HL Deb 07 August 1871 vol 208 cc944-8
LORD COLCHESTER

rose to ask Her Majesty's Government, Whether a notice dated from the Metropolitan Police Office, prohibiting a meeting in Trafalgar Square for the purpose of petitioning Parliament, was genuine, and why, if such be the case, the meeting in question was allowed to take place without interruption, and to call attention to the state of the law with reference to public meetings? The noble Lord said, that when he first gave Notice of his intention to bring this subject under the attention of the House, the circumstances appeared to him really to be of so inexplicable a character, and the position in which the Executive authority had found itself so remarkable and without parallel, that he had framed his Question with the view of ascertaining whether the notice prohibiting the meeting was a genuine document. Since that time the explanations which had been given "elsewhere" had so far modified the situation that the meeting seemed to have been first prohibited under one impression, and then allowed under another, more accurate, and that after a public and avowed prohibition it was permitted on a private understanding, by which, technically at least, the law was to be respected. But for the inquiries made "elsewhere," the later communications between the promoters of the meeting and the authorities would have remained unknown to the public, and the country would have inferred that a meeting of a somewhat extreme political character had, after being publicly prohibited, been triumphantly held in defiance of the Home Office. Those explanations, however, in whatever degree they exculpated the action of the Home Office, furnished evidence of a serious defect in the law, and of a loophole by which the whole object of legislation on the subject might be defeated. While the right of public meeting was, in due limits, an essential security of civil freedom, it might easily degenerate into one of the greatest dangers to order and liberty, and there was no question on which greater care, both legislative and Executive, seemed to be called for, while at no time, perhaps, had the subject pressed itself on our attention in a more startling manner than this year. The ordinary quiet of the day of rest had been disturbed by a procession of societies almost openly seditious and disloyal, who had marched through the streets and assembled in a public park to express their sympathy with a sanguinary movement against social order in another country, mingled with ill-concealed aspirations for the overthrow of monarchy in this country. This, it appeared, could not be legally dealt with. On the other hand, another assemblage, of no political character, of persons who feared lest their humble industry might be seriously crippled by one of the proposals of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, appeared to have fallen within the wording of the Act of Parliament, which was summarily put in force against it. What had happened in the recent case? The meeting was for an object which, however objectionable in its tone and language, was perfectly constitutional in itself—namely, the discussion of a projected public grant. It was summoned by the Land and Labour League, a body of very extreme and startling views on agrarian questions, but which, to do it justice, did not, like the various Republican societies which had lately sprung up and thrust themselves into notice, carry disloyalty and treasonable purposes on the face of it. Now, after the meetings that had been tolerated, and the speeches which had been made in public places, it was almost surprising that the Home Office thought it worth while to attempt interference at all. It was still more strange that they should have rushed into the field with a public proclamation before ascertaining whether the meeting came within the law or not. That law, as laid down by the Home Office upon the Act of George III., made it unlawful to meet within a certain distance of the Houses of Parliament to prepare any remonstrance, petition, or declaration to Parliament concerning any matter in Church or State; while a meeting of any kind, however large, clamorous, or threatening, ceased to be illegal if only it declined to show so much respect to Parliament as to lay its desires before it at all. Under these circumstances, surely the Secretary of State for the Home Department must have foreseen what would happen — namely, that the meeting would assemble and talk, but would abandon any idea of petitioning, and would triumphantly defy all attempt to arrest their proceedings? It appeared that communications passed between Mr. Bruce and the promoters, after the issue of the prohibitory notice, as to their intention of petitioning or not. Now, if the law was in this position, surely some such understanding should have been arrived at before the Secretary of State committed himself by a public notice? Whether, however, blame attached to anybody or not, he trusted that the Government intended, at the very earliest opportunity to rectify the deficiency of the law. The object of the Act clearly was to avoid the inconveniences—he might say the dangers—to which legislative assemblies might be liable in great capitals from large popular gatherings endeavouring to influence their proceedings by menace. Such dangers had been experienced both in America and in France. In short, the object of the Act was to prevent popular gatherings in the neighbourhood of the Houses of Parliament. It was not contemplated by its framers that such assemblies would meet without the professed object of presenting a statement of grievances to Parliament. If, however, they did meet without such object, the case became still more serious. The recent meeting, indeed, was unimportant; but such might not always be the case. An organ of pure philosophic Liberalism, which combined with that character the credit of being neatly epigrammatic on occasions, The Spectator, had remarked— According to Mr. Bruce's reading of the law, 100,000 men might assemble in front of Westminster Palace Gate and discuss angrily the conduct of the House of Commons, and he would have no power to make them move on. The Americans and Canadians are right, and we shall have to more Parliament into the wilderness yet. Burton-on-Trent would be about the central point, but then the draymen might overawe it. Now, he had no desire to adjourn to Burton or elsewhere, and unless there was an extraordinary change in English habits, Parliament would always meet in the British capital. This made it the more necessary that public meetings in the capital, during the Session of Parliament, should be subject to a law that was clear, consistent, and rational. It ought not to affect those who met for a definite and a constitutional object, those who looked to Parliament for relief, and wished to approach it with deference, while it gave absolute and triumphant impunity to those who assembled only to give play to seditious declamation, to threaten unconstitutional force, or to impose on Parliament the sense of a fraction of the population of the Metropolis as the voice of the English nation. He wished to know whether the Government intended to amend the existing law?

