Lords Sitting of 8 July 1869

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS— First Reading— Contagious Diseases Prevention (Metropolis)* (176); Shipping Dues Exemption Act (1867) Amendment* (178).
Second Reading—Bankruptcy * (154); Imprisonment for Debt * (168); Municipal Franchise (200).
Third Reading—Life Peerages (113), negatived.

REPRESENTATIVE PEER FOR IRELAND.
Writs and Returns electing the Earl of Bantry a Representative Peer for Ireland in the room of the late Earl of Wicklow, deceased, with the certificate of the Clerk of the Crown in Ireland annexed thereto—Delivered (on oath), and certificate read.
REPRESENTATIVE PEER FOR SCOTLAND.
The Clerk of the Parliaments delivered a certificate of the Clerk of the Crown that the Earl of Kellie had been elected a Representative Peer for Scotland (fifteen Peers of Scotland only having been duly elected at the election of the Peers of Scotland to sit in the House of Peers in the present Parliament of the United Kingdom): Certificate read.
LIFE PEERAGES BILL—(No. 113.)
(The Earl Russell.)
LIFE PEERAGES BILL—(No. 113.)

  THIRD READING.
  Order of the Day for the Third Reading, read.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 3a."—(The Earl Russell.)
  THE EARL OF MALMESBURY: My Lords, I have given notice, even at this late period of the Session, that I shall feel it my duty to oppose the Bill of the noble Earl (Earl Russell), and to move that it be read a third time this day three months. It is now exactly three months since the noble Earl introduced it, and it is for him to explain why he has allowed it to remain so long under your Lordships' consideration; but I believe the more you have seen of it the less you have liked it. The object of the noble Earl in bringing forward this Bill is no doubt a very worthy one. It is, as I understand, to strengthen the practical powers of this House and increase its prestige, and to enable emi-
  1388
  nent men who do not possess a large fortune to sit in the House without transmitting to their descendants the expenses, or supposed expenses, of an hereditary peerage. Now, I venture to think that this House requires very little increase of practical power and prestige. I am aware that many persons, both in their speeches and writings, have represented that this House is not on a level with the opinions of the time, and that it cannot, therefore, march pari passsû with the House of Commons; but that does not appear to me to be the case. What, let us consider, is the composition of this House as the oldest legislative body in Europe, and as the highest in character and general respect? Some persons have said that it is a House of mere landowners—that is, men of a sort of upper-class farmers; and being so, that they are not as fitted as they might be for the consideration of the general questions which agitate the political world. But is that the fact? Of course many of us are landowners, and are not, I think, as such, incapacitated from considering general questions; but it is not true that we are only landowners. Property of every kind belongs to Members of this House. We are not only owners of land, but owners and even lessees of mines and other industrial property. Among us there are also bankers, railway directors, and men most eminent for their knowledge of commercial affairs, such as the Marquess of Salisbury and other Peers. There are others who are eminent officers of the Army and Navy, who are ready to enter upon discussions of interest to your Lordships relative to those professions. There are more than fifty Peers who have been eminent and distinguished Members of the House of Commons. There are eminent diplomatists, like Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and Lord Cowley. There are historians, among whom I may name my noble Friend behind me (Earl Stanhope), who, if ever your Lordships were mistaken on any point of history, would set you right. There are writers both of prose and poetry, including my noble Friend opposite (Lord Houghton) and another noble Lord (Lord Lytton), than whom no English writer can be more distinguished. There are twelve or fifteen Peers, who possess immense property in this metropolis, and who can assist us in discussions on property, and who are

  1389
  conversant with the wants of the middle and lower classes. There are eminent lawyers, and a great number of magistrates accustomed to judicial decisions, many of them being chairmen of quarter sessions. Now, if your Lordships consider this catalogue of Peers with various qualifications, is it possible to suppose that a legislative Assembly can be more complete in its construction than the House of Lords is? This Assembly, as I understand it, has existed for about three centuries, and I am not aware that at any period it has done anything to derogate from its character and dignity. It is not for a Member of the House to say much on the subject; but during the last few days or weeks your Lordships — according to the opinions of the public Press, and of public opinion everywhere expressed—have most creditably in the eyes of the country maintained your powers of debate and your general capacity in considering important subjects. Well, that being the case, I ask your Lordships whether you think there is any necessity for altering one of the fundamental rules of our Constitution—namely, that peerages should be hereditary. I venture to think there is not. When I consider the opinion of the noble Earl himself, that such a measure as he has proposed is necessary in order to popularize this Assembly, I feel compelled to differ from him altogether. We have had what may be considered the test of the opinion of the people transmitted to us recently by a Gentle-man supposed to represent the more popular opinions of the day, and one at the same time representing Her Majesty's Government. That right hon. Gentleman has publicly declared that this Bill is but a childish tinkering of legislation. It is no less a person than Mr. Bright, a distinguished Member of Her Majesty's Government, who has expressed himself thus. Now, I want to know whether Her Majesty's Government generally agree with Mr. Bright on this point? At all events, so far as the argument of the noble Earl goes as to the necessity of such a Bill in order to make this Assembly more popular, I think the evidence of the right hon. Gentleman in question is worthy of consideration, for he is supposed to know pretty well what the popular opinion is, and it would be hardly fair to make this an exception, and to assert that he cannot answer for
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  popular opinion on this subject. The noble Earl's second reason for introducing the Bill was that it would give an opportunity to men of eminence and ability, but without fortune, to enter this House. Now, he has not given any names to prove that any eminent men who would have done good service in this Assembly have refused peerages on account of their being hereditary. It would be hardly becoming to mention the names of living persons; but I may mention two very eminent men who declined entering this House because they had no children; and I have always thought it one of the noblest feelings of human nature, that a man should not be ambitious of a seat in your Lordships' House, from any selfish vanity, but in order that he might transmit the honour to his descendants. Your Lordships will probably recollect the very touching letter written by Mr. Burke to Mr. Pitt, when, being offered a peerage, he said that ambition and life had lost all interest in his heart since the death of his only son. On that ground, he refused a peerage; and Lord Kingsdown—whose death has been so great a loss to this House—to my knowledge, more than once refused to accept a peerage—although he was so eminent in his profession, and was so calculated to confer honour on the House—because he had no family. It is true that, ultimately, he felt it his duty to accept it. It is supposed that there are men who would accept life peerages; but I very much doubt whether any such men as your Lordships would wish to enter this House would do so. Of course, there are persons ready to accept anything that is offered them; but these are not the men whose admission the noble Earl contemplates. It appears to me that they would stand in such a false position that no men, with the usual amount of pride and self-respect would accept these peerages. They would not be your Lordships' Peers, according to the true sense of the expression, because they would not be your equals in respect of privileges. They would not transmit the title to their descendants; and they would, therefore, be on a different and lower footing from the rest of the House. They would not be nobles, because the very essence of nobility is the succession of the title to posterity. They would thus be in a false position, to say nothing of the equivocal position of their families,

