Lords Sitting of 27 March 1868

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Indian Railway Companies * (57); Oyster and Mussel Fisheries* (58).
Committee—Railways (Extension of Time)* (36); Consolidated Fund (£362,398 19 s. 9d.)*; Legitimacy Declaration (Ireland)* (27).
Report—Consolidated Fund (£362,398 19 s. 9d.)*; Legitimacy Declaration (Ireland)* (27).
Third Reading—Fairs (Ireland)* (47), and passed.

SCOTLAND—POOR ASSESSMENT.

  MOTION FOR RETURNS.
  THE EARL OF AIRLIEsaid: I think that the Returns which I propose to move for will throw some light on a measure that is likely to come before the House this Session—I mean the Bill to Amend the Representation of the People in Scotland. As that Bill is not now before your Lordships, of course I do not mean to discuss its provisions; and I shall not refer to it further than to say that I understand it is the intention of the Government to propose for Scotland the same occupation franchise in counties that was embodied in the Reform Act of last year—a franchise based on rateable value. As a general rule, I am strongly in favour of placing England and Scotland as nearly as possible on the same footing; but I think if we can show that there are circumstances in the case of Scotland which make it inexpedient to adopt a franchise founded on rateable value, that we are fairly entitled to press that consideration upon the Government. Perhaps, for the sake of strengthening my case, I may be allowed to refer to what has lately taken place. A very short time ago, the Prime Minister addressed a letter to the newspapers in which he laid down the principles on which a Conservative Reform Bill should be founded. One of those cardinal points was that no place should be wholly disfranchised. But I understand that in

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  the case of Ireland the Government propose wholly to disfranchise five or six boroughs. I understand also that the much-abused "hard and fast line," which the right hon. Gentleman denounced last year as wholly inadmissible, is to be adopted in the Irish Reform Bill. I refer to these circumstances not for the sake of taunting the Government with having abandoned some of those Conservative principles which the Leader of the Party invented for them last year, and which he affirmed again this year, some ten days before he threw them over, but because I wish to point out that the Government are not exactly in a position to require us to accept any provisions I which they may choose to put into the Scotch Reform Bill, merely because they happen to have been inserted in the Reform Act of last year. In the few observations I am about to make, I shall confine myself entirely to the county occupation franchise, because I take it for granted that the burgh franchise in Scotland will be the same as the English borough franchise—that is, that it will be simple household suffrage. We have in Scotland that which you have not in England, a valuation of the whole property of the country, founded upon that which, after all, is the true measure of value, the rent actually paid by the occupier. On that valuation all rates are assessed with the exception of the poor rates, and, in some counties, of the rates levied for keeping up the roads. Nothing would be simpler than to make the valuation roll the register, as practically it is now. The figure to which you should reduce the franchise so as to make it equivalent to a £12 rating in England would be a fair subject for discussion. But when you come to deal with the rateable value on which the poor rates are assessed, and seek to found a franchise on it, you get into all sorts of difficulties. In the first place, there are about a hundred parishes in Scotland where the occupiers are not rated for the relief of the poor. If you say that rateable value is to be the basis of the franchise, you cannot leave the state of things in those parishes exactly as it is at present, because the result would be not only that there would be no enfranchisement in those parishes, but that the occupiers who now have votes would actually be disfranchised; and, of course, that is too absurd a conclusion to be contemplated. There remains, then, only one alternative—you may force an assessment for the relief of the poor on those parishes where it does not
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  now exist. I cannot imagine that the Government will bring forward so mischievous a proposal. Why are there no poor rates in the parishes I have referred to? Because there is full employment for the able-bodied men, and the sick and infirm are supported mainly by their relatives, who, from a feeling of honourable pride, are not willing that they should be dependent upon strangers. Any small deficiency there may be is made up by collections in church, supplemented by voluntary contributions from the proprietors. To force an assessment on these parishes would go far to demoralize and pauperize them. The only course, then, open to you with regard to these parishes is, that the assessor should be called upon to make deductions from the rents paid by the occupiers, for the sake of establishing what you may call a rateable value, but which really is not a rateable value because no rates are assessed on it; there are no poor rates, and all the other rates are levied on the gross rental. You are going to establish a fictitious valuation, not for the purpose of rating, but merely to ascertain the occupier's qualification to vote, when you might arrive at the same result by much simpler means, I come now to those parishes—the great majority—in which the occupiers are rated for the relief of the poor. In these parishes, the valuations are made by the parochial boards, who are authorized to make deductions, and those deductions are not made on any uniform principle. They vary greatly, not only as between different kinds of property, but as between property of the same kind in different parishes. I have had occasion to look into this matter of parochial assessments, and I find that in the county of Forfar the deductions vary from nothing at all to about 40 per cent—that is to say, in one parish an occupier who pays £12 is rated at £12, while in other parishes a £12 rating is equivalent to a rent of about £20. I believe that as great discrepancies exist in the other counties which are included in the Return moved for. I have here a Return made up by those persons whose duty it is to collect the poor rates in the county of Renfrew. I find that the deductions allowed to occupiers of the same description of property vary in different parishes from nothing at all up to 75 per cent. As to dwelling-houses, in five parishes there is no deduction made, and in them a £12 rental and a £12 rating are synonymous; in one parish a deduction is made of 33¾

