Lords Sitting of 28 July 1870

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Factories and Workshops* (247); Forgery* (248); National Debt* (249); Statute Law Revision* (250); Pedlars' Certificates* (251); Turnpike Acts Continuance* (252); Sanitary Act (1866) Amendment* (253).
Select Committee—Report—Telegraph Acts Extension* (206).
Committee — Clerical Disabilities (210–254); Absconding Debtors* (214–256); Sheriffs (Scotland) Act (1853) Amendment, &c. (243–257).
Report—Settled Estates* (245–255); Wages Arrestment Limitation (Scotland)* (192).
Third Reading—Life Assurance Companies* (239), and passed.

FRANCE AND PRUSSIA.

  MINISTERIAL STATEMENT.
  EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, I rise for the purpose of fulfilling the promise which I made to your Lordships at the suggestion of my noble Friend Lord Russell. I have been so accustomed for so many years to yield a willing obedience to my noble Friend's wishes that his request simply would have been sufficient for me, even if I had not thought that he had a perfect right to make it. I shall not in the statement I propose to make detain your Lordships long: I shall tell your Lordships nothing new; and although at other times I may have regretted, I am rather glad than otherwise, on this occasion, that I am incapable of any oratorical display. My noble Friend (Earl Russell) referred the other day to two precedents of statements having been made with regard to negotiations in reference to pending war. The first, I think, was in 1823, when Mr. Canning, in a magnificent speech, explained and vindicated the course taken by the Government, after the negotiations for preventing an invasion of pain by France had come to an untimely end. The other statement to which my hon. Friend alluded was, I believe, in 1854.
  EARL RUSSELL, interposing, explained that he had referred to the statement made in 1864 with reference to the war between Germany and Denmark.
  EARL GRANVILLE: I was under the impression that my noble Friend referred to the failure of the negotiations with Russia in 1854; I was about, therefore, to point out that on that occasion my noble Friend took the course of putting aside, as of less importance, the conduct of the Government, and his speech turned chiefly on the conduct of the enemy which had obliged England to take a particular course. Any statement made by me to-night will be made under very different circumstances. It is not for me to trace before your Lordships the direct or the indirect causes of the war which has now unfortunately broken out,
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  nor is it for me to attempt to apportion praise or blame to either belligerent; but simply to comply with the request which my noble Friend had a right to make—namely, that the country should know what course Her Majesty's Government have taken during the few days which preceded the commencement of that war. In doing this I shall assume, in order to avoid being tedious, that your Lordships have read the Papers which were presented the day before yesterday, and I shall, therefore, merely refer to some of the principal points in the course of the negotiations. I have already stated to your Lordships the substance of a conversation which I had with the French Ambassador on the day I had the honour of receiving the Seals of the Office I now hold—the regret I expressed, the reservations which I made, and also the promise that I should endeavour, without any dictation, to induce Prussia and Spain to consider the question in all its most serious lights. From that moment dates the policy of Her Majesty's Government—which I believe was summed up very shortly by myself to the Ambassador of a neutral Power, when I said that our course was to urge the French Government to avoid precipitation, and, without dictation, to impress on Prussia and Spain the gravity of the situation. I felt that our position was very much that of trying to prevent a fire with inflammable materials all around, and with matches all ready to ignite—that it was not the moment to go into any elaborate inquiries as to who had brought the materials, or the rights and wrongs of the case, but that we should endeavour as soon as possible to remove those materials, and to prevent one of the greatest calamities which could happen to the world. With regard to the promise which I made as to Spain and Prussia, your Lordships must perceive that the task was not a very easy one. Strong words had been used; both those countries are proud military nations, and it required some care and caution lest in any interference on the part of Her Majesty's Government harm instead of good should not be done. Your Lordships must judge, after reading the Papers which have been placed in your hands, whether we were right in the course which we took in omitting altogether any reference to some of the most obvious reasons for peace, and in

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  very lightly touching upon some other arguments, basing our representations on motives honourable to both countries, and of a patriotic character which might be adduced without in any degree hurting the pride or the national self-love of either of them. We had success, at all events, up to a certain point—though it is really sad to have to speak of anything like success when the failure has been so complete as it has eventually turned out to be. With respect to Spain, those of your Lordships who have read the correspondence will see that Mr. Layard, with great energy and great judgment has faithfully executed the instructions of Her Majesty's Government. He found considerable irritation existing at the time; but he put himself on the most friendly footing with the Spanish Government, and it is impossible not to believe that his exertions had considerable effect in inducing it to acquiesce in an arrangement which, at least, preserved that country from being involved in the present war. As regards Prussia, there are accidental circumstances which increased the difficulty. While our Ambassador was at Berlin, the King of Prussia was at Ems, and the Foreign Minister at his own country house; but the result of the negotiations—of course I cannot say how far we contributed to their success or not—was that which we thought the principal object—namely, the withdrawal of the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern—was attained. As to our endeavours to represent to France that she should not act with precipitation, I think your Lordships will see from the despatches of Lord Lyons that, bit by bit and day by day, he, by his representations, obtained on the whole something like a delay of five days before the declaration was made in the Chambers of immediate preparations for hostilities—a declaration which took away all hope of peace. I do not know whether your Lordships were struck as I have been with his despatches, so full of matter, and where so very much hangs upon a word; but I cannot help thinking that there is one passage in them which has almost the interest of a work of fiction, were it not connected with too serious a subject. I refer to his despatch of July 14, where he says—
  "My despatch (of the previous day) was sent off at the usual hour, 7 o'clock in the evening.
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  During the early part of the night which followed, the hope that it might yet be possible to preserve peace gained some strength. It was understood that the renunciation of his pretensions by Prince Leopold himself had come to confirm that made on his behalf by his father, and that the Spanish Government had formerly declared to the Government of France that the candidature of the Prince was at an end. The language of influential members of the Cabinet was more pacific, and it was thought possible that some conciliatory intelligence might arrive from Prussia and enable the Government to pronounce the whole question to be at an end. But in the morning all was changed. A telegram was received from the French Chargé d' Affaires at Berlin, stating that an article had appeared in the Prussian Ministerial organ, The North German Gazette, to the effect that the French Ambassador had requested the King to promise never to allow a Hohenzollern to be a candidate for the throne of Spain, and that His Majesty had thereupon refused to receive the Ambassador, and sent him word by an aide-de-camp that he had nothing more to say to him."
  Now, it is quite impossible to say whether, but for this incident, war might have been prevented or not; but it is really sad to think that possibly much turned on an incident in this watering-place which, I believe, was misunderstood by both parties, and was by neither intended to be an insult, and that the news arriving simultaneously in Germany and in France should have acted on the strong national feelings of each; the one imagining that it was a deliberate insult to their Sovereign, and the other that it was an affront put on the personal representative of the Emperor. It is on these small causes that great events very often to a certain degree turn—although, as I said before, it is not clear whether without this incident the war could have been permanently averted. As soon as we found—to go back a little—on the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern being withdrawn, that it was not withdrawn in a mode which appeared to the French Government consistent with their interests and their honour, we immediately, and I believe without the loss of any time whatever, began to try what other modes we could adopt to preserve peace. We first of all considered whether we should merely make an application for delay to both parties; but it appeared to us that, with the strong and increasing feeling of both nations, any vague proposition of that sort would have very little chance of success. We then—though I cannot say we were very sanguine—determined to make this proposition to both parties—that while we did not think France

