HL Deb 03 April 1868 vol 191 cc803-19
LORD STRATHEDEN

rose, according to Notice, to call their Lordships' attention to the further Correspondence respecting the disturbances in Crete. He had first to direct their Lordships' attention to the "Identic Note" communicated in October last to the Turkish Government on the part of Russia, France, Prussia, and Italy. The general result of that Note had been to inflict a severe blow upon the Turkish Government, and, as regarded the Eastern question, to place Great Britain on the one side and France and Russia on the other. As that was a state of things inconsistent with the position of affairs established as the result of the Crimean War, it became an important matter to inquire how far our Government had contributed to produce it, or laboured to avert it. The question was, whether our Government had done as much as was possible to exempt themselves from all responsibility for a proceeding which, according to their own language, was both unfortunate and injurious? In a despatch from Lord Stanley to Lord Bloomfield was the following passage:— Her Majesty's Government had given no advice which had been disregarded. They had recommended the granting of local autonomy to Crete; and the plan of Government now proposed for that island, if it did not amount to an entire concession of local autonomy, yet fell very little short of it, and seemed to include that which was practically the most important point—equal rights for Mussulmans and Christians. Under these circumstances, I felt unwilling to join in any representation which, however courteous and friendly in its language, bore the character of a remonstrance or protest. I saw no necessity for taking such a step, and, if unnecessary, it could only be injurious. It was clear from that despatch that the "Identic Note" had been for some time under the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, that they disapproved it, and held that the Turkish Government had not done anything to call down upon itself, deservedly, such an European reprimand. In the Circular issued on the 18th of October last by Prince Gortschakoff to the diplomatic representatives of Russia was the following passage, which sufficiently showed that the "Identic Note" was the inspiration of Russia:— When at last the insurrection of Candia revealed the progress of this situation, the Imperial Cabinet reiterated its efforts with the Turkish Government and the Great Powers. It addressed an invitation to the Cabinets to join with it in an exhortation to the Porte not to allow this insurrection to increase, the rebound of which might be felt all over the Christian East, and which might become the first spark of a general conflagration. On the 31st October Mr. Elliot, our Representative at Constantinople, addressed the following despatch to Lord Stanley:— I have the honour to inclose a copy of the identic note upon the affairs of Candia, which, as your Lordship will have learnt by my telegram of this day, has been sent in to the Porte by the Representatives of France, Russia, and Italy. The Prussian Minister has likewise received similar instructions, and will act upon them today or to-morrow. After alluding to the efforts of the Powers to put a stop to the effusion of blood and to diminish the honors of war, the note goes on to declare that while the act of amnesty offered none of the guarantees which would justify its being looked upon as a serious measure, the refusal of the inquiry shows that no remedy is to be looked for to the abuses which provoked the insurrection of the Cretans; and nothing having been done to satisfy the other Christian populations of the Empire, the Powers apprehend that the obstinate resistance of the Porte may precipitate a crisis in the East. In this case the Porte is warned that it would ask in vain for even the moral support of the Cabinets in the difficulties which the neglect of their advice will have brought about. It will not surprise your Lordship that this note should have produced upon Fuad Pasha an impression of the most painful description. He spoke of it to me yesterday as being a direct incitement to rebellion held out to the populations of several provinces, where for some time past the ground has been diligently prepared by intriguers labouring to keep alive disaffection in the Empire. That it is eminently calculated to produce the effect apprehended by Fuad Pasha appears to me incontestable, nor is the probability of its being taken as an encouragement to the disaffected disputed even by the Ministers who, in execution of their instructions, transmitted the note to the Porte, but who confine themselves to assurances that their Governments had no wish to add to the difficulties of the Turkish Empire, and that the expressions which seem equivocal are capable of explanation. It is, however, evident that the effect produced by the note, when it shall be made public, will be in accordance with the interpretation that can hardly fail to be put upon it in Turkey, rather than with that which may be given in the Cabinets of the Ministers at Paris or at St. Petersburgh; and it will be looked upon much more as an address to the disaffected subjects of the Sultan than as a communication to His Majesty's Ministers. With respect to the conduct of our Government throughout the negotiations on that subject, he could not help admitting that up to the time of the "Identic Note" their conduct appeared to deserve the highest admiration. The Foreign Secretary had resisted a variety of lures held out to induce him to enter into lines of action inconsistent with our various obligations towards the Ottoman Porte; but their merits in that respect, however great, were merely of a negative character. It was one thing to adhere to our engagements, and another thing to advance towards the accomplishment of great objects of policy; and one great object of English policy in regard to Turkey should be to prevent France from joining Russia.