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  per cent, and there a £12 rating is equivalent to a rental of £18; in other parishes the deductions vary from 10 to 25 per cent, and the amount of gross rent required to give a £12 rating varies from £13 to £16. But in the case of lands, the discrepancies are much greater. In three parishes no deductions are made; in two parishes a deduction is given of 75 per cent, and in those, to get a £12 rating an occupier must pay a rent of £48. Between these limits there is almost every conceivable variety in the amount of deductions allowed. If, then, you found the county occupation franchise on the rateable value on which the poor rates are assessed, and if you fix the figure at £12, the result will be this, that in one parish an occupier who pays a rent of £12 will have a vote, while his neighbour, perhaps in the next parish, will not be qualified to vote for the same county unless he pays a rent of £48. This is an inequality too monstrous to be endured; the county franchise must be established on a basis which shall approximate at least to justice and equality. But I do not understand that it is the intention of the Government to alter in any way the laws relating to the assessments for the relief of the poor in Scotland. We come, then, to this point, that while the valuation for purposes of assessment is to be continued on the old footing, another valuation is to be made, not for purposes of assessment, but in order to ascertain the qualification of occupiers to vote. To make this valuation, we must set in motion a machinery of some kind—we must have a staff of clerks, and this needless expense and trouble is to be incurred merely for the sake of enabling the Government to preserve what they are pleased to call their consistency. It may be said that I have anticipated, in some degree, a discussion that might more conveniently have taken place when the Scotch Reform Bill came before this House. I will endeavour to meet that objection. I cannot forget what took place last year when a far greater measure—the English Reform Bill—came before your Lordships. On that occasion very important Amendments were proposed by two eminent Members of this House. Nobody can pretend that those Amendments were in any degree factious, or that any exception could be taken, on that ground, to the speeches by which they were supported. Those Amendments were honestly intended to assist the Government in framing a measure which might have some elements of
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  permanence. How were those proposals met? The Government not only opposed the Amendments; they refused even to discuss them. They said, in effect—Your proposals may be good or bad, but we cannot consider them, it is too late; the subject has been fully discussed in the House of Commons; if you introduce any material alterations, we throw upon you the responsibility for the loss of the Bill. That was the manner in which this great measure was dealt with here—that was the manner in which this House was treated by a Government which calls itself Conservative. I cannot expect that the Scotch Reform Bill will be treated with more ceremony than the English Bill—I cannot expect that the Government will show more respect and consideration for your Lordships' House this year than they did last year. I have moved for these Returns, because I wish that this particular point, as well as the Bill itself, may be fully discussed, and discussed in good time, both here and elsewhere; and I am not without hopes, when the matter is placed in its true light, that Parliament will adopt a county franchise founded on the real rent, and will reject this fanciful scheme of a franchise founded on what is called rateable value, but which is not rateable value at all, because no rates are to be assessed on it.
  Motion for,
  Return from each Parish in the several Counties of East Lothian, Mid Lothian, Lanark, Renfrew, Ayr, Aberdeen, Fife, and Forfar, showing in a tabular Form the Deductions allowed by Parochial Boards to the several Classes of Occupiers of Lands, Minerals, Dwelling Houses, Public Works, and Railways; and showing the Gross Rent which, subject to such Deductions, is required in order to give to each Class of Occupiers a clear Rent of £12 rated for Poor Assessment: Also, for a Return of the Parishes in Scotland in which the Occupiers are not rated for the Relief of the Poor.—(The Earl of Airlie.)
  THE EARL OF DEVONthought it more convenient to abstain from discussing the details of a measure which was not yet before their Lordships; and he would therefore merely state that the Government had no objection to the production of the Return.
  Motion agreed to.

UNITED STATES—THE NEUTRALITY LAWS—THE "ALABAMA" CLAIMS.

