§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYrose, pursuant to Notice, to call attention to the guarantees which have been undertaken by this country, and to the military resources at the command of this country for fulfilling them; to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether any communications have passed with Foreign Governments with reference to those guarantees; and to move that the collection of guarantees published in 1859 should be reprinted, with the addition of any that have been contracted since that time? [Earl Granville, was not yet in his place, but arriving at this moment, the noble Marquess, after making allusion to the noble Earl's tardiness, proceeded] — My Lords: I do not think it necessary to offer any apology for calling your Lordships' attention to a most important matter connected with the foreign relations of this country, inasmuch as I think it will be admitted that this is a juncture of no common peculiarity, and no common moment. The whole of the old system of Europe may be said to have been swept away. We are looking into a future in which the equilibrium that governed Europe in past times has disappeared, and we have to reckon on new forces, new balances of power, possibly new enemies—I trust on new and strengthened alliances. This, at all events, is a time at which it is fit to ask the House and the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville) to review our position with respect to our foreign obligations. My Lords, I cannot think that your Lordships will be of opinion that the aspect of our relations with Foreign Powers is at present altogether satisfactory. We find ourselves in this peculiar position — that while all our leading authorities at home tell us our condition was never more satisfactory, and our influence never greater, every important organ of opinion abroad, whether French or Prussian, tells us we have effaced ourselves, and that our influence in Europe is nought. And certainly the events of the past year would rather seem to confirm the foreign view of our position than that which we are pleased to indulge in ourselves. There are three great Powers in the world now 1361 —Russia, Prussia, and America—and from their treatment of us we may very satisfactorily gather the condition in which we stand in the estimation of the world at large. Now, what do we find? We find that in a momentous matter Prussia has concluded a treaty defensible on no ground, and in utter contempt of our remonstrances. We find that Russia has taken the opportunity of tearing up the treaty which we imposed upon her in happier times. We find that America, in the Hall of her Representative Assembly, and in the residence of her chief Executive Officer, openly receives and honours those whom we had cast out as rebels. That is the condition in which our power and influence stand, so far as illustrated by those three Powers. I confess that it would be nothing but a gloomy prospect that I should ask you perhaps to consider, were I to enter on the general question of our foreign relations, and to compare our present position as regards other countries with that which we occupied in past times. It is not, however, with matters of mere sentiment that I desire to trouble you. Whether we exercise a great influence or a small one—whether our influence is of that material kind which our fathers were wont to value, or that great moral influence with which we are flattering ourselves, and which means our never being able to induce others to do what we want—these are, to a certain extent, matters of taste and sentiment. If the people of this country do not choose to occupy the position of those who went before them—if they prefer to lose the honour or sentimental tradition rather than incur the cost and risk which it would involve, there is little more to be said. What I am going to ask your Lordships' attention to is a matter of a more solid and practical character. We have been accused of being a shopkeeping nation. Now, I want your Lordships to examine your ledgers and see what is the condition of your obligations—to see, in commercial language, what are your liabilities and what are your assets. I want you just to look and count up the obligations you have incurred in the past, to calculate the results of those obligations, and to look round and see what are your means of satisfying them. Now, my Lords, what are those liabilities? It has been the practice of many Powers of Europe, 1362 on the conclusion of a treaty, to guarantee the resolutions to which they have come as to the territory it might assign to any particular Power. That was a dangerous game to play — a game to which all nations have committed themselves more or less, but none so much, or so frequently, as England. Our guarantees extend over the whole of Europe, and even into the other hemisphere. I will not follow them beyond the Atlantic, but will simply ask, what are the guarantees which we have undertaken in this quarter of the world? Beginning from the Westward, we have guaranteed the territory of Portugal, the territory of Belgium, of Switzerland, Greece, Turkey, and Sweden; and, to show your Lordships that this term guarantee is no word of uncertain significance, I will venture to read the terms in which two of these guarantees have been undertaken—so that you may know the exact extent of the obligations they involve. I will not quote any of the ancient guarantees, which, it may be said, belong to a system of politics that has passed by, but will confine myself to those entered into since the noble Earl opposite became a Member of the Legislature of this country. The first that I will ask your Lordships to look at is that which guarantees the territory of Sweden. It was undertaken during the Crimean War, in conjunction with the Emperor of the French. The Article by which we undertake to guarantee Sweden and Norway states that, in case Russia should attempt to obtain the cession or exchange of any part of the territories belonging to those Crowns, the King engages forthwith to apprize England and France, and that England and France engage to furnish him "sufficient" — mark the word—
