HL Deb 29 June 1871 vol 207 cc729-41
LORD ORANMORE AND BROWNE

said, that in rising to move the Address to Her Majesty, of which he had given Notice, he was desirous of explaining to their Lordships why he had done so, notwithstanding that the subject had so recently been discussed in that House. The Resolution which was then brought before their Lordships by the noble Earl (Earl Russell) was so framed that their Lordships could not come to any issue on the question it raised, and therefore he thought it desirable that he should himself, in default of some more competent person, move a Resolution capable of being brought to a more definite conclusion. Moveover, the constitution of the Commission which had framed the Treaty was such that from the Leaders of the Opposition the House was nearly sure to hear but an uncertain sound. He thought all who heard or read the debate would agree that, though like every debate in which the Leaders of the House took part, it was ably conducted, it was apologetic on the part of the Government, and wanting in purpose on the part of the Opposition. The only exceptions to this were the noble Earl (Earl Russell) who brought forward the Motion, and the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury), who never spoke without putting pith in what he said. The condemnation of the Treaty by the noble Earl was plain and straightforward; it had the old John Bull ring, which once was so grateful to English ears, but which was now thought coarse and unrefined. The country would be grateful to him for not weighing the interests of party in the balance with national honour, and the condemnation of the Treaty by the noble Earl was the strongest evidence of its unworthiness, for ever since Her Majesty's Government had been in office he had given them his unqualified support. The noble Earl (the Earl of Derby), who was formerly Minister for Foreign Affairs under a Conservative Government, though he condemned the Treaty, yet recommended their Lordships not to take further action, because the other House would approve this or any other treaty that the Government might submit to it. Now, with every deference for the high authority of the noble Earl, he must domur to the wisdom of such a course, for it would reduce this House from its position as a branch of the Legislature to an office for the registry of the decrees of the other House. It was this die-away policy which was spoken of by the right hon. Member for Birmingham when he said—"It's not necessary to meddle with the Lords—they are dying a natural death." If their Lordships acted only on party views, or those of expediency, the country would not support them; but if they acted on their honest convictions of the responsibilities of their high position all friends of order, whatever their politics, would rally round them. Though still at a loss to understand it to be constitutional for the Crown to agree without the consent of Parliament to pay a large sum of money, he (Lord Oranmore and Browne) did not seek to abrogate the Treaty, but to condemn the policy which accepted it as contrary to the honour and dignity of this country. He would remind their Lordships that only a few nights back the noble Earl (Earl Granville) stated, in support of the Convention of Paris, that it had never been censured by a vote of either House of Parliament. Though confident that the reasons for condemning this Treaty were very strong, they might, from being feebly put, appear weak; and he would, therefore, confine himself to a plain statement of the facts of the case. The first Article of the Treaty expressed regret for the escape, under whatever circumstances, of the Alabama and other vessels from British ports; whereas the Memorandum drawn by the late Lord Clarendon in reply to Mr. Fish, dated the 6th of November, 1869, stated that the fact was that only one vessel, the probable intended belligerent character of which the British Government had had any evidence, escaped. The noble Earl, in his first Instruction, dated the 9th of February, accepted this view as the bases of negotiations, and