Lords Sitting of 20 May 1870

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading— Tramways * (107); New Parishes Acts Amendment (1870)* (108).
Second Reading—Poor Relief (Metropolis) (97).
Select Committee—Sequestration* (81), The Lord Bishop of Ely added, Lord Westbury discharged.

CIVIL DEPARTMENTS (SCOTLAND).

  QUESTION.
  THE EARL OF AIRLIEwished to know, Whether the Government proposed to take any steps for carrying out the recommendations of the Civil Departments (Scotland) Commission? The subject into which that Commission was appointed to inquire was not a new one. In 1858 Mr. Baxter proposed, in the House of Commons, the creation of a Secretary of State for Scotland; but the Motion, modified in favour of an Under Secretary, was opposed both by Lord Palmerston, then Prime Minister, and Mr. Disraeli, and negatived by a large majority. In 1867 the subject was discussed on the Motion for going into Committee of Supply, but no substantive Motion was made; and last year, in the House of Commons, a Question was put to the Prime Minister, who stated that, in consequence of the representations of the Scotch Members, the Government proposed to institute an inquiry, by such administrative means as were at their command, into the administration of Scotch business. The representations referred to were probably those contained in the Memorial which was appended to the Report of the Commission—that the functions of the Lord Advocate were too multifarious to be overtaken by one man; that it was objectionable to place the chief government of Scotland in the hands of a practising lawyer; that the existing system of management by Boards in Edinburgh was cumbrous; and that Boards were not directly responsible to Parliament; that the creation of an Educational Board would tend to perpetuate an objectionable system, and that the appointment of a Chief Secretary for Scotland, as in Ireland, would be most acceptable to the people. One of the memorialists—Mr. M'Laren, the Member for Edinburgh—defined at great length what, in his opinion, should be the duties of the new official. In consequence of these representations, a Commission was appointed under a Treasury Minute—
  "To inquire into the establishments now existing at Edinburgh, which are available for Scotch business, with a view to ascertain how far economy in those establishments, by their abolition, reduction, or modification, may be rendered practicable in the event of the appointment of any new Parliamentary officer for the transaction of Scotch business."

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  The specific instructions to the Commissioners were to inquire into—
  "1. The authority under which those offices are constituted. 2. The number, rate of salary, &c., of the officers belonging to those establishments. 3. The duties which they perform."
  The Instructions, therefore, given to the Commissioners were full and comprehensive; they were not tied down by any narrow and technical restrictions, but ample scope was given them for ascertaining the state of public opinion in Scotland as to the Scotch establishments. In pursuance of their Instructions, the Commissioners proceeded to examine a great number of witnesses—all persons well versed in the transaction of Scotch business. They also transmitted a series of questions to the Conveners of Counties and the Magistrates and Town Councils of the burghs. He would venture to say that there never was an important question in which greater unanimity of opinion was exhibited by all the witnesses examined. The evidence given by everyone who was conversant with the present system of management of departmental business by the Scotch Boards was in its favour—there was a general agreement among all those who were qualified to speak to the facts, that the business was well and economically administered by the Boards, at much less expense than similar business in England or Ireland. The Conveners and Provosts all expressed satisfaction in the main with the mode in which Scotch business was at present conducted, and deprecated the appointment of a Chief Secretary. On the other hand—what was calculated to make even a stronger impression than the evidence in favour of the present system was, that the Scotch Members who memorialized Mr. Gladstone, failed to produce one particle of evidence in support of their assertions. Mr. Craufurd declined to give specific instances of the inefficiency of the Boards, and said "He would rather state generally that he considered government by Boards objectionable." Mr. M 'Laren had to admit that he was not familiar with the working of the Boards; but asserted that the people of Scotland disapprove of Boards—an assertion he would leave the hon. Member to fight out with the Town Councils; and Sir Robert Anstruther allowed that the savings which he proposed might be well effected under the present system, while his only specific
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  charge against the Board of Supervision—that of remissness in enforcing the Public Health Act, referred to June, 1867; whereas the Board had no Parliamentary power of intervention till the following August. Mr. Baxter, moreover, after 12 years' consideration of the subject, gave no details to show how a saving of £20,000 a year could be effected by the abolition of the Boards. The great desideratum of the advocates of change appeared to be the creation of a new Parliamentary Office, for which, practically, Scotch Members alone would be eligible; and, it being necessary to find duties for this new official, they proposed to subvert a system with which the people were well satisfied. Indeed, the gradual withdrawal of the matter from Parliamentary discussion, and the attempt by private representation to exercise pressure on the Government, were indications that the support of public opinion could not be confidently relied on. He came now to the Report of the Commissioners. The Commissioners reported that it was inexpedient, even if practicable, to substitute chief clerks and departments for the present Boards. They said that the present distribution of the business under the various Boards is decidedly economical, and, in a financial point of view, will bear comparison with the same branches of public business as administered either in England or Ireland; they suggested the amalgamation of the Board of Supervision and the Lunacy Board. Sir James Coxe, on the contrary, the Lunacy Commissioner, Mr. Walker, the chairman of the Board of Supervision, and everybody practically acquainted with the question were opposed to such a step. The present staff of each Board was fully worked, so that the amalgamation would not affect any reduction: and persons whose relatives were afflicted with mental derangement would feel it a stigma to have those relatives under the direction of a Board the proper business of which was the management of paupers. He hoped the Government would pause before consolidating two departments so perfectly distinct in their functions. The Commissioners, believing that Scotchmen were not altogether satisfied with the present arrangements, had recommended the appointment of a Scotch civil Parliamentary officer, to be attached to the Home Department, who should be one of the advisers