Sufficient naval and military forces to co-operate with the naval and military forces of his said Majesty for the purpose of resisting the pretensions or aggressions of Russia,I will take another model of these guarantees, and that the most important into which we have entered, and the one which is most likely to be brought home to us by a breach of the conditions on which it depends. I refer to Turkey. The guarantee says—The high contracting parties guarantee, jointly and severally, the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, recorded in the Treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of March, 1856.1363 Your Lordships will notice the words "jointly and severally"—they are very important words. In a discussion on a recent guarantee a short time ago, it was shown that the guarantee was purely a joint one; that the execution of it could never be required unless all the parties who joined in it were prepared to join in executing it; and that, as the parties who were to join in executing it were the only parties at all likely to break it, it did not involve much danger. But this cannot be said of our guarantee with regard to Turkey. This guarantee is joint and several. If you stand alone—if, as Mr. Odo Russell said the other day, "with or without allies"—the infraction of the treaty on any point of the frontier of Turkey binds you in honour to interfere. From the moment this guarantee was entered into, the frontier of Turkey became to you as the frontier of England—indeed, something more, for you can deal with the frontier of England with loss but without dishonour, whereas you cannot abandon an inch of Turkish frontier without forfeiting your plighted honour. Now, in the presence of all these gigantic engagements to protect the territories of Portugal, Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, Greece, and Turkey, I wish to inquire what means you have at this moment—what means the Government propose to furnish — of executing the obligations you have undertaken. I will just state the forces with which you would have to deal. And here I must guard myself against being told that it is premature to assume that there will be any necessity for meeting our obligations. We hope the world will remain for a long time at peace; but had there been no danger of anybody attacking these territories you would never have entered into guarantees, and the very fact of our having concluded these guarantees obliges us to consider what we should do in case other Powers violated the frontier we have thus secured. We must, therefore, inquire what their power is? The countries principally likely to be attacked in case any Power was disposed to attack them, lie on the frontiers of Russia, Prussia, and Austria. I do not include France, for, I suppose, at the present moment it is unnecessary to inquire into its power, in the event of another war. The standing Army of Austria is 800,000 strong, its 1364 Reserve, is 300,000, and its Landwehr 200,000. Russia has a standing Army of 827,000 men, 410,000 local troops, and 229,000 irregulars. The field troops of North and South Germany number 670,000, their depôt troops 228,000, and their garrison troops 263,000. Austria has altogether 1,053,000 men, Russia 1,466,000, and Germany 1,161,000. Now, what have you got to meet this? I was very much struck in the debates, both in this and in the other House, by the readiness with which the Ministerial advocates always point to our fleet as a sufficient answer to all such questions. My noble Friend behind me was recently rebuked for not alluding to the fleet, and for not remembering that the fleet is our first line of defence. So, again, in discussing our military forces, it never seems to enter the mind of anyone that our fleet has anything else to do beyond defending the particular island on which we stand. If, however, you have entered into these guarantees, you must recollect that the frontiers of those countries are your own frontiers, and that so long as the boundaries and the guarantees exist you are bound to resist attack on them until you have released yourselves from your engagements. Of what use is it, then, to talk of the fleet? Of what value would the fleet be in defending the European or Asiatic frontier of Turkey, or in defending Sweden? Look at the history of the past. Was the fleet of much use in the siege of Sebastopol, or even in the Baltic during the Crimean War? So far as I know it, it did nothing towards the reduction of any great fortress or town on the Russian coast. It did nothing towards keeping troops in the North which Russia wanted in the South. We are too apt to be misled by the great things the fleet did during the great Revolutionary War. No doubt it was a powerful instrument in hampering and ultimately in subduing Napoleon; but why? We had then the power of declaring a general blockade, and of searching neutral ships for enemies' goods. In your reckless Utopianism you have flung those two weapons away, and your fleet can only blockade the particular port to which it is sent, or bombard any fortress which may happen to be on the coast. I believe that since the Declaration of Paris the fleet, valuable as it is for preventing an invasion of these shores, is 1365 almost valueless for any other purpose. I do not doubt the courage or vigour of French sailors; but we have seen how perfectly worthless the French fleet has teen during the deadly peril of their country. I believe there is no delusion more fatal to this country than to believe that, if we are called upon to sustain our foreign policy with respect to any one of these guarantees, our fleet is a first line of defence, if so, what have you to oppose to the millions of men of these European Powers? I believe we have 100,000 soldiers in these islands, or are to have when the Estimates are voted; 200,000 Militia and other irregular troops, and 150,000 Volunteers. But the Militia and Volunteers cannot leave these islands. For the purpose, therefore, of foreign action, your utmost strength is limited to 100,000 men. I do not intend to criticize their composition. I am perfectly willing to accept with thankfulness and with full credence the testimony of the illustrious Duke the Commander-in-Chief the other night to their efficiency; but I remember that at the same time he added that they were far too small for our needs at the present day—a statement very important coming from one in his position. It is absurd to suppose that you