VISCOUNT MELVILLE

said, he would like to know what the state of the law was, and whether it permitted the people to assemble in vast numbers within a few yards of Parliament? The meeting in question had been prohibited three or four days beforehand. The Guards were kept under arms, and at 7 o'clock in the evening out came a notice that the meeting was to go on. The Secretary of State had hoisted the white feather. This was a disgraceful policy, which brought law and order into contempt. Either the Secretary of State should not have issued the notice, or he should have acted upon it. Something like rigour had been exercised by the Irish Government on the other side of the Channel. They had issued a notice prohibiting the meeting and had acted upon it, and whether they were right or wrong, he respected them for it. He hoped the noble Lord would be able to give some explanation of the extraordinary conduct of Government in reference to the Trafalgar Square meeting.

THE EARL OF MORLEY,

in reply, said, he thought he should be able to show that the Home Secretary had acted not only with perfect consistency, but in entire conformity with the law. The facts of the case were very simple. A meeting was held in Hyde Park on Sunday week to consider a Petition to Parliament. It was adjourned to the following day in Trafalgar Square, notice being given that the object was to consider a Petition to Parliament respecting Prince Arthur's annuity. This clearly contravened the Act of George III., which prohibited meetings during the Session within a mile of the Houses of Parliament for the purpose of petitioning, and the Home Secretary had no alternative but to prohibit it. In the course of Monday it became clear to the promoters of the meeting that their position was an illegal one, and they accordingly announced that the meeting would be held at a later hour, and that its object would be not to present a Petition, but to consider the subject to be brought before Parliament that evening. That being the case, it was plain that, although the Home Secretary was justified in prohibiting the meeting in the first instance, he was not entitled to forbid it when the intention to petition Parliament was abandoned, so long, at all events, as there was no breach of the peace. He would not enter into the question whether the law was sufficiently stringent or not. It was evident that at present a meeting could be prohibited if it caused terror to the people, or if it led to a breach of the peace; and that those taking part in it could be punished if they obstructed a public thoroughfare. The Statute of Geo. III., moreover, prohibited meetings with a view to petitioning Parliament held within a certain area; though, curiously enough, such part of the parish of St. Paul's, Covent Garden, as was within that area was excepted from the operation of the Act. Their Lordships would, he thought, be satisfied that the Home Office, so far from vacillating, had acted according to the law in prohibiting the meeting in its original form, and in permitting it under altered circumstances; and that, if any defect had been shown, it was in the law itself, and not in its administration.