THE EARL OF CARNARVONrose to call the attention of the House to some points connected with the question of 693 National Defences, and to move for Returns, and said: My Lords, I shall have to crave the indulgence of your Lordships in bringing this subject under your notice, as I have been suffering from severe indisposition; and if it had not been that in my postponing the subject I might have put your Lordships to some inconvenience, I would not have attempted to deal with it. In the first place, I perhaps owe some apology to your Lordships that I, a civilian, should undertake, at this early period of the Session, to deal with military matters, when I see around me so many noble Friends on both sides of the House who are far more familiar with such matters and far more competent to deal with them. My excuse is that I shall not enter into any military technicalities, but shall, I hope, confine myself to points lying within the comprehension of all of us, whether civilians or soldiers, and in which, looking to the welfare and credit of the country, we have a common interest. It would, perhaps, be unfair to avoid all mention of proposals recently submitted to Parliament by my right hon. Friend the Secretary for War. In a certain sense, they appear to me to be in a right direction, and to remove some anomalies, while many of the details I heartily approve. I regard the proposals, however, as in a great degree mere patchwork, as wholly inadequate to the necessities of the time, and as one of the most extravagant schemes—looking to the worth of the money—that a so-called economical Government has ever proposed to Parliament. The proposals fail, as it appears to me, in not providing what we really require—an Army. As far as the Reserve forces are concerned, I do not profess to understand what the exact nature of the plan is as to the Volunteers; but I am afraid it falls very far short of what is required. As regards the Militia, the amount of training seems insufficient. A maximum of three months—even allowing for all the innate superiority of the British soldier—is but a poor equivalent for three years' training in Germany. Without going into detail, I must venture to express my dissent from the belief that you can possibly maintain the Militia upon purely voluntary enlistment. I will not now enter into the question in what form the principle of compulsion should be adopted; I merely express a doubt of the possibi- 694 lity for maintaining the Militia at the proper standard by voluntary enlistment. The right hon. Gentleman, who has introduced the Bill into the other House, talks of asking for compulsory powers in the event of an emergency. My answer is, that when the emergency arises, it will be too late to do so. As regards the Army itself, I will only say, on this occasion, that the right hon. Gentleman's proposals appear to me to be simply an addition of some 20,000 men to the standing force of the country. As my right hon. Friend, two years ago, reduced the Army by some 20,000 men, so now he increases it by 20,000, and I know of no reason why, if he remains in Office next year, he should go down to the House of Commons and propose to reduce it again. Your Lordships have to look to the enormous sum at which our military expenditure stands. I am not one of those who are in any degree disposed to grudge any sum which may be necessary; but, unless you place your military arrangements on a safe and permanent basis, I think £15,000,000 a year an extremely high, not to say an extravagant price to pay for them. I do not want to compare our system with foreign nations, but there is an obvious inequality between them. We know that Prussia maintains more than 1,000,000 of men in the field for £7,000,000 a year; that Austria maintains 700,000 or 800,000 men for about the same sum; that France, even at the same rate of expenditure as ourselves, was able to place 250,000 men in the field; and that Belgium maintains 100,000 men for £1,500,000. An obvious inequality, I say, appears when you ask this country to spend not less than £15,000,000, and do not show a greater result than the Army Estimates do at present. Were this all it would be bad enough; but you must remember that this £15,000,000 by no means covers all the necessary expenses. It leaves your Army without its proper equipment. Mr. Cardwell talks of 470,000 men; but does he mean to say that that £15,000,000 in any degree equips or maintains those 470,000 men so as to enable them to be, in every sense of the word, an Army? This, you must remember too, leaves our ports unprotected, our great towns undefended; and a night or two ago the Prime Minister informed the House of Commons that the defences of Liverpool 695 must stand over almost sine die. And what do you get in exchange? The promise of the abolition of purchase. Now, I am not standing here to defend purchase, though I am bound to say that, so far as I remember, never has a system been more misunderstood and misrepresented. I believe the common opinion is that there is a sort of auction, and that the highest bidder obtains the commission. You ought to look very carefully to see what substitute we are to get for purchase. You are bound, above all, to see that in destroying purchase you do not destroy that which is one of the great indirect advantages of it—namely, that it causes a rapid flow of promotion to go through the Army, and secures you that which hardly any other Army in the world possesses, and which I hold to be an inestimable advantage—I mean young officers. And what are you to pay for the abolition of the existing system? It is said that it will cost you £8,000,000 or £9,000,000, and it is very questionable whether you get a fair return for it. I will not go further into my right hon. Friend's proposals, except to say that they seem to me to have this great defect—they hold out no promise or guarantee of real permanence in our military arrangements. If that be so, what is the inevitable result? It must be that we run back into the vicious circle of reductions and panics to which we have been liable for the last 25 years. One of my complaints against Her Majesty's Government is that they have encouraged this. They now propose a large addition to the Army Estimates; and what does that imply? It implies that the defences of the country are not in a satisfactory state. Yet in the autumn Mr. Cardwell told us that its defences had never been in a more satisfactory state. [Earl GRANVILLE: When?] During the autumn, at one of the numerous assemblies which the right hon. Gentleman attended. I think it was when he addressed the Ancient Druids at Oxford. What their knowledge of military matters amounts to I do not undertake to say; but he succeeded in re-assuring them, if he failed in re-assuring the country. What I complain of is that the Government surrendered themselves in the first instance to the policy of reductions at a time when they ought to have known that the whole soil of Europe was honey- 696 combed by secret transactions and treaties. Knowing that two great military Powers had been for years on the verge of a quarrel, they proposed these large reductions, cleared our arsenals of workmen, cut down the number of our troops, and reduced the Estimates for the Army. I complain, moreover, of the manner in which the reductions were made. If there is one principle on which all parties should agree more than another, it is that whenever reduction becomes necessary it should be made rather in unskilled than in skilled departments—obviously because the skilled branches of the service are articles of slow growth and manufacture, and cannot be extemporized at a moment's notice, no matter what the emergency. But what were these reductions? My right hon. Friend cut down the cavalry—that arm which the recent campaign has shown to be the eyes and ears of an Army, and without which vigorous operations are impossible. I believe also that the horses, in consequence of the low price given, are in many regiments far too young. In the same way he reduced the artillery. I do not intend to value the exact measure of the artillery augmentations he now proposes. It seems to me that almost in proportion as he increases it in England he appears inclined to reduce it in India. If so, the change is a mere hocus-pocus, and of no real advantage. I hope and presume, however, that the increase in England overbalances the diminution in India. So low, I believe, were the artillery cut down last year, that whenever a review or field day was ordered it was necessary for one battery to borrow horses of another. I am told that at the Wimbledon Review last summer the two batteries of horse artillery in the field had to fill up their complement by borrowing of other batteries. I speak under correction; but, certainly, this has been stated in more than one quarter. Not merely do I complain of reductions, and of the reductions being made on a false principle, but, if I may draw a further distinction, of the false economies to which Her Majesty's Government have been prone. To go into detail would be trespassing too largely on your Lordships' patience; but I will give one or two instances, which I am afraid are specimens of the rest. Two years ago a Floating Obstruction Com- 697 mittee sat, and reported that a large supply of torpedoes should immediately be provided. Now, your Lordships are aware that in the American Civil War torpedoes played an important part, and that there is scarcely a single Continental Power which has not long since provided itself with a supply of them. Up to the middle of last summer I believe the total number of torpedoes in store in England was one. Of course, I shall be only too glad to be corrected in any of these details—I state them as they are currently reported. Take another case. During the winter there has been a controversy in the Press with regard to the supply of powder. Now, I believe these to be the facts—The best class of powder is called pebble powder; of that, I believe, none worth mentioning is in store. The second class, which for all practical purposes is nearly as good, is pellet powder. Of that there is but a very small stock—not enough to supply us for a very short time indeed in the event of hostilities. Lastly, there is a very limited supply of ordinary powder. Now, if this statement be true, observe what the consequence is. The new guns provided at so much expense and trouble are works of art in themselves; but they cannot have their full power, or anything like it, developed unless one of the two superior classes of powder is used. That powder is said not to be in existence. They fail in nine-tenths of their power, and if you charge them with the inferior powder, in any proportion so as to make up the loss of power, that powder damages the gun. You are placed in a terrible dilemma, and after making every allowance it seems that you have not in store the primary necessary of military operations. I am told that last April works which were in process with the view of manufacturing this powder were stopped, and the manufacture itself came to an end. Again, we heard last year a great deal about breech-loaders. I understand that when the Continental War broke out the order for the manufacture had fallen off to the miserable number of 30,000. I am told, also, that when the Secretary for War spoke of 300,000 breech-loaders being in store some regiments of the Line were even at that time armed—it is hardly credible — with muzzle-loaders. One of the Highland regiments was armed, I am told, with muzzle-loaders so late as last autumn; and my belief 698 is that a detachment of the 7th Fusiliers mounted guard last August at Portsmouth with muzzle-loaders in their hands. I will take another case. Your Lordships remember that in 1859 a very important Commission was appointed to consider the defence and fortifications of the country. They reported a few months afterwards, and the very first proposition which they laid down was that the works should be completed in the shortest possible time, as neither the Army, the Navy, nor the Reserve forces, nor all three combined, were, in their opinion, sufficient for the security of the country. Ten years elapsed; and in 1869, as I find by a Return, not one of those eight places which they recommended should be fortified were in a state of completion; and further, that the work that had been done had been done in a way not altogether satisfactory. I am informed that at Dover last August the services for the fortifications were curtailed; and that at Christmas, in the midst of a hard frost, totally inconsistent with building, orders were sent down—the country being in a state of fever as to fortifications—to proceed with the batteries immediately. Contracts were consequently entered into, and the ground prepared at a time when it was impossible the work could be properly done, in the hope, I suppose, that a certain number of guns would be mounted before the meeting of Parliament. Those guns, I believe, are not mounted now; at all events, at the end of January there was not one 7-ton gun properly mounted at Dover. I do not blame the present Government exclusively with regard to the fortifications. The Commission of 1859 recommended a certain additional amount of barrack room; but, in consequence of the other reductions made, the barrack room was reduced by one-half. Again, £1,000,000 was recommended to be expended for coast defences; but I do not think it has ever been expended. A Committee was appointed two years ago to consider what the state of these fortifications were, and under the head of "important omissions" they stated that, in estimating the powers of various works, the absence of collateral support and the facilities for attack afforded to an enemy by the omission to occupy important positions were of paramount importance; and that, in some instances, the defence 699 was seriously jeopardized. Such is the result arrived at after spending a considerable sum. In consequence of these reductions you not only have failed, after 11 years, in completing any one of your works, but you have left many of them in such a state that the defence might be seriously jeopardized in the event of attack. There is one other point with regard to fortifications which is obvious to the most ordinary mind, and which I beg to urge most strongly. A strong recommendation of the Commission of 1859 was in favour of what they termed a Central Arsenal. They objected—and I think very wisely—to a concentration of all our military stores at one place. Well, I think for three or four years running the paltry sum of £150,000 appeared in the Estimates under this head. What has been the consequence? At this moment there is concentrated; within a narrow circle of the metropolitan district, everything which would be vital and necessary in the event of invasion. The manufactory of guns is at Woolwich, the manufactory of stores is at Enfield, the store of weapons is in the Tower, the manufactory of powder is at Waltham, even the clothing establishment is in London—in one word, everything is in or near London, and London itself is perfectly helpless, at the mercy of an invader. Is this a state of things which ought to be allowed to remain a single hour? And yet, in the face of that Report, you propose to spend £8,000,000 or £9,000,000 on the abolition of purchase. One of the first speeches I can remember, when I was first in Parliament, at the time of the Crimean War, was made by Lord Herbert, then Secretary for War, who was giving an account of the terrible disasters which had occurred. He stated that the defect of the English Army was that, however admirable its regimental organization, the Army itself was but a mere collection of regiments. Now, I doubt very much whether, when he had been two years in Office, Mr. Cardwell stated that the defences of the country were never in a better condition — whether, indeed, at this moment, anyone would venture to say that, except a few regiments at Aldershot, the Army is anything more than a collection of regiments now. I doubt whether there are at this moment stores in England sufficient to put 100,000 700 men, or half that number, in the field. The guns are admitted to propose to increase the maximum number of guns to 280. I believe that the number possessed by Prince Frederick Charles's army alone was 400; and I saw by an estimate the other day that the Prussians have in France alone as many batteries as we shall ultimately, when the increase has been effected, have single guns. I should like, again, to know what the Military Train is. I believe it is generally estimated that a corps de armée ought not to have less than 1,000 waggons. Have we anything like 1,000? I fear, too, whether, in the event of calling out the Militia and Volunteers, or the Militia alone and the Regular Army for training and drill, anything like sufficient barrack accommodation could be found. Yet I know that the Government have been selling barracks and barrack