HL Deb 27 July 1869 vol 198 cc778-95

THE EARL OF CARNARVON, who had given notice to call the attention of Her Majesty's Government to the present position of Affairs in New Zealand, said, the noble Earl the Secretary for the Colonies (Earl Granville) has lately laid on the table, by command of Her Majesty, a bulky volume of 600 pages of correspondence on the affairs of New Zealand. The first portion of it consists mainly of complaints on the part of Sir George Grey with reference to the course I pursued when I held the Seals of the Colonial Office; but I do not think it necessary to address myself to those complaints, though I shall be prepared, whenever the necessity arises, to justify the policy which I recommended the Crown to adopt. It also contains recriminatory matter which it would serve no useful purpose to enter into; and it raises various questions of possible and impossible policy as regards New Zealand, which I likewise propose to pass by. The only points to which I invite your Lordships' attention are the present position of the colony, and the difficulties arising from a certain sense of financial exhaustion, from the undoubted danger with regard to the Maories, and from a strong feeling of local irritation. Now, there are in New Zealand two parties and two policies—the party and policy of independence, and the party and policy which looks to the mother country for protection and assistance. It is easy, of course, to lay down the broad rules that in colonial matters the Home Government is concerned only with the external relations of the country, and that the Colonial Government is concerned solely with matters of internal regulation and police. That rule is perfectly sound; but the lines of external and domestic policy are constantly intercepting and crossing each other, and they are very difficult to define. Moreover, in New Zealand there are complications caused by the presence of the native tribes and their warlike character, by the peculiar physical geography of the country which cuts it up into various parts, with various feelings and difficulties, by a Constitution hastily and I think inadvisedly given, and by the conditions under which Imperial troops have from time to time been employed. They have sometimes been employed solely at the charge and under the orders of the Home Government—the objection to which is that this country is thus called upon to bear the expense of native wars; sometimes under the orders of the Colonial Government — which is still more objectionable, for it would involve our carrying on a war while the policy by which that war was caused would be determined by others; and there has more than once been a tendency to regulate their employment by the joint councils of the Home and the Colonial Governments—which of all policies seems to me the most objectionable, since it would necessarily lead to a division and confusion of power. All these questions and considerations, though perhaps not very familiar to your Lordships, have been discussed over and over again in the colony, and have greatly complicated this matter. I think the independence of New Zealand was in former years somewhat prematurely given, that the Constitution was not calculated to work well, and that the abandonment of native affairs was premature on our part; but, whether or not this be so, the fact remains that it has been done, and that we must accept it. I feel satisfied, too, that when the temporary irritation existing in the minds of the colonists has passed by they will be ready and anxious to accept that fact also. There can, it seems to me, be no retreat from the course we have adopted, and in its main lines the policy pursued by successive Colonial Secretaries, by Mr. Cardwell, by myself, by my noble Friend (the Duke of Buckingham), and by the noble Earl (Earl Granville), must be adhered to. I believe the present irritation is not founded on any solid or substantial grounds of policy, and that the colonists themselves are far too self-reliant and manly to wish to be relieved from their duties, or placed in a position unlike that of any other British colony. That irritation, I am convinced, is due to misconception—not on both sides, for I do not think there is any in this country, but in the colony. It also arises from a very simple cause, the operation of which I have more than once remarked. We, in England, are sometimes so engrossed with the mass of Public Business, with one first-class question crowding upon another, that we are obliged to pass by colonial questions with comparatively little debate, and to appear sometimes as giving them apparently less attention than they deserve. Now, to the colonists, a question which to us is only one of a hundred, is one of vital moment, and they fancy we are indifferent when we are not really so; and such is their feeling for this country that I believe they would sometimes bear injustice rather than indifference. I believe both parties in this case entertain the warmest feelings towards each other. I