§ LORD CAIRNS, who had given Notice, to inquire of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether any further progress has been made in concluding the Treaty with France and Prussia as to the neutrality of Belgium; and, whether Her Majesty's Government can state the text of the Treaty?—said: My Lords, I was anxious yesterday to put the Question which stands in my name on the Paper for to-day, but I was prevented doing so by the absence of the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to whom I had been unable to give Notice in consequence of the early hour at which your Lordships met on that day. Your Lordships listened with great interest and attention to 1747 the statement made by the noble Earl on Monday night. I think I may answer for both sides of the House that as to a great part of that statement it was a satisfaction to your Lordships to receive the information contained in it. I cannot—although any approval on my part must be of little consequence—withhold my expression of approval at the object which Her Majesty's Government had in view in the negotiations in which they have been engaged—an object which has put an end to any doubts, if such could exist, that they are prepared to maintain the engagements of the Treaty of 1839—engagements which do not concern the honour more than they concern the interests of England. There is also, I think, no doubt that of all ways, that most calculated to avoid the dire necessity of war is to announce at the very commencement the intention of the Government on a matter of this kind—to allow it to be known that this country is determined to adhere to her engagements, and will treat any violation of the engagements of the other signatories, parties to the Treaty of 1839, as a just and proper cause of war. Having said this, I must go a little further, and express to your Lordships frankly and briefly some considerations which, have occurred to me with reference to the new engagement which has been proposed—considerations which to my mind appear to point to seeds of very considerable embarrassment and possible complication arising out of that engagement. Now, the signataries of the Treaty of 1839, putting aside Belgium, were five in number, and those five engaged, in words which are familiar to your Lordships, to maintain and defend the neutrality of Belgium. Two of those signataries are most unfortunately now engaged in war, and apprehensions are entertained that—whatever may be the intentions of those Governments at the present time—tho pressure of events, whether they desire it or not, may lead one of them, or, as has been suggested in the past few weeks, both of them, to forget the engagements of the Treaty of 1839, and to compromise or violate the neutrality of Belgium. Under those circumstances, that which would have been the natural course for this country to pursue is so obvious that I certainly think strong reasons ought to be given for departing from it. By the natural 1748 and obvious course, I mean the course which would have been taken if the Government of this country had made known—not by way of menace, but of information—to the two belligerent Powers that we bore in mind and were not unobservant of the obligations of the Treaty of 1839—that we were prepared to maintain those obligations, and that we should oppose any attempt of either or both of them to violate those obligations. And, at the same time that this information was convoyed, the natural course would have been to enter into communications with the remaining signataries of the Treaty who are not engaged in war—namely, the Court of St. Petersburg and the Court of Vienna—to inform them of the communication we had made to the belligerents, and to endeavour to arrange with them for an united course of action in contingencies that might arise. I cannot imagine that this course would have occasioned any delay greater than that necessary to accomplish an engagement such as is now proposed—I cannot imagine that it would have required more time to communicate with Russia and Austria than with France and Berlin. Nor can I see that the course I have indicated would have carried with it any threat or appearance of menace. The statement would have been made not to one of the belligerent Powers alone, but to both. It would not have assumed that there was any intention to disregard the obligations of the Treaty of 1839. It would have simply proceeded upon the natural assumption that when there was a warlike conflagration raging round a small protected territory, events might happen which would require the obligations of the Treaty of 1839 to be borne in mind and enforced. An obvious advantage, too, would have arisen from such a course. England and the two other neutral Powers, acting together, would have been free from any possibility of suspicion of siding with or favouring either of the belligerents. They would have stood aloof as neutral Powers, prepared to do no more than maintain the obligations of the Treaty by which they were bound, and they would not have been chargeable under any circumstances with the inconvenience of entering into fresh and new engagements with either or both of the belligerent Powers. That being, as I venture to think, the natural course 1749 which matters should have taken, allow me to state very briefly what I have termed the elements of danger that I cannot help foreseeing in the engagement which is proposed. In the first place, the arrangement, as we are given to understand it, is this—that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one of the belligerents, we are to engage ourselves to co-operate with the other belligerent, and the other belligerent is to engage to co-operate with us. I do not