can sustain these guarantees with nothing but whatever you can spare from these 100,000 men. I know I shall be told that we do not, and never can, compete in numbers with the military monarchies of the Continent. No doubt; but I would venture to call your attention to another Power which proceeds on a totally different principle, and which, like you, refuses to compete with the great military monarchies of the Continent, and frames its policy accordingly. I am no great admirer of America; but I must say that in this matter of foreign policy there is a consistency and unity of purpose which we might well study. The Americans, it is true, have a smaller standing Army—not more, I believe, at present than 50,000 men—but then they do not pretend to share in the councils of other nations. They appear at no council board, and as they do not care to take part in the negotiation of any treaty they are burdened with none of those onerous guarantees. If you wish to share their immunity from danger you must also share their immunity from all responsibility for what occurs in 1366 Europe. Now, it is not easy to make this little "streak of silver sea" like the Atlantic. It is very difficult for us to keep apart from European affairs. I was going to say it is impossible—but when I have seen how readily we stood aside and witnessed a great nation crushed, I cannot say that it is impossible. We are taking up a position which is without example among the nations of the world. The art of war has received enormous development. Vast bodies of men are now raised which could not be raised in times past, and owing to the railway system every one of the Powers to whom we are likely to be opposed is capable of concentrating at a few weeks' notice upon a single point its whole military strength. They have recognized the change in the art of war, and how necessary it is to increase their power both of defence and offence. We have reduced both; and yet while we have refused to increase our military strength we refuse either to take the part of retiring from promises which we are unable to perform, or of ceasing to meddle with affairs which we are no longer able to influence. We are speaking with a double voice. We maintain the pretensions and hold the language handed down to us from another period when we had more spirit, and at the same time every nation in Europe knows that our military organization is such that we cannot act up to the promises we have made. We have been recently told on very high authority that the organization of our military system imposes upon us a rôle d' effacement.
§ EARL GRANVILLEWhat is the authority?
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYThe Moniteur of Versailles. Consequently a power of deliberation is all that is now left open to us in European affairs. It throws a doubt into all we may do. It is no use our maintaining a high tone when it is well known how far short our means fall of our great pretensions. There is great danger of our being at any moment in a difficult position. It is impossible to mistake the course of current events. We see that these small kingdoms which we have guaranteed are marked out by the destinies of the world for destruction. Almost every successive generation sees the absorption of one or other of them into a larger empire. The great organizations and greater means of 1367 locomotion of the present day mark out the future to be one of great empires. The small Powers will have hard work to live at all. These guarantees, therefore, will be no sinecure. These territories we have guaranteed are, of all others, the very territories that are likely to be attacked. Who will say that Sweden, and Turkey, and Belgium, and Portugal are likely to be the most long-lived among European nations? We know that the military storms of this era do not give much notice. They burst upon us suddenly when we least expect them; and with our onerous obligations, and our minute military force, we may at any moment be put in the dilemma of either sacrificing our national honour or of rushing on to certain defeat. I do not think that defeat is likely to be the horn of the dilemma we should adopt. My fear is that when the extremity comes we shall look at the obligation, turn it round and round, talk very big, lecture one side or the other, and then when Europe cries shame on us, we shall congratulate ourselves at home upon the moral pinnacle on which we stand. That of late years has generally been our part when we have had inconvenient obligations to encounter, and it will increasingly be our part in the future. At all events, let us face these things now. This is a period above all others when this subject can be entertained by Her Majesty's Government. The treaties which inflict upon us the most burdensome guarantees are at this moment under discussion at the council table of Europe, and a Congress at which others will be brought forward is likely to be summoned very shortly. I think it is now right to ask the Government to look boldly at the future—no longer to postpone their decision to the last extremity; to make up their minds whether anything is to be done to provide forces adequate to fulfil these obligations, or whether they intend to ask other Powers to allow them to withdraw from, or modify them. Unless they come to some determination—if they continue this system, which I must call one of permanent braggadocio—if they will not adapt their promises to their powers, or their powers to their promises, I foresee a time of terrible humiliation to this country which may shake our institutions to their centres. Therefore it is that I now venture to ask the noble Earl to give us some as 1368 surance of his policy in this respect, and now, while the nations of Europe are in council as to the future aspect which the political whole of Europe is to assume, not to forget the guarantees which are contained in this book, but to do something to spare us the terrible humiliation which will come upon us if the day should arrive for meeting, with such a force as the Estimates now present, the great military monarchies of Europe. The noble Marquess concluded by asking the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether any communications have passed with Foreign Governments with reference to these guarantees, and his Motion?