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  of the Home Secretary—the Lord Advocate being the other—as to Scotch affairs. He thought that everyone who had looked to the evidence would see that there was not a shadow of foundation for the charges which had been brought against the Boards: he would admit, however, that he thought there was some ground for the complaints as to the conduct of Scotch Parliamentary business, it being notorious that Bills of great importance were introduced into the House of Commons at a very late hour, and reached their Lordships' House so late in the Session that it was impossible to give them due consideration. Moreover, the Lord Advocate, though generally, under any Government, a man of ability and eminence, was not always sufficiently accessible to Scotch Members; while, occasionally, his private practice required his absence from London during the Parliamentary Session. Admitting all this, however, he thought some modification might be made with advantage. The Scotch Lord of the Treasury was not overburdened with work—indeed, Sir William Gibson Craig, who once held that post, informed the Commission that he had much difficulty in finding sufficient work, though he ultimately succeeded. Before creating, therefore, a new Scotch Office, enough work should be found for that official to prevent, at least, the time from hanging heavy on his hands. The Home Secretary was really responsible for the government of Scotland as well as of England, and for Scotch as well as English; legislation. It appeared to him that what was wanted was, that the Home Secretary should be well informed as to Scotch affairs, and the wishes, feelings, and habits of thought of the Scotch people; and he thought that might be effected by placing in the Home Office a permanent Under Secretary, who, if not a Scotchman, should, at all events be well acquainted with Scotch business. It seemed to him that there were considerable advantages in that plan over the plan proposed by the Commissioners of having a Scotch Parliamentary Under Secretary. There was the obvious advantage that, as he would not change with the Government of the day, his services would be available for every Home Secretary. It was one of the difficulties of Parliamentary government that, from the frequent changes of ad-
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  ministration, and for other reasons, men were often necessarily selected to fill high and responsible posts who had no special knowledge of the duties which they were called upon to discharge, perhaps for the first time; and he had always understood that it was only because they were in the various offices gentlemen of great experience and ability, who did not vacate their posts when a change of Government took place, that that difficulty had been successfully met. Moreover, if they were to have a Scotch Parliamentary Secretary, the field of choice was limited by various considerations. In the first place, the Under Secretary must be a supporter of the Government of the day, and he must be a Scotchman, or, at least, a Scotch Member. But it was by no means certain that they would be able to induce the best of the Scotch Members to accept the new post. Men of energy and capacity would probably prefer to retain their independent position as private Members rather than accept a post in which there was not much to be done, and where, therefore, they would have but little opportunity of distinguishing themselves. There was a great risk that the Office might fall into the hands of men of inferior abilities, whoso Parliamentary career had been more or less unsuccessful. He desired to see the most capable men selected; but he did not wish, whenever a change of Ministry took place, to see the government of Scotland thrown down as a prey to be scrambled for by a clique of hungry provincial politicians. He did not wish to see Scotland governed as a province; and the way to avoid that was to bring home to the Secretary of State the fact that he was responsible for Scotch as well as for English legislation; and that could be done more completely and effectually by placing in his Office a Gentleman thoroughly conversant with Scotch affairs than by the erection of a new Parliamentary Office, which might often be filled by a man who was not fit for it, nor for anything else, because the men who were fitted for it could not be got to take the place. He had thought it desirable to call the attention of the Government to this subject as one of importance; but, in the meanwhile, as Scotland was at present well represented in Parliament—in that House by the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll), in the other by

