Lords Sitting of 24 July 1868

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Election Petitions and Corrupt Practices at Elections* (287).
Second Reading—Electric Telegraphs (282); Expiring Laws Continuance * (280); Inland Revenue * (279); Drainage and Improvement of Lands (Ireland) Supplemental (No. 4)* (273); Poor Law Board Provisional Order Confirmation)* (266); Registration (Ireland) (281).
Committee—Consolidated Fund (Appropriation)*; Drainage and Improvement of Lands (Ireland) Supplemental (No. 3)* (255).
Report—Public Schools (262–285); Consolidated Fund (Appropriation)*; Drainage and Improvement of Lands (Ireland) Supplemental (No. 3)* (255); Colonial Shipping* (274).
Third Reading—Sanitary Act (1866) Amendment *(252); Municipal Elections (Scotland) (276); Larceny and Embezzlement* (277); Titles to Land Consolidation (Scotland)* (268); General Police and Improvement (Scotland) Act Amendment * (267), and passed.

ELECTRIC TELEGRAPHS BILL—(No. 282.)
(The Duke of Montrose.)
ELECTRIC TELEGRAPHS BILL—(No. 282.)

  SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  THE DUKE OF MONTROSE, in moving that the Bill be now read the second time, said, its object was to place the telegraphic communication of this country under the Government and in the hands of the Post Office. When that proposal was first brought forward there certainly was a great expression of feeling on the part of many persons that the arrangement was a very undesirable one, being very contrary to our general habits, which left almost every-

  1693
  thing to private enterprize and the operation of free trade. The objections at first taken to the scheme, however, on being sifted passed away. The proposal, moreover, was not so novel as it at first sight appeared. In 1858 Mr. Ricardo, the founder, and then the Chairman of the Electric Telegraph Company, brought the subject under the attention of the Government, and in a letter to Mr. Gladstone urged his reasons for thinking it desirable that the telegraphs of this country should be placed in the hands of the State, Again, Mr. Allen, a distinguished civil engineer, and a man of great experience in regard to telegraphic communication, urged the adoption of the same course, In 1861 the Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce also took up the question, and memoralized the Government upon it; and since then there had been a very general expression of opinion by various public bodies and other persons in favour of such a measure. Petitions had been presented to that effect from thirty-two Chambers of Commerce, from sixty-four Town Councils and Corporations; from the general public there were twenty-four, and from persons connected with the newspapers, and more especially the provincial Press, there were 297 petitions. The petitioners concurred in thinking that the existing charges for the transmission of telegraphic messages in this country were too high; that many places were unprovided with facilities for telegraphic communication; that in the great majority of places provided with such facilities the telegraph office was inconveniently remote from the centre of business and of population, and open for too small a portion of the day; that in countries in which the telegraphs were under the control of the State lower rates and a more widely spread system prevailed; that in such countries correspondence by telegraph was more general and more popular, as it were, than in England; and that like results to those produced in other countries in those respects would follow in this country the adoption of the like means. In Belgium and in Switzerland telegraphic communication was in the hands of the Post Office; and in most other European countries it was also in the hands of the State. In Belgium there was one telegraphic message sent for every thirty-seven letters; in Switzerland one message to sixty-nine letters; and in England only one message to 103 letters; thus showing that the telegraph was not
  1694
  at all made use of here as it was in other countries. It was stated by those who were examined before the Committee, and who were perfectly well acquainted with, the working of the telegraphs, that the persons who chiefly used them in England were stock-brokers, mining agents, and persons engaged in other speculative businesses, but not the general public; whereas in Switzerland all classes of the community availed themselves of telegraphic communication for their private correspondence, in respect to which, indeed, it to a great degree took the place of the post. In Belgium 59 per cent of the telegraphic messages sent related to private, not to commercial affairs. The rates charged there were of course lower than in this country; and it was expected that through the present Bill the rates would be very much diminished. In France the cost of sending a message 600 miles—a greater distance than in this country—was 1s. 8d.; in England it cost 2s.; in Prussia the charge for sending a message 500 miles was 1s. 6d.; in England it was 2s.; in Belgium the cost of sending a message 160 miles was only 5d.; while in England it was 1s. 6d.; in Switzerland a message was sent 100 miles for 5d., and in England for 1s. 6d. The reductions in the rates had produced a great increase in the number of messages. In 1863 in Belgium a reduction of 33 per cent in the rates produced an immediate increase of 80 per cent in the number of messages and in 1866 a reduction of 50 per cent in the rates caused an increase of 85 per cent in the number of messages. In Prussia in 1867 a reduction of 33 per cent in the rates was followed by an increase in the first month of 70 per cent in the number of messages. In France, in 1862, a reduction of 35 per cent in the rates was followed by an increase of 64 per cent in the number of messages. But Switzerland afforded the most striking example of all. The inland rate was reduced 50 per cent in the early part of this year, and the number of inland messages increased 90 per cent over those of the corresponding three months of the previous year. It was remarkable that the increase in the number of messages followed immediately the reduction of the rates. In England there had, indeed, been an increase from the growth of population and the extension of business, but not a very large increase. Under those circumstances the Chambers of Commerce adverted, as