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  both sons and daughters. I do not think, therefore, the noble Earl would easily get such recruits as he wishes, and such as your Lordships would like to see added to this Assembly. If, however, such recruits could be got, observe the political power which would be given to a Prime Minister. I have seen in the public prints a suggestion that a man with such a philosophic mind as the late Member for Westminster (Mr. Mill) might very properly be made a life Peer, if such a measure as the present were passed. Now, I do not think that that was a good illustration of the advantage supposed to be derived from this measure; for supposing the noble Earl had been Prime Minister, and had created Mr. Mill a life Peer under this Bill, he would certainly not have popularized this House by admitting a man who had just failed in an attempt to get a seat in the House of Commons by popular election. Life peerages would present a temptation to a Minister, much more than is the case with hereditary peerages, to create Peers in order to gain political strength; and, if they were courted, the result would be that the Minister would every year have before him a list of candidates for that distinction. Thus, if the noble Earl's expectations be correct, there would be great objection in a political point of view. Mr. Bright has spoken of the Bill in terms of the utmost contempt; and whether or not he is right in thinking this Bill would give no satisfaction to the middle and lower classes, it is my belief that persons who accepted those peerages would find them attended with such inconveniences that they would regret having done so. At all events, I think that it has not been proved that this change in our ancient Constitution is necessary or expedient; and, in the absence of such proof, I protest against a change in our Constitution, which has been in successful operation for more than three centuries. For these reasons it is that I move that the Bill be read a third time this day three months.
  Amendment moved to leave out ("now'') and insert ("this day three months.")— (The Earl of Malmesbury.)
  LORD LYVEDENsaid, he could not for a moment conceive that the creation of life peerages would so completely alter the constitution of the House as seemed to be supposed. He agreed with the
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  noble Earl that this House contained many valuable Members, men both of intelligence and wealth, nor did he think it was advisable to attempt to give it more of a representative character. This Bill would certainly have no such effect, for naval and military men were not generally conversant with the feelings of the people, nor did the legal profession induce men to acquire that knowledge, while diplomatists were accustomed to move in an altogether different sphere. He approved the Bill, however, not as being likely to add to the strength or reputation of the House, but on the ground of convenience. What was it that it was proposed to do? A seat in their Lordships' House was considered to be the greatest honour that a man could arrive at; but at present this honour could not be bestowed upon military men, who had attained to great distinction in the military profession, unless the country provided a fortune for the Peer and his two successors to maintain the dignity. This was virtually creating pensionary Peers, and was extremely objectionable, for it resulted in a pauper peerage, and the third succeeding Peer, being excluded from the profession of the Bar and from commerce, the two most honourable and easy means of making a fortune, had no fortune adequate to the dignity of the peerage, and was, therefore, reduced to a mercenary marriage, or to some other mode of achieving a fortune which was not creditable. It was very unfortunate that men should be placed in a position in which they could not sustain the honour that they had attained. He did not think that the creation of military peerages would increase the reputation of their Lordships' House; but he thought that there should be facilities for conferring that honour. The recent debates, as the noble Earl had remarked, had immensely added to the feeling in favour of the House, owing to the spirited and intelligent manner in which they had been conducted, and to the independence which their Lordships had shown, the right rev. Bench having shown that it included some of the first orators in the country. As to the legal profession, that stood, in reference to peerages, almost in the same position as the military profession. His own opinion was that the best way would be for the Legislature to make ex officio legal peerages, and confer such peerages, for instance, on the Chief Jus-

  1393
  tices of England, Ireland, and Scotland, the Master of the Rolls, and other men eminent in their profession. This would add to the legal strength of the House, and would be a stimulus to the Bar, while the peerages being ex officio, there could be no inferiority attached to them. For the sake of convenience only, and not from any representative view or for the reform of the House of Lords, he should vote for the Bill. Shorn as it was of its fair proportions, he did not know whether it was worth while to persevere with the Bill, and he much regretted the decision of the House in the Wensleydale case. The limitation of the life peerages to two in a year would lead to a canvass and to pressure being brought to bear on the Government whenever there was one left open. He agreed, however, with the noble Earl that there would not be much eagerness in accepting these peerages. Still, there might be men who disliked undergoing contest for a seat in the House of Commons, but who would be useful Members of the Legislature. He remembered being told by a most eminent man, the late Sir Charles Metcalfe, on coming home from India, that he had every qualification for a seat in Parliament, his political views being of the most extreme kind, as they were then—twenty years ago—considered. He was in favour of the Ballot and household suffrage, and he had introduced a free Press in India, and had done other things which everybody else shrank from, but somehow he could not face a hustings mob, and was thus disqualified for a seat in the House of Commons. No man could have been more fitted for the House of Lords, and luckily, having no children, he was able to accept an hereditary peerage, but had he had a family he could not have done so. In a few cases of this kind the Bill would prove beneficial; but the annual creations having been reduced to two, he feared it would be of very little use.
  EARL STANHOPEsaid, that having lately addressed their Lordships upon this Bill, he would trouble them with only a few words upon the present occasion. He still retained the opinion that he expressed when the Bill was first introduced; and he thought that with the limitations that the Bill had now received, it was worthy of their Lordships' support. His noble Friend who had moved the rejection of the Bill (the Earl of Malmesbury) had laid great
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  stress upon the fact that Mr. Bright had spoken very unfavourably of it. He, however, conceived that this was not an argument which should have weight on this side of the House. In the first place, he did not think that the fact that Mr. Bright was opposed to the measure would be a sufficient argument to induce their Lordships to persevere no further with it, for he feared it often happened that they contemned that which Mr. Bright honoured and honoured that which Mr. Bright contemned. But further still, if, as some Members of this House seemed to believe, Mr. Bright were in truth unfriendly to the hereditary branch of the Legislature, he would of course dislike and gainsay those very measures by which the stability of that branch would be best promoted. As to this being an experiment, he maintained that the Members of the right rev. Bench were, to all intents and purposes, life Peers. It was true that a noble Earl (the Earl of Derby), in his speech on going into Committee, while approving generally the principle of the Bill, contended that Bishops were not life Peers, because their peerages depended upon nominal baronies, but this was merely a technical distinction. The question was not by what tenure a Member of the House sat, but whether on his death his dignity and. seat descended to his heir, and if this was not the case it was, for all practical purposes, a life peerage. The example, therefore, of the right rev. Bench furnished a precedent for this proposal, and its very narrowness ought to commend it to their Lordships, since they would run no danger of being led on further than they wished. It would open the doors of the House to eminent men of the legal profession, and others who were highly qualified in every respect, but were not possessed of a sufficient fortune to enable them to accept hereditary peerages. Their Lordships were acquainted with the case of a most eminent and distinguished ornament of the House — he meant the first Lord Denman—who, for a long time, refused a peerage because his fortune was not, in his judgment, adequate at that time to the support of hereditary rank, and there were other cases in which life peerages might be useful. There had recently been a discussion whether the Bishops of the Irish Church should retain their seats in this House after the passing of the Disestablishment Bill,