ground. Mr. Cardwell talks of planning defences for London, and he proposes to take money for a survey of the defensible positions round London. This is very reasonable and sensible; but the amount of money provided in the Estimates for the work is £1,000. Why, we shall have to wait another 10 years before the task is completed, and it is a sum of money thrown away. If the thing is necessary, either spend sufficient to do the work at once, or do not waste it in driblets of this sort. I should be glad to know whether we have a supply of maps for military service? Your Lordships are perhaps aware that when Marshal Mac-Mahon attempted his disastrous retreat maps were placed in his hands according to which he directed the march of his troops, and that he found the roads traced on them had never been completed. The Prussian authorities, on the other hand, had maps in which every farmhouse was marked, with the number of horses, and other important information carefully tabulated. Surely if they could do that for France, we ought to have equally good maps of England. This is no more than was done in 1803, when there was expectation of an invasion. All along the South Coast the Government were in full possession of all the details and resources of the country. In connection with this there is another important point on which I must say a word—it is a very great and very important subject—the subject of the military education of our officers. A 701 Commission, appointed, I think, by the Government two years ago, inquired very fully into the matter, and took some remarkable and valuable evidence. I certainly am not one who would in any degree disparage the qualities of the English officer, for I know well what those great qualities are. Whatever may be said against our officers, let this, at least, be remembered—that they have never failed. Where courage, self-devotion, the power of winning the confidence and affection of their men are required, we are able to calculate, with mathematical certainty, on finding those great qualities in the English officers. Be careful never to impair the value of such an article as that. At the same time, every English officer would be the first to admit that in the present age war is in a very remarkable stage—that science of the highest kind is being brought to bear on every detail, and that in the German Army, to which we now look for an example in these matters, every officer is almost a professor. If the standard is raised in one Army, you must, in self-defence, raise it in another; and it is impossible to read the evidence given before that Commission by my noble Friend Lord Strathnairn, who was so long in chief command in India and in Ireland, without perceiving that this point requires immediate attention. He pointed out that while our military education has many valuable points, it falls short in that strategic instruction which is in these days vitally essential. Have Her Majesty's Government done anything in this matter? Are they prepared to do anything? I shall be told, perhaps, that military instructors have been appointed. This is a decided advantage; but regimental instruction is hardly sufficient to meet the necessities of the case. I will not weary the House by going into further details. I complain of my right hon. Friend's scheme partly for what it does, and still more for what it omits to do. I can hardly disguise what my own opinion is, though I fear it is not shared by your Lordships. I cannot help regretting that my right hon. Friend and Her Majesty's Government did not take the opportunity of offering to Parliament and the country something in the nature of military service obligatory on the population at large. This, I know, is deemed a foreign notion. My answer is, that our ancestors 702 had it, and that foreigners imitated it from us. I may be told it is unpopular. If so, still if it is right, it was the duty of the Government to press its importance, for in the present state of the world it has become necessary. It is said that it disturbs industrial occupations; but everything is a disturbance of them. A tax of £15,000,000 is a terrible disturbance; but you might have a worse one, and anything which jeopardizes the safety and security of the country will be a disturbance far greater. I am not going to press this point; but I am honestly bound to state my opinion, and there may be a later opportunity of discussing it more fully. No mention has been made by the Secretary for War of camps for manœuvring. This may seem a detail; but it is essential that we should have camps such as they have abroad, where troops can be massed in large numbers. Officers of experience have assured me that it is there only that the weaknesses and defects of a system come out. Till that is done, and as long as you live on mere red-tape and bureau administration, so long will the defects continue. I can hardly refrain also from saying that I entertain great misgivings—though in the presence of military men I announce them with all diffidence—as to the present Control system. I know that the system of intendance, from which it was in a great measure copied, failed to a certain extent in the Crimea, to a greater extent in the campaign in Italy in 1859, and that it has failed most completely in France in the present war; but I also know that the system has the authority of very great names in this country. My noble Friend behind me is a strong supporter of it, and it saw the light very much under his auspices. I am bound to point out, however, that since it was initiated by him some changes of an enormous kind have been made in it which makes it differ considerably from its original character. According to my noble Friend's scheme the general of each district was nearly paramount. I may be wrongly informed; but I understand that the assistant controllers in different parts of the country are now in direct correspondence with the War Office. They correspond with the Controller-in-Chief, who in nine cases out of ten supports them, and the general, who ought to be the one per- 703 son to give orders and be responsible, is practically shut out from the field of operations. Moreover, these assistant controllers are in many cases civilians; and this fact has an important bearing upon a second principle of vital consequence. It was recommended by the Committee, when the system was established, that while transport and all general stores should be placed under the Controller, ordnance stores—that is, ammunition and what I may call fighting stores—should be entrusted to soldiers and experts alone. This is obviously proper, for in these days of scientific warfare, when ammunition and artillery are reduced to so scientific a form, none but experts can master the technicalities of the art, and grave consequences may ensue from the want of such knowledge. I am told, indeed, that at a review of the West Kent Militia, last year, cartridges were served out by a civilian assistant controller, who, I suppose, not being very familiar with the matériel he was handling, gave the men ball cartridges instead of blank cartridges, the result being that one or two officers were very nearly shot, and the lives of the men in the front ranks very much endangered. Such ignorance as this in actual warfare would cause great confusion. It may be objected that my suggestions would involve great changes. My answer is that the changes proposed by the Government are too small, whether you measure them by the cost or by the necessity of the case. Measure them by the cost, and I ask any one who complains—and justly complains—of our great military expenditure, to calculate how much less it would cost if you could appeal to the free services and energies of every ablebodied Englishman. Measure them by the necessity of the case, and compare the state of things here with the state of things abroad. Look at those great Continental nations, passing every man through military discipline, organizing the nation in great standing camps, and arming and drilling them. People in England applaud all sorts of theories about voluntary service, and say that a system of compulsion such as prevails on the Continent would be a retrograde system, and contrary to the first principles of civilization. I agree with all that; but it will not stop what is going on abroad. By fine speeches here you cannot alter the policy 704 of these great military Powers. All you can do is to place this country in a state of defence, and I ask you to consider how we stand in this matter. Assuming your Army to be sufficiently numerous—assuming the supply service to be sufficient—assuming the military organization to be all that you require—look for a moment at what our system of military administration is. We have a War Office in London. While in those Continental nations the War Minister is a man who is permanent, or, at all events, in office for a long succession of years, and is trained to the highest point of professional and scientific knowledge, we have here a series of gentlemen, mostly civilians, holding Office for a very short time, and generally quite unfamiliar with all military details when they accede to Office. I am not blaming the Government for this. The War Office has been in existence for 16 years, and during that time there have been eight War Ministers—giving two years as their average term. Of those eight, two only had been in the Army, and one—perhaps the ablest of all—declared that when he went to the War Office he did not know the muzzle from the butt end of a musket. Look at what the administration of the Department is and must be. It is in a state of perpetual change. Ever since I have known anything of it, endless Minutes have been written with a view to endless alterations. Endless Committees have been moved for and have sat. The War Office, moreover, is often choked with correspondence; whereas if there be an Office which primâ facie should have little correspondence it is the War Office; yet I have been told that one-fourth of our official correspondence passes through it. I observe a calculation that 4,250,000 ounces of letters come to and go from it. Is it conceivable that an Office which spends its time in letter-writing can be such as you require military administration to be? The Secretary for War is perfectly helpless amid all this. He finds himself surrounded by defective organization, and very often with inadequate information and assistance. He is encumbered with questions on all sorts of details in the House of Commons, and lives in constant terror. Beyond all this, he is governed by the one predominant necessity of finance — he is influenced by the ideas of finance, 705 which dominate for the time at the Treasury, and is driven to propose constantly economies which are of the most unsatisfactory kind. Then, while undue economy is exercised in one branch of the Department, often unnecessary waste is incurred in another — for instance, you bring home all the way from Canada a quantity of rubbish — the quality of which can scarcely be believed without its being seen. Indeed, it was not worth the expense of transport. But when you pass from the War Office and the Secretary of State to the Government itself, what do you find in their position? Why, ever since the Crimean War we have witnessed a succession of violent changes, and at present the Cabinet is without a military adviser. The result of that, of course, is, that there is, and can be, no steadiness either of action or policy in military matters. It is quite true that you may say the policy of this country is one of defence, and not of offence. In that statement I heartily concur. I wish that our armaments should be constructed in accordance with that policy. But it should be remembered that a war of defence may involve some measure also of offence, and that you are, moreover, encumbered with treaties and guarantees abroad, which at any moment may pledge you to take up a position requiring to be backed by arms. If may be said that in European complications it is our desire to be neutral. So we are, and so I trust we may remain. But we have learnt within the last 12 months that neutrality, to be effective, must be either benevolent or strong. What, my Lords, was the answer returned by the first Napoleon when the Venetians represented that they desired to be neutral? He said—"Place 50,000 men on the Adriatic and then I will consider you as neutrals and recognize your neutrality." And that is our position. Unless our neutrality be backed by military force, I believe our neutrality and representations by such a neutral Power to be absolutely worthless. All those who have watched the course of affairs must fear that if we were, unhappily, to be involved in hostilities we should find the same want of preparation which has been our invariable characteristic. That was the experience of Marlborough and of Wellington; and the historian of the Indian Mutiny records that when the Mutiny broke out no preparations had 706 been made in India. But it must be recollected that our position now is very different from what it was in the 18th century, and that in India we had to deal only with Sepoys. And, my Lords, what was said of the Roman eagles may, I think, be said now of the Prussian eagles—that they owed their victory as much to their swiftness of flight as to their sterner qualities of war. In modern times war is declared in a few hours' notice, and woe to those who have not made their preparations long before. It may sound the language of an alarmist; but I cannot forget the words I quoted just now of that eminent Commission of 1859, appointed to consider the defence of the country; and that which the Duke of Wellington, Lord Lyndhurst, Lord Palmerston, and Sir John Burgoyne have all thought possible, I should certainly not be presumptuous enough to say was impossible. What we did in former days at Alexandria, what the French did when they crossed the Danube under fire, what Napoleon very nearly succeeded in doing at Boulogne in 1805, is certainly not beyond the range of possibility now. And lastly—though I say it in no sort of hostility — that which is discussed in high German military circles as a curious and interesting strategic problem—the invasion of England, deserves, at least, attention on the part of those so deeply interested in the matter as we are. I do not blame the Prussian or the German officers for discussing such subjects, nor do I blame the Government for it; but I know, as a matter of fact, that in the German portfolios there are designs and sections of every English ship of war launched, showing her guns, her armaments, her measurements, and her size. For a national army, such as the German nation now is, which makes war its profession and its study, these are all very interesting and curious problems; but we, on our side, ought, at all events, to be prepared. Anyhow, let us not forget what have been the lessons of the last six months. We have learnt, at all events, this—how, in the 19th century, in spite of the progress of civilization, like thunder in a clear sky, a declaration of war may be pronounced in a few hours. We have seen, also, how, in a few hours after the declaration of war, large forces and tremendous agencies, guided by intelligence of the very highest order, may be set in motion; we have 707 seen how victory attached itself irresistibly to that Power which had known how to prepare beforehand for the contest, and we have seen how vain have been the efforts of hastily-armed and ill-trained levies. And we have seen the utter misery—transcending the language any man can use—worthy only of a prophecy out of the Book of Revelations—which has fallen upon the men, women, and children of the conquered country, destroying the industry and happiness of years. I have no wish to exaggerate in this matter. I am afraid it is in vain to appeal to Her Majesty's Government. They have systematically—I do not say designedly, but through long miscalculation of the temper of the country — they have spoken smooth things when the horizon was in reality cloudy and threatening: like the oracles of old, they have deceived others until they have ended by deceiving themselves. I do not appeal to the peace-at-any-price party—they are happily a small minority—but the English people, whose common sense never fails them, and who know how much they would, one and all, high and low, rich and poor, lose if this country were to receive a shock, or its security were endangered, look for something more. During last autumn a Member of Her Majesty's Government, in addressing his constituents on this subject, said he trusted no great time would be wasted in Parliament in talk on military matters. With that hope I disagree entirely. I hope and trust that Parliament will be so far alive to the feeling of the country as to spare no time or trouble in discussing and considering matters in which not only the credit and honour, but the very security and prosperity of the country are at stake.