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  the Lord Advocate and by the Home Secretary, who, if not a Scotchman, was a Scotch Member—the matter did not press.
  THE DUKE OF ARGYLLsaid, he regretted the absence of his noble Friend the Chairman of the Commission (the Earl of Camperdown) who could have most fitly answered the Question. He (the Duke of Argyll) thought that the result of the inquiry had been to scatter to the winds nine-tenths of the accusations which had been brought against the present administration of Scotch affairs. The dissatisfaction prevailing among at least some Scotch Members had first attracted his notice in connection with the Scotch Education Bill of last Session. Their Lordships would remember the great anxiety—he might almost say unnatural amount of attention—which was bestowed on the clauses of that measure in this House; and he excited some surprise and, he feared, some indignation of noble Lords opposite by stating that those clauses were immaterial, and that almost any way in which four or five sensible Scotchmen could be brought together to superintend the education of the country would answer the purpose. During the discussion on the Bill he had remarked that certain Members of the House of Commons manifested dissatisfaction with the conduct of Scotch affairs, dwelling especially on the inefficiency, expensiveness, and irresponsibility of all Boards. He had not himself looked closely into the administration of 'these Boards; but, while thinking this dead run against the very name of a Board rather irrational, he was not able from full knowledge of the working of the system to rebut those complaints. In consequence of these allegations the Government referred the subject to a Commission, which was presided over by his noble Friend Lord Camperdown, who conducted the inquiry with great ability, and, he thought, with very great success. He subjected, the complaining Members to a rigid cross-examination, and it was found that there existed no foundation whatever for their complaints. It was shown that the various branches of Scotch administration contrasted favourably with those of England and Ireland. Under these circumstances, the Government had little to do but to let well alone. Lord Advocates might not always, owing to their
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  private practice, be as accessible to Scotch Members as might be wished; but this did not render it necessary to appoint a Chief Secretary for Scotland similar to the Chief Secretary for Ireland. The legislative business of that country was very small, and most of the Bills were more or less connected with legal administration, in framing which the Law Officers of the Crown had necessarily to be consulted. When questions of general policy arose, such as education—although his learned Friend Lord Moncreiff, giving his great ability, and long, and, he might say, devoted, attention to the subject, took a very prominent part in framing the Education Bill—there was no necessity for measures of that kind to be entrusted to any new officer, as any Members of the Government connected with the country naturally directed attention to them. A Chief Secretary would not have enough proper business to occupy his time, and he would be likely to fill it up by meddling with things which he had better leave alone. His noble Friend had made a suggestion that evening well deserving consideration; and it had also been suggested that the Scotch Lord of the Treasury should have special charge of Scotch business in the House of Commons. These, however, were questions of arrangement which could easily be adjusted. His answer to his noble Friend's Question was, that the Government did not contemplate any serious change. One or two minor recommendations of the Commission, supposed to tend to economy, it had already been found impossible to carry out. It had, for instance, given a kind of half opinion that one Lunacy Commissioner would be sufficient; but the Government, after full consideration, had found it essential to fill up a vacancy which recently occurred in that Board, in order to avoid throwing undue labour and responsibility on Sir James Coxe, a most able, energetic, and conscientious man, whose time was already fully occupied. The duties of his own Department had prevented him (the Duke of Argyll) looking into the details of the matter; but he could assure his noble Friend that no serious change was contemplated.