Moved, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for, Copy of the Instructions to the British Representative at Paris in reference to the identic Note proposed to be communicated to the Porte by Russia, France, Italy, and Prussia."—(The Lord Stratheden.)

THE EARL OF MALMESBURY

said, that he did not hear the first part of the noble Lord's speech so distinctly as he could wish; but so far as he could gather, it was the noble Lord's wish to ascertain what was the present state of the insurrection in Crete and the policy of Her Majesty's Government. That policy had been throughout the same. The Government felt naturally the deepest interest in those who were suffering all the horrors of insurrection in such a place as Crete, and they had a sincere desire to put an end to the insurrection if they could do it without interfering with the just rights of the Porte. No doubt some cruelties had been committed; but he believed they had been greatly magnified. All the accounts from Her Majesty's servants abroad proved this, and although the country had been devastated, and very considerable misery had resulted from the insurrection and the efforts of the Porte to put it down, as it had a right to do, yet this suffering must be the natural consequence of any rebellion whatever. According to the reports of Her Majesty's servants, especially Mr. Elliot, our Ambassador at Constantinople, the insurrection now assumed comparatively trifling dimensions. Only a few insignificant skirmishes had taken place lately. He should not attempt to go into the original causes of this rebellion, or to ascertain the comparative blame that might be due to each of the parties. If their Lordships would read the despatches of Consul Longworth, they would see that the main point at issue between the Porte and the Candiote population was the difference of religion and race. The Cretans were certainly not overtaxed, they were under a comparatively mild Government, they were exempted from many of the laws to which other subjects of the Porte were amenable, and they enjoyed a general freedom and liberty of speech which other countries might envy. They were ruled over by a Pasha, with whom he (the Earl of Malmesbury) had been acquainted in Paris, and who was an amiable and enlightened man. He believed that the insurrection was very much to be attributed to the amiable weakness of that gentleman, who had allowed it to proceed so far that at last he was unable to put it down. In this state of things the Porte had done all that it could. It had asked the advice of Her Majesty's Government, and had appointed two Christian Governors, and the Ministry of the Porte had issued regulations for the government of the Christian population, a copy of which he had sent to this country, and which would be laid upon the table. The policy of Her Majesty's Government was non-interference, especially in the internal affairs of other nations. Having for many years asked the Porte to treat its Christian subjects with justice, the Government of this country were bound to remind the Porte constantly of these promises. It was our interest that they should be kept; but we were not bound, and it would indeed be a fatal error on our part, to encourage the enemies of the Porte under the plea of giving it good advice, or to place ourselves in a position adverse to the Porte. For this reason Her Majesty's Government had not thought it their duty to join in any Identic Notes with other Powers. There would be no objection to lay upon the table the despatches which had been lately received, and to give any information on the subject.