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  was justified in insisting on a guarantee for the future from the King of Prussia, yet if France would withdraw that demand the King might, very consistently with his own honour, in the same sense as he had given his consent to the Prince's candidature, communicate to the French Government his consent to its withdrawal. That attempt was unavailing. It was refused by M. Bismarck, though afterwards I was informed that the King himself had consented to take such a step as we proposed; and the French Government absolutely refused it. As soon as we were aware that there was no chance of both parties accepting it, we sent within an hour another proposal to both countries, making an appeal to them, under the Protocol of Paris, that they should have recourse to the good offices of some friendly Power or Powers—not offering ourselves as mediators above other Powers, but simply stating that we were ready to take any mediatory part which might be requested of us. This proposal was also unsuccessful. It was rejected by France; and it was not accepted by Prussia. Events rapidly succeeded—and, indeed, I believe the declaration had actually been made before our proposal arrived—which took away almost all hope of peace being preserved. As soon as war was declared we thought we had but one course. As soon as we possibly could we fulfilled all the formalities necessary to proclaim our complete neutrality. I stated the other day what I thought that neutrality imposed on us. I stated that friendly relations had existed up to that moment between ourselves and the two belligerents. Since that time those friendly relations have continued. It is quite true that I have not been entirely exempt from complaints by both parties. M. de Lavalette—and here I wish to say that I never knew a person more straightforward or agreeable in his business relations than he—has complained to the Prime Minister that I was cold, very cold. M. de Gramont told Lord Lyons that he regretted the want of more goodwill on the part of the English Government. M. Bismarck, on the other hand, has expressed regret that I should have undertaken to make to the King of Prussia a proposal which it was impossible for him to accept—although, as I mentioned just now, it subsequently turned out that the King had thought
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  fit to adopt it. Count Bernstorff, whom, your Lordships have known for so many years in this country, has found many faults both of omission and commission on my part in proceedings which, I am assured by the highest legal authorities, are the mere routine practice of this country when acting as a neutral. I hardly like to mention these things without making acknowledgment of the singular friendly courtesy which I have personally met with from all the members of the Corps Diplomatique, who seem in this instance to appreciate some of the difficulties with which I have been surrounded, so lately appointed to the Foreign Office, and having to communicate with all of them on matters of such vital importance. I do not in the least complain of the representations I have mentioned. I think it is quite natural that two great nations involved in a death-struggle, such as this appears to be, should look with suspicion on every act of neutral Powers, and that they should have a tendency to feel that those who are not completely with them must be against them, however unfounded the suspicion may be. It is satisfactory, moreover, to me, because I think it shows that, complaints coming from both sides, we have been able up to this time to follow satisfactorily a course that is beset with much difficulty, while it certainly reminds me of the duties which I owe to my own country and to foreign countries in this particular dilemma. As for our position of neutrality, I believe it is a policy approved by your Lordships, by the other House of Parliament, and by the country at large. I believe we are bound with absolute firmness to maintain all the rights which neutrality gives to us. I believe we are perfectly justified in tendering good offices to either country which do not interfere with the demands of justice and impartiality. I am aware of the great responsibility which weighs upon Her Majesty's Government. I know how bound we are to observe every event as it goes on; and I believe your Lordships will agree with me that it is right that we should abstain from all superfluous declarations of what we should or should not do in any possible contingency. I am quite convinced that in order to maintain the honour of this country, and in order to be of the greatest use in restoring peace—if such

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  restoration is possible—the best course we can pursue is in words and in attitude to maintain a dignified and a calm reserve.
  THE EARL OF MALMESBURY: My Lords, after the very temperate and sensible speech we have heard from my noble Friend (Earl Granville), I am sure your Lordships will not be inclined to find fault with the course which Her Majesty's Ministers have thought it to be their duty to pursue under very trying and difficult circumstances, or with the spirit in which they have acted. I feel this personally, because I was once placed almost in the same situation as my noble Friend, and, therefore, I can entirely appreciate the great difficulties in which he found himself placed on his accession to Office My noble Friend, almost the next day after he received the seals of the Foreign Office, found himself in a position so difficult that it would have caused the deepest anxiety to any man who had been much longer accustomed to that particular Department than the noble Earl, and I cannot fail to say that I think he has met the circumstances in a manner that does him infinite credit; and I really do not see how my noble Friend could have acted in any other way in the difficult position in which he was placed. I may, however, go rather further than he has, because he thinks that under certain circumstances war might possibly, though perhaps not probably, have been avoided. He alluded to the incident, as he calls it, that took place between the King of Prussia and the French Ambassador. Now I really think that had very little to do with the subsequent results. I cannot but think that it was very nearly a foregone conclusion between both parties that this war was, some day or other, to take place. I think all the circumstances which have occurred, and which your Lordships have anxiously watched, prove that my conviction is correct. My Lords, it is a circumstance very worthy of remark that when the King of Prussia was staying at Ems absent from his Cabinet, when these difficult circumstances had actually shown themselves to the public eye, that his Minister, Count Bismarck, should have kept away. It seems to me very extraordinary that he should not have hastened to his Sovereign and have given him that assistance and advice which it surely was his
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  duty to have given him. I believe it was through his absence, and on account of his absence, that the unfortunate incident took place of the French Ambassador pressing the King for another audience. If, therefore, as my noble Friend sincerely believes, there were circumstances which if they had not been neglected might have prevented war, he may console himself by reflecting—for that is the best test of the matter—how difficult it is now found to make peace. Supposing even that a Congress assembled and a mediation such as the Protocol of Paris in 1856 recommended was in full force, where was the specific cause of war to be found? What could be said at that Conference? Could they give to either side the concession demanded—any disputed territory—that could call for such a war as that now taking place between these two countries, a war without any just cause or any real reason? It would be deceiving ourselves to look here or there for any specific cause or any specific insult on either side. My Lords, the first excuses for anger and war have been entirely given up. We hear nothing about them. The combatants stand face to face, and any moment we may hear of a battle taking place; but what they are fighting for it is difficult for either of them to say, except that the two nations were determined to make war upon each other. Both the Emperor and the King have said that this is a national war. It is a trial of strength between the two nations. Europe, in fact, was too small for these great potentates to live quietly side by side. Her Majesty's Government, or any other Government, wishing to make peace now would find it impossible to do so. There is nothing tangible upon which mediators could put their hand—any proposition by which they could separate these inveterate combatants. Our course is that which Her Majesty's Government has taken, and in that course they will be supported by the Opposition—namely, a course of perfect neutrality. But besides an absolute neutrality on our part we must insist as much as possible upon an honest neutrality on the part of other nations now at peace. It is of the utmost importance that we should speak plainly on this subject, and tell Denmark that she must remain neutral. I assume this country is ready to maintain its treaties and guarantees, and therefore it is most essential

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  that Belgium and Holland should be told that they must remain perfectly and honestly neutral; and I trust Her Majesty's Government will use every effort the moment they see danger in the direction I have pointed out. I hope that by their advice, and by such pressure as is fair and honourable to all parties, to insist on that neutrality being kept. My Lords, if that is done, I trust we shall pass through this great crisis in Europe without injury to ourselves or those nations which are, fortunately, out of the arena of conflict. We are happily without that arena, and up to this moment I repeat Her Majesty's Government have, I think, done their duty, and I trust they will carefully watch that other countries do the same. But there is one thing of the highest consideration to which I must allude, because it causes great anxiety in men's minds—and that is that although we are without the arena of the conflict, and stand in a neutral position, our national resources must be maintained in such a state as to meet any contingency that may unfortunately arise, and oblige us to mingle in that war which is now confined to the two belligerents. I can quite understand the great anxiety that prevails throughout the country that at this moment our Army is not in the position it ought to be. The noble Lord the Under Secretary for War (Lord Northbrook) said a few evenings ago that our Army was never in a more sound and satisfactory condition than it is at this moment. So far as the common-sense meaning of these words is concerned I have no doubt of it—for so far as soundness goes the Army may be in a very satisfactory condition. But I am not speaking of the quality, but of the quantity; and I fear that our Army, good as it is, is not so large or so numerous as it ought to be under present circumstances. I am not now going into statistics or to repeat facts for which I have the best authority with respect to the numerical force of the Army, but only to express an anxious hope that Her Majesty's Government, under the circumstances, will do their duty, and take care that we have a sufficient numerical force in the country with which to meet any contingency. At the beginning of the Session, when nobody could foresee these storms, it was a matter of frequent congratulation among Her Majesty's Ministers and their
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  Friends that they had reduced the military force of the country—and there can be no doubt as to the fact. Now, with the possibility of our being drawn into the complications that are likely to arise on the Continent of Europe, I trust Her Majesty's Government will retrace their steps with regard to the Army. It can be no disgrace or dishonour to them under the present aspect of affairs to change the line of policy they adopted in a moment of profound peace. I will say nothing more to-day on the subject. I think my noble Friend opposite will, however, have before long to give your Lordships some information with respect to that Draft Treaty winch has first been published in The Times, and which though at first not known to be authentic seems by Prussia, at all events, to be declared to be so. As far as I know there is no information beyond the few words addressed to my noble Friend by the French Ambassador. There is at present no official explanation from the French Government; but I think your Lordships will wish my noble Friend to give, if consistent with his duty, any further information he may receive.
  EARL RUSSELL: My Lords, I wish to explain in the first place that the precedents to which I referred on a former occasion were those of 1823 and 1864. In both those cases England took no part in the war, but on the breaking off of the negotiations determined to remain neutral. The first related to France and Spain, and the second to the Conference of London which was convened in order to preserve peace between Denmark and the two German Powers, Austria and Prussia. In both instances a statement was made by the Government as to the unfortunate issue of the negotiations, and their determination to remain neutral. With regard to the difficulty which has now arisen, there has no doubt arisen such a state of national temper between France and Prussia as to render it probable that war would before very long ensue; but it is, nevertheless, of the utmost importance to ascertain how this war has commenced, and what have been the immediate causes that have produced it. If I allude to these points it is chiefly because I wish that the personal conduct of the King of Prussia which has been made the turning point in these negotiations should be clearly elucidated and understood.