forget the limit or proviso, which I will refer to in a moment; but at first sight we are engaged to make common cause in that contingency with one of the belligerents. We thereupon cease to maintain in any sense the position of a neutral Power, or that of a neutral Power engaged merely in defence of the neutrality of Belgium; we become identified in the eye of the other belligerent and in the eye of the country of the other belligerent as allied with the first belligerent, with all the traditions and all the consequences which arise from taking part with one of two highly excited nations. We join that one nation, and I fear we leave behind that act on our part a train of bitter memories which it might require a great length of time to efface. If I mention the names of one or other of the countries to which I refer, I hope it will not be supposed that I am anticipating on the part of one or of the other any actual violation of the Treaty of 1839; but supposing such a thing were to happen—suppose the Treaty were to be violated by France, we become bound to take part with Prussia—we are arrayed in arms with Prussia in this great contest against France. Now, do you suppose that in such case, the French people, intelligent and ingenious as they are, will carefully discriminate and boar in mind the fact, that we allied with Prussia merely to defend the neutrality of Belgium, and that they will not look upon us as partners with Prussia, and as making common cause with it to all intents and purposes? If, on the other hand, the violator of the Treaty be Prussia, and we are to unite with France, do you suppose that the people of Germany, who are at this moment showing themselves eager enough to watch the least symptom of a departure from neutrality on our part, would discriminate as to the object and purposes for which we unite with France, and that 1750 they will not look upon us simply as allies of France in a war against themselves, and that all the traditions and all the train of angry memories which such a course naturally excites will not arise? More than this. In the position which I have attempted to describe there is an end to all power on the part of England to interpose at any part of the contest and say—"Our only object is to protect the neutrality of Belgium. We have no interest in the war." On the contrary, England would have become to all intents and purposes one of the belligerents, and counsels or suggestions of that kind from us would be extremely unlikely to be listened to. I will go further. I said I had not forgotten the proviso as to the extent to which we are to co-operate with the other belligerent Power in the event of the neutrality of Belgium being violated by one of them. The arrangement, as I understand, is that if one of the belligerents should violate the neutrality of Belgium we should engage to join the other, but should not be bound to co-operate with the other for the general purposes of the war. Now, I ask, how a co-operation of that kind could possibly happen?—how the co-operation of England could be limited in its extent and ambit to the mere object of maintaining the neutrality of Belgium, and could be prevented from going beyond that, and to the general operations of the war? Look at the position of the two co-operating Powers, England and the belligerent which she will join. Their objects will be as different as any two objects can be. The object of England will be to interpose to maintain the neutrality of Belgium and there stop. The object of the belligerent which she will join will be altogether different. It will be to humble, to strike at its enemy, to inflict the most serious blow which could be inflicted upon the other belligerent with which it was engaged in a death struggle. What would be the consequences? You would have two Powers co-operating with different and antagonistic objects. You would have them at constant variance as to whether any particular strategic operation was required—whether it was all that was required for the preservation of the neutrality of Belgium, or whether it did not go beyond such preservation of neutrality and launch out into some general object of the war. 1751 Yon would have divided counsels, antagonistic schemes—you would have that which would be of all things that can be supposed fatal to the harmony of the two co-operating Powers, and disastrous to the accomplishment of any good result from that co-operation. Then I go further. If England were to interpose alone, or interpose in union with the two other neutral Powers, Austria and Russia, and to interpose merely for the purpose of maintaining the engagements of the Treaty of 1839, you would have—I will not say, a very strong prospect, but, at all events, a reasonable prospect of localizing any war which unfortunately might become necessary — you would, have some prospect of confining military operations, first, to the purpose in view — namely, to protect Belgium, and nest to the locality which was principally concerned, the locality immediately contiguous to Belgium. But the moment you go beyond this and enter into an engagement to join one of the belligerents in a course of operations which it has in hand, it becomes necessary that the other belligerent, for its own defence—for its own success in the war in which it is engaged, should treat England so joining its antagonist as a Power which it must strike at, which it must humble; upon which, if possible, it must inflict an injury in every part of the world where an injury can be inflicted upon this country. So that, in place of any chance of localizing the struggle, you of necessity extend its limits to whatever part of the world English power and English dominion may reach. The