THE DUKE OF ARGYLL

said, the noble Earl (the Earl of Malmesbury) had failed to apprehend the main point of the question raised by his noble Friend—namely, that, now for the first time since the Treaty of 1856, almost all the Great Powers of Europe, with the single exception of Great Britain, had been united to a certain extent in action, and to a still larger extent in the language held towards the Ottoman Empire. He understood his noble Friend to ask whether the Identic Note presented to the Porte by the combined Powers, and which was represented by the Porte itself as a document of very serious import, had been properly resisted and opposed by the British Government? He understood his noble Friend to inquire, whether if the Government thought this Note so serious, as affecting the independence and integrity of Turkey, they took any means to dissuade the other Powers from agreeing to that Identic Note? It was an important and significant fact that this action on the part of the Great Powers had placed this country in a very undesirable position of isolation. With one sentiment of his noble Friend he was bound to express his sympathy and concurrence;—it was now thirteen months ago since he (the Duke of Argyll) had expressed an opinion that the Government had committed an error in having refused to withdraw from Crete the families of the non-combatants in that struggle. He had reason to think that some noble Lords thought he had made out his case; but no one spoke in that sense, while two or three noble Lords on both sides of the House expressed a contrary opinion. He rejoiced that, although he might be in a minority in that House, he found himself in a very large majority on the other side of the Channel. The Great Powers, it appeared, combined in recommending the Porte to stop the effusion of blood, and to seek, in common with them, a solution of this deplorable conflict by an honest inquiry into the grievances and wishes of the Candiotes. In the meanwhile they insisted on withdrawing the families of the insurgents from the calamities of war. He was aware that even a Member of the Opposition who might speak on the Eastern Question addressed their Lordships under very considerable responsibility. Every word uttered in the House was reported in the East, and he therefore wished to guard against any misconception. He had no wish to criticize the foreign administration of Lord Stanley; for he shared the impression general in the country that, on most questions, he had shown admirable judgment and prudence, and a strict regard to the true interests of England, and, while differing from him in this instance, he gave the noble Lord credit for having been animated by the most upright motives. Now, he had been represented as favouring the opinion that it would be for the advantage of Crete to be annexed to the kingdom of Greece. Such, however, was not his opinion. The Government of Greece was just now in a very deplorable condition, for he understood that within a few miles of the Acropolis of Athens it was not safe for anyone to ride-or walk, on account of brigands, and that the Isthmus of Corinth had to be constantly patrolled by cavalry to secure the safety of ordinary travellers. Under such circumstances it was preposterous to desire the annexation of any territory to Greece, which was bound to put its own house in order before it could assume to annex other dominions. The advice repeatedly urged upon Turkey by Her Majesty's Government, to give Crete what is called autonomy, he believed to be the best advice which it was possible to give. What, however, was implied in such advice? We did not think of advising Russia to give autonomy to Poland, nor did we recommend the United States to give autonomy to the South. It was obvious, then, that the parallel sometimes drawn between Turkey and other States was quite fallacious. He was asked last Session how he would like England to be advised to give autonomy to Ireland or any part of the British dominions; but his answer was that whenever the Great Powers were obliged to fight on our behalf, and to sign a treaty virtually guaranteeing our integrity and independence, they would have a right to press advice upon us respecting Ireland. With regard to the refusal of the Government to assist in the removal of non-combatants from Crete, he thought that refusal had not been a frank and straightforward one, but had apparently been based on a wish to avoid the incurring of responsibility. He observed a remarkable despatch from Sir Andrew Buchanan, describing the language which he had held to the Russian Government. Sir Andrew, it appeared, on being asked by Prince Gortschakoff to represent to this Government the propriety of removing non-combatants, replied that the Government had already refused to remove women and children; but that this was a matter of less consequence, inasmuch as the American fleet could do so, and had been ordered into Cretan waters for that very purpose. He did not wish to blame Sir Andrew Buchanan, who was one of the ablest servants of the Crown, for he unquestionably held the language of his Government; but such language was not consistent with the argument used in the House last