  1695
  he had stated, to the want of accommodation in this country, and the high rates charged; and they believed that a reduction of the rates, together with improved facilities, like that in other countries, would be followed in England also by a very great augmentation in the number of messages transmitted. It was proposed to place the telegraphs in the hands of the Post Office, because that Department had great advantages which no telegraph company could possess. It had agents in every town and village in the country, and persons whom it could employ at a very small cost; and, according to the arrangement that was proposed, almost every Post Office would be made a telegraph office as well. That would be the case not only in the large towns, but in country places also. A map had been prepared, marked by 2,056 dots, representing the places at which Money Order Offices were opened, and to which the electric wires were carried. Of these, there were 567 places; at which the telegraph accommodation was very imperfect, only 648 where it was; perfect, and 850 where there was no telegraph at all. In Scotland there were 196 Money Order Offices, and in Ireland 369, at which towns there was no telegraph, In England there were 1,300 out of 2,000 towns and villages which had now no telegraph within the town. A circumstance which had prevented the full development of the railway system was that the telegraph offices were generally in or near the railway stations, which were frequently three-quarters of a mile or a mile from the town itself. Out of 622 places supplied by one railway company with telegraphic communication about 223 were only worked at the railway stations. The distance of the office from the town naturally led to a very considerable payment being demanded for porterage; and the saving in this respect would greatly diminish the charge for telegrams. The cost of the telegraphic message was now comparatively little, but the cost of porterage was great. The usual charge was 1s. a mile, and in a very large number of cases 1s. was charged for porterage. But the Post Office was usually in the centre of the population, and the distance to be carried would therefore be very much smaller. As the telegrams would go through the Post Office delivery, it was proposed that they should be delivered free of charge, which would of itself involve a considerable saving. In many
  1696
  large towns where it might be thought considerable facilities would have been given by the telegraph companies they had one head office and no more. In Edinburgh there were three telegraph companies; but their offices were all within 100 yards of each other and in. the centre of the town, leaving a large portion of the city unprovided with telegraphic communication. In Manchester and Liverpool there was a head office in each town, but no district offices, and all the telegrams had to be sent out by messengers. It was proposed that there should not only be telegraphic communication with the head offices but with the minor offices. The district offices would be made separate head offices, and when messages came to them they would be delivered at much less cost and with greater speed than at present. A good deal had been said about a 6d. rate; but it only nominally existed in some towns. It would be a great convenience, but in reality the 6d. rate was quite a delusion. A charge was usually made of 1s., or 1s. 6d. for porterage, and what was called a 6d. rate was in reality more expensive than the proposed 1s. rate under the new system. If any one attempted to send a telegraphic message five or six miles from London it often took three or four hours to reach its destination. Some experimental messages had been sent to places like Highbury and Hampstead, which were not delivered for three or four hours. In one case a messenger was employed to take a telegram to the office in London. He then walked to the railway station, took a return ticket by the train, which cost 8d., and got there before the message, for which 1s. was paid. It was thus cheaper and quicker to send the message by the railway. Under these circumstances it was not wonderful that mercantile men and Chambers of Commerce were of opinion that there was a great want of additional telegraphic accommodation, and that the work would be much better done. Another convenience under the new system would be the facilities offered by the Post Office for the transmission of messages at night. In many towns it was necessary to give attendance at the Post Office during the whole night, and the clerks, being more or less occupied with other work, could attend to the telegrams at an hour when the telegraphic offices were now shut up. At present in many towns there was practically very little accommodation except

