§ EARL GRANVILLEMy Lords, I rise for the purpose of fulfilling the promise which I made to your Lordships at the suggestion of my noble Friend Lord Russell. I have been so accustomed for so many years to yield a willing obedience to my noble Friend's wishes that his request simply would have been sufficient for me, even if I had not thought that he had a perfect right to make it. I shall not in the statement I propose to make detain your Lordships long: I shall tell your Lordships nothing new; and although at other times I may have regretted, I am rather glad than otherwise, on this occasion, that I am incapable of any oratorical display. My noble Friend (Earl Russell) referred the other day to two precedents of statements having been made with regard to negotiations in reference to pending war. The first, I think, was in 1823, when Mr. Canning, in a magnificent speech, explained and vindicated the course taken by the Government, after the negotiations for preventing an invasion of pain by France had come to an untimely end. The other statement to which my hon. Friend alluded was, I believe, in 1854.
§ EARL RUSSELL, interposing, explained that he had referred to the statement made in 1864 with reference to the war between Germany and Denmark.
§ EARL GRANVILLEI was under the impression that my noble Friend referred to the failure of the negotiations with Russia in 1854; I was about, therefore, to point out that on that occasion my noble Friend took the course of putting aside, as of less importance, the conduct of the Government, and his speech turned chiefly on the conduct of the enemy which had obliged England to take a particular course. Any statement made by me to-night will be made under very different circumstances. It is not for me to trace before your Lordships the direct or the indirect causes of the war which has now unfortunately broken out, 1052 nor is it for me to attempt to apportion praise or blame to either belligerent; but simply to comply with the request which my noble Friend had a right to make—namely, that the country should know what course Her Majesty's Government have taken during the few days which preceded the commencement of that war. In doing this I shall assume, in order to avoid being tedious, that your Lordships have read the Papers which were presented the day before yesterday, and I shall, therefore, merely refer to some of the principal points in the course of the negotiations. I have already stated to your Lordships the substance of a conversation which I had with the French Ambassador on the day I had the honour of receiving the Seals of the Office I now hold—the regret I expressed, the reservations which I made, and also the promise that I should endeavour, without any dictation, to induce Prussia and Spain to consider the question in all its most serious lights. From that moment dates the policy of Her Majesty's Government—which I believe was summed up very shortly by myself to the Ambassador of a neutral Power, when I said that our course was to urge the French Government to avoid precipitation, and, without dictation, to impress on Prussia and Spain the gravity of the situation. I felt that our position was very much that of trying to prevent a fire with inflammable materials all around, and with matches all ready to ignite—that it was not the moment to go into any elaborate inquiries as to who had brought the materials, or the rights and wrongs of the case, but that we should endeavour as soon as possible to remove those materials, and to prevent one of the greatest calamities which could happen to the world. With regard to the promise which I made as to Spain and Prussia, your Lordships must perceive that the task was not a very easy one. Strong words had been used; both those countries are proud military nations, and it required some care and caution lest in any interference on the part of Her Majesty's Government harm instead of good should not be done. Your Lordships must judge, after reading the Papers which have been placed in your hands, whether we were right in the course which we took in omitting altogether any reference to some of the most obvious reasons for peace, and in 1053 very lightly touching upon some other arguments, basing our representations on motives honourable to both countries, and of a patriotic character which might be adduced without in any degree hurting the pride or the national self-love of either of them. We had success, at all events, up to a certain point—though it is really sad to have to speak of anything like success when the failure has been so complete as it has eventually turned out to be. With respect to Spain, those of your Lordships who have read the correspondence will see that Mr. Layard, with great energy and great judgment has faithfully executed the instructions of Her Majesty's Government. He found considerable irritation existing at the time; but he put himself on the most friendly footing with the Spanish Government, and it is impossible not to believe that his exertions had considerable effect in inducing it to acquiesce in an arrangement which, at least, preserved that country from being involved in the present war. As regards Prussia, there are accidental circumstances which increased the difficulty. While our Ambassador was at Berlin, the King of Prussia was at Ems, and the Foreign Minister at his own country house; but the result of the negotiations—of course I cannot say how far we contributed