next observation I have to make is this. Since England, in case of the violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one belligerent, is to join the other, you make it the object of each belligerent to obtain the alliance of England, and its co-operation against its rival. The co-operation of England is to depend on the simple fact of the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. Now, I can conceive nothing more likely than that a skilful politician, or an ingenious strategist, would be able without very great difficulty so to arrange matters on behalf of one of the belligerent Powers that it would become absolutely necessary for the other belligerent to commit some act which would be a violation of that neutrality; and then, the moment that that act was done, 1752 the co-operation of England is secured to that belligerent who has caused and necessitated the very act of which we complain. I ask your Lordships what would be the effect on public opinion in this country if anything of the kind occurred? Suppose one of the belligerents, by this ingenuity—which I think would, not be very difficult—succeeded in making it necessary for the other belligerent, for the sake of its own preservation, to do some act which would be a violation of the neutrality of Belgium; and suppose the people of this country should see, as they certainly would, that the real offender was not the belligerent who actually and mechanically violated the neutrality, but the other, who made that act necessary; what would the country say if it found the Government engaging us in a war on behalf of and in co-operation with that belligerent which was morally the guilty party in the transaction? The next observation I have to make is this—the engagement seems to me to be one entirely useless. If both the belligerents should violate the neutrality of Belgium, it would have no operation. If, on the other hand, only one violates the neutrality, and if we are to engage in hostile operations in consequence of that act, we should always, without the least difficulty, without any previous engagements, be perfectly sure of securing the co-operation of the other if we should wish for it, and if the terms upon which we should be willing to accept it were agreed upon between us. Hence it is useless in the one case and superfluous in the other. Then I ask your Lordships to consider what effect it may have upon the acts and engagements of Russia and Austria. If the neutrality of Belgium should be violated, and if this country should assort—as it would assert—tho engagements of the Treaty of 1839, and if we then applied to Austria and Russia to join us, I can quite well understand that we might expect to secure their co-operation for the purpose of maintaining engagements to which they were bound as well as ourselves. But enter into an arrangement of this kind—let the same thing be attempted, and appeal to Austria to join us in enforcing the Treaty. I can understand Austria replying—"We admit that we are bound by the Treaty of 1839, and we should have been very glad to co-operate with 1753 you in maintaining its obligations; but you have entered into another engagement, in consequence of which"—supposing France was the violator—"you have agreed to co-operate with Germany, and now you are about to enforce the engagements of the Treaty of 1839 in co-operation with Germany. We should be quite willing to co-operate with you if you acted, as we should act, simply as neutrals in the quarrel; but if you are going to co-operate with Prussia we decline to act upon that policy, and we therefore will not give our adhesion." I gathered from the statement of the noble Earl (Earl Granville) that a communication had been made to Austria and Russia, and that, though no formal answer had been obtained, such communications as we have had were satisfactory. Now, I have no doubt Austria and Russia will not think it necessary to protest against this arrangement; but it is one thing to abstain from protesting—it is one tiling to use civil expressions with regard to it—it is another thing to say—"We toll you distinctly that we shall not allow this engagement in any way to interfere with our obligation to co-operate with you, if you desire it, in maintaining the Treaty of 1839." I will not say more than that I greatly fear there are at this part of the case the seeds of difficulty which possibly may lead other Powers to take a different view of the obligations of 1839 than they would otherwise have done. I have now, with a brevity befitting the day and hour, pointed out—I hope in no spirit of criticism beyond that which my sense of duty makes me feel necessary—the doubts which I entertain with regard to the Treaty. I desire to repeat most amply, however, my great pleasure at the object which the Government had in view, and the spirit they showed in undertaking this fresh engagement. The difficulties I feel are as to the mode in which it has been done, not as to the object for which it has been done; and I shall be very glad if the text of the Treaty will remove any of those difficulties. For my own part, there is nothing I should hear with greater pleasure from the noble Earl, whose answer I cannot anticipate, than that circumstances had arisen which prevented the consummation of this fresh engagement. If, however, the difficulties I feel are not removed by the text of the Treaty, and if the engagement 1754 is one which is actually to be consummated, I can only express a further wish, in which I am sure your Lordships, whatever you may think of what I have said, will all agree with mo—that wish is, that circumstances may never arise which will render it necessary for those engagements to be put in operation.
