THE EARL OF DALHOUSIErose to call the attention of the House to the Report of the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the recruiting for the Army. He should make no apology for troubling their Lordships by calling attention to this subject. Their Lordships were well aware that not many months ago a Commission was appointed by Her Majesty's late Government to take into consideration certain matters in reference to the system of recruiting in this country. That Commission had reported to Parliament, and its Report was in the hands of the public. But, be-fore he entered into the particulars of their Report, he wished to say a few words respecting a charge brought against the Commissioners of having inadequately performed their duty, and of having sent forth a Report to the public which did not fully enter into all the matters referred to them. Now, he entirely denied the justice of any such charge; and he thought he had some reason to complain that the Commissioners were not better defended in "another place" than the Members of Her Majesty's late Government seemed disposed to defend them. It had been stated, too, that the Commission had trenched upon the vast subject of there-organization of our military forces. Now, in the first place, he totally denied that his noble Friend below him, the late Secretary for War, would have been guilty of taking a step which would show that he was disposed to delegate to a Commission high functions which properly belonged to the Executive Government. The re-organization of our military forces, taking into consideration all the circumstances in other countries at this time, was a question second only in importance to that great domestic policy which was engaging the attention of the public at the present time; and to refer such a question to the consideration of a Commission would, in his opinion, be a 1769 weakness, and more than a weakness, on the part of any Cabinet; while the question really referred to the Commission was one which might be very properly so referred. The facts were these. Great alarm had been created—greater, perhaps, than was actually justified—with reference to the mode of maintaining the ranks of our army by the usual mode of recruiting. The Government and the military authorities, being naturally anxious on the subject, dealt with it as a question in which parol evidence was necessary, and they therefore referred it to a Commission. It was first of all proposed that the Commission should inquire into the condition of the general recruiting for the army, and the Commissioners were instructed to inquire into the operation of the laws at present in force for raising men to serve in our army, into the existing system of recruiting, and, after careful consideration of that important subject, to report any change in the existing law affecting the recruiting of men for the army which, in their judgment, would tend to facilitate recruiting and to retain in our army the men who had completed the first period of their service. It was usual on all occasions that the commands set forth in the Commission should be explained more in detail in Instructions from the Department which the inquiry concerned. Accordingly, as Chairman of the Commission he received from his noble Friend, the then Secretary of State for War, a Letter of Instructions, which were embodied in the Report of the Commission. That Letter instructed the Commissioners, first of all, to inquire why the number of recruits raised during the last few years had not been fully sufficient to meet the losses resulting from death and other causes; they were also to inquire into the remedies for that state of things, and into the operation of the Limited Enlistment Act; and they were further to inquire whether there existed any grievances in the army which might be detrimental to the enlistment of men into the army; they were likewise to consider whether, by substituting a system of general enlistment for a system of enlistment for particular regiments, the enlistment for the army might not be rendered more useful to the army itself and more popular among those who entered it. Finally, they were called upon to state how they might best induce time-expired men to re-enter on a second engagement; and failing to do that, how time-expired men might be induced to give their ser- 1770 vices to the public by means of certain arrangements so as to form a small nucleus of reserve to be called upon in case of accident. All that the Commissioners had done. They had given their best attention to the Instructions placed in their hands. It appeared to the Commissioners that the present system of recruiting was in many respects defective, that it might be amended with considerable success and rendered much more efficient. The Commissioners ascertained that the recruiting was in trusted to an officer at the Horse Guards, who was competent in every way to perform the duties of the office, provided those duties were confined within reasonable compass. The Adjutant General was responsible to the Commander-in-Chief for the recruiting of the army; he bad, how-over, only time to give cursory attention to the recruiting, and the Commissioners therefore thought it better that it should be conducted by an officer specially put at the head of the department, responsible to the Adjutant General and through him to the Commander-in-Chief. He was glad to learn from a statement made in "another place" that it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to adopt that recommendation. He was certain it would be attended with great advantage to the service in enabling us to get a much larger number of troops with much greater facility; and he believed that when that system came to be worked it would not be one I bit more expensive than the present system of recruiting for the army. So much for the administrative system of recruiting. The Commissioners then proceeded to inquire whether there were any grievances of which the soldier had to complain, and which tended to prevent men from enlisting with that freedom which they had exhibited in former times. The Commissioners found what appeared to them to be a great number of petty grievances, of perhaps no great consequence if taken singly, but in the aggregate amounting to a system which they believed to have a bad effect in deterring young men from entering the army. They found that while the soldier was supposed to have Is. a day for pay and Id. a day for beer money, the men complained: that no sooner were they enlisted in the ranks than they discovered that the 1s. a day never came into their pockets. There were stoppages for clothing, stoppages for I rations, and stoppages for this and the other; so that the soldier never was certain what the amount was which he should 1771 receive. In fact, the impression got abroad on account of those stoppages that faith was not kept with the soldier. They found that the principal of those stoppages of which complaint was made arose from the soldier being required to provide himself with a fatigue jacket and foraging cap, which cost him 12s. a year. Now, it certainly did appear to him a striking anomaly that the soldier had to provide himself with this fatigue jacket. He did not see why a soldier should be called upon to pay for a jacket which was his undress, and which he were when he was doing all the hard work required of him in quarters; while the tunic, his show dress, was provided for him by the public. He could see no good reason for this; and the Commission, taking the same view as he did, came to the conclusion that the public should take upon itself the burden of paying for this jacket. Then there was another thing which came before the Commission. It was strongly urged that calling on the soldier to pay for washing the sheets used on his bed was not right. That stoppage he thought amounted to 2d. a month, and it was a tax the public ought to pay. Another question which came before the Commission was that of rations; and they had very strong evidence, especially in respect of the cavalry and artillery, that three-quarters of a pound of meat a day was not a sufficiency of animal food to enable the men to go through the work expected of them. As regarded the infantry in quarters where there was not much to do, perhaps three-quarters of a pound might be sufficient; but speaking of the troops generally, all the testimony which the Commission heard led them to the conclusion that the men should have one pound of meat at home, seeing that they had that quantity, with various other additions to their other rations, when abroad. The Government seemed disposed to treat those questions of stoppages and of an addition of a quarter of a pound of meat to the daily rations in a liberal spirit; but he ventured to think that they proposed to proceed on a wrong principle. If he properly understood the statement made in "another place" by the gallant General who he deeply regretted was no longer in the office which he had so ably filled (General Peel), the Government proposed, in lieu of a remission of the stoppages and of an addition of a quarter of a pound of meat per day, to give the soldiers throughout the army an additional 2d. a day. The 1772 result would be this—for two or three years, perhaps, the clamour would be laid asleep; but in the course of time these very same grievances would crop up again, and having parted with our money by giving increased pay, we should still have to deal with the stoppages and the meat question. Again, he must observe that he could not concur with the gallant General in his mode of increasing the pay. The