QUESTION. (Hansard, 17 February 1868)

THE EARL OF AIRLIE

rose to ask the Under Secretary for War, Whether 788 any Steps have yet been taken to carry out the Recommendations of the Defence Commission (1860) with regard to the Construction of Floating Batteries for Purposes of Harbour and Coast Defence? The noble Earl remarked that the subject of his Question appeared to him to be of the greatest importance, and that it would consequently be necessary for him to make a somewhat lengthened statement respecting it. Several years ago a Royal Commission was appointed for the purpose of inquiring into the expediency of providing for the defence of the country by means of the construction of fortifications at certain points. The Commissioners presented their Report in the year 1860. They recommended that the dockyards should be placed in a complete state of defence, and that to attain this object fortifications should be constructed, and supplemented by floating batteries. Now, in order to show what kind of vessels the Commissioners had in their mind he would read the following extract from their Report:— The vessels to be constructed for the purposes of harbour defence should be divested of all qualities that are not necessary for this kind of service, in order to reduce the expense of building, and to prevent them from being detached on other duties. The vessels which in the opinion of the Commissioners it was expedient to construct were not intended to be sea-going ships, but were meant for the defence of our harbours and coasts, and for that purpose alone. Since that Commission reported a great deal of fresh light had been shown on this subject, and in 1865 we had the experience of the American War. In that year a Committee of naval officers was appointed by the then First Lord of the Admiralty to report on Captain Coles's plan of turret-ships. The Committee recommended that the turret system should be tried, and that a sea-going vessel should be built by way of experiment. They expressed, however, strong doubts as to whether this particular mode of construction was adapted to sea-going ships, though they expressed no doubt whatever as to its being suited for vessels intended for the defence of our coasts and harbours. He was glad to notice that his noble Friend the Chairman of that Committee was in his place, because he would be able to correct him in the event of his making any misstatement respecting the recommendations of that Committee. Well, the Committee, after giving their opinion on 789 the relative advantages and disadvantages of this mode of construction, expressed themselves in these terms— We fully recognize the great advantages of the revolving turret system of armament as applied to floating batteries and harbour and coast defences, to which they are, in a great measure, confined, as vessels on the Monitor plan can be built so low as to render it most difficult to hit them, and in which the unlimited training of the turrets would not be interfered with by masts or other obstructions. A floating battery of this description, even with one turret only, would be most formidable, for if the turret were disabled she could haul out of action under the protection of her consort. He believed he was correct in stating that there was an almost universal concurrence of opinion that, for purposes of coast and harbour defence and for occasional service in the Channel, turret vessels were superior to every other class of ship. There was a universal opinion that they could carry a heavier armament and heavier armour-plates. Indeed, as a matter of fact, vessels of this sort had for the last four or five years carried guns much heavier than any which had been placed on board other ships. The Hercules, the last of our broadside iron-clad ships which had been launched, and the strongest broadside ironclad afloat, carried iron plates nine inches thick over the part where she was most heavily plated; but so far back as the autumn of 1864 the Americans had launched a vessel carrying a turret fifteen inches thick. With regard, however, to the form best adapted for a sea-going ship, the greatest possible variety of opinion existed. This being the case he should have thought the proper course would have been to construct, in the first instance, those vessels which were absolutely necessary for the purpose of placing our dockyards in a position of security, and to proceed with great caution and deliberation in building those other vessels in regard to which there existed so great a diversity of opinion. But it seemed that exactly the opposite course was adopted. We had spent £11,000,000 in the construction of what were termed iron-clad cruizers. Of these all, except four, were broadside vessels, and we had got together a collection of vessels hardly any two of which carried the same armament, or had the same rate of speed or draught of water, while some of them were of such prodigious size that there were very few harbours in the world which they could enter; and he believed he was correct in saying that they could not be docked in any dock except 790 that of Malta; while, to add to the inconvenience, many of them could not carry more than three or four days' coal. Now, it was said that we must have cruizers to protect our trade; but what, he would ask, was meant by the protection of our trade? Did it mean that our merchant vessels should be so protected in time of war that our merchants could carry on their trade as in time of peace? If so, we