  MOTION FOR PAPERS.
  EARL RUSSELL: I rise for the purpose of calling your Lordships' attention to the Commission on the Neutrality Laws, and to ask, how soon the Report of the Commission will be laid before Parliament? and to move that—
  "An humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for, Copies or Extracts of any further Correspondence that may have taken place between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States in reference to the Alabama and other claims."
  My Lords, in doing this, though I do not desire to censure the course of the Government, yet I may say that I do not concur in that course. My wish is that this country shall avoid as much as possible just the opposite error to that which both Houses of Parliament were disposed to fall into three or four years ago. During the progress of the civil war in America it was evident that a considerable number of Members of both Houses were hardly prepared to do justice to the Government of the United States, and as non-belligerents to perform all the duties of neutrality in good faith, and to abstain from everything to which that Government could justly take exception. I remember that when, on one occasion, I referred to the Southern States as the "so-called" Confederate States, the Leader of the Opposition told me that I might with just as much propriety speak of the United States as the "so-called United States;" and the same noble Earl indulged in a panegyric upon Mr. Laird, who, in my view, was usurping the Prerogative of the Crown and endeavouring to make war on his own account, thereby running the risk of involving this country in hostilities. It will also be remembered that, in the presence of a large company of Members of the House of Commons, Mr. Laird said he was proud of having fitted out the Alabama, and much preferred being the builder of that vessel to having made such a speech as Mr. Bright had recently delivered; and that statement was loudly applauded by many hon. Members. All this shows that many Members in both Houses were not prepared to do everything required by the duties of neutrality. Moreover, some noble Friends of mine objected very strongly to our allowing ships fitted out in this country for the purpose of running
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  the blockade to be subject to the common law of nations, which exposed merchant ships to the risk of capture if they carried anything contraband of war. They were for protecting such ships by the naval force of this country. I find that the danger now is of a totally different kind. I find that that partiality for the Southern States has altogether ceased; and that, instead of the difficulty which I had to encounter, as the Minister of the Crown, in performing the duties of neutrality, there is a difficulty in preserving the proper position and dignity of this country against unreasonable or unfounded demands. Not that I think any objection can be taken to the course that has been pursued by the United States Government. It is only natural that people who suffered from the capture of their merchant ships and the destruction of their property should come to us for redress. The Government of that country have stated their case very temperately, and it is not from them that any of the excitement which has lately prevailed has arisen. It is persons in this country who, when the excitement caused by the capture of the Alabama and other vessels was entirely allayed in America, have raised the question anew, being apparently apprehensive that we shall have to meet the heavy claims which have been preferred. I confess that, under these circumstances, I feel considerable apprehension that the Government maybe so pressed, that, either by negotiation or by the introduction of a Bill into Parliament at a time when the business of the Session is hurried through—or, perhaps, by both modes—our position as a neutral nation may be endangered, and we may concede demands to which, as an independent Power, we ought not to submit. It is with this view, therefore, that I beg to recall to your Lordships some of the circumstances which have occurred since the present Government have been in power, and also during the former Government. Just before I left the Foreign Office I had a correspondence with Mr. Adams; and here I may say, that I cannot mention that gentleman's name without expressing my high esteem and respect for him, the value I place upon his character, and the assurance I feel that in conducting business he did everything which honour and good faith and moderation could prescribe. While carrying out the orders of his Government, his invariably conciliatory conduct tended to render easy what would otherwise have been an almost impossible task. Now, with regard to Mr. Adams,

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  I may state the way in which he and I left the question when I was about to leave the Foreign Office. I wrote to Mr. Adams stating the whole case as then understood by Her Majesty's Government, and about a fortnight afterwards an answer was received by my noble Friend (Lord Clarendon), going through all the points to which I had addressed myself. Mr. Adams stated that upon the law we entirely agreed. I had said frequently that the conduct of the United States towards Portugal in 1818 was such as might advantageously be followed, since when some Portuguese ships had been captured by privateers fitted out in America they did all that was required by their neutral position and by their dignity as an independent State. Mr. Adams, at the commencement of his letter, stated that, as we entirely agreed upon the law, there was no need of carrying on further discussion upon that subject; but he went on to make a statement with respect to the facts of the case. I had expressed a hope that there might be some legislation which would tend to ascertain more precisely the position of neutrals, and on which both Powers might agree. Mr. Adams, remarking upon this, said—
  "So long as the heavy list of depredations upon American commerce, consequent upon the issue of a succession of hostile cruizers, built, fitted out, armed, manned, and navigated from British ports, continues to weigh upon their minds, it would be the height of assurance to expect any common legislation."
  Upon this Lord Clarendon, in a letter dated the 2nd of December, 1865, remarked—
  "It is, nevertheless, my duty in closing this correspondence to observe that no armed vessel departed during the war from a British port to cruize against the commerce of the United States."
  Thus, while there was an agreement respecting the law of the case, there was the widest difference with respect to the facts. Mr. Adams spoke of a succession of armed cruizers being fitted out in British ports. But Lord Clarendon said that no such cruizers left British ports to prey upon the commerce of the United States. The noble Lord who now holds the seals of the Foreign Office differs so far from me, that he holds it was wise to submit the question at issue in this controversy to arbitration. I have already stated in this House that that is a matter entirely within the discretion of the Secretary of State; and that the fact of my having refused to submit the question to arbitration was no reason whatever against Lord Stanley adopting that
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  mode if he thought that beneficial results would follow, and to that course I could not make any objection. But I certainly do not anticipate any good results from arbitration. Now, as to the questions to be submitted to arbitration, I own I cannot concur with Her Majesty's present Government. It seems to me that, Mr. Adams having stated that a succession of hostile cruizers, manned and armed by this country, had been sent out to prey upon the commerce of the United States, and Lord Clarendon having distinctly denied that assertion, the first thing for an arbiter or for any Commission that might be appointed to investigate would be the facts. If it was found that there had been armed vessels, or even that there had been vessels built and equipped in this country, that had gone out to prey on the commerce of the United States, it would then become a substantive question to ascertain whether there had been any want of due diligence on the part of the Government of this country. In the meantime it would seem to be useless to place so vague a question before an arbiter as whether this country was morally responsible for that which had been done during the war. Evidently that would be an entirely independent question. I know not in what manner any arbiter or Commission could proceed unless first to ascertain the facts of the case. Now, my I Lords, I wish to make some observations on a very few cases concerning which there may be a complaint that armed vessels had been sent out to prey upon the commerce of the so-called Confederate States. One of the first of these cases was that of the Florida. She was equipped here, and afterwards obtained a commission at Mobile, a port belonging to the so-called Confederate States. The next case was that very remarkable one which has given rise to the greater part of this correspondence—that of the Alabama. Now, unless it be said that the Government are morally responsible for the mental illness of Sir John Harding, I do not know how we can be held blamable. According to the Opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown, there was not sufficient evidence upon which the Government could proceed to detain that vessel until the 24th of July. The Opinion of Sir Robert Collier, upon which the American Minister relied, was taken on the 23rd of July. If Sir John Harding had been in possession of his usual judgment upon that day, the Law Officers