year, that the removal of non-combatants would be at variance with the duty of a neutral State, since it would relieve the insurgents from a burden which it was proper they should bear. That was a fair and logical position, but to say that we would not take such a step, but that there was the American fleet, and that we should be delighted if they did it—for this was really implied—was not a proper position to assume. The Americans had no right beyond what belonged to any other fleet, and such language amounted to a distinct intimation that the Russian fleet or any other fleet might also assist. Sir Andrew's statement, though volunteered on his part, was approved in subsequent despatches from the Foreign Office, and, indeed, he simply repeated what he knew had been the language of Lord Stanley in London. Prince Gortschakoff, very naturally, took care to make use of the observations of Sir Andrew Buchanan, and of those of Lord Stanley to Baron Brunnow, and in one of his despatches he remarked that though the British Government had not thought proper to take part in the removal, they had intimated that it was not their business to interfere with the other Powers who might do so. Thus the only overt act which had been taken by the other Powers was actually suggested by the Foreign Office, with a virtual intimation that no objection would be offered by England. He was happy to say that all the other Great Powers had taken part in the removal. The French Government sent vessels; the Americans took a few non-combatants, but then suspended operations; Russia and Italy sent vessels; and a gunboat was sent by Austria. Considering the calamities and brutalities to which these unfortunate people were exposed, and considering that Crete had at one time established its independence, and was restored to the Porte by the concurrence of all the Great Powers of Europe, those Powers had, in his opinion, come to a wise, just, and humane decision. The noble Earl (the Earl of Malmesbury) had passed over those calamities very briefly, and it was easy to indulge in general denials, and to say that there was no truth in the reported massacres of women and children. No doubt many of the stories were exaggerations, and some of them complete fabrications; but he observed that France and other Powers had urged on Lord Stanley that, if he was not satisfied with the information he had received, a joint Commission should be sent to Crete to inquire into the facts. Lord Stanley ultimately acceded to that proposal to this extent, that he was willing to urge on the Porte to nominate a Commission of their own, to which certain names should be added by the Great Powers. The noble Lord on this as on other points seemed to have somewhat vacillated, from an evident desire to avoid responsibility and to let matters take their own course; for, when asked whether he adhered to this suggestion, he expressed a doubt whether he could by such a Commission get better information than he already received from Her Majesty's Consuls in Crete. Now, he was quite willing to take the evidence of these gentlemen, and after carefully reading the blue book his impression was very different from that of the noble Earl. Mr. Dickson, our principal Consul in Crete, who was by no means a phil-Hellenist, but was a good friend of Turkey, testified in many of his despatches to the humane conduct of some of the leading officers of the Turkish army. No doubt the responsible officers of the Turkish Government were generally humane in their conduct, but the charges of brutality were directed at the irregular troops, who were known to be such savages, and so incapable of military discipline, that their employment involved the commission of all kinds of atrocities. On this point Consul Dickson, in one of his despatches, said— I myself have repeatedly urged on Server Effendi, as I did with his predecessor, the expediency of disarming and disbanding the Cretan Bashi-Bazouks; for by doing so I consider that the island would be spared further devastation, and these barbarous and fanatical mercenaries prevented from perpetrating their wonted misdeeds, while the Imperial authorities would be relieved from a serious charge in their mode of conducting the war. Server Effendi replied that he was desirous of effecting this wholesome measure; but that it could only be done by degrees and with great tact and caution on the part of the Government. The brutalities lately committed on Christian women and children defy description. That was the language of their own Consul, and, notwithstanding such evidence as that the noble Earl (the Earl of Malmesbury) had got up and told their Lordships that the war had, on the whole, been conducted with humanity. If the Government wanted further evidence would they take that of their Naval Officers on the station? At all events, when Lord Stanley said he had no independent means of knowledge, and that he was willing to trust to his own Consuls and Officers, their Lordships had a right to rely on the information which those gentlemen communicated. Lieutenant Murray, writing on the 22nd of July, 1867, to Lord Clarence Paget, said— The reign of terror which has long threatened has become a fearful