§ Moved, "That the collection of Guarantees published in 1859 should be reprinted, with the addition of any that have been contracted since that time."—(The Marquess of Salisbury.)
§ EARL GRANVILLEMy Lords, the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) has made a very remarkable speech, and has put most important questions connected with the welfare of this country. The noble Marquess was so anxious to make the speech that he gave notice of a Motion four days before he had made up his mind what the Question he should put to the Government should be; and such was his haste that even this evening he complained of my not being in my place before the hour at which, according to the forms of the House, the Orders of the Day are called on. There are one or two things I wish to say with regard to the speech. One is, that I certainly recognized, except in a very few sentences, nothing of party spirit in it. The other is, that the noble Marquess has not shown the inconsistency which some of the critics of Her Majesty's Government have done, who have declared that we are utterly unprepared for war, and yet in the same breath have complained that we did not use language and do things which must inevitably have led to that result. I would, however, appeal to your Lordships whether, in the exaggeration which characterized almost every portion of the noble Marquess's speech, it is likely to be of utility in any national point of view. It was once remarked by a very eloquent and witty man that the peculiarity of this country was that we were in the habit of laying ourselves upon the dissecting-table and cutting down to the very bone in the face of Europe and all 1369 the world. I believe that the principle is a good one; but when carried to a false and exaggerated extent, the only effect it has is to give an impression very far from the truth as to the position of this country in the eyes of Europe. I think the noble Marquess, in introducing this subject, might have avoided his preface about the miserable position this country holds in Europe—about our being effaced from the councils of the world, and the impossibility of our exercising any influence for any good purpose. The noble Marquess, on my asking the authority for this description, told us it was The Moniteur Officiel, of Versailles, which said this. Now, it is rather remarkable that that sentence was in a non-official article in that journal, and that the next day the Foreign Minister of Germany expressed his regret to Mr. Odo Russell that such an article had appeared without his knowledge; and he took the important step, certainly not at our request, of putting a censorship on the non-official articles of that newspaper. The noble Marquess even condescended to twit us with being considered a nation of shopkeepers. Now, if our being a nation of shopkeepers means that we love peace, order, liberty, and industry, I admit the accusation; but if it means that we flinch from doing that which the honour and interest of the country require us to do, I entirely repudiate it. The noble Marquess throws it in our face as a term applicable to us because in a great and deadly struggle—
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYMay I interrupt the noble Earl? I did not use the term as one of reproach. I adopted it as a common figure of speech.
§ EARL GRANVILLEI really do not think that, when the noble Marquess quoted the phrase, as showing the estimation in which we were held all over Europe, it was with any other view than that which I have pointed out; but if he disclaims it, I am glad to have him on my side so far. I beg leave to say, for the benefit of others who have used it in the sense I have described, taunting us because we have maintained a fair and impartial neutrality during the struggle which we vainly attempted to prevent, that it was applied to us by a great military genius whose fall was very much accelerated by the most extravagant expenditure, both of blood and treasure, 1370 which up to that time any nation had ever made. I say, therefore, that the re-pointing of it as a term of reproach is perfectly ridiculous as applicable to a judicious and politic course, and to the policy which, when we first declared it in Parliament, was almost unanimously approved by both Houses and by the country. I perfectly admit that in this country remarks are made about our descending to the position of a second or third-rate Power. I admit that this sort of language has been repeated abroad, in France and Germany, and in some of the neutral States; but when I seek tangible proofs of it I fail altogether to find that to be the estimation in which we are held on the Continent. Let us look first to the neutrals. With one neutral there was, for a moment, an incident of a very painful character—I allude to the Circular of Prince Gortchakoff; but whatever there was of offensive in the mode of that declaration was offensive in like manner to both the belligerents. I say both advisedly, for I believe that whatever understanding there might have been between the two countries, as to a possible revision of the Treaty of 1856, the mode was surprising and distasteful to both the belligerents. It was the same