SINGAPORE—JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE.—PETITION.
EARL GREY:* My Lords, the Petition which I have to present is well entitled to your Lordships' attention, both on account of the persons by whom it is signed and of the subject to which it relates. It is signed by a very large proportion of the principal inhabitants of Singapore of all classes, landowners, merchants, and others, and its object is to complain of a change in the tenure by which the Judges hold their offices since the Colony has come under the direct administration of the Crown by which it is said that their independence has been seriously impaired. Now, it is certainly of the utmost importance not only that justice should be fairly administered in our Colonies, but also that there should be perfect confidence in the independence of the Judges to whom its administration is entrusted, and I am afraid that this Petition, and the information supplied to me by those who have placed it in my hands, clearly show that at this moment no such confidence exists among the inhabitants of the Straits Settlements. But though this is greatly to be regretted, I observe with satisfaction that no complaint of any specific evil that has actually arisen is to be found either in the Petition or in any of the documents by which it is supported. It is not represented to me that the Judges have been unduly influenced in any of their decisions by the Executive Government, that any abuse has yet occurred, or that any want of proper independence has been shown in the conduct of the Chief Justice. I do not observe any complaint of this sort; but what is complained of is, that principles have been asserted and rules laid down which threaten the independence of the Judges, and may lead to evil hereafter. Much alarm of this kind undoubtedly prevails; but it appears to me to have been caused not by anything really faulty in the existing arrangement as to the tenure of office by the Judges, but by a misapprehension on the part of the inhabitants, produced by what I must regard as very indiscreet expressions used by the Governor in a despatch that has been published. I come to this conclusion, because I find that the people of Singapore do not complain of the Judges being removable by the Secretary of State, since a similar
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power existed when Singapore was under the Indian Government; but what they feel to be a grievance, is that the Governor should have the power of suspending a Judge from his office. Now, if the Governor were invested with an arbitrary power of suspending a Judge at his own pleasure and discretion, I should entirely agree with the petitioners as to the great abuses to which it might lead; but this is not the case. The petitioners overlook the fact that, according to the established practice of our Colonial Service, the Governor is not at liberty to suspend a Judge, except for grave misconduct, and misconduct of such a character that serious public inconvenience would arise from allowing him to continue in the discharge of his duty during the time required for a reference to the Secretary of State. This is the rule that used to be enforced, and I believe that this rule remains unchanged. Nor is this all. When a Judge is suspended by a Governor, the suspension ought never to be confirmed without an inquiry. When I had the honour of holding the seals of the Colonial Department, it was once or twice my painful duty to have to decide on the removal of a Judge, but I never took that step until the charge against the Judge had undergone a careful examination by a Committee of the Privy Council, to which men of high professional eminence were summoned, and before which the Judge had an opportunity of being heard by counsel in his defence. Without such an inquiry no Judge was removed, and it was perfectly well understood that it a Governor suspended a Judge, and subsequent inquiry showed the suspension to have been on insufficient grounds—still more, if it appeared that the Governor had acted from any improper motive, or from a tyrannical disposition—it was not the removal of the Judge, but the recall of the Governor that would follow. A Governor, therefore, exercises the power of suspension under the gravest responsibility, and with the full knowledge of the results which will follow from its abuse. I believe that the origin of this power—which is a very old one in our Colonial practice—was this. In former times, when communication between England and our distant Colonies was much more difficult than at present, more than one case arose in which that disposition to quarrel—which I fear dis-

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tinguishes small societies) led to disputes between Governors and Judges, and produced a state of things in some instances perfectly intolerable. Communication with the Government at home being slow and uncertain, it was necessary to avert such inconvenience by vesting in the Governor the power of suspending the Judges as well as the other officers of his Government. In the present state of the world, and with the present facilities for communication, such a power is less necessary than it was. But if the necessity for it is less, so also is there less danger of its being abused, because a reference to the Secretary of State can now be so promptly made, that I do not think any Governor would venture rashly to suspend a Judge on insufficient grounds. Let me add that no honest error of judgment on the Bench would ever for a moment be considered a sufficient cause for the suspension of a Judge. Such an error of judgment affords matter for an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council—not a ground for suspending a Judge. Conduct that would warrant his suspension must be conduct of a nature to interfere with the public service; and I believe it has always been perfectly well understood that the Governor has not the slightest right to endeavour to influence the Judge in the performance of his judicial duties. That principle I hold to be a cardinal one, and I trust the noble Earl (Earl Granville) will assure me that this is his opinion also. If these rules are acted upon, there can be no real danger to the independence of the Judges, and I think, my Lords, that the apprehension which exists in Singapore has been mainly caused by what I have called an indiscreet expression of the present Governor of the Straits Settlements, who has said, in a despatch that has been published, that the Judges are liable to the control of the Executive, just like other members of the public service. This I hold to be a mistake. It may be necessary in carrying on the government of a Colony for the Governor to suspend a person holding the office of Colonial Secretary, or some similar office, for mere inefficiency and inability to discharge his duties properly, because, otherwise, such difficulties might arise that the public business would come to a dead-lock; but he is not entitled to take this course with respect to a Judge merely because he thinks
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his judgments have been wrong. There is, as I have said, another mode of bringing wrong judgments under review. The alarm of the inhabitants of Singapore has been increased by another circumstance. The passage in the Governor's despatch to which I have taken objection has been coupled with another despatch addressed by the late Secretary of State for the Colonies (the Duke of Buckingham), in which he lays down the rule that the official members of the Legislative Council are bound to support the Governor by their votes. So far as regards persons holding offices connected with the Executive Government, this rule is, I think, proper and necessary. It would lead to absolute anarchy, and would render it impossible for the government of the Colonies to be carried on, if the Governor could not reckon on being supported in his measures by his subordinate officers. They are at liberty to lay their opinions fully and freely before him, and state to him the objections they may see to any of his measures; but in the last resort he must decide, and it is a wholesome and necessary rule in a Colonial Government that its members must support the Governor. But I cannot think that the Duke of Buckingham meant to apply this rule to the Judges. A Judge stands in a very different position to the members of the Executive Government, and I do not see any difficulty or inconvenience in his being left at liberty, honestly and fairly, to give his vote in opposition to the Governor. Of course, his power must be exercised honestly, and it would be cause for complaint if he should systematically place himself in opposition to the Government. My Lords, I am afraid that those who put this Petition into my hands will hardly be satisfied that I do not go more entirely with them in their complaint. At the same time, when they placed it in my hands, I told them how far I could go. I told them that I should state my opinion as to how far I considered that their grievance could be removed. Allow me to add that I do think there is a degree of apprehension existing in Singapore which, it is very desirable my noble Friend should take measures to remove. I hope that in the answer he will make to me this evening he will state his concurrence in the view I have taken—namely, that a Judge ought not to be disturbed in the posses-