§ EARL GRANVILLEMy Lords, I have heard the speech of my noble and learned Friend (Lord Cairns) with a feeling of very great relief. I expected—and my expectations have certainly been justified—that he would speak with that reserve and fairness towards the Government on a great international question which he was likely to exhibit on such an occasion; but I knew also that, with regard to the particular form of the proposal, every possible objection to it would be exhausted by the ability and the skill of the noble and learned Lord, and I am much relieved at finding what those objections seem to be. The noble and learned Lord very fairly stated what course ought, in his judgment, to have been pursued by Her Majesty's Government. He said we should have entered into no engagement whatever, but have declared, without any menace to the belligerents, our determination to maintain the neutrality of Belgium. Now, I ventured the other day, with regard to the question of menace, to say that I believed the form in which we had put it was less menacing and less offensive to those Powers than any other way in which it could have been put. I will venture to explain my meaning. It is mainly a matter as to form, and not as to substance—because if there were a difference of substance I should own we had put ourselves in the wrong. It is sometimes useful to compare the action of nations and that of individuals, and very often the conduct of a high-spirited nation and of an honourable man is very much the same. I will suppose that one of your Lordships found two persons about to engage in a duel, and at once declared to them both the obligation he would feel under to strike the one who took an unfair part in that duel. I believe that would be regarded by both as an imputation upon their intentions, and might almost encourage them to do that which otherwise they would have thought wrong by being precluded from doing it by menace. But if, instead of that, the third person says 1755 to each—"You say, as I have every reason to believe, you mean to fight without any unfair play whatever; but you express a suspicion that fair play will not be exhibited by the person with whom you are engaged in hostilities. If it is any pleasure to you that I should agree with you to strike your opponent if he begins unfair play, I will do so; but, mind, this is a bargain which I must offer to the other equally." I believe that exactly in proportion as they were confident of their own good faith and suspicious of the bad faith of their opponent they would accept, as France and Prussia have accepted, the proposal so made to them. The noble and learned Lord says we ought, without menace, to have told them what we were going to do, and then, he says, you should have strengthened yourselves by going to the other great Powers parties to the guarantee of 1839; and this, he says, would have strengthened our position. Now, the facts as they have happened show that the course which he suggests would not have been successful. I stated the other day that we had received the most friendly assurances from both Russia and Austria. Now, it is rather curious that we have since received from Austria her distinct readiness to agree to our proposal, supposing that France and Prussia do not object to sign the Treaty. So that with regard to Austria we have exactly secured the very promise and consent to our proposal which she would not have given to a single menace on our part. From Russia we have received the most friendly assurances; but there is certainly a disinclination on the part of Russia to accede to this proposal; because Russia considers, and says that the original Treaty binds them, and they would wish to have an understanding of a much wider description—on the merits of which I do not now say one word, one way or the other, but which understanding would certainly bring us under obligations we do not hold at this moment. Russia would, therefore, in the same manner, have refused simply and solely to join us in a single menace with regard to the neutrality of Belgium. These facts show that the course advocated by the noble and learned Lord would not have been the most judicious one. But then he says we put ourselves in a great difficulty if the case should arise. Now, I cannot help again pointing 1756 out to your Lordships that, being bound by the obligations of that Treaty, we must, if the contingency arises, act upon those obligations. We are not now in a position like that described by a Conservative Government, when we joined in a Treaty guaranteeing Luxemburg, and when, almost before the ink with which it was signed was dry, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of this country announced, to the surprise of France and the indignation of Prussia, that we had signed it as a collective guarantee, and that as the co-operation of the other Powers was the only case in which the guarantee could possibly be brought into question, England had brought itself under no new obligation at all. I admit that there is this disadvantage about the present engagement, that if the contingency should arise—which God forbid!