gallant General, as he understood, proposed to give 2d. a day additional pay to the recruit, but only 1d. more to the old soldier; so that it would seem to the public that they attached more value to the raw recruit than to the man who had served years in the army. Now, the Commission took an opposite view. They would remit to the recruit all the stoppages for clothing. They did not propose to increase the pay of the recruit; but when the old soldier came to re-enlist they would give him 2d. a day additional in consideration of his past services. He was prepared to maintain that the proposals of the gallant General were not near so economical as those which the Commission had suggested. According to the recommendations of the Commission, the abolition of the stoppages for the shell jacket and the forage cap would cost £80,000 a year. The cost of an additional quarter of a pound pf meat a day to 70,000 men—taking that as the number of troops at home who would be receiving it—would be £187,500; but supposing the number at home to be 80,000, the cost would be £23,000 more, or £200,000; so that, with the £80,000 for the jackets and forage caps, the entire cost would be £280,000; while the proposals of the gallant officer the late Secretary for War would involve an additional expenditure of £376,000. There were a great many other recommendations of the Commission which might be carried out simply by arrangements made by the Secretary of State for War in concurrence with the illustrious Duke at the head of the army. Among the complaints brought before the Commission was a strong one against keeping soldiers in camps during winter. He was not aware that camps were continued during the winter in any other country. In France, Russia, and other countries there were camps for instruction during the summer months; and he thought it was of great consequence to the army that camp instruction should be carried on actively and zealously in this country; but when the winter came the troops should be re- 1773 moved from camps which did not afford the comfort of ordinary barracks, and should be dispersed in winter quarters, where they would have an opportunity of mixing with their fellow-citizens generally. The result of this would be that they would return to the camp in better spirits and in better order for the active duties of camp service. The Commission recommended a system of enlistment for general service, and of that recommendation the late Secretary of State for War approved. Another recommendation was that, following what was already practised in the navy, institutions should be erected in which boys from the age of fifteen up to seventeen-and-a-half or eighteen years of age should be instructed for service in the army. It appeared to the Commissioners, however, that a system of this nature would entail a great deal of expense. Accordingly, the Report merely touched upon the facts, and left it to the discretion of the Government to say whether a course which had proved successful in the navy should be extended to the sister service. For his own part, he believed that the system would provide the army with a number of men who eventually would become the most useful and valuable in the ranks. No subject could be fraught with more vexation than that of barrack damages. With this he perceived the Government proposed to deal in a somewhat singular manner, the gallant General proposing that the troops should repair their own damages. What that meant exactly he could not say. It was his own opinion that troops ought not to be called on for such repairs at all, except in the case of wilful damage. In the Prussian service barrack damages were never heard of, unless in the case of wilful damage to public property; and in that case the soldiers who committed it were punished and fined until the public property was restored. Except in similar cases the article of barrack damages ought to be scored out of soldiers' accounts altogether, and the change, he believed, would afford very great satisfaction. The Commissioners were also of opinion that it was a matter of some moment to encourage the passage of militiamen into the regular army as a good fountain from which the line might be supplied; but they found there was one objection to it on the part of the militiamen in the fact that every militiaman, after a year's service, who wished to enlist in the line, had to refund 18s. 6d. of the bounty he had received for 1774 the year. The Commissioners recommended that the deduction of 18s. 6d. made from a militiaman on passing into the line should no longer be made, but that there should be a simple transference of services. This recommendation, which he thought a very useful one, did not appear to have been adopted. He should be glad to hear they had, as he thought it would open a very good source of supply of troops to the line. The attention of the Commission had likewise been directed to the operation of the Limited Enlistment Act; how far it had interfered to stop recruiting in the army, or deprived the country, at an inconvenient time, of the services of men who were in their prime as soldiers. Much had been said against that Act, and great and unnecessary prejudice with regard to it existed, he believed, among commanding officers in the army. Scarcely one of those who appeared as witnesses failed to declare that it had been the ruin of the army. But on being asked if they would like to go back to the old system of twenty-one years' service, the answer was, that it was quite impossible; they could not do it. And while all condemned the Act, not one of them had anything to suggest in its place. The Act was introduced by himself, and after giving it his consideration, he was not prepared to say the law required alteration. In his opinion it was a good measure, and one which, he thought, would work well if other circumstances were made to work well with it. He had, however, no objection to yield his own opinion upon that point if by so doing he could reconcile all parties to one general view; and in that spirit he suggested that, instead of making differences between the services—namely, twenty-one years for the infantry and twenty-four years for the cavalry, there should be one uniform period of twenty-one years for all; and that that should be divided into two periods—namely, of twelve and nine years, to complete the twenty-one years for the pensions. Under these circumstances he anticipated that the soldier, having served so much of the period as twelve years, would be indisposed to retire without securing his claim to a pension, and therefore they would be more likely to retain the twelve years 'men than the ten years' men. He had also thought that by making some alterations in other respects, and enabling the soldier to carry to the pension a larger sum than at present, they would hold out inducements to the men to 1775 enlist, not only in the first instance, but to carry on their service until it was no longer required. The Commissioners also recommended some arrangement with regard to the good-conduct pay, whereby it would be acquired in a shorter time, and they also suggested a mode of dealing with it under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief, whereby it would be made more acceptable than at present. He would not go into minute details upon the point, but would merely refer to the evidence, which he thought deserving the attention of the military authorities. The Commission did not find that the Limited Enlistment Act had in any way interfered with the readiness of recruits to enter the army; and it was proved that recruits did not enter as readily for permanent as for the limited service under the Act; in fact, it was only in accordance with human nature to suppose that it would be so. Another point with regard to the Act which the Commissioners were called upon to consider was the way in which men could be induced to renew their service after the first period had expired. They proposed to give the old soldier on renewing his service an extra pay of 2d. a day, and that he should, by arrangement with the Commander-in-Chief, be exempt from certain drill, and that he should be treated more on the footing of an old soldier than a raw recruit, and be exempted from some of the drills which recruits had to undergo. Such a modification would, it was thought, exercise a considerable effect in inducing valuable men to re-enter the army. But with regard to this question of re-entry some drawbacks existed. It was the opinion of most persons competent to form an opinion that a soldier in the ranks fitted originally for the discharge of duty of all kinds was not worth much after fourteen or fifteen years' service. Probably, provision might be made enabling men of this class to retire from the service at the expiration of a given number of years, and still to work out their claim to a pension by serving the remaining period either in the militia or some other force. He would not call it an army of reserve, because that would be giving a great name to a very little thing. The Commission thought, with the advantage of the 2d. a day in addition to the good-conduct pay, there would be no occasion to raise the pension, seeing that a man could retire with the ample pension of 15d. a day. The questions connected with the re-organization of the forces, so as to form 1776 an army of reserve, the Commission believed to be outside their powers; and, for himself, he might say that if it had been proposed to refer so large a question to the Commission he should have declined to serve. The intentions of the Government in that respect, as