  1697
  in the middle of the day. Great objections were at first made to the Bill by different persons, but they had been entirely removed in the course of the discussions in the House of Commons, and before the Select Committee. A dislike was expressed by some to put the telegraphs in the hands of the State, and it was suggested that the Government might detain some messages and send others on. He thought it was much less likely that such practices should occur in a Government office, when the matter would be open to the animadversion of Members of both Houses, than in the office of a public company. The telegraph companies had had, indeed, such a complete monopoly that complaints had never been listened to at all. It was said that the Government would not be liable for the non-delivery of messages; but the telegraph companies were equally above control; they protected themselves by very stringent conditions; and the consequence was that, although many persons had been injured by mistakes and delays in the transmission of messages, there was no instance of any one ever obtaining redress. One mistake involving the buying or selling of 3,000 instead of 300 shares had caused the absolute ruin of one individual, but he never got 1s. from the company. The public would therefore be just as well off in the hands of the State as of a public company. Another objection was that the secret contained in these telegraphic messages would be divulged. He did not believe that the companies had always been free from these imputations. The proof, however, that the Post Office would be likely to keep these secrets was supplied by the Post Office itself. It was known to their Lordships that an enormous number of letters were posted without any address at all, while the persons to whom others were sent could not be found. The number of letters that went through the "Dead Letter" office was stated at 3,000,000 a year; but though these were often letters of great importance, and sometimes contained large sums of money, he had never heard the slightest imputation against the Post Office that the secrets contained in these letters were divulged, and tills objection might be regarded as sufficiently answered. It was at first impossible to make satisfactory arrangements with the telegraph companies; but all objections had been overcome. The companies had asked for provisions about arbi-
  1698
  tration which they had obtained, and it was agreed that they should receive twenty years' purchase of the net telegraphic profits of the company, deducting the working expenses. The next objection which had been offered was that the railway companies had arrangements for the use of the wires along their lines, and that the public safety would be endangered if they were deprived of those advantages. This, however, had been met by allowing them facilities of communication by their own wires, the wires of the Post Office being used independently of them. With regard to the Press, it would, of course, be impossible for the Post Office to procure information, as some of the telegraph companies had been doing; but the Press would choose what intelligence they wished to be transmitted, and such messages would be forwarded at a reduced rate. With this arrangement the Press were quite satisfied, and were strongly in favour of the Bill. The objections originally entertained to the measure had thus been completely removed. Another objection, remained, which had referencee to secresy in connection with very important messages; but with reference to these, it had been proved that cipher could be used with great facility, mercantile transactions being now, indeed, carried on in this way. A slight penalty now existed with regard to breach of confidence, and to allay any apprehensions on the subject a clause had been inserted constituting it a misdemeanour, punishable by imprisonment, for any person to make a telegraphic communication public; and this, he thought, would give perfect security. With respect to a monopoly of telegraphic communication, some had objected to it, while others had urged that if, after the Post Office had paid a large sum of money for these undertakings, other persons competed with it, the result might be a considerable loss to the State. It had not been thought right, however, to sanction a monopoly, and thereby, perhaps, prevent a fair trial of new inventions; though he believed that if all the existing undertakings came into the hands of the Post Office there would be no prospect of competition arising, so that a monopoly would practically exist. As to the financial part of the question, their Lordships would probably not wish him to enter into details, but would like to know what the cost was likely to be, and whether the arrangement would be remunerative. Now,