to their success or not—was that which we thought the principal object—namely, the withdrawal of the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern—was attained. As to our endeavours to represent to France that she should not act with precipitation, I think your Lordships will see from the despatches of Lord Lyons that, bit by bit and day by day, he, by his representations, obtained on the whole something like a delay of five days before the declaration was made in the Chambers of immediate preparations for hostilities—a declaration which took away all hope of peace. I do not know whether your Lordships were struck as I have been with his despatches, so full of matter, and where so very much hangs upon a word; but I cannot help thinking that there is one passage in them which has almost the interest of a work of fiction, were it not connected with too serious a subject. I refer to his despatch of July 14, where he says—
My despatch (of the previous day) was sent off at the usual hour, 7 o'clock in the evening. 1054 During the early part of the night which followed, the hope that it might yet be possible to preserve peace gained some strength. It was understood that the renunciation of his pretensions by Prince Leopold himself had come to confirm that made on his behalf by his father, and that the Spanish Government had formerly declared to the Government of France that the candidature of the Prince was at an end. The language of influential members of the Cabinet was more pacific, and it was thought possible that some conciliatory intelligence might arrive from Prussia and enable the Government to pronounce the whole question to be at an end. But in the morning all was changed. A telegram was received from the French Chargé d' Affaires at Berlin, stating that an article had appeared in the Prussian Ministerial organ, The North German Gazette, to the effect that the French Ambassador had requested the King to promise never to allow a Hohenzollern to be a candidate for the throne of Spain, and that His Majesty had thereupon refused to receive the Ambassador, and sent him word by an aide-de-camp that he had nothing more to say to him.Now, it is quite impossible to say whether, but for this incident, war might have been prevented or not; but it is really sad to think that possibly much turned on an incident in this watering-place which, I believe, was misunderstood by both parties, and was by neither intended to be an insult, and that the news arriving simultaneously in Germany and in France should have acted on the strong national feelings of each; the one imagining that it was a deliberate insult to their Sovereign, and the other that it was an affront put on the personal representative of the Emperor. It is on these small causes that great events very often to a certain degree turn—although, as I said before, it is not clear whether without this incident the war could have been permanently averted. As soon as we found—to go back a little—on the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern being withdrawn, that it was not withdrawn in a mode which appeared to the French Government consistent with their interests and their honour, we immediately, and I believe without the loss of any time whatever, began to try what other modes we could adopt to preserve peace. We first of all considered whether we should merely make an application for delay to both parties; but it appeared to us that, with the strong and increasing feeling of both nations, any vague proposition of that sort would have very little chance of success. We then—though I cannot say we were very sanguine—determined to make this proposition to both parties—that while we did not think France 1055 was justified in insisting on a guarantee for the future from the King of Prussia, yet if France would withdraw that demand the King might, very consistently with his own honour, in the same sense as he had given his consent to the Prince's candidature, communicate to the French Government his consent to its withdrawal. That attempt was unavailing. It was refused by M. Bismarck, though afterwards I was informed that the King himself had consented to take such a step as we proposed; and the French Government absolutely refused it. As soon as we were aware that there was no chance of both parties accepting it, we sent within an hour another proposal to both countries, making an appeal to them, under the Protocol of Paris, that they should have recourse to the good offices of some friendly Power or Powers—not offering ourselves as mediators above other Powers, but simply stating that we were ready to take any mediatory part which might be requested of us. This proposal was also unsuccessful. It was rejected by France; and it was not accepted by Prussia. Events rapidly succeeded—and, indeed, I believe the declaration had actually been made before our proposal arrived—which took away almost all hope of peace being preserved. As soon as war was declared we thought we had but one course. As soon as we possibly could we fulfilled all the formalities necessary to proclaim our complete neutrality. I stated the other day what I thought that neutrality imposed on us. I stated that friendly relations had existed up to that moment between ourselves and the two belligerents. Since that time those friendly relations have continued. It is quite true that I have not been entirely exempt from complaints by both parties. M. de Lavalette—and