developed in the other House, fell far short of the exigencies of the case. A measure had been proposed which was complex as well as inadequate, the result of which would be to take from the militia, which the Commissioners recommended should be maintained at its full quota of 120,000 men, one-fourth of that number, who should be ready in case of an outbreak of hostilities to join en masse the Queen's army, and be ready to take the field. But if that were the full extent of the promised army re-organization, and all they had to hope for in the way of opening up our military resources, he was much disappointed. The number of our male population between the ages of eighteen and forty-two capable of bearing arms on an emergency was, he believed, 5,000,000. It was hard, indeed, then, if at least one-tenth of that number could not be imported by some simple arrangement into the ranks of the Queen's army and militia in a case of emergency. He would not be content until he saw the military organization of the country upon such a footing as would permit our placing in the field at least this number of men in the course of three weeks or a month after the suspension of diplomatic arrangements with any country in Europe; and he believed that if the Secretary of State for War were to address himself earnestly to the question, and without calling to his assistance a Commission, or a number of Commissions, would act in concert with the officers of the army and the illustrious Duke at their head with the law as it stood, such a scheme as he had described might be devised. Their Lordships would remember that although service in the Queen's army was voluntary, and that army existed but from year to year, by the vote of the House of Commons, service in the militia was compulsory, and that although compulsion to serve in it was suspended from year to year the power of compelling was not dead, but only dormant; and he was inclined to the opinion that it should no longer remain dormant. If they were to have the militia increased to any amount by Act of Parliament, he had no hesitation in saying that any Government bold enough to put 1777 the compulsory system into operation—if the voluntary system failed—would find themselves supported by the voice of the country and by a patriotic press; and that without very much greater expense, a scheme might be devised of passing men through the militia with better training than at present, and with a shorter period of service in the militia, and sending them to any army of reserve, where they might accumulate in large numbers until, including the Queen's army and the standing militia, a force might be brought together of at least 500,000 men. That was his opinion, and he believed also the opinion of many others; but it required great boldness and firmness on the part of the Government to handle; but it was one of those questions on which, if the Government were bold enough to enter, they were entitled to the support not only of those who followed them as a matter of course, but of every man who had the interest of Ills country sincerely at heart. In order to put himself in order he moved for a Return of the recommendations of the Commission for Recruiting, which had lately reported, and in company with it the number of those recommendations which the Government were about to adopt and the number which they decline to accept.
§ Moved, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for, Return of the Recommendations of the Recruiting Commission of 1866, and the Steps taken thereon.—(The Earl of Dalhousie.)
THE EARL OF LONGFORDsaid, that he appeared accidentally on both sides of this Question. He was a Member of the Royal Commission of last year, of which the noble Earl who had just spoken was the Chairman; and he had since become a humble Member of the Government, which had to some extent disagreed with the recommendations of the Commission, and had adopted other propositions. He agreed both with the Commission and the Government. The recommendations of the Commissioners were twenty-eight in number, and in them he generally concurred; but he also put forward some suggestions of his own which were not adopted by the Commission. He must say, on reflection, that he could not help thinking that the Commissioners had rather directed their attention to matters affecting the condition of the soldier, in preference to the immediate question of obtaining recruits; and therefore when the time came for the War 1778 Office to consider their Report and what action should be taken upon it, it was decided—and he thought rightly—that a small immediate addition to the pay of all ranks would be preferable to those more remote advantages which had been proposed by the Commission. Both had the same object in view—namely, the improvement of the condition of the military service, so as to make recruiting more popular and successful. Another object was to make the recruiting service more respectable—in which he cordially agreed—and give the army a better character in the country than it generally enjoyed, and which sometimes he thought it unfairly bore. He had often regretted the manner in which the recruits for the army had been spoken of even by military officers, who six months afterwards spoke of the same men as noble fellows, whom they were proud to command. Recruits had been spoken of as "the dregs of the population," the "sweepings of the streets," "the riffraff of the population," and other hard names, which they scarcely in all instances deserved. Undoubtedly the recruiting depot was a sort of Cave of Adullum, open to the distressed and discontented classes; but he did not believe from the results that all who entered came under these derogatory descriptions. He certainly continued to think that, from whatever class the recruits were drawn, a direct and immediate addition to their pay affecting every recruit from the moment of enlistment would have a more speedy and satisfactory effect in filling the ranks than any postponed additions of pay and pensions, which, though excellent in themselves, did not immediately act on the minds of the population. During the last few months recruiting had been more successful, and the deficiencies of 4,000, 5,000 and 6,000 on the 1st of January in three successive years was now only 1,300. It was not, however, difficult to suggest reasons for this. It was notorious that work had been very slack, which was a condition favourable to the recruiting service. "It was an ill wind that blew nobody good," and the crisis in the City had a very favourable effect on the muster rolls. When the Commission was proposed last year, and he was asked to become a member, he must confess he had doubts whether the inquiry was altogether necessary, and he expressed his doubts to the Marquess of Hartington. The noble Lord thought otherwise, and at his instance he consented to become a member. 1779 The subject of recruiting had been thoroughly considered by Lord Hotham's Commission, and all that remained to learn was further experience of the Army Service Act, passed in 1847, which introduced or revived the principle of limited enlistment. That Act was passed against the remonstrances of military men in both Houses of Parliament; and in their Lordships' House it passed with a very slight majority, which looked, on reading the division list, a party one, for proxies were called, and it was remarkable that the majority of the few military Members of their Lordships' House voted against the Duke of Wellington. The noble Earl on the cross-benches (Earl Grey) who moved the second reading of that Bill gave a complete military statement; but the speakers who followed remarked that it was one long argument against the necessity of his own Bill. The Bill, however, was passed. Expectations were held out that the measure would introduce a better class of recruits, who after their limited term of service would join an army of reserve; and there was even a happy dream that these superior recruits, further improved by military training, habits of discipline and good order, obedience, and even morality, would revert to the community as valuable members of society, and still further raise the character of the military service. But the result had been that superior recruits had not joined the army, the discharged soldiers had not joined the reserve force, and they had not yet heard that society had gained much by the return to its bosom of those of its members who had received moral training at Aldershot and Chatham. All that could be said of that Act was that its working had not proved so inconvenient and damaging to the service as had been expected. Of 100 recruits about fifty reached the end of their first term of service; of those fifty about half re-engaged; it has been more, but the proportion is declining; so that we lose only a little less than half of the best men in the service. This might not seem a very bad result numerically, but it was difficult to describe the inconvenience in regiments, the expense of passages, the difficulty of collecting a force, or of meeting the requirements of our Indian and colonial service, which were occasioned by the uncertainty whether soldiers would renew their engagements. He found during the deliberations of the Commission it would have been hope- 1780 less to propose any extension of the period of service; but he certainly thought that an extension of the first term from ten to twelve years was a step in the right direction; and he was glad that the Commissioners had turned a deaf ear to the suggestions which had very frequently been made, and which, no