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  calculations had been made, based on the returns of receipts and expenditure furnished by the telegraph companies. The maximum estimate assumed an increase of revenue from an increased number of messages; and as such an increase had been going on for years, and would be likely, with reduced rates and greater accommodation, to go on in a still greater ratio, this presumption appeared a reasonable one. According to this estimate there would be 7,500,000 of messages, increasing 10 per cent yearly, and producing an annual revenue of £680,000; while the expenditure, judging from the companies' experience, would be £378,000, thus leaving a balance of £301,000. The minimum estimate, founded on the present number of messages and the present expenditure, gave a gross revenue of £437,000, the net proceeds being £203,000. It was exceedingly unlikely that no increase would arise, and £280,000 might perhaps be taken as the probable surplus. As to the cost of purchasing the telegraphs, an estimate was presented in the first instance very much lower than that which was now offered, it being based on the purchase of only one or two of the undertakings. Negotiations had been since carried on for the acquisition of the other undertakings; and it had been found necessary to take some of the submarine cables. The undertakings it was now proposed to purchase were the Electric and International, the British and Irish Magnetic, the United Kingdom, the London District (a very small concern), and the Universal Private Companies, as also Reuter's cable and privileges. In addition to these there were some railway companies which had telegraphic communication entirely in their own hands and carried on the business of telegraph companies. A great saving to the public would result from the purchase of these rights; for at present, while for a message between Manchester and London there was a certain rate, a message between Manchester and Dover would cost considerably more, a charge being made by two distinct companies. It would, therefore, be necessary to purchase the telegraphic rights of the South-Eastern, London and Brighton, Chatham and Dover, and North British Railway Companies, and also of the Caledonian Company, north of Perth. The purchase of all these undertakings would probably cost £5,000,000. Now, taking the minimum net revenue of
  1700
  £200,000, this would meet a loan at 3½ per cent of £6,000,000, so that there would be no fear as to providing the interest of the money. If, on the other I hand, the net revenue amounted to £300,000, the Government would be able to raise nearly £10,000,000. It was evident, therefore, that there would be a sufficient margin; and since in all probability it would be unnecessary to raise so large a sum, there was no fear of loss to the State, which would, in fact, be borrowing money at 3½ per cent and be receiving 5 per cent. The mode of raising the money would rest with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and a great part of it might probably be obtained from the surplus lying in the Post Office Savings Banks, or it might be raised in other ways which would present no difficulties. He thought he had now sufficiently shown that this measure would lead to greatly increased accommodation, that it would involve no cost to the State, that the work was likely to be very much better done, and that public opinion was in favour of the change. The Bill had passed the other House without a division and he believed that Lord Stanley of Alderley, the late Postmaster General, was strongly in its favour, he having, indeed, moved in the matter some three years ago. He should have been glad had the noble Lord been present to give his testimony to the value of the measure.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a."—(The Duke of Montrose.)
  LORD OVERSTONEsaid, he hoped the S measure would work successfully; but he should like an explanation as to the basis on which the Government had calculated the purchase money. Twenty years' purchase on the profits seemed to be excessive.
  THE DUKE OF MONTROSEsaid, it should be recollected that the Electric Telegraph Company paid a dividend of 10 per cent, and they had been making a great deal more, which they were not allowed to divide, but which went to form a reserved fund and to maintain their cable. As far as he could learn they had kept their telegraph in excellent order and much of their surplus profits had gone to keep up the cable, which more than anything else was liable to interruption. There was a great increase every year in the business done and the profits made; but the Government had taken into account merely the present profits, and had not

  1701
  made their calculations with reference to any probable increase in future years. The arbitrator would have full power to examine the books and accounts.
  Motion agreed to.
  Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Monday next.

PUBLIC SCHOOLS BILL—(No. 285.)
(The Earl of Derby.)
PUBLIC SCHOOLS BILL—(No. 285.)