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  would have agreed upon an Opinion, and on the 25th the Alahama would have been detained. But, unfortunately, it so happened that the great excitement to which Sir John Harding had been subjected in the course of these questions unfitted his mind for giving an opinion on so important a matter, and therefore some little time was lost, and it was not until the morning of the 29th of July that the Foreign Office were in possession of the Opinion of the Law Officers. That Opinion would have been immediately acted upon, but on that day information was received that the Alabama had gone to sea upon a trial trip. Orders were immediately sent to Queenstown and also to Nassau with a view to the detention of the vessel; but I hold in my hand an account sent by the Consul of the United States at Liverpool to Mr. Adams, to the effect that she was not an armed vessel, and that after going, I think, to Beaumaris, she sailed round by the North of Ireland, and never stopped until she reached the Azores. There she obtained from another vessel her powder and stores. The Alabama was therefore not an armed vessel when leaving this country, and it was in the jurisdiction of another Sovereign that she received her armament. With regard to the question of neutrality, the policy of the United States may be said to be founded upon the conduct of the American President and Secretary of State in 1794. Until that time it had been held by writers on the Law of Nations that a neutral Power might take one of two courses — it might either allow arms and ammunition to be supplied to two belligerents impartially, or it might abstain from giving succour to either. The latter course was thought by Washington to be the safer and wiser. That course was followed by the United States in 1794, and the law remained in that condition until the wars broke out between the colonies of Spain and Portugal and the mother countries, when great complaints were made by the latter of the number of captures that had been made by the cruizers acting from the United States. I hold in my hand the complaint made on the 8th of March, 1818, by Senhor Correa de Serra to the United States Government, in which he said that three Portuguese ships had been captured by privateers fitted out in the United States, manned by American crews, and commanded by American captains, though under insurgent colours, and
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  he demanded satisfaction and indemnification for the injury which had been done to Portuguese subjects, as well as for the insult which had been offered to the Portuguese flag. To this letter the American Secretary of State, after reciting the complaint of the Portuguese Minister, replies as follows:—
  "The Government of the United States having used all the means in its power to prevent the fitting out and arming of vessels in their ports to cruize against any nation with whom they are at peace, and having faithfully carried into execution the laws enacted to preserve inviolate the neutral and pacific obligations of this Union, cannot consider itself bound to indemnify individual foreigners for losses by capture over which the United States have neither control nor jurisdiction. For such events no nation can in principle, nor does in practice, hold itself responsible."
  The United States, however, not only took measures to prosecute, but enacted a special law in order to maintain their neutrality more faithfully. The Act of 1818 having passed, it is alleged that those depredations ceased; but about a year and a half afterwards Senhor Correa, in a note of the 23rd of November, 1819, says—
  "I do justice to, and am grateful for, the proceedings of the Executive in order to put a stop to these depredations, but the evil is rather increasing. I can present to you, if required, a list of fifty Portuguese ships, almost all richly laden, some of them East Indiamen, which have been taken by these people during the period of full peace. This is not the whole loss we have sustained, this list comprehending only those captures of which I have received official complaints. The victims have been many more, besides violations of territory by landing and plundering ashore, with shocking circumstances. One city alone on this coast has armed twenty-six ships, which prey on our vitals; and a week ago three armed ships of this nature were in that port waiting for a favourable opportunity of sailing on a cruize."
  Now, the Portuguese having suffered by the loss of many of their vessels, and the United States Government having stated that they had put the laws in force, and having assumed that they alone were to be the judges how their laws were to be carried into effect, Mr. Adams says he considers the case of the United States against Portugal "impregnable." They endeavoured to put their laws in force; but there was a great public feeling in favour of fitting out privateers against the Portuguese Government, and they were not able to prevent Americans — for the ships were manned and commanded by citizens of the United States—from carrying on such depredations. Then, I say, if that case be "impregnable," if the United States had