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sion of his office, except for some grave misconduct and after adequate inquiry. If he does so, I am hopeful that his explanation will go far to remove the existing apprehension. But I also trust he will go farther, and inform me that a despatch will be published in Singapore for the satisfaction of the public, and in which he will lay down, in such clear terms as cannot be misunderstood, what the rules are which regulate the conduct of the Government at home in these matters. My Lords, I will only add one word more. I believe that in these cases of dispute, which, in 99 cases out of 100, are of a personal character, there is some fault on both sides; and what is really wanted is, temper and a sincere desire to promote the public service. I believe that when these qualities exist, and when there is a good selection of men on whom high office in the Colonies is conferred, these difficulties do not arise. I believe, moreover, that for legal offices in our smaller Colonies, it is most desirable that men should be selected not from the narrow circle of the Colonial Bar, divided as that often is by party spirit and personal animosity, but from the larger and wider sphere of the English Bar, where men of honour, high character, and ability, may be obtained for service in the Colonies. No doubt appointments from the English Bar would involve adequate salaries, because men such as are wanted would not sacrifice their prospects at home without sufficient consideration; but, if I am not mistaken, the colonists would be ready to pay adequate salaries if good appointments were made. This is a matter to which I trust the attention of my noble Friend will be directed, and that it will not be lost sight of in any appointments that he has to make. My Lords, I beg to present the Petition of which I gave Notice.
The noble Earl then presented a Petition of landowners, merchants, and other inhabitants of Singapore, praying for greater security for judicial independence.
EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, I am extremely obliged to the noble Earl (Earl Grey) for having brought forward this subject, for reasons which I will state later. I have paid the greatest possible attention to every word he has said, and I believe I perfectly agree in every opinion he has expressed. My Lords, there are two points raised by my noble
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Friend. In the Petition, a copy of which was sent to me, only one of these is referred to—it is a protest against the unconstitutional power given to the Governor to remove or suspend a Judge upon his own responsibility. The noble Earl has raised another point, which has regard to the position which a Chief Justice or Judge ought to hold in the Legislative Council. I entirely agree in the principle the noble Earl has laid down. I think it absolutely impossible for a Government to be carried on if the Members of the Executive were allowed to vote in opposition to the Governor. It is obvious that if that were permitted anarchy and confusion would result. I also agree with the exceptions stated by the noble Earl. The Judges are in a different position from the mere Executive, however distinguished they may be; for I quite agree that more freedom must be allowed to the Judges, partly because they are not connected with Executive office, and partly because they must have the greatest possible independence in their judicial functions. Yet it would be most unbecoming in a Judge or Chief Justice if they were found leading an Opposition, or committing themselves to anything like factious opposition with regard to the Government to be carried on; and I think it would not be creditable either to the Governor or the Chief Justice, although some difference of opinion may arise between them, if they did not avoid the scandal of very decided opposition. With regard to the other question—the irresponsibility of Judges—I thought it, both in principle and practice, so important that, desiring to strengthen, in every possible way, my position on this subject, I directed a Memorandum to be prepared, stating the facts and the arguments on both sides, which was transmitted to my noble Friend the Lord I President of the Council, and I requested him to gather the opinion of those members of the Judicial Committee who had great experience in matters of this sort, and transmit their opinion to me. The I result was, that the Registrar of the I Council drew up a very interesting Memorandum on the subject, some passages of which I should like to read to your Lordships, and the whole of which I shall lay on the Table as well worthy the attention of my noble Friend—and, indeed, of all who take an interest in