  REPORT.
  Amendments reported (according to Order).
  LORD LYTTELTONsaid, with regard to the Conscience Clause, he ventured to think that the words as they now stood would involve a power of interference by the Governing Body with the regulations of the boarding-houses of the School which he could not approve. The noble Duke opposite (the Duke of Marlborough) did not think any such power was given by the clause. But all he (Lord Lyttelton) proposed to do was simply to put into the clause what the noble Duke said was already within its meaning. He did not think his proposal would do any harm, and the Bill would work much more satisfactorily if it were adopted. He therefore moved at the end of Clause 13 to add—
  "Provided that no such regulation shall interfere with the discretion of any keeper of an authorized boarding-house in connection with the School in respect of his religious teaching and training of the boys in such house."
  THE LORD CHANCELLORopposed the Amendment, which he did not think was required, and which, if made, would not meet the objection of the noble Lord. It was impossible to mix up the religious instruction of the Schools with the regulations of the boarding-houses.
  LORD OVERSTONEasked whether the Bill would not empower the Governing Bodies to withdraw the boys in a particular boarding-house from religious instruction?
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, that as he understood it there was no such power in the Bill.
  EARL GRANVILLEsaid, he hoped the noble Lord would not press the Amendment.
  THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGHjoined in the appeal. The Amendment was really not wanted; and the insertion in the Bill of anything that was not wanted would
  1702
  be injurious. This original clause had been the subject of discussion and of compromise in the House of Commons; and though he did not deny that the intention of the noble Lord pointed in the right direction, he feared that the Amendment, if adopted, would be looked upon as an attempt to get rid of the full beneficial effect of the clause introduced into the other House. He hoped the noble Lord would listen to the advice which had been tendered him, and would not press the Amendment.
  LORD LYTTELTONsaid a few words in reply.
  Amendment negatived.
  LORD LYTTELTONsaid, he would now move the clause investing the Master with certain powers, the consideration of which was deferred by the Committee on Thursday. If their Lordships would look at the evidence which had been collected on this subject they would see that the points embraced by the clause were of the greatest importance in the administration of Schools, which would be more efficient if these powers were distinctly conferred on the Master, and their possession by him would sometimes enable the Governing Bodies to obtain better men. In the case of expulsion, for instance, the Head Master alone was in a position to know all the circumstances of a particular case, and that his hands would be weakened by an appeal to the Governing Body.
  After Clause 13, moved to insert the following Clause:—
  The Head Master should have the uncontrolled Power of regulating the Arrangement of the School in Classes or Divisions, the Hours of School Work, and the Holidays and Half Holidays during the School Time, of appointing and changing the Books and Editions of Hooks to be used in the School, and the Course and Methods of Study (subject to all Regulations made by the Governing Body as to the Introduction, Suppression, or relative Weight of Studies), of maintaining Discipline and prescribing Bounds, of administering Punishment, and of Expulsion.—(The Lord Lyttelton.)
  THE DUKE OF MARLBOROUGHsaid, that when the noble Lord asked him yesterday what course the Government would pursue in reference to the clause now moved, he answered that the Government would give it their best consideration. They had done so, and his objections to it were unchanged. The first objection to the clause was that it proposed to place specially under the control of the Head