reality. Parties of Bashi-Bazouks, who have given up service with Omer Pasha (not finding it sufficiently remunerative), scour the country, and put to death any man, woman, or child they find. The whole district of Kissamoss is a scene of mourning; for all the young men being in the hills fighting, their families are left without protection, and at the mercy of these ruffians. And then he went on to say— His Excellency did not deny that the massacre had taken place; but, as an extenuating circumstance, said that some Turks had been killed by Christians, which is utterly untrue, as there is not a Mussulman in the whole district outside the walls of the town. He was obliged to confess that the Government is powerless to prevent these atrocities from taking place, nor do they care to prevent them, for the Turks now openly avow their intention of killing all the Cretan Christians. He would not trouble the House with further extracts. Such being the facts, in the month of July or August, the whole of the foreign Consuls in Crete united in a telegraphic message to their various Ministers at Constantinople and elsewhere requesting the immediate assistance of the fleets of their respective Governments in order to carry away the fugitives; and, accordingly, the various nations to which he had referred sent squadrons more or less strong—the French sent four vessels, the Prussians two or three, the Italians one or two, and the Austrians one gunboat—and a very large number of those unfortunate persons were removed to Greece. Now, what he ventured to observe was that the only result of the conduct upon which he had animadverted last Session was this—that we had stood absolutely alone; the neutrality and independence of Turkey, if there had been a violation, had been violated by the other Powers, we looking on, and not only not remonstrating, but rather indicating our approval, only we had not had either the honour or the satisfaction of having contributed to that result. Having said so much with regard to this particular case, he would now add a few words on the subject of our general policy and the course taken by Her Majesty's Government in recommending Turkey to give autonomy to Crete. He did not think any advice given to Turkey in that tone would be of any avail. The truth was Turkey was surrounded by many difficulties and dangers, and he should not feel surprised if she did not take any advice that was given her in reference to granting autonomy to Crete. But that, in his opinion, only pointed to the necessity of another course. As the integrity and independence of Turkey were the result of a treaty among the other Powers of Europe, it seemed to him of infinite importance that those Powers should all act together, and that the worst calamities would fall on Turkey if the principle were once admitted that two or three Powers might each follow their own counsel with regard to her affairs while England stood aloof, neither approving or disapproving, but letting matters take their course. It was the great object of the treaty concluded by the Great Powers at Paris in 1856, and in the conduct of which his noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon) bore so conspicuous a part, that there should be joint action on the part of all the Great Powers with respect to Turkey, and that individual action should not be allowed where concert could be arrived at. But by refusing to join the other Great Powers in a matter in which they were clearly right, we had afforded a precedent and example for separate action on their part which might extend to other matters of more serious import, and thus there was a serious risk that we might place the result of the contest wholly beyond our control or guidance. He believed that nothing could be more dangerous to Turkey than the continuance of the present stale of things in Crete. A great Empire, nominally one of the Great Powers of Europe, whose integrity we had guaranteed, had sent to a comparatively small island an army of upwards of 40,000 men, and a large contingent from Egypt, and yet in that small island small bands of the population in the mountains had for upwards of two years successfully maintained their independence. Was not that a contest sufficient to excite all the other Christian provinces of Turkey to revolt? That was a most dangerous spectacle to the other provinces of Turkey; and he entreated Her Majesty's Government, in conjunction with the other Powers of Europe, to urge with a little more insistance on Turkey the duty of taking that course, whatever it might be—and he did not express any conclusive opinion on that point—which might be found for the interests of that Empire whose integrity and independence rested upon our guarantee. He believed the present state of things was this: Omer Pasha had gone to Servia; the Turks held two or three towns in Crete; they were able to advance over the plains to the foot of the mountains, but not to enter into any of the strongholds of the mountaineers. He left their Lordships to judge what the effect of such a state of things would be upon the other provinces of Turkey if the European Powers did not insist that an autonomy should be given to Crete.

THE EARL OF DENBIGH

said, that the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) would lead one to imagine that this had been a bonâ fide insurrection of the Cretans against the tyranny of the Turks. That was not the opinion of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary, and if their Lordships turned to the last Report of Consul General Longworth they would find a very different account. Consul General Longworth, speaking of Vely Pasha, said— It would be most unjust to Vely Pasha, on the other hand, to refuse him credit for his endeavours to promote the prosperity of the island, to civilize the inhabitants, and insure a greater measure of toleration for the Christians. He not only encouraged the building of churches, schools, and hospitals, but liberally contributed from his own funds for such purposes. He caused physicians to be brought from Constantinople that the poor might receive medical aid at the expense of the Government. He strove to advance the interests of trade, established buoys at the entrance of the harbour of Canea, introduced cranes, improved the light-house and Custom House… By the whole black population of the isle he was looked up to as their best friend and benefactor. No other Turkish Pasha that I haw heard of has shown so much indulgence and liberality to Christians; yet, with every claim on their goodwill and gratitude, it cannot be denied that he had for some time past incurred their dislike, and this grew finally into a feeling of hostility.

THE DUKE OF ARGYLL

inquired what was the date of that Report?

THE EARL OF DENBIGH

said, the date was 1858, before the insurrection; but he quoted it to show that there was no cause for the revolt. The Consul went on to show that the chief cause of the alleged difficulties was that the Cretans had been obliged to contribute to the making of roads— For the construction of roads all over the island, the Pasha decided that every able-bodied male inhabitant should contribute either nine days' labour or its equivalent in money — fifty-four piastres the year. If, as has been suggested, instead of this mode of proceeding, a joint-stock company had been established, with a privilege to exact a toll, it is questionable whether the arrangement would have proved a bit more satisfactory. It was very clear that it had been the object of the Russian Government for a long time to bring its power to bear on the Porte for the purpose of weakening it, and so obtaining a footing for themselves in the country; and what hotter opportunity of doing so could there be than to try to secure for Crete what was called autonomy? All the despatches and letters that had appeared within the last few months had made it clear that the real object of Russia was to obtain Crete as a dowry for the Queen of Greece. That had been openly stated, and he believed it. He agreed with the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) that we did wrong in standing aloof — in witnessing the nefarious transaction without using very strong language in deprecation of it. It was an inhuman thing to stand by and see others assisting Russia without openly condemning their conduct. The taking away of the non-combatants, although it might be justified on the score of humanity, could not be justified on the score of policy. It was clear that in an insurrection the taking away of non-combatants assisted the combatants, and was therefore a violation of neutrality. He was glad that the British Government had absolutely refused to join the other Powers in addressing Turkey. We had thereby earned the gratitude of the Porte, which had a decided right over Crete. He should excessively regret to see this country concurring with other nations in a course which should assist Russia in detaching Crete from the Empire of the Porte.

THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY

said, it was not necessary that he should undertake the defence of the policy pursued in this question by the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. But as the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) had again brought that subject under the consideration of their Lordships, he could not help repeating the opinion he had expressed upon a former occasion, that the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary had shown great wisdom in abstaining from joining the other Powers in removing the families of insurgents from the island. He agreed with the noble Earl who had just addressed their Lordships (the Earl of Denbigh) that such an interference would have been a distinct breach of the neutrality we were bound to observe. It was naturally difficult to take a course which might lay one open to a charge of inhumanity; and therefore the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary deserved all the more credit for adhering firmly to a policy which laid him open to such a charge. What the Ottoman Empire had chiefly suffered from had been the meddling of its candid friends. The candid friends who came forward on this occasion made one very plain recommendation—namely, that the Porte should relieve itself from its resposibilities and give Crete her independence. There was a policy which was well known as the "artichoke policy," which was that of divesting a State little by little of its responsibilities and of its outlying positions until at last the heart of the artichoke might be eaten up at one mouthful. Wishing, as we did, that the Ottoman Government should be maintained until there was some civilized and independent Government to take its place, we ought not to join in that policy—["Hear, hear!"]—and he was very much surprised to hear the noble Duke cheering that observation, because he distinctly laid it down that the only Government that had been put forward to take charge of the island of Crete was entirely unfit to do so. If that were so, what policy did the noble Duke desire we should follow? If we were to follow the policy of inducing the Porte to give up Crete, we ought, at all events, to be prepared to suggest some independent and civilized Government that should take its place. The noble Duke said he approved the suggestion that Crete should be governed on the principle of autonomy, and be placed in the position of Moldavia and Wallachia. That was precisely what the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary recommended. The noble Duke complained that our Government had not acted in that matter in concert with the other Powers. Now, there could be no objection to our co-operating with other Powers who were taking a course of which we approved; but how could we be expected to co-operate with them if they pursued a policy which we condemned? The noble Lord the Foreign Secretary took a proper course and went as far as he could in the same direction as the other Powers; but he had refused to unite with them in departing from the policy which this country had generally observed. Acting upon that principle, he had recommended the Porte to grant autonomy to Crete; but, as continued officious meddling with the Ottoman Government would weaken instead of strengthen it, he abstained from enforcing judicious advice with a pressure which might have produced the same effect as injudicious advice. The Porte naturally claimed to be the best judge of what it was necessary to do in its own dominions. The Powers that had guaranteed the independence and integrity of the Porte no doubt felt justified in offering their advice, and it was their duty to point out the consequences that would follow the disregard of it; but if they proceeded to exercise that kind of pressure which amounted to a threat that, if the Porte did not comply with the advice, then their moral support, as it was called, would be withdrawn, they acted inconsistently with the spirit of the treaty under which the independence and integrity of Turkey was guaranteed. He trusted that this country would not pursue an indirect policy in the matter. If we thought that the Ottoman Empire should no longer be sustained, let us say so plainly. As long as we were prepared to sustain it, he trusted we should not by such indirect measures as removing the families of insurgents or applying pressure to the Porte pursue a policy which might involve this country in difficulty.

THE EARL OF MALMESBURY

said, that after the very effective vindication of the policy of the Government which had been offered by the noble Earl who had just addressed their Lordships, he need not again trespass upon their time at any length. The noble Duke opposite (the Duke of Argyll) had put into his mouth two or three expressions he never used: he had not denied that there had been cruelties in Crete; but he said that the reports from our employés showed that they were chargeable only to the Executive. The noble Duke said it was an extraordinary thing that we had not joined the other Powers in removing non-combatants from the island; but it should be remembered that his noble Friend at the head of the Foreign Office was not the Minister of France, or Russia, or Prussia, but the Minister of England, and that it was to the policy of this country that he had to give effect. Unless we assumed a position in Europe which would not be recognized, how were we to regulate their course of conduct on matters of this sort? They had combined to give the Porte what advice they pleased, and we were not obliged to follow in the same course. The Government did not approve the course proposed by the other Powers, and showed its disapprobation by not joining in it, and the Foreign Secretary took the wisest course for maintaining the independence of Turkey. We should have been inconsistent in our policy, which was one of non-interference, if we had assisted in the removal of the refugees. It was a singular fact that a petition had been received from many hundreds of fugitives in Greece, praying that they may be allowed to return to Crete under protection. This showed that in flying from their country they had not bettered their condition. Of course we must take all these things cum grano salis. Fully sensible of the immense importance of maintaining the independence of the Ottoman Empire, the Government felt that the best policy to pursue with that end in view was one of non-interference, coupled with judicious advice to the Porte in respect to the treatment of its Christian subjects.

EARL RUSSELL

I must say that my opinion is entirely favourable to the conduct which Her Majesty's Government have pursued. I believe Lord Stanley has acted rightly under the circumstances. I should not like to give any abstract opinion as to the propriety of allowing women and children to be taken away from the place where an insurrection breaks out. That is a point upon which the Executive Government of the day must form their own opinion; and I think it is quite impossible for any independent person to form an opinion in regard to the circumstances of this case, and, as far as I can see, the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office formed a just judgment upon these particulars. It is easy to say that it would have been a work of humanity to have removed these persons, but it is not so in every case. The contest may be a very barbarous one, and it may be that in removing these women and children you tend to prolong that cruel contest; and, if so, it could be no work of humanity to remove them. As to the task in which the Russian and other Governments have taken a part, there has not been that relief given which one might expect; and many of these unfortunate persons are starving in Greece, instead of earning their living in their native land. If that is the case, I must say that I think it was a most unfortunate interference on the part of those different Powers, and I am very glad, therefore, that the Government of my own country have taken no part in it. As to the animus with which the advice of these Powers was given, that advice was given in an Identic Note sent and counsels proffered to the Porte. We see by a despatch, dated about a year ago, that the French Ambassador came to Lord Stanley, and told him that the opinion of his Government was that the separation of Crete from the dominion of Turkey was inevitable, and that the French Government wished to save the dignity of the Porte, and were disposed to advise that the Sultan should consult the Greek inhabitants of Crete, and ask them whether they would like to be joined to the kingdom of Greece. Omer Pasha, in recounting what took place, says that the Government of Russia had openly avowed that they wished for the separation of Crete from the Government of Turkey; and if we had joined in this Identic Note and in the counsels given to the Porte, we could not have shut our eyes to the ultimate views of these Powers, and to the fact that they meant, however courteously they might express themselves, to aim a blow at the integrity of the Turkish Empire. But when one blow had been given to the integrity of the Turkish Empire—when Crete had been separated from Turkey because there was an insurrection—who shall tell me that there will not be persons who will be skilful enough to get up insurrections in other Christian provinces of Turkey, and that the same advice may not be repeated next year or the year after, in order to separate one province after another from the dominion of the Turkish Government. I therefore say, like Lord Stanley, that I am not surprised that the Turkish Ambassador should have told him that the Sultan was determined to refuse that advice, and that he thought a concession to the extent of separating provinces from the Turkish dominion was extremely dangerous; that it would lead finally to the partition of the Turkish Empire; and that, therefore, they could not consent to it. I quite agree with my noble Friend that it was very good advice on the part of the British Government to recommend an autonomy. Now, autonomy is a very good word; but of course it means differently when applied to different provinces. In some provinces there are no Turks whatever; and when you speak of an autonomy with regard to them, you mean the Christian inhabitants of those provinces governing themselves. In Servia, for instance, there are no Turks, and autonomy would therefore mean persons of the same race and religion as the rest governing that country for themselves. But if you speak of an autonomy for Candia, you do not mean the same thing; because, together with a large population of Greek Christians, there is likewise a considerable population of Mohammedan Turks; and an autonomy for Candia would therefore mean, not that there should be one Government governing people of one race, but that there should be two Governments, one governing the Christians and the other governing the Mohammedans—the Turkish Government using the best means, through the Governor, to maintain peace and harmony between the two populations. This is a very delicate matter for a foreign Power to interfere in by advice; and I see no reason why we should interfere by advice further than to express a general opinion in favour of autonomy. If we mean, as I think we are bound, to respect the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire, my belief is that the Foreign Minister of this country has acted with great prudence and discretion, and has done his duty to his own country and to its allies.

EARL GREY

said, he should like some information from the Government on one point. If they were to believe the accounts which were published of what was going on in Crete, it appeared that the insurrection would have been suppressed long ago but for the open support given to the insurgents from Greece. Such conduct on the part of Greece gave undoubted cause of just complaint to the Turkish Government. The Turkish Government, if left to itself, would soon be able to stop the blockade runners from Greece by following them to their homes and destroying them, a course which they would be justified in following. He wished to know if it was the fact that Turkey was not allowed to take the only effectual means of stopping the blockade-runners; if so, Turkey was not fairly dealt with, and the Powers of Europe ought either openly to say that they meant to give up their policy of maintaining the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and to deprive Turkey of Crete; or else, in common humanity and justice, they should leave the Turks at full liberty to take the only legitimate means in their power to bring this contest to a close.

THE DUKE OF ARGYLL

said, he had been misunderstood. He did not mean to say that England ought to have taken part in the Identic Note, which was a very foolish one; but that any advice tendered to Turkey in favour of autonomy was as much meddling with the Empire of Turkey as would be the case in any other course which might have been taken.

Motion (by Leave of the House) withdrawn.