here I wish to say that I never knew a person more straightforward or agreeable in his business relations than he—has complained to the Prime Minister that I was cold, very cold. M. de Gramont told Lord Lyons that he regretted the want of more goodwill on the part of the English Government. M. Bismarck, on the other hand, has expressed regret that I should have undertaken to make to the King of Prussia a proposal which it was impossible for him to accept—although, as I mentioned just now, it subsequently turned out that the King had thought 1056 fit to adopt it. Count Bernstorff, whom, your Lordships have known for so many years in this country, has found many faults both of omission and commission on my part in proceedings which, I am assured by the highest legal authorities, are the mere routine practice of this country when acting as a neutral. I hardly like to mention these things without making acknowledgment of the singular friendly courtesy which I have personally met with from all the members of the Corps Diplomatique, who seem in this instance to appreciate some of the difficulties with which I have been surrounded, so lately appointed to the Foreign Office, and having to communicate with all of them on matters of such vital importance. I do not in the least complain of the representations I have mentioned. I think it is quite natural that two great nations involved in a death-struggle, such as this appears to be, should look with suspicion on every act of neutral Powers, and that they should have a tendency to feel that those who are not completely with them must be against them, however unfounded the suspicion may be. It is satisfactory, moreover, to me, because I think it shows that, complaints coming from both sides, we have been able up to this time to follow satisfactorily a course that is beset with much difficulty, while it certainly reminds me of the duties which I owe to my own country and to foreign countries in this particular dilemma. As for our position of neutrality, I believe it is a policy approved by your Lordships, by the other House of Parliament, and by the country at large. I believe we are bound with absolute firmness to maintain all the rights which neutrality gives to us. I believe we are perfectly justified in tendering good offices to either country which do not interfere with the demands of justice and impartiality. I am aware of the great responsibility which weighs upon Her Majesty's Government. I know how bound we are to observe every event as it goes on; and I believe your Lordships will agree with me that it is right that we should abstain from all superfluous declarations of what we should or should not do in any possible contingency. I am quite convinced that in order to maintain the honour of this country, and in order to be of the greatest use in restoring peace—if such 1057 restoration is possible—the best course we can pursue is in words and in attitude to maintain a dignified and a calm reserve.
§ THE EARL OF MALMESBURYMy Lords, after the very temperate and sensible speech we have heard from my noble Friend (Earl Granville), I am sure your Lordships will not be inclined to find fault with the course which Her Majesty's Ministers have thought it to be their duty to pursue under very trying and difficult circumstances, or with the spirit in which they have acted. I feel this personally, because I was once placed almost in the same situation as my noble Friend, and, therefore, I can entirely appreciate the great difficulties in which he found himself placed on his accession to Office My noble Friend, almost the next day after he received the seals of the Foreign Office, found himself in a position so difficult that it would have caused the deepest anxiety to any man who had been much longer accustomed to that particular Department than the noble Earl, and I cannot fail to say that I think he has met the circumstances in a manner that does him infinite credit; and I really do not see how my noble Friend could have acted in any other way in the difficult position in which he was placed. I may, however, go rather further than he has, because he thinks that under certain circumstances war might possibly, though perhaps not probably, have been avoided. He alluded to the incident, as he calls it, that took place between the King of Prussia and the French Ambassador. Now I really think that had very little to do with the subsequent results. I cannot but think that it was very nearly a foregone conclusion between both parties that this war was, some day or other, to take place. I think all the circumstances which have occurred, and which your Lordships have anxiously watched, prove that my conviction is correct. My Lords, it is a circumstance very worthy of remark that when the King of Prussia was staying at Ems absent from his Cabinet, when these difficult circumstances had actually shown themselves to the public eye, that his Minister, Count Bismarck, should have kept away. It seems to me very extraordinary that he should not have hastened to his Sovereign and have given him that assistance and advice which it surely was his 1058 duty to have given him. I believe it was through his absence, and on account of his absence, that the unfortunate incident took place of the French Ambassador pressing the King for another audience. If, therefore, as my noble Friend sincerely believes, there were circumstances which if they had not been neglected might