Lords Sitting of 24 March 1871

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Local Government Supplemental * (58).
Committee—Report—Stamp Act (1870) Amendment * (45); Income Tax Assessment * (48).
Third Reading—Prison Ministers * (53), and passed.

CHINA—THE TIEN-TSIN MASSACRE. TREATY OF 1858.

  ADDRESS FOR PAPERS.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVON, who had given notice to call the attention of the House to the Parliamentary Papers issued with reference to the Tien-tsin Massacre, and the relations of this country and China; and to move for Copies or Extracts of Correspondence relative to the revision of the Treaty of 1858, said, he would have been glad had any other noble Lord undertaken the task of calling the attention of the House to the Papers which had been published respecting the massacres at Tien-tsin; but since no other of their Lordships had undertaken to do so, and considering the importance of the subject and the mention of it in the Speech from the Throne at the commencement of the Session, he would crave the indulgence of their Lordships while he drew their attention to it. In doing so he would, in the first place, refer to some of the circumstances of the case, and then to the inferences naturally to be drawn from them. The former were probably so fresh in their Lordships' recollection that he need only briefly recapitulate them. Prior to the 21st of last June there had been rumours afloat of an unsatisfactory nature and some excitement prevailed. On the 21st, without warning, the gongs sounded, and a large number of Chinese, armed with weapons, rushed tumultuously to the French Consulate and afterwards attacked a religious establishment occupied by some Sisters of Mercy of French, English, Belgian, and Irish nationality. The French Consul was killed, as also his assistant and two French gentlemen and ladies, while the unfortunate Sisters of Mercy were murdered under circumstances of a revolting and fiendish nature. Not content with this, the mob wreaked their vengeance on the helpless bodies of the victims, and exhibited
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  more of the passion of animals and devils than of men. Meanwhile, disciplined Chinese troops, with their officers, stood by, the local authorities were at least passive, and the Governor of the place, if not an actual participator in the crime, at all events attempted no kind of opposition. For some days afterwards the European community of Tien-tsin was left to itself, the local authorities being entirely quiescent, and it was probably owing only to their courage, and to the friendly assistance of an American captain, who showed the greatest humanity and courage, that the mischief spread no further. Such were the briefly stated facts of the case. The opinions as to the cause of these proceedings were very conflicting. Four theories had been started. It was attributed by some to a superstition on the part of the Chinese that the Sisters of Mercy were in the habit of kidnapping children for the purpose of using parts of their bodies in their materia medica. Others—and he thought the noble Earl opposite rather leant to this view, threw blame on the acts of the missionaries—whose general conduct was said to be such as to provoke the Natives to their deeds of violence. The third theory ascribed it to the general hatred of foreigners prevailing in China—some facts detailed in the Papers went to strengthen that suggestion—that the official classes were engaged in, and instigators of, the offence. The first of these suggested causes was obviously untrue—Mr. Wade, our chargé d'affaires at Pekin, who at first believed there might be some foundation for it, had entirely abandoned it. Moreover, the Chinese authorities admitted that no child had been kidnapped or purchased, or was missing. As to the second, he was quite aware that missionaries in China, like many other zealous people, sometimes acted imprudently; but it was only due to them to say that rather more blame had frequently been imputed to them than they deserved, and there was nothing in the Papers to warrant the belief that they were at all responsible in this case. As to the general hatred of foreigners, there were facts stated in the Papers which appeared to strengthen this theory. During the last year or two there had been outbreaks against foreigners at different places, sometimes successful, sometimes suppressed. In