  1703
  Master certain minor arrangements in respect of which it was scarcely possible to conceive the Governing Body would ever wish to interfere by taking them out of the hands of the Head Master—such matters as the prescribing of bounds, administering punishments, and details of that kind and, on the other hand, the noble Lord proposed to give to the Head, Master exclusive power in some important matters, such as expulsion. But even with regard to expulsion the noble Lord felt the weakness of his case, for the Head Master would have no power to expel a boy from, the foundation. [Lord LYTTELTON: He would under this clause. No; the power rested exclusively with the Governing Bodies. Another point of the greatest importance was that of the selection of the books to be used in the School. He was quite aware that that proposal came quite within the recommendations of the Commission; but no Head Master ought to possess the power of determining the character of the instruction to be given in a School, whether secular or religious. If the discretion were limited to the nature of the secular instruction, there might be more said in favour of it; but the case was different with respect to religious instruction. Many eminent and talented persons took different views on religious subjects; and he could not conceive that anything would be more likely to prove injurious to the interests of a School than that its Head Master should have peculiar views on some of the religious subjects of the day, or that he should introduce into the syllabus of School instruction books that might be looked upon by many with suspicion. There was nothing parents were more particular about than the religious instruction of their children, and if books that were objectionable in their eyes were introduced, they would at once remove their children from the School. The matter might come to this—the Head Master might be a man of great attainments, and in every other respect well fitted for superintending a great institution, and yet, if he introduced these obnoxious books, in the exercise of the discretion vested in him, the Governing Body would have no power to prevent his doing so, except at the cost of parting with a man who was in all other respects a most valuable and excellent Master. The noble Lord proceeded on the assumption that this proposal was recommended by the Commissioners, whose words, indeed, he used. That was perfectly true; but
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  the Commissioners never intended that their recommendations should be embodied literally in an Act of Parliament. On the same principle the noble Lord might have taken the very next recommendation, which was that there should be periodical School Councils, presided over by the Head Master; but that the noble Lord omitted altogether. The intention of the Commission was to give a general guidance either to Parliament or to the Governing Bodies, and it was not fair to say that because they recommended anything it ought to form part of a Bill. Another objection to the clause was, that while it placed certain things directly under the uncontrolled and exclusive management of the Head Master, I it left out other things which, from their omission, would be assumed by the Governing Bodies to be not under the control of the Head Master, but under their own. Take the amusements of the School—cricket, boating, swimming, and rifle corps. It was now admitted by everybody that all such things were under the control of the Head Master; but if certain things were by the clause taken out of the control of the Governing Body, and minor matters were not specified, the argument would be that those things which were not legislated for directly and specifically were left to the Governing Body. The result would be that, although the noble Lord wished the Master to have uncontrolled power, the passing of the clause would defeat his object. By placing certain things by statute in the power of the Head Master, and leaving out other things, the noble Lord would raise an antagonism between the Head Master and the Governing Body, as the latter would assume that all powers not vested in the Master belonged to themselves, and the result would be confusion, where there ought to be harmony and peace. It was further highly objectionable to give statutory powers to a Head Master, who occupied the position of a servant, was subject to dismissal by the Governing Body, and had his salary: regulated by them. For his own part, he thought that as long as the Governing Body had the power of dismissing the Head Master, there was security for the good management of the School, and that there was no necessity for the proposal now submitted to their Lordships. On these grounds he must ask their Lordships not to agree to the clause.
  EARL DE GREY AND RIPONsaid, that two of the School Commissioners were

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  present in the House the other day when the Bill was under discussion, and both were agreed as to the propriety of some such clause being inserted as was now proposed. He did not think that the noble Lord who introduced the clause had been guilty of any inconsistency in adopting one portion of the recommendations of the Commissioners and omitting the other. Every Head Master was in favour of such a proposal as that now made. He himself thought, for instance, that it was essential to the maintenance of discipline that the Head Master should have the power of expulsion. At Sandhurst the Commandant had not that power fully, and consequently his power over the discipline of the pupils was greatly impaired. If that was the case in a Military College, how much more must it be so at the Public Schools? He granted that so long as the Governing Bodies preserved the power of dismissing the Head Master, should he misconduct himself, they would he able to influence him and check him should he do wrong. But he maintained that the point under debate was one of principle and not of detail; and the success of those great institutions for which their Lordships were called to legislate depended very much on their having fit men at their head, and, when such men were secured, in intrusting them with the entire conduct of the Schools. He trusted their Lordships would not reject the clause.
  LORD HOUGHTONsaid, that if the Governing Body were not intrusted with a certain amount of power and left a certain amount of discretion, they would in reality be no Governing Body at all. The question was whether in establishing those bodies they should not be placed in a position which would enable them to exercise such a general supervision as would secure for them the respect of the Schools.
  LORD OVERSTONEobserved that it was the Governing Body who would in the first place choose the Head Master, and that if he misconducted himself it would be in their power to remove him. There were common-sense principles applicable to all such cases. A high officer, like a Head Master, should be chosen with all caution, prudence, and judgment; and when a man was appointed to manage important affairs, accompanied by responsibility for their proper management, he must be invested with the necessary authority to insure success. Plenary autho-
  1706
  rity with plenary responsibility vested n one person was, in reality the only way in which truly efficient and satisfactory service could be obtained. The Head Master of a School might be compared with the commander of an army, he Governing Body being his council of war; and their Lordships were aware that no army could achieve glory with a council of war as its commander. If a man were put upon his trial, and he knew that failure in his undertaking would be his misfortune and success his glory, he would exert himself to the utmost. It was only by giving complete authority to the person intrusted with the charge of a School, and making him exclusively responsible for the consequences, that they could expect to see its affairs managed with real efficiency and success.
  THE EARL OF HARROWBYsaid, he thought the Governing Body might be intrusted with a very large share of authority, and yet by no means be constantly meddling in the details of daily School management. It was said, "Let them choose the best man as Head Master," but that was what the Governing Body always tried to do; but even if they succeeded in securing the best man he would not be impeccable. He might require advice, and might occasionally have to consult the Governing Body. Public Schools had flourished, in spite of the possibility of the Governing Body interfering; and it had never yet been held that it was necessary to make the Head Master absolute. He hoped their Lordships would not make the Governing Body ridiculous by rendering them powerless, by investing the Master with absolute power. It was to be supposed that the Governing Body would at least have the attribute of common sense, and common sense would teach them to abstain from interference in cases when it would be unnecessary or injurious.
  EARL GRANVILLEsaid, he had been struck with the difference between the opinions expressed in regard to the Governing Bodies of these institutions. Some authorities held that they always acted with sense, and never interfered unduly with the Head Masters, while others took an opposite view. He himself believed that the Governing Bodies had, in certain cases, interfered in very minute matters, and thus weakened the authority of the Master. A Governing Body meeting once or twice a year would probably wish to

