HL Deb 13 May 1869 vol 196 cc689-703

Amendment reported (according to Order).


commented on the impolicy of disturbing arrangements in important affairs only a few years after those arrangements had been made. Now, he was not aware that any circumstances had arisen which should induce the Government to bring forward this measure, making great and important alterations in the Government of India. That Government had been established after great deliberation first in the House of Commons and afterwards in their Lordships' House. It was only eleven years since that great measure had passed, and he had not heard of anything that had happened since that time from which it could be inferred that the system then established had in any way obstructed or seriously delayed the course of Public-Business; on the contrary, he had always understood that the Council of India was regarded as an admirable vehicle for the conduct of public affairs. He could see no reason therefore for this important change. The great object of the Act of 1858 was to render the members of the Council independent by giving them a tenure of their office for life. The framers of the present Bill seemed to have a fear of the undue longevity of the members of the Council, and therefore proposed to alter the life tenure by making the members elective for ten years, with power of re-election tinder peculiar circumstances for five years more. Now, there was no doubt a great advantage in having an infusion of fresh blood into the Council of India, as well as in other institutions; but he did not believe that would be gained by giving a tenure of office for ten years, for in this case an appointment for ten years must be much the same as an appointment for life. Therefore, the change was not, as far as he could see, accompanied by any corresponding benefit. He did not understand the grounds on which the noble Duke proposed to make these great alterations in the Government of India. Alterations made in important matters in rapid succession must tend to impair the confidence of the public in the legislative wisdom of Parliament. It seemed to him as if they were treating the great interests of the country as children treated a house of cards. No sooner was a system got into working order and was promoting the public good than a Minister came forward to suggest great and extensive alterations. It seemed as if a Constitution was intended for nothing else but to be mended. He believed this was highly prejudicial to the public interests. It destroyed confidence in public men; and therefore he must say "Not-content" to the measure.


said, the professed object of the Bill was to provide a quicker succession of Indian councillors, and he concurred in the desirability—India being in a condition of such rapid change—of having councillors possessed of recent knowledge of the country. He proposed, however, that instead of effecting that object by the means proposed in the Bill—that the Council should be partly elected and partly nominated—all the members should be nominated directly by the Crown, and would move an Amendment having that effect. This suggestion he offered on the second reading, but the noble Duke did not appear to understand him, his reply being that though he could work with a smaller Council he saw no need to reduce its number. Now, he (the Marquess of Salisbury) did not himself think the number too large, bearing in mind that much of the routine work must be done by them; but it would be more consistent with the practice in other Departments of the State that all these officers should be appointed by the Crown. This was the opinion of Lord Palmerston and of Lord Derby at the time the system was first proposed; and the opinion which was ultimately adopted, that a portion of the Council should be elected, was adopted only for the sake of getting rid of what was, at the time, a great political difficulty. It was considered highly desirable that a change so important in the constitution of the Council of India should not have to encounter the opposition of the Directors of the East India Company, and to get rid of their opposition the present plan, which was their suggestion, was adopted. But the reason for this state of things had long passed away, and he would not act upon the opinion originally entertained by all the statesmen of the day if he would not take the advice of the late Viceroy of India (Lord Lawrence), who sat behind him, and provide in this Bill that the Crown, through the Secretary of State, should nominate all the members of the Council.

Amendment moved to omit "elected or."—(The Marquess of Salisbury.)