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  one instance the Governor of a Province issued a proclamation for the purpose of encouraging the belief that a drought had been caused by foreign trade in the rivers. Indeed, the decrees and proclamations put forth by authority had often been animated by feelings of the worst character. In the present case hatred of foreigners in general was manifested, for French and Russians both fell victims, and a day or two previously Dr. Fraser was mobbed, but being mounted escaped serious injury. In one of the few cases where the Chinese authorities had exercised a firm repression, one of them was assassinated in his public office. As to the fourth theory, it must be remembered that manifestations of animosity against foreigners had occurred both at Tien-tsin and in other parts of the Empire. For some time past placards had been put forth, with official connivance, if not authority, denouncing foreigners, and insinuating the grossest charges against them; pamphlets had been issued containing the vilest calumnies, and fans had been printed representing mandarins standing over the corpses of Europeans. There had, in fact, been that atmosphere of suspicion and animosity which generally preceded such outbreaks. Mr. Wade, who was certainly not prejudiced against the Chinese authorities, had himself stated that the Governor of Tien-tsin must have been aware that some such outbreak was in contemplation. Then the conduct of these officials was anything but satisfactory after the massacre had taken place. The officer appointed to conduct the inquiry arrived late at his post; the inquiry commenced late, 19 days, at least, being allowed to go by, and the first day's proceedings consisted of a charge against the Sisters of Mercy. What, meanwhile, was the action of the local authorities? The Mandarins immediately seized some native Chinese, and for 20 days subjected them to horrible tortures, in the hope, it must be assumed, of obtaining some exculpatory evidence. After this act of the drama had been completed, the magistrates themselves were called in question for their conduct, and were virtually allowed to escape with impunity. Mr. Wade anticipated that, when committed to prison, their sentence would be commuted to banishment, and that this would before long
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  be remitted. What was the penalty inflicted on the undoubted murderers? Seven days were allowed to pass before any of the criminals were arrested. They were then brought to some kind of trial, and, finally, after a delay of three months, 15 were proposed to the representatives of the foreign Powers as fit and proper objects for execution. Mr. Wade protested against this as altogether inadequate, and the Chinese Government then proposed that four or five additional persons should be executed. Indeed, so unsatisfactory were the whole proceedings, that prior to the execution of the 15 criminals the representatives of England, the United States, Prussia, and Russia drew up a joint Protest, in which they said—
  "The undersigned think it their duty to say that this decision, taken after a delay of three months, is in no way satisfactory."
  The execution was conducted in a manner at least suspicious. The criminals were not required to kneel, as was usual, and they were taken to the place of execution amid the plaudits of their friends, being considered, as victims offering up their lives as public sacrifices to the hatred of foreigners. He was not surprised that Mr. Wade, in winding up the history of the case, should have commented on the final decree in these terms—
  "It is neither in substance nor form calculated to satisfy the representatives of foreign Powers, who, having acted throughout as the friendly counsellors of China, can hardly fail to consider themselves as having been trifled with."
  These being the facts of the case, there arose the perhaps still more serious question—what was the present relation between ourselves and the Chinese? On the one hand we were struck with the important commercial position which we held, and the still vaster fortunes in store for us on the opening up of the Northern regions, which were wholly undeveloped and abounded in resources; and on the other with the limited spirit of enterprize of the Natives, and their readiness to carry on trade with Europeans, provided they were allowed by the official classes to do so. It was a remarkable fact that during our numerous wars with China our trade in tea had not been suspended; and why? Because the people were so anxious to maintain it that even though one-half of the Empire was at war with the foreigner the other half remained at peace. This justified the

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  hope of a vast expansion of our trade if the existing obstructions were peacefully and gradually removed. Our position in China depended on our maintaining that spirit of enterprize among our commercial community which had had a footing for so many years, and had so largely extended our commercial relations. Lord Russell once stated that the fewer the points of contact between Europeans and Chinese, the safer and better it would be. With great deference to this opinion, he (the Earl of Carnarvon) believed that the converse was the fact, and that the more points of contact were multiplied, provided this was done fairly and discreetly, the better in all respects it would be. Our position also depended on our recognizing the fact that the community at Tien-tsin was not merely an English, but a European one. The American captain to whom he had referred as placing his ship at the disposal of the women and children entered with heart and soul into the cause, and though he found no fault with the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary, he could not help wishing that our co-operation with the French in this matter had been a little heartier. He was no advocate for a vehement or high-handed policy with regard to the Chinese. He thought that in former days that policy was strained too far; but during the last few years he could not help thinking that we had, to a certain extent, passed from one extreme to the other. It seemed as if we were now inclined to trust solely to diplomacy; but he feared that by keeping the idea of force wholly in the background we had deprived ourselves of a most useful instrument of influence in our relations with the Chinese. The people of that nation were good diplomatists—perhaps better than ourselves—and when they found that despatches such as some in the recent Blue Book, in which it was hinted pretty broadly that unless they reversed their line of action we should proceed to hostilities, had as a matter of fact no result, they soon became inclined to turn an indifferent ear to our remonstrances. The House was, perhaps, aware that a very able Englishman, Mr. Hart, was now Inspector General of Customs in China, and it was no exaggeration to say that he was the adviser of the Chinese Government in these matters. Mr. Hart had told him that when he had been called upon to read
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  such despatches to the Chinese officials, the first thing they always asked was—Does it mean peace or war? Mr. Hart, acquainted as he was with European notions, would reply that it meant peace; whereapon the statements of the despatch were disregarded and its objects fell to the ground. There were several points in which there seemed a danger of our losing ground in our relations with the Chinese Government. There was the delicate and difficult question of enforcing audiences from the Emperor. To this we were entitled under Lord Elgin's Treaty; but the demand had hitherto been evaded. It might seem an idle form, but it was still the prevailing notion in China that there was only one sovereign ruler in the world, the Emperor of China, and that all other nations were tributaries and vassals, standing in the light of foreigners and savages. He did not press this point on the noble Earl, but it was one which required consideration. Another point, and that vitally affecting our position, related to the instructions given at various times to our naval officers on the China station. He was not prepared to say that those instructions bore the interpretations placed on them by the officers, but there appeared ample ground for misconception, and the sooner this was set right the better. Mr. Matheson, a name well-known in China, writing to the noble Earl in September last, stated that the naval officers, it was understood, were forbidden by the Admiralty to land their men under any circumstances, even when life was threatend, and were to confine their assistance to British subjects, to receiving on board their vessels those who might, when attacked, be compelled to seek an asylum. In answer to this Mr. Otway wrote—
  "The standing instruction to Her Majesty's Consuls and naval officers in China as to the employment of Her Majesty's ships of war are in cases of great emergency to protect the lives and properties of British subjects if placed in peril by wanton attacks directed against them, either on the part of the local authorities or by an uncontrolled popular movement."—[Correspondence No. 1 (1871), No. 26]
  This answer was a very guarded one, and though the subject, he was aware, was a delicate one, he thought the expressions should have been a little plainer, for it was evident that great misapprehension on the subject existed in the minds of British residents in