§ Moved, "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for, Returns of the number of places which it was recommended by the Defence Commission, 1859, should be fortified, and of which the fortifications are now complete: the number of tents and tent equipages now in store, exclusive of officers and hospital tents: the amount of barrack accommodation in England and Scotland, specified according to districts and counties: the barracks and barrack grounds sold or disposed of within the last two years."—(The Earl of Carnarvon.)
§ LORD NORTHBROOKMy Lords, although my noble Friend (the Earl of Carnarvon) was kind enough to give me notice that his speech would have a wider scope than the mere words of his 708 Notice would seem to indicate, I cannot proceed to make the observations which occur to me, in answer to my noble Friend, without venturing, as a very young Member of your Lordships' House, to suggest that there is a great objection to answering a speech made in the House of Commons by a speech in this House, and that nothing can be more inconvenient than for your Lordships to discuss Estimates which have not yet been brought under consideration in the House of Commons. Both these things, however, have been done by my noble Friend this evening. I shall endeavour, as far as I am able, to extract from the somewhat loose statements made by my noble Friend, and from the mass of incidents which he has crowded one upon another, what my noble Friend conceives to be the policy which the Government ought to adopt, and what he conceives to be amiss in the proposals of the Government. I believe I am correct in saying that we are accused of having recklessly reduced the Army by discharging 20,000 old soldiers, who, at the rate of £100 a year each, represent the saving of £2,000,000 which is shown on a comparison of the Estimates of 1870 with those of the year 1868. Then it is said that the Government had to replace these 20,000 experienced soldiers by 20,000 recruits in the autumn of last year, thereby adding again to the Estimates the sum of £2,000,000 which had been previously taken off; the result being that the Government had been forced to revert to the military policy of their predecessors, and had only imperfectly re-established our military force in the condition in which it stood in the year 1868. I think I am describing the attack as fairly and as strongly as I can. In the first place, I wish to induce your Lordships, if I can, to discard from your minds the notion that the calculation which has been constantly referred to here and "elsewhere," that every soldier costs £100, and that, consequently, to discharge 20,000 men effects a saving of £2,000,000 in the Estimates, is correct. The calculation has not the slightest foundation in fact. My noble Friend opposite has been constantly referring to the Army Estimates for this year, and perhaps he will allow me also to refer to them for a moment. If the Votes which comprise the cost of the pay, provisions, clothing, and all 709 other attributes of the men themselves for this year be compared with the same Votes of last year, it will be seen that out of the whole increase of £2,886,000 in the Army Estimates of this year about £1,000,000 only depends upon the increased number of men. Your Lordships will see that for 20,000 men that is just £50, instead of £100, a man. The noble Earl behind me (Earl Granville) in replying the other night to some remarks which had been made by the noble Duke (the Duke of Richmond), expressed an opinion that the cost of a soldier of the Line was about £40 a year. My noble Friend was perfectly correct; according to a Parliamentary Return, the average annual cost of 1,000 rank and file of Infantry of the Line serving in Great Britain,—including the pay of officers and non-commissioned officers, clothing, commissariat charges and allowances is given at £40,000. I trust, therefore, the statement that a soldier costs £100 a year will never be brought forward again in any discussion on military affairs. And now I come to the main question—were the reductions made in 1869 and 1870 reckless reductions? It has been asserted that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War came into Office with the avowed object of effecting retrenchment; and my noble Friend who has just addressed your Lordships used language which I think had better have been uttered in the presence of my right hon. Friend than behind his back. The noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon) asserted among other things that my right hon. Friend was governed by the one predominant necessity of finance. Such statements as this, however, are utterly inconsistent with the declared policy of the Government and with the facts of the case. In the first place, they are inconsistent with the assertions publicly and deliberately given by Her Majesty's Government and by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War in the other House. The other day it was noticed that in the paragraph in Her Majesty's gracious Speech from the Throne, relating to the Estimates for the present year, no remark was made in reference to their having been framed with a view to economy. This, however, was by no means inconsistent with Her Majesty's Speech in 1870, in which it was stated that the Estimates— 710
Framed with a view, in the first place, to the effective maintenance of the Public Establishments, will impose a diminished charge upon the subjects of Her Majesty.Thus the primary object announced in 1870 was the maintenance of effective establishments, and it is not correct to say, as the noble Lord has done, that efficiency was disregarded in the deliberations of Her Majesty's Government. I challenge any noble Lord opposite to point out any statement made at any time, either in or out of Parliament, by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War to the effect that his mission was to reduce the Army and retrench the public expenditure without reference to the efficiency of the service; yet these were the words used the other day by the noble Duke opposite in regard to Mr. Cardwell—"He came into Office with the avowed object of retrenchment."
§ THE DUKE OF RICHMONDI quoted the words from a letter written by Lord Russell to the newspapers, in which he said that Mr. Cardwell's policy was retrenchment, and that he had done his best to carry it out.
§ LORD NORTHBROOKI have no wish to misrepresent the noble Duke; but surely the words fairly bear the interpretation I have placed upon them. The noble Duke must be aware that the opinion of Earl Russell could be no evidence of the intentions of Mr. Cardwell, who had himself said in public, when moving the Army Estimates last year, that—
Saving effected by the sacrifice of efficiency is not economy. … . But, on the other hand, I contend that economy, when not pushed beyond the proper limit, is in itself an element of efficiency, and that without true economy efficiency can seldom exist."—[3 Hansard, cxcix. 1160.]I trust I have now convinced your Lordships that the assertion that the reductions have been reckless is contrary to the declared policy of the Government and of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War; and I must now ask your Lordships to consider for a moment whether those reductions have or have not been reckless in point of fact. From the first, Her Majesty's Government announced a distinct policy in regard to the reduction of the Army; and that policy I had the honour to explain at some length in this House last Session in answer to Earl Russell, 711 who, I regret to say, has not yet been able to appear in his place this year. I then endeavoured to explain that policy to be one of concentrating the forces of the Empire. Instead of allowing the forces to be quartered in driblets in different parts of the Empire, it was resolved to mass at home a large portion of our troops, so that they might be at once available when required. That policy was not a new one. It was recommended by the Committee appointed by the other House in 1861, and it was advocated by some of the highest authorities on military affairs. Nevertheless that policy was never thoroughly carried out till the accession of the present Government, when it was adopted under the auspices of the noble Earl, who was then Secretary of State for the Colonies (Earl Granville). The result has been that if we compare the years 1868 and 1870 we find that the number of troops in the Colonies has been reduced by 25,000 men, and the net expenditure in the Colonies proper, omitting the garrisons, has been reduced by £1,164,000. Now, I know many of your Lordships will agree with me in thinking that the policy of concentrating our forces at home has been advantageous to the Empire; for a concentrated force is clearly more powerful than one which is severed and distributed. I believe it also to have been beneficial to Colonies themselves, by inducing them to rely more on their own exertions; for the withdrawal of the Imperial forces has led them to raise levies with which they could, at all events in the first instance, undertake the task of defending themselves when attacked. At the same time, it is clear that the real defence of the Colonies is the fact of this country possessing a naval superiority over all the other nations of the world. I have said that the policy of concentrating troops at home was, in the first place, advantageous to the Empire at large, and, in the second, advantageous to the Colonies themselves; and I say also that it was advantageous to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. It has given us greater strength at home, coupled with a diminution of the expenses of the Army—a consideration which even in this House is not to be lost sight of. My noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Carnarvon), when he was Minister for the Colonies, 712 deliberately carried out the policy I have been explaining: at any rate, when he came to discuss the matter with my noble Colleague behind me (Earl Granville) the differences between them were very minute.
THE EARL OF CARNARVONI have not made a single remark this evening about the concentration of troops in England, and I am not aware that the word "Colony" or the word "colonial" escaped my lips.