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  My noble Friend (Earl Granville) quoted a despatch, which states that the personal behaviour of the King to M. Benedetti infuriated the French Government and Chambers, and thus became the immediate cause of the declaration of war. Now, since 1840 I have had the honour of some personal acquaintance with the King of Prussia, and I feel sure that his kind temper, his love of peace, and his gallant behaviour on all occasions, would always induce him to act as became a Prince, a soldier, and a gentleman. The account given in the Prussian papers of His Majesty's interview with M. Benedetti is a very simple one, and had it been placed before the French people must, I think, have made them acquit the King of any conduct tending to his discredit. It appears from the Prussian papers that the King, being at the watering-place of Ems, was accosted by the French Ambassador, who asked him to disavow or recall the consent acknowledged to have been given by him to the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern. The King said he could not do that; but that he would communicate with the Prince as to the withdrawal of his candidature. A few days afterwards the King met the French Ambassador on the public walk, and told him he had a newspaper in his hand which showed that the Prince had withdrawn his candidature. That seemed to promise an end of the difficulty which had arisen on account of that candidature; but, to the King's surprise, the Ambassador went on to demand that His Majesty must promise that he would at no time, or under any circumstances, approve or give his consent to the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern for the Throne of Spain. The King replied that that was a step he could not take. Soon afterwards he found that the Ambassador had asked for a fresh audience; and he sent an aide-de-camp to tell the Ambassador that the Prince's candidature had been withdrawn, and that in the same way and to the same extent that he had approved the candidature he approved its withdrawal, and hoped, therefore, that all difficulty on that point was at an end. Now, nothing, in my opinion, could be more fair and frank than that conduct. The King, on subsequently meeting the Ambassador, wished to know whether he had anything to say to him other than the proposition
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  which he had already made to him. The Ambassador replied that he had no fresh proposition; but that he had certain arguments to adduce in support of the proposition which he had already made, and which the King had already declined. The King, I think, very naturally and property, said that, as far as he was himself concerned, he had already given his decision, but that if there was a political question to be discussed, he had better go to Count Bismarck, and discuss with him the arguments which were to be adduced. If it was a question of argument and of political discussion, the King was surely quite right thus to refer the French Ambassador to his Minister. The Ambassador asked whether Count Bismarck was expected the next day, and when told he was not said he would be contented with the King's answer. Now, I see nothing rash or intemperate in that conduct of the King; though the French Ambassador seems to have exhibited some want of good temper, caution, and prudence, throughout the transaction, especially in declining to discuss with Count Bismarck, and insisting on discussing with the King. The King has, like my noble Friend (Earl Granville), been exposed to the blame of both parties. While his good temper and anxiety for peace produced a volume of indignation in Germany, his refusal to discuss the matter any more with the Ambassador produced great excitement and fury in Paris. I do not wish to go much further into the matter; but I must refer to the statement of the French Foreign Minister with respect to this conduct of the King—and I am surprised, by the way, that neither his circular to the French diplomatic servants abroad nor the Proclamation of the Emperor, which appears to me of the highest importance, is included in the Papers which have been placed before us. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs says—
  "The language, at first hesitating, and then decided and haughty, held by the head of the House of Hohenzollern, his refusal to pledge himself to maintain in the future the renunciation he had sanctioned in the past, the treatment of our Ambassador, who was by a verbal message denied all further communication for the furtherance of his mission of conciliation, and, finally, the publicity given to this most unusual proceeding by the Prussian journals and by the notification of it that was sent to all the other Cabinets—all these successive evidences of aggressive intentions have removed all doubts even from the most prejudiced

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  minds. Can there be any illusion when a Sovereign who commands 1,000,000 of men declares, with his hand upon his sword-hilt, that he chooses to be guided by his own judgment and circumstances?"
  Now, I must say it is not necessary or proper that in such a document the King's conduct should have been spoken of in such a manner—it is not usual for the personal conduct and character of a Sovereign to be thus made a ground for war. I do not wish to enter into the main question, for Lord Lyons' despatch of the 12th of July has expressed fully in his conversation with M. de Gramont all that can be said; but infinitely more grave questions may arise in respect to our conduct, and which must not be lost sight of. Everyone in this House must approve the steps the Government have taken, for neutrality is the only course that becomes this country in the present crisis; but it cannot be concealed that great difficulties may arise. The Emperor of the French has declared by his Ambassador that he will respect the neutrality of Belgium, but that statement contained the qualification that he will do so as long as it is respected by Prussia. At any time, therefore, the neutrality of Belgium having been broken by one party may be violated by the other also, and it will have to be considered whether it is our business to look on at that step, or whether we ought not to support Belgium according to our solemn Treaty engagements in her neutral position. Other questions may arise, and our mediation may be required. In such a state of things it seems to me, to be the duty of Her Majesty's Government to see that this country is sufficiently armed. I am not one of those who found fault with them for reducing the Army at the beginning of the year. For a state of profound peace the military and naval force proposed by the Government was adequate and sufficient; but I cannot think it sufficient and adequate for the circumstances in which we are now placed. Without making any boast or ostentation of increasing our Army and Navy, we ought quietly to increase them so as to be prepared for emergencies that are not very unlikely to arise. We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that this is a great war—a war between two of the most powerful nations of Europe. It is stated that 250,000 men will appear in the field on each side, while each Power has
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  1,000,000 in reserve ready to support them if they fail. This is likely to be the most formidable war we have seen in our days — no one can say at what moment we may be called upon to fulfil our Treaty obligations — and in such a state of things it is not advisable that this country should be unarmed, or should have a force smaller in proportion to that of other Powers than has been deemed necessary in former times. We should also so act with Austria and Russia as to be able at any time to offer our mediation with a chance of its being accepted. It would be useless to make such an offer now; but in the course of the autumn or winter, when the feverish heat which now prevails has cooled down, there may be a disposition on both sides to accept the friendly and reasonable proposals of the neutral Powers. I hope, therefore, the Government will cultivate amicable relations with Russia and Austria — Powers which I am sure are friendly to us — and that they will endeavour by every means in their power to stop a war which, according to all appearances, will be unprecedented in the calamities which it may bring upon nations now pursuing a course of industry in the centre of Europe. I should be sorry if any opportunity of arresting so great a calamity were neglected.

CLERICAL DISABILITIES BILL—(No. 210.)
(The Lord Houghton.)
CLERICAL DISABILITIES BILL—(No. 210.)

  COMMITTEE.
  Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee, read.
  Moved, "That the House do now resolve itself into Committee."—(The Lord Houghton.)
  EARL BEAUCHAMPmoved that their Lordships go into Committee on that day three months. The Bill was of no slight importance, inasmuch as its effect would be to alter the status of every clergyman in the Church. Up to the present time, a gentleman taking Holy Orders knew he was incurring the most serious obligations, and pledged himself to devote his whole life to the ministrations of his sacred office. Although the Bill of 1862 relaxed some of the restrictions attached to clergymen, it never proposed to go to this extent. The Inns of Court subsequently allowed clergymen to be called to the bar provided they complied with the requirements they laid down. The