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  China. Almost immediately afterwards the subject was again brought forward, and Mr. Medhurst, our Consul at Shanghai, undertook to give an interpretation of the instructons. He stated—
  "One of the special purposes for which Her Majesty's ships of war are stationed in Chinese ports is to afford protection in cases of great emergency to the lives and properties of British subjects when imperilled by wanton attacks, either on the part of the local authorities or of uncontrolled masses of people; but this general definition is qualified by the warning that the interference of a naval force in any emergency is alone likely to receive the subsequent approval of Her Majesty's Government, if it can be clearly shown that without such interference the lives and property of British subjects would in all probability have been sacrificed, and even in such a case Her Majesty's Government will expect to hear it established to their satisfaction that the alternative of rescuing the British subjects by receiving them on board was not available."
  He still thought the instruction was so cautiously explained as to be calculated to mislead, and sometimes to discourage officers in the discharge of their duty. In another letter it was stated that although the instructions did not absolutely and under all circumstances interdict commanders of ships from protecting life and property on shore, the interpretation put on them by the officers was such that half a foreign settlement might be burnt down before they actively intervened. Mr. Hammond writing to the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce on the 28th of December, stated that if an attack on the British settlement at any of the ports was imminent, a body of marines might be landed, and if these were insufficient a detachment of troops from Hong Kong or Japan. He also wished to draw the attention of the noble Earl opposite to the Treaty of 1858. In spite of Lord Clarendon's efforts the revision of that Treaty had broken down in consequence of the hostility of our commercial interests in China; but the sooner it was revised the better it would be for all parties, and it would then be seen how far the restrictions on trade might be relaxed. The position of our Minister at Pekin should also receive consideration. At the present moment we had no Minister in China, the British interests in that country being looked after by a chargé d'affaires; but under ordinary circumstances our Minister was confined to Pekin, and never left that capital during the term of office, and he thought it advisable that this restriction should no longer exist. There were evi-
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  dences, on all hands, that the unfriendly spirit towards foreigners was spreading in China; and it was worth noticing also that the Chinese military authorities not only possessed a large number of arms of precision of the best manufacture, but they had established manufactories of them for themselves. In justification of what he had stated, he wished to point out that throughout these Papers there was a remarkable concurrence of opinion among those who were best qualified to judge with reference to the attitude that we should adopt in China. Thus, Consul Lay, writing from Tien-tsin on the 20th of June, 1870, said—
  "We do want a man-of-war here. These troubles increase when one is absent."
  Consul Medhurst, writing from Shanghai, on the 16th of July, said—
  In my despatch dated the 13th inst., I had the honour to report that a general uneasiness prevailed in the minds of the Natives of this port, brought about no doubt by the disturbing influence of the intelligence received from Tien-Tsin. I am happy to state that this feeling has to a great extent subsided during the last twenty-four hours, and that the bearing of the people has lost much of that aggressive character which it certainly showed a few days ago. I attribute the change to the prompt turn out and thoroughly prepared condition which the French exhibited on the occasion of the alarm on the night of the 12th to the active drilling of the volunteers on our side every day, and to the fact that two vessels of war, the "Barossa" (British) and "Ashurlot" (American), opportunely came into port."—[Parl. P., p. 46.]
  Admiral Sir Henry Kellett, the Admiral on the station, writing on the 21st of July, said—
  "Though the aspect of affairs has greatly improved since I last wrote, the condition of China is very critical, and requires a temperate but firm attitude of the great Powers."
  And, lastly, Mr. Wade, who had consistently opposed any high-handed course being taken by us with reference to the Chinese, said, on the 13th of October—
  "Had there been a gunboat, English or French, at Tien-tsin on the 21st of June, I doubt greatly that the atrocity of that day would have been perpetrated."
  He did not wish it to be supposed because he had laid stress upon the importance of the presence of a gunboat that he was in favour of this country taking a high-handed course with regard to China. He thought that we could not do the mercantile community interested in the Chinese trade a more cruel kindness than to adopt towards China an attitude likely to result in hostilities. But we must remember that since the