have seen enough of the colonists to know their strong attachment to this country, and I am sure that as warm feelings are entertained for them in this country as for any part of the United Kingdom. It is no slight advantage to us that in all parts of the world there should be communities speaking the same lan- guage, holding the same institutions, animated very much by the same sympathies, and subjects of the same Sovereign, and we are not likely to undervalue it. On the other hand, these colonies give a free vent for all the activity and energy which find insufficient scope in this country; and it is no slight advantage to them that they bear the name of Englishmen, and are members of the British Empire. History furnishes no example of such a colonial Empire as ours—an Empire from which we exact no tribute, on which we impose no restraint, and to which, sometimes on being asked and sometimes without being asked, we have freely accorded perfect independence. It has been the fate of other great Empires — Spain and Venice for example—to be detested by their colonies, and I believe it was because they pursued a, policy exactly opposite to that which for the last quarter-of-a-century we have adopted. I cannot believe, therefore, that there exists in New Zealand any feeling of misconception or irritation which goes deeper than the surface, for the essential lines of our policy are lines recognized both by them and by us, and nobody can say that we are laying a burden upon them, and requiring them to strain their resources for our own private advantage. As to the course which should be pursued in the present state of affairs, it is very difficult to give an answer. New Zealand claimed some time ago the control of their own affairs, and it was given them by Sir George Grey, when Governor, on his own authority and responsibility, the act, however, being subsequently endorsed by the Duke of Newcastle. Mr. Cardwell, on succeeding to the Colonial Office, made various offers in respect to the troops, which were substantially declined; and on succeeding him I renewed those offers with little variation, when they were again substantially declined. The colony, or a part of the colony—for I doubt whether the feeling be general—seems now disposed to retrace their steps; but the noble Earl opposite (Earl Granville) has declined, as I understand, either to leave the troops there or to resume the control of native affairs; and the Treasury has refused, under present circumstances, any financial guarantee to the colony for the purposes of war. It is difficult to say what can be advised; but I may venture on this suggestion, whatever it may be worth. A great part of the present difficulties is due to the distance by which we are separated from New Zealand and the importance of carrying on communications with that colony. Misunderstandings are under those circumstances very likely to arise; and it seems to me to be possible that some one on the spot, accredited by Her Majesty's Government, enjoying their confidence and also the confidence of the colonists, and armed with whatever powers the Government might think fit to entrust to him, might make inquiries and offer suggestions which might bring about a better state of things. Your Lordships will recollect that this is not altogether a novel proposal. Years ago, when matters had assumed a very formidable appearance in Canada, and when the differences between the two Provinces brought things almost to a dead-lock, Lord Durham was sent out from this country, and no one can doubt that great benefit resulted from his mission. In like manner, in the case of Jamaica, Sir Henry Storks was sent out to restore order; and, lastly, when in 1859 difficulties of a peculiarly delicate nature arose in the Ionian Islands, no less a person than the present Prime Minister undertook a mission to those islands, which, although it did not at the moment effect all that was thought desirable, yet produced this result—that his presence there allayed in a great measure the discord which prevailed, tended to soften the asperities and bitterness of feeling which existed, and paved the way for a more satisfactory state of things. I throw out this suggestion, my Lords, without in any degree insisting upon it, for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government. If some such course be not adopted with regard to New Zealand, then the only alternative it appears to me to which we can have recourse is to allow the colonists themselves to work out their own fortune and policy, while we give them every assistance which we can legitimately afford in working out that fortune and policy, the main outlines of which have been laid down by successive Secretaries of State. I have always taken a deep interest in the colony of New Zealand, and I should be very glad to see this feeling of temporary misunderstanding removed and a much more satisfactory state of feeling as to the relations between the colony and the mother country substituted in its place.