§ LORD NORTHBROOKI believe that to be quite true; but the very fact shows that the noble Earl has not looked at the question as a whole, and that he has omitted even to allude to the cardinal point of the policy which he is now attacking. It is impossible to discuss the military policy of the Government without dealing with the concentration of troops, upon which it chiefly depends. Therefore it is not my fault that I have alluded to the question, but it is his that he has overlooked it. Now, what has been the effect of our policy upon our military strength at home?—a vital point in the discussions of the last six months. The noble Earl opposite believes that the reductions were carried out in an improper manner, because artillery, and cavalry require longer training than infantry, and these forces ought to be reduced with the greatest reluctance. But will your Lordships believe that all the foundation for the attack is that the cavalry at home were reduced from 8,949 rank and file in 1868, to 8,762 in 1870, being a diminution of 187; and that the artillery at home were reduced from 12,015 rank and file in 1868 to 11,690 in 1870, being a diminution of 325? The reduction in both those arms of the service therefore amount only to about 500 men. The noble Earl made some remarks about the strength of the artillery last year, and the field force at the Wimbledon Review. Last Session I had a statement about the field force at Wimbledon which I carried about with me day after day in order to be prepared to answer a Question, fully expecting that one would be asked in this House; such a Question, however, was never put; and as, of course, I did not expect the information would be called for now, I have not the paper with me; but a gallant Friend opposite, to whom I showed the statement at the time, and who is a much greater authority 713 than I can pretend to be, was perfectly satisfied that the statement disposed of the attacks about the constitution of the field force at Wimbledon. Did we in other ways reduce the force in a reckless manner? Certainly not. We did not reduce a single British regiment nor a cadre of a single battalion of the British Army; and I do not think the noble Earl, however disposed to criticize, would cite in support of the charge the reduction of two West India regiments, of the Canadian Rifles, and of the Cape Mounted Rifles — forces which I do not wish to disparage, which were broken up for political or other reasons, but which did not add to the defensive force of this country, and the loss of which could not be seriously accounted a diminution of the military strength of Great Britain. As to our discharging veterans we did not recklessly get rid of any who desired to remain, and who could be advantageously retained. The fact is, the men who were discharged were men whose term of service had nearly expired and who declined to re-engage, and men of worthless character; and the highest military authority, the illustrious Duke on the cross Benches, has given his opinion that the result of the reductions was that the battalions were in a more solid state than they were before the reductions took place. A curious illustration of the effect of the reductions is to be seen in a Paper recently laid upon the Table of the House — the Report upon the Military Prisons for 1869—in which the diminution of military prisoners is greatly attributed to the expulsion from the Army of "men hardened in a career of vice." If such was the result of the reductions, no one can say that they were recklessly made. As the speech of my noble Friend (the Earl of Carnarvon) was an indictment against Her Majesty's Government upon the policy they have pursued, and as it is a subject upon which, during the Recess, there has been much misrepresentation, I hope your Lordships will bear with me if I endeavour to explain the inaccuracies into which he has fallen. What, then, has been the effect of the the reductions upon the force at home in 1870, before the increase of August, as compared with the force at home in the year 1868? Dealing with the Regulars of all ranks, the strength of the establishment in 1868 was 87,505, and in 1870 it was 89,051. I will not compare 714 the Reserves, except to say generally that whereas in 1868 their numbers were 3,545, in 1870 they were 21,900. Your Lordships will see that in 1870, after a reduction in expenditure of £2,000,000, we had in this country a larger and more powerful force than we had in 1868. I now come to the allegation of the noble Earl that what we did by increasing the Army last year was simply to place ourselves in the same position in which we stood in 1868. Surely, however, if our strength at home was greater after the reductions than before it was not necessary to add 20,000 men to the Army to bring it up to its previous position. But the circumstances of the country in the autumn were entirely different from what they were either in 1868 or 1869; and if we are told that the Army must always be the same whatever the surrounding circumstances may be — whether there be a profound peace or whether the nations of Europe be engaged in deadly conflict, then I say no such doctrine has ever before been maintained in this or in any other country. In Prussia, for example, the keystone of the military system is low establishments in time of peace and high establishments in time of war; and unless that rule be recognized in this country, we shall have constant complaints of lavish expenditure and reckless reductions in consequence. It was considered necessary that an increase should be made in the Army in the autumn of last year; but that increase raised our strength at home far above that of 1868. The comparison of the establishments of the two years is really most striking. The rank and file of the cavalry in 1868 numbered 8,949, and in 1870 they numbered 10,422. The artillery in 1868 were 12,015, and in 1870 they were 16,408. The field artillery may be considered to have been almost doubled. It was said by those who had only imperfect information to rely upon that the increase of artillery at home was obtained at the expense of India; but the strength of the rank and file of artillery in India remained as before. The rank and file of infantry, which were 35,580 in 1868, will be 53,150 this year. Therefore your Lordships will see that the allegation that by the addition of 20,000 men in August last we merely placed ourselves in the same position that we were in in 1868 is 715 entirely erroneous. So much has been said about the difficulty of obtaining recruits, that, although my noble Friend did not allude to the subject, I may, perhaps, be allowed to make a short statement. The number recruited since August 1, 1870, has amounted to 26,155, and the casualties during that time amounted to 7,804.
§ VISCOUNT HARDINGEwished to know how many of the recruits were for the short period of enlistment? ["Hear!"]
§ LORD NORTHBROOKunderstood that cheer, and would advert to the subject of short enlistments by-and-by. The net increase in the Army during the period referred to had been 18,351. The number of short enlistments had been 3,383. There were some remarkable facts connected with this recruiting. It used to be considered utterly preposterous to suppose that a system of recruiting could be carried on without bounty. Well, bounty was abolished last June; the whole of these recruits, therefore, were obtained without bounty, and — what is still more satisfactory — although these recruits were sent to the depôts without escort, the percentage of desertions was less than it had ever been under the old system. The rate of recruiting during the last six months was nearly the largest that we have ever had. The largest number of recruits in any one year from the civil population, and the disembodied Militia, was in 1858. The number of recruits in that year was 53,000—about 1,000 per week. But, without bounty, we have come up to about the same number of recruits, although no great inducements were held out last year, as in 1858, to the disembodied Militia to join the Army.
§ THE DUKE OF NORTHUMBERLANDasked whether the standard had not been lowered?
§ LORD NORTHBROOKThe standard was lower in 1858 than in 1870. For some regiments it was then as low as 5 feet 3 inches. It is the opinion of the Inspector General of recruiting that the recruiting during last autumn was as satisfactory as it could possibly be under the circumstances. With regard to this subject, a Report will be laid on the Table which will afford to your Lordships a good deal of interesting information. With regard to the Control 716 system, the noble Earl appears to be under some misapprehension, which is the more remarkable as it was one of the measures introduced by Sir John Pakington when at the War Office; and the Conservative Government, in which the noble Earl held Office, took credit for it in the Queen's Speech before the dissolution of the last Parliament.
THE EARL OF CARNARVONbegged pardon for interrupting; but Sir John Pakington was not at the War Office, but at the Admiralty when he was at the Colonial Office. When the Control system was brought forward he was not in Office.
§ LORD NORTHBROOKI entirely acquit the noble Earl of any share in the responsibility for initiating the Control system. I had forgotten the unfortunate separation that occurred between the noble Earl and his Colleagues. My noble Friend is quite in error if he supposes that the Controller is independent of the general officer commanding a district. That was the error of the French intendance, and has been avoided in the Control regulations, by which the general officer is made the supreme authority. My noble Friend has related an anecdote about ball and blank cartridges. The story has been told before, but the mistake had nothing whatever to do with the Control department, for the officer who made the mistake did not belong to the Control department, but was one of the officers of the old department. My noble Friend also indulged in some criticisms on the general principles of the administration of the Army; but I was not able to gather what remedy he would suggest to correct the ill consequences to which he adverted. Of course, we all know that in the changes in the Government of this country it rarely or ever happens that the Secretary of State for War, who is responsible for the administration of the Army, can be a soldier of distinction; and we also know that, owing to those changes, the responsible Minister rarely remains in Office for a great length of time. It must also be admitted that in respect to the great Departments of the Army and Navy, civilians, who had no practical acquaintance with those services, must feel great difficulty on being placed at the head of the Departments. Still, as long as constitutional government prevails 717 in this country, it would not be easy to provide a remedy for the inconvenience which undoubtedly exists in that respect. What has been done by the Secretary of State for War appears to be the best thing that could be done under the circumstances. He has by an Order in Council divided the business of the Army into three distinct departments, and has placed a responsible chief at the head of each; and when my noble Friend says that there is no military adviser at the War Office I will inform him that my right hon. Friend has placed, by an Order in Council, the illustrious Duke on the cross Benches—the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief—in that position. Without dwelling more on these administrative questions I shall be prepared, on all proper occasions, to defend the arrangements made in the War Office, which have been settled with the view of defining duties and fixing responsibility. In the end an economy of more than £50,000 will be obtained by the reductions which have been made in the War Office by my right hon. Friend. My noble Friend made some remarks to the effect that the Secretary of State for War is at a loss to know where to turn to obtain accurate information; but I believe that he is perfectly satisfied with the information he receives from those who are responsible for the several departments, and has found great relief in respect to the weight of his duties by the alteration, which placed responsible chiefs at the head of different departments, and I rejoice that he will now have the advantage of the assistance in the other House of that distinguished officer Sir Henry Storks. My noble Friend made some observation on the subject of stores, and I am glad to say that he did not assert that we were careless with respect to the provision of great guns. With respect to gunpowder, the noble Earl said that the powder we had there was so defective in quality it was impossible to use it with safety or satisfaction.
THE EARL OF CARNARVONWhat I meant to say was this—that the best kind of powder in store existed in such small quantities that I might say it scarcely existed at all. By the use of the inferior powder the gun would lose about nine-tenths of its propelling power, and it would act most injuriously on the new guns.
§ LORD NORTHBROOKI admit that there is a difficulty in getting sufficient and adequate powder at once to suit the new guns; I ask how is it possible, with respect to a new kind, upon which a Committee has just reported, that there should be a large quantity in store? If a new sort of manufacture be introduced, machinery must be got for it; and if my noble Friend asserts that any delay has taken place with respect to the manufacture of this gunpowder, I shall be happy to meet him on that question on a future occasion. As to the amount of powder in stock I will at once tell your Lordships how we stand, for there is nothing to conceal in the matter. We have of the L. G. (large grain) powder, 214,536 barrels; of the R. L. G. (rifled large grain) powder, 66,075 barrels; of the pebble powder, 564 barrels; and of the pellet powder, which we have abandoned, 149 barrels. Now, of the R. L. G. powder—which is admitted to be good and efficient for the large guns—we have twice as much in store as was consumed during the siege of Sebastopol, where, I believe, the consumption was under 30,000 barrels. I, therefore, hope the noble Earl will set his mind at ease as to the supply of gunpowder. I pass now to the subject of breech-loading arms, and must say I am surprised that my noble Friend should come here with the old story as to what the Secretary of State said in the other House during the autumn of last year. The statement then made by my right hon. Friend was strictly accurate.
THE EARL OF CARNARVONI said nothing as to its accuracy or inaccuracy. I merely stated that there was at that time in the North of England a regiment still armed with muzzle-loaders, and another similarly armed in the South.
§ LORD NORTHBROOKThere are ways of stating a thing so as to produce a certain impression, and I appeal to noble Lords around me whether the statement of my noble Friend did not seem intended for the purpose of throwing some degree of discredit on the statement of the Secretary of State. Now, as his representative in this House, I cannot pass by such an allusion, and will give it what I think must be accepted as a complete answer. Every word in the statement made by my right 719 hon. Friend in the other House was strictly accurate. At the same time, it is possible there might then have been a regiment somewhere in the North of England, and another at Portsmouth or elsewhere, armed only with muzzle-loaders. Everyone is aware of the practice regulating the supply of breechloaders to troops for service in India. My right hon. Friend had stated in the House of Commons, only a few days before the answer to which my noble Friend referred, that some of the regiments stationed in India were still armed with muzzle-loaders; that recruits sent out to join their regiments were not provided with arms, but regiments proceeding to India carried with them the Snider rifle. The regiment at Warley or at Portsmouth alluded to by my noble Friend was simply a regiment just returned from India, and in a few days it would have received the breech-loading arms. Anything, therefore, approaching to the allegation that our Regular forces at home were not armed with breech-loaders is entirely contrary to the facts of the case. My noble Friend, indeed, is very unfortunate when he deals with breech-loading arms. In the autumn he made an interesting speech at an agricultural association in his own county, and said he doubted whether a single regiment of Militia was armed with breech-loaders.
