MINISTERIAL STATEMENT. (Hansard, 8 August 1870)

§ EARL GRANVILLE

My Lords, I rise in pursuance of the pledge which I gave the other day, that I would make a statement to your Lordships in reference to the important subject of the neutrality of Belgium. I should have very much preferred laying the Papers on the Table first and subsequently making the statement; but the end of the Session is so very near, and I understand that many of your Lordships are intending to leave London to-morrow. I think it is fairer, therefore, that I should make my statement at the earliest opportunity; and I may add that it is a statement which it would have been impossible for me to make at the last Sitting of the House. With regard to the Papers, I can only say that I shall take all the requisite steps for their being laid on the Table, in order that they may be distributed to your Lordships as soon as it can be done with propriety. It is unnecessary to remind your Lordships that not only the outbreak of the present hostilities, but also certain incidents accompanying them have excited a great deal of anxiety not only in Belgium and in other neutral States of Europe, but also in this country, and that a position of things existed which made it impossible for Her Majesty's Government to remain in a perfectly quiescent state, relying merely on the obligations they had contracted in former times. There were several courses 1672 which might have been taken. There was one thing which we from the first were determined not to do. We were quite determined not to make useless complaints—not to deal in vague threats or indefinite menaces. We might have taken an exactly opposite course. We might have explained to the country and to foreign nations that we did not think this country was bound either morally or internationally, or that its interests were concerned in the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium. Though this course might have had some conveniences—though it might have been easy to adhere to it—though it might have saved us from some immediate danger—it is a course which Her Majesty's Government thought it impossible to adopt in the name of the country, with any due regard to the country's honour and to the country's interests. Another course would have been that, maintaining our obligations such as they are described in the Treaty of 1839, we might have simply made a declaration of the determination of this country to resist any interference with the neutrality of Belgium by force of arms. Now, in the first place, such a declaration would have been a direct menace to the Powers who are now engaged in hostilities; in the second place, it would have given an appearance of isolation to our policy; and, in the third place, I do not believe it was the course best calculated to prevent that particular event which we wish to avoid. Your Lordships may ask why, if we rejected this expedient, we did not propose to all the neutral States—at all events to all those who are connected in the same Treaty as ourselves—to make a joint declaration to the belligerents to the same effect. Your Lordships, however, have already had painful experience of the fact that time is a very important element in matters of this kind. It would have been impossible to calculate the time which would have been required for negotiating with those several States, even if they were quite ready to meet our wishes. The exact terms of such an arrangement, how far it was to go, and in what manner it was to be carried out, would have occupied time which it was impossible to calculate. We took a different course. I was authorized by a Cabinet Council held on Saturday week, the 30th of July, to write to both of the belligerents to this effect. I wrote to 1673 France and to the Court of Berlin in the same terms mutatis mutandis. We said Her Majesty's Government had already expressed their satisfaction with the assurance we had received from Trance, that the Emperor intended to respect the neutrality of Belgium. We said we had received the same assurance from the other belligerent. We added that we thought there could not be a doubt of the duty of both those countries to maintain the obligations of the Treaty which they had severally entered into in common with ourselves and with other countries; but we had observed that in the declaration of both that the promise was conditional on the other belligerent not violating it, and we could not help gathering from that, that, in the opinion of each, such an assurance was not one of a complete character. We, therefore, proposed to each that if they wished to give a more patent proof to the world of their intention, or wished for a clearer assurance from us that we meant to maintain the independence of Belgium, we were ready either to enter into a Treaty or in some solemn instrument to record our common determination. We communicated the proposal to the representatives of Austria and Russia in this country; and, at the same time, we sent it to our representatives at the Courts of both the belligerents and to the neutrals who are parties to this Treaty. I confess I regret that we had not been able to obtain their previous consent; but time was so precious, and our proposal is so much in accordance with the policy which we believe they wish to pursue, that we had no doubt of their concurring in what we had done. I can only add that we have had no direct answer except telegraphic messages from those Courts, but as far as they go Her Majesty's Government think the assurances are of a satisfactory character. With regard to France, she accepted the principle of the new Treaty we proposed; but she desired to make some modifications in its wording, in order, it was stated, to avoid misunderstanding. Her Majesty's Government were not able to accede to any alteration in the draft Treaty itself, but we willingly gave those explanations which we believed in our own mind expressed the simple and clear meaning of the Treaty; and we have every reason to believe that those explanations will remove all objections on the part of 1674 France to signing it. We are in hourly expectation of an answer from that Government. With regard to Prussia, I heard nothing till Friday, the 5th of August; but on the morning of that day Count Bernstorff told me he had received a message from Count Bismarck, who had left Berlin in order to be present at the head-quarters of the King. Count Bismarck, he told mo, had stated that he had not up to that time received any proposal from Lord Augustus Loftus; but he added that he should be ready to concur in any measure which would strengthen the neutrality of Belgium, though he could only give a general assent until he was acquainted with the document itself. Later in the same day Count Bismarck telegraphed that he had received from Count Bernstorff a summary of the draft Treaty, that he had submitted it to the King, and that His Majesty had authorized him to agree to it. Still later on the same day another telegram reached London, saying that the proposal itself had arrived, with the draft Treaty, and that he authorized Count Bernstorff to sign it as soon as the full powers which were being sent to him reached this country. The heads of the Treaty are these—It reserves all the obligations of the Treaty of 1839; it provides that if the armies of either belligerent violate the neutrality of Belgium, Great Britain will co-operate with the other in defending that neutrality, but docs not engage to take part in the general operations of the present war between them; and a corresponding co-operation is pledged by the other parties. The Treaty is to held good for 12 months after the ratification of a Treaty of peace between the two belligerents. I do not wish to enter into any argument on this question; but, perhaps, your Lordships will allow me to state one or two of the objects which we have proposed to ourselves in taking this course. We believe it would be impossible to give a clearer announcement of our determination on this matter; and yet, while we give it positively and clearly, your Lordships will agree that we do so without menace, or without anything offensive to the two belligerents, with whom we are still in friendly alliance. We think, moreover, that it is calculated to prevent, both politically and strategically, that event which we particularly wished, to avoid, and we trust that it is calculated to increase con- 1675 fidence and calm the alarm which has certainly been felt for some days past with regard to a question to which England attaches the greatest possible importance. I am aware that objections may be raised to the course which we have taken, as there might have been to any possible course which we could have selected. There is one objection which I believe is entirely without foundation—namely, that the very fact of this Treaty which we propose being entered into will in the slightest degree impair the obligations of the Treaty of 1839. Those obligations we have expressly reserved in the words of this Treaty. I may remind your Lordships, too, that within the last 20 years a most important Treaty was entered into by some of the greatest Powers of Europe, and that only a fortnight after, without any intervening event whatever, three of them entered into an obligation to defend by arms the guarantee which they had previously given by a Treaty more numerously signed. I have not thought it right to trouble your Lordships with any argument in the matter. I hope I have said enough to show that Her Majesty's Government have not been indifferent, and that they have not been idle in trying to maintain the position which this country ought to held with regard to this great and important question.