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  Now, had the principle of life peerages been in operation, the Crown might have conferred that honour on the two Archbishops of the Irish Church, whereas, under present circumstances, it seemed to him that for Prelates of a disestablished Church to retain their seats was repugnant to the principle of disestablishment as admitted by the second reading. He said this with regret, in the presence of one of those most rev. Prelates, and with the sincerest wish that by such a system as that of life Peers, he might continue to be a Member of the House; but, that a Prelate of a Free Church should have a seat in this House, could not be defended on any principle known to the present Constitution. This question was determined the other night without any division being taken; but, if a division had been called, he should have been compelled, with whatever regret, to vote against the continuance of the Irish Prelates in Parliament, after the passing of the Irish Church. Bill. He knew, too, that several Peers on his (the Opposition) side of the House took the same view. The Wensleydale case was the first question to which his attention was directed on becoming a Member of this House, and he thought then, as now, that an unlimited power of creating life Peers would be fatal to the independence of the House; but when the annual creations were restricted to two, and when the Government would be by the terms of the Preamble held responsible for the selection of qualified persons, he could see no ground for apprehension, and he should, therefore, vote in favour of the Bill.
  EARL GRANVILLE: After the speech of the noble Earl (Earl Stanhope) in so much of which I agree, I should not have risen if I had thought there was much question at this stage of the Bill of discussing its merits and demerits, for it appears to me we are beyond that. I shall certainly support the noble Earl (Earl Russell), not merely on account of personal and political ties, but because I think he has been treated on this subject in a manner which he had no reason to expect. There was a debate on the first reading of the Bill, which is not usual, and there was another debate on the second reading. On the latter of these occasions the noble Earl (Earl Malmesbury) was consistent, for he objected to the Bill, but otherwise there was a general concurrence of opinion in its favour. [Lord
  1396
  DENMAN: No!] It was shown by the vote in its favour. With regard to the speeches made, the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Salisbury) said he regarded the Bill as sound in principle [the Marquess of SALISBURY: Hear, hear!]; and though the noble and learned Lord (Lord Cairns) gave a much less cordial support to it, he said it depended entirely on its details. What happened when we got into Committee? Formidable Amendments were proposed on different sides, but after a long discussion we came to a unanimous compromise. Since then nothing has occurred that I know of which should induce your Lordships to form a different opinion respecting the Bill, and I cannot therefore understand why we are now asked to reject it altogether. Allusion has been made to what Mr. Bright said in a letter which, I think, has received quite sufficient consideration in this House. I have great regard for the opinion of Mr. Bright, both as a Colleague and as a friend; but I earnestly protest against that sort of omnipotence being given to Mr. Bright that if he chooses to make a joke, whether your Lordships think it good or bad, on any of your proceedings, you are immediately to be diverted from a course which you originally thought it wise and expedient to take. Then it has been said —"But Mr. Bright is a Member of the Government," and all I can say is that if this Bill should go down to the other House, Mr. Bright would certainly vote for it. I stated from the first that this was not a Government measure, my noble Friend having introduced it as an independent Peer, in order to divest it of any party bearing. The Government have given it here the same support which it will receive from them if it goes down to the House of Commons, and I am at a loss to know what are the grounds on which your Lordships are asked to come to a decision exactly contrary to that at which you arrived on the last stage of the Bill, when you unanimously agreed to a compromise.
  LORD CAIRNS: The remarks of the noble Earl (Earl Granville) call for a few observations from me. This Bill was introduced into the House a very long time ago—I think before Easter—having regard to the length of the Parliamentary Session; and at that time the attendance in your Lordships' House was by no means so large as it has since

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  become. The subject of it was very novel, for since the decision in the Wensleydale case this question had entirely slumbered, and in that case the point was whether the Prerogative of the Crown had been rightly exercised or not, and not whether an alteration of the law should be made enlarging the power of the Crown for the creation of life Peers. Under these circumstances, it is not to be wondered at that on the introduction of the Bill the opinions of your Lordships were very much unformed on the subject, and that very little debate arose. On the second reading, which, I think, was immediately after Easter, I remarked that the Bill might, under certain circumstances, have some advantages, that it depended very much on the details, and, although I should think it my duty to propose some Amendments, I reserved to those around me—who, I believe, were very few at the time—perfect liberty to take such a course as they might think fit on the third reading. I have never concealed my sentiments on this Bill; but I am not going into the matter over again. It appeared to me, in the first place, that the Bill had this about it—that you would by it be creating an inequality that is at present unknown in this House; for I do not admit that the position of the right rev. Bench is at all analogous to the present proposition. They hold their seats by virtue of their offices, and their successors in office are their successors in the Peerage. Then the next objection is this—that it being admitted on all sides that we must limit the Bill in some way, it was agreed that there should be provided an annual limit to the number of Peers created, and the question became one of degree. In the case of hereditary Peers, we all understand that there are at all times a certain number of applications to the Minister for the favour of the Crown. The Minister may, however, say—"I am not going to recommend the creation of any Peers at present," and that is a sufficient answer to the application; but when you say that the Minister shall have power to recommend the creation of two life Peers in any year, they become much more like offices than anything else. The inevitable consequence is that pressure would be put on the Minister every year to go up to the maximum, and if towards the end of the
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  year two Peers had not been made there would be applications to which he would be obliged to accede, for he would otherwise have to tell them the reason why he did not recommend them. If some faithful adherent requests the favour of the Crown, a Minister cannot say—"I have great respect for you, but I must tell you that you are not the sort of person these life peerages were intended for. They were intended for men like Dr. Jenner, or Sir Joshua Reynolds, or Watt, and you therefore cannot have this life peerage." The consequence will be that, there being two vacancies to be filled up, filled up they will be, whether the persons promoted are those who rise to the standard of the noble Earl or not. My third objection was, that though, in some possible cases, there might be benefit from the Bill, it is extremely small, and for the purpose of obtaining that small benefit you are opening up the constitution of this House, and sending it down for discussion in the other House. I should not shrink from that danger if there were any great benefit to be obtained; but it is by no means desirable to run that great risk for the smallest possible amount of benefit. The only benefit suggested is that there might be some persons—for it has never been proved that there would be—who would be very desirable Members of this House, but who might be unwilling to accept an hereditary peerage. These are the views I have always entertained; but even with these views, unfavourable to the Bill, I should not, on the third reading, especially after what was done in Committee, have thought of voting against the Bill but for what has happened since. I do not say that the noble Earl has not pressed the Bill in every way in his power; but the third reading is not fixed till very nearly the middle of July, the House of Commons is very much occupied, and will probably be still more occupied for the remainder of the Session. If it goes down it cannot be considered there until just the close of the Session, and if alterations are made, those alterations, it is not unlikely, will be questions of great interest to your Lordships, but they will come back for re-consideration at a time when the attendance here cannot possibly represent the feelings or sentiments of the House. That is very undesirable. If our busi-