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  effect of this Bill would be to induce young men to enter the Church without that serious condition of mind or consideration which was so essential to the proper performance of their sacred functions. The 7th and 8th clauses were especially objectionable, inasmuch as they would enable such gentlemen as had abandoned their profession as clergymen to return to their sacred calling. In 1860 a Petition was presented to the House of Commons signed by 15 clergymen, praying the House to pass some such measure as the present; but within a year or two subsequently one of those gentlemen had found out his error and became one of the most zealous of his Order in the discharge of his duties; and another, who had gone over to the Church of Rome, returned to the Church of England, and had ever since administered his sacred functions in a most admirable manner.
  Amendment moved, to leave out ("now") and insert ("this day three months.")—(The Earl Beauchamp.)
  THE BISHOP OF GLOUCESTER AND BRISTOL, in supporting the Amendment, said, it appeared to him that this Bill had not received the serious attention in the other House that its importance demanded. The Preamble recited that "it was expedient that relief be given in respect of civil disabilities and in certain other respects" to persons in Holy Orders. Well, they all knew that these disabilities were two—namely, that no clergyman of the Church of England could have the honour of sitting in the House of Commons; and secondly, that no clergyman was eligible to municipal office. It seemed to him that these disabilities could be removed in a far easier way than by a measure of this kind which most seriously affected the whole status and character of the English clergy. Was it wise or proper to hold out to young men such a possibility as the Bill offered? If young men entered the Church with the knowledge that they could at any time divest themselves of their sacred functions, and subsequently resume them, the hands of the Bishops would be weakened. If, on the other hand, after once renouncing the ministry, they were debarred from ever returning to it, the Bill would allow them, by a kind of "happy despatch," to put an end to their ministerial life.
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  He characterized the Bill as one that was intended more or less to ease the consciences of two or three very eminent men who had taken Holy Orders. He should feel it his duty to give it every opposition.
  LORD HOUGHTONsaid, it was rather unusual on going into Committee to try to throw out a Bill which had passed the House almost sub silentio on the second reading. He remembered that the noble Earl opposite (Earl Beauchamp) had once served him just the same trick in the House of Commons when they were both Members of that Assembly, and was successful there; but he trusted to the good sense and justice of their Lordships to defeat his intention with respect to the present measure. The Bill was one of great importance, both to many excellent and respectable persons and to the Church. It provided that no man should be compelled to perform the functions of the Church who did not think himself fit for that solemn office, and who was not ready to accept all the duties and responsibilities which devolved upon him. When men who entered the Church found that these functions were not compatible with their feelings, the Bill relieved them from that painful position by a solemn act of revocation. It was to the interest of the Church itself that no one should be compelled to perform the functions of a minister whose heart did not thoroughly correspond with his duties. It would be time enough to discuss the 7th and 8th clauses when they were in Committee.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVONsaid, the Bill was one which completely altered the status of the clergy, and the House ought to think twice before proceeding with such a measure at this period of the Session, when it could not possibly receive the consideration it deserved. Consideration by a Select Committee would be the best it could receive, and that was now out of the question. He should support the Amendment of his noble Friend unless some suggestions were made which would remove his objections to the measure.
  THE BISHOP OF LLANDAFFtrusted that their Lordships would proceed with the Bill. When a young man entered the order of the diaconate he made a solemn profession, that he trusted he was moved by the Holy Ghost to take this office, declaring his belief in the Old

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  and New Testaments, and stating that he held no doctrine contrary to those of the Church. If, unfortunately, anyone after having been admitted on these most solemn conditions felt that he no longer held the same opinions, and could not honestly and sincerely renew these declarations, it was surely much better for the person himself and for the Church at large that he should not be compelled to remain in a false position, and should not be burdened with the avowal of doctrines in which he no longer believed.
  THE BISHOP OF ELYthought their Lordships should pause before they passed this Bill. It was desirable that before young men took Orders they should thoroughly consider the consequences, and determine beforehand whether they could give up their whole lives to this sacred office. From personal experience he could say that a good deal of difficulty was now felt by young men in making up their minds on this point; but if they saw that they might take Orders, throw them up, and return to them again, he was afraid that persons, who now thought seriously whether they could devote their lives to the Church, would be induced to think much less seriously about it, and would rush into an office for which they were imperfectly fitted. Another objection to the Bill was that as it enjoined the Bishop to accept the resignation and record it in the register of the diocese, it would make resignation of Holy Orders a distinct ecclesiastical act, and thus by a side wind tend to decide the question of the delibility or indelibility of Holy Orders. He hoped, therefore, their Lordships would pause before giving their assent to the measure.
  On Question, "That now stand part of the Motion?"—Their Lordships divided:—Contents 52; Not-Contents 29: Majority 23.
  Resolved in the Affirmative.
  House in Committee accordingly.
  Clauses 1 to 6, inclusive, agreed to.
  Clause 7 (Deed of revocation and recalling by Archbishop and consequences thereof).
  THE BISHOP OF LONDONmoved the omission of the clause. The clause provided that, on executing a deed of revocation, the Archbishopmight, if he
  1068
  thought fit, cause the deed to be recorded in the registry of the Province; and thereon the person executing it should be restored, to all intents and purposes—except that he would be incapable of holding preferment for two years—to the same status as before he executed the deed of relinquishment. This clause was not in the original Bill.
  THE BISHOP OF LLANDAFFhoped the clause would be retained. It would obviate in some measure the objection which had been taken to the Bill, that it would operate in deciding the question of the delibility of Holy Orders, inasmuch as the clause provided that the Archbishop might restore a clergyman who had resigned without re-ordaining him; therefore, the person, under this Bill would still remain a clergyman. He could conceive the case of a young clergyman entering on his profession with the highest religious aspirations to promote the glory of God and the welfare of the Church; but he was sure it must be in the experience of every Bishop that he was obliged in a great many cases to ordain candidates for Holy Orders who had but a very scanty amount of theological learning; and when a young clergyman came in contact with the various opinions which were afloat in the present day, and began to doubt, on grounds which, perhaps, he had never satisfactorily examined, the soundness of the principles he had imbibed with his mother's milk, it was not at all improbable that he would experience a severe mental conflict. In his opinion, if a man would only do the will of God, and earnestly seek God's grace, he would eventually be led to a right conclusion; but, meanwhile, he might have to undergo a severe mental struggle. He might be, or imagine that he was, sceptical on the subject of his religion; but it would be a sad thing, supposing him to be confirmed in his original belief after the lapse of a few years, that he should be wholly debarred from resuming his ministry. There were two safeguards provided by the Bill. In the first place, the Archbishop, before re-admitting such a young man to the ministry, had the opportunity of inquiring into the circumstances under which he was led astray, into his present opinions and his moral conduct. It was further provided that the applicant should not be capable of holding any preferment

  1069
  until after the expiration of two years. In addition to this, when at length he obtained preferment, he must, like any other person similarly situated, present to the Bishop of the diocese a testimonial to the effect that for three years he has neither held nor taught anything contrary to the doctrine or discipline of the Church of England. Surely these safeguards were amply sufficient, and their Lordships might with perfect security for the interests of the Church and of religion allow a locus penitentiœ for these young men. For his own part, he should esteem and value the more a conscientious young man who had gone through a process of mental doubt at a certain period of his life, and eventually been confirmed in the true faith.
  THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYthought the State ought to act towards the Church in this matter as it did towards the other professions of which it held itself to be the guardian. If a barrister retired from the Bar he gave up all claim to be a barrister. So, again, if an officer in the Army or Navy gave up his commission he could not resume it. It appeared to him that there was no reason why a clergyman should be treated differently in this respect from the members of other professions. The right rev. Prelate (the Bishop of Llandaff) dwelt entirely on the case of conscientious men, who might be interesting psychological subjects; but they seemed, after all, in the position of weak brethren, and furnished an excuse for all kinds of irregular legislation. Their case was not, however, one of common occurrence. They had to deal with a much harder and a much less admirable material, and his opinion was that, in the event of the clause being passed, many a clergyman who did not get on very well in his profession would take a secular employment, and at the same time keep a second string to his bow; for, if the clerical profession improved, or if he had a propect of obtaining a good living, he might return to the Church. This, he believed, would by no means tend to the advantage of the Church or the edification of congregations.
  EARL BEAUCHAMPsaid, he did not think such cases as were anticipated by the noble Marquess would occur, because absolute discretion was vested in the Archbishop, who would certainly not allow anyone to return to the clerical
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  profession who was found to be actuated by an unworthy motive. In his judgment the parallel drawn by the noble Marquess with the other professions did not really apply to a calling so sacred as that of a clergyman. He trusted the right rev. Prelate would not persist in his opposition to the clause.
  LORD LYVEDENsaid, the clause would allow a person to play fast and loose, and as playing fast and loose would be highly discreditable to the clerical profession, he trusted their Lordships would reject the clause.
  LORD HOUGHTONsaid, that his sentiments accorded with those of the right rev. Prelate (the Bishop of Llandaff) rather than with the extremely secular and almost light opinion of the noble Marquess, which, indeed, was hardly respectful to the Church.
  On Question?—Their Lordships divided:—Contents 13; Not-Contents 71: Majority 58.
  Clause struck out.
  Remaining clauses agreed to, with Amendments.
  The Report of the Amendments to be received on Monday next, and Bill to be printed, as amended. (No. 254).

SHERIFFS (SCOTLAND) ACT (1853) AMENDMENT, &c. BILL.—(No. 243.)
(The Lord Chancellor.)
SHERIFFS (SCOTLAND) ACT (1853) AMENDMENT, &c. BILL.—(No. 243.)