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the subject. The pith of it is this, that it is the opinion of the Judicial Committee that some effectual means must exist for removing Colonial Judges who are guilty of grave misconduct. It is impossible to adopt as cumbrous a method as is adopted in cases of Judges at home; at the same time, it is necessary that they should have a hearing before a perfectly impartial tribunal. The Memorandum shows that it is the almost universal rule, both in the case of removals and suspensions, that there is a hearing before the Privy Council. In the case of removal of a Judge under Burke's Act it is necessary that the case should be brought, of absolute right, before the Privy Council. And so in cases of suspension, as my noble Friend says, in later times—except when the Privy Council refuses to hear, because no appeal is made by the person so suspended—they usually recommend that the matter be referred either to the General Council of the Committee or the Judicial Committee; and it is usually thought by the Lords of the Council, when the Judicial Committee meet on questions of this sort, that the President of the Council and the Colonial Secretary should attend the meetings of the Committee. The Memorandum goes on to state that when the charges are brought against a Judge at the instance of the Legislative Assembly, before the Privy Council, the aspect of affairs is somewhat changed, because, instead of the Judicial Committee acting as a Court of appeal, it is obliged to take on itself something of the character of a Court of primary jurisdiction. The difficulty of procedure, the difficulty as to evidence, the difficulty of getting the issues clearly put, whether with regard to law or fact, in all these casess is found most onerous to the plaintiff, and much less satisfactory to the Lords of the Council. But the Memorandum goes on to state—as my noble Friend put it, with perfect truth—when a Governor of his own accord suspends a Judge, he takes a step of the gravest responsibility. He is obliged to bring a specific charge, and the Judge is entitled to give a full answer. It is the interest of the Governor to bring the matter forward with all the evidence in the clearest manner for his own defence. In point of fact, the Governor is placed almost equally on his trial with the Judge whom he has
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removed. The opinion of the Privy Council is in favour of that course. If your Lordships will permit me, I will read the last two paragraphs from the Memorandum. I am exceedingly anxious to give full explanations, not only to your Lordships, but also to the petitioners on this subject, and I think it will have a very good effect in the Colonies, when it is known that this is not a mere opinion of the Privy Council, but that it has the authority not only of my noble Friend the noble Earl, but also of those Judges who have the greatest experience in these matters, who entirely approve the system adopted. The Memorandum concludes by stating—
"The experience of the Lords of the Council, therefore, strongly corroborates the arguments stated in Sir F. Rogers' paper in favour of proceedings by the Governor, subject to a review by the Secretary of State or the Privy Council in England; and they have invariably found that in the cases in which proceedings have originated with the local assemblies, the delay, uncertainty, and expense have been greatly augmented.
"At the same time, when the misconduct charged is purely judicial, and therefore not properly amenable to the decision of the Executive authority, acting on the advice of law officers or advisers of inferior rank, it would seem that the due maintenance of the independence of Judges requires that judicial acts should only be brought into question before some tribunal of weight and wisdom enough to pronounce definitively upon them; and this function appertains with peculiar fitness to the Privy Council, which, as a Court of Appeal, has to review the decisions of all the Colonial Courts."
That opinion, I apprehend, is perfectly in accordance with the wishes and desires of the petitioners. There is also an important Minute of my noble and learned. Friend (Lord Chelmsford); but it is rather long, and therefore I do not read it at length; but I am glad of the opportunity of stating, in general terms, that it is consistent with the views expressed by the noble Earl. The opinion of Dr. Lushington on the matter is given in very brief terms, and I think I may trespass on your Lordships' time by reading what he says. Dr. Lushington states—
"I entertain no doubt in my own mind that the most efficacious means of proceeding, and productive of the least evil consequences, is that the Governors of the Colonies respectively should be intrusted with the power of investigating any alleged charges against the Judges, and, if in their opinion need be, of suspending them; of course, all the proceedings, and the evidence upon which they act, should be remitted without delay to the Colonial Office, and, if need be, Her Majesty will be advised to remit the case to the consideration

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of the Privy Council. I apprehend that the Judicial Committee has no peculiar claim to take cognizance of such a case. I think that the propriety of the Colonial Governor being invested with this power, great as it is, would be more apparent if contrasted with any other mode of proceeding than that suggested."
My Lords, being thus strengthened by these authorities, I am exceedingly glad that the subject has been brought before the House, as the discussion may prove satisfactory to those who thought themselves aggrieved by the results which have followed the placing of the Settlement under the control of the Colonial Office. With respect to the importance of selecting the best men not only for judicial employments, but for all other employments in the Colonies, that is a subject not at all new to me; and, in the situation I occupy, I feel that there is no one thing in respect to which I can be more useful than in attempting to select both for judicial and civil offices the very best men that can be obtained; and in overcoming the difficulties—which I own are not small, in respect of recommendations of persons who sometimes do not turn out so well, or do not entirely fulfil the character which zealous friends have given them.
Petition ordered to lie on the Table.