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  ness were so arranged that the Bill could go down to the House of Commons for consideration at the beginning of next Session, and could come back to us early in the Session, it would be a different thing. Another circumstance which has changed the position of the question is this—It was understood at an early stage of the Bill that the Government, though it was not their Bill, thought great advantage would result from it and would be prepared to recommend it elsewhere with, the whole united force of the Government. Upon the Report, however, the noble Duke opposite (the Duke of Argyll) pointed out the great dangers and difficulties of legislation of this kind in a very able way, and though he did not announce his intention of opposing it, he took care to say everything which a very powerful speaker could say against it. He impugned the reasons on which many Members of the House had supported it, and argued that if it was to be supported at all it must be on the very narrowest grounds—grounds which hardly warranted supporting it in any degree. With regard to Mr. Bright's opinion, I do not wish to say anything invidious; it is sufficient to know that a Member of the Government has described it as a childish piece of tinkering. These two circumstances show that it is utterly impossible that it can be commended to the other House by the united support and approbation of the Government, for it will be in the power of Members of the other House to contrast the provisions of the Bill with the opinions expressed by two Members of the Government. Under these circumstances, we should be doing a dangerous and unwise thing, at this period of the Session, to send it down to the House of Commons; and for these reasons, and these alone, I shall vote for the Amendment.
  EARL RUSSELL: I have, at previous stages of the Bill, explained my objects in bringing it forward, and answered the objections which were taken to it. It is, therefore, unnecessary for me to travel over that ground. With regard to raising the reputation of this House, I never pretended that this House required anything of the kind, and after the debates which we have lately heard this would be about the worst moment for questioning its capacity or character in carrying on legislative business. There
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  are, however, persons who from time to time would be very considerable ornaments to this House, and not only so, but would be very useful in the discussion of certain questions, some of whom might not happen to have sufficient means to enable them to accept the burden of an hereditary peerage. The noble Earl (the Earl of Malmesbury) says such persons would refuse life peerages; but I do not see why this should be the case. The noble Earl mentioned the late Lord Kingsdown, who was a great ornament to this House and whose presence there was very useful, but who for some time refused a peerage, and if he had had any family would probably have persisted in that refusal. I do not see why the peerage should be confined to those who have large means, and to those who have neither large means nor large families. A man of great merit and great ability may happen to have a small fortune and a large family of children. I do not pretend that there would be any considerable advantage in making this change in the constitution of this House; but there are obviously cases in which it would prove very useful, and some of those who object to this Bill do so because they wish for a much larger change. The Wensleydale case has been alluded to, and I must say that the resolution which the House then adopted was a most extraordinary one. It appears to me entirely arbitrary, and to have been dictated by the spirit of party. A similar attack on the Prerogative of the Crown was made shortly after the Union with Scotland, for it was contended that no Scotch Peer could be created an English Peer. That Resolution, however, was ultimately reversed. I hope that, after the full consideration the Bill has received, your Lordships will not reject it at this last stage.
  LORD DENMANsaid, the noble Earl who introduced the Bill (Earl Russell) had been compelled to produce the Abyssinian Papers by a majority of only 1; and if there had been one soldier life Peer in the House the Motion would have been defeated. It had been stated that it would be an advantage to the House if certain Judges were to sit ex officio. He knew no learned Judge who would wish to sit in that way. There was a great dearth of Law Lords in

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  the House, in 1856, when the question of life peerages was brought forward, but now there were a great number of Law Lords. The noble Earl (Earl Russell) had spoken of Hallam and other eminent persons, most of whom were bachelors, and who probably would have declined the honour of a life peerage; and as for Mr. Watt, he was so interested in the researches which he followed that he would not be likely to give up his time to political discussions. It was said by Mr. Drummond that if he were for any reform, it would have been for reforming that House, and he referred to the authority of Sir William Temple. He had looked into Sir William Temple's works, and he seemed to have wished to diminish the number of their Lordships' House, instead of increasing it. Sir William Temple appeared to think that no Duke should have less than £8,000, no Marquess less than £7,000, no Earl less than £5,000, no Baron less than £4,000, entailed on his family. In 1818, the subject of diminishing the Peerage was brought forward with the assent of the Sovereign; but an ancestor of the noble Lord who had now spoken in favour of life peerages said that it was so distasteful that it was put off for a year. Perhaps the best course, under present circumstances, would be if this Bill were postponed for twelve months.
  On Question, That ("now") stand part of the Motion?—Their Lordships divided: — Contents 76; Not-Contents 106: Majority 30.

  CONTENTS

  Canterbury, Archp.

  Kimberley, E.

  Hatherley, L. (L. Chancellor.)

  Lichfield, E.

  Minto, E.

  Morley, E.

  Devonshire, D.

  Powis, E.

  Somerset, D.

  Russell, E. [Teller.]

  Saint Germans, E.

  Lansdowne, M.

  Stanhope, E. [Teller.]

  Normanby, M.

  Stradbroke, E.

  Salisbury, M.

  Winchilsea and Nottingham, E.

  Abingdon, E.

  Zetland, E.

  Airlie, E.

  Camperdown, E.

  Eversley, V.

  Carnarvon, E.

  Halifax, V.

  Chichester, E.

  Hood, V.

  Cottenham, E.

  Leinster, V. (D. Leinster.)

  Dartrey, E.

  De Grey, E.

  Lifford, V.

  De La Warr, E.

  Powerscourt, V.

  Fortescue, E.

  Sydney, V.

  Granville, E.

  Grey, E.

  Chester, Bp.

  1402

  Belper, L.

  Methuen, L.

  Boyle, L. (E. Cork and Orrery.)

  Monck, L. (V. Monck.)

  Mostyn, L.

  Calthorpe, L.

  Northbrook, L.

  Camoys, L.

  Poltimore, L.

  Charlemont, L. (E. Charlemont.)

  Ponsonby, L. (E. Bessborough.)

  Clermont, L.

  Romilly, L.

  Clifford of Chudleigh, L.

  Rosebery, L. (E. Rosebery.)

  De Tabley, L.

  Dunning, L. (L. Rollo.)

  Rossie, L.(L. Kinnaird.)

  Ebury, L.

  Sandys, L.

  Fingall, L. (E. Fingall)

  Saye and Sele, L.

  Foley, L.

  Sefton, L. (E. Sefton.)

  Hastings, L.

  Seymour, L. (E. St. Maur.)

  Hatherton, L.

  Keane, L.

  Stratheden, L.

  Lawrence, L.

  Sudeley, L.

  Leigh, L.

  Sundridge, L. (D. Argyll.)

  Lurgan, L.

  Lyveden, L.

  Taunton, L.

  Meredyth, L. (L. Athlumney.)

  Vernon, L.

  NOT-CONTENTS.

  Beaufort, D.

  Selkirk, E.

  Buckingham and Chandos, D.

  Shrewsbury, E.

  Sommers, E.

  Manchester, D.