said, he agreed with the noble Karl (the Earl of Ellenborough) that it was undesirable, unless there were strong reasons for it, to make extensive changes in settlements of important questions effected at a comparatively recent period. On this ground alone he would object to the Amendment of the noble Marquess. He attached some value, moreover, to the provision that part of the Council should be elective rather than nominated by the Crown, for he thought the elective principle materially contributed to the importance of the office, and the estimation in which retired Indians held it. While not desiring to increase the emoluments of the office, the Government were anxious not to detract from the consideration in which it was held; for distinguished men were often induced to accept it on that account rather than out of regard to mere pecuniary considerations. He was actuated by this further argument—that the elections by the Council had hitherto worked extremely well, as was shown by the names of the gentlemen who had been elected by the Council during the last ten years. Passing by those members who were elected by the old Court of Directors, who, though distinguished men, were, of course, elected on other grounds, he found that the first gentleman elected was Sir Henry Durand, undoubtedly one of the most able servants of the Indian Government; the second was General Baker, an officer who had rendered the greatest service, as he was sure his noble Friend behind him (Viscount Halifax) would give evidence, in all the difficult questions arising out of the amalgamation of the two armies; the third, Sir Robert Montgomery, one of the most distinguished servants of the East India Company, who furnished most valuable information to the Secretary of State with regard to matters connected with the Punjaub and the North-West Pro- vinces; and the fourth, Sir Frederick Halliday, who was Lieutenant Governor of Bengal during the Mutiny, and gave important assistance to the Viceroy. When there were four elections successively of men of such eminence, he thought they might safely say that the system of election by the Council must be working well. A suggestion had been made by his noble Friend (Lord Lyveden) that persons appointed councillors should have returned from India within five instead of, as at present, within ten years. Now, suggestions of this kind at first sight appeared plausible: but under such a rule Sir Frederick Halliday himself would have been shut out from election, he having been nine years home—so that the Council would lost one of its most valuable Members. The Government had fully considered the question, and, acting very much on the principle laid down by his noble Friend, that no adequate reason could be shown for changing the system, they had decided not to accept the Amendment.


said, that the Bill had undergone no discussion in Committee, in consequence of the impatience of the House to proceed to an exciting personal and party question; and though there was, consequently, the more necessity for considering it fully at the present stage, he feared that another impending personal question would exercise the same untoward influence. He hoped, how ever, that the noble Marquess would press his Amendment, for both Lord Palmerston and Lord Derby originally proposed to place all the appointments in the hands of the Crown, and the present arrangement was only adopted in order to propitiate the East India Company to the passage of the Bill. It was no answer to say that very good men had hitherto been elected by the Council; that was not necessarily the result of self-election which led to an indecent canvass in the Council itself. Men equally good, if not better, had been appointed by the Crown, and there was no reason why the Crown should not nominate in this as in other cases. He was still of opinion that gentlemen appointed should not have left India longer than live years, for things were changing so rapidly in that country that recent experience and information were highly essential. In his opinion, the limitation of the term of office to ten years would be a decided improvement, for it would secure an infusion of fresh blood.


said, he regretted that the Bill had passed through Committee in so perfunctory a manner, owing to the anxiety of their Lordships to proceed to a personal or party discussion, and hoped it would now be discussed with due attention and care. He did not wish to exaggerate the question, whether the members of the Council should be elected or appointed by the Crown, into undue importance; for hitherto the best men had been put into the Council, however appointed; but he deprecated any measure which would diminish the independence and self-respect of that body, for a strong Council might be of great service to a Secretary of State in giving him the support requisite to resist the pressure of parties in this country—a pressure not always applied in a way conducive to the benefit of the people of India. He had no fears of the Council becoming too subservient, but he was jealous for their independence; for during his own experience as Secretary of State, he remembered several questions on which English interests or feelings were, to a certain extent, opposed to Indian interests. With regard, for instance, to the question of contracts in which the ryots of Bengal were so deeply interested, and by which their welfare might be so vi-tally affected, a feeling existed in this country which, had it been acted upon, might have led to the most serious consequences. A strong independent Council was of great value on that occasion. He agreed in the desirability of obtaining, from time to time, an infusion of new blood, for things in India were changing so rapidly that persons who had long left the country were, as a rule, of less ser-vice than those conversant with the existing state of things. The noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Ellenborough) was mistaken in supposing that a ten years' term of office was equivalent to appointment for life;, for only one gentleman of those placed on the Council in 1858 had since been removed by death. The shortening of the period of absence from India would unduly fetter the choice of the Secretary of State or of the Council—and it must be remembered that there was no obligation to select gentlemen who had beer absent nearly ten years. and, in fact, most of the councillors had returned home within a much shorter time. If the qualification were limited to five years' absence a most desirable man might be excluded on account of no vacancy occurring within that period. He himself first introduced the principle of nomination by the Act of 1853, for he had found that the election which was then in the hands of the holders of East Indian stock, being carried on by personal canvass of the shareholders, the best men were by no means invariably chosen. That might be a proper mode of selection, however, when the East India Company was a commercial body, but when it had become a political, rather than a commercial, body, it appeared to him indispensable to secure in some other way that the best men from India should be appointed. The members of the Council had as strong an interest as the Secretary of State in adding to their body the best men, and they had not elected any person whom he should not himself, had he been Secretary of State, have been quite ready to appoint. Indeed, he was bound to do justice, both to the Council and to the successive Secretaries of State who had preceded and succeeded him, and who deserved the highest credit for their selection of the fittest and most able men.