§ LORD NORTHBROOKOf course, I accept that explanation; but I think it is somewhat unfortunate that on a subject of such importance the correction was not made at the time. Another question alluded to by my noble Friend was that of our fortifications. What, he asked, is the reason why these great and important works—these real safeguards of the country—are not yet completed? Simply because it is not possible, by the mere word of a Minister, to create or to complete such gigantic works. My noble Friend calls upon us in the spirit of the old lines—
Ye Gods! annihilate but space and time,And make two lovers happy!If we could have annihilated space and time and made these forts as with the wand of a magician, we should have been only too glad to have done so. But the cause of the delay is a perfectly simple one. In 1859 there was no bigger gun than the old 68-pounder, weighing some 720 5 tons. Since then the weight of our guns has gradually increased, first we had a 7-ton gun, then an 18-ton gun, next a 25-ton gun, until now we have a 35-ton gun. What would have been thought if these works had been hastily completed for an armament of 5-ton guns, and in the meantime these large guns had come into use? That is the real fact with regard to these fortifications. One change after another has taken place. We have been living in a period of great and rapid transition. Only the other day the Moncrieff gun-carriage was invented, and it may, perhaps, be still further improved. Such inventions give rise to great changes, and involve considerable delay, though they may lead to great and permanent advantages. However, I hope the Return to be furnished respecting the present condition of these fortifications will give all the information required, and your Lordships will see that, though not practically completed along the whole coast, yet, on several of the most important points of the coast, they will give an effectual protection to our dockyards—the great naval arsenals of this country. My noble Friend (the Earl of Carnarvon) read an opinion from some professional authority respecting these fortifications, which are pronounced in some place or other to be insufficient. Not knowing the particular work alluded to, and not being an Engineer officer, I cannot profess to argue the matter, or to give a practical opinion on the point at issue. All I can say is that the opinion quoted by my noble Friend is not shared by an officer who will be recognized as one of the highest authorities on the Continent upon questions of this nature: Colonel Brialmont, of the Belgian service, who carried out the fortifications of Antwerp, expressed to Colonel Jervois, the able officer in charge of these works, the highest opinion as to their merits, and stated that he looked upon this country as being in advance of the other nations of Europe in works of fortification. I hope that opinion will weigh with greater force than that of the authority quoted by my noble Friend. Then my noble Friend asked why, after a Commitee had reported in favour of torpedoes, we had not a supply of them in store? But what would have been the use of having an enormous store of torpedoes ready in in the course of last year? Was there 721 any probability of our having to use any one of them? If the torpedoes had been made immediately after the Report of the Committee to which my noble Friend refers, the consequence would have been what has so frequently happened in similar cases—that a pattern, tolerably good for the time being, would have been manufactured in considerable quantities, and then a better pattern having been obtained, the money previously spent would have been wasted. What has actually been done is much better; we have set about ascertaining the proper character of torpedoes, and a certain number of them will be immediately prepared. All the necessary stores which cannot be bought at short notice will be purchased; and the manufacture of gun-cotton, which cannot be obtained in the market at short notice, will be proceeded with. As to those stores which can be easily procured at any time, we shall wait till the occasion arises, and we shall then, in a few days, be able to supply any number of torpedoes for the defence of our harbours and ports. The necessary plans of defence will be kept ready. We shall merely want certain materials which can be easily supplied. Upon the general question of the sufficiency of our supplies I will state the opinion of one of our most experienced and distinguished Artillery officers, the Director of Stores, General Adye, who has informed the Secretary of State that our arsenals and depôts have reserves of all kinds in abundance, and that, in his opinion, as far as relates to munitions and military equipments, we now stand better prepared for war than we have been at any period within his recollection. So much for the attack made by my noble Friend upon the administration of the Army during the last two years. My noble Friend quoted, evidently from recollection, an expression which he attributed to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War at a meeting of the Druids' Society at Oxford—that this country never was in a more complete state of defence than it was in the autumn of last year. Now, possibly that opinion is a true one—I do not wish to discuss the point—but the remark was never made by my right hon. Friend. During the speech of my noble Friend I have had an opportunity of communicating with my right hon. Friend, and 722 the remark he made was different from that attributed to him. What he said was that, as regards the effective force at home last autumn, it was greater, as he believed, than it had been in any one year since 1815, excepting at the conclusion of the Crimean War. I think it right to correct the misapprehension into which my noble Friend has fallen upon this point. And now, my Lords, I come to the part of my noble Friend's speech, in which he attacked the present policy of Her Majesty's Government. With regard to the charge of extravagance brought against that policy, as my noble Friend did not propose any counter plan, nor adduce any particular instance of this extravagance, I am equally unable to consider his plan, or to answer his observations. But my noble Friend appears to me to have never touched upon the point which really lies at the root of all questions connected with the organization of our Army, and that is—"What is it you want your Army to do?" My noble Friend said something about "benevolent neutrality;" but I would ask my noble Friend, does he mean that we are to change, or that we are not to change the policy which this country has pursued with respect to military affairs ever since the Peace of 1815? That policy, as I understand it, is that we should keep up a naval force of great strength and efficiency, and with it a moderate Army, one in no way equal to the great forces maintained during the whole of that period by many of the great military Powers of Europe. Are we to alter this system, or are we to adapt it to the circumstances of the time? As far as I could gather from the speech of my noble Friend, although it was difficult to extract a positive opinion on that part of the subject, he would alter that policy. But if we are to alter it nothing short of a conscription on the largest scale—carried to the extent it is done in Prussia—coupled with enormous Estimates, would suffice. If, on the other hand, we are to adopt our policy to the altered circumstances of the time, in what point are our proposals deficient? We have heard during the Recess arguments from many quarters, and my noble Friend has spoken to-day, although I think he said he would not press it, in favour of compulsory service. What does he mean by saying that he would not press it?
THE EARL OF CARNARVONI think I merely said I would not at this moment force the discussion on that head. I do not think I said anything more.
§ LORD NORTHBROOKBut, my Lords, it is a very inconvenient thing to make statements upon any subject, and then to say we are not to have any discussion on the subject. Am I to understand that my noble Friend wishes to press compulsory service on the country? If my noble Friend does press compulsory service on the country, then he must, I think, show reasons far stronger than he has adduced to-night before we accept it. And for what would the compulsory service be? I can understand any person proposing compulsory service for the Army; but, as I understood my noble Friend, that was not his proposal.
§ LORD NORTHBROOKI did not suppose that that was my noble Friend's meaning. In adopting compulsory service for the Army you would have a broad, intelligible, and active principle to act upon; for by such a conscription you would have a powerful Army and be able to command a force of men equal to the forces of Prussia or of France, and able to carry out any policy which this country might deem desirable on the Continent of Europe. But if I rightly understand the position my noble Friend now takes, it is one in favour of compulsion, but not for the Army. But the whole of these military measures are intended to raise, not a militia, or a volunteer army, but an army of soldiers. And what would be the advantage of resorting to the compulsion of the ballot for the Militia? The reports issued by commanding officers of Militia show that they can obtain under the system of voluntary enlistment all the recruits they want; and the only result, therefore, of resorting to the Ballot would be to substitute unwilling for willing Militiamen. It is difficult to go into the question of the Ballot on an occasion like this, when we have no scheme before us. I do not know whether my noble Friend proposes substitutes or no substitutes, or to change entirely a voluntary for a compulsory force; but this I will under- 724 take to say—that the argument advanced by my noble Friend in favour of the Ballot will not be sustainable when the discussion takes place. Putting aside the question of compulsory service, it appears to me that one of the main principles of Army Organization is the maintenance of a sufficient Reserve, and as the system of short service upon which the maintenance of such a Reserve depends is one of the cardinal points in the scheme proposed by Her Majesty's Government, I would like to ask my noble Friend in what particular does he deem the Government proposal insufficient? The principle of short service is the principle on which all depends—it is one of the cardinal points of the scheme, and I hope that when it comes before your Lordships — with the experience of last year—it will receive your cordial assent. I can assure the noble Earl that all these subjects have been carefully considered, and that calculations have been made of the number of men who will probably be brought into the ranks of the Army Reserve by a system of enlistment for three years in the Army and nine years in the Reserve. I believe that the additional numbers brought in by this means will in a short time produce a very effective Army Reserve, and that it will consist ultimately of no fewer than 100,000 men. It is obvious that if we take steps to obtain an Army Reserve of that magnitude another most important alteration is necessary. The cadres of the Infantry battalions will require to be considerably increased, and we must have greater elasticity in the organization of our Army. Having a small peace establishment, we should then be able on an emergency to place trained men in the ranks, and complete a force of infantry very much larger than we have at present. Another point to which we attach the greatest importance is that the Militia recruits shall be thoroughly trained when they first enter the service. Our proposal is that they should be trained for a period of three months after their enlistment, and it has been favourably received by many colonels of Militia whose opinions have been asked on the feasibility of the measure. My noble Friend thinks three months not sufficient; but I believe that recruits for Her Majesty's Household Troops have only four months' training before they are put in the ranks. If 725 so, surely three months' training will be sufficient for Militia recruits. Again, we hope by the changes which will ensue from the abolition of the purchase system to find a remedy for the existing defects in regard to Militia officers. With respect to the Volunteers, we propose to insist on greater efficiency, especially in reference to the qualifications of officers. This is not the proper occasion for dilating on these points, but I mention, them in passing in order to show that none of the principal branches of the service have escaped the notice of Her Majesty's Government. There can be no doubt that the general re-organization of the Regular Army is a matter of primary importance at the present time. No one can more heartily agree than I do with the eloquent panegyric pronounced by my noble Friend on the glories and the merits of the British Army; but the experience of great wars constantly alter the organization and tactics of armies; while, as military writers say, the great principles of strategy have remained unchanged from the time of Cæsar to the present day. Now, it certainly appears to me wise and necessary to take advantage of the knowledge gained by the terrible experience of other nations in order to apply all improvements to our own organization. No one can be more sensible of this than my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, and not one of the points referred to by my noble Friend has escaped his attention, or that of the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief. My noble Friend asked me what was going to be done in reference to the education of officers. My reply is, that much has been done already, and that the recommendations of the Royal Commission upon Military Education have, in all substantial respects, been carried out. The illustrious Duke on the cross Benches issued on the 1st of August, 1870, a General Order laying down the conditions of the education of officers and the subjects they were to qualify themselves in for promotion from one rank to another. These conditions, I may remark, were almost identical with those recommended by the Commissioners. The illustrious Duke has also continuously directed his attention to improvements in field fortification, and fresh instructions have been issued on that subject. A Committee has also investigated the subject of an Intelligence 726 department. I will not now discuss the Estimates, but as to the survey of the district round London it will be found that more than the sum mentioned by my noble Friend has been taken for that purpose. Having thus shown that we are prepared to utilize to the utmost the lessons derived from the experience of other nations, I wish to say a few words concerning the combination of all our forces. Up to the present time everything has been done which the law permitted to effect such a combination; but the state of the law has prevented the Government from going farther than they have done. If it were desirable to give greater elasticity to the British infantry, which appears to me to be almost essential with short