  Tankerville, E.

  Northumberland, D.

  Richmond, D.

  Clancarty, V. (E. Clancarty.)

  Rutland, D.

  Wellington, D.

  De Vesci, V.

  Gough, V.

  Ailsa, M.

  Hardinge, V.

  Bath, M.

  Hawarden, V.

  Bristol, M.

  Melville, V.

  Exeter, M.

  Sidmouth, V.

  Tweeddale, M.

  Stratford de Redcliffe, V.

  Winchester, M.

  Templetown, V.

  Abergavenny, E.

  Gloucester and Bristol, Bp.

  Amherst, E.

  Bandon, E.

  Beauchamp, E.

  Abinger, L.

  Bradford, E.

  Cairns, L.

  Brooke and Warwick, E.

  Carew, L.

  Brownlow, E.

  Chelmsford, L.

  Dartmouth, E.

  Churston, L.

  Derby, E.

  Clarina, L.

  Doncaster, E. (D. Buccleuch and Queensberry.) [Teller.]

  Clements, L. (E. Leitrim.

  Colchester, L.

  Ellenborough, E.

  Colonsay, L.

  Feversham, E.

  Colville of Culross, L.

  Graham, E. (D. Montrose.

  Congleton, L.

  Denman, L.

  Harewood, E.

  De Ros, L.

  Hillsborough, E. (M. Downshire.)

  De Saumarez, L.

  Dunboyne, L.

  Home, E.

  Egerton, L.

  Kellie, E.

  Foxford, L. (E. Limerick.)

  Lauderdale, E.

  Leven and Melville, E.

  Gormanston, L. (V. Gormanston.)

  Malmesbury, E. [Teller.]

  Manvers, E.

  Granard, L. (E. Granard.)

  Morton, E.

  Nelson, E.

  Grinstead, L. (E. Enniskillen.)

  Portarlington, E.

  Radnor, E.

  Hartismere, L.(L. Henniker.)

  Romney, E.

  Rosse, E.

  Headley, L.

  1403

  Houghton, L.

  Sheffield, L. (E. Sheffield.)

  Hylton, L.

  Sherborne, L.

  Kesteven, L.

  Silchester, L. (E. Longford.)

  Kilmaine, L.

  Lovel and Holland, L. (E. Egmont.)

  Sinclair, L.

  Southampton, L.

  Monson, L.

  Stanley of Alderley, L.

  O'Neill, L.

  Stewart of Garlies, L. (E. Galloway.)

  Penrhyn, L.

  Raglan, L.

  Saint Leonards, L.

  Rayleigh, L.

  Strathnairn, L.

  Redesdale, L.

  Templemore, L.

  Rivers, L.

  Thurlow, L.

  Ross, L. (E. Glasgow.)

  Tredegar, L.

  Saltersford, L. (E. Courtown.)

  Truro, L.

  Walsingham, L.

  Saltoun, L.

  Wynford, L.

  Resolved in the Negative; and Bill to be read 3a on this day three months.

BANKRUPTCY BILL—(No. 154)
(The Lord Chancellor.)
BANKRUPTCY BILL—(No. 154)

  SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading, read.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: In bringing this Bill before the attention of your Lordships, I feel, in the first place, that a few words are due from me in explanation of the fact that the measure comes to us from the other House. It was the desire of some of your Lordships, particularly of my noble and learned Friend on the left (Lord Cairns), that the Bill should have been first introduced into this House early in the Session instead of into the House of Commons; but, my Lords, the motive which influenced me to adopt the course pursued has been justified by the result. This Bill pre-eminently concerns the interests of trade and commerce; and not only have we Gentlemen in the House of Commons eminently qualified to consider the subject in those interests, but we have also in that House a number of Gentlemen, members of the Bar and solicitors in practice, competent to form an opinion on the details of the Bill as affecting a mercantile community, and also upon its principles. I feel, my Lords, that no apology was needed for having brought the subject of bankruptcy under the notice of Parliament this Session, because for several years past Bills have been introduced for the purpose of amending the law, and I am thus very far from claiming any special credit for the particular Bill now before us—upon which, however, I have certainly bestowed great attention—because
  1404
  I have profited in my consideration of the subject by proceedings in reference to the Bills, first of my hon. and learned Friend (Sir Roundell Palmer) in 1866, then of Sir John Rolt in 1867, and then by my noble and learned Friend who sits on my left (Lord Cairns) in 1868. I, therefore, claim no credit whatever for proposing any new scheme or system. All I do claim credit for is having most seriously considered all the information that I could obtain upon the subject. I simply endeavoured, from the various documents placed before me, aided by the results of my experience, to prepare such a Bill as might prove generally acceptable to that part of the community who were more particularly interested. Hitherto the Government has been successful with this measure, for, thanks to the very clear statement of the Attorney General, it has been received from the first moment to the last with considerable favour, and I believe none of its important provisions have been very seriously modified. After all the consideration the subject of bankruptcy has received I shall not weary your Lordships by any historical disquisition upon it, but will rapidly review the course of the Law of Bankruptcy since the year 1821, when the law was consolidated. In that year the laws relating to debtors engaged in trade—and it is to be observed that a distinction was drawn between traders and non-traders—were consolidated. Up to that period they were scattered over a variety of statutes and books of practice, but were, as I have said, consolidated at that time. That Bill worked well, and without any very great dissatisfaction being expressed, up till the year 1831; but at that period dissatisfaction was expressed at the constitution of the tribunal invested with the power of deciding questions in bankruptcy. I refer to the Commissioners in Bankruptcy, who fulfilled various functions, including that of being Judges. This system was very much disliked, and it was further found that the assignees did not answer the purposes for which they were intended as well as was desirable. Accordingly, in the year 1831, a Bill was introduced by Lord Brougham to establish a Court of Bankruptcy, and to introduce official assignees, in whom it was thought the general creditors might have more reliance. After this, things