  COMMITTEE.
  House in Committee (according to Order).
  Clauses 1 to 12, inclusive, agreed to.
  Clause 13 (Courts to be held and duties to be discharged by sheriffs).
  LORD COLONSAYmoved to omit all the words after the word "authority" in line 11, page 5. The words proposed to be omitted provided that all sheriffs, whether appointed before or after the passing of the Act, should be relieved of the duty of attending the sittings of the Court of Session. The Amendment, if agreed to, would leave them under their present obligation of being compelled to attend the Courts at Edinburgh at least two months in every year—the object, of course, being that they should keep up their knowledge of the progress of the law.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORthought the Amendment unnecessary.
  LORD CAIRNSsupported the Amendment. The assistant barristers in the County Courts in Ireland were gentlemen who practised in the Superior Courts. What had worked well in Ireland could scarcely fail to be advantageous in Scotland.
  LORD PENZANCEobjected to the Amendment.
  On Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the clause?"—Their Lordships divided:—Contents 28; Not-Contents 33: Majority 5.
  Words omitted.
  An Amendment made.
  The Report of the Amendments to be received To-morrow; and Bill to be printed, as amended. (No. 257.)

INDIA—FINANCIAL STATEMENT.
THE DUKE OF ARGYLLrose, in pursuance of Notice, to lay on the Table of the House despatches relative to Finance in India, and to make a statement on the subject. He said, he was very sorry to be obliged to address the House that evening; but he was sure the noble Marquess opposite (the Marquess of Salisbury) and other noble Lords present agreed with him in thinking that there were at this time questions of great moment connected with the finances of India, to the solution of which the people of India were looking with very considerable anxiety. He therefore felt that, whatever the state of the House, it would be scarcely decent to again postpone the statement of which he had given Notice, especially as it was not at all certain that he should have an opportunity of making it to a larger House; but one promise he would give their Lordships—that his speech should not be a long one. His opinion was that the expositions of Indian finance were often loaded with an unnecessary amount of detail, with masses of figures which such of their Lordships as were not well acquainted with financial accounts would not be able to understand and digest. In figures he should confine himself to general results; but he should also direct their Lordships' attention to some of those points of policy and principle which now required consideration in connection with the government of India. The general result of the finances of the last year
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was this — When the Budget was produced Sir Richard Temple estimated that there would be a surplus of about £52,000; but in the course of September — when Sir Richard Temple was absent on leave in England—it became evident to the Indian Government that there were material errors in the Estimate. A telegram was sent to the Government at home, stating that on a reconsideration of the figures, and looking to the new liabilities which had come upon them, the Indian Government had every reason to believe that at the end of the financial year there would be a deficit of upwards of £1,500,000, and in the face of such circumstances they had determined to take immediate steps for the retrenchment of their expenditure, and to obtain an increase of the Revenue of the country. During the remaining months of the year much doubt was felt as to the practical effect of those measures, for up to a late period of the year it was doubtful whether there could be any retrenchment, and whether there would be such an increase of the Revenue as would extinguish the anticipated deficit. In March, when the regular Statement was framed on 10 months of actual expenditure and an Estimate for the next two months, the Government of India were hopeful enough to think that the deficit would be little more than £500,000. A few days ago he received a telegram from Lord Mayo, saying that before the Financial Statement was made to this House, he would be able to telegraph, if not the actual figures, at all events some approximation to the result of the last financial year, and last week he received another telegram from the noble Lord, which justified the belief that there would not be a deficit, but probably a surplus of between £100,000 and £200,000. Much undeserved blame had been cast on Sir Richard Temple for the errors which were contained in his Financial Statement; but it should be remembered that during the last 10 or 12 years there were very few instances in which the actual outcome of the accounts was not wholly different from the figures presented in the Budget. This remark was equally applicable to the Budgets of Mr. Wilson, Mr. Laing, and every other Finance Minister. The truth was that there were some elements of uncertainty in the finances of India which

1073
removed them altogether from the position of our finances at home as regarded the possibility of estimating the Budget at the beginning of the year. In the first place, the Opium revenue was proverbially uncertain; secondly, there were great droughts in India which affected the expenditure on public works; thirdly, about £1,300,000 of the Revenue of India was spent in England for stores the price of which fluctuated; fourthly, there was a varying amount of loss on the enormous sums dealt with in exchange between England and India; and, lastly, there had been some obvious mistakes, owing to the omission of items of Revenue and Expenditure which ought to have been taken into account. Whatever fault might be charged upon Sir Richard Temple, he was bound to confess that in the Estimate for last year the India Office at home was responsible for a mistake of between £200,000 and £300,000; but he hoped that in future the accounts would be prepared with greater accuracy, and he believed that steps were being taken by Lord Mayo to effect that result. Although the change which had been effected in the result of the financial year was mainly due to the measures that Lord Mayo and his Government had taken, it would not be true to suppose that the difficulties of Indian finance had been solved by the fact of there now being a surplus instead of a deficit. Looking to the great increase in the Revenue of that country during the past few years he always returned to the accounts with the thought—"How is it possible we can have any difficulty with this magnificent, this Imperial Revenue of £48,000,000 or £50,000,000?" On looking at the accounts for the year ending last April he found that £1,500,000 was due to extraordinary causes; but ordinarily the Revenue was not less than £48,500,000. How was it possible, then, that there could be any difficulty in disposing of that Revenue? In order to bring that question home to the House he would analyze the expenditure, which would be found classified under six or seven heads. In the first place, £1,892,000 was paid to the Native Princes under various treaties and obligations. Then there was the interest of the debt, amounting to £5,700,000. The Government guarantee for railways amounted to £1,500,000. These sums together made a total charge of £9,090,000, leaving for
1074
other purposes £39,400,000. And how was that disposed of? The cost of collection was £7,399,000; the cost of the Civil Service, £12,649,000; the cost for the Army £16,500,000; leaving a surplus of £2,850,000, which was entirely swallowed up in ordinary public works. Was it possible to effect a reduction in any of those items of expenditure? There was no prospect of any diminution in the sum to be paid to the Native Princes; but as regarded the interest on the debt there would be, during the next 10 or 15 years, operations in that debt which would afford opportunities, if their credit remained good, of reducing the interest to be paid. Three weeks ago he should have spoken with a confident hope of being able to save a considerable sum within a short period, for much of the debt was borrowed at 5 per cent; while lately the Government had been borrowing at 4 and 4½ per cent, and when the time came for their paying off existing loans and contracting fresh ones, he hoped they might have been able to save a considerable sum. Unfortunately, the war which had broken out in Europe was already affecting the monetary securities of all nations, and among others those of the Indian Empire, and there was not now the prospect of raising money on favourable terms. He earnestly trusted that the war would be a short one, and that India would obtain that benefit to which it was fairly entitled from the high condition of its credit. As regarded the public debt, in 1874 the old capital of the East India Company would be paid off, on which there would be a gain of £450,000; but they could not count on any other great saving being made for some years at all events. As to the guaranteed railways the loss in the year just ended was £1,500,000, and the Estimate for the current year was £1,200,000; but, as during the past three or four months there had been a remarkable increase in the traffic — the increase being £250,000—there was a prospect of there being a reduction of the charge accruing on account of existing railways, though against that must be set the amount that would have to be paid on lines that were now being constructed. On the whole, the result of the working of the Indian railways was by no means unsatisfactory, for the total capital was upwards of £82,000,000, and the total loss, even in a comparatively bad year, was £1,500,000.