EARL GRANVILLE

I think the noble Earl has been very judicious in what he has omitted to notice in the speech which he has just made. As your Lordships will observe, I came down to the House prepared with a considerable amount of ammunition in the event of any attack being made on the policy of the Government; but I am bound to say that all that has fallen from the noble Earl tends to justify and strengthen the Government in pursuing the course which they have followed, and which is a course really consistent with that which has been adopted by their predecessors in Office. I feel also greatly the advantage of not being obliged, by the observations which have been made by the noble Earl, to enter very much into this question. Tilling unworthily as I do the position which I happen to occupy with regard to the colonies, I should not like to be compelled to come forward in this House at all in the shape of an advocate against New Zealand; and it is, unfortunately, very difficult, when complaints and attacks are made in Parliament on the policy of the Government, not to enter into full explanations in order to show where we think others have been wrong and we ourselves in the right. I quite agree with the noble Earl in what he said with regard to the position in which the country might find itself in the case of an internal war in the colony. First arises the question whether the mother country should take upon herself the defence of the colony and the perfect control of that war. Then comes the question whether, losing a portion of that control, she is still liable to furnish the colony with military aid, and by means of the double government, to which the noble Earl has referred, to lead the Crown and the colony into very great difficulties. Lastly comes the question whether, the whole power being vested in the colony, it should bear the entire responsibility. In the history of New Zealand each of the two former courses has been pursued from time to time; but it now appears that, after considerable delay we have come to adopt the last course, which seems to me to be the right one in the interest both of the mother country and of the colony itself. The policy of the Government, as indicated in the Papers which have been laid before Parliament, has been in the main approved by the noble Earl, and has, I believe, met with the general approval of the country. I do not wish to enter further into the question. I am of opinion that the great and important thing is to declare on the part of the Government their determination to adhere to that policy. The objection which I entertain to the suggestion which the noble Earl has thrown out, and which has been acted upon with advantage under some circumstances—though I think there would be great practical difficulties in the way in the present instance—is that it may create some doubt as to the principles on which the mother country is determined to act with regard to the colonies. The most important thing of all, with the view of removing that dissatisfaction, which I quite concur with the noble Earl in regarding as being of a temporary nature is, in my opinion, that we should understand perfectly our mutual relations, and that, with all those friendly offices to which he has also alluded, we should throw upon the Colonial Government the responsibility of shaping their policy in such a manner as that they should make up their minds to do that which is necessary to put an end to— what I can hardly call war, but that system of brigandage and outrage which exists, and—which I regard as being still more useful—to adopt those conciliatory measures towards the natives which are most likely to result in peace and conciliation. It only remains for me to thank the noble Earl for the manner in which he has brought the subject under your Lordships' notice.

THE BISHOP OF LICHFIELD

said, he would not enter into the past history of New Zealand, but he thought he should be wanting in his duty towards the colonists of New Zealand, as well as towards the natives of that country, if he were not to address a few words to their Lordships on the present occasion. Against the general policy which had been enunciated by the noble Earl at the head of the Colonial Department he had nothing to say, because he believed it to be strictly sound. It was but fair to add that the rejection of aid from England came from the colonists themselves in the first instance, and that one Prime Minister, Mr. Weld, had taken office on the distinct reliance upon local resources. He therefore entirely concurred with the noble Earl as to the strict justice of the view which he took. He at the same time agreed with the other noble Earl who was formerly at the head of the Colonial Office (the Earl of Carnarvon) in the opinion that there was nothing which the colonists felt more than indifference or neglect on the part of the mother country; but they probably forgot that they were but one of fifty colonies that required the attention and consideration of the Home Government. But it was not only the colonists, but the natives, whose interests were concerned, and he would ask whether it was not the Imperial Government who made the first contract with the latter? Had that contract, entered into in 1839, when the New Zealanders, who were broken up into small and hostile tribes, confiding in the power of England received the British Government for the express purpose of putting down anarchy and bloodshed—evils to which no one was more alive than the New Zealanders themselves—been fulfilled? He feared that contract had not been fulfilled; and on that ground alone he begged the Government to pause before they refused all further aid to the colony. New Zealand was at present composed of about 200,000 English settlers and about 30,000 or 40,000 natives, of which number he would undertake to say more than one-half were attached and loyal subjects of Her Majesty, while another portion was neutral and ready to be made loyal; those by whom the murders were committed—which had been properly called acts of brigandage—being only a contemptible minority. He therefore appealed to the Government, seeing how great the cost of employing soldiers in the colony was, and how difficult it was to keep colonial forces in any degree of discipline or subjection, to lend such assistance as would enable the colonists to put an end to that system of brigandage in a country in which the wars which, from time to time had occurred, had, he must say, been conducted in a most honourable and chivalrous manner. There were repeated examples of that. He must say that never were wars conducted by any European nation in a more honourable and chivalrous manner than the wars of these New Zealanders, so long as they were national wars. Now, however, that the native forces were broken up into small sections, the same results had followed which always ensued in other countries under similar circumstances. The principal chiefs, finding that they were unable to make head against the British troops in open fight, retired under the leadership of their native King into the heart of the country, where they shut themselves up in their fastnesses and maintained a sort of armed neutrality: others had divided themselves into small parties, and taking advantage of their knowledge of the country had attacked the outlying settlements. He had received a letter from the late Chief Justice, Sir William Martin, who went out to the colony in 1839. The writer said— After the great calamity at Poverty Bay a storm arose in our newspapers of plans for preventing the like doings in other parts. Among the most prominent was one from Sir David Monro. He urged the suspension of the Constitution and the transfer of all power in native matters to a Dictator, to be sent out hither from England. That, he believed, was the plan proposed by the noble Earl opposite.