  1405
  went on till the year 1849, when a considerable change took place with reference to the whole Bankruptcy Law. A new consolidation of the laws was effected, and there was introduced a principle which, at that time, was thought desirable, namely, the principle of giving several classes of certificates by which the Judge could regulate his punishments and inflict whatever measure of it he thought proper. After this had been done the Bankruptcy Acts were found to work so unsatisfactorily that, in the year 1854, a Royal Commission was appointed to inquire into the causes of the great diminution of the funds of bankruptcy used for the payments of the Courts, and also to decide what should be done with reference to the official assignees who did not prove so great a success as was anticipated. My noble and learned Friend near me (Lord Chelmsford) introduced a Bill, in 1859, founded upon the Report of that Commission, well calculated to remedy those defects; but, although it was read a second time, a change of Ministry prevented its further progress. After this Lord Westbury, in 1861, introduced a Bill, which passed and brought about many beneficial reforms, but brought with it also some serious inconveniences. It was beneficial, in the first place, by abolishing the distinction between traders and non-traders, but was defective in another point. Lord Westbury was very desirous that the debtor himself should have an opportunity of declaring, at the earliest possible moment, that he felt himself involved in difficulties, was unable to meet his engagements, was desirous of making an immediate abandonment of his property in favour of his creditors, and was desirous of making application for proceedings in bankruptcy, which, up till that time, it was not competent for him to do. But, unfortunately, though well conceived, the plan was found to work unfavourably to the creditor, because it left a loophole for fraud, and of this I can speak from personal experience, as president of a Court of Appeal in cases of bankruptcy. The fraud was committed in this way—A debtor was allowed to obtain the concurrence of his creditors to wind up his affairs by arrangement, instead of by passing through the Court; and it happened that if he were indebted on Bills of Exchange he managed to keep them
  1406
  out of his account, on the plea that he could not tell who possessed them, and the holders of them were not included among his creditors. Then, every creditor voted, and fraud was frequent by the bankrupt having given security for, say, £2,000 to a creditor for some £3,000, in order that he might go to the meeting and vote in the debtor's favour against those wholly unsecured. To meet this defect in the law Mr. Moffatt, who was then a Member of the House of Commons, selected particular clauses to deal with this particular difficulty, and in 1861 he carried a Bill providing that in all these arrangement deeds the debtors should not merely state the amount of debts, but should give the names and addresses of the creditors and swear to the truth of the statement. This was considered to be necessary, because it was found that fictitious debts had been manufactured in order to enable a debtor to pass through the court and to be whitewashed of his debts. That this species of fraud did take place I can prove by reference to some Returns that have been drawn up, which show the number of persons who availed themselves of these deeds before and after the gentleman I have referred to took the matter in hand, and the clause of the Bill of 1861 was passed. From the 11th October, 1867, to the 11th January, 1868, there were no less than 2,010 deeds executed; while from the 11th October, 1868, to the 11th January, 1869, only 804 were executed. During the first of these periods, again, only 33 per cent was divided among the creditors; while during the latter 66 per cent was divided. These figures show the extent of the fraud which was formerly perpetrated and the advantage gained by the passing of the measure. I now proceed to state what it was led me to devote my attention to the preparation of this one measure in preference to other measures of legal reform. I found that there had been all the measures upon this subject which I have named, and when I was called upon to take a part in public affairs, on the 9th December, there was only an interval of ten weeks before the Session. With the details of the Irish Church Bill to be considered, I did not feel it possible for me to undertake more than one other subject, and therefore I gave my attention to this. Consulting the opinion of

  1407
  men engaged in business, as expressed by the Chambers of Commerce, and having regard to the several Bills which had been introduced, I found one thing which accorded with my own experience pretty clearly established, and it was that there was a strong desire that creditors should be left more to the management of their own affairs, and that the object of the Court should be, first, to take care that justice was rendered to those who might be considered weak—namely, the smaller creditors, who, though a majority in number, might be a minority in the value of their debts; and second, to take care that there was a full disclosure by the bankrupt of all his assets and a secured realization of them. Subject to these two conditions, I found there was an increasing desire that creditors should be left to manage their own affairs upon a principle which was adopted some time ago in Scotland. For the sake of avoiding disappointment hereafter, I may say I do not find the Scotch system quite so cheap as it has been represented to be. As your Lordships are aware, there are three methods adopted in the winding up of companies; they may be either wound up by the Court of Chancery, or wound up voluntarily without the interference of the Court, or they may be wound up voluntarily under the supervision of the Court; and, as the result of my experience in every case that comes before me, I recommend, and, if I can, I enforce, winding up under the supervision of the Court, which I believe to be the best mode to adopt in the winding up of a company. The aim in bankruptcy is to secure a man's assets, as speedily as possible after he is known to be in a hopeless condition, for the equal benefit of all creditors; and the object of the Bill which sanctioned deeds of arrangement was to encourage a man to come forward, as soon as he discovered he was insolvent, and give up the property which was no longer his own to his creditors. Then we have to inquire how you may best induce the honest debtor to disclose his insolvency and prevent the dishonest debtor from withdrawing any part of his property. We thought it best to allow the debtor to call his creditors together, but not to put the Court in motion unless they decide upon doing so. We further propose that any creditor having security shall vote only in respect
  1408
  of the unsecured balance, and, further, to secure the minority of the creditors, we propose that the Court may approve or disprove the deed of arrangement. We proposed that a debtor should be entitled to his discharge when he had paid 10 s. in the pound; but the House of Commons fixed the limit at 6s. 8d. in the pound. Lord Westbury graphically described the swarm of people who poured down upon a bankrupt's effects. There are the messengers, who are not wanted at all. A number of respectable firms of Liverpool write to me to say that, in the great majority of cases, no messenger is required. They say that in most cases the bankrupt can be left in possession of his property. They say, further, the official assignee is a useless officer, and they need neither the one nor the other. The course we have adopted is to leave it to the creditors, immediately after a bankruptcy, to make an application for adjudication in bankruptcy; to hold a meeting immediately after obtaining this for the purpose of choosing trustees, and when they are appointed to hold another meeting. But, in order to secure against any improper dealing with the bankrupt, it was determined to get rid of the messenger immediately after adjudication. By doing this we think we have taken a good means of securing the realization of the assets, and also have held out inducements to the bankrupt to meet his creditors at the earliest possible period after he thinks he has become bankrupt. That having been done, the next thing to be considered was what was to be done after the discharge of the bankrupt. The Act of 1849 acted with great severity towards the bankrupt after he had surrendered his property. Having secured the assets, the question which we next considered was how we were to distribute them and not punish the bankrupt? If he is to be punished at all he should be punished in a different way, and with that object I shall presently say a few words on another Bill which I shall introduce to your Lordships by-and-by. We think that the question of awarding punishment and the handing over the assets to the creditors should be kept entirely distinct, and accordingly we have confined the power of imprisonment to the cases where the bankrupt, by not yielding up his property or neglecting to answer questions put to him, has been guilty of