1075
The next item related to the cost of collection, which stood at £7,399,000, and there was no prospect of any considerable diminution in it. Indeed, he doubted whether there would be any diminution at all. It should be remembered, however, that under this head were comprised not only charges corresponding with those that arose in the collection of the Revenue in this country, but such as were peculiar to India—namely, advances made to the opium cultivators and expenses incurred by the Government in the manufacture of salt. These advances and expenses amounted together to £2,200,000, out of the total sum of £7,400,000; and the cost of collection during the present year showed an increase of £500,000, due partly to the extended cultivation of opium. In the Estimates of the current year Lord Mayo had made a sensible diminution in the charges for civil government from £12,649,000 to £12,352,000, showing a reduction of £297,000. Under the head of civil government came the cost of education. The attention of Lord Mayo and the Government had been directed to the fact that the intention of various Secretaries of State, and especially of his noble Friend (Viscount Halifax), had been to a considerable extent departed from, and that the charges for education had been growing very rapidly for the benefit of those classes who could afford to pay for their own education; whereas, the charges incurred for the benefit of the poorer classes and for vernacular education had not increased in the same proportion. Lord Mayo had instituted a review of the whole system, for the purpose of saving the Revenue in regard to the higher class schools and Colleges, without unduly interfering with existing interests and long standing arrangements. He could not state what the reduction would be; but the principle of it had been sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government, nothing being proposed at all at variance with the despatches of 1854 and 1859 from Lord Stanley and the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury). The total saving on the cost of the civil government was £297,000. Of course, the great item of expenditure was the Indian Army, which had absorbed £16,481,000. The Government of India proposed certain reductions in the European Force of India, which had received the sanction of the
1076
Imperial Government. They were reductions mainly in the Staff of the Army, and in the number of regiments; but were not reductions in the number of bayonets. Sir William Mansfield, and other authorities, were of opinion that the military force in India was not greater than was necessary for the safety of the country; but they thought an important saving might be effected in the Staff and organization of the Army, the regiments serving in India being brought more nearly up to a war footing. This change having been sanctioned by the Government, some regiments had been brought home, and now in India there were 50 regiments of Infantry, with 41,000 bayonets, instead of 52 regiments, and nine Cavalry regiments instead of 11. The saving thus made amounted to £500,000, and would be an important relief to the finances of India during the current year. It was right to add that Lord Mayo proposed some further saving through a reduction in the Native Army; but certain differences of opinion, into which it would be inexpedient to enter, had arisen between Lord Mayo and the Goverment at home as not the mode merely in which this saving should be made. He hoped, however, that some arrangement would be entered into for reducing the cost of the Native Army. The Indian finances were, more or less, suffering from the necessary magnitude of charges connected with our regimental system at home; discussions might arise upon the particular items, but the principle adopted had been that India should be charged with the full cost of the whole force employed there, including its fair proportion of the effective and non-effective services. There could be no doubt that, under the old system, the Company recruited its European force at a much smaller cost than was possible under the existing system; and if there were not important political considerations adverse to the old system, the Indian Government might recruit its force at a much less cost. He was one of those who advocated the amalgamation of the two armies, and still believed it would be a serious political danger to India to have a large European Army there, separated in spirit and in feeling from the Imperial Army of the Crown; but he was bound to admit that the increase of expenditure thrown upon the Government of India by the results of amalgamation and the

1077
exclusive employment of European troops had been greater than he or anyone could have anticipated. It would be the duty of the Government to see that the expenditure was reduced to a minimum consistent with the efficiency of the force, and not interfering with the organization of the Imperial Army, which must depend on Imperial considerations. But the expenditure must not be rudely increased as against the people of India. It would be an awkward circumstance if, under the pressure of high taxation, the people of India had any reason to suppose that we were exacting tribute from them through, the medium of expenses which were not strictly due to the defence of India, or exclusively for Indian purposes. He might remind the House that the Act of Parliament specially provided that the Indian Revenue should be expended for the purposes of India alone, and any expenditure on the British Army not strictly connected with Indian purposes would be at variance with the Act, adverse to the policy of Parliament, and at variance, also, with their duty to the people of India. As far as it was recommended by the Government of India, the reduction he had indicated had been carried into effect, and a further reduction of Native troops was now under consideration.
He now came to the question of public works, apart from which we had a large surplus of Indian Revenue. It was very important that the House and the country, as well as the people of India, should observe this fact. They were perpetually talking of the deficits in Indian Revenue, and it was perfectly true that, as a mere matter of account, there had been a chronic deficit. But, taking the Revenue at £48,500,000, and defraying out of it the enormous military expenditure of £16,500,000, with all the cost of collection and the charges of civil government, there was still left a surplus of £2,800,000. In short, the deficits which had arisen in Indian finance had been due entirely to the expenditure on public works. In the year 1869–70, an expenditure of between £5,000,000 and £6,000,000 sterling was incurred on ordinary public works. This being so, it was very important that some attention should be paid to what were called ordinary public works. During the last two years the expenditure had been augmented considerably by the cost of
1078
barracks, though general improvements all over the country, apart from the barracks, had largely contributed to the expenditure. Last year, with regard to barracks, he stated that those which were projected would cost £10,000,000 sterling, and he concurred with the noble Marquess that while it was all very well to talk of defraying the cost of those works out of Revenue, if at the end of the year a loan was found necessary, it came to the same thing as if you borrowed from the beginning. But the system of borrowing for public works had an injurious effect upon the plans for those works, and Lord Mayo had expressed a strong opinion to the Government of India to the effect that, if from the first it had been contemplated that the barracks should be paid for out of Revenue, they would never have been devised on so extravagant a plan. Information had reached him which threw a melancholy light upon the construction of great public works, planned under the expectation that the cost would be defrayed by loans. Their Lordships would, no doubt, have seen in the newspapers many letters complaining of the construction of these barracks. They were said to have failed in their purpose—to be more uncomfortable, if not more unhealthy, than the old barracks had been. At the request of Lord Mayo, he had recently seen Dr. Cunningham, who was at the head of the sanitary department of the Army of India, and possessed of Lord Mayo's views upon the subject of the barracks. He said that in Bengal, where the climate was less dryly hot than in the Upper Provinces, there was no very great complaint with regard to them; but, in the Upper Provinces, they were really intolerable. As Lord Napier had had much to do with the building of these barracks, and was about to return to India, a meeting was arranged in the India Office between him and Dr. Cunningham, who was very severely cross-examined on the subject by Lord Napier to show that if the barracks had been completed by the addition of all those appliances rendered necessary by the climate, in accordance with the original design, there would be no room for complaint. The impression left upon his mind from this conversation was that, although it might be true that the addition of verandahs and a constant application

1079
of water in the upper stories would make a great change for the better, the improvement would involve great expense, and yet not be perfectly satisfactory. Sir William Mansfield had called his attention to the habits of the soldiers, which bore upon this question. The barracks were constructed under the impression that the men would use the upper storey for sleeping purposes and the ground floor for recreation; but it seemed that the soldier when not on duty, or engaged in out-door recreation, was generally found by his bedside at work upon his accoutrements, perhaps, or else taking rest upon it; and, considering the upper storey was little better than a great sun-trap, which did not cool even by the morning, the soldier suffered from the heat. Altogether, he had come to the conclusion that it would be better not to finish the barracks, and that, at least as regarded the Upper Provinces, barracks of one storey only should be built with thicker walls and fuller accommodation for the men, so that their place of recreation should be in close proximity to their sleeping apartments, and that they should not be obliged to go upstairs to an even when they wished to rest or amuse themselves with their own affairs. The cost of these barracks was a necessary consequence of a standing Army, and should form an annual charge upon the Revenue just as they would in this country; but it would be more economical if they were treated as extraordinary works.
The total expenditure for the current year had been framed in the Budget to show a saving of £1,500,000, so that Lord Mayo had not only succeeded in obtaining a small surplus in 1809–70, but proposed a saving in addition for 1870–1. Last September, the Government was alarmed to find a considerable deficit, and recommended a considerable increase in the salt duties in Madras and Bombay, and to raise the income tax from 1 to 2 per cent for the remainder of the year. He had sanctioned these measures without hesitation, and it was owing to the adoption of this policy, accompanied by a reduction of expenditure, that an equilibrium had been maintained. He had consented to the increase in the salt tax with very great reluctance, because, as he had stated in the despatch to India, although the evidence was rather in favour
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of the salt tax not being oppressive in Lower Bengal, it could be almost positively stated that it bore heavily on the poor inhabitants in the Central and North-West Provinces of India; and as salt could be manufactured in a rough way in India, a very heavy tax would load to evasion of the duty. Five annas a maun, however, was not much, and the Government got £300,000 a year by the increase; but if that addition to the Revenue were purchased by a very considerable diminution in the consumption, the tax could not be justified.
He next dealt with the income tax. Seeing that opium could not be expected to yield more than £6,900,000—full £1,000,000 less than last year, the Government of India felt they could not secure a surplus without increasing the income tax; and he consented to an increase to 3⅛ per cent. Public meetings had been held on the subject, and memorials had been presented to the Government alleging the total unsuitableness of the income tax to India, a view which would naturally be taken by those who were subject to the tax. In the licence tax of 1867 and the certificate tax of 1868 there was an element of injustice. Those taxes were applicable to trades and professions; and thus, while the Government's own officers, and all Native traders were subject to the tax, proprietors of land were exempt. Sir Stafford Northcote had pointed out the injustice in a despatch, and he had expressed the same view. This injustice had been remedied in the Income Tax Acts of 1869 and 1870. The income tax would be borne as long as it was kept low, and it was not high this year as compared with our own. We were spending upon that country immense sums for public works, which were fully as important for India as any of the reforms introduced by Lord Napier. For his own part, he could not see why the income tax should not be a permanent instrument of Indian finance, provided it could be kept within reasonable limits. The present rate was 7½d. in the pound. Now, in four years during which there had been profound peace in this county, our income tax had stood at 9d. or 10 d. in the pound, that rate being borne, he would not say with great pleasure, but with comparative contentment by the people of this country, because they were convinced that the Revenue thus raised