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  no reason to make any indemnity, or to agree to any commission for the purpose of seeing whether the Portuguese owners should be indemnified, the case of Her Majesty's Government, which is similar to that of the United States in regard to Portugal, is equally impregnable. Your Lordships know what proceedings took place with regard to the Alexandra. A very long argument was carried on in the Court of Exchequer, and the reason why the case was not fully judged was owing to a very strange peculiarity in our mode of proceeding. Another matter of dispute was with regard to the rams that were built and fitted out at Birkenhead. There was great difficulty in getting legal evidence with respect to these vessels. We were informed, however, that these vessels were intended for the service of the Confederate States, and the question was whether, on my own responsibility, I should order their detention. The allegation made, on the other hand, was that these vessels were intended for the Pasha of Egypt. Thereupon I sent a telegram to our Consul General in Egypt, directing him to inquire of the Pasha whether these vessels were really building for him at Birkenhead? and I received an answer that the Pasha denied that he had given any such orders, and said that a proposal for a contract had been made to the former Pasha, but that he had refused to have anything to do with it. I then directed the Secretary of Embassy at Paris to make inquiry there of M. Bravay, with a view to ascertaining whether or not these vessels were intended for the Confederate States; and a contract was placed in his hands, by M. Bravay, according to which Captain Bullock, the agent of the Confederate States, was said to have transferred, for a certain sum of money, the possession of these vessels into his hands. I at length succeeded in ascertaining a fact which the Customs Department had previously been unable to ascertain—namely, that these vessels were clearly built for the Confederate States; and when I had once ascertained that, and that the Confederate Government had tried to secure themselves by selling the vessels to other parties, I thought that I was fully authorized to detain them, though I was advised that it was doubtful whether, when the case came to a trial, there was legal evidence against them. Still, it seemed to me that there was sufficient moral evidence that these vessels were intended to act against the blockading squadron of the
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  United States; I therefore gave orders for the detention of these vessels. Now, I do not believe that I exceeded the law in so doing; but it was very possible that if the case had come on for trial it might have been found that we had not the legal evidence to secure a conviction. I was told even that, although I had in my own hands a copy of the contract to which I have just alluded, it would not be possible to produce it in a Court of Law in this country, the peculiarities of our law being such that it was necessary that the original contract should be produced. I know not how that may be; but I thought that possibly the peace of this kingdom was at stake, and that if these vessels went out to break the blockade instituted by the United States, an injury would be inflicted upon that Government which the United States probably would not pass over; and I therefore thought that, whether all the requirements of the law had been complied with or not, I should be right in ordering the seizure of these vessels. Mr. Adams continued to complain that we had not altered our law; but if we had altered it—if we had adopted the American law—we should not have been able to take the efficient measures which we did take. We might then have compelled them to forfeit a certain sum of money, but we should not have been able to seize and keep the vessels. We certainly incurred considerable risk, which, I think, we were bound to incur in order to maintain the peace of this country. The only other case I shall mention is a very important one, to which great weight should be attached—the case of the Shenandoah. The Shenandoah was a regular merchant vessel, and was sold by the person then the owner of it to some person who was engaged for the Confederates. It left this country without any arms, equipment, or furnishing whatever, other than those of a merchant ship; and it was not till a month afterwards that we heard it had arrived off the port of Funchal, and was being armed by other vessels. Now, it seems to me that this is a very important question, not only as regards the conduct of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but as regards our future legislation. There are two things we may very well do in order to preserve our neutrality. You may prevent troops from being drilled or recruited on your own soil with a view to enter the service of a belligerent Power. That you may do by die exercise of your

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  authority. What you cannot do is to prevent individuals from going to a foreign country, as the Earl of Dundonald did, and engaging in the service of a belligerent. So likewise with regard to vessels. If a vessel is being armed, or fitted as a vessel of war, in one of your ports, you may give power—and I should be very glad to see such power given—to the Executive Government to detain that vessel upon the order of the Judge of the Admiralty Court, or of some competent authority, unless the Government is fully satisfied that the vessel is not intended for use against any State friendly to Her Majesty. That you can do. But, suppose that a vessel is simply a merchant vessel, that you have no information of the purpose for which she is destined, that no one has told you that the owner has got a secret engagement, how can you prevent that vessel from going to some far distant neutral port, and there being armed against some Power in amity with Her Majesty? I will put a case that might occur in the future, and that might have occurred some months ago. There was an apprehension at one time, and a very natural apprehension, that, on account of Luxemburg or some other cause, France and Prussia would engage in war. It was well known that the French naval forces were vastly superior to those of Prussia, and it was believed that, in a short time, the ports of Prussia and her allies would be blockaded. But what was to prevent the Prussian Government from entering into contract with a merchant at Amsterdam for the building of steam vessels of speed and strength in English ports on the Thames, the Clyde, and the Mersey, those steamers afterwards going to certain neutral ports without arms in order to meet other vessels furnished with arms and equipment? I submit to your Lordships and to the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, who is a Member of the Commission on the Neutrality Laws, that it would be carrying our neutral obligations to a very dangerous length if we were to say that, where an unarmed merchant vessel sailed to a foreign port and was there armed, the Power in whose ports she was built became responsible for any of her subsequent acts. I own it seems to me that we have already in spirit gone far enough in our Neutrality Laws. It would be a wise precaution to give greater power to the Executive Government over armed vessels, or vessels fitted out as vessels of war, attempting to leave our coast for
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  belligerent purposes. But if we were by treaty or by law of the realm to impose such further obligations as I have just mentioned, and if we, as a shipbuilding country, engaged to stop unarmed vessels from leaving our coast, that would be a dangerous obligation into which Her Majesty's Government ought not to enter. Another suggestion has been made with regard to the Alabama claims and our differences with America. It is understood to have been made by Mr. Seward — namely, that every other question with regard to which we have had controversies with the United States as to the meaning of treaties and the occupation of territory should be considered at the same time, and that we should come, if possible, to some general agreement on all these points. I believe that to be a very wise and practicable suggestion, and at all events we should endeavour to settle all these matters. My Lords, I will now ask the noble and learned Lord how soon the Report of the Neutrality Commission will be laid on the table?
  THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I shall endeavour, in the first place, to answer the Question which the noble Earl has put to me. This time last year, as the noble Earl has stated, a Royal Commission was appointed to inquire into and consider the character, working, and effect of the Laws of this Realm available for the enforcement of Neutrality during the existence of hostilities in other States with whom Her Majesty is at peace; and further to report what, if any, change ought to be made to give them increased efficiency and bring them into full conformity with Her Majesty's International obligations. That Commission was composed, among others, of a Member of your Lordships' House—Lord Houghton; Dr. Lushington (the late Judge of the Admiralty Court); Sir William Erle, Mr. Baron Bramwell, Sir R. Phillimore, Sir Roundell Palmer, the present Queen's Advocate, Sir Travers Twiss; Mr. Vernon Harcourt, Mr. Baring, Mr. Gregory, and Mr. Forster. I also had the honour of serving upon it, and we had the great advantage of being presided over in our deliberations by the sagacity and experience of another Member of your Lordships' House—Lord Cranworth. I think your Lordships will be of opinion that this Commission has not lost any time. It was appointed just a year ago; and it was composed of members whose occupations in other respects were very