—and which I do not believe will arise—we should be obliged to act upon our engagements. Being, however, so obliged, I cannot conceive that it would not be an enormous advantage to have a Power with 500,000 or 600,000 soldiers co-operating with our Army and fleet. The noble and learned Lord has made a most ingenious supposition—one very much like a game of chess I have seen, where a very superior player tells his adversary he will force him again and again not to be checkmated, but to checkmate himself. I could hardly understand why the noble and learned Lord did not describe what the ingenious scheme was that should enable one belligerent to force the other to commit that particular outrage which would necessarily increase the forces of his enemy by the power, the wealth, and the public spirit of such a country as that to which we belong. I take it that if either army were driven by a defeat to the frontier of Belgium, and obliged for their own safety to seek shelter there, it would be no violation of neutrality, for if they submitted to be disarmed there would be absolutely no infraction of the neutrality which they had guaranteed. The noble and learned Lord says we might be driven into war by the action of either one or both the belligerents. Now, I think I have stated enough to show that even if either of them were not restrained by the fear of this country, the fear of this country joining with their enemy would certainly prevent them from taking a step of that 1757 character. It is a case I should hardly have put had it not been suggested—though, I admit, in very courteous terms—by the noble and learned Lord to both those nations; but suppose, he says, both violate the neutrality, that absolves us from the obligations of the Treat}', and it then falls to the ground. It would certainly place us in one of the most awkward positions I could possibly conceive; but I really think that, right as it is to look with suspicion in the interests of our own country upon all possible designs of any other country, for us to fear that two Powers, after a solemn renewal of an engagement such as this, binding on the personal honour of the Emperor of the French and the King of Prussia, should, within a very few months, in the face of the whole world, desert such an engagement, requires too strong an effort of the imagination. I am quite sure, my Lords, that this Treaty, which has for its principal object the neutrality and independence of Belgium, is likely to be effectual, and will prevent the occurrence of that particular event which would be most disagreeable and most entangling to Great Britain. As to this instrument in the slightest degree weakening the effect of the previous Treaty of 1839, I entirely deny it. There is an express reservation of that Treaty; and, besides that, as I mentioned, the other day, there is an exact precedent to this case. The seventh Article of the General Treaty of Paris, of March 30, 1856, between England, France, Austria, Italy, Prussia, and Russia, stipulates as follows—I am afraid I must read it in French, as I have no other copy by me—
Leurs Majestés s'engagent, chacune de son coté, à respecter l'indépendance et l'integrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman; garantissent on commun la stricte observation de cet engagement, et considéront on conséquence tout acte de nature à y porter atteinte comme une question d'intérêt général.But a fortnight after this, without any event of importance having intervened, England, Austria, and France signed, on the 16th of April following a separate treaty, by the first Article of which—Les Hautes Parties contractantes garantissent solidairement entre elles l'indépendence et l'intégrite do l'Empire Ottoman conservés par le Traité conclu à Paris 30 Mars, 1856.This, I say, is a most complete precedent, and justifies us in saying that the Treaty now almost concluded does not in the 1758 slightest degree weaken the guarantee, whatever that may be, which was given by the Treaty of 1839. There is one point on which I have heard some objection, though the good sense of the noble and learned Lord induced him, I presume, to reject it—which is that the way in which we have acted is a disrespect to Belgium and almost an infraction of her independence. Now, if so, I admit that it was done after consideration and advisedly. We thought that in the very delicate and difficult situation of so small a country between two such powerful belligerents, having once asserted her intention to maintain her neutrality and independence, and having received assurance from both parties that that neutrality and independence should not be violated, it was better for her not to put forward proposals, risking refusals from one or both of the belligerents—refusals which would not have signified to a great country like ours, but might be extremely awkward for a small country like Belgium. As soon as the negotiations had reached a certain point, I officially informed the Belgian Government of the course I had pursued and the character of what had been done. I further pointed out that in the draft Treaty I have avoided bringing in her name, but said they would understand that all was intended to be done in practical harmony with Belgium, that we should count upon her support, and that our sole object was the independence and neutrality of that country. Your Lordships will see that at all events the Belgian Government has felt no resentment at what has been done by the few eloquent words used by the King at the opening of the Belgian Chambers, and by the enthusiastic reception which those words met from all parties. I trust that this Treaty will not come into effect. I believe it will not. But as far as it has gone, and as far as the judgment of Her Majesty's Government is concerned, we thought it the best manner of preventing that great difficulty which has excited so much alarm and anxiety both in this country and to foreign nations.