said, he agreed with the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) that the election by the Council being part of a compromise with the East India Company, no reason now existed for its continuance. He thought that the Bill conflicted with a great principle which should always be borne in mind—the principle that every person in the service of the State in India should look to the Crown alone for the reward of his services.


believed it would be better for the Council themselves, and bettor for India that all the members of the Council should all be nominated by the Crown, rather than that a portion of the Council should be elected by the members themselves. It was obvious to his mind that, whatever might be the sense of responsibility of a Council of fifteen members, that of the Secretary of State must be still greater; the Secretary of State was mainly responsible to Parliament and the country for the working of the government of India, and, therefore, so far as information went, he would always consult the different members of the Council as to the best man he could select: while the fact of the nomination being in his hands would give the best security for the best man being nominated. He thought also that there was an evil inherent in a Council elected by the members of the Council; that gentlemen who aspired to a seat at their Board would canvass the members for their support. It was not desirable to place councillors in a false position and encourage that tendency. The nominations by the Council and by the Secretary of State, he would admit, had hitherto been equally good; but, in the long run there would be a greater security for obtaining able men if the latter had the entire selection. As to the qualification, he thought the field of selection would be unwisely limited if confined to men who had not returned from India more than five years. It was true matters in India were in a transition state, but that transition was by no means, so great as was generally supposed. Certain changes were coming over India; but the feelings, sympathies, and aspirations of the people were very much what they were formerly. Were they themselves consulted, he believed they would prefer the selection as councillors of men of long standing in the service, rather than of younger men.


admitted that there was great force in the argument that we ought not needlessly to interfere with a Constitution which had been settled by Parliament only ten years ago; but the existence of this Bill was a proof that in many cases the Constitution was to be interfered with, and therefore went far itself to answer the noble Earl's objection. Then, surely, when dealing with the tenure of office it was advisable to consider whether any other improvement could be introduced. No doubt the choice of councillors by the Council had so far been everything that was desirable; but he agreed with the noble Lord the late Viceroy of India that a priori the best system was that which made the Minister of the Crown answerable for the appointment of members of the Council. He thought he might venture to urge upon Her Majesty's Government that they should take that view, if upon no other ground, for the reason that it would only be revert- ing to the view taken by the Government of Lord Palmerston and the Government of Lord Derby in 1858. The introduction of the element of election by the Council themselves was a matter forced upon the Ministry in consequence of the strong feeling which the East India Company had upon the subject. The Secretary of State being answerable for the good government of India should also be responsible for the nomination, and he hoped that after the expression of opinion by the House the Government would accept the Amendment.


said, that but for the Council the Secretary of State would practically be without any check; for Parliament was too much occupied with other matters, and was too ignorant of the real state of India and its varied wants, to be able to interfere with advantage. Indeed, when it had interfered it had rather done harm than good. As for his Colleagues in the Cabinet, the general business of the Government was so exceedingly heavy that there was little hope of their considering a great Indian question with a real knowledge of the points to be decided. Moreover, under our form of government the Secretary of State for India must inevitably sometimes be a person of comparatively small experience and knowledge of Indian affairs—so that it was obviously a hazardous experiment to in trust him with almost unlimited powers in disposing of great questions. For these reasons nothing ought to be done to impair the independence of the Council, or the impression which existed both here and in India of its independence. He was persuaded that the power of electing a certain proportion of their own body had an important effect, and as the present system admittedly worked well, it was unadvisable to change it. While admiting the desirability of obtaining members possessed of recent information, he objected to fettering the discretion of the Council and the Secretary of State by fixing the limit of five years' absence from India; and he hoped the Government would consider the suggestion made on a former evening by the noble Lord (Lord Lawrence) by adopting a more liberal system of retiring pensions. It was good policy to induce the best men to join the Council, and also to provide against their remaining in the Council too long, when unfitted mentally or bodily for the efficient discharge of their duties.


said, he still thought the balance of argument was in favour of maintaining the present arrangement. If the House insisted on giving this additional patronage to the Government, they would, of course, still go on with the Bill, but it was right that the sense of the House should be taken upon it.