authorized an expression of regret for the escape of the Alabama. Now, even with regard to the Alabama, Lord Clarendon had quoted a very remarkable judgment of an American Judge, Judge Storey, which he held to apply to that vessel, in which that learned Judge said— There is nothing in our laws or in the law of nations that forbids our citizens from sending armed vessels as well as munitions of war to foreign ports for sale. It is a commercial venture which no nation is bound to prohibit, and which only exposes the persons engaged in it to the penalty of confiscation. Lord Clarendon also called attention to the remarkable fact that Mr. Adams urged the captain of a Federal ship to pursue the Alabama, and that he refused to do so; at which Mr. Adams expressed the greatest indignation in a despatch to his Government; and, again, that the United States ship San Jacinto, when blockading the Alabama in the French port of St. Pierre, let her slip away at night from under her bows. Was this country to pay for the neglect of American cruisers? Under these circumstances Her Majesty's Government took the part of a humble friend in expressing regret for the escape of the Alabama; but in expressing regret with regard to the other vessels Her Majesty's Government accepted a position at once humiliating and contrary to the dignity and honour of this country. The terms of his Resolution were not lightly chosen. They were the words of the late Lord Clarendon, and so had the sanction of every Member of the present Cabinet. They were contained in the reply to Mr. Reverdy Johnson's request to re-consider the terms of the Convention then agreed on, with the view to include the claims of the Government of the United States; and if he deemed such a charge contrary to the honour and dignity of this country how would he have found terms sufficiently strong to condemn the provisions of this Treaty? Assuredly the nation was daily feeling the loss of statesmen of his calibre? The sixth Article of the Treaty appeared to him to be an example of diplomatic prowess as exceptional as it was unprecedented and dangerous. It contained an absolute surrender of every point for which the present and every preceding Government of this country had contended. The noble Marquess who signed this Treaty (the Marquess of Ripon) and the noble Duke the President of the India Board (the Duke of Argyll) contended that its conditions resulted from the advance of ideas on international duties. Lord Clarendon's Minute in reply to Mr. Fish was the last and most complete reply to the claims put forward by the Government of the United States; but he found nothing in it showing the advance of ideas referred to, but only a reiteration of the same principles that had been supported by every preceding Foreign Minister. He accepted the principle of arbitration as agreed to by his predecessor, which was a great concession, for it allowed our international obligations to be judged, not by our own municipal law, not by the municipal law of the United States, but according to the very undefined principles of International Law; but he never contemplated the possibility of the Government of this country being a party to make rules by which the arbitrators were to be guided, which defined acts as contrary to International Law which were never held to be so before, and gave them a retrospective effect, rendering this country liable to heavy penalties. When arbitration with rules having a retrospective effect was proposed on the 8th of March by the American Commissioners, our Commissioners had no hesitation in declining to entertain such a proposition as contrary to their instructions, and it was only after a month's delay that Her Majesty's Government sent instructions to agree to them. He thought it quite natural that the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Ripon) should at the Cobdon Club the other night explain that the conditions were not "humiliating," and that he should pass quickly over the present results, which were definite, and draw the attention of his hearers to the indefinite future.