§ LORD CAIRNSThe noble Earl has not stated what progress has been made with the Treaty, and whether he can give its text.
§ EARL GRANVILLEThe Treaty with Prussia was signed by Count Bernstoff and myself yesterday, and I was also in- 1759 formed yesterday by the French Ambassador that he had authority to sign as soon as the full powers arrived. I have not the slightest objection to read the text. Of course I read only one Treaty, as the other, mutatis mutandis, is identical with it—
§ "DRAFT OF TREATY BETWEEN ENGLAND AND "PRUSSIA RESPECTING BELGIUM.
§ "Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the King of Prussia, being desirous at the present time of recording in a solemn act their fixed determination to maintain the independence and neutrality of Belgium, as provided in the VIIth Article of the Treaty signed at London on the 19th of April, 1839, between Belgium and the Netherlands, which Article was declared by the Quintuple Treaty of 1839 to be considered as having the same force and value as if textually inserted in the said Quintuple Treaty, their said Majesties have determined to conclude between themselves a separate Treaty, which, without impairing or invalidating the conditions of the said Quintuple Treaty, shall be subsidiary and accessory to it; and they have accordingly named as their Plenipotentiaries for that purpose, that is to say:—
§ "Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, &c.
§ "And His Majesty the King of Prussia, &c.
§ "Who, after having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:—
§ "Art. I. His Majesty the King of Prussia having declared that, notwithstanding the hostilities in which the North German Confederation is now engaged with France, it is his fixed determination to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as the same shall be respected by France; Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, on her part, declares that if during the said hostilities the armies of France should violate that neutrality, she will be prepared to co-operate with His Prussian Majesty for the defence of the same in such manner as may be mutually agreed upon, employing for that purpose her naval and military forces to insure its observance; and to maintain, in conjunction with His Prussian Majesty, then and thereafter, the independence and neutrality of Belgium.
§ "It is clearly understood that Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland does not engage herself by this Treaty to take part in any of the general operations of the war now carried on between the North German Confederation and France beyond the limits of Belgium as defined in the Treaty between Belgium and the Netherlands of April 19, 1839.
§ "Art. II. His Majesty the King of Prussia agrees on his part, in the event provided for in the foregoing Article, to co-operate with Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, employing his naval and military forces for the purpose aforesaid; and, the case arising, to concert with Her Majesty the measures which shall be taken, separately or in common, to secure the neutrality and independence of Belgium.
1760§ "Art. III. This Treaty shall be binding on the High Contracting Parties during the continuance of the present war between the North German Confederation and France, and for twelve months after the ratification of any Treaty of Peace concluded between those parties; and on the expiration of that time the independence and neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the High Contracting Parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest as heretofore on the Ist Article of the Quintuple Treaty of the 19th of April, 1839.
§ Art. IV. The present Treaty shall be ratified."
§ VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFEI wish, my Lords, to say a few words upon this important subject—and few they must be, in the present most critical state of affairs, and when Parliament is on the very brink of Prorogation. My excuse for speaking at all at such a moment is the connection I have held during many years with questions like that which is now under consideration. As far as I can judge from hearing the text of the intended Treaty read casually, as one may say, by the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, care seems to have been taken to avoid any of the risks and embarrassments pointed out by my noble and learned Friend (Lord Cairns). It is not my intention to enter into the comparative merits of the plans adopted by Her Majesty's Government, and that which the noble and learned Lord would have preferred. What strikes me as manifest is that we are greatly indebted to the Government for the care they have taken to meet the requirements of the honour and interest of the country by redeeming the pledges which were given in the Treaty of April, 1839, at the same time that they have endeavoured to guard us from the danger of being eventually involved in the horrors and calamities of war. I must be allowed, however, to take a more comprehensive view of the matter. To anyone who looks beyond passing circumstances to the whole extent and results of the war, considerations may readily occur which it would be well to bear in mind. I cannot doubt that, while standing to our guarantee of Belgian independence and neutrality without prejudice to our desire of remaining at peace, it is the object of Her Majesty's Ministers no less than the feeling of the country that we should keep in our hands as far as possible the means of limiting the range and continuance of the war, and of tendering our mediation with good effect whenever 1761 the opportunity occurs. Supposing that I either of the two great parties now opposed to each other should obtain an ascendancy dangerous to the balance of power in Europe, and even to the very existence of some independent States, it would surely be desirable that our position should be such as to offer a limit to the excessive pretensions of victory. Now, I conceive, that with such purposes; in view, Her Majesty's Government would have found it advantageous to communicate with Austria and Russia before they committed themselves to any decided course of proceeding. What, in fact, was their position with respect to the Treaty when all hopes of peace between the two opponents had ceased? There were five parties to the engagement which declared and guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium. Two of them—namely, France and Prussia—are belligerents; the other three—Great Britain, Austria, and Russia—are neutrals. Each belligerent gave formal assurance to Belgium that he would respect its neutrality, provided it were respected by the other. The King of the Belgians declared on his side that he would maintain his neutrality with all the force at has disposal. So far all was satisfactory. England and the other two neutral guarantees remained. Here I must confess that in my very humble opinion it would have been better, looking to the contingencies of war, if an attempt had been made to unite our own plain course of duty with that which seemed to devolve equally upon Austria and Russia. In this manner we might have kept clear of whatever risks and inconveniences may possibly arise in carrying out the new Treaty, and also, perhaps, have laid the foundation of a more complete understanding with both those Powers as to offers of mediation at any convenient juncture, and also as to the means of preserving Europe from any great and dangerous disturbance of its present settlement at the close of the war. It appears that there would have been little or no difficulty in making such an arrangement. Austria, we are told, has already consented to adopt the provisions of the Treaty; and Russia, although not yet quite up to the same mark, has I shown, as I understand from the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville), her good disposition in the matter. The proposal which I should have been glad, to see 1762 made to those Powers might have assumed a very simple form. Its terms need only have expressed a joint recognition of their duty to maintain the neutrality of Belgium in every fitting emergency, to the full extent of their available means. Such a declaration could not possibly have given any offence—certainly, no just offence—to either of the belligerents, for it would have been nothing more than the complement of what they had themselves declared, in virtue of those long-standing engagements to which both they and the neutral signataries of the London Treaty were parties. Other neutral Powers of less magnitude might, in due season, have rallied round this point of union, and helped to give motives of moderation to that belligerent whose eventual triumph in arms might naturally enough suggest extravagant conditions of peace. In submitting these impressions to your Lordships, I beg to disclaim all intention of casting blame upon Her Majesty's Government. The view which I have taken of the question may be altogether erroneous; but I thought that, as Parliament was to be immediately prorogued, it might not be unseasonable for those who have been personally conversant with matters of this kind to express an opinion in public, and I trust, my Lords, that you will kindly forgive this brief intrusion upon your time.
§ EARL GRANVILLEI only wish to say one word on my noble Friend's remarks. Her Majesty's Government did communicate the proposal both to the Russian and Austrian Ambassadors within an hour after it was made to France and Prussia.