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  Treaty of 1858 the wall of separation that had hitherto existed between China and the outer world had been forcibly beaten down, and that we could not now escape from the difficulties of our new position. He believed it to be the duty of the British Government, in the first place, to insist—temperately, if you please, but at all events, firmly—upon the terms of the Treaty of 1858 being carried out in their integrity; and, in the next place, they should endeavour, whenever opportunity offered, to remove those artificial restrictions which had undoubtedly hindered, to a great extent, trade communication between China and other countries—that they should revise the instructions to the naval commanders on that coast; and that they should act towards the Chinese in a spirit of temperate firmness. He also trusted that, while keeping up our communications with the Central Government of China, we should not permit the local authorities, in the event of the occurrence of outrages of this kind, to shelter themselves behind the Central Government, but should hold them responsible to a certain extent for such breaches of the terms of the Treaty. In making these remarks, which were intended to draw attention to the critical—he would not say unsatisfactory—state of our relations with China, he trusted that he had not exceeded the bounds of fair criticism on Papers of this kind, regard being had to the importance of the subject.
  Moved, "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for Copies or Extracts of Correspondence relative to the revision of the Treaty of 1858 with China."—(The Earl of Carnarvon.)
  EARL GRANVILLEsaid, the House was much obliged to the noble Earl for the interesting speech he had made, which had evidently involved a very careful study of the Blue Book on this subject, which was issued the other day. The noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon) had called their attention, first, to the outrage at Tien-tsin, and, secondly, to the policy which he thought this country should adopt with regard to China. He entirely agreed with the noble Earl that that outrage was utterly inexcusable—and, in fact, nobody could think of saying a word in its defence. But at the same time, if he might offer any criticism on the speech of the noble Earl, it would be that it was conceived rather too much
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  in a strain of feeling hostile to the Chinese generally—a tone which he was afraid characterized much of the opinion of this country, and certainly that of the English residents in China. With regard to the cause of the massacre, he should be sorry to give any decided opinion; but he should be disposed to agree with the noble Earl that there were four causes which had contributed to bring it about. The first of those causes was undoubtedly the superstitious feeling that existed among the lower orders of Chinese, who believed that their children were kidnapped into the convents for the purpose of their being put to death and their bodies made into drugs. He believed that some such feeling did exist; and they all knew how the wildest notions sprung up in the breasts of semi-civilized and uneducated nations respecting the practices of strangers whose religion they believed to be false. The second cause was the course adopted by the missionaries. He remembered that two years ago there was a discussion on the subject in that House, and they were nearly unanimous in bearing testimony to the high and noble motives which animated the men who incurred hardships and risked their lives for the sake of spreading the knowledge of Christianity. But he thought there was a very general opinion that any imprudent conduct on the part of the missionaries, particularly in an empire like China, was likely to produce not the progress of Christianity, but very unfortunate secular results. The Protestant missionaries in China stood on a different footing from the Roman Catholic missionaries established there; they were few in number; they had received no encouragement from the Government; there were no supposed treaty rights on which they relied—and, generally speaking, they were under the superintendence of some large missionary societies in this country who had given them very good and judicious advice, that they should not interfere in matters connected with commerce and manufacturing industry. Again, Great Britain had also important temporal interests in China in connection with her commerce and her manufactures, whereas, on the other hand, Roman Catholic countries had hardly any trade there, and their great object had been to propagate that form of the Christian creed which they themselves

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  professed. There was no doubt that a great deal of harm had been done by the missionaries of foreign countries claiming treaty rights which other Europeans did not possess in China, and extending a sort of protection not merely from persecution, but of a special character over their Chinese converts, which naturally excited much disgust among their fellow-countrymen, and exposed them to insults and misunderstandings. Although the stories about their buying children, and encouraging others to kidnap children with a view to the salvation of their souls could not be substantiated, yet there was great danger in respect to the position of Europeans generally in China unless the French and other Roman Catholic Governments exercised some more direct control over the missionary and other religious bodies of their respective countries. Another cause adverted to by the noble Earl as one of the causes of the massacre was the hatred of foreigners. Now, that there should be some dislike to foreigners in China was almost an obvious truism. They all knew that an exclusive system had for hundreds of years prevailed there; and it was not very surprising if certain circumstances connected with the intercourse of Europeans with that country should be calculated to excite among its people fear rather than love. They knew the prejudice that existed among the literary class in China against foreigners, and especially among the lower orders, who had not the advantage of education to give them a better feeling in regard to them. But the moral he drew from that was that, it being our desire to maintain and extend our friendly relations with the Chinese, we ought not to be hostile in our language towards them, nor too intolerant of the habits and customs handed down to them from generation to generation, and which must necessarily take much time and patience totally to eradicate. Our true course would be to do all we could to conciliate them without departing from our own principles. Then came the question as to the supineness of the Chinese authorities. He was far from saying that there had been no such supineness, or that greater activity and vigour in taking precautions might not have prevented the massacre. But that sometimes happened, unfortunately, in other countries besides China; and all that we had a right to require was
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  that compensation should be given, proper amends made, and the best measures adopted to avert the recurrence of such lamentable events. No doubt that event had filled the country with horror. It was a calamity which it was too painful to dwell upon; certainly it created a great panic in China last summer, which had its rebound in this country. And he must say that great credit was due to the official representatives of Her Majesty in China, who were quite alive to the gravity of the situation, and did all they could to calm the exaggerated alarm of their fellow-subjects. While pressing in the strongest manner on the Chinese Government the necessity of granting redress, they also endeavoured to inspire some feeling of courage and hopefulness among the Europeans. He quite admitted that the noble Earl's criticism had been offered in a very fair and conciliatory spirit with regard to the policy of both the present Government, and the Government which preceded it. Considering, however, that there was an armed vessel in every Chinese port of the least pretension, and that only 11 years ago we took Pekin and destroyed the Emperor's summer palace, he could not think there was any great reason to fear that the Chinese—a singularly shrewd nation—would think that we meant to trust absolutely to diplomacy alone, and would refuse to resort to force in any emergency whatever. The noble Earl had expressed a hope that the ambiguity in the instructions issued to our naval officers on the China station would be removed; but he (Earl Granville) could not see how he was to set about removing any such ambiguity, because he did not conceive that any really existed in the instructions sent to those officers and to our Consuls by Lord Clarendon. What could be clearer than instructions which, while allowing them to protect the lives and property of British subjects, stated that they were not to try by force to insist on reparation, but were to refer to the central power, and to the Minister at Pekin, for the redress that was necessary? The noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon) talked as if that was a new policy suddenly inaugurated; but it was inaugurated by Lord Elgin and Sir Frederick Bruce, and had been followed ever since we had a Minister at Pekin. It was true—and the noble Earl had