  1707
  do something to show it had authority, and by its interfering between the Master and the boys the hitter might get the notion that the decision of the former was not final. That would be a great evil, considering that the character of the School must always depend so greatly upon the character of the Master. Moreover, if the Head Master committed very grave faults, the ultima ratio of dismissal must rest with the Governing Body.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORwas anxious, before their Lordships went to a division, that they should consider what was the real question on which they were about to divide. He thought they were all substantially agreed on the proposition that it was very desirable, if the Governing Body exercised due care in getting the best Head Master they could obtain, that they should give him very great—indeed, the utmost possible latitude; that they should make him feel that he had that latitude, and that they were not going to interfere with him in matters of which he must have infinitely more knowledge than they could possess, and on which he must act almost every day in the year. But the question was whether now, for the first time in the history of their legislation, they would give statutory powers, absolutely uncontrolled, to a person who, standing in the position of a Head Master, however excellent he might be, and however large the discretion vested in him, was, after all, only the servant of the Governing Body. He would put the matter in this way to the noble Lord (Lord Overstone) who had had large experience in extensive banking operations. He had no doubt that the noble Lord, if he wished to set up a branch bank in a country town, would get the most trustworthy confidential manager or clerk he could, pay him a large salary, and say to him—"I look to you for the proper conduct of the business in that town. I give you very great latitude." But if an Act of Parliament stepped in and said that the person thus employed should have such statutory powers that his employer should not be able to interfere with him, he asked, would the noble Lord undertake the government of the bank on those terms? But it was said that if anything went wrong the Governing Body of the School would have the power of dismissing the Head Master. Let him test that assertion. Supposing the Head Master had the statutory power which the Amendment
  1708
  would give him, and supposing he introduced into the School a book trenching on religious instruction and containing principles and doctrines of which the Governing Body highly disapproved, and which might operate very injuriously on the fortunes of the School—then the Governing Body would have no power to interfere. But as it was said they would be able to dismiss the Head Master—supposing they did dismiss him, in that case what would happen when the matter came before the public, as it was sure to do? The Governing Body might allege, on their side, that it was true the Head Master was an excellent Head Master, but they had disagreed with him about a certain book which he had introduced into the School, and thereupon had dismissed him. The answer made to that would be—"What! dismiss him for that! Why, Parliament has given him power to do these things." What then becomes of that great safety-valve, the power of dismissal? A Governing Body could not in the face of public opinion, after Parliament had passed a clause saying these things should be in the uncontrolled power of the Master, dismiss the Master for exercising the uncontrolled power which Parliament had given him.
  LORD LYVEDENsaid, that as the whole responsibility rested with the Head Master he ought to have a power separate from the Governing Body. If the powers were given him by the clause the Governing Body would remove him for exercising that power in a bad manner, as well as for other things.
  LORD REDESDALEsaid, that from his experience as president of one of the largest schools in England—Cheltenham College—he thought it necessary to give uncontrolled power of management to the Head Master. He was removable by the Governing Body, subject to an appeal to the Visitor, who was the Bishop of the diocese. He did not believe that a competent man could be otherwise obtained; but there appeared to be much force in the objection of the Lord Chancellor against making this a matter of statutory regulation. It ought to be imperative, however, upon the Governing body to make regulations under which the Head Master should be elected, giving him freedom in all these matters.
  LORD LYTTELTONwas certain the Governing Bodies would get very much j better Masters if they left them uncon-