matter of offence to every other country of Europe, and it has been met in a way common to us as well as other countries. I would point out a slight incident with regard to it. We were the first to complain, and to assert that we would not admit what had been done by Russia; and the very fact of Russia going into a Conference, where the condition which we put on the entrance into the Conference was a withdrawal of the declaration she had made proves a good deal. What is more—although two Governments in Europe were desirous that the Conference should be held in their capital, and although we expressed no wish whatever, and even put London as the last alternative to other places, the European Governments unanimously decided that London was the proper place for holding it. With regard to other neutrals, does the noble Marquess rely entirely on a phrase in an article published by a small French paper? Has he read the Papers laid before Parliament, and can he conscientiously say that, on the part of the neutral Powers, a feeling has been shown of our being effaced, and of no account 1371 in the councils of Europe? It is impossible not to remark the courteous and conciliatory tone they have displayed towards us, their anxiety to know our views upon every subject, their wish to conform as much as possible to our policy, and their always proposing to us to put ourselves in the first rank with regard to anything to be done. This is evidently the estimation in which we are held in Europe, and we are not to judge in the matter from chaffing articles in newspapers. With regard to the belligerents, take Prussia. I am sorry to say there has been a feeling of great dissatisfaction with us on the part both of Germany and France. I remember Lord Clarendon speaking in this House four years ago on the disadvantages to us of a war between France and Prussia. He pointed out not only the great difficulty of our avoiding being dragged into the war—which we fortunately have not been—but said it appeared to him almost impossible that the most hostile feelings should not be excited on the part of the belligerents if we performed our duties strictly and impartially as a neutral Power. The result has verified his prophetic sagacity to a certain extent, and I certainly expected it last year. Has Prussia, however, treated us with the contempt which is alleged? She has complained of certain things—such as the export of arms. I do not say that was reasonable on the part of statesmen; but it was most natural that some irritation should exist, such as we ourselves felt, to some extent, under similar circumstances. I have from the first known the firm declaration of Germany, that as it was belligerents who made war, it was the belligerents who should make peace. I could hardly understand myself how men so strong with regard to military means, so powerful with regard to diplomacy, should be so sensitively fearful even of appearing to yield to any advice tendered in a friendly manner by Powers who would have been inclined to act in that manner; but if there is any inference to be drawn from it—if that fear has been expressly shown to England more than to any other Power—it is certainly an indirect compliment in itself, and does not, in the slightest degree, show what the feeling would be towards small and insignificant States which should offer advice without any possible means of enforcing it. Both 1372 France and Germany have shown an incapability of understanding how, notwithstanding our neutrality, we could wish to be on friendly relations with the other belligerent without being hostile to them; but, with this exception, I really am not aware of any one proceeding on the part of Germany which justifies the view taken by the noble Marquess. When an unfortunate incident occurred on the Seine, nothing could be more prompt or courteous than the explanations made by Prussia; and the Correspondence on the Table with regard to one of the guarantees to which we are parties does not show that we have much to complain of in the tone which Germany has adopted towards us in that Correspondence. There is another incidence of some importance—the fact of Mr. Odo Russell having, for the last three months, been at the German head quarters at Versailles, he being the only diplomatic Representative there of any European Power. He has been received, with singular courtesy and cordiality—a good deal owing to his personal merit, his great ability, knowledge, and conciliatory manner; but still I cannot believe that the exception made in that way can be regarded as otherwise than a compliment to this country. With regard to France, her position of calamity and her reverses naturally inspired more dissatisfaction on her part. She is angry with us, not unnaturally, again—though I believe our policy was perfectly just and right—for not flying to her assistance when she was in difficult circumstances; but in none of her appeals to us is there a trace of her thinking us feeble and useless. At one time she assures us that one word from us would be sufficient; at another time she asks us to give more force and strength to our appeal, saying that if we did so she could succeed and conquer the enemy. Are these