  1409
  contempt of the Court. What we do is this—We place the property of the bankrupt in the hands of a trustee, who is selected by the creditors, and his proceedings are subject to the supervision of inspectors, who superintend what he does; and, what is still more important, the trustee is bound not only to render a quarterly account to the inspectors, but is under a heavy penalty in the shape of increased interest to hand over all moneys belonging to the bankrupt's estate within ten days of their coming into his possession. Again, a Controller will be appointed to superintend the whole of the districts of bankruptcy throughout England, and he will be required to render his account yearly. When a report is made to the Court stating that no more sums remain to be collected on account of the bankrupt's estate, the bankruptcy will be declared closed. A bankrupt whose estate pays 10 s. in the pound will be discharged from further liability; and the creditors themselves have power to grant a release where even less is paid, by coming to a resolution in open Court that the bankruptcy was due to involuntary misfortune, and was not attributable to any misconduct on the part of the bankrupt. If, however, the bankrupt be not discharged, and the bankruptcy be not declared closed, then this result follows—We have thought it right to recur to some extent to the provisions of the Insolvent Debtors' Act. As your Lordships know, an insolvent was never discharged from his liabilities, and his future property might always be demanded in payment of his debts. And certainly a great scandal has arisen from the fact that men who have paid little or nothing to their creditors have, after having passed through the Bankruptcy Court, been able subsequently to amass considerable property, while their creditors have remained unpaid and been—what I believe it is but just to term—defrauded. We propose that the bankrupt shall have three years in which to rehabilitate himself, during which period he shall remain unmolested by his creditors. At the end of the three years, unless his bankruptcy shall have been declared closed, any of his former creditors may apply to the Judge, and, on stating that he has ascertained that the bankrupt is in possession of considerable property, may ask for an order sequestrating a
  1410
  portion of it. I think that this will be a proper place to say how much reason there really was to be dissatisfied with the existing system. In 1868, out of 9,125 adjudications in bankruptcy, 6,679 were on debtors' petitions—a thing which we, of course, propose to abolish—and 817 on the petitions of the creditors, others being made by the registrars of prisons, and others in formâ pauperis. There were 1,714 cases in which dividends were paid, and, in 6,489 cases, no dividend at all was realized. It is obvious, therefore, that the existing system has given rise to a gross system of fraud. The next point I come to is the nature of the Court which we propose should preside over the administration of matters in bankruptcy. It is necessary that there should be some Court, as knotty questions demanding solution will occasionally arise. But such questions as will ordinarily occur, of law or otherwise, may be settled by the trustee, who is, however, amenable to the Court. While upon the subject of deeds I ought to mention that a very fruitful source of litigation hitherto, in courts both of law and equity, has been the validity of the deeds. We propose that the Judge in Bankruptcy shall settle that question once for all. It is only with regard to the Court that any change has been made in the plan I drew up. It was the opinion of the members of the Judicature Commission, though this particular subject did not come under their consideration, that it was desirable in the establishment of any new Court that it should be empowered to deal with questions both in law and equity. Representations, too, on this point were made by the Chambers of Commerce from Liverpool, Manchester, and other large towns, and we therefore determined that the Court should have jurisdiction on all matters connected either with law or equity. I also thought, for the same reason, that it would be desirable that one of the Superior Courts in London should take charge of bankruptcy, and I found upon inquiry that a Common Law Judge was to be preferred. I found that, in London as well as in the country, there was a strong desire to get rid of a peculiar Court. On. this point, however, let me not be misunderstood. I do not mean to say that any complaint was urged against those by whom business in bankruptcy is ad-

  1411
  ministered. The demand in this direction did not arise from any dissatisfaction of that nature. Now, my Lords, I thought that a Common Law Judge was preferable because the duties could be performed by him without taking him away from his Court, because there would be an easy appeal to the Judges in banco, and because the plan would not entail any increased expenditure, inasmuch as the Judge would be relieved from attendance on circuit, and would thus find ample compensation in the increase of comfort and leisure which would naturally arise from this arrangement. In the House of Commons, however, Sir Roundell Palmer directed attention to the abilities of the learned Judge of the existing Court of Bankruptcy—and in the tribute that was paid to that learned Judge I entirely concur—and suggested that that learned Judge should in the first instance be appointed as the Chief Judge, and that the plan I originally drew up should be adopted upon Ms vacating his office. Of course the Government had no objection to the adoption of that course. As the matter now stands-he will receive the same remuneration as he now does; but that arises rather from the way in which the matter was introduced into the House of Commons, when this plan was recommended on the ground that it would not be accompanied by any increased expenditure. There will then be one Judge instead of three, but I believe that under this Bill there will be no increase in the amount of work that he will be called upon to perform, although if there should be there will be no difficulty in doing what is right and just. Under this Bill matters will to a great extent be in the hands of the creditors themselves, and we shall consequently cease to witness those unseemly disturbances which at times do occur under the existing system, and, indeed, as were witnessed yesterday in one of our police courts. I need not detain your Lordships by going further into the details of the Bill, every portion of which has been so fully discussed in "another place." I may, however, briefly refer to a Bill which is a corollary of the one to which I have been referring. The Imprisonment for Debt Bill will come before your Lordships immediately, and there is a third Bill—a repealing measure—to remove all the statutes which stand in the way of the
  1412
  two other Bills. In the Imprisonment for Debt Bill are matters which will be found to require much consideration from your Lordships. We propose to abolish imprisonment for debt. Where there is mere doubt we propose that there should be no imprisonment; but where a person has contracted debts fradulently there we give a power of imprisonment. At present the County Court Judges can imprison debtors against whom orders for payment have been made, and who, having the means to comply with those orders, refuse to do so. Out of 300,000 cases of debt coming before the County Court Judges each year about 7,000 persons are ordered to prison, or about 2½ per cent of the total number of debtors. We felt that either the powers of the County Court Judges to imprisonment for debt should be abolished, or the principle must be extended. We could not have one law for the rich and the other for the poor. We concluded, therefore, that we must introduce an analogous power in the case of larger debtors, because all the County Court Judges who gave any opinion on the subject were unanimously of opinion that it would be very dangerous to withdraw the power in the case of small debtors. At present the jurisdiction of the County Court Judges in respect to imprisonment reaches only to debts of £20. Under this Bill it will be extended to debts of £50, and the Superior Courts will have a similar jurisdiction in cases beyond that amount. My Lords, I do not conceal from myself that it is impossible to assert beforehand the success of any measure like this Bankruptcy Bill. I have, however, strong hopes of its success. In the House of Commons it received a very remarkable amount of support. It has been considered and approved by some of the ablest lawyers and some of the most eminent solicitors. Another great advantage is, that owing to the ability of the able draftsman who drew it up, the Bill contains only 130 clauses, and, coupling it with the Bill for the Abolition of Imprisonment for Debt and the repealing Bill, the whole of this new bankruptcy code comprises only 180 clauses—a number which, I believe, will be considered very moderate by all those who remember the history of our past legislation upon this subject. We proceed on the principle of saying to the creditors—"Take the whole thing

