HL Deb 13 June 1871 vol 206 cc1974-6
LORD GREVILLE

rose to call attention to the judgment delivered on Friday last in the Court of Appeal in Ireland by Lord Justice Christian, involving a point of great importance in connection with the Act of last year. The Landed Estates Court decided that they were not bound to insert in the particulars of the sale of an estate the claims of the tenants to compensation for improvements under the Act of 1870. The tenants thought they would be injuriously affected by this decision, and accordingly they carried their case to the Court of Chancery Appeal, which was constituted of two Judges, one a permanent Judge entitled the Lord Justice of Appeal, and the other the Lord Chancellor of Ireland. The latter affirmed the decision for the same reasons as had been given by the Court below—namely, that he did not think that the interests of the tenants were in any way affected by the conveyance. The Lord Justice of Appeal also affirmed the decision, but on the ground that he did not consider that the tenants possessed any right whatever under the Act of 1870. He would quote the exact words of the learned Judge, who was one of the ablest Judges in the land, and whose opinion, therefore, carried great weight. He said— They were asked to ascribe to the Land Act an effect which would be confiscation pure, simple, and uncompensated—a specimen of legislation unparalled in the whole range of real property statute law. It was sought to have that effect given to the first clause of the Land Act by the use of the words that the usage prevalent in Ulster should be declared legal. He could give no such construction to that clause. He supposed that the Act was passed from the highest motives of Imperial policy, and he might suppose that it was passed as the price of keeping a political party in power. But all that was beside the question. The 1st clause of the Act passed last year enacted that the Ulster tenant-right customs should be legal, but now the Court of the highest Court of Appeal in Ireland had declared that they were not legal.

LORD CAIRNS

rose to Order. He did not dispute for a moment that the subject was of great importance, or that the noble Lord had the right to ask a Question respecting it. As, however, the Question related to expressions alleged to have been used by a learned Judge, he submitted that those expressions ought not to be quoted from a newspaper report.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

said, he had hesitated to interpose, but he ought now to state that the learned Judge who was alluded to entirely disavowed the accuracy of the report.

LORD GREVILLE

said, there was nothing more to be said if the learned Judge asserted that the report was in the main inaccurate. He would not go into that part of the case, but it was a very serious thing if the tenantry generally throughout Ireland—and particularly in Ulster and those other districts in which tenant-right customs prevailed—were to be left in doubt as to whether their property in improvements which was supposed to have been created by the Act of last year did not really exist, and if any proprietor could by selling his estate defeat the whole object of the Act. He should be very glad to find that the learned Judge had not used the words attributed to him; but as great fears were entertained on the subject by many persons in Ireland, he would ask what course the Government intended to pursue if the report turned out to be substantially correct?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

said, he was not at all surprised at the noble Lord (Lord Greville) asking the Question, which he would answer on behalf of Her Majesty's Government. On examining the newspaper reports—which had not attracted his attention until it was brought before him in connection with this question—he found it contained expressions so strong and singular alleged to have been made by Lord Justice Christian, that, supposing them to be correct, he should have felt some embarrassment as to the course proper to be pursued. He had, however, now been allowed to see a letter from the learned Judge, who, speaking of the report, said, in substance— It is not a report, but rather a travesty of what I was supposed to have said. The strong expressions which I may have used with reference to one subject have been transferred and carried to a totally different subject, and the whole report, as it appears in the newspapers, is unintelligible and does not contain anything that I expressed. So far for the report. Under these circumstances it would of course be impossible for him (the Lord Chancellor) to express an opinion on the statements attributed to the learned Judge. With regard to the subject-matter itself, he must observe that no decision had been given to the effect that the Ulster custom was not protected and rendered valid by the Act of last year. Indeed, the learned Lord Justice of Appeal concurred with the Lord Chancellor in the judgment. The matter, therefore, amounted to this—supposing that the words attributed to the learned Lord Justice of Appeal were actually used by him—that there was a difference of opinion between the two learned Judges of the Court, with respect to a matter which was not before them for decision at the time. Unless the tenantry carried the case further, there would be no means of obtaining a legal decision as to the construction to be placed on the Act; and until the Government knew what the actual construction was he did not see how any legislative measure could be brought forward with reference to the subject.