THE MARQUESS OF RIPON

explained that what he had said on the occasion referred to was that the Treaty was a perfectly fair one on both sides, and that it was not in any degree humiliating.

LORD ORANMORE AND BROWNE

continued. The taxpayers of this country would have to buy the goodwill of our American cousins at a cost at least of £10,000,000, which might probably amount to nearly £13,000,000, owing to the engagement to pay the expenses of American cruisers; and he believed there was no precedent for any such payment except after a disastrous war, such as had recently occurred to a neighbouring country. The supporters of this Treaty laid great stress on the precedent of arbitration accepted by this Treaty. That principle would be readily accepted in all cases where one party, as in this, laid down rules that virtually prejudged the case, and the other agreed to abide by them; but lawyers would know that arbitrations were often only the beginning of litigation. He could not divine any reasons which induced the noble Earl (Earl Granville) so suddenly to change the instructions he had first given to our Commissioners and to agree to the terms dictated by the American Commissioners, unless that he had accepted the view suggested by the noble Marquess a few nights since that his duties as Foreign Minister had ceased—and, in fact, these negotiations were virtually conducted as President of the Board of Trade, and that in this capacity he accepted the "peace-at-all-price policy" as that which was necessary to protect commercial interests. He would now endeavour to convince their Lordships that this principle, as carried out in this Treaty, would not contribute to establish good relations with the United States, but must rather complicate them. What did this Treaty do with the question—in the opinion of the noble Secretary for Foreign Affairs the most urgent of all—of the American Fisheries? Our Commissioners pressed again and again on those of the United States the renewal of the Reciprocity Treaty, which was as often declined, and all we obtained was the settlement by arbitration of what sum the United States' Government were to pay for the value of the Fisheries. But he believed that the Dominion declined altogether to sell their rights; so this, the most urgent question of all, existed in a more irritating form than ever. Then the Government of the Dominion urged on our Government to obtain a settlement of their claims for the Fenian raids; and he believed there was nothing clearer in International Law than that a Government was bound to prevent filibustering expeditions by land, for the preparations for them could not be concealed. Our Commissioners very properly urged the consideration of these claims, but the Commissioners of the United States insisted on entirely ignoring them; and again we submitted to their dictum. But by our "friendly" conduct we were to secure good relations with our American cousins. Let their Lordships consider whether, according to any estimate we could form of the political institutions or of the character of that great people, this most desirable end was to be gained by that Treaty? No one was more alive than he was to the conviction that no honourable means should be left untried to secure it—nay, more, he was convinced that American statesmen had this same wish; but in the States elections were constantly recurring, and there were two votes to be secured—the vote of those who wished to carry out to its fullest extent the Monroe doctrine, and the vote of his (Lord Oranmore and Browne's) countrymen. The former coveted Canada; the latter, he was sorry to say, could only be gained by a demonstration of hostile feeling to this country. Thus, a grievance must be created against this country, and the more we yielded to unjust demands the more would be demanded, and even a coward would fight when driven to the wall. As between individuals, so between nations. Friendship could not exist save with mutual respect; a weak yielding to unjust demands would not command this. They all remembered the courage and determination the Northerners showed to maintain their institutions; they spared no sacrifice of life or property to maintain the integrity of their country. So high-spirited itself, could America respect our humility? What Government was more susceptible in taking offence, or more careless in giving it than the American? Their Minister remonstrated against the noble Earl (Earl Russell) receiving privately the representatives of the Confederate States, though at that moment they had an army of 500,000 men, and carried on the contest for more than four years. They objected to an English vessel saving the survivors of the Shenandoah from a watery grave. But the other day, when Her Majesty's Government sent the Fenian convicts in state cabins to America, the Congress passed an address of sympathy and congratulation to them, and the President gave them a public reception. The National Press in Ireland stated, and the Press of America re-echoed, and most impartial men accepted the fact, that the Fenian "scare" was the real cause of the exceptional legislation of the last two Sessions. So the Prime Minister had acknowledged it to be; and perhaps it was one of the elements that caused the noble Earl (Earl Granville) to make advances to the United States. He feared the people of the United States might consider that the public reception of the Fenian convicts had no slight influence in producing the large concessions contained in that Treaty. But great benefits were to accrue to our commerce in future. Unable to protect our own commerce, we had bribed the Americans not to molest us. Without the bribe the Government of the United States absolutely declined to accept these rules. So America's position was certain present gain, whatever might be future results; ours was certain present loss, with a most problematical gain in the future. Now, acknowledging that the Government of the States was quite as likely to be bound by Treaties as other countries, was it not our experience that Treaty obligations were held but light when they could be conveniently thrown off? The Treaty of Vienna lasted as long as the exhaustion caused by a long war was felt—no longer. The Treaty of Paris was ignored because it was disagreeable to the people of Russia. Would the Treaty of Washington endure if its provisions became inconvenient or disagreeable to the people of the United States? The results of this Treaty were, then, these—We had accepted a position so humiliating as to encourage aggression; we had given just offence to our colonies by not protecting their interests; while the most irritating question—the Fisheries—was in a more irritating position than ever. The people of this country, occupied with questions of domestic politics, took the Treaty on trust; but when they felt the pressure of the additional taxation caused by it they would be justly indignant. They had always been ready when called on to give their lives and their money to protect their national honour, and when they perceived that honour had been sacrificed they would not only blame Ministers who made the Treaty, but would accept it as an evidence of the incapacity of our statesmen and of a break-down in our institutions—a result most unfortunate and dangerous. He could not, in conclusion, better describe the effect of such a policy on the public mind of Europe than by reading an extract quoted in The Times from a leading German paper— The result is that England has become absolutely powerless in all international matters. Formerly she was listened to by kings and generals, now her words are received courteously, but half contemptuously. What she guarantees is rather endangered than made secure by her signature. This state of things has given pain to a small but important part of the nation, who look to the present with shame, and to the future with despair.

Moved, "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty conveying the deep regret felt by this House at Her Majesty's having been advised to sign a Treaty with the United States which is unbecoming the honour and dignity of this country." — (The Lord Oranmore and Browne.)