have prevented war, he may console himself by reflecting—for that is the best test of the matter—how difficult it is now found to make peace. Supposing even that a Congress assembled and a mediation such as the Protocol of Paris in 1856 recommended was in full force, where was the specific cause of war to be found? What could be said at that Conference? Could they give to either side the concession demanded—any disputed territory—that could call for such a war as that now taking place between these two countries, a war without any just cause or any real reason? It would be deceiving ourselves to look here or there for any specific cause or any specific insult on either side. My Lords, the first excuses for anger and war have been entirely given up. We hear nothing about them. The combatants stand face to face, and any moment we may hear of a battle taking place; but what they are fighting for it is difficult for either of them to say, except that the two nations were determined to make war upon each other. Both the Emperor and the King have said that this is a national war. It is a trial of strength between the two nations. Europe, in fact, was too small for these great potentates to live quietly side by side. Her Majesty's Government, or any other Government, wishing to make peace now would find it impossible to do so. There is nothing tangible upon which mediators could put their hand—any proposition by which they could separate these inveterate combatants. Our course is that which Her Majesty's Government has taken, and in that course they will be supported by the Opposition—namely, a course of perfect neutrality. But besides an absolute neutrality on our part we must insist as much as possible upon an honest neutrality on the part of other nations now at peace. It is of the utmost importance that we should speak plainly on this subject, and tell Denmark that she must remain neutral. I assume this country is ready to maintain its treaties and guarantees, and therefore it is most essential 1059 that Belgium and Holland should be told that they must remain perfectly and honestly neutral; and I trust Her Majesty's Government will use every effort the moment they see danger in the direction I have pointed out. I hope that by their advice, and by such pressure as is fair and honourable to all parties, to insist on that neutrality being kept. My Lords, if that is done, I trust we shall pass through this great crisis in Europe without injury to ourselves or those nations which are, fortunately, out of the arena of conflict. We are happily without that arena, and up to this moment I repeat Her Majesty's Government have, I think, done their duty, and I trust they will carefully watch that other countries do the same. But there is one thing of the highest consideration to which I must allude, because it causes great anxiety in men's minds—and that is that although we are without the arena of the conflict, and stand in a neutral position, our national resources must be maintained in such a state as to meet any contingency that may unfortunately arise, and oblige us to mingle in that war which is now confined to the two belligerents. I can quite understand the great anxiety that prevails throughout the country that at this moment our Army is not in the position it ought to be. The noble Lord the Under Secretary for War (Lord Northbrook) said a few evenings ago that our Army was never in a more sound and satisfactory condition than it is at this moment. So far as the common-sense meaning of these words is concerned I have no doubt of it—for so far as soundness goes the Army may be in a very satisfactory condition. But I am not speaking of the quality, but of the quantity; and I fear that our Army, good as it is, is not so large or so numerous as it ought to be under present circumstances. I am not now going into statistics or to repeat facts for which I have the best authority with respect to the numerical force of the Army, but only to express an anxious hope that Her Majesty's Government, under the circumstances, will do their duty, and take care that we have a sufficient numerical force in the country with which to meet any contingency. At the beginning of the Session, when nobody could foresee these storms, it was a matter of frequent congratulation among Her Majesty's Ministers and their 1060 Friends that they had reduced the military force of the country—and there can be no doubt as to the fact. Now, with the possibility of our being drawn into the complications that are likely to arise on the Continent of Europe, I trust Her Majesty's Government will retrace their steps with regard to the Army. It can be no disgrace or dishonour to them under the present aspect of affairs to change the line of policy they adopted in a moment of profound peace. I will say nothing more to-day on the subject. I think my noble Friend opposite will, however, have before long to give your Lordships some information with respect to that Draft Treaty winch has first been published in The Times, and which though at first not known to be authentic seems by Prussia, at all events, to be declared to be so. As far as I know there is no information beyond the few words addressed to my noble Friend by the French Ambassador. There is at present no official explanation from the French Government; but I think your Lordships will wish my noble Friend to give, if consistent with his duty, any further information he may receive.