evidences of the feebleness or weakness of this country? I entirely deny that we have effaced ourselves, as the noble Marquess says. The noble Marquess has given a description of the different guarantees, and our ability to execute them; and in that description he said things which I cannot possibly agree to. There was great exaggeration in his description of international law. I remember, four years ago, when some of us were complaining of an explanation of treaty obligations which we 1373 thought extraordinary, a noble Earl opposite (Earl Grey) reproved some of us for continuing the discussion, as one which it was very undesirable to continue. I believe the remark applies still more strongly to a person having an official position, who should go and lay down general principles as to the application of different liabilities. It is not only not my duty to do that, but it would be acting contrary to my duty to give any definition of the sort. A Turkish statesman, when asked by three great European officials as to a certain doubtful alternative, said—"When a lady is in an interesting condition, it is impossible for me to tell whether the child will be a boy or a girl, and I decline to answer the question until the child is born." If any of those dilemmas occur which the noble Marquess dwelt upon, it will be our duty strictly to recognize whatever obligations we are under, and then to concert with our allies—or, if there is any obligation resting on us exclusively, to consider by ourselves—the means best adapted to the honour and interest of the country. No doubt these treaties exist, one of the most stringent being the Treaty entered into 400 years ago with Portugal; and they come down to the Treaty respecting Luxemburg, which the noble Marquess omitted to mention, the stringency of which, as explained by the Government of that day, is of an infinitesimal character. The noble Marquess asks if there has been any Correspondence with Foreign Powers with reference to these guarantees? There has been Correspondence on the subject of these guarantees from the time of the Portugese Treaty 400 years ago, and there has lately been Correspondence respecting the Luxemberg Treaty, which has been already placed on the Table, as also has the Correspondence respecting the Treaty of 1856, which preceded the Conference. I am not aware of any other Correspondence which has passed under the present Government, to which, I presume, his Question is confined. I entirely deny the noble Marquess's description of the helplessness of this country. We have done things during the last six months—I have mentioned three—which would have been eminently culpable in the Government had we believed that we were so impotent, both for offence and defence, as the noble Marquess has re 1374 presented us to be in the opinion of all foreign nations. I will not enter into the question of our Army preparations, for that was discussed here a few nights ago by competent authorities, and we shall have opportunities, probably, of discussing in detail the measures which the Government have thought right to introduce to strengthen what now exists; but I deny that we are in a position of incapacity to fulfil the engagements we have entered into and the language we have held. As to our system of "permanent braggadocio," I was accused the other day—not, I think, with much force—of having used some of those conventional phrases of courtesy, which, avoiding irritating, do not in the slightest degree weaken the force or clearness of what is said; but I challenge the noble Marquess to produce anything which I wrote by the advice of my Colleagues bearing the least semblance of braggadocio, or containing a word to which I do not now implicitly adhere. We adopted a certain policy last year, and endeavoured to adapt it to circumstances as they arose, I am told with great success—not in stopping the war, which I believe it was utterly impossible for us to stop, unless we had rushed into the fight ourselves, and then, of course, no one could tell what would have happened—but success in keeping this country out of entanglement. I believe we have contributed also, in some degree, to localize the war, and prevent its becoming a universal conflagration. The noble Marquess derided the usefulness of our Navy. Now, three days after hearing a noble and gallant Admiral describe our Navy as in a perilous condition, I met one of the most eminent men of the United States, Commodore Roberts, who has been sent here, not exactly as naval attaché, but as inspector of the navies of Europe. He told me he had heard these criticisms with astonishment, for he was struck with the admirable state of our Navy, and its immense superiority to all the other navies with which he was acquainted. I asked his permission to mention this, which he frankly gave; and when you get this sort of independent observation in support of the official declarations of the Government, I trust neither your Lordships nor the public will go to bed at night with the nightmare created by the noble Mar 1375 quess's speech. I have no objection to the Motion the noble Marquess has made; but I thought it necessary to say thus much in answer to his exaggerated statements.