doubt, would still be made, as to the reduction of the period of service, and the establishment of enlistment for three, four, or five years. The fact was, that at present the period of home service was so short, and the conditions of home service on account of garrison duties and detachments so unfavourable, that there was no time for drilling or completing the training of large numbers of recruits. Even without such an accident as the Fenian campaign, the greatest inconvenience arose from the shortness of the term of home service. The noble Earl (the Earl of Dalhousie) mentioned some recommendations of the Commission. One of them, the appointment of an officer to superintend the recruiting service, had been adopted; but the noble Earl was aware that by the substitution of direct payment for prospective advantages so much money had been absorbed as rendered the adoption of other recommendations impossible. They would, however, be carried out as far as possible from time to time. With regard to the recommendation for the appointment of training schools on the same principle as training ships in the navy, he looked upon the suggestion with great favour and would do all in his power to get them established. With reference to barrack damages it was proposed that the troops should repair their own damages. The experiment had been tried at Parkhurst and found to answer well. He thought that the question of camps had pretty well been settled already for our troops were very scattered, and mixed very freely with their fellow-citizens in garrison towns. With regard to the army of reserve, the Government proposed to adopt one of the recommendations of the Commission, which gave the power of commuting the latter portion of a soldier's period of service with a view to his joining an army of reserve. He thought, however, that it was very unreasonable that the soldiers purchasing their discharge should be compelled to join the army of reserve, and he did not see how such a plan was ever likely to be adopted. But it must be observed that all successful 1781 systems of reserves, by whatever name they may be called, are based on conscription; for, if improved modes are adopted of taking men out of the ranks, such as by very short periods of service, some improved way of filling the vacancies must also be established. Parliament, however, had shown no disposition to consent to the principle of conscription, and while that disposition remained, coupled with an objection to increased outlay, we must submit to the mortification of having a force which had been described as scarcely sufficient even in a time of peace, The fact was that at present we were endeavouring to make a small army do the work of a large one. The numerical force of it was merely sufficient in a time of peace, and he would not encourage the hope of a good reserve without much bolder measures than any which had been yet proposed. He might also inform the noble Earl, who had expressed a strong desire that facilities might be afforded for the transfer of recruits from the militia to the army, that it was the intention of the Government to remit the 18s. 6d. now deducted from the bounty paid to the recruits on such occasions.
EARL DE GREY AND RIPONassured the noble Earl who had first spoken that he was quite right in supposing that there was no intention on the part of the Government of his noble Friend behind him (Earl Russell) of delegating to the Commission any portion of the duties which ought to be discharged by the responsible Ministers of the Crown. He was certainly, for one, of opinion that it was just as necessary to maintain the responsibility of the Ministers of the Crown in the present time as it was in former days. Still, however, their Lordships would probably agree in the opinion that the Letter of Instructions addressed by the Marquess of Hartington to the Commissioners covered a very large and important field of inquiry. It was perfectly true that at the time when the Commission was issued the public attention had not been specially directed by the great events which had but recently token place on the Continent to the question of a large military re-organization; but, still, the Commissioners were empowered to take a wide range in their inquiry. He should not enter at any length into the remarks of the noble Earl behind him (the Earl of Dalhousie) on the proposed increase to the daily pay of the soldier, as that proposal would be fully dealt with in "another place." 1782 There seemed, however, to him to be a good deal of force in the argument employed by the noble Earl, that the proposed increase of pay would still leave the other causes of discontent undealt with, and that those causes of discontent would, when the increase had been firmly established, still call for remedy. With reference to the working of the Limited Service Act, he must say that he concurred in the spirit of the remarks of his noble Friend behind him in preference to those of the noble Earl the Under Secretary of State for War. It was obvious that the majority of the officers of the army viewed that Act with disfavour; but the noble Earl the Under Secretary of War must have looked at that Act and the discussion which took place at the time of its passing very cursorily to have described as he had done the able and argumentative speech made by the noble Earl on the cross-benches (Earl Grey) who had introduced the Bill to their Lordships. For his own part, he must say that his recollection by no means agreed with that of the noble Earl, nor did he think that the results of that Act had been contrary to what its promoters intended. No doubt that Act had, in one respect, somewhat disappointed expectation, that was to say, with respect to the resumption of service by men entitled to their discharge. It was expected by many that these men would have returned to the service; but, as the noble Earl had stated, nearly one-half of them had taken their discharge. He was not going to express an opinion as to the extending the period of service from ten to twelve years—if that measure were to be carried out it must be brought before the House in the shape of a Bill, when its merits could be discussed; but he would point out one fact with regard to that recommendation. It was perfectly true that an overwhelming majority of the officers of the army examined before the Commission were in favour of the change from ten years to twelve; but, with one exception, no question upon the subject appeared to have been put to the non-commissioned officers or privates, who could have given the best evidence as to what was likely to induce men in their station in life to join the army, and in that instance the witness said he did not believe the alteration would have any effect. There was, however, one thing which he hoped Her Majesty's Government would take into serious consideration. They all 1783 knew that when the early period of a man's life was past, any change in his employment or alteration in his mode of life was a matter of difficulty; and, of course, the older he was the greater would be the difficulties which a man so changing would have to encounter. If that was true with respect to a man in civil life, how much more true must it he of the soldier who was accustomed to be fed, lodged, clothed, and in every action of his life commanded by other persons? Every year, therefore, that was added to the length of his first engagement after a certain period tended to render him at the end of it less fit to take his place in civil life. And that was a question of importance not only as regarded the interests of the men, but also as regarded the recruiting of the army. He had heard military men who were opposed to the Ten Years' Enlistment Act say that it sent men back to civil life without the means of earning a subsistence, that they therefore led a miserable existence, and deterred others from joining the army. That was true to some extent; but he also thought it was often greatly exaggerated. But when the noble Earl implied that those who left the army were no acquisitions to the society to which they returned, their Lordships would find in the blue book an answer to that; because they were told that one great cause why these men did not re-engage was the ready employment which they found in railway companies and other great public establishments, on account of the discipline and good training which their ten years' military life afforded. The notion, therefore, that ten years' men gave the public a bad idea of the military life was much exaggerated; but the evil, such as it was, would be increased just in proportion to the number of years added to the ten years' service. That consideration was one well worthy of attention, and the Government must be pre pared to meet it when the Bill on the subject came before that House. And, now, a few words upon a subject which the noble Lord opposite touched on so lightly—namely, the providing a reserve for the army. The attention of those whose duty or inclination had led them to bestow thought on military questions had been long directed to this difficult matter, though that of the public had not been attracted to it till very recently in consequence of the course of the German war, and the unexampled rapidity with which Prussia had placed a large army in the 1784 field, and augmented it from her reserve. But when we looked at this matter by the light of events in foreign countries, we should always carry along with us certain points which constituted a marked distinction between this and other countries. The first distinction—the geographical—was satisfactory. We