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was expended in a manner calculated to benefit them. If, then, the people of India could be persuaded that the amount yielded by the income tax was expended for their benefit, and not extravagantly wasted, they would see the necessity of bearing, even in the time of peace, those imposts which were necessary for the financial security of the country. At the same time, he had no hesitation in expressing his regret that the Government had found it necessary, during a time of profound peace in India, to raise the tax to the comparatively high figure of 7½d. in the pound. Indeed, he should be very glad if the Government could reduce that tax to a point at which it might more permanently remain as a steady instrument of Indian finance.
He would next direct the attention of the House to another subject, second to none in importance as regarded the expenditure of the Indian Empire—namely, imposing on local cesses or assessments no inconsiderable part of those public works which had hitherto been provided exclusively out of the Indian Revenue. His noble Friend and Kinsman Lord Dalhousie had remarked that the people of India would do nothing for themselves; that they trusted to the Government to do everything in the nature of public works; that even the repairing of tanks and the embanking of small irrigation courses were left to the Government to execute; and that in matters of this kind it would be most important to encourage private enterprize in India. He should be sorry to say that the course taken in giving guarantees to public companies had had the ultimate effect of stopping private enterprize in India, except when the Government came forward with a guarantee; but the truth was that when once the example of guarantees had been set it was almost impossible to get rid of them. In his opinion, however, this was not properly private enterprize at all. It was nothing more than the enterprize of the Government acting in a most inconvenient form and at a great loss to the Revenue of India. His noble Friend thought that the expenditure for the education of the people, the making of roads and embankments, and other improvements of that kind ought to be provided out of local cesses or assessments; but he was met by an unexpected difficulty, for Sir William Grey, Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, although he at one
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time appeared favourable to the project, afterwards took a wholly different view of the subject, and said it would be a breach of faith on the part of the Government if they increased, in any way whatever, the demands made upon the agricultural classes. A correspondence was carried on for two years in reference to this question, and was resumed when Lord Mayo went out. The Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, however, continued his resistance to the proposal, and finally the Government of India appealed to Her Majesty's Government to set the question at rest. During the time he had held his present Office he had never been called upon to deal with a more important and, in some points, a more difficult subject; but he at last arrived at a very clear and thorough conviction as to the course the Government ought to take. He would now lay upon the Table a copy of the despatch which would settle the question as far as regarded the opinion of Her Majesty's Government. It was to the effect that there was nothing whatever in the permanent settlement and the promises given to the Zemindars of Lower Bengal by Lord Cornwallis which disentitled the Government of India from throwing upon local resources the expenditure which was necessary for local purposes. In this matter he was sorry to say he had met with the opposition of some of the oldest members of the Council, and it was only by a narrow majority that he secured the assent of the Council to the despatch which he now had the honour to lay upon the Table. That despatch was accompanied by the protest made by the minority, and he earnestly recommended the Papers to the attention of their Lordships, because they dealt with a question second to none in importance as regarded the Revenues of India. He might here point out that the argument based on the permanent settlement of Bengal was equally applicable for a certain time to all the other settlements in India; for if, in consequence of the permanent lease given to the Zemindars of Bengal, we were precluded from raising local cesses for local purposes, the same argument would disentitle us from raising a single sixpence in the other parts of India during the continuance of the existing settlements, which were for 20, 30, or 50 years. The despatch to which he had just referred had been received in India, and the

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Lieutenant Governor proposed to bring in a Bill, in the course of the present year, for raising £500,000 for constructing roads, and from £200,000 to £300,000 for the purposes of vernacular education. It was intended that these local cesses should be made as far as possible with the co-operation and concurrence of the Natives of India themselves, in order that they might be convinced that the works proposed to be executed would be for their benefit.
Their Lordships had, perhaps, noticed in The Times of that morning a short report of a long address delivered by Sir Charles Trevelyan, who had had great experience in Indian affairs, and who was in favour of the decentralization of finance in India. The same opinion was held by his right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Bright); but he could not help thinking that those who went in for a rapid decentralization of finance in India did not fully perceive the difficulties of the case. Indeed, the natural tendency of events was at present in favour of the centralization of the management of finance in Calcutta; but this project of local cesses had a most important bearing in the direction of decentralization. He might remark that the great expenditure which caused all our deficits was on account of ordinary and extraordinary public works. Soon after he came into Office he had his attention directed to the remarkable fact, in reference to the immense sums we were annually spending on public works, that we really had no security for the adequate education of the officers through whose hands they passed. It was true there was one College in India for the education of civil engineers; but the great supply of civil engineers came from England, and there was no security with regard to their education and scientific attainments. He was not, of course, speaking of the great civil engineers from this country, who might be employed by the railway companies, but of the rank and file of civil engineers in India who were sent out by the Government, and in whose case, he must repeat, there was no adequate security that they had obtained an adequate scientific education. Under those circumstances, he could not help inquiring whether it would not be of great value that we should provide a College for the education
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of those civil engineers, and erect them into the character of a service imbued with something of the old spirit of the servants of the Indian Government—some of the esprit de corps which was so valuable in the old servants of the East India Company, something which would make them serve the Government, from the feeling that they belonged specially to its service, while they should go out from this country with something like an adequate scientific education. That matter had been for some time under the consideration of the Government, and they had arrived at the conclusion that it was desirable to take measures for the education of civil engineers, looking to the long time which the construction of great public works must occupy in India. It was proposed that the entrance to the College which it was intended to establish should be by open competition, and that the young men admitted to it should be educated in the scientific requirements which were connected with their profession. A very distinguished officer who had returned from India—Colonel Chesney—had his heart in the work, and he looked forward to the experiment with great hopes of success. It would afford an opening to young men in this country which they would, he thought, be anxious to seize, because it would enable them to secure a very considerable position almost immediately on their arrival in India, when they would start with a salary of about £400 a year, and rise in their profession by selection and ability. They would be entirely at the disposal of the Governor General of India, and they would have the prospect of retiring with a pension larger than in former times.
He was sorry to have troubled their Lordships so long; but the Statement was one which was looked forward to by the people of India with great interest, in respect of whose affairs great questions of principle had lately been debated. He hoped he had made clear to the House what were the views of the Government on those questions of principle, and if any doubts existed on the subject in the mind of any noble Lord, they would be removed by the Papers which he was about to lay on the Table.
Before he sat down he wished to say a word or two with regard to his noble Friend Lord Mayo, the Governor General of India. A sufficient opportunity

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had now been afforded for judging of the manner in which his noble Friend worked his great Office, and he could not allow the present occasion to pass without expressing his sincere admiration of the devotion with which he attended to its duties. Lord Mayo was earnestly and anxiously desirous to secure the benefits of British government to the people of India, and was unsparing in the use which he made of his time and ability in dealing with the minutest details of the finances and public works of that country. He had even taken the unusual step for a Governor General—a step which even perhaps was open to some objection, while it showed his willingness to shrink from no labour—of charging himself departmentally with the conduct of public works in India, and he took an eager and energetic part in the discussion in the Council with respect to them. Having made those few remarks, which he felt to be due to the services of his noble Friend, it only remained for him to thank their Lordships for the attention with which they had listened to his statement.
The noble Duke then presented (by command) a Statement on East India (Finance): And also, Papers relating to the levy of a Road and Educational Cess in Bengal.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYsaid, he had to thank the noble Duke for the able statement he had made, and which was both of an interesting and satisfactory character. The finances of India unhappily presented more than one point of contrast with those of this country. The efforts of an English financier were generally directed to the question of dividing the surplus which he expected to have, while the Indian financier was chiefly concerned with the duty of providing for an impending deficit. He regretted, he might add, that an outcry had been raised on the subject of the income tax. The obstacles in the path of the Indian financier were enormous. If he wished to impose a duty on exports or imports, he had to consult the interests and convenience of 200,000,000 of people. If he turned to the land, he was met by the agreements with Zemindars and charged with a breach of faith; while the consumption of the inhabitants of India was so restricted that any attempt to raise money on the article
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of salt was almost impossible. When the last remedy was tried and the income tax was resorted to, outcry was raised by all those who formed public opinion in that country, owing to the heavy nature of the tax upon them. For his own part, he must confess that, although he looked, on the tax as inevitable and right, he could not help sympathizing with those who endeavoured to induce the Secretary of State for India to reverse his decision on the point. It was true that our outlay in India had tended largely to increase the prosperity and civilization of that country; but to the people with fixed incomes it had brought no benefit whatever. Many of the points which the noble Duke had alluded to had been under the consideration of the Government and Council of India for many years past, and he was glad to find they had been decided in a way that seemed to promise best for the future of India. He was glad to hear the statement of his noble Friend with respect to those unhappy barracks which had been hanging like a millstone for so many years round the neck of Indian financiers. India had in that respect suffered greatly from what might be called the weight of public opinion in England. Those works were the result of the Crimean War. They originated in a feeling which was most estimable and admirable; but which, like many other good feelings, was pushed to too great an extent. The barracks, however, had been stopped, and he earnestly hoped a more sober view as to military objects would prevail in connection with the public works in India. With respect to the question of loans for military works, his noble Friend, it seemed to him, did not lay so much stress as he ought to have done on one or two considerations. It was better boldly and honestly to have recourse to a loan than, by relying upon overstrained estimates of future income, to run the risk of adding to a long list of deficits. It had been said that by resorting to loans public credit would be injured; but nothing had so deleterious an effect upon public credit as repeated heavy deficits. He should greatly prefer that the funds for defraying the I charge of erecting the new military buildings should be raised by a loan rather than that they should be provided out of income at the risk of causing another of those deficits which