§ THE EARL OF MALMESBURYMy Lords, I was surprised to hear the noble Earl reproach my noble Friend (the Marquess of Salisbury) with indecent hurry in bringing forward this subject, for I began to think that it was almost a disrespect to the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs for the House to have sat a month without taking more notice of his important Department, at a time when Europe is in an unparalleled condition; and had not my noble Friend brought the question forward, I think I could not have abstained from doing so myself. During the whole of my life—and that is now not a very short one—I have never remembered political international morality at so low a standard. This decadence of political morality began with the breach, in the most inexcusable manner, of the Treaty of 1852, which was drawn up by Lord Palmerston, approved of by the noble Earl opposite (Earl Russell), then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and signed by me, and from that moment Europe has been a scene of confusion. My Lords, this first act of aggression — of dishonesty, I will call it—was the invasion of Denmark; and I remember the late Lord Palmerston saying to me on that occasion—I wrote down his words afterwards—"This is the worst thing I have ever yet seen; but it will bring on worse things still." He spoke a prophecy which has been fulfilled. That invasion of Denmark did not profit those who expected to profit by it, because Prussia took care that it should not, that being her second breach of faith in the matter. Then came the war between Austria and Prussia — a war so dishonourable, I think, to both parties, and which set a bad example to other nations—and which I cannot help thinking has, like many other bad examples, been followed. What was the cause of this war between France and Germany? Napoleon III., believing that he would be the next person attacked, anticipated—exactly as he did when he made his coup d'état in Paris—the attack that would be made on him by Prussia. He put on one side all respect for the covenant of nations and for international agreements, as 1376 made in 1856, and, as your Lordships know, he has been severely punished for a breach of these, when, at the time, he had received no adequate insult from Prussia to justify him. This brings me to the remark of my noble Friend opposite (Earl Granville), who said he believed it was impossible to stop this war. I will do my noble Friend the justice to admit that, once the war began, it was impossible to stop it; and for this reason—because the fortune of the war all ran in one way, and so rapidly that it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to mediate between the belligerents. If the victories had been alternate, or anything like drawn battles, then my noble Friend might have stepped in to stay the slaughter, and might, perhaps, have stopped the war. But I am not so sure that he might not have averted it originally. That he could have averted it eventually, perhaps, was doubtful; but, still, every moment gained in diplomacy is a blessing to mankind. Every year added to the duration of peace is of immense advantage, because through the death of some one man, or through some other event, you may hope to see an outbreak of hostilities prevented. An historical fact occurred in 1859, when the late Lord Derby's Government was in office, and I was myself at the Department over which my noble Friend now presides. At that time the Italian War was about to break out. We, of course, desired to settle the difference between Austria and Italy by a Conference. The Emperor Napoleon was most eager for that war, because he had his dynastic reasons for wishing it. Your Lordships may depend upon it that he was more eager to go to war at that time, and to join Count Cavour in attacking Austria and emancipating Northern Italy, than he was to commence hostilities against Prussia a few months ago. After extensive correspondence and great anxiety on the subject, we did prevail on the Emperor Napoleon to agree to disarm himself, and to oblige Count Cavour to disarm, and refer the questions in dispute to a Conference; and if Austria had not madly and precipitately rushed into Piedmont, that war, so far as the French Emperor was concerned, would never have happened. I say this because it is just to the Emperor Napoleon, who has been the best ally to this country of all Sovereigns who ever sat on the 1377 Throne of France, and in whom, therefore, whatever we may think of his course since, we ought to feel some grateful interest—I say this in justice to him because it proves that he was amenable to the representations of the British Government, to whom he was a firm ally. Therefore, I do not agree entirely in what my noble Friend said as to its being absolutely impossible to have averted the war. I may observe that we found the Emperor Napoleon amenable to two arguments—first of all, to the argument that he did not fight with the other powers of Europe upon equal terms — that the Emperor of Austria might lose half-a-dozen battles and not lose his Empire or his Crown, whereas he staked everything on the fate of one battle. The second argument was that if he defeated Austria completely, it was impossible to suppose that the rest of Germany would stand quiet and allow her to be destroyed. Therefore, if in the more recent case it had been properly shown, to him not only that he risked his dynasty by this wilful war, but also that Russia would not have allowed him, even if he had gained some victories, to take possession of Prussia, that might have induced him to change his mind, or, at all events, to wait till he was attacked. It may, my Lords, be said that these are mere speculations on the past; but I have adverted to them in consequence of the observation of my noble Friend opposite that it was impossible to stop the war. The main object of the speech of my noble Friend behind me (the Marquess of Salisbury) had reference to our guarantees towards foreign States. No doubt, our honour is involved in those guarantees, and I confess that I should have been better pleased if my noble Friend opposite (Earl Granville) had risen in his place to-night and boldly said that England was bound to stand by her guarantees, and that she would stand by them. My noble Friend opposite did not say that: he left us to guess it; for I do not for a moment think he meant to throw doubt on those guarantees. They are of various descriptions. Some of them do not involve our own national interest, or our own self-defence and security; but others, again, do directly involve the safety and security of this country. The guarantee of Belgium, for instance, is as necessary for