heard of vast numbers of men—500,000 and 700,000—which formed the military organization of Prussia, Austria, or France. But we should always remember that those countries were much more liable to sudden invasion than we wore. He was not one who held that an invasion of this country was an impossibility, nor was he insensible to the change which had been produced, disadvantageous for us, by the adoption of steam navies and the increased powers of locomotion. Such a charge could not be brought against any Member of the late Government; because from 1859 to 1866 they had adopted a series of measures with a view to meet the altered circumstances of the case and add to the strength of the country. But it must he admitted that that upon which we had relied—at times, perhaps, too much—the sea, constituted a barrier much stronger and more defensible than any land frontier. But, on the other hand, we had not that compulsory system which formed the basis of the great Continental military organizations. And, with regard to the reserve, which formed the other portion of the military system of Continental Powers, it should be borne in mind that they employed a constant, far-reaching police surveillance, which enabled them when a man had left the army to keep their eye upon him, to know what became of him, and to call him back into the ranks at any moment. There was also in the nature of our military requirements an important difference which ought not to be overlooked—he meant the foreign service which was required of our troops. Austria and Prussia had no foreign service; the foreign service of France in Algeria applied to by far the smaller portion of her army. But, as for us, we were just now considering ourselves fortunate with regard to our infantry, who formed the staple of our army, that we had a fair hope of requiring them to serve only ten years abroad for five at home—that is, that two-thirds of our force should be employed on foreign service while one-third served at home. These were things which we must take into our consideration when we compared our military institutions with those of 1785 other countries. There was another point to which he wished to refer, and in doing so he reserved to himself the amplest power to give to the proposals the fullest consideration. It was now only a week since the right hon. and gallant Gentleman the late Secretary of War (General Peel), whose resignation of office he, and he believed every one on both sides of the House, sincerely regretted, had made these proposals known to the public. Any proposals coming from the gallant General were entitled to their best consideration. The few observations which he should make, therefore, ought to be looked on rather in the nature of doubts than of positive opinions. On the question of reserves, he entirely agreed with the gallant General, that if they had a reserve at all it must resolve itself into two parts—a reserve for foreign service and a reserve for home service. By a reserve for foreign service he meant a reserve of men who could be called out immediately for service abroad on the occasion of foreign war. And by a home reserve, men who would only be available in the case of invasion. With respect to the reserve for foreign service, he believed that the Government proposal contained the germ of an important arrangement. As he understood, the intention of Her Majesty's Government was that in regiments at home men should be allowed to retire on furlough before the term of their service had expired, with the simple liability of being recalled to the ranks in the event of war.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYwas understood to say that this only applied to men who had returned from foreign service.
EARL DE GREY AND RIPONsaid, he could not help thinking that the principle of that proposal was capable of a wider and more extensive application, He took the principle to be this—that they should shorten the first term of service by granting unlimited furlough with the liability of being recalled to the ranks on the occurrence of war. He believed that that plan was capable of greater extension than had been given, and he thought he saw in it the germ of an arrangement which would give them an army of reserve of considerable strength. He did not like using the term "army of reserve," because phrases of that description were likely to mislead, as implying a very large number of men. But whatever the force might be called it was quite clear that anything under 40,000 or 50,000 men would not meet the re- 1786 quirements of the case. But when he came to consider the other portion of the plan he must confess, as far as he understood the details, he entertained doubts of its advisability. It was proposed to obtain engagements from not more than a fourth of the men in the militia, which would authorize their transference to the line. It ought to be considered whether it would not be wise to keep the home reserve distinct from the foreign reserve. If 30,000 men, and those probably the most soldier like, were withdrawn from the militia at a time of great emergency, the militia regiments would be weakened, and double recruiting would have to be prosecuted for the militia as well as the line. But, under any circumstances, the training the men got in the militia would be necessarily inferior to that obtained by men to be secured in the other way suggested by the Government. Besides, they would have to take men from the militia of all periods of service, and even five years' service in the militia would give only a maximum of six weeks' training in anyone year. That could hardly be called training that would qualify men to take their places in regiments of the line and to form part of an efficient reserve. Arrangements might be made to meet that objection, but it deserved serious consideration. There was a feeling on the part of the public that with an army of reserve there ought to be a countervailing reduction of expenditure on the army. Looking to the large amount of our Army and Navy Estimates, it ought to be the constant endeavour of every Government—and it was to a greater extent than Governments received credit for—not to add to our expenditure, and if more was required to be spent in one direction, to make a countervailing reduction in another. If we had to consider only the wants of the home service, the establishment of a large reserve in England would give us the means of a considerable reduction in the number of men in the army; but we must bear in mind that the number of men at home was determined by two distinct considerations—our home requirements and the requirements for colonial relief. We should soon arrive at a point at which the question of colonial reliefs would become the really determining question of the number of men to be kept at home, and that was a question of general policy and not of military organization. He would only point to this matter as showing the difficulties 1787 that were involved. There were two forces which now constituted the home reserve—the Volunteers (including the Yeomanry) and the militia. It had been rightly pointed out the other night that from the constitution of the Volunteer force, composed as it was of men engaged in commercial and industrial pursuits, it could not possibly be placed in camp or garrison except at the last moment, and when an emergency actually arose. Therefore, the Volunteers could only constitute the second portion of our home reserve. The first portion was the militia; and it was because of that that he deprecated mixing it up with the reserve for foreign service. The militia ought to be kept intact. It had too often been said that the militia had been disregarded of late years; he must give that statement a most complete denial. Lord Herbert, from the time he took office, directed his attention to the militia as much as to any other portion of our military force; and it was through his exertions, and the exertions of those who had succeeded him, that the militia had been placed in a more satisfactory condition than it was at the time it was disembodied in 1859. He did not deny that it might be improved in efficiency both as to officers and men. There was not a sufficient number of officers of military training and experience; and this was well worth the consideration of the Government. The period of training was not limited only by financial considerations. One object was to obtain men who, when they had completed their training, would return to civil life and find continuous employment. Militia training must never be so long as to break off a man's connection with his previous employer, and make it difficult for him to find employment again. These were matters well worthy of consideration. He accepted the warning on the subject of reserves contained in the Report of the Royal Commission, and agreed that it was urgent the question should be settled at an early period; but although he deprecated delay, he deprecated still more undue haste. It was easy to give; it was impossible to take away. They could give extra pay; but when once it was given it could not be taken away. They might form a new force and enter into engagements of a novel character with the men; and whether the force was practically useful or not they must maintain the force and the engagements. Therefore it was a matter in which they ought to proceed without undue 1788 delay, but at the same time with the utmost deliberation; and he was confident it was only by full, fair, and deliberate consideration that they could overcome the many difficulties which beset this most important question.
§ THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGEMy Lords, none can know better than my noble Friends sitting on the opposite side of the House the difficulties which beset this question. They arise, on the one hand, from the great freedom which is enjoyed by every subject of the Queen, and from the facility with which every individual of any distinction or military experience having any idea of his own can suggest improvement in our military organization. On the other hand, the House of Commons wisely, prudently, and necessarily looks after the expenditure of the country, which must not and ought not to exceed that which is absolutely necessary. On the one hand, we are told that the military authorities are not doing this and that which would be for the advantage of the soldier; and, on the other, we are told by the House of Commons, which holds the purse-strings of the nation, that we are spending a great deal too much money, and that, so far from entering into new arrangements and organizations, we ought to curtail our expenditure, and make our present organization less expensive. I think there is great reason and justice in what is said on both sides, and I only wish to impress upon your Lordships that these facts place the military authorities in a most delicate and difficult position. This debate has been produced by the Report of the Royal Commission on Recruiting, to the appointment of which the Marquess of Hartington assented, because of a well-founded impression which had got abroad—an impression which I fully shared—that the difficulties of recruiting in this country were becoming so grave as to endanger the efficiency of the army, and that the matter ought, therefore, to be fully investigated. The object with which the Commission was appointed was to obtain recruits; and the real question is, how they are to be obtained. In theory there is no question that if you improve the condition of the soldier it is far more to his advantage than an addition to his pay; but it is not so regarded practically, it is pay that will induce men to come, and not improvements of their condition. I admit that the reasoning does not appear sound, but in practice it is found to be so. My noble Friend who brought this ques- 1789 tion forward (the Earl of Dalhousie) asked me, when a witness before the Royal Commission, whether I agreed in the various recommendations of the Commission? I entirely agreed with my noble Friend that the not making the soldier pay for his necessaries and barrack damages would be a very great and desirable object, and would give great relief to the soldier. These advantages, however, would not, in my opinion, bring so many men into the army as an addition to the soldier's pay; for, after all, this is merely a question of going to the labour market. This country boasts, and justly boasts, that it is the only country, except that great American Republic with which we are so intimately connected, in which there is no forced conscription. With the exception of Great Britain, there is not a single country in Europe, however small, where there is not a conscription. We are therefore obliged to go to the labour market in order to get men to serve the State, and men serve the State not so much for honour and glory or anything of that sort, as for the pounds, shillings, and pence which go into their pockets. They look to that more particularly. I feel satisfied that if one thing more than another would induce men to enter the army it is additional pay. This, of course, is entirely a question for the consideration of the Government. I am only giving my individual opinion upon it as a Member of your Lordships' House, and as holding a high position in the army. I think that the proposal for additional pay in preference to the other recommendations of the Commissioners is a sound and judicious one. At the same time, I am bound to say that some of the recommendations of the Com mission are of the greatest possible value, and great advantages might be expected to result from their adoption. These are questions, however, which are not the main consideration. The question which I have to consider is this—"How am I to get the men I require for the army?" And my answer is that increased pay will bring the men more readily than anything else. If I had my choice, I should prefer giving the additional 2d. a day to those men who have served ten years; but then it should be recollected that men who have served that period will have 3d. a day more than at present, and to that extent the Government have gone beyond the recommendations of the Commission. My noble Friend thought that sufficient distinction had not been made between the raw material and the 1790 men who re-engaged after ten years' service, and he said there was a strong feeling in the army against the Ten Years Enlistment Act. I believe that that is the case, though certainly I myself entertain no strong objection to it, but, on the contrary, am prepared to support it to the fullest extent. At the same time, I am inclined to think that it docs greatly increase our difficulties in enlisting for the army. In my opinion, when once a man makes up his mind to become a soldier he does not think about the length of time he will be required to serve. Whether the term of service be five, ten, fifteen, or twenty years does not much matter to him at that time; but when a man gets a little older and reflects upon his position he begins to consider whether he shall re-engage or not. The reason why I prefer twelve to ten years is, not because I think it makes the slightest difference to the men on enlistment, but because it will enable men to look forward to a shorter period of re-enlistment. I do not in any way condemn the Ten Years Enlistment Act, though I think it has produced great difficulties in the army. In the first place, you want one-fourth more recruits than you did before, as only half the men re-engage after the expiration of their term of service. Now, as regards the illustrious Duke (the Duke of Wellington) who has been alluded to as having been a party to the first Limited Enlistment Act, I thought it right to look back and see what was said by that great statesman, who was always listened to by your Lordships with great attention. His opinion was, that as long as he was satisfied that the old soldiers would re-engage and remain in the army he should cordially support the Bill; but if he had thought that a contrary result would be produced by the Bill he should have opposed it. Now, my Lords, I stand upon exactly the same ground. I am aware that there area great variety of opinions on this matter, and that there are some persons who not only regard the Ten Years Enlistment Act as a most satisfactory measure, but think that the principle of it ought to be extended. I must point out, however, that there has been a very considerable increase in the Army Estimates on account of the large number I of ten years enlistment men whose term of service will expire this year, and whose places will have to be filled up by men who will receive bounties. The expenditure will be very large, while at the same time the efficiency of the regiments will be greatly 1791 lessened. My noble Friend has recommended a system of furloughs; but he must remember that for every man on unlimited furlough there must be a man enlisted to take his place; and that again will add to the-expenditure of the country. As to the period of service in the army reserve, I should have preferred commencing with ten years; but as seven years has been recommended, I shall support the shorter period in order that the experiment may be tried. As regards the question of reserves a great difficulty has arisen. As you have not any kind of compulsion on the men, and dare not even re-introduce the ballot for the militia, how are you to get those 500,000 men referred to by my noble Friend for an army of reserve for this country? Of course, if they can be obtained I shall be the first to accept, with gratitude, the force thus placed at the disposal of the country. It will, however, involve so large an expenditure that I am at a loss to understand how to propose to raise so large a force. Now, what is a reserve force raised for? It is raised in order to make up the cadres of regiments. The whole question is one of the most difficult ones of the day. We have very small regiments and do not know how to increase them. My Lords, if we could raise our regiments to even 1,000 men per battalion that would give us something to commence with; and, in case of a war—should such a misfortune occur—we should be enabled to get on. I remember what occurred at the time of the last great war in which we were engaged—one in which I had the honour to take a share. Every regiment that went abroad at that time was found to be so weak in numbers that it had to call for volunteers. The 93rd called for volunteers from the 42nd and the 79th. But the 93rd had scarcely embarked when the 42nd was ordered out; and of course the latter had become so reduced in strength that it had to call for volunteers. This was done, and it received men from a regiment which almost immediately followed it. Those several regiments arrived at the Crimea about the same time, and there they were each with their own men serving in other regiments. I should be sorry to see such a state of things again, and