Lords Sitting of 8