the se 1378 curity of England, in my opinion, and in the opinion of the greatest statesmen who are gone, as that which has been called our "silver streak of sea." Antwerp was described by the great Napoleon himself as a pistol held at the head of England by whoever possessed it. I know that has been doubted by some persons, and among them by a very able and gallant officer, Captain Sherard Osborn, who has published his views that Antwerp is no longer of the same consequence to us that it used to be; but he has not proved his case. We have no guarantee in respect to Holland; but is it to be supposed that if Holland were invaded we should not defend her, because we have no guarantee? Mr. Pitt and Lord Palmerston placed the highest value on the independence of Holland. The state of Europe, and the state of morality among Governments, is such that we cannot answer for a single day that they will not make might right at any moment or at any point. Recollect the negotiations which occurred—and they were by no means fictitious, but authentic negotiations—between Count Bismarck and the Emperor Napoleon with regard to the annexation between them of Holland and Belgium, and that they should each defend their share of the spoil against all comers. Your Lordships do not suppose that men of that position and note talk over plans of that sort like school girls talking about their sweethearts, just for the pleasure of chatting? Do you suppose these ideas were not in the brains of those two able men as possibilities, and that the only thing which prevented their maturity was that it suited neither party to carry them further at that time? Well, my noble Friend behind me (the Marquess of Salisbury) asks my noble Friend opposite—"Are you ready to support your guarantees, and are you strong enough to defend them?" My noble Friend opposite says—"We are strong enough; we have a great Navy." But is it not most extraordinary that my noble Friend—a Member of the Cabinet, and a most important Member—knowing what he must have known of the state of Europe last year, should have allowed the Army to be reduced to such a degree as it has been? The Government then, it appears, regrets what has been done, and has placed the Army at a higher strength; but it is impos 1379 sible to suppose that strength is equal to maintaining our guarantees affecting Belgium and other countries; and therefore, considering the noble Earl has not said that we will stand by these guarantees, his speech will very much increase the difficulty of maintaining them, and very much alarm those who believe that the safety and honour of England are involved in maintaining them. My noble Friend's language is much less strong than it was six months ago, because we understood then from him that he did regard the guarantee respecting Belgium as one which England should never shirk. I cannot help saying, then, that I am not at all satisfied with the answer of my noble Friend opposite. I am one of those who believe that this country is bound strictly to maintain whatever covenants she has entered into with other nations; and, consequently, that it is our duty — our bounden duty — to provide ourselves with such a force as will enable us to do so with that lofty spirit which has ever characterized us.
§ EARL GRANVILLEOne word, in explanation regarding the treaty obligation as to Belgium. I certainly decline giving general answers to specific cases put by the noble Marquess; but the noble Lord forgets that the treaty obligation entered into at the end of last summer with regard to Belgium was exactly one of those engagements which I said we entered into in the belief that we could carry them out; and I added that I defied the noble Marquess to show that we used any words to which we do not adhere.
THE EARL OF LAUDERDALEsaid, as the Navy had been alluded to, he thought it right to make a few remarks. He quite agreed with the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) that the fleet did little in the Baltic and the Crimea; and there was good reason for it, for the guns and shot which they carried were perfectly useless against stone walls or granite. There was not a broadside gun that carried solid shot, and anybody who knew anything of our naval guns knew that hollow shot were perfectly useless against granite forts. That would sufficiently account for the Navy doing nothing. But as an instance which lately occurred he might mention that the Report of the French Admiral who commanded the French fleet in the North Sea, and which 1380 did comparatively nothing, gave the reason why. The Admiral said—"I had not a ship with me with which I could go near their shores." Now, he was sent to carry on coast operations, and if he was not supplied with ships that could go near the shore what could he do? The Admiral showed that it was not the fault of the French officers or the men, as the officers and men from the ships behaved admirably when defending Paris. He (the Earl of Lauderdale) had heard a great deal said about our fleet; but he believed that at the present moment our fleet was much in the same condition as the French. We had hardly a single armour vessel afloat for coast and harbour operations; hardly a vessel fit to go in shore and attack forts. He was glad to hear that a distinguished American officer had found out that we had a very powerful fleet. It was true we had about 40 iron-clads; but they all drew from 24 to 26 or 27 feet of water. Now, these vessels were not fit for coast operations. What we required was a very large number of vessels fitted for operations in shore. Of armour-plated vessels drawing less than 16 feet of water we had hardly any, except the class of vessels called gunboats. There was no doubt that our fleet consisted of very powerful ships, but it was a mistake to suppose that because these 40 vessels were armour-plated that they were fit to attack forts. He did not think that out of the 40 we had above 10 which were shot-proof against guns of 12 tons or upwards. He did not believe that the Navy was in such a state as the public supposed it to be. We were not in a state to defend our own coasts or forts, or to attack an enemy's. They knew that some 200,000 men could be collected on the opposite coast in a very few days, and as the ports opposite had each 20 or 30 large ships at command, each ship capable of transporting 800 to 1,000 men, the work of transhipment would not fail on that ground.
EARL GREY, in reply, acknowledged that the present would be an inopportune moment for discussing the conduct of England during the war just closed, but hoped some noble Lord would bring the matter forward before the Session was over.
§ Motion agreed to. (No. 33.)