On Question? their Lordships divided: —Contents 89; Not-Contents 53: Majority 36.

Cambridge, D. Stratford de Redcliffe, V.
Dublin, Archp. Templetown, V.
Richmond, D. Chester, Bp.
Somerset, D. Derry and Raphoe, Bp.
Gloucester and Bristol, Bp.
Abercorn, M. (D. Abercorn.)
Oxford, Bp.
Bristol, M. Ripon, Bp.
Salisbury, M. [Teller.] Tuam, &c, Bp.
Westmeath, M.
Bolton, L.
Abergavenny, E. Brodrick, L. (V. Midleton.)
Albemarle, E.
Amherst, E. Cairns, L.
Annesley, E. Castlemaine, L.
Bandon, E. Chaworth, L. (E. Meath.)
Bathurst, E. Chelmsford, L.
Carnarvon, E. [Teller.] Churston, L.
Chichester, E. Clifton, L. (E. Darnley.)
Derby, E. Colchester, L.
Devon, E. Colonsay, L.
Doncaster, E. (D. Buccleuch and Queensberry.) Colville of Culross, L.
De L'Isle and Dudley, L.
Denman, L.
Eldon, E. Do Ros, L.
Ellenborough, E. Digby, L.
Feversham, E. Dunboyne, L.
Graham, E. (D. Montrose.) Dunsany, L.
Egerton, L.
Haddington, E. Fitzwalter, L.
Hardwicke, E. Foxford, L. (E. Limerick.)
Hillsborough, E. (M. Downshire.)
Heytesbury, L.
Home, E. Hylton, L.
Lauderdale, E. Kesteven, L.
Lucan, E. Kilmaine, L.
Macclesfield, E. Lawrence, L.
Nelson, E. Lyveden, L.
Portarlington, E. Monson, L.
Romney, E. Penrhyn, L.
Rosse, E. Ravensworth, L.
Rosslyn, E. Redesdale, L.
Stanhope, E. Saltersford, L. (E. Courtown.)
Stradbroke, E.
Tankerville, E. Saltoun, L.
Verulam, E. Silchester, L. (E. Longford.)
Wilton, E.
Strathspey, L. (E. Seafield.)
De Vesci, V.
Hardinge, V. Templemore, L.
Hawarden, V. Tredegar, L.
Sidmouth, V. Wharncliffe, L.
Hatherley, L. (L. Chancellor.) Sydney, V.
Abercromby, L.
Cleveland, D. Belper, L.
Grafton, D. Clandeboye, L. (L. Dufferin and Claneboye.)
Saint Albans, D.
Dacre, L.
Ailesbury, M. [Teller.] De Mauley, L.
Camden, M. Ebury, L.
Lansdowne, M. Foley, L. [Teller.]
Granard, L. (E. Granard.)
Camperdown, E.
Clarendon, E. Harris, L.
Cowper, E. Hatherton, L.
Dartrey, E. Houghton, L.
De Grey, E. Kenry, L. (E. Dunraven and Mount-Earl.)
Effingham, E.
Fortescue, E. Lurgan, L.
Granville, E. MontEagle, L. (M. Sligo.)
Grey, E. Mostyn, L.
Harrowby, E. Northbrook, L.
Kimberley, E. Panmure, L. (E. Dalhousie.)
Leicester. E.
Minto, E. Penzance, L.
Morley, E. Poltimore, L.
Powis, E. Ponsonby, L. (E. Bessborough.)
Russell, E.
Portman, L.
Bolingbroke and St. John, V Somerhill, L. (M. Clanricarde.)
Eversley, V. Sundridge, L. (D. Argyll.)
Halifax, V.
Leinster, V. (D. Leinster.) Taunton, L.
Vaux of Harrowden, L.