§ THE DUKE OF CLEVELANDI confess that when I heard of this Treaty I had a very great objection to it, for it seemed to me that the Treaty, though limited in duration, cast some slur upon the Treaty of 1839; but now, having heard the explanations of my noble Friend at the head of the Foreign Office, my objection is not so strong as it was at first. I thought, with others, it was desirable that the Government should make it known that it was their express determination to maintain the Treaty of 1839, which is still binding on this and other countries. But in my opinion it is desirable to have some instrument defining our obligations with more distinctness than the Treaty of 1839, as doubts 1763 have more than once been entertained as to the precise nature of those obligations, and we shall be thrown back upon that Treaty when the term of the present Treaty expires. Some doubt may in future arise as to the mode in which the Treaty is really operative, and I should have preferred some instrument of a permanent character, respecting which no doubts could arise—a Treaty entered into by the same great Powers, including the belligerents. I am, of course, not acquainted with the negotiations which have taken place. Austria has signified her intention to stand by her obligations; but I do not know what Russia will do. Perhaps she thinks the Treaty of 1839 sufficiently binding; and the other signatary Powers will probably entertain the same opinion. If any new instrument were necessary, it should have been merely a defining and declaratory one; and I agree with the noble Viscount that efforts should have been made to obtain the adhesion of other neutral Powers. I sincerely hope Her Majesty's Government have not tied their hands by entering into this fresh Treaty; for, if such is the case, their course of action will be limited, should any future necessity for action arise. It is difficult to define, in an engagement like the present, how far our obligations extend, and to what mode of action we were bound. It is not for us to incur any fresh obligations; while, at the same time, it is not for us to say that we have no interest in any part of the Continent, especially as regards the support of the smaller and neutral Powers. It is of great importance to us, politically as well as commercially, that Belgium and Holland should be maintained as independent Powers, and that two important Empires like France and Germany should not be entirely coterminous. I do not apprehend any danger on this head, especially now that the honour of two great countries is pledged. The Government have acted wisely in providing for the security of Belgium, though, as I have said, a different course might have offered a better permanent security, which in these times of change it would have been desirable to obtain. I wish to take this opportunity of expressing my satisfaction that the Government have not altered the existing law with regard to munitions of war. It would have been a very injudicious 1764 act, and one which would have created much rancour in France, to interfere with the export of coal, which though ancipitis usûs, is an article of commerce between the two countries.
§ THE EARL OF SHAFTESBURYSurely the Session ought not to close without an expression of thanks to Her Majesty's Government for the dignified and patriotic course they have pursued in this great and trying emergency. Perhaps I am not in a position to be the person to come forward to tender those thanks; but my feeling is so very strong that it overcomes my prudence. I cannot but come forward and say how deeply grateful I feel for the course they have taken in the face of such great dangers. I may add an expression of my hope and of my firm belief that the people of this country will sustain the Government in a course that is essential to the discharge of their duty to the interests and to the safety of the British Empire.
§ LORD REDESDALEthought that England should not have entered into any separate engagement, but should have adhered to the Treaty of 1839, unless assured that the former would be accepted by all the parties to the latter. In case of a violation of the neutrality of Belgium he did not see how they were to act, for they had no force there, and were debarred from exercising any force elsewhere.
§ LORD REDESDALEunderstood they were bound to act within the territory of Belgium.
§ EARL GRANVILLENo.
§ LORD REDESDALEurged that it would be extremely awkward if they had to take action without the full co-operation of Russia, as he feared would be the case.
LORD DENMANhoped the Government, instead of arranging for a triangular duel, would do their utmost to restore peace. There was no passage in history which he more admired than the great scheme of Henry the Great, by which a police of all nations might have been established to prevent war. He hoped that directly the least appearance of equality appeared, that an armistice might be established; and there had never been a juncture at which agreement could more easily be obtained with 1765 justice to all parties, so far as the true object of an Œcumenical Council was attainable.