service, and to have three battalions to each regiment, with such arrangements that it would be easy to transfer men from one battalion to another so as to complete regiments for service; if, on the other hand, we wished to combine the Militia with the Line regiments in such a way as that they should form part of a harmonious and uniform system, united by local names, or by conditions of service, and so giving to the auxiliary forces the great benefits of the regimental system, which has been rightly considered one of the greatest merits of the British Army; in either of those cases we find, with regard to the Regular Army, that we are stopped entirely by the system of purchase, and, in regard to the auxiliary forces, we are stopped altogether by their being placed by Act of Parliament under the command of Lords Lieutenant of counties. In the opinion of the Government the changes necessary in order that these forces shall be bound together are the abolition of the purchase system and the resumption of the command of the Militia by the Crown; and both these form part of the scheme of the Government. Therefore, whether you look, first, to the establishment of short service in the Army; second, to the better training of the Militia; third, to the proper efficiency of the Volunteer forces; fourth, to the completing and improving of the organization of the Army and its tactical efficiency; or, fifth, to the combination of the whole; there is not one point with which the scheme of the Government fails to deal. It would be inexpedient now to raise a discussion on the question of pur- 727 chase; it would be better to defer such discussion until the Bill is before your Lordships. All these changes produce what I may call a radical reform in many branches of the Army; and in the preparation of these measures the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief has cordially assisted the Government, giving them all the support they could desire. Holding the position I do it would not be right of me to abstain from saying this; and I believe I may add that the illustrious Duke entirely agrees with the proposals of the Government. The key of the speech of my noble Friend is that he wished to avoid hot and cold fits in respect of military affairs—improper economy one day and panic another; and he appears to think that the responsibility for these things rests only upon those who are for the time being responsible for the administration of the Army. But my noble Friend's indictment applies, in every count, equally to the Administration of which he was a member, and, indeed, to every Administration for the last 20 years; and it is absurd to suppose that the short intervals of Conservative Administration have sufficed to keep alive the British Army. I venture to say, moreover, that responsibility attaches to others — namely, to the Leaders in both Houses of the Opposition to Her Majesty's Government for those fits and panics, and no one has been so great a culprit in this particular as Mr. Disraeli. What has he done in two of the greatest crises in which the military administration of this country has found itself placed? In 1857, just after the expiration of the Crimean War, when the question of military expenditure was brought before the country, he lent the whole weight of his influence as the Leader of the Conservative party to a movement for the reduction of the Estimates to the standard of 1853. Again, in 1862, when a contest of a different character had been brought to a conclusion, Mr. Disraeli gave utterance to one of those epigrammatical expressions which are never forgotten; he attacked what he called the "bloated armaments" of this country. But those "bloated armaments" of 1862 were in strength very much like those which have lately been considered entirely insufficient; and which, only the other day, he characterized in words quite as epigrammatical—as "skeleton battalions and attenuated 728 squadrons"—and that notwithstanding that the strength of the Army at home, for the defence of these isles, even before the recent increase, was greater than when he himself ceased to hold the office of Prime Minister. It seems to me that the responsibility of the leaders of public opinion who do not belong to the Government is very great, and I wish I could acquit my noble Friend opposite from being a culprit of the same kind; but I must remind him of a speech he made in the provinces during the Recess. He thinks he is making amiable comments when he is really saying most violent and cutting things. He proposes nothing himself, but says he is dreadfully surprised at hearing Mr. Cardwell's statements, and that he is not satisfied with half-and-half recommendations and milk-and-water principles. I complain that statements are made by my noble Friend and others who, having occupied positions of high importance in public affairs, are looked to as leaders of opinion in this country, without sufficient information; and while they are ready to criticize and accept for the purpose of criticism any statement from whatever quarter it may come, they are willing to give no credit to those who are entrusted with the responsibility of the administration of a department while Parliament is not sitting. So far from believing that the proposals made by the Government for the organization of the Army are insufficient or extravagant, I believe that, when your Lordships consider the measure itself, you will be of the opinion that those proposals have been framed not only with due regard to the necessities of this country, but also with due regard for that economy without which no military measures can have a permanent character. My Lords, I have only in conclusion to say with respect to the Returns for which the noble Earl moved, that there will be no objection to produce them with a slight modification in the first, showing what progress has been made in the works of fortification, instead of simply showing whether they are complete or not. My Lords, I have to thank the House most sincerely for the kind attention they have paid to me in fulfilling a task of great difficulty, having had to deal with questions partly of great principles and partly of minute detail without that preparation beforehand which it would have been 729 much more satisfactory to me to have given, because I should then have been able to condense my remarks within a space and time not so unreasonably inconvenient to your Lordships.
§ THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGEMy Lords, I hope I may be allowed to say a few words on this important subject. The subject is so difficult that a good deal has been said on both sides as to what ought and what ought not to be done. I certainly have no wish to enter into the controversy in any way; but, as in the position which I have the honour to hold I am in a great measure responsible for the efficiency of the Army, it would ill become me to allow such a subject to pass without making a few observations. But they shall be very few, and for this reason—that I think questions of this sort will be much more easily and satisfactorily discussed when we have the proposed measure before us. I am sure my noble Friend will excuse me for the observation; but I confess that I came into the House this evening without really knowing what would be the exact subject of debate. I confess, looking to some of the remarks of my noble Friend, it was almost impossible to know what was to be the direction of the discussion; for the debate has gone much beyond the subject-matter before us, and no one could be prepared to meet offhand all the questions that have been raised in the way they ought to be met. Therefore I hope to be excused by your Lordships if I show any shortcoming on this occasion. Your Lordships will understand that it arises not from any want of interest in the subject, or of respect to the noble Earl, but because I think the subject would be better discussed when the details of the Ministerial Bill are before us. As a matter of general remark, I venture to think that the intentions shadowed forth lie in the direction which the circumstances of the case demand, and which have been so much discussed by the country. The subjects which have been brought under your Lordships' notice are matters which fall more immediately within the responsibility of the Secretary of State than of myself. Military questions have been much less before your Lordships than other portions of the case. I therefore reserve to myself the opportunity of making what observations I think necessary on these subjects on some other 730 occasion. But I have no hesitation in saying I think it is fortunate that we are endeavouring to amend the present constitution of our military forces rather than to introduce an entirely new system. The Government have endeavoured to extend the Reserves of the country—to increase the means of finding an Army for defence more than for offence—for offence is certainly not intended by the measures they have propounded—on the principles on which the Army has hitherto teen founded, with the exception of limited service, which has been introduced to a large extent. Now, if limited service can be applied in the manner proposed, and if we can get good men under it, that, I believe, will be the simplest and easiest way of increasing the Reserves of the Army. It is a problem, however, that time alone will solve, and we must hope that the measures which have been commenced, though hitherto small in result, will expand our resources, and that it will be found practicable to have larger and more efficient Reserves. I quite accord with what fell from my noble Friend (Lord Northbrook), that the Army, having been weeded of inefficient men, is to that extent more efficient. With reference to the artillery, it has been supposed there was something like jugglery between the reduction of Indian artillery and the increase of artillery at home; as if the object really were to throw dust in the eyes of the public. But I hope the House will understand that, so far as we are concerned, there has been nothing of the sort—I am sure the noble Duke the Secretary of State for India will endorse what I say—it has long been in contemplation to make certain reductions in the artillery in India for financial considerations, and advantage was only taken of this opportunity of carrying that proposal into effect. It was also supposed that the batteries were not strong enough in men, and therefore it was intended to increase the number of men in the batteries in India, and to bring a certain number of skeleton batteries home. But the plan emanated with India itself; and, personally, I should have been glad if it had not been so, because we should have had a certain amount of promotion, which would have been gratifying to the artillery at home. But that was impossible, and I wish to put it clearly before the public, that this was an Indian and not a home question. My noble 731 Friend seems to be under the impression that the artillery is not so largely increased as he would wish; but I think it will be found to be largely increased, not only in the number of guns, but in the number of men. It is essential that a corps like the artillery should be as efficient as possible; and, as Artillerymen take longer time to make efficient than men in other branches, the intention is to increase the artillery more largely than any other branch of the service. In the same spirit it is intended to increase the cavalry, as they, too, require longer time to make efficient than the infantry, which can be more quickly brought up to the desired strength. At the same time, this is a matter that must be looked to with great care; and, although men may be sufficiently drilled to come into the ranks in four months, and may make remarkably good soldiers in a well-disciplined regiment with old soldiers by their side, yet I do not quite agree with my noble Friend that these men can be trained in the Militia and made efficient soldiers in three months. I happen to have seen a statement of General Moltke, in which he distinctly says that a man is not a first-rate soldier till he has served three years in the ranks. This was really the basis on which the Bill of last year proceeded, so that we have actually admitted the principle.
§ LORD NORTHBROOKexplained. All he meant to say was, that three months might be sufficient for a Militia recruit to put him into the ranks of the Militia.
§ THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGEI am delighted to have given my noble Friend the opportunity of making that explanation. But I go beyond the expression of my noble Friend; for the Bill of last year placed the minimum at three years. The Government has, therefore, adopted the just and proper period. However, these are details which we shall have a better opportunity of discussing when the Bill comes before us. I only wish the House should understand the reason why I do not now enter into the discussion at length. I have endeavoured, not in a political capacity—for in my position I have no politics—but in a military capacity to assist the Government in carrying out their measures. I only hope, whatever the result, it may be satisfactory. I have one other remark, my Lords, to make. It is a personal one. It has been frequently said 732 of late that I am one of those who are not disposed to go with the spirit of the age, and to improve the condition of the Army in various ways. But I beg most distinctly to assure your Lordships—though the assurance, I should hope, was scarcely required—that, from the first day I entered on public life till the present hour, I have endeavoured to the utmost of my power to support every measure for advancing the comfort and efficiency of the British soldier. I am not aware of ever having resisted any measures of the kind, but, on the contrary, I have always endeavoured to promote all those measures which I believed to be most conducive to the best interests of the service, and calculated to place our Army, small as it is—too small, I believe, for the present circumstances of the age—in an efficient condition, as I firmly believe it is at present.
§ THE DUKE OF RICHMONDMy Lords, the noble Lord who spoke second in the discussion (Lord Northbrook) told your Lordships that he was a young Member of this House; yet he ventured to give my noble Friend near me some advice. He said it was extremely inconvenient to make a Motion of this kind dealing with a variety of questions, which were at present under the consideration of the other House, and then the noble Lord himself proceeded to reply to a speech of mine made on the first night of the Session. If I am not mistaken, the noble Lord was in the House upon that occasion, and that, I submit, would have been the proper time to contradict anything which fell from me, if the noble Lord thought I had made any incorrect statement. I then stated that Lord Russell had written a letter in which that noble Lord stated that Mr. Cardwell's mission was retrenchment. I also said that at the General Election it was stated on the hustings that retrenchment was the watchword of the Government.
§ LORD NORTHBROOKRetrenchment with due regard to efficiency.