THE EARL OF CARNARVON

said, he had not proposed such a scheme.

THE BISHOP OF LICHFIELD

said, that something similar had been proposed by the noble Earl. He had understood the noble Earl to say that the case was analogous to that of Jamaica and the Ionian Islands, and that it might be necessary to send out special Commissioners. He admitted, however, that the word "Dictator" had not been used by the noble Earl. Sir William Martin went on to say— This met with some favour, but the extreme improbability of the English Government consenting to resume the management of native affairs, and various points in the plan itself, diminished the feeling in its favour. After waiting until it had become clear that Matutaera— the native King—and his people were minded to keep the peace, I addressed the enclosed memorandum to the Resident Minister, Dr. Pollen. The word "King," he might remark, had been the source of much unnecessary offence. There had never been a King in the colony of New Zealand. The natives had only heard of a Queen, and their notion—not a very exalted one of a King—was taken from the Book of Judges. Well, Sir William Martin, proceeded as follows:— He forwarded it with an expression of his entire concurrence to Wellington. No answer has as yet been received, but Dr. Pollen tells me that his letter was crossed by one from Mr. J. C. Richmond to himself, in which Mr. Richmond expressed his readiness to throw up the confiscated lands to a large extent. Since then our case has been strengthened by a letter from Mr. Serancke, full of details, of the accuracy of which he is satisfied. It appears that the murders at the White Cliff were committed by four men— whose names are known—from Mokau; that a raid was actually set on foot by a body of eighty men under one Reihana, and that on their march to Alexandra they were intercepted by Matutaera and his friends and driven back. Further, Mr. Serancke certifies that Rewi is clear of complicity in the late crimes, and has been steadily supporting Matutaera and Tamati. At the request of Dr. Pollen, I have written to Tamati to suggest for consideration three bases of peace, not as from the Government, but as suggestions made to them and to the Government—namely—1. That a district may be defined within which they may make and administer laws for themselves, and appoint their own chief magistrate. 2. That lands in Waikato shall be given to all who are willing to settle quietly down under the law. 3. That both sides shall co-operate for the purpose of repressing crimes of violence. On this point he would call the attention of the Secretary of State for the Colonies to a despatch sent by his predecessor, the Duke of Newcastle, to Governor Gore Browne — which was explained in my hearing to the native King by the well-known chief, William Thompson—to the effect that if the latter thought fit to assign a district to the chief magistrate chosen by the natives, in the same manner as the superintendents of the English provinces, he was quite at liberty to do so, provided that the laws made for such district should be submitted to the Governor for his confirmation. This might have been easily done. The island was at that time divided into six provinces—there were now nine — each of which had its own chief magistrate and its own provincial council, and it would have been easy to form a province in which the so-called native King should be superintendent; and if the native King would act with us and pass laws to be submitted to the consideration of the Governor he saw no reason why such a system should not be adopted. Governor Denison was of the same opinion— he said there was nothing to be afraid of in the name of King; the thing to be done was to recognize him, and make use of his authority for the maintenance of order. The possibility of doing this was proved by the fact that in the very district of which so much had been lately heard — the native-King district — he found, some years ago, the laws so carefully administered by the native magistrates that a traveller might leave his baggage by the wayside with the most perfect safety, because nobody stole there. He asked how it was that they did not steal there. They said— "Some do not steal from the fear of God, while others do not steal from the fear of the £5 "—the fine imposed by the native King for every theft that was committed in the district. The stories told of the force of law in the reign of King Alfred were literally fulfilled in this part of New Zealand. And this it must be remembered was done by the natives themselves. He believed that at that period the King might have inaugurated a system of good government in the very heart of the country. The people most earnestly desired that this might be done, for the New Zealanders were essentially a law-loving people. When he first went out to that colony the natives paid willing deference to the authority both of the magistrates and missionaries, and it was not until the effect began to be felt of what is called the Queen's right of pre-emption—that was to say that the natives might sell their land to the Crown only—that the idea of the Queen's sovereignty began to be degraded in the eyes