Resolved in the Affirmative.


said, he was unwilling to stand in the way of the important discussion on the Notice Paper, but he wished to obtain their Lordships' opinion with reference to a point which was discussed on a previous evening, but upon which no vote was taken. The present powers of the Secretary of State in regard to expenditure were, as that debate had shown, extremely doubtful. The noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) maintained that the limitation of the power of the Secretary of State to spend money did not really limit the executive and administrative power of the Secretary of State, and in that view he was supported by the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack; while the contrary view which he (the Marquess of Salisbury) adopted was supported by his noble and learned Friends (Lord Cairns and Lord Chelmsford). The power was thus, at all events, a matter of considerable doubt, and any Secretary of State for India who acted upon the opinion expressed by the noble Duke might have the opinions of his noble and learned Friends flung in his teeth; he would be thought to have transgressed his power, and might be further exposed to the unpleasant consequences attaching to a Minister who spent the public money without any Parliamentary power or authority to do so. He desired that this ambiguity should be removed; and, as he thought there ought to be some distinct definition of the law on this subject, he would propose a clause to the effect that the Secretary of State should be authorized to make no grant out of the revenues of India; that he should be authorized to make no increase of pension, or to pledge the revenues of India for any future year; and, most important of all, that he should not be able to engage the revenues of India, through his Colleagues, without the consent of the majority of his Council. Beyond these points, however, he proposed that the Secretary of State should be responsible to Parliament alone. At the same time he did not think that there was any essential difference between the noble Duke and himself.

Moved to insert the following clause— Whereas doubts have arisen as to the powers of the Secretary of State over the expenditure of the revenues of India, and whereas it is expedient that such doubts should be removed; be it enacted as follows:—Section 41 of the said recited Act for the better government of India is hereby repealed. The expenditure of the revenues of India, both in India and elsewhere, shall be subject to the control of the Secretary of State in Council, but no grant of such revenues, or any part thereof, no increase in the pay or pension of any person in the service of Her Majesty, and no contract or engagement charging or involving the appropriation of such revenues for a period of more than a year from the date of such contract or engagement, or involving any payments to any other Department of Her Majesty's Government, shall be made without the concurrence of the majority of votes at a meeting of the Council."—(The Marquess of Salisbury).


regretted that he could not accept the Amendment of the noble Marquess, which, if it removed any existing difficulty or doubt, would only substitute others in its place. The present law was that no grant or appropriation of the revenues of India could be made without the consent of the Council. That prohibition prevented the Secretary of State from giving direct orders for the handling of money, but did not prevent him from ordering a service in India for which money was to be paid. He believed he was betraying no confidence in adverting to the origin of the doubt in this matter. A great many members of commercial bodies in this country urged upon the noble Marquess—as they had since urged upon himself—the expediency of ordering a survey of the country between Eastern India and China for the purpose of making a telegraph and a railway. It might be expedient, as the noble Marquess thought, to have a knowledge of the intervening country. But the Government of India took a very different view, and his noble Friend (Lord Lawrence) represented that the contemplated project might entail political complications, and expressed a strong opinion against an expenditure which would impose a considerable burden upon the tax-payers of India. The Council in this country backed the representations of the Government of India, and resisted the survey. He believed that the noble Marquess, notwithstanding, had his own way, and that the Council eventually did not resist his will, but assented to an order for the survey of the country. Considerable expense was incurred; and his noble Friend (Lord Lawrence) afterwards renewed his remonstrances as to the danger of bringing the Government of India into contact with the border tribes. When those remonstrances reached this country, Sir Stafford Northcote was Secretary of State, and the survey was given up. The matter had been under discussion since he (the Duke of Argyll) had been at the India Office, but on no considerations would he over-rule the Government of India in such a matter. The noble Marquess said, that, under the present law, the Secretary of State could not order such an expenditure on his own authority, and he desired so to alter the law as to confer that authority upon him. But the definition of the financial power of the Secretary and Council by the proposed clause was open to great objection. It left the Secretary of State absolutely free to engage for any amount of service, and to pay for it out of the revenues of India. It would not prevent him from engaging a whole army of engineers, and paying the expense without consulting with his Council. It would prohibit him from increasing the pay of any existing office, but it did not prohibit him from creating any number of now offices. He could not add £5 to the salary of any existing office, but he could create any new office with a salary of £5,000 a year. The words of the Amendment—"no contract or engagement charging or involving," would give rise to infinite ambiguity. Did they mean a contingent or necessary "involving?" The whole paragraph was full of ambiguity and difficulty, and on its very front and face it gave a power to the Secretary of State which Parliament never intended he should possess. The words—''involving payment for more than a year," he believed had been introduced to meet an objection he had himself stated the other night to the noble Marquess. He pointed out to the noble Marquess that, as his Amendment stood, the Secretary of State might charge on the Indian revenues the whole of the British Navy serving not only in the Indian but in the Chinese seas; or, by an arrangement with the War Office, he might double the rate of pay of the Queen's troops in India. The words were therefore added—"or involving any payments to any other Department of Her Majesty's Government." lint if there was no agreement with the "Department," the Secretary of State would not be prevented by the words from making the payment. He (the Duke of Argyll) was at present negotiating with the Admiralty about the expense of the naval service in the Persian Gulf, and they were likely to come to an agreement on the subject; but, under this clause, without coming to any agreement with the Admiralty, he might order the payment of £100,000 or £200,000 or £300,000 for those ships. The actual balance in hand in bank of the Indian revenues ranged from £8,000,000 to £12,000,000 sterling, and it would be possible, under the Amendment of the noble Marquess, for the Secretary of State to pay the whole cost of the Abyssinian War without the consent of a majority of his Council. That was an absurdity which Parliament never could assent to. This Amendment would give rise to doubts and difficulties infinitely greater than those which could arise under the simple and straightforward wording of the present law, which was perfectly consistent with our Constitution. He seriously appealed to the House to consider the position of the Secretary of State for India with reference to money matters. He ventured to say the power of the Secretary of State ought not to be materially increased Already it was the greatest power possessed by any Minister, because it was practically unchecked and uncontrolled, except by his Council—he might squander millions before the people of India were aware of the fact; and it was most important that he should be obliged to consult his Council before he dealt directly with matters involving large expenditure. He hoped their Lordships would not adopt the Amendment of the noble Marquess. He did not think that the noble and learned Lord opposite (Lord Cairns), if sitting in a judicial capacity, would adhere to the interpretation he gave the other day.