§ THE DUKE OF RICHMONDWould anyone, in addressing his constituents, dare to say that he was going to Parliament to support measures of retrenchment, but with regard to efficiency he did not care one farthing on the subject? Towards the end of his speech the noble Lord put words into the mouth of the illustrious Duke—
§ LORD NORTHBROOKI am not aware that I put any words into the mouth of His Royal Highness. I merely said first, in alluding to certain improvement which the illustrious Duke had carried out, that in respect to those matters it would perhaps be better for me rather than the illustrious Duke to state what he had done. There was another case—
EARL GREYrose to Order. He said it was most irregular for the noble Lord to contradict another noble Lord in the course of his speech. If the noble Duke misrepresented anything, the noble Lord should wait until the termination of the noble Duke's speech, and then make whatever explanation he thought desirable.
§ THE DUKE OF RICHMONDI must apologize if I have misrepresented the noble Lord. The noble Lord having answered various statements made by me on the first day of the Session, went into the whole of the Government scheme with respect to the Army, replied to a great deal which my noble Friend near me (the Earl of Carnarvon) said and did not say, and apologized for his long statement by saying that he was also answering remarks made out-of-doors. Certainly, there was a great deal more irregularity in that course of proceeding than in anything which he found fault with in the conduct of my noble Friend. The subject of barracks was touched on by my noble Friend, and I can state that Christchurch Barracks were all but sold within the last 12 months for £1,500. They were, however, rescued from that fate, and they are now about to be occupied by a force in Her Majesty's service. I understood the noble Lord to say that some of the arsenals were in a complete state of fortification, and that some had been delayed in consequence of a change in the artillery, the guns being heavier than formerly. The effect of this course of proceeding is, that you will never be able to complete these forts until you arrive at an absolute state of perfection. I will not go into details as to whether the battery at Wimbledon was complete or not; but I will remind your Lordships that the statement was not that the battery was not complete, but that, to complete it, other batteries had to give up their horses. With respect to training, I ask, if you put a recruit of four months' training into the ranks, 734 what sort of exhibition would he make? From my own experience in one of Her Majesty's cavalry regiments, I know that it takes more than a year to make a finished cavalry soldier. On this, as on other points, the noble Lord has been misinformed. This is a very large question. I quite agree that we cannot discuss the Government system as a whole, and it would be inconvenient to attempt to do so until we have it before us. Indeed, I should have been glad to have passed over anything connected with the Government scheme had it not been for some remarks made by the Under Secretary for War to which I cannot assent. I will only now allude shortly to one of many points—the abolition of purchase; and I feel bound to say that before abolishing this system the Government were bound to do three things—they must show, first, that the existing system is a bad one; secondly, that it has worked badly for the country; and, lastly, that the officers now in the British Army and their predecessors for a long series of years were not good officers, and did not properly lead their men in the various battles which are now matters of history. In the next place you have to show that the system you are about to substitute for it is a good system, and one which can be properly carried out. But above all—and I quite concur in the remark made on this point by the noble Lord opposite—the taxpayer must be considered, even in the House of Lords. You must show the taxpayer what he will have to pay if you abolish purchase, and come to the system of retirement—which purchase will render inevitable. So far as the country is concerned, the purchase system is the cheapest you can have, and you are bound to show what will be the expense of abolishing it. The noble Lord himself (Lord Northbrook) will be candid enough to admit that it is perfectly easy to show not only the expense of buying up all the interests which at present exist under the purchase system, but the expense of a scheme of retirement, and I think that information should be laid before the country. There is another subject on which I cannot forbear to remark, even in the presence of the illustrious Duke. The position of the illustrious Duke with regard to the Army of this country does not form part of the Government scheme, and, 735 therefore, there is no irregularity in mentioning it. Those who have taken an interest in military affairs, as I have done for a very long time, must have been struck with the many speeches which were delivered, and the many statements which were made last year with regard to the position of the Commander-in-Chief. Scarcely a man in the country, except, perhaps, the Secretary of State, has, during the Parliamentary Recess, had more abuse lavished upon him than the illustrious Duke. Now, I believe it to be absolutely necessary to the interests of the Army that the officer Commanding-in-Chief should be a permanent officer. I can conceive nothing so bad for the Army as that its military chief should be selected by the Secretary of State, and should only serve for a term of five years. We all know what changes of government take place in this constitutional country. Now, if the Commander-in-Chief were appointed in this way, the Parliamentary pressure that would be put upon him would make it of the greatest possible difficulty for him to do his duty. Even a permanent officer in the position of His Royal Highness finds the duty of selection one of the greatest difficulty. Unless, then, the strictest and most positive rules are laid down for the selection of officers, an officer who is superseded will inevitably think he has a grievance. Your Lordships will recollect the case of an officer who was not thought fit for promotion, and who for the last ten years has been litigating with the authorities on the matter. You, therefore, want at the head of the Army one who is entirely above suspicion, one independent of all political influence, and who in these respects gives to the Army and the country the satisfaction which, if I may venture to say so in his presence, is given by his Royal Highness. In my opinion, it would be most unfortunate for the Army if we had any other system of administration than that which now prevails, and we hardly required the assurance of the illustrious Duke that he has always carried out the views of the Government of the day as far as he could do so. Ten years ago, in a debate upon the second reading of the Mutiny Act, His Royal Highness said that, as far as he was personally concerned, it should be his earnest and anxious endeavour to carry out the decision then come to in such a 736 manner as to promote the best interests of the Army and of the country. I believe that His Royal Highness has acted most strictly and judiciously on the opinions he then uttered, and I think the country is extremely fortunate in having at the head of the Army one who is so thoroughly and practically acquainted with all the details of the regimental system, and the whole system of military discipline and promotion. Before concluding, I wish to ask the Under Secretary for War a question with regard to the position of Sir Henry Storks. What is the exact office he holds?
§ LORD NORTHBROOKSurveyor General of the Ordnance.
§ THE DUKE OF RICHMONDIs that a permanent office? Or would he go out with the Ministry? I see that he has just been returned to represent the borough of Ripon in Parliament, and I think we have a right to know whether his is a permanent or a political office; whether in case of a change of government he would expect to go on as before.
EARL GREYMy Lords, no more vital question can occupy our attention than that of the sufficiency of the national defences; I think, therefore, we have reason to thank the noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon) who has brought this subject under our notice, and I own I was surprised that the Under Secretary should have found fault with the introduction of this subject at such a time as the present. He must remember that the Estimates never came before this House at all, and that the Government measure embodying the changes proposed in our military system will probably come before us at a very late period of the Session. If, therefore, we waited to discuss this matter until that Bill came before us, the Estimates would by that time have been voted, and we should practically be debarred from discussing at all, to any useful purpose, the important question of the military policy of the country. The course taken by the noble Earl is, in my opinion, perfectly regular and Parliamentary. I heard with pleasure a great portion of the speech of my noble Friend (Lord Northbrook). I was very glad to hear my noble Friend opposite early in his speech enter his protest against compulsory service, for I am persuaded that there could be no greater mistake than 737 to attempt to force such a system upon this country. As he said, no one proposes to introduce it for the Army, but to adopt it for the Militia would be to adopt the system with all its hardships and none of its advantages. My noble Friend behind me (the Earl of Carnarvon) has talked of the enormous expense of the English Army as compared with the Army of Prussia, and has contrasted the £7,000,000 which Prussia pays for her Army with the £15,000,000 annually expended on our own; but that comparison I believe to be most fallacious. It may be true that the Prussian Army costs to the State in money paid from the Treasury no more than £7,000,000 a year; but how much more does it cost in the indirect burden which it throws upon the people? The Prussian Army is so cheap, because you compel all ranks among the population to serve for very inadequate remuneration. We, on the contrary, are obliged to pay a fair market value for the services we require, because we do not resort to compulsion. We get no one to serve in our Army who does not receive what he himself considers a fair remuneration for the work which he performs. Again, in Prussia you not only get this service for comparatively nothing, but you expose the whole country to the enormous burden of having a very large proportion of the civil population withdrawn during some of the best years of their lives from the business which they are afterwards to follow, thus diminishing the productive power of the country; so that if the cost directly and indirectly of the Prussian Army were compared with our own, we should, I think, have no reason to be ashamed of the comparison. Now, my Lords, I think it would be a very mistaken policy to support in times of peace an Army upon the same scale as we should do in times of war. The expense of such an Army would be intolerable, while it would excite the just jealousy of other nations, and thus tend to perpetuate that system, which has unfortunately prevailed in Europe for some years, of keeping the military establishments of nations in a state of permanent preparation for war, which has had the effect not only of imposing upon them a large part of the burdens of war in times of peace, but also, as I believe, of making war itself more probable. But, at the same time, it seems to me absolutely necessary 738 that we should have such arrangements for the defence of the country as will enable us to defend ourselves effectually in case of sudden danger; and your Lordships have to consider whether the arrangements now in progress are sufficient to afford us that real security which we ought to look for against sudden invasion. Looking at what has happened during the past year; looking at the suddenness with which war broke out, and the quickness with which enormous numbers of troops were put in motion; looking, too, at the merciless manner in which the conquered have been treated by those who have hitherto boasted of their superior civilization, but who, I think, must henceforth forfeit all claims to that distinction, this country is bound, in my opinion, not to trust for its exemption from the cruel exactions of foreign generals and soldiers to anything but its own power of repelling attack. Nor do I forget that, after all, our main reliance must be on our naval force. I do not underrate the enormous advantage we possess in having between ourselves and the military nations of Europe what has been called "the silver streak of sea." But we must not trust exclusively to this. Though extremely improbable, I can conceive it possible that by an unfortunate combination of circumstances an expedition, not upon a very large scale, might, in spite of all we could do, succeed in reaching our shores. And we should be in great danger if such an expedition could do us any great injury. If we were so strong at home that to send a small force against us would be to send it to certain destruction our situation would be different. To assemble a large Army and to make the necessary preparations for bringing it over would require much time, and the preparations which would have to be made could not well be concealed, and we should thus have time to make our preparations also. Nor is this all. To carry a large Army across the sea with its artillery and stores would require a multitude of vessels, which so loaded, it would be extremely difficult to keep together and to protect. Our unencumbered iron-clads and gunboats would have such facilities in attacking a naval expedition of that kind that it would be extremely difficult for it to effect a landing. Seeing, then, the almost insuperable difficulties standing in the way of 739 any hostile expedition upon a really large scale effecting a landing on British territory, I, for one, should be satisfied with such a state of things as would enable the Government immediately after the breaking out of war to assemble a force sufficient to crush an expedition, not amounting to a large Army, as soon as it should land upon our shores. But, my Lords, is that the case? I find that on the 1st of August last year the whole of the Regular force within the United Kingdom was 84,000 men. I find it stated that, even with the increase now provided for, the Regular force within the United Kingdom is calculated during the present year at only 108,000. To that are to be added, of the First Army Reserve 9,000, and of the Second Army Reserve and Pensioners 30,000. Therefore, you have only 147,000 men, all told, connected with your Regular forces. But I cannot suppose that all your Pensioners are fit for service, or that the whole of both classes of the Reserve can be considered equivalent to troops of the Line; so that we must look at something very much under 150,000 as the total of our Regular Army that we could command in time of war. When you consider the force required to garrison Ireland and our one great arsenal, and to protect our dockyard, when you make the requisite deductions for sick, and when you add the consideration that you cannot be sure that an attack might not be made simultaneously at different parts of our coast, no man, I think, will say that our force is sufficient to leave us the assurance that an enemy landing on our coast, though only in moderate strength, would be certain to be driven into the sea. But then we are reminded that we have also the Volunteers and the Militia. The Volunteers and the Militia are, no doubt, a very useful force within certain limits; but it is quite idle to talk of their being really available for active operations in the field at the commencement of a war. The Militia, though a very costly force in proportion to the advantages we derive from it, has been brought to a state of comparative efficiency, reflects great credit on its officers, and would, no doubt, be capable of rendering in some ways very useful service. I cannot include it, however, among the available force which may be reckoned upon in case of emergency for active service in the field. 