POOR RELIEF (METROPOLIS) BILL.

  (NO. 97.) SECOND READING.
  (The Lord Privy Seal.)
  Order of the Pay for the Second Reading, read.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY, in moving that the Bill be now read the second time, said, that in 1867 a Bill was passed under the auspices of Mr. Hardy, who was then at the head of the Poor Law Department, the object of which was to produce a degree of equalization of rates in respect to the poor in the metropolis by placing certain charges on the Common Fund; and by the present Bill it was proposed to extend that principle still further. Before explaining the details of the Bill, he would state the result of the Act, known as Mr. Hardy's Act. The result of that Act was to put the cost of lunatics, education of children in district schools, fever hospitals, medicines, and drugs, and a large sum for the salaries of officers, and other items of expenditure on the Common Fund. The measure had now been in operation for three half years. For the
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  first half-year the sum charged to the Common Fund for these purposes was £130,000; for the second half-year, £170,000, and for the last half-year the charge had increased to £200,000—an increase partly to be explained by the fact that at first the Act was not brought fully into operation. The various items might be shortly stated. For the year ending Lady Day, 1869, the maintenance; of lunatics cost £160,000; the medicines and surgical appliances, £9,000; the salaries of officers, £103,000; the children in district schools, £91,000; the expenditure under the Houseless; Poor Act was £12,000; and registration and vaccination fees amounted to £15,000. The consequence of the operation of the Act had been, besides the equalization of the rates, that children formerly maintained in the workhouses, where their education could not be attended to in the most desirable way, had to a great extent been removed to district schools. This was an object which Parliament had long desired to attain, but it was not effected in any satisfactory degree, until by Mr. Hardy's Act an inducement was held out to the local administrators of the Poor Law in the metropolis to erect district schools, whereby they obtained a contribution from the Common Fund. Another result of the Act had been an increase—and a desirable increase—in the salaries of the officers. Various parishes had previously felt great reluctance to increase the salaries of the medical and relieving officers, even when such increase was required for the proper administration of the Poor Law; but now, when proper salaries were provided, the actual effect had been to decrease the expense of the administration of the law. The present Bill extended still further the principle of placing certain charges on the Common Fund. Owing to the construction of railways, and the changes brought about in the habits of the richer classes in the metropolis, the burden of the poor rate was not so equally distributed as formerly. The City of London was now almost exclusively occupied by warehouses and places of business, and by a very small number of dwelling-houses, so that a small number of persons only remained in the City during the night; the labouring men who worked there during the day slept in Bethnal Green and