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  laid too much stress on the fact—that they had one letter from a Consul who would have liked to have a man-of-war in the port where he was stationed. Now, our Consuls were a most excellent class of men, who discharged their duties with great fidelity to their country; but if the British Consul had one weakness in the world, it was his wish for the presence of a British man-of-war in front of his official residence. It was exactly to prevent that accumulation of ships of war, and to prevent that authority being invested in all these local officers—acting sometimes under the pressure of panic, sometimes on the representations of a missionary body, or of a few merchants congregated together, and who desired to have the knot of some difficulty cut—that that policy was adopted, and Her Majesty's Government had no intention of departing from it—the policy that our Consuls were not to have in their hands what was practically the Queen's prerogative of declaring peace or war in every great port of the Chinese Empire. With respect to any misapprehension as to the possibility of our naval officers landing men for the protection of the lives of British subjects, it rested entirely on two letters which gave no proof whatever of the fact. These officers were informed by Mr. Wade, before he got his instructions from this country, that he was in communication with Admiral Kellett as to the landing of marines for the protection of life and property. Now with regard to the Treaty, the noble Earl had alluded to our Embassy at Pekin. Now, our policy was to make the Chinese Government themselves understand that we looked to them, with whom we had made the Treaty, to see that its stipulations were carried out. That principle possessed every advantage both for ourselves and for China. It was for our interest to strengthen rather than to weaken the authority of the Central Government of that country; and it was also for the interest of the Chinese Government itself that we should adopt a course which would strengthen their control at the extremities of their Empire; and although this might sometimes involve a little delay, and there might be occasions on which we should be obliged to offer the assistance of our naval force to co-operate with the Chinese authorities in redressing what ought not to have existed, yet he thought that in
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  the long run we should obtain any just demand we had to make, much better by that regular mode of proceeding than by pursuing the decentralizing policy of giving back to the local authorities some of that power which had been, as he believed, wisely taken from them by different Ministers. In December, 1868, Lord Derby, as Foreign Secretary, gave positive instructions to the effect that the complaints of missionaries were to be dealt with not upon the spot, but by a reference to our Minister at Pekin. The noble Earl opposite had adverted to the maintenance and revision of treaty rights. Sir Rutherford Alcock, acting under instructions from Lord Clarendon, succeeded in obtaining a revised treaty which he sent home from China, and which was thought by Lord Clarendon to be a great advance on the existing state of things. A different opinion, however, was entertained by the commercial classes in this country and in China; and Lord Clarendon, without changing his own opinion, felt that the opposition of those classes to the new treaty was so universal that one of his last official acts was to recommend to the Cabinet that it should not be ratified; and his advice was taken accordingly. But Mr. Wade, in the absence of Sir Rutherford Alcock, had shown almost every quality they could wish to see in the representative of this country in China; and their Lordships might count on Her Majesty's Government doing all that was in their power to obtain becoming conditions at the hands of the Chinese Government.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYsaid, he thought that, according to the statement of the noble Earl himself, there was some ambiguity at least in the view which the Government took of the instructions sent to our naval officers in China. He would not trouble the House more than a single moment by reading extracts to show that orders had been sent to China that guns and men should not be disembarked for the protection of British subjects in China. On page 174 of the Blue Book, Mr. Wade, writing of an application by Acting-Consul Lay for assistance in anticipation of an attack, said such an attack was, of course, a possibility, and he promised to call on the senior officer in the North "to relax or obtain relaxation of the Standing Orders so far as to admit of the debar-