740 There are, I know, some persons who say that the Militia is a very efficient force, and who consider it to be unduly disparaged when it is excluded in reckoning the amount of force we should have available for the field at the beginning of a war. At all events, it is contended it was found to be of the greatest possible advantage to this country in the last great war. I wish the following facts to be considered by those who regard the subject in this light. It is perfectly true that after the great Revolutionary war had been going on for some years, the Militia having been constantly embodied since the outbreak of the war, became a force not much inferior to the Line; but it was paid like the Line; it was managed like the Line; and in everything but name it constituted a portion of the Regular Army. At the beginning of the war, however, the Militia was nothing better than an armed rabble, and it required much labour and time to bring the force into the state of comparative efficiency which it subsequently attained. In the early part of that great war the officers intrusted with the defence of our coasts took little or no account of the Militia regiments under their orders in reckoning what force they could command. The advocates of the Militia say that in six months it would become a useful force; but we should not have six months to prepare—probably, not six weeks; possibly, not six days. Therefore I say the Militia is not to be reckoned on as an effective force for taking the field against an enemy who might succeed in landing on our shores at the beginning of a war. You have one method, and one only, of providing for your safety. In consequence of the expense and burden on the country you cannot constantly keep up a large Army in time of peace. On the other hand, you cannot trust to undisciplined or half-trained troops to meet disciplined troops. The advantages which thoroughly trained soldiers have always had over those who have not been so trained have been enormously increased by the improvements of late years in the weapons and the art of war, and it is now simple madness to pit partially-instructed troops against such soldiers as we should have to fight if we were again involved in war. It follows, therefore, that what you really want is a means, when a war breaks 741 out, of adding to the Regular Army at almost a moment's notice, such a number of thoroughly trained men as will give it the force necessary for all operations. I was glad to hear my noble Friend the Under Secretary of State say that what we ought to look to was a powerful Reserve in connection with the Army; but I wish the Government had postponed the unwise reduction made last year until the Reserve had existed in something more than imagination. My noble Friend has defended with great ability, but not with equal success, the reduction of the Army last year. He says the Government dismissed 20,000 soldiers; but that some of them were bad characters and others nearly worn out, and that now we are getting a better class of men in their place. My noble Friend has quoted the authority of the Commander-in-Chief to show that reduced battalions of 500 good soldiers may be better than battalions of 600 in which there are 100 inefficient or bad ones. Yes, but not better, as the illustrious Duke has pointed out, than battalions of 600 good, soldiers. I do not dispute the wisdom of discharging the bad soldiers; but surely their place ought to have been filled up at once. Again, my noble Friend says — "We have concentrated our force at home, and have as many men, or rather more, at home now than we had in former years." Surely, however, my noble Friend must perceive that, in considering what is our available force for defence at home, we must not merely consider the soldiers who are at this moment within the four seas, but those who, before this concentration was effected, might be recalled from some of the Colonies on a very short notice. I am of opinion that what my noble Friend calls concentration has been carried a great deal too far; and I may also remark that there were some great advantages in keeping a portion of our troops in the Colonies. They do not in some of the Colonies cost more than they do at home, and are even more favourably placed for health and discipline. The means now exist of bringing them very quickly home if they are wanted; it is therefore an obvious fallacy, in comparing the amount of troops you can command to meet an emergency, to count only those at the moment in the United Kingdom, excluding those available at short notice. 742 But, whether the policy of concentration has been carried too far or not, I do maintain that to reduce our standing force, either at home or abroad, before the creation of the contemplated Reserve, was a most imprudent measure. Though the actual breaking out of the war last year was very sudden, yet for three or four years at least threatening symptoms had been observable on the Continent; ever since 1866 France had been extremely discontented with the changes which had taken place in Germany, and Germany, on the other hand, resented the disposition shown by France to interfere with her. The occurrence of war on the Continent ought not to have come upon the Government as an entirely unexpected event, and it should have found us with a respectable force available. As the intended Reserve was still to be created, this force could only be furnished by the Regular Army, and it was therefore imprudent at such a time to reduce its numbers. This was also unwise for another reason. You cannot speedily create a reserve of trained soldiers unless you have a large regular Army from which men may take their discharge. My noble Friend says we may ultimately have 100,000 men for a Reserve. Well, I want to see that Reserve made; but, in order to bring about such a result, we ought temporarily to keep up the Regular Army in excess of what we mean to maintain it at permanently. In fact, it is only by taking that course that the Reserve can be formed. If the Army had not been reduced last year, and if, at the same time, Her Majesty's Government had encouraged soldiers to take their discharge at early periods, we might by this time have made considerable progress towards forming a Reserve. Her Majesty's Government had the means of doing this without passing the Act altering the terms of enlistment, and I continue to think that passing that Bill last Session was a mistake, for the reason I then stated—that frequent changes in the terms of enlistment confuse men's minds and are exceedingly mischievous in every respect; and I still think it would have been better if the Government, without altering the law in any way, had given notice that applications to leave the Army and join the Reserve would be favourably received. I therefore venture to say Her Majesty's Go- 743 vernment have made a great mistake in not more largely increasing the Regular troops until they can form a more considerable Reserve. I am quite aware that the expense of that will be urged as an objection to the proposal. I shall be told that the Government have gone as far as they could in adding to the Army Estimates, and I will admit that these Estimates are unduly heavy; they are, in my opinion, heavier than they need have been, while the country might have been more effectually protected if our military administration had been more judiciously conducted than it has been for the last few years. Without adding a single farthing to the amount which the Government propose to demand, they might have made a considerable further addition to the Army. The measures for the improvement of the Militia are calculated to cost the country £400,000 in the ensuing financial year; if that money had been devoted to the increase of the Regular Army, according to the calculations of my noble Friend opposite, (Lord Northbrook) it would have given a further increase of 10,000 men. That would have been a very substantial increase of the Army, and an increase, too, of the means of feeding your Army Reserve; and I ask whether, in view of a sudden emergency, an addition of 10,000 men to the Regular Army would not have been more useful to the country than the proposed improvement of the Militia? This is not the time to discuss the proposals affecting the Militia; but I cannot help saying I am afraid my noble Friend has fallen into the great mistake of taking a middle line between two opposite policies, and incurring the inconveniences of both, without obtaining the advantages of either. I am afraid that, by the additions he is going to make to the Militia, he will increase its numbers more than is necessary for the peculiar service for which alone the Militia is intended; and he will further do this without making the Militia into soldiers, and he will discourage men from enlisting into the Militia. From what I have heard, I am inclined to think that requiring three or four months' drill of every Militiaman before he is to be considered a soldier will deprive you of some of the most useful classes who now enlist into the Militia. A Northumberland adjutant, an exceedingly able officer, wrote to me 744 the other day, saying it was a great mistake to suppose that the same classes enlisted into the Army and into the Militia; in truth, he said, the two were recruited by quite different classes, and he stated that many of the artificers and men employed in the great works on the banks of the Tyne joined the Militia, though their pay in it is far lower than the wages they habitually earn, for the sake of enjoying a month's relaxation at reduced pay, and being of service to the country. We could not enlist a more valuable class into the Militia artillery, and it would be a great misfortune to discourage them entering it; but I believe that by prolonging the term of drill for recruits you will do so; and the addition to the time will be quite thrown away as far as regards making the men into anything like regular soldiers. My noble Friend said that three months' training ought not to be so very insufficient for Militiamen, when four months was sufficient to enable a man to take rank in the Guards; but the fallacy was admirably exposed by the Royal Duke who spoke afterwards, and who showed that, although four months' drill might enable a small percentage of men to take their places in a regular, well-drilled regiment without serious inconvenience, it would be totally different if the whole force were composed of men of that description. And when a Guardsman takes his place after four months' drill, his education does not stop, but it is continued for two or three years more; and I firmly believe that the illustrious Duke was right in saying that to make a really efficient soldier a training of at least three years is required. But the education of the Militiaman stops; and therefore it appears to me to be a great mistake to spend £400,000 a year upon the Militia when, by applying the money in another way, you could have your full money's worth in an increase of the Regular Army. I further believe the Government are making an injudicious appropriation of money in proposing the immediate abolition of the system of purchase. I remain of the opinion I have long held, that, in spite of objections to it, the purchase system has not worked badly. In abolishing that system, I believe you will find it a matter of extreme difficulty to establish any system of retirement which will make so rapid a current of promotion in your 745 Army as to make that Army efficient. Undoubtedly, hitherto, the Government have not solved the problem with regard to the seniority corps in our service, and I should have wished them to have solved that problem with respect to the Artillery and Engineers before they proceeded to abolish purchase in the rest of the Army. Even if all the benefits anticipated from the abolition of purchase should be realized, it is not a subject of pressing importance, for our regimental system has supplied us, on the whole, with an admirable body of regimental officers. The matter is not so pressing that you ought to apply to it so large a sum as £8,000,000, until you have attained other objects that are of more immediate importance. I will only mention one, which it is remarkable the noble Lord (Lord Northbrook) passed by in his very able answer to my noble Friend behind me (the Earl of Carnarvon). I do not remember any other important point in his speech which was not noticed by my noble Friend opposite; but this he did not touch upon, feeling, no doubt, that it was difficult to deal with. I refer to the importance of having some other arsenal besides Woolwich. Seeing how exposed it is to hostile attack, it is the height of imprudence to leave it our only great military and naval arsenal, and we ought to have another place where we can upon a large scale manufacture great guns and equipments for the Army. I think another arsenal like that at Woolwich is required, and that opinion was held, and admirable reasons were given for it, by the Commission which inquired into the matter several years ago. It would have been more judicious on the part of Government to have done something towards meeting that great need than to spend so much money in the abolition of the purchase system. But, unfortunately, popularity was to be gained by the one expense, and only the good of the country by the other, and in deciding upon their measure, popularity, and popularity alone, is the guide of our Government.
EARL DELAWARRthought it advisable that the Army should be divided into two portions; one to be enlisted for 12 years for service abroad, and the other for three years for service at home. At present a man who enlisted never knew what his destination would be, and 746 this prevented many men from entering the service.
§
Motion, as amended, agreed to.
That an humble address be presented to Her Majesty for,
List of the works recommended by the Defence Commission of 1859, with a statement of the present condition of the works authorized to be constructed, specifying whether they are or are not complete:
The number of tents and tent equipages now in store, exclusive of officers and hospital tents:
The amount of barrack accommodation in England and Scotland, specified according to districts and counties:
The barracks and barrack grounds sold or disposed of within the last two years."—(The Earl of Carnarvon.)
§ House adjourned at Ten o'clock, till To-morrow, half past Ten o'clock.