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had for so long been a scandal to Indian finance. There was no valid objection to a loan being raised for such objects, because the public debt of India was very small compared with the Revenue of that country. What weighed upon their credit was the general impression that their resources were very near an end. Considering how large a portion of their Revenue came from a precarious source, he could not help renewing the entreaty which he made of his noble Friend last year, that he would press upon the Government of India the necessity of assuming all their income at the lowest possible figure and their expenses at the largest, and rather to make up the difference by resorting to the public creditor than to add one more to the disgraceful series of balance sheets.
LORD LYVEDENsaid, he regretted that the noble Duke had not made his statement upon the finances of India at an earlier period of the Session, when a graver and more useful discussion might have been held upon the subject than was possible on the present occasion. His noble Friend spoke of the great difficulty of evoking public opinion in India in respect to economy. The civil servants there, as a rule, did not wish for a reduction of expenditure, and there was no public opinion to back up any attempt at such reduction. It had been stated, at a public meeting recently held in Bombay, that between 1856 and 1870 an increase in the Revenue of £19,500,000 had all been eaten up by the increase in the Expenditure, and that whereas in 1863 the military expenditure was £14,000,000, in 1870 it had increased to £16,000,000, although the number of troops had been reduced by 6,000. These were matters which ought to receive the grave attention of the Indian Government. He should not advise that the European Force should be reduced by a single man; but the Native Force might well be reduced, especially in the tranquil Presidency of Madras. He hoped his noble Friend would turn his attention to the necessity of effecting economy in India. A great outcry had been raised in India against the income tax; but he did not see how it was possible to do without it. The new barracks in India, he believed, were universally condemned. Everything ought to be done for the health and comfort of the soldiers; but it was unwarrantable
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extravagance to build superb houses for their residences. He agreed with the declaration in the despatch of the noble Duke of last September that the military expenditure might be reduced by £1,500,000, without reducing the force of a single regiment. He wished to know whether any proposal for dealing with the subject of recruiting had emanated from the joint Committee of the War Office and of the India Office which had been appointed to inquire into the matter? India was under one very great difficulty—it was not allowed to make its own regulations with respect to cotton or customs. The moment they attempted to do so the manufacturers of Manchester raised an outcry of an interference with the principles of free trade. During the American War there was a great demand for Indian cotton; but since that war had terminated the demand, in a great measure, had ceased, and it was not surprising that the cultivation of cotton was not carried on for an uncertain market. With a view to secure economy, he would suggest to his noble Friend to consider the propriety of sending out some competent person from this country, as Mr. Wilson and Mr. Laing had been sent out, as it was quite certain that those having the management of Indian financial affairs would never take the necessary steps for bringing about such a result themselves. Indeed, he thought the Government contemplated such a step, as he had read in the papers that the First Commissioner of Works had been selected for the purpose.
LORD LAWRENCEsaid, he rejoiced to hear what his noble Friend had stated with respect to Sir Richard Temple. He must say that that gentleman had fallen upon evil times. Amongst the many excellent officers he had known during his career in India, he did not know one whose zeal, ability, or earnest desire to do his duty, both to India and the Home Government, surpassed that gentleman's. With respect to the barracks, he could not say that he was altogether enamoured of them; but he thought that they had been somewhat harshly criticized, as they had certainly proved successful in the North-Western Provinces. But in other parts of India, more particularly in Lower Bengal and the Central Provinces, he thought that double-storied barracks were suitable to the country. Everybody there who could

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get a double-storied house did so, and that showed that such buildings were useful. No doubt there was a great deal in what Sir William Mansfield said about habit; but still he should have thought that the English soldiers, when they found the upper rooms too hot for them, could carry their beds down below. The plans of these barracks had been approved by all the authorities in India after full consideration, and subsequently they were sent to England and were approved by the authorities here. If these barracks had proved failures, of course, the Government ought not to build any more of them. In reference to the remarks which had been made touching the increase of Revenue and Expenditure, he thought that a careful scrutiny of the figures which were published from time to time would account for what at first sight seemed so strange. The greater part of the Revenue of India was raised from some six or seven items, and a considerable portion of the increase of Revenue arose from increased taxation, or from a precarious increase in the customs. Among the items of expenditure given in the Budget was one for the telegraphs. Some years ago it would not have appeared in the Budget. The expenditure on telegraphs was at present larger than the receipts from that source. Then, again, there was a very much larger expenditure than formerly upon the post office, and there was also the increase of interest in consequence of the increase of the debt. He could not but think it was a great mistake to have allowed the income tax to expire in 1865. Mr. Wilson, who, no doubt, did a great deal to reduce the expenditure and put the finances of India in order, to facilitate the arrangement of that tax, which was a matter of some delicacy, limited it to five years. The consequence had been that when the five years expired everyone cried out against the income tax, and the authorities in India had not the courage to re-impose it. If the income tax had been retained, even at 1 per cent, it would have given some considerable resources without inflicting any considerable burden. But it was objected to by the English in India, and to please them it was allowed to expire. He must say that, in his opinion, the English in India ought not to object to pay for the advantages which they enjoyed
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in pecuniary respects, and also in respect of position. Very many of them occupied higher positions there than they could have hoped to fill in this country. As regarded the Natives, the income tax only affected a small portion of them. There were only about 200,000 persons who paid the tax; and, of course, they said how unjust and abominable it was that the tax should be placed upon a few only and should leave the mass free from it. In many instances it touched the pockets of those who had hitherto paid scarcely any taxation; and hence the grievance. He thought that it was a most serious matter that we should do anything in India which had a tendency to increase our debt. We were a small number of people there, managing and controlling many millions; and when war, convulsion, and disturbance arose we could not expect to raise any material additional amount by taxation, but must borrow money in order to bring the disturbance to an end as quickly as possible. He held most strongly this—that the sound policy in India was that we should borrow for only thoroughly productive works, and that for all other works we should, as far as possible, make the year's income pay the year's expenditure. He thought that if this principle were acted upon, not in any narrow spirit, we should not only be able in the long run to do all that was really necessary for the welfare of the country, but should be able to pay our way with the income of the year. He did not deny that it was a wise policy to keep the income tax down as low as possible whilst the people of India protested against it. He thought that they very naturally protested against the administration of the Government at home and in India. It was felt that there were some items which were unfairly charged against the Revenue of India. Last year he protested against the charge made upon India in reference to the Abyssinian War; and now he would mention two or three other items. Some years ago there was established a telegraphic line of communication between England and India, and the whole expense of that line — upwards of £1,000,000—had been charged against the Revenue of India. That seemed to him to be very unjust. The advantage had been very great to England, and each country should have paid half the

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expense. In the nature of things, the line was one that would never pay. He thought also that the charge for supplying India with troops should not be higher than was absolutely necessary—that was, that the charge should be upon the lowest scale. Further, he did not see why India should pay anything on account of our establishment charges in China. All these items made up a large sum; but the question was not so much the amount of money as the feeling that the charges engendered in India. Whilst the Englishmen exiled in that country complained of the income tax, the whole people of India complained that novel taxes were levied upon them, and that in certain instances they were paying more than they should pay for charges in England; and these things caused great dissatisfaction.
Then the Statement respecting East India (Finance): And also, Papers relating to the levy of a Road and Educational Cess in Bengal: Severally presented (by command), and ordered to lie on the Table:
House adjourned at a quarter before Ten o'clock, till To-morrow, Three o'clock.