should have to undertake a task which was very difficult and well nigh impossible. The trade of the world had so grown, we had thrown open our trade to foreign shipping so completely, and competition for the carrying of this great trade Was so sharp, that a very slight difference in the rates of freight and insurance would soon induce a merchant to ship his goods on board a vessel belonging to one country rather on board a vessel belonging to another; so that, in the event of a great war, it would be next to impossible to prevent a great portion of our trade being transferred to neutral bottoms. If by protecting trade was meant protecting our coasts and preventing a blockade of our harbours, then he went to the fullest extent with those who were in favour of building vessels for the protection of our trade. We had an enormous amount of capital embarked in our merchant ships; but supposing those ships were to suffer, even then our trade would not be annihilated. Our commerce would, in fact, be carried on in neutral vessels. He did not think anyone could contradict him when he said that those armed ships, to which he had been referring, were the vessels best suited not only to the defence of our dockyards, but also to the protection of our commercial harbours. He put it to any naval man whether a small number of those vessels stationed at, say, the mouth of the Thames, would not prevent a blockade of sea-going vessels very much their superior in number and size? The Americans would tell us now, if their opinion on the subject were asked, they had discovered a mode of constructing vessels which would render a blockade of the United States by any maritime Power quite impossible. We knew that during the late war in America, notwithstanding the number of vessels which had been destroyed, so far from the trade of the United States being destroyed, the imports of that country during the last two or three years of the struggle were much larger than they had been at any former period. That was a practical proof 791 that so long as a country could keep its ports open its trade might be carried on even though its merchant shipping were swept from the seas. On the other hand, if we were engaged in war against another maritime Power, and that, owing to a want of proper defences, a blockade was established on our coasts, what would be our position? We must not measure the amount of injury which we should sustain from a blockade by the injury which we had been able to inflict in times past on other nations. During the blockade established by the North, the population of the Southern States suffered great hardships, indeed, he might say miseries, though the people against whom it was directed were a purely agricultural people, thinly scattered over one of the most fertile countries in the world, a country capable of producing far more food than was required to supply the wants of its inhabitants. We, on the other hand, were a trading and manufacturing community, dependent for a large portion of our supplies of food on foreign nations. Let, then, a blockade be established over our ports, and it meant not high prices, not suffering, but famine and starvation, as regards great masses of our population. As, therefore, between a class of ships which, in the opinion of all professional men and of the American Government, would be able to prevent a blockade, and between another class which it was supposed might be useful as cruizers, there could be no hesitation. But it was said that these turret-vessels could be very quickly built. In plain English that meant that we might wait till war broke out, but if we did that we should find that we had to pay an enormous price for very bad work; and if we waited till danger was imminent, it was by no means certain that we could get the work done in time, on any terms or at any price. We should have watched the progress of events to very little purpose if we had not noticed that the operations of war, like everything else, had of late been much accelerated. Now the object of each belligerent was to concentrate within a few months efforts that formerly would have been spread over years. The tendency of the modern system was, in fact, to strike quickly, to strike hard, and to strike home. It would be very little comfort to us, if we suffered a great disaster, to know that if the enemy had only given us a few months to prepare for him we should have been able to defeat his attack. Nor was this warning 792 gratuitous or ill-timed. Everywhere there was distrust and uneasiness—every European Power was adding to its armaments; and no man could tell how long the present armed peace might last, or by what accident it might be broken. He (the Earl of Airlie) was no alarmist. On the contrary, it had always appeared to him extraordinary that Englishmen should speak with apprehension of a revolution in the art of war, the tendency of which was in favour of that people which had at its command the greatest amount of coal, of iron, and of manufacturing skill. Nor did he cry out for an increased expenditure. Parliament had never shown itself niggard in its reponse to any appeal made to it for means by the Government of the day; but he did put it to Her Majesty's Ministers seriously to consider whether it would not be prudent to carry out this measure of defence to which he had referred, and to be content to abandon for a time those experiments in naval architecture which had proved so costly, and, he feared, so very unsatisfactory.