the only way we can avoid it is by an army of reserve. I should prefer infinitely men who had served for seven or eight years in the army; but in this free country, unless you kept such men in your pay, you would have no hold on them. It is impossible to lay your hand upon any 1792 man except one who is actually a furlough man. In the militia, however, you have men who are bound to come together for training. It is stated that it is unadvisable to mix up the Line with the militia. Well I think it is not advisable to do so; and therefore I should not have recourse to this system if I could avoid it; but I do not see how we can avoid doing so, if we want an army of reserve. One objection made to the plan is that it would diminish the efficiency of the militia; but really I cannot see how this would be the result. One of the first things we did at the time of the last war was to call on the militia. Men and officers volunteered from the militia into the Line, and no doubt this would be the case in the event of another war. I think the effect of adding those additional men to the militia in time of peace would be calculated to increase rather than impair the efficiency of the militia. My Lords, we must all bear in mind that the question of finance—the question of expenditure—has to be considered in dealing with this matter; and when we view the plan of my right hon. Friend (General Peel) in connection with this question, I think we must arrive at the conclusion that it is the most advantageous that could be adopted on a very economical principle. I take it for granted that my right hon. Friend had good reason for bringing in the Supplementary Estimate for the reserve with that for the recruiting; but the cost of the reserve is to be only £50,000, and in return I am convinced it will do the State some service. In reference to some remarks which fell from my noble Friend (the Earl of Dalhouise) on the financial result of the proposed addition of 2d. to the pay of the men, I may observe that I have been told, and certainly understood, that the expenditure involved in the plan recommended by the Royal Commission far exceeded that which will be required to carry out the plan of Her Majesty's Government. I am not at all responsible for the decision on this point. It was a question for the War Department; but, on economical grounds, I believe that the proposal of the Government is a better mode of dealing with the matter than the one suggested by the Royal Commission. There is only one other point to which I feel it necessary to allude—that of the camps. Now, I believe that the objections to the camps in winter are a bugbear. Without intending any disrespect to the sister island I will ask any man whether 1793 such quarters as Mullingar, Fermoy, Templemore, and others which I might mention can be compared to Aldershot, a place within thirty miles of London, and from which an officer can come up to town in less than two hours. In fact, it is not a camp—it is a station. As for the men, they are better taken care of there than anywhere else. They have less duty there, and they have about 3 per cent sick. In fact, every attention is paid to their comfort and convenience. As to calling it a camp, in the ordinary sense of the word, my noble Friend must forgive me when I say that it is no such thing. In summer there may be some camp life there, but every man is well housed in winter. The huts for the officers may not be so comfortable—comparatively they are not so comfortable—as those of the men; and this is the reason why we hear so much about the matter. Do not let me be misunderstood. Do not let it be supposed that I think the officers' quarters ought not to be cared for, because I think quite the contrary. We have done an immensity for the men, and very little for the officers; and therefore I should be glad to see something done for the latter; but, at the same time, I must say that what is alleged against those camps, on the ground of their discomfort, is the greatest nonsense possible. It is a great error to suppose, either in one respect or the other, that the camp is not a place well suited for the purpose to which it is now applied. In conclusion, my Lords, I beg again to express my sense of the importance of this whole question, and to add that I think good results must follow from discussions such as we have had this evening.
EARL GREYsaid, that having had an opportunity of fully explaining his views on the subject before the House in his evidence when examined by the Commissioners on Recruiting, he had not anticipated that there would be any occasion for his taking part in the present debate. But the noble Earl the Under Secretary of State for War had devoted so much of his speech to an unsparing condemnation of the Act for Limiting the Term of Service in the Army which he (Earl Grey) had been responsible for recommending for their Lordships' adoption twenty years ago, that he felt bound to trouble the House with a few observations in vindication of a measure which he was still convinced was a wise one. The Act in question had two main objects; the first of 1794 these was to render the army more popular among the classes of the population which afforded the largest number of recruits; the next to endeavour to provide a means of increasing the effective strength of the army in the least possible time in the event of a war breaking out between this and any other country. In order to make the army popular it was necessary above all things to convince the friends and relatives of those desiring to enlist that it was for the advantage of their connections to enter the army. The inquiries which he made more than thirty years ago, when he first filled the office of Secretary at War, satisfied him that no small part of the unpopularity of the army arose from the belief on the part of parents that they would never again see their sons who enlisted. He found that this impression seriously affected the success of the recruiting sergeant. Owing to the long period of service then exacted, and the neglect of the most necessary measures of sanitary improvement, this belief was but too well founded, as a very small proportion of our soldiers in those days ever returned to their homes. But if men were enlisted at the age of eighteen, and were then enabled to come back after ten years' service, having received an efficient training in the meantime, not merely with the right of entering the army of reserve on terms of great advantage to them, but also with the assurance of commanding the best employment in civil life for which their training would have fitted them, it was reasonable to expect that the service would speedily become popular in every village. It was further contemplated by the authors of the Act that soldiers, at the end of their ten years' service, should be induced to accept their discharge on terms by which a hold would have been retained over them, so that the country at a moment's notice would be able to call them back to their old regiments for service at home, and thereby to strengthen their depots and free the regular army for foreign service. These were the views which dictated the measure of 1847, which, according to the noble Earl, had proved a complete failure. He did not deny that it had failed to fulfil the expectations of its authors. But why? Simply because the plan as they intended it had never been tried. Unfortunately the officers of the army from the highest to the lowest had gene. rally viewed the scheme with feelings of dislike, and had opposed to it a resistance which had effectually deprived it of all 1795 chance of success. In all professions, and in none more strongly than in the army, there was a dislike among those who had risen to eminence in it to depart from beaten paths. Now, the first requisite of any scheme was that a system of training should be established for the men, which would enable them not only to be more serviceable while in the army, but to earn a respectable living when they retired from it; the whole thing turned upon that. At the time he spoke of, it was well known that when a man of good character was discharged from the Sappers and Miners (and it was a rare exception to find a man of bad character in this corps, which was distinguished for its good conduct) he was perfectly certain to succeed in the labour market, and to obtain good employment in civil life, because the training he had undergone made his services so valuable. What had been done in the case of the Sappers and Miners might be done with the line; the soldiers of the line might receive the same training as the Sappers, which would not only ensure them good employment when discharged, but also render them far more valuable as soldiers; and this he said on no light authority. The First Napoleon stated over and over again, in his writings, and in his conversations at St. Helena, that in time of peace every soldier ought to be instructed not only in military drill, but in some industrial employment, and especially in the use of the spade and of entrenching tools. This, he said, was the practice of the Romans, who did not allow a soldier to take his place in the ranks of the legion till he was thoroughly instructed in this sort of labour as well as in the use of his weapons. This system Napoleon declared to deserve the imitation of every military nation, and spoke from