§ EARL RUSSELLMy Lords, I wish to explain in the first place that the precedents to which I referred on a former occasion were those of 1823 and 1864. In both those cases England took no part in the war, but on the breaking off of the negotiations determined to remain neutral. The first related to France and Spain, and the second to the Conference of London which was convened in order to preserve peace between Denmark and the two German Powers, Austria and Prussia. In both instances a statement was made by the Government as to the unfortunate issue of the negotiations, and their determination to remain neutral. With regard to the difficulty which has now arisen, there has no doubt arisen such a state of national temper between France and Prussia as to render it probable that war would before very long ensue; but it is, nevertheless, of the utmost importance to ascertain how this war has commenced, and what have been the immediate causes that have produced it. If I allude to these points it is chiefly because I wish that the personal conduct of the King of Prussia which has been made the turning point in these negotiations should be clearly elucidated and understood. 1061 My noble Friend (Earl Granville) quoted a despatch, which states that the personal behaviour of the King to M. Benedetti infuriated the French Government and Chambers, and thus became the immediate cause of the declaration of war. Now, since 1840 I have had the honour of some personal acquaintance with the King of Prussia, and I feel sure that his kind temper, his love of peace, and his gallant behaviour on all occasions, would always induce him to act as became a Prince, a soldier, and a gentleman. The account given in the Prussian papers of His Majesty's interview with M. Benedetti is a very simple one, and had it been placed before the French people must, I think, have made them acquit the King of any conduct tending to his discredit. It appears from the Prussian papers that the King, being at the watering-place of Ems, was accosted by the French Ambassador, who asked him to disavow or recall the consent acknowledged to have been given by him to the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern. The King said he could not do that; but that he would communicate with the Prince as to the withdrawal of his candidature. A few days afterwards the King met the French Ambassador on the public walk, and told him he had a newspaper in his hand which showed that the Prince had withdrawn his candidature. That seemed to promise an end of the difficulty which had arisen on account of that candidature; but, to the King's surprise, the Ambassador went on to demand that His Majesty must promise that he would at no time, or under any circumstances, approve or give his consent to the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern for the Throne of Spain. The King replied that that was a step he could not take. Soon afterwards he found that the Ambassador had asked for a fresh audience; and he sent an aide-de-camp to tell the Ambassador that the Prince's candidature had been withdrawn, and that in the same way and to the same extent that he had approved the candidature he approved its withdrawal, and hoped, therefore, that all difficulty on that point was at an end. Now, nothing, in my opinion, could be more fair and frank than that conduct. The King, on subsequently meeting the Ambassador, wished to know whether he had anything to say to him other than the proposition 1062 which he had already made to him. The Ambassador replied that he had no fresh proposition; but that he had certain arguments to adduce in support of the proposition which he had already made, and which the King had already declined. The King, I think, very naturally and property, said that, as far as he was himself concerned, he had already given his decision, but that if there was a political question to be discussed, he had better go to Count Bismarck, and discuss with him the arguments which were to be adduced. If it was a question of argument and of political discussion, the King was surely quite right thus to refer the French Ambassador to his Minister. The Ambassador asked whether Count Bismarck was expected the next day, and when told he was not said he would be contented with the King's answer. Now, I see nothing rash or intemperate in that conduct of the King; though the French Ambassador seems to have exhibited some want of good temper, caution, and prudence, throughout the transaction, especially in declining to discuss with Count Bismarck, and insisting on discussing with the King. The King has, like my noble Friend (Earl Granville), been exposed to the blame of both parties. While his good temper and anxiety for peace produced a volume of indignation in Germany, his refusal to discuss the matter any more with the Ambassador produced great excitement and fury in Paris. I do not wish to go much further into the matter; but I must refer to the statement of the French Foreign Minister with respect to this conduct of the King—and I am surprised, by the way, that neither his circular to the French diplomatic servants abroad nor the Proclamation of the Emperor, which appears to me of the highest importance, is included in the Papers which have been placed before us. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs says—
