible for the way in which the examinations were conducted. It had been said that proper instruction was not given to officers; but that remark would not apply to the Staff College, where the examinations were severe enough to satisfy any requirements. He concurred in the recommendation of the Royal

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  Commissioners that education should be more practical and less theoretical—and one of the most important of their recommendations was that no officer should be allowed to go to the Staff College, unless the general officer under whom he served reported that he was physically as well as mentally capable of performing his duties. He was glad to hear that a complete scheme for the instruction of the Artillery had been drawn up by officers who were worthy of all consideration—for one of the great complaints in the past had been that there was no uniform standard of examination in that department. It seemed that after the passing of the Army Regulation Bill, all officers were to be appointed to direct commissions by competitive examination; but he feared that such a system would increase those "cramming" schools which were admitted to be a great evil. He was pleased to hear the illustrious Duke say that English officers only needed opportunity and encouragement in order to render them efficient in their duties, for these gentlemen possessed qualifications superior to the officers of any Army in Europe.
  LORD STRATHNAIRNsaid, that the main object of his Motion was to draw the attention of Parliament to the want of strategical instruction for the officers of our Army. Garrison instructors did not undertake to give it, and nothing could be more undesirable than that officers should attempt to teach one of the highest branches which they never had the opportunity of learning. With reference to what had fallen from the illustrious Duke, he desired to say that his Address was intended to remove the erroneous impression which had been created to the disfavour of the British officers; and with respect to the relations between them and their soldiers, he maintained that the men of the English Army were more easily controlled by their officers than the men of any other. He was not enamoured of the purchase system, but it was only fair that some regard should be paid to its working.
  Motion agreed to.
  House adjourned at Eight o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter before Six o'clock.