his own experience of the great advantage of having soldiers skilled in civil labour. He said that the French Army in Egypt, having been raised at an early period of the French Revolution, included a large representation of skilled labour. Owing to this, when it was cut off from all communication with France by our superior naval force, the aptitude of the soldiers composing that army yet enabled it to provide for all its own wants, and to maintain themselves by the resources they created in the country. In the short interval afforded by the Peace of Amiens Napoleon pursued this system of industrial training, and the army with which he threatened us at Boulogne, 1796 and afterwards won the battle of Austerlitz, he declared to be the best he ever had, because it had undergone this educational process. In his later war he said he had far inferior armies, because the heavy demands for men did not allow time for the proper training of conscripts before they took the field. The policy recommended by the first Napoleon had been since followed to a great extent in the French army. He had himself some years ago had an opportunity of seeing in the camp then held at Boulogne a striking example of what could be accomplished by military labour; the huts, roads, gardens, everything connected with that encampment had been executed by the soldiers themselves, without any help from extraneous labour, as he was informed by the officers who very courteously showed him the establishment; and he understood that since the camp had been transferred to Chalons the same system had been followed. It had been found in France that not only was this system economical as regarded outlay, but that it was also attended with great advantage from providing healthy occupation, mental and bodily, for the men. But when we decided to form a camp everything was done for the soldier instead of by him; even such a matter as the draining of the ground was carried out by paid labourers, though it would have been a most useful piece of education for the soldiers to have executed the work. Up to the present moment not a single attempt had been made to introduce a system of industrial training for the army; but this was the most important proposal in the scheme of 1847, and he therefore denied that it could be said, with any correctness, to have been tried and to have failed. Then, again, instead of the ten years' men being encouraged to take their discharge, as was suggested in that scheme, every effort was made to retain them. The military authorities not understanding, as he supposed, that it was of the very essence of the scheme that soldiers should frequently return to their homes after a short service in the enjoyment of advantages which should induce others to enlist, had endeavoured, as far as possible, to induce men to re-enlist at the end of their first term of service, and had discouraged their entering into the reserve. This had arisen from the short-sighted fear of losing men from their regiments, as if it was not a gain instead of a loss to allow 100 men to leave the army after their ten years' ser- 1797 vice, provided that 500 men were thus encouraged to enlist in their place, and that the 100 men could still be fallen back upon in case of an emergency. For his own part, he still believed in the scheme of 1847, and only felt that it might well have gone a little further instead of stopping where it did. Before the Commission, he had earnestly recommended in his evidence, and in a letter which he had afterwards addressed to his noble Friend behind him, the Chairman of the Commission (the Earl of Dalhousie), that soldiers, instead of being persuaded to re-enlist, should, on the contrary, be afforded the utmost facilities for taking their discharge. He would not allow a man to take his discharge before the expiration of the first period of his service unless he enrolled himself as a soldier of reserve; but the very moment a man was declared to be thoroughly well acquainted with his profession and a really trained soldier, then he would permit him to take his discharge, if at home, on condition that he enrolled himself as a soldier of reserve; and he would not encumber these soldiers of reserve with many strict regulations; all that he would require of him would be that he should present himself at the nearest depot for one week in each year for training, in order that he might not forget the knowledge he had acquired, and in return for this he should be allowed to reckon two years in the reserve as equal to one in the ranks towards establishing his claim to pension. That limited period of training, he was convinced, was sufficient to prevent a soldier from forgetting what he had once learnt in the army. One other condition he would impose upon the soldier of reserve: that if a war with this country broke out, he should be liable at any time to serve with his own regiment, but at a double rate of pay, that is, at the same pay as was now allowed to the enrolled pensioners. Thus a number of trained soldiers would be really at command at the very time when they were most valuable; and when disbanded they would tend to make the service more popular. He was persuaded that such a system would draw numbers of men back to their standards and marvellously increase the array. He would remind their Lordships that under the present circumstances of the world—as was seen by the remarkable experience of Germany in the past year—the real danger of a country was encountered during the first fortnight 1798 of a war, and he insisted that this country, with the large armies now kept up on the Continent and modern facilities for suddenly moving large bodies of men, could not be safe unless it could throw into the ranks of the regular army a large reserve of trained soldiers within a fortnight of the breaking out of war. That was what the Prussians had found of immense value, what England would find of equal value, and what England could obtain by the means he had suggested. It had been said that the old soldier was invaluable in the army, and should not be parted with at any cost. It was quite true that it was of great importance that there should be a certain proportion of old soldiers in every regiment, and especially among the noncommissioned officers; but it was not less true that there was also a great advantage in having troops employed on active service mainly composed of men in the vigour of their ago. Experience proved that the proportion of men fit to appear under arms was very much larger among the younger men than the older, because the ratio of sickness increased with ago. Moreover, the older men either married or plunged into vice, and the illustrious Duke (the Duke of Cambridge) knew how inconvenient it was to have a number of married men in the army. If his views were sound, he thought it followed that recruiting for ten years' service was not so ill-advised a proposition as some supposed; but it was certain that one of two courses must be pursued—either the service must be made attractive or else the War Office must catch men as it could, and, having caught them, hold them to the last, and get everything possible out of them. The illustrious Duke had said these questions were all matters of money; he (Earl Grey) was prepared, however, at the proper time, to show that the adoption of his recommendations would cause no increase of expense, but, on the contrary, would tend to economy by reducing pensions and various charges to a larger amount than the new expenses it might create. At all events, he was sure it would be far more economical than the costly measure of direct increase of pay; and he agreed with the noble Lord who had introduced the question (the Earl of Dalhousie) that it would have been wiser, instead of giving that increase, to have relieved the soldier from some of those small charges which he regarded as grievances; because, in time, he would not think of the increase which he had re- 1799 ceived, but would still talk of his grievvances, so that in the end the country would have both increased his pay and removed his grievance as well.
§ THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGEsaid he entirely concurred with the recommendation which had been thrown out of giving to the soldiers an industrial as well as military training; but so short was England of troops, so much were the soldiers moved about, that industrial occupation was out of the question for want of time. With reference to another matter he could assure his noble Friend that officers would be only too glad to avail themselves of what he had suggested, if they had the power.
THE EARL OF DALHOUSIEexpressed his gratification at having been the means of bringing on the discussion of the evening; but he adhered to the opinion which he had expressed in the early portion of the evening, that the private soldiers regarded being kept at Aldershot during the winter as a great grievance. This operated as a serious drawback to enlistment in the army. The evidence which had been given before the Commission by private soldiers on this point had been given most readily, and without a moment's hesitation.
THE EARL OF LONGFORDapologized for having forgotten to say that no objection would be offered to the noble Earl's Motion.
§ Motion agreed to.
§ House adjourned at a quarter past Eight o'clock, till To-morrow, half past Ten o'clock.