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  kation of guns and men within the settlement." To what Standing Order did Mr. Wade refer? Whoever had issued them, they were obviously dangerous to the lives as well as the property of every English inhabitant of a Chinese port. The noble Earl had departed from his usual good taste in ridiculing the desire of the Consuls for protection by attributing their wish for gunboats to the common desire of officials to have an armed force at their command. But it should be remembered that these Consuls had been witnesses to, and almost sufferers from, what might be called one of the most frightful catastrophes ever heard of. Surely, then, it was no matter for ridicule if, after such a calamity, he saw indications of another attack, he applied for such assistance and protection for British subjects to which they were entitled, and which he in his official position had a right to expect. The Blue Book showed that the Consul was right in seeking protection from his Government. Acting-Consul Lay, in a letter to Mr. Wade, on page 175, gave a description of the state of Chinese feeling which justified the gravest apprehensions. He wrote—
  "You are aware that there is still a strong feeling against us in the city—I mean borne by the people themselves, and not confined to the rowdy class. It was stated that these troubles were caused by these rowdies, and that when they were punished all would be well. I trusted such might be the case, but it does not seem to be so. Upwards of 2,000 of these blackguards have run away from Tien-tsin; hundreds have been seized by the authorities; and yet, with the city clear of them, peace between foreigners and Chinese has not yet been established. Excitement still reigns and ill-feeling still exists."
  It was hard, indeed, that a Consul, confronted by this state of things, should be censured for seeking assistance. He would not criticize the policy announced by the noble Earl; no doubt centralization would be a very good thing, and it would be eminently satisfactory if European Powers could induce the central authority in China to keep its people in order at the several ports; but, in the meantime, while the ideal policy was being carried out, horrible catastrophes might recur again and again. The state of things in China corresponded with the state of France at the present time. A Government existed in both countries unable to insure the lives of those committed to its care, while the foreigner protested against the breach of treaties,
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  and threatened that if the breach were continued he would attack, not the central government, but the place in which these breaches had occurred. Count Bismarck had threatened to take the place of the Government in Paris, and this policy must always be pursued where society was thoroughly disorganized. The Government of China had not the power, if it had the will, to prevent the feeling against the foreigner culminating in outrage; and the only way of preventing such outrage was by inspiring fear in the very place where it occurred. It was right that missionary difficulties and all disputes not involving danger to life should be settled with the central Government; but the desire to fix responsibility upon the Chinese authorities should not hinder us from giving by our own acts the utmost possible protection to those European inhabitants who might otherwise be horribly slaughtered before the Chinese Government had awakened to a sense of its duty.
  EARL GREYsaid, he would ask the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) whether he was prepared to say that the feeling of hostility on the part of the Chinese against our countrymen was altogether unnatural, or to be wondered at? No honest man could examine the history of our relations with China for the last five-and-thirty years without coming to the conclusion that China had very great wrongs to complain of. Wars of the most cruel kind, involving the infliction of the most frightful suffering, had been waged against them. It was not our own acts alone that had embittered the Chinese against us; the indirect mischief we had caused them was very great. The Taeping rebellion, which had desolated a large part of the Empire, and caused more deaths and suffering than any other rebellion in history, he had been assured by one of the most distinguished missionaries who ever served in China, could be directly traced to the disorganization of the Chinese Government in consequence of the wars with us. Their central authority was for a time completely destroyed. Besides the evil which they had suffered from the disorganization of the Government, which was the natural consequence of our acts, the compulsory opening of China to Europeans by our means had brought upon them other evils also—among them he would ask their Lordships to

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  look at that most horrible traffic in Coolies, in which atrocities equal to those perpetrated in the African slave trade were committed, which was carried on by Europeans in spite of the efforts of the Chinese Government to prevent it. No doubt the British Government had given that new slave trade all the discouragement in their power; but it was not the less true that it owed its existence to what we had done, and it was justly regarded in China as one of the consequences of our having compelled them to depart from their traditionary policy of excluding foreigners from their country. We ought not to forget these things when we complained of the conduct of the Chinese, and he would ask could it be a matter of astonishment that, with such circumstances as these to justify it, a feeling of hostility to England should exist among the Chinese, who distinguished as little between foreigners as Englishmen distinguish between Chinamen? He did not favour the policy of keeping a large number of ships of war in the neighbourhood of the Chinese ports. He regretted to say that, in former years, their presence had led to much evil; for when our countrymen saw themselves supported by such a display of force they were apt to show a disregard for the feelings of the people among whom they lived, which they would not do if they felt they must rely upon their own good conduct for their safety. The far more prudent course would be to cultivate a good understanding with the Chinese Government and people, and dispense with the gunboats. And when the Chinese authorities were blamed for not having quelled disorder, he was inclined to ask whether they were singular in this? Was England perfectly successful in preventing violence against those who rashly and foolishly outraged the feelings and prejudices of the people? Had we been able to prevent serious outrages in Birmingham upon anti-Roman Catholic lecturers; and could it be supposed that if a Buddhist lecturer were to make his appearance in the streets of London, denouncing Our Saviour as an impostor, belying the Christian religion, and ridiculing all that we hold most sacred, that such a man would not receive summary punishment at the hands of an outraged people? Was it then a matter of surprise if the
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  same thing happened in China? It was not right that we should induce Englishmen to suppose that they could so act with impunity in China, under the protection of the naval force in those waters. Before sitting down he desired to add a word or two on another matter—namely, the importance of not taking up matters locally, but of always going to the Imperial Government for redress for any wrongs that might be suffered. It appeared to him that the reasons for adhering to this policy had been very inadequately considered by his noble Friend behind him. If they took the redress into their own hands, as was too much the practice 30 years ago, they might possibly succeed for the moment; but in so doing they inflicted a blow of the most fatal character upon the Imperial Government. By persevering in that policy they would gradually break down the Imperial authority altogether, and by degrees reduce China to the state of anarchy which prevailed during the Taeping rebellion. If they destroyed the authority of the Chinese Government, when they considered how many millions of that people there were, were they prepared to set up any authority in its place? To destroy that authority, he believed, would be very easy for a small force sent from this country; but he believed, also, that the result of such a policy would be as great a misfortune to ourselves as it would be to the Chinese, who for ages had enjoyed under their existing system of government a very high measure of peace and happiness, and had been able to carry on with us a trade lucrative and beneficial to both parties. Destruction of the authority of the Government might be easy; but to place in its stead a Government capable of maintaing order would prove a more difficult undertaking. For these reasons he could not but confess that he viewed with sincere satisfaction the policy which the Government had pursued.
  THE DUKE OF SOMERSETsaid, he concurred with his noble Friend who had just sat down (Earl Grey) that the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government was wise and prudent, and one in which, as shown in the Blue Book, he, at all events, failed to see any ambiguity. At page 220, for instance, he found the following passage written from the Foreign Office to the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce:—