THE EARL OF AIRLIE

said, he must apologize to their Lordships for rising to offer a few remarks on this subject, after the exhaustive discussion it had undergone in the House very recently; but he thought it might, perhaps, not be altogether undesirable that some Member on that—the Ministerial—side of the House, who was not bound by official ties to defend the acts of the Government, should be allowed to express fairly and unreservedly his opinion on that most important question. He hoped the noble Lord who had just sat down (Lord Oranmore and Browne) would not deem him wanting in respect if he said he did not think that he had raised any absolutely new points that evening. The noble Lord objected to the expression of regret and to what he called the apology for the escape of the Alabama and other vessels from our shores; but the truth was there had been no apology at all made. We had expressed regret at the disastrous war from which France had so greatly suffered; but nobody would suppose, because we expressed regret at its occurrence, that we were responsible for that war. It appeared to him to be a most natural thing that, these vessels having escaped from our waters and committed depredations against the commerce of a friendly Power, we should feel regret at that fact, and feeling such regret, why should we be ashamed or afraid to express it? Three causes—the repeal of the Navigation Laws, the Declaration of Paris in 1856 that the flag covered the cargo, and the greatly increased rapidity with which commercial operations were now carried on—had, in combination, no doubt, with other causes, brought about a complete change in the conditions under which our trade was conducted; that unless we could seal up our enemy's ports and sweep his cruisers from the sea, it would be impossible for us now to prevent our trade from passing into neutral bottoms in time of war, however powerful might be our sea-going fleet; that he founded himself not only on what has happened during the American Civil War, but also on the fact that on some recent occasions when rumours of European complications, in which this country might be involved, had reached the East Indies in a somewhat exaggerated state, British vessels had found it impossible to obtain freight on any terms; that this state of things was not only most injurious to our Mercantile Marine, but that it had also a most mischievous effect in respect of our influence with foreign nations, who must see clearly that we should be very slow to expose our merchant shipping to the risk of being destroyed by vessels fitted out in neutral ports; and that, therefore, the adoption of the principles laid down in the Treaty of Washington would greatly strengthen our hands as regards our foreign relations. He trusted this would not be the last time the two great Anglo-Saxon nations would be found acting in concert for the good of humanity. He was especially gratified that the credit of the work on our side could not be claimed by one political party exclusively. He thought his noble Friend (the Marquess of Ripon) and the right hon. Gentleman (Sir Stafford Northcote) would ever look back with pride to the part they had taken in establishing principles so beneficial to the interests of England and so calculated to promote the cause of peace throughout the world.

THE EARL OF LAUDERDALE

said, he had lived long enough to see many treaties entered into between this country and the United States, in all of which this country had been more or less on the losing side. Although we had not surrendered any territory, we were in a worse position under this Treaty than we ever had been before, because it was a Treaty evidently framed to meet the views of the people of the United States. He would not, however, complain of them; on the contrary, he gave them great credit for the clever way in which they had outwitted us. They had weathered us on every tack; they had—to use an Eastern expression—made us eat dirt, and pay the bill into the bargain. He regretted that the question of the line which should be drawn down the centre of the Strait of Rosario had not been referred to the Emperor of Germany, and a fertile cause of disputes thus settled. Our negotiators had not had a chart before them when they drew the existing line—they went to sea without a chart, and the consequence was that our interests suffered. He regarded the Treaty as a one-sided arrangement, and as unbecoming the honour and dignity of the country. As for ships which left our shores unarmed, it was absurd that we should hold ourselves responsible for acts committed by those who might be on board them.

LORD HOUGHTON

, as a member of the Neutrality Commission, begged to express his satisfaction at finding that the legislation which it had recommended had been carried into practice. In the issue of that Commission his noble Friend (the Earl of Derby) was no doubt influenced by the fact that those ships which, consciously or unconsciously, we had allowed to go from our ports had inflicted very serious damage on the American mercantile navy. The formation of the Commission itself implied that his noble Friend (Earl Granville) did not regard the existing law as satisfactory or sufficient for the purpose for which it was required. There was, indeed, he thought, a still larger wisdom at work, for it was impossible not to see that the tendency of all International Law was to increase the responsibility of neutrals and to confine conflicts which might unhappily break out among nations within the limits of those nations themselves. The recommendations of the Commission had, he was glad to believe, laid the foundations for the Treaty which had recently been so happily concluded. That Treaty should not be regarded as the result of the action of two nations each of which was trying to get the better of the other. The allegation on one side was that the vessels that had sailed from our ports and had inflicted great injury on the citizens of the United States had done so by our default; and the question we had to consider was how the angry feelings that had arisen could best be mitigated. There was no question of national honour involved in the making reparation for a wrong which had been committed. We had, unfortunately, allowed a great calamity to be inflicted on a nation, and it was on our part a national duty, as well as duty to humanity, to appease the angry feeling which had in consequence been created, and so to lay the foundations of International Law as to prevent the occurrence of such calamities in future. That being so, his noble Friend below him had, in his opinion, done nothing more than his duty in approaching the subject in a most amicable spirit, and in determining almost that it should be happily settled. Now the question must be regarded as closed for ever, and he confidently hoped that the Treaty would be found to operate for the future prosperity both of this country and America. He quite differed from those who maintained that the increased responsibility of neutrals was likely to be productive of evil results. He, on the contrary, believed that it would be the cause of great future advantage, because nations would be on their guard against the influence of the dangerous feeling that neutrals were entitled to profit by the calamities of belligerents. He had already, as a member of the Neutrality Commission, in that House expressed his readiness to go further than even the Treaty did in the direction of which he was speaking. He should be glad to see the exportations of munitions of war made illegal; and, indeed, though the strict wording of the Treaty did not seem to include such a prohibition, he had a strong hope that the spirit which animated it would culminate in such a prohibition, and thus contribute still more to the promotion of the general peace of Europe. It was impossible not to feel that if during the late contest on the Continent our laws had precluded us from exporting arms, much controversy would have been avoided, and possibly, owing to the still more desperate condition in which one of the belligerents would have been herself placed, the war brought to an earlier termination. He could not avoid again repeating his satisfaction at the conclusion of a Treaty so much in accordance with the recommendations of the Neutrality Commission.