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  pressing. Notwithstanding that, we have held something like twenty-five meetings, and I am happy to say we have agreed—I think I may say unanimously—upon our Report. It is on the point of being presented to Her Majesty, and after that no doubt it will be laid in the usual way before your Lordships. As to the views of that Commission, it would be obviously improper for me to say a word. I may, however, express a hope that when the recommendations of that Commission are known, if it should be the pleasure of Parliament to adopt them in the shape of legislation, I trust that many, if not all, the difficulties and embarrassments which have arisen in times past may easily for the future be avoided. The other question put by the noble Earl is as to any Correspondence which may have taken place between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States in reference to the Alabama and other claims. There is no Correspondence subsequent to that which has been already laid before Parliament by my noble Friend the Secretary of State. Beyond this I hope the noble Earl will not consider I am wanting in any courtesy or respect for him if I decline to follow him into the somewhat large and difficult field upon which he has entered. I feel quite satisfied—as I am sure your Lordships do—that when the noble Earl, who was at the head of the Foreign Office, felt it to be his duty to decline the arbitration for the settlement of these claims proposed by the United States, he acted from a high sense of public duty. I think you will be of opinion that, in the progress of public sentiment upon this subject, and as time went on and public prejudice and passion much abated, my noble Friend the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs did that which was eminently desirable for the maintenance of good relations between this country and the United States when he consented, or proposed, to refer to arbitration the question of these claims. If I rightly understand the noble Earl, the objections or doubts which he suggested as to arbitration of that kind were really only two. The noble Earl, as I understood him, said that the case upon our side as regards these claims was an extremely clear one; and that we were not chargeable in any way or manner in which the Government of the United States contended we were chargeable. It is no reason for declining arbitration that you have an extremely good case to submit
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  to the arbitrators. On the contrary, I think that would be rather a reason why we should not shrink from having the case alleged against us referred to a tribunal of that kind. The other objection which the noble Earl mentioned was this—he said there was a controversy on a matter of fact at the very commencement of the claim which was made by the American Government. The noble Earl stated very accurately that Mr. Adams had contended that armed ships had left the ports of this country; whereas Lord Clarendon had taken issue on that point, and had denied that any ships which could be properly so described had left the ports of this country. Questions of fact are just as necessary to be referred to arbitration as questions of law. I should desire to know how a question of fact of that kind, asserted on one side and disputed on the other, is to be determined, unless you are able to evoke the aid of some independent arbiter or tribunal, who will decide the fact as well as he will decide the law. I think, therefore, none of these grounds could afford any reason why we should decline arbitration. I do not desire to say more with regard to the state of the negotiations than to remind your; Lordships exactly how they now stand. As the noble Lord the Secretary of State said elsewhere, we have now conceded that; which, in the first instance, the American Government required—that is to say, that there shall be arbitration as to the liability of the Government of this country with regard to the claims in question. But beyond that, and since that concession on our part, the American Government, through their Foreign Minister, have made a further demand, and they require now not merely that we shall refer to the arbitrator whether this country is liable in respect of these claims; but also that it shall be referred to the arbitrator, as a matter to be decided, whether this country acted properly or improperly in recognizing the seceding Southern States as belligerents at the time this country so recognized them. In answer to that demand, the argument of my noble Friend has been so simple, I and I venture to say so conclusive, that in a very few sentences I will remind your Lordships of it. My noble Friend contended, in the first place, that that question is altogether irrelevant to the claims arising out of the case of the Alabama and of other ships, and irrelevant for this reason: it has never been disputed on