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  "The general purport of those Instructions was that Her Majesty's naval forces are only actively to be employed in China for the protection of British life and property, when actually imperilled by acts directed against them by Chinese authorities, or by the violence of the Chinese populace, which those authorities might be unable or unwilling to control."
  That he believed to be the right line to lay down as to the interference of Her Majesty's naval force; for, from his own connection with the Navy, he was perfectly aware that it was impossible to give any loose instructions to the officers commanding on the station. A young officer in command of a gunboat would, for instance, be ready enough to take a Chinese town, for he would only be too delighted at the idea of having something to do. It was therefore necessary to impress some moderation in the instructions which they gave. He also concurred in the remarks made by Consul Robertson, who, in answer to a letter from the Rev. J. Chalmers, giving an account of the destruction of a chapel at Fatshan, said—
  "In reply, I have to express my regret at the event, but am not at all surprised at its following so ill-judged an event as that of opening a chapel at a time when a strong anti-missionary feeling is agitating the minds of the Chinese, and at a place, too, which has always been turbulent and ill-disposed towards foreigners."
  Again, Consul Robertson, in a letter to Mr. Wade, said—
  "Such outbreaks as at Tien-tsin, or elsewhere' may be settled for the time; but certainly the feeling of the Chinese, high and low, is strongly aroused in defence of their ancient institutions and religious tenets, which they consider in danger from foreign missionary intervention."
  Was it surprising that the people should be easily excited when they saw their ancient customs and religion attacked by the missionaries? But the despatches showed how this chapel at Fatshan was destroyed, for the Consul said—
  "My own information leads me to believe that the outbreak was caused by the injudicious prominence given to the opening of this establishment at a time when the feelings of the people are strongly excited against missionaries."
  If our countrymen in China would defy the feelings of the people, there would, of course, be outbreaks; but he thought the Consul had throughout given wise and prudent advice. He concurred in the opinion that the policy pursued by the Government was a sound one, and trusted that they would resolutely adhere to it in the future.
  EARL GRANVILLEdesired to say but one word in explanation. It had not in any way been his intention to cast any reflection on the conduct of our Consuls in China—on the contrary, no one who read these Papers could, he thought, fail to see that when they were in difficulty Her Majesty's Government had rendered them every assistance in their power, and had thoroughly approved their conduct. But he did not attach much weight to the pleas of those who, clamouring for men-of-war and gunboats, urged in support of that plea the opinion of our Consuls, who of course were, naturally enough, favourable to their presence. In saying this, he was not in any way attaching blame to the Consuls, for if he were himself a Consul he should probably do exactly the same thing.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVONasked what the Standing Orders were that were referred to in the Correspondence, and if the noble Earl would lay them on the Table of this House?
  EARL GRANVILLEsaid, his impression was there were no Standing Orders, but only Admiralty Instructions; and if they had not been already produced they should be laid on the Table of their Lordships' House.
  In answer to the Earl of CARNARVON,
  VISCOUNT HALIFAXread the following extract from the Blue Book relating to the massacre of Tien-tsin, observing that, as would be seen from a footnote, the instructions therein referred to had already been published in a Parliamentary Paper of 1869—
  "The general purport of those instructions and of that letter was, that Her Majesty's naval forces are only actively to be employed in China for the protection of British life and property when actually imperilled by acts directed against them by Chinese authorities, or by the violence of the Chinese populace which those authorities might be unable or unwilling to control; and although it is not expressly stated, yet it is clearly to be inferred, from the tenor of the instructions, that it would be consistent with their spirit, and with the policy of Her Majesty's Government, that the Senior Naval Officer on the spot, if satisfied that an attack on the British settlement at any of the ports, and specifically at Shanghai, was imminent, should disembark and maintain on shore, till the danger was passed, a body of Marines, which, however, it would be desirable, if possible, to relieve daily from the ships, so as to avoid the appearance of a foreign occupation."—[Correspondence No. 47.]
  Motion agreed to.

VOLUNTEER ARTILLERY—ARMS.