  1413
  in your own hands. We enable you to put in motion a machinery by which you may realize assets for yourself. More than that the Legislature cannot do." My Lords, if this attempt fails I do not at present see what else we can do; but I think there is everything to justify us in hoping that the attempt will be successful, and therefore it is with considerable confidence I ask your Lordships to read the Bill a second time.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a."—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  LORD CAIRNS: My Lords, judging from the appearance of the House, I think the subject of bankruptcy as years roll on is not growing more attractive. But, be that as it may, knowing the difficulty of preparing Bankruptcy Bills, I congratulate my noble and learned Friend (the Lord Chancellor) on the fact that this measure has attained the stage it has now reached. In all the leading principles of the Bill I entirely concur. It is the principle on which the last three Bankruptcy Bills have been framed —namely, that the creditors should be made, as far as they can be made so with safety, the arbiters and masters of their own business and their own property. In other words that there should be a maximum of power in the creditors and a minimum of interference on the part of the Court. I must, however, make a complaint, not against my noble and learned Friend, but against the course taken by the Government with respect to the introduction of this Bill. Early in the Session we urged on the Government the necessity of introducing the Bill in this House in the first instance rather than in the House of Commons, and we foretold what has come to pass—that if the Government did not take that course the Bill would not reach this House until a period when to send it to a Select Committee—and a Bill of this character ought to be examined by a Select Committee—would be tantamount to rejecting it. Let me now make one or two observations upon the details of the measure. I agree with my noble and learned Friend that it is a pleasant thing to hear of a Bankruptcy Bill of only 180 clauses. But we should deceive ourselves if we judged the measure merely by the number of its clauses. This is, no doubt, shorter than other Bankruptcy Bills; but the reason of that
  1414
  is that it is not a Bankruptcy Bill in the sense of containing within itself the Law of Bankruptcy. It is rather one to empower the Lord Chancellor and the Chief Judge in Bankruptcy to make a Bankruptcy Bill. In every section the word "prescribed" occurs. Almost everything in it is something "prescribed," this word having reference to the orders which were to be framed by the Lord Chancellor and the Chief Judge. I think it is well to leave a good deal to be done by means of general orders, but I doubt whether this Bill may not carry that principle to an extreme length. Again, my Lords, while in the Bankruptcy Bills passed from time to time one uniform phraseology had been adopted, an entirely new phraseology is introduced into the bankruptcy system by the Bill now before your Lordships. I think it would have been well to preserve the old phraseology, because by the introduction of those new terms we run the danger of rendering the whole of the previous decisions on questions of bankruptcy perfectly useless. The question is—what is this House to do with the Bill? The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack says that it deserves our most careful consideration. That a measure of this nature deserves the best consideration that your Lordships can give to it is undoubted; but it appears to me that, with questions of importance arising upon almost every clause, the Bill could only receive due consideration before a Select Committee. To refer the Bill, however, to a Select Committee at this period of the Session would be tantamount to saying that it should not pass this Session, and therefore I do not propose to ask your Lordships to adopt that course. I cannot, however, help feeling painfully that this Bill will pass—if it does pass—through this House without receiving that amount of consideration which it deserves at your Lordships' hands. I have to express my satisfaction with the excellent change which was effected in the other House of Parliament, by which Mr. Commissioner Bacon, the present head of the Bankruptcy Court in London, is to be appointed the Chief Judge of the new Bankruptcy Court, in place of one of the Common Law or Equity Judges. It is with no want of respect to the learned Common Law and Equity Judges that I say that in point of ability, efficiency and

  1415
  great and varied experience in bankruptcy matters, no better selection could have been made than that to which I have referred. By some oversight, however, the Bill provides that the salary of the learned Judge who is to be appointed to fill this responsible and arduous office shall only be the same as that he now receives; while the other Commissioners —happy men—are to be allowed to retire and receive their salaries for doing nothing. This is, however, evidently a mere oversight, and will doubtless be remedied in Committee. I also think that the question of the compensation of the other bankruptcy officers both in London and in the country should be considered in Committee, as, in my opinion, the Bill as it stands proposes to treat them rather hardly. Under the Bill, as it was originally introduced into the other House, all those officers who held their situations during good behaviour were to retire upon their full salaries; but just before the Bill had passed through Committee, on the Motion of a Member of the Government (the Secretary to the Treasury) an entire change was effected in the treatment they were to receive under the Bill. I feel assured that your Lordships will not approve this method of treating servants of the public, and that you will, in Committee upon the Bill, see that they have justice done them. In conclusion, I may state that I shall be glad to offer the noble and learned Lord all the assistance in my power towards rendering this Bill a satisfactory measure.
  LORD ROMILLY: I rise merely to express my general concurrence in what has fallen from the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, and from the noble and learned Lord opposite. I may, however, point out that the orders to be issued by the Lord Chancellor under this Bill, if not found to work satisfactorily, can be varied with greater facility than the provisions of an Act of Parliament could be. There are, however, many matters in this Bill which demand serious attention. I am unable to understand why any distinction is made in freedom from imprisonment depending on the amount of the debt. The power of imprisoning the debtor for the purpose of enforcing the payment of debts recovered in the County Courts appears to me to be very objectionable, and to encourage tallymen and an injurious system of credit. I admit that all, or nearly all, the Judges
  1416
  of these Courts are strongly in favour of preserving to them that power; but they are not, in my opinion, the best judges. And it should be remembered that no adage of the law is more earnestly clung to by Judges than that—
  "Boni judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem."
  Nor is there one which ought to be more carefully watched and defined. I hope that the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack will appoint such a day for going into Committee upon the Bill as will give those noble Lords who desire to do so ample time for preparing the Amendments upon the measure which they may desire to propose.
  LORD CHELMSFORD: I feel disposed simply to echo the observations of the noble and learned Lord who has just sat down; but I may be permitted to remark that when I introduced a Bill upon this subject some time since the commercial world appeared to be divided in opinion as to whether the creditors should be permitted to have the entire control of the bankrupt's estate, or whether the matter should be taken out of the hands of the creditors altogether, and the power of dealing with the bankrupt's estate be given to the Court. From what has fallen from the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, however, it would appear that the commercial world has now come to the conclusion to place the matter altogether in the hands of the creditors, leaving the Court only a minimum of power to supervise their proceedings. I can assure the noble and learned Lord that I will do my best to assist him in making this Bill as satisfactory as possible.
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I have to express my thanks to the noble and learned Lords for the kind consideration they have promised to give to this Bill. The reason for the provision as to general orders is that those orders, if found unsatisfactory in practice, may be altered. With regard to the phraseology of the Bill, I may observe that it has been approved by the House of Commons, and by large numbers of eminent members of the Bar, and by solicitors generally. In order to afford ample time for the preparation of Amendments by your Lordships, I will fix Friday week for going into Committee upon the Bill.
  Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Friday the 16 th instant.

MUNICIPAL FRANCHISE BILL.
(The Earl of Lichfield.)
MUNICIPAL FRANCHISE BILL.

  (NO. 125.) SECOND READING.
  THE EARL OF LICHFIELD, in moving that the Bill be now read a second time, said, that it proposed an innovation in giving to women the right to exercise the municipal franchise; but when they paid the rates they had the same interest in an economical administration of municipal funds, and in the efficient management of municipal affairs, as any other inhabitants. The Bill would afford considerable convenience to persons claiming the right to vote, because they would go before one court instead of two, and it would be attended with a saving to the rate-payers.
  Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Tuesday next.

  CONTAGIOUS DISEASES PEEVENTION (METROPOLIS) BILL [H.L.]
  A Bill for the better prevention of Contagious Diseases in the City of London and within the Metropolitan Police District—Was presented by The Marquess TOWNSHEND; read la. (No. 176.)
  House adjourned at a quarter before Eight o'clock, till To-morrow, half past Ten o'clock.