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  either side that there was a time at which, beyond all doubt, the recognition of the Southern States as belligerents must have been proper and necessary on the part of this country. If we take that time — it matters little whether it be a month sooner or later—about the month of July, or the date of the battle of Bull's Run, then it would be many months before the time at which the Alabama left this country, which happened in the April following. In the next place, my noble Friend has contended that, according to the principles of International Law, according to all authorities on International Law, according to the authorities recognized by the United States Government itself, the question whether a neutral Power shall, at any particular time, recognize a state of war between two Powers which are actually at war, is a matter entirely to be decided by the neutral Power itself; and that there are no data upon which any arbitrator or independent tribunal can be called upon to pronounce whether the recognition was proper or was improper. In the third place, my noble Friend has contended—and this, perhaps, will be quite sufficient even if there were no other argument in the case — that before the Government of this country recognized the Southern States as belligerents, the Government of the United States itself had recognized the Southern States in that capacity, by declaring the blockade of their ports, which could be declared only upon the footing that a state of war existed. My noble Friend has pointed out that if the question were to be re-opened it would go further than the United States has proposed, because it would entitle us to claim compensation for all captures made by the United States Government of ships that were breaking the blockade. That is the stage at which the negotiations — I hope only for the present—have come to a halt. The noble Earl referred, in words which I am sure would find a response in the minds of all your Lordships, to the character, great eminence, and ability of the distinguished statesman who has been so long the Minister to this country of the United States, and whose departure from this country in that capacity we all, I am sure, extremely regret. I could not help being much struck by some observations made by that very eminent person a few days ago. Speaking on the subject which has now occupied your Lordships' attention, Mr. Adams is reported to have said—
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  "The sum of all true diplomacy is to be found in the Christian maxim of doing to your neighbour that which you would he should do to you; and where the will is good a way of arrangement is sure ultimately to be found."
  My Lords, I think we have shown substantially that our will for the adjustment of this difficulty is good. I am willing to take according to the letter what Mr. Adams states of the will and inclination of the American Government. It will be strange, indeed, my Lords, if with that state of mind on both sides, an arrangement of this difficulty does not before long present itself.
  LORD WESTBURYwished to offer a few observations, which, he said, would be elicited by the regret he felt that these negotiations for arbitration had been suspended for a time. He thought they were suspended under some misapprehension of the nature of the claim intended to be brought forward by the United States. It was extremely desirable to ascertain with accuracy what ought to be the condition of the arbitration. In the discussion of this matter we often heard the phrases "International Law" and "breach of International Law." No word could be more inappropriate to express the mutual obligations between nations of equal rank and power than the word "law," for there was no law whatever. There was no sanction or any power of this country judicially to inflict punishment for breaches of the so-called law. There were, however, certain rules which had been agreed to by civilized nations, and which derived their authority and force merely from the consents of their Governments, but that was by no means law. Throughout the whole of these discussions false notions were incidentally suggested by the use of the phrase "International Law." There was one rule of conduct which undoubtedly civilized nations had mutually agreed to observe, and it was that the territory of a neutral should not be the basis of military operations by one of two belligerents against the other. In speaking of the base of operations he must to a certain degree differ from the noble Earl. It was not a question whether armed ships had actually left our shores; but it was a question whether ships, with a view to war, had been built in our ports by one of two belligerents. They need not have been armed; but if they had been laid down and built with a view to warlike operations by one of two belligerents, and this was knowingly permitted to be done by a neutral

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  Power, it was unquestionably a breach of neutrality. Now, what was the obligation of a neutral Power? Its obligation could be no more than that it should use the laws and institutions of its own country in order to prevent a breach of its neutrality. It could not be called upon to do any more. If there were any grounds of complaint it ought to be shown that the neutral had by its own laws and institutions the power to prevent the subject of that complaint. This was the doctrine laid down by the United States in their disputes with Portugal. They alleged that they had, bonâ fide and with sincerity, used their own laws and institutions to the utmost in order to prevent any breach of their neutrality. Indeed, the animus with which the neutral Powers acted was the only true criterion. The neutral Power might be mistaken; it might omit to do something which ought to be done, or direct something to be done which ought not to be done; but the question was whether, from beginning to end, it had acted with sincerity and with a real desire to promote and preserve a spirit of neutrality? A neutral could never be required to do more. Possibly, one nation might have a right to make domiciliary visits, and to search for and take possession of papers; but a country having that power could not complain of a country which did not possess it, for not using such means of discovering whether or not a breach of neutrality was meditated. He wished these observations to be applied to the demands made by Mr. Seward, and the manner in which they had been met by the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The ultimate issue of the Correspondence—if he correctly understood his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack—was this:—Mr. Seward said, "I will insist in the reference that you did wrong, and that you acted injudiciously and without proper information in recognizing the Confederate States as a belligerent Power." Now, it was quite preposterous to suppose that Mr. Seward meant to contradict himself. The object of the reference was to obtain compensation for breaches of our neutrality; but when Mr. Seward issued his own proclamation there had unquestionably been attempts to break the blockade on the part of the merchant vessels. Mr. Seward could therefore never say that he claimed compensation in respect of our proclamation of neutrality, involving, as it did, a recognition of the Confederate States as belligerents; but what
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  he meant was this—he said in effect:—"Whether you were a sincere and loyal neutral is the question in dispute, and that must be judged from a view of the whole of your conduct. I do not mean to put it merely upon the particular transaction relative to the Alabama. I insist upon it in that case undoubtedly; but I contend that from beginning to end you had an undue preference and predilection for the Confederate States; that you were, therefore, not loyal in your neutrality; and I appeal to the precipitancy with which you issued your Proclamation, thereby involving a recognition of the Confederate States as a belligerent Power, as a proof of your insincerity and want of impartial attention." And now could we prevent him from using that document for such a purpose? How unreasonable it was to say, "When you go into arbitration you shall not use a particular document, even as an argument upon the question whether there was sincere neutrality or not." He (Lord Westbury) should very much regret if the negotiations were broken off on a misapprehension of the meaning and intent of the American Government, and if that which was most necessary for the peace of mankind—the security of peace with the United States—was perilled by any such misapprehension. A favourite notion had always been entertained in the United States that the late war was not a civil war, but a revolt or rebellion, and very probably the United States committed a blunder in proclaiming the blockade. It was quite competent for them to have issued a proclamation prohibiting intercourse with the ports of the States whom they alleged to be in a state of revolt; but the effect of such a proclamation would simply have been that if a foreign ship had attempted to enter one of those ports, the United States vessels could not have captured and condemned her, but could only have obstructed her progress and turned her away. Instead of adopting such a course, however, Mr. Seward issued a proclamation of blockade, and by that proclamation necessarily placed the Confederate States in the position of belligerents, and all the other countries in the world in a position of neutrality. Mr. Seward, indeed, admitted this; but complained of a breach of neutrality, and held that that must depend, not upon single transactions, but upon the inferences to be derived from the whole of our conduct. Now, suppose the case of the Alabama were being argued before an arbitrator, his