  QUESTION.
  EARL VANE, in asking the Under Secretary for War the Question of which he had given Notice, Whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to introduce an improvement in the Arms supplied to Volunteer Artillery, and, if so, when; and to call attention to the Arms now used by the Volunteer Artillery, said, he would not occupy much of their Lordships' time by going into any arguments which would doubtless be raised when the whole question of the Reserve Forces came before Parliament; but he was most anxious to ascertain from Her Majesty's Government how much longer the Artillery Volunteers were to be provided with antiquated and, when compared with modern improvements, almost useless weapons. As their Lordships were well aware the Rifle Volunteers had had as good an arm given to them as the country could produce; while, on the other hand, many of the Artillery Volunteers had now for 11 years been obliged to content themselves with the old muzzle-loading carbines and smooth-bore 32-pounder. He held in his hand a circular which had been sent to many commanding officers in the North of England, himself included, by one of our most efficient Volunteer Artillery officers, and he would, with their Lordships' permission, read one paragraph of it, as showing the feelings of many Northern Volunteers—feelings which, he felt sure, were shared by many others in many counties—
  "The united object of the Volunteers should now be to obtain—not from Her Majesty's Government, but from Parliament—a straightforward answer to this straightforward question—'Is the Volunteer force to be maintained in a state of efficiency or is it not?' Either let Parliament impose discipline, provide equipment, defray expenses, and reduce the nnmerical strength, if necessary, or let existing corps be disbanded at the earliest possible date. Temporizing measures would do more harm than good, because they would lull the public into an idea of false security, and cause improvements of vital importance to be deferred to a period commonly termed too late."
  LORD NORTHBROOKasked whether his noble Friend had any objection to mention the name of the officer from whose circular he had quoted?
  EARL VANEsaid, it proceeded from Colonel Allhusen, of the 1st Newcastle-upon-Tyne Volunteer Artillery. Colonel Allhusen said—
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  "The question at issue is not one of politics, but of national common sense. It is essential we should all pull together so as to raise the Volunteer force from its present ridiculous position. Look at your men, after 11 years' outlay and trouble, armed with muzzle-loading carbines, and old smooth-bore 32-pounders. Many of us are quite tired of playing the fool and being compelled to pay for being laughed at by military men and civilians. One thing or the other; let us be prepared fairly to meet all comers, or strike us out of the defensive muster-roll."
  LORD TRUROregretted that this matter had not been brought forward in the form simply of a Question. What he would desire to ask was whether it was the intention of the Government to arm the Volunteer Artillery with such weapons as would qualify them to perform their duties efficiently? An impression prevailed, some years ago, that the Volunteers generally were not fitted to serve with field Artillery. But the opinion having been taken, first of Sir George C. Lewis, then of Earl de Grey, and finally of Lord Palmerston himself, it was determined that a fair and reasonable proportion of light field Artillery should be conceded to the Volunteer forces. It was now rumoured that it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to withdraw these guns, although, according to his experience, they were much better suited to the height and physique of Volunteers than the heavy guns to which the Royal Artillery were trained.
  VISCOUNT HARDINGEsaid, that when his noble Friend opposite came down to distribute the prizes to the National Artillery Association, he encouraged the Volunteers by the announcement that, as soon as arrangements could be made, they would be armed with guns of precision. He therefore wished to take this opportunity of inquiring whether it was proposed to give rifled guns to the Artillery Volunteers; and, if so, of what description? In this country it would be almost impossible even to hope for a force of Regular Artillery proportionate to our wants; it therefore became necessary to look to the Reserve Artillery, to the Militia, and to the Volunteer Artillery to supplement the deficiency. He had been informed that it was intended to arm the fortifications with the discarded breech-loading Armstrongs; if that were so, he wished to know whether there were a sufficient number available for the

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  different batteries of Volunteers and Militia along the sea-coast? It was of the utmost importance that those two branches of our Volunteer forces should be encouraged by giving them arms of precision, instead of the smooth-bore muzzle-loaders of days gone by, in the practice of which the men took no interest. As to a supply of breech-loading carbines, he, for one, was disposed to look upon the time spent in practising with them rather in the light of time lost; and to believe that the true weapons for Artillery Volunteers to work with was the big gun itself. He was compelled to differ from the noble Earl who had last spoken on the subject of Volunteer Field Artillery, for he believed that it entailed great expenditure both on officers and men in the line of horses, &c. At the same time, he was not by any means an advocate for putting down any Volunteer field batteries which might actually exist.
  LORD NORTHBROOKsaid, it was proposed that the Volunteer Artillery should be armed with the 40-pounder breech-loading Armstrong gun, and the delay which had occurred had arisen in consequence of some proposed alterations in the organization of the force. It was proposed that in future the Volunteer Artillery should be placed under the command of officers of the Royal Artillery in the different districts; and by this means it, as well as the Militia Artillery, would be brought into closer connection with the Regular service. As to the armament of the Volunteer Artillery with breech-loading carbines, since a Question on this subject had been asked by his noble Friend near him (Lord Truro), he had ascertained, as the result of further inquiry, that it would be possible to issue them before the date he (Lord Northbrook) then mentioned. He was rather surprised at the strong expressions used by Colonel Allhusen in the circular quoted by the noble Earl, for the corps which that officer commanded had been supplied with 40-pounder Armstrongs, and large guns and not carbines must be admitted to be the proper arm of Artillery; so far, therefore, from having been neglected, Colonel Allhusen's corps had been treated with particular favour. As soon as the arrangements had been completed, guns of a similar kind would be apportioned to the various districts—the numbers
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  being determined by the requirements of each district. He agreed entirely with what had fallen from the noble Viscount (Viscount Hardinge) with respect to Volunteer Field Artillery.
  EARL GREYsaid, that what was really required was that there should be in the hands of the Volunteers a sufficient supply of rifled guns. He hoped there would soon be a sufficient number of large and powerful guns on all our coasts to afford our Volunteers opportunities of practising with those arms.
  In answer to the Earl of MALMESBURY,
  LORD NORTHBROOKstated that the Militia Artillery had been by no means overlooked in the arrangements which had been made. The same attention would be paid to the Militia Artillery as to the Volunteer Artillery. Indeed, the former would even have to deal with larger guns, because they would, in time of war, be placed in garrisons where guns of great calibre were used.
  House adjourned at a quarter before Eight o'clock, to Monday next, Eleven o'clock