  1709
  trolled, and he must therefore press his clause to a division.
  LORD DENMANaddressed the House shortly, but was quite inaudible.
  On Question? their Lordships divided:—Contents 17; Not-Contents 30: Majority 13.
  Resolved in the Negative.

  CONTENTS.

  Abingdon, E.

  Lyveden, L.

  De Grey, E. [Teller.]

  Monson, L.

  Granville, E.

  Northbrook, L.

  Lichfield, E.

  Overstone, L.

  Morley, E.

  Ponsonby, L. (E. Bessborough.)

  Sydney, V.

  Saltersford, L.(E. Countertown.)

  De Mauley, L.

  Saye and Sele, L.

  Foley, L.

  Seaton, L.

  Lyttelton, L. [Teller.]

  NOT-CONTENTS.

  Cairns L. (L. Chancellor.)

  Hawarden, V. [Teller.]

  Stratford deRedcliffe, V.

  Buckingham and Chandos, D.

  Strathallan, V.

  Mar. lborough, D.

  Abinger, L.

  Richmond, D.

  Churchill, L.

  Churston, L.

  Exeter, M.

  Clinton, L.

  Bradford, E.

  Colchester, L.

  Brooke and Warwick, E.

  Colville of Culross, L. [Teller.]

  Chichester, E.

  Graham, E, (D. Montrose.)

  Denman, L.

  Hartismere, L. (L. Henniker.)

  Harrowby, E.

  Lucan, E.

  Houghton, L.

  Malmesbury, E.

  Mostyn, L.

  Nelson, E.

  Silchester, L. (E. Longford.)

  Powis, E.

  Southampton, L.

  Hardinge, V.

  Further Amendments made: Bill to be read 3a on Monday next; and to be printed as amended. (No. 288.)

REGISTRATION (IRELAND) BILL—(No. 281.)
(The Lord Privy Seal.)
REGISTRATION (IRELAND) BILL—(No. 281.)

  SECOND READING.
  THE EARL OF MALMESBURY THE EARL OF MALMESBURY moved, that the Bill be now read 2a.
  THE EARL OF LEITRIMexpressed regret at the course taken by the House of Commons with regard to polling-places, his fear being that scenes of confusion and bloodshed would occur at the approaching election.
  THE EARL OF MALMESBURYsaid, he deeply regretted the failure of the proposition made by the Government, when the Bill was in the other House, for an increased number of polling-places, in consequence of the opposition of the very
  1710
  persons who for the last two years had been urging the necessity of such an increase for the convenience and peace of the country. Polling-places were now in many instances thirty miles apart. Considering, however, that the question was peculiarly one for the consideration of the House of Commons, and that it would have been useless for the Government to persist in their scheme against the determined opposition they met with, they were obliged, especially at so late a period of the Session, to give way and leave things in their present unsatisfactory state. He trusted that the noble Earl's predictions would not be verified, and that the opposition to the scheme would not occasion the confusion and bloodshed which he appeared to dread. The Government had every wish to preserve tranquillity as far as possible during the coming election, and were determined to perform their duty by maintaining the law, as it stood, to the utmost. They did not think it expedient to propose any alteration in the Bill as it had come up from the other House.
  EARL GRANVILLEsaid, he did not think it necessary, as the Government did not intend to propose the restoration of the clauses expunged by the other House, to enter into the reasons why those clauses had been deemed objectionable.
  Motion agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Monday next.
  House adjourned at a quarter before Eight o'clock, to Monday next, half past Four o'clock.