said, the noble Duke had made himself a sort of posthumous Hansard to the Indian Council, by referring to matters which had been discussed by the Council two years ago, which were not on the records, and to which there were no means of referring. The noble Duke referred to the question of the survey of Eastern India frontiers for the purpose of insinuating some degree of censure upon him the Marquess of (Salisbury).


said, he had not at all intended to imply any censure on the noble Marquess. If he differed from the Government of India on a very important question he had quite a right to do so.


said, that, in reference to telegraphs or railways, he had not sent any despatch directing that any step should be taken that would compromise the peace of India in any way, and he assuredly had never manifested any liking towards a telegraph across the Burmese territory. He thought it an inconvenient practice in any Minister of the Crown to refer to matters affecting the conduct of his predecessor to the record of which he could not appeal. With regard to the interpretation which the noble Duke had put on his Amendment he would only make one remark—that the noble Duke had entirely changed his opinions on the subject. On the first reading of the Bill the noble Duke gave them a very interesting disquisition on this subject, and used these words— It follows from this argument—which I believe to be well founded both upon the historical facts of the case and the words of the Act—that the Secretary of State is supreme in all matters what- ever, except simply such matters as were included under the principle of the financial veto of Mr. Pitt—that is, direct grants or appropriations of money to persons either hero or in India which might be made for purposes of political jobbery. That I believe to be the state of the law; and if it be, I need hardly say that it makes the Secretary of State practically supreme in all matters, whether they do or do not cost money."—[3 Hansard, cxcv. 1074.] Was that language consistent with the speech which the noble Duke had made to-night? He had not put this Amendment on the Paper to alter the law. If the noble Duke desired that the Council of India should stand in the same position as the House of Commons, he had no wish to make any alteration. His only desire was to give effect to the principles the noble Duke had himself expressed and to clear up any doubt with respect to the power of the Secretary on this point. If he had succeeded in converting the noble Duke he was satisfied, and would withdraw the Amendment.


said, that the noble Duke had now asserted a doctrine wholly different from what he had formerly expressed. Originally the noble Duke claimed for the Secretary for India a power to spend the whole revenue of India by ordering services in India for which the Governor General should be desired to pay, and then preventing any veto on the accounts when they came home. However, the proposition now advanced by the noble Duke was a totally different one, for he said that it was impossible to suppose that by the law as it stood the Secretary for India could have such extensive power to spend money. The noble Duke had certainly learnt, something by the discussion, and he hoped his knowledge would be followed by some useful result.

Amendment (by Leave of the House) withdrawn: Bill to be read 3a on Friday the 4th of June next; and to be printed as amended. (No. 104.)