of the people. Those who referred to the earlier documents would find that this was the very result predicted by acting Governor Shortland. When the sovereignty of the Queen was ordered to be proclaimed over the whole of the Northern Island in 1840, Governor Hobson wrote to Lord John Russell to the following effect:— If I am to carry out this instruction I must have a much larger force placed at my command, as there are many breaches of the peace and civil wars among the people which I must suppress. What the answer was he did not know; but from the failure of that despatch in procuring any sufficient assistance from England he dated the source of all the present troubles in New Zealand. The agents of the Government for the purchase of ground had done incalculable in-jury by going about the country in a very injudicious manner buying up the land —often from the wrong man—and from that the civil wars and bloodshed had arisen. In the neighbourhood of New Plymouth two sections of a tribe engaged in civil war, in consequence of a Government agent having bought land from an individual against the will of the tribe to whom it belonged. It was only when they came within the boundary of the English settlement that a proclamation was issued warning the natives that if they fought on what was called the Queen's ground they would be considered the Queen's enemies. Of course it was understood that outside that boundary they might fight as long as they pleased. This was very far from being a fulfilment of the contract originally entered into with those tribes who accepted the Queen's sovereignty. They had accepted our government on the condition that we should preserve them from the consequences of anarchy among themselves; and yet twenty years after that contract was entered into we found them making war against one another in every part of the colony. He might sum up all by referring to a text cited on a public occasion by William Thompson, who was called "the King-maker." It was this verse from St. Paul, — "Ye have reigned as kings without us; would to God ye did reign." In the eagerness for land the Government had abdicated all those functions of government which alone induced the natives to accept our rule. He would ask their Lordships were they to listen to those cold-blooded persons who said that the natives were perishing fast, that this was a war of extermination, and that it must take its course? If, indeed, the natives were to perish in God's providence from off the face of the earth, let us lift up our prayers for the remnant that is yet left—let us act in the spirit of that prayer by trying to fulfil the contract that we made twenty years ago—that the English and the New Zealanders should be one people. When on one occasion a native chief gave him some land on which to build a College, he said— I give you this land as a site for a place of education for the youth of both races, that they may grow up together in the new principles of the faith of Jesus Christ, and in obedience to the Queen. That, he would undertake to say, was the prevailing feeling throughout the; whole of New Zealand. Every New Zealander desired to be a faithful subject of Her Majesty until that unfortu- nate article of the treaty of Waitangi, the Queen's right to the pre-emption of land, took the precedence over every other idea, and the whole notion of government and of the sovereignty of the Queen was lost in the simple question of in what manner and by what quickest possible means the property of the soil in New Zealand; should be transferred from the natives; to the Crown. Their great mistake in New Zealand had been their asserting from the beginning a sovereignty over a country which they could not govern. Within a few years they had repeated all the errors committed in Ireland centuries ago. There had been repeated ' confiscations of land, large tracts had been taken from the natives, and so-called military settlers were placed in them to defend the district. These military settlers speedily sold their lands. On one occasion he knew that a dealer came to those settlements and bought up in one day the land of thirty of those supposed defenders of the country, who went away leaving the place unprotected; and then a number of peaceful settlers came instead of those military men, and scattered themselves over the district, and although they were exposed to every; kind of danger they were never injured, because they were living in the King's country and the King's word was for peace. In other parts, indeed, where peculiarly exasperating circumstances had occurred, the case had been different. The men who had done all the mischief on the East Coast and at Poverty Bay were men who had been carried off as prisoners to the Chatham Islands. They were told that if they conducted themselves well at the end of two years they would be set at liberty. They behaved in the most exemplary manner that they might earn their freedom; but at the expiration of the two years they were informed that they were not to be set at liberty. The magistrate who was instructed to read this dispatch to them had asked a friend to watch the countenance of the prisoners as he read