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  other distant places, and obtained relief there when sick or out of work. But the poorer classes in those outer parishes formed part of the same population just as much as if they resided in the same Union, and it seemed fair to throw the rate over the whole district so as to produce a more equal distribution of the burden. On the other hand, he should be sorry to see a complete equalization of the rate, as that would take away from the different local authorities a strong incitement to local management and the exercise of economy. Therefore in this matter he desired that steps should be taken cautiously, and that he thought was done by the present Bill. The proposal was that a certain proportion of the expense of the maintenance of in-door paupers should be thrown on the Common Fund, the amount to be repaid to the local Guardians out of that fund to be limited to 5d. a day for each pauper. The total expenditure for the in-maintenance of the adult poor in workhouses—excluding lunatics and vagrants—was estimated to have been, during the year ended in Lady Day, 1869, £285,000. Taking £285,000 as the total cost of in-maintenance, under the clause of the Bill which provided that 2s. 11 d. should be paid in respect of each pauper out of the Common Fund, the total charge on the Common Fund would be £170,000, and the charge upon the individual parishes would be £115,000. In round figures the result would be that about two thirds of the charge would be borne by the Common Fund and about one-third by the parishes. The aggregate sum at which the metropolis was rated yearly to the relief of the poor was £1,400,000; and of this £400,000 was now chargeable on the Common Fund under Mr. Hardy's Act; an additional sum of £170,000 would be so charged under this Bill. The result would be that under that Act and this Bill rather less than half the total charge would be thrown upon the Common Fund, and the remainder of the charge would be borne by the separate local funds, as at present. It might be objected that the Bill introduced a principle applicable to all England, and which would lead to a consolidated national rate. On behalf of himself and the present Poor Law Board, he wished to say it was not intended that this Bill should lead to any result so greatly to be deplored—rather
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  than that should happen they would forego the advantages to be derived from the operation of the Bill. One subsidiary advantage of the proposal was that Guardians would be encouraged so to administer relief as not to bring the poor into the workhouses—because the accommodation would be limited, as it was provided that each workhouse should be certified in respect of the number it would accommodate, and if that number were exceeded no claim on the Common Fund could be entertained. That would give the Poor Law Board a control over the numbers to be housed in each building, and, at the same time, the arrangement would deprive parishes of the inducement to build workhouses in order to put the poor in them. The total average cost of each pauper in the metropolitan workhouses was nearly 4s. 10 d. a week, and the total charge that would be thrown on the Common Fund was 2s. 11 d. a week. There was, therefore, left a considerable margin within which Guardians might save by good management, or lose by bad management. Another important provision under the Bill was the power given to the Poor Law Beard to enforce its requirements on any refractory Union by withdrawing the contribution upon the Common Fund, instead of, as at present, having to resort to the cumbrous remedy of a mandamus. An analogous power was possessed by the Home Office in reference to the management of prisons—if its requirements were not complied with, the contributions from the Consolidated Fund could be withheld. He trusted the Bill would receive the favourable consideration of the House.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a."—(The Lord Privy Seal.)
  THE DUKE OF RICHMONDconcurred generally in what had been said by the noble Earl. When he (the Duke of Richmond) was at the Poor Law Board very great complaint was made that parishes which benefited by the labour of the poor who did not live in them escaped the burden of their relief. This Bill would do something to remedy that state of things by, to some extent, equalizing the rates over the whole metropolis. He was glad to hear the noble Earl say that he thought the Bill went far enough in the direction of equalization and centralization, for equalization

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  would be a dangerous principle to carry out over the whole country. He thought that 5d. a day was rather a large sum to be repaid in respect of the maintenance of a pauper in a workhouse or asylum. He did not know whether their Lordships had power to change the figure, but he would suggest to the Government the propriety of considering whether the sum might not be reduced to 4d. in "another place." Altogether he was satisfied with the Bill.
  THE EARL OF DEVONhailed the Bill with great satisfaction, considering it to be founded on the best principle, and calculated to lead to approximate equalization of rates and their just and economical administration. He had always desired an approximation to equality in the rating of the metropolis, and therefore he would give the Bill his cordial support.
  LORD REDESDALEsaid, that at first sight the object of the Bill seemed to be extended centralization in the system of Poor Law relief. From his own experience in connection with a country Board of Guardians he could say that the system of common Union rating had had the most prejudicial effects in most of the rural districts. It had taken away from the inhabitants all interest in their own poor, and had thus thrown upon the rates a number of persons who used to be employed. He admitted that in the metropolis the same reasons did not apply, for in the metropolitan parishes people did not know their own poor; but in the counties the breaking down of the parochial system had had a most prejudicial effect.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYexpressed his satisfaction that the principles of the Bill should have been approved of by two noble Lords of such experience in the administration of the Poor Law. As to the limit of 6d. to which some exception had been taken by the noble Duke (the Duke of Richmond), it stood at 6d. in the Bill as originally framed; but that being thought too high it was reduced to 5d. At 5d. the amount cast upon the common fund would be £170,000, at 4d. it would be £135,000; but as the point had been carefully considered he could hold out no hope that the suggested reduction to 4d. would be made. As to the objection that the Bill was an approach towards a general system of centralization in the
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  administration of the Poor Law relief, he could assure the noble Lord (Lord Redesdale) that not only the Government did not wish to commence such a system, but were entirely opposed to it. He could only oppose the experience of the noble Lord as to the injurious effect of Union rating by his own; for as Chairman of a Board of Guardians, he had observed no falling off in the attentions paid to the poor. Things remained in that respect much as they were.
  Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Monday next.

  NEW PARISHES ACTS AMENDMENT (1870) BILL [H.L.]
  A Bill to amend the New Parish Acts and Church Building Acts—Was presented by The Lord Bishop of WINCHESTER; read 1a. (No. 108.)
  House adjourned at Seven o'clock, to Monday next, Eleven o'clock.