EARL GRANVILLE

My Lords, I am quite sure from the appearance of the House that your Lordships will not think it disrespectful in me if I do not repeat the arguments in favour of the Treaty, and of the course which Her Majesty's Government has taken with regard to it, which were urged a few days ago by myself and by several of my colleagues. The noble Lord who began this discussion (Lord Oranmore and Browne) based his Motion, so far as I understood him, on two grounds, the one being the necessity of keeping up the character of this House, and the other in order that the people of this country might be enabled to understand the Treaty in the future—the noble Lord assuming, I suppose, that up to the present they do not comprehend its import. With regard to the character of your Lordships' House, I said the other day that I believed it to be very important that great international proceedings like the present should be thoroughly discussed; but I doubt extremely the desirability of again debating this particular question after the thorough discussion it received on the recent occasion of a Motion hostile to the Treaty being proposed in this House by one of the most eminent men in Parliament—a man entitled to speak with the greatest weight and position on the subject. On the occasion to which I refer the House expressed an almost unanimous opinion on the subject, and the noble Earl (Earl Russell) himself did not think it necessary to have his Motion put from the Woolsack; I therefore repeat that I very much doubt the desirability of re-opening a discussion which can have no good effect with regard to the practical issue of the case. With regard to the second ground on which the noble Lord bases his Motion—his desire to better instruct the people of this country as to the Treaty—I must beg leave to express my opinion that the people of this country understand the Treaty of Washington quite as well as the noble Lord does. I trust that, at any rate that they will not make that confusion between the obligations of international and municipal law which, as far as I could gather, seemed to pervade the mind of the noble Lord. I rejoice, however, that this short discussion has arisen, because it has given to two of my noble Friends opportunities of making very excellent speeches upon the merits of this Treaty. There is one point only in those speeches to which I wish to allude briefly. The noble Lord (Lord Houghton) is the only Member of the Neutrality Commission who thought it desirable that for the future the exportation of arms and munitions of war should be prohibited as a rule of International Law, in the same way that vessels of the Alabama class should be prevented leaving our shores. In answer to that, I beg to state that, in my opinion, the questions rest on grounds totally different and distinct the one from the other. On the one hand, nothing is no easy as to prevent a vessel of the Alabama class escaping from our shores, and the only loss to the country which would result from such a prevention would be the small amount of profit which the individual constructing and equipping the vessel might derive from the transaction, which in almost every case is contrary to the Proclamation of the Queen. But, on the other hand, I believe that no Government could succeed in preventing the export of arms, and that the attempt to do so would involve the search of almost every vessel in our Mercantile Marine—a proceeding which would injure the free flow of commerce, and so prove most undesirable in itself.

LORD ORANMORE AND BROWNE

, in reply, said, he had brought forward his Motion in order to give the House an opportunity of coming to an issue on the merits of the Treaty, which opportunity was not afforded on the occasion when their Lordships were merely asked to ratify a Treaty which had been brought to a constitutional conclusion.

On Question? Resolved in the Negative.