the letter. A look of despair at once came over them, as if every hope they had in life were cut off. They had been placed on lonely and remote islands, 600 miles away; they had looked forward to the day of their emancipation, and with that view they had behaved exceedingly well. But when they saw no hope left to them, was it surprising that they took matters into their own hands, seized a ship, and escaped? Those men went back to their own country: they offered to remain quiet if they were let alone; but they were followed up by a military force, driven into the woods, their places stormed, and their houses burnt. The most unwise thing of all was that, in spite of warning, the military officers who had followed up those escaped prisoners went and settled down on the land which had just been taken from them. The New Zealanders would not be like the Scotch, the Irish, or the Welsh if, under such circumstances, they had not taken their revenge. He trusted that none of their Lordships would believe that the New Zealanders were naturally a cruel and treacherous race. There were, no doubt, a few murderers among them at the present moment under the force of circumstances; but there was not one cannibal among them, except when, stimulated by frenzy or goaded on by a false prophet, they acted under the same maddened impulses that led French women during the frenzy of the Revolution to lap the blood of persons who had been decapitated by the guillotine. When maddened by the influence of some fanatic, some excesses of that kind might, perhaps, have been committed by a native New Zealander; but as to cannibalism in the real sense of the term, which was sometimes gravely charged against them, and at other times, he grieved to say, alleged against them in order merely to point a jest, such a thing had entirely ceased since the colony was established. He therefore appealed to Her Majesty's Government to give some assistance to New Zealand. He thought it might be done in two ways. He hoped that the use of the Imperial credit might be extended to the Colonial Government to enable it to raise a loan on reasonable terms for one simple purpose —namely, to compensate the settlers who must be removed from the disturbed districts for a time, because their remaining there was likely to provoke a continuance of these murders. Another way in which he hoped New Zealand would receive some assistance was in the maintenance of a small force to act as a police force—because he did not think the Colonial Government ever could maintain such a force as was ne- cessary to follow up and suppress brigandage and murder. The native who had lately murdered a missionary was now at large, and was known to be living some twenty or thirty miles from our frontier settlements on the Waikato river; and, after the expenditure of millions of money and the loss of the lives of so many British officers and soldiers, no attempt had been made to bring to justice that notorious murderer. If that man and other notorious murderers were once given up to justice, and if we once made a treaty of peace with the New Zealanders, there was nothing in our experience of the country before or since its colonization to warrant the belief that any solemn covenant entered into with them would ever be broken. He thought that it would be very beneficial if, instead of the regiment now shut up in the towns, a flying body of about 500 men, under the authority of the British Government, yet acting in conjunction with the Colonial Government of New Zealand, were held ready at any moment to go to any part of the colony wherever a crime had been committed—not in any way to protect the settlers in the possession of the land, nor to be mixed up at all with the land question, but merely to arrest murderers; and he believed that such criminals would be apprehended with the good will of the native population themselves. He was convinced that the colonists, instead of looking to some other Power for the protection which might be denied them by England, would far rather cling to this country, as they had ever yet clung to it as their own mother, their own friend, and their own protector. He did not ask for assistance to enable the colonists to do acts of injustice towards the natives. Such acts, he must say in defence of his own brother-settlers, had not been attempted excepting on very rare occasions. The general feeling of the settlers, he could assure their Lordships, had been for many years that of friendliness towards the native race. There were a few persons among the settlers, as there were also a few among the New Zealanders, who would, at times, rush into violence; but the great majority of the colonists lived in peace and harmony with their native fellow-subjects, and their good will was, in a great degree, reciprocated by the natives. He, therefore, entreated Her Majesty's Government to pause before committing themselves finally to the principle that, under no circumstances, would they depart from the rigid policy of entire abstinence in future from any interference in the affairs of New Zealand; and he made that appeal to them on the ground of mercy both to the settlers and to the natives.