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  noble Friend (Earl Russell) might say, "Why, the Alabama was permitted to escape simply by an accident, over which I had no control; and you ought not to judge of my conduct by one accidental default, but by the spirit I manifested when I seized the Alexandra and the rams, and placed myself in peril from the Conservative Opposition, which nearly brought the Government into a minority." Now, if it would be reasonable for his noble Friend to use that topic, derived from the general conduct of the English Government, as touching the particular case of the Alabama, surely it was equally reasonable for Mr. Seward to apply his argument to any particular fact connected with the conduct of this country, and to draw from it the opposite conclusion as to the sincerity of our neutrality. While, therefore, he (Lord Westbury) cordially concurred in all that had been done by the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office, he regretted that the noble Lord should have taken one matter up from a mistaken point of view, and should have supposed that Mr. Seward intended to make a demand for pecuniary damages in respect of our Proclamation, instead of using it as a special argument in support of his claim for damages in other particulars. He deeply lamented that the negotiations should have terminated upon that misconception. One point had arisen in the course of the debate to which it was proper to refer — namely, the desirability of effecting an alteration in the existing law. In his opinion no alteration of the law would be effectual unless it extended to this—that no armed vessel, and no vessel obviously built for warlike purposes by any private individual in this country, should be permitted to leave our harbours unless upon security, or upon the fact being clearly ascertained, that she was bonâ fide the property of some other Power not being a belligerent. In conclusion, he would say that he had only desired for a moment to point out the view of the case which he trusted would be considered by the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office, and to express his hope that the negotiations for an arbitration would be resumed, and would shortly be brought to the condition of a final reference.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, he wished to correct two errors into which his noble and learned Friend (Lord Westbury) had inadvertently fallen, and which, if left unnoticed, might lead to misunderstanding
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  elsewhere. His noble and learned Friend had placed a very ingenious construction upon the demand made by the United States Government through Mr. Seward. All he could say was that the explanation of that demand which his noble and learned Friend had given had never been given by Mr. Seward himself; and he thought, for this very good reason, that if all that was desired was that the premature recognition, as it was called, of the state of belligerency should be made a topic before the arbitrator, or a matter of evidence going to support the claim raised in other respects, that was not a thing to be stipulated for beforehand; it was a question for the arbitrator. The arbitrator would be the judge of what evidence was relevant and what was not. It was for the arbitrator to decide what evidence he would admit; and it was, he thought, a thing unheard of that a reference to arbitration should contain a definition of the evidence to be adduced before the arbitrator. The other error which he desired to correct was this:—His noble and learned Friend had spoken of the negotiations as having been broken off. The exact point at which they stood was this. Mr. Seward's last communication contained a proposal, couched in somewhat general terms, that there should be a Commission to inquire into all claims. Upon that his noble Friend the Foreign Secretary requested Mr. Seward to develop more accurately what he designed or aimed at by such a Commission; and the negotiations, he thought, were at present waiting for a communication from Mr. Seward on that score.
  LORD WESTBURYexplained. What he had said was this, that in the last despatch of the Foreign Secretary he stipulated that all question of precipitancy should be excluded from the consideration of the arbitrator. If that were so, it could not be admitted either as a matter of evidence, or as a general topic.
  EARL RUSSELLwas also understood to explain that he had not objected to the Foreign Secretary having assented to arbitration; but to his having assented to an arbitration that was so vague.
  Motion (by Leave of the House) withdrawn.
  House adjourned at Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, Twelve o'clock.