The language, at first hesitating, and then decided and haughty, held by the head of the House of Hohenzollern, his refusal to pledge himself to maintain in the future the renunciation he had sanctioned in the past, the treatment of our Ambassador, who was by a verbal message denied all further communication for the furtherance of his mission of conciliation, and, finally, the publicity given to this most unusual proceeding by the Prussian journals and by the notification of it that was sent to all the other Cabinets—all these successive evidences of aggressive intentions have removed all doubts even from the most prejudiced 1063 minds. Can there be any illusion when a Sovereign who commands 1,000,000 of men declares, with his hand upon his sword-hilt, that he chooses to be guided by his own judgment and circumstances?Now, I must say it is not necessary or proper that in such a document the King's conduct should have been spoken of in such a manner—it is not usual for the personal conduct and character of a Sovereign to be thus made a ground for war. I do not wish to enter into the main question, for Lord Lyons' despatch of the 12th of July has expressed fully in his conversation with M. de Gramont all that can be said; but infinitely more grave questions may arise in respect to our conduct, and which must not be lost sight of. Everyone in this House must approve the steps the Government have taken, for neutrality is the only course that becomes this country in the present crisis; but it cannot be concealed that great difficulties may arise. The Emperor of the French has declared by his Ambassador that he will respect the neutrality of Belgium, but that statement contained the qualification that he will do so as long as it is respected by Prussia. At any time, therefore, the neutrality of Belgium having been broken by one party may be violated by the other also, and it will have to be considered whether it is our business to look on at that step, or whether we ought not to support Belgium according to our solemn Treaty engagements in her neutral position. Other questions may arise, and our mediation may be required. In such a state of things it seems to me, to be the duty of Her Majesty's Government to see that this country is sufficiently armed. I am not one of those who found fault with them for reducing the Army at the beginning of the year. For a state of profound peace the military and naval force proposed by the Government was adequate and sufficient; but I cannot think it sufficient and adequate for the circumstances in which we are now placed. Without making any boast or ostentation of increasing our Army and Navy, we ought quietly to increase them so as to be prepared for emergencies that are not very unlikely to arise. We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that this is a great war—a war between two of the most powerful nations of Europe. It is stated that 250,000 men will appear in the field on each side, while each Power has 1064 1,000,000 in reserve ready to support them if they fail. This is likely to be the most formidable war we have seen in our days — no one can say at what moment we may be called upon to fulfil our Treaty obligations — and in such a state of things it is not advisable that this country should be unarmed, or should have a force smaller in proportion to that of other Powers than has been deemed necessary in former times. We should also so act with Austria and Russia as to be able at any time to offer our mediation with a chance of its being accepted. It would be useless to make such an offer now; but in the course of the autumn or winter, when the feverish heat which now prevails has cooled down, there may be a disposition on both sides to accept the friendly and reasonable proposals of the neutral Powers. I hope, therefore, the Government will cultivate amicable relations with Russia and Austria — Powers which I am sure are friendly to us — and that they will endeavour by every means in their power to stop a war which, according to all appearances, will be unprecedented in the calamities which it may bring upon nations now pursuing a course of industry in the centre of Europe. I should be sorry if any opportunity of arresting so great a calamity were neglected.