LORD LYVEDEN

said, the noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon) who had opened the debate, in a speech remarkable for its moderation, had stated that there was nothing the colonists so much disliked as indifference. His own experience was that they did dislike indifference. But let the House look at this debate, and see to what all the difficulties which had been spoken of would lead. It would lead to so many things the colonists would dislike that he feared very much they would prefer our indifference. Even the noble Earl himself mentioned two things which would give rise to great difference of opinion in the colony. The one was that our acknowledgment of the independence of the colony was premature, and the other, that our giving up the native tribes to the colonists was also premature. Mr. Fitzherbert, in a letter to his noble Friend the Secretary for the Colonies, stated that in the beginning there was a great determination on the part of Government to establish the colony, and great encouragement was given to induce people to go out and settle there. But his noble Friend said, very properly, in his answer, that a number of Englishmen, without any encouragement from the Government, took upon themselves to form one or more settlements in the colony of New Zealand, and the Government of the day only thought it their duty to place the relations between the settlers and the natives upon a safe and honourable basis. And not only was that true—not only was it true that the Government gave no encouragement whatever to the settlers, but they gave them discouragement. The New Zealand Company were determined to establish themselves in New Zealand, whether under the authority of the Crown or any other authority, and they planned all sorts of schemes to induce people to go out. But so little encouragement was held out by the Government that only this morning, in looking over some despatches of that time, he found a letter addressed to himself as Under Secretary of the Colonies on the part of the Company, in which he was informed that they would write to him no more, his tone was so discouraging, but it was their desire to see Lord Russell himself, under whom he served at the time. But Lord Russell gave the same answer as he had done—; so that the fact was that they had met with discouragement from the Government, instead of encouragement. He agreed with the noble Earl that it would be idle now to enter into old questions of disputes, in which General Cameron, Sir George Grey, and others took part. At present the only question was whether we were to pursue a particular line of policy or not. Nothing could have been more interesting or instructive than the speech of the right rev. Prelate, who had spent almost all his life in the colony. But what were his proposals, and what had he said? He said that the Imperial Government had made a treaty with the natives, and that it had been departed from. But was it really the case that it had been departed from? for he (Lord Lyveden) did not know in what respect. Then the right rev. Prelate asked to have loans made to the colonists; but for what? To carry out the policy which the right rev. Prelate himself so strongly condemned as injurious to the Maories. If the right rev. Prelate had attacked any one, it was the Colonial (Government that he had attacked. No doubt the policy of self-reliance was an excellent policy; but it was a miserable policy if, whenever a difficulty arose, it called out for "Help, help." If, now, because of the horrible massacre at Poverty Bay, and other calamities of the kind, the colonists were to come to the Imperial Government and say—"We can no longer rely upon ourselves, and must now come to you," it would put an end to responsible government altogether. The noble Earl opposite had suggested to send out a Commission—

THE EARL OF CARNARVON

said, he had not suggested that a Commission should be sent out, but that some person accredited by Her Majesty's Government should be sent out to make inquiries on the spot.

LORD LYVEDEN

said, the noble Earl must remember that every inquiry, whether conducted by a single person or otherwise, must give rise to new hopes and expectations, the effect of which would be to a great extent to make the government of the colony still more difficult. Every inquiry on the spot must, to a great extent, supersede the authority of the Governor; and when once the authority of the Governor was superseded, not only the settlers, but the natives would come to think that their friend the Queen was taking their part against the Governor—so that every chance of the pacification of the colony would be overturned. There was one suggestion which he thought might be acted on by his noble Friend, and that was to enter into some negotiation with the Maori King. With regard to money and troops, he hoped his noble Friend would not recede from his original determination. He imagined that by this time all the troops had left New Zealand. [Earl GRANVILLE assented.] A loan had been already guaranteed to New Zealand, and he saw no reason why there should be any other guarantee. The colonists must be left to themselves to work out their own safety. No doubt that might be a very great difficulty, but it was one which they must meet, and which they would never meet as long as we sent them troops. If the settlers were left to their own resources he could not help thinking that those in the Southern Island, who had not hitherto been so active as the rest, would combine with their brethren in the north to put down the insurrection. With the stern determination of British men in them, and the resolution to use their best endeavours to promote the interests of the colony and defend themselves, he could not but think that we might look forward in a short time to the prosperity of New Zealand—as one of those favourite colonies in which Englishmen at home, from the Sovereign down to the pauper emigrant, felt the greatest interest, and which was regarded as one of our noblest colonies, and one which afforded to all emigrants the greatest advantages for settlement.