SECOND READING. (Hansard, 31 May 1867)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR
, in moving the second reading of a Bill to amend the Acts relating to the jurisdiction of the County Courts, said, that the first object of the Bill was to enable actions to be brought in the Court of the districts where the causes of action wholly, or in part, arose. At present the action must be brought in the Court of the district where the cause of action wholly arose. Thus, if goods were delivered to a railway company to be sent to York and were damaged in transit, the party at York would have to sue the company in London, because the company were supposed to reside wherever their chief office was; but by this Bill the action could be entered in the Court at York, where the cause of action in part arose. At present in the Superior Courts, where an action was allowed to go by default, the plaintiff could sign judgment in eight days and issue execution eight days afterwards. In the County Courts no such facilities existed. By the 2nd clause of this Bill, if the defendant did not within six days of the return day of the summons give notice in writing to the registrar of his intention to defend the action, the plaintiff would be entitled to enter up judgment. By the 3rd clause, actions commenced in any metropolitan County Court might be continued in any other of the metropolitan Courts, if the defendant resided or carried on business within the district of any such Court. By Clause 4 it was provided that no action should be brought to recover debts for any ale, porter, beer, cider, or perry consumed on the premises. The 5th clause provided that when, in any action of contract brought or commenced in any of the Superior Courts, where the amount of the claim did not exceed £50, the defendant might within eight days after service of the writ take out a summons before a Judge at Chambers, calling on the plaintiff to 1385 show cause why the action should not be tried in a County Court, and the Judge might, unless cause was shown, order the cause to be so tried. At present the Superior Courts had concurrent jurisdiction with the County Courts when the plaintiff resided more than twenty miles away from the defendant, or from the place where the cause of action arose. It had been determined that this applied to cases where one of several plaintiffs lived twenty miles off, although the firm might live next door to the defendant. It had also been held that a railway dwelt where the principal office was. A learned Judge had informed him that a Leeds case was recently tried before him, in which the claim was £19, and because the parties lived twenty miles apart the action was brought in the Superior Courts, and seven witnesses were brought tip all the way from Leeds to Westminster Hall. The cause of the evil was that the attorneys always went to the Superior Courts whenever it was possible, of course to the great increase of expense. The object of the clause was to provide a remedy and to enforce the use of the County Courts in such cases. He proposed to give jurisdiction to the County Courts in cases of ejectment, where the annual value of the property did not exceed £20, and also cases when title came in question, where neither the value nor rent of the property exceed £20 a year. But in these cases an appeal was to be allowed. The 17th clause was intended to extend the operation of the 10 & 11 of the Queen, c. 96, "The Trustees' Relief Act." It enabled trustees, where the value of the trust estate did not exceed £500, to deposit the money with the registrar of the County Court where they, or some of them, reside. The 21st section extinguished a number of petty Courts which at present had jurisdiction in matters of debt. It enacted that henceforth no action that could be brought in a County Court should be brought in the Court of any hundred manor, wapentake, or other inferior Court; and it placed the recovery of loans by loan societies in the County Court instead of before justices.

§ LORD CRANWORTH
, in expressing his approval of the measure, referred to some observations made the other evening by his noble and learned Friend on the Woolsack, which the learned Judges on 1386 the Northern Circuit had interpreted as reflecting upon their ability and industry in the administration of justice. It was perfectly true that out of seventy-tight causes put down for trial on that circuit, only fifty-seven had been tried; but practically the whole of them were disposed of, because, as their Lordships well knew, many causes were in the course of an assize withdrawn, or otherwise disposed of, without coming before the Judge at all. He had promised to refer to this matter on the first opportunity, and he had accordingly mentioned it in order to enable his noble and learned Friend to remove an impression which he felt certain had never been intended.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR
said, he would be sorry to have it imagined that he intended to cast the slightest reflection on the ability or industry of the learned Judges who had presided over the Northern Circuit. Indeed, he had expressly taken care to guard against such an interpretation by stating most explicitly that the amount of business had rendered it absolutely impossible that the learned Judges could dispose of the whole of the causes without assistance. He must, however, mention, in self-defence, that one of the Queen's Counsel on the circuit, in a letter to a friend, referred to the constant demands which were made for his assistance in disposing of the civil business. Though, of course, those gentlemen were always willing to give this assistance in times of emergency, a constant practice of this kind could not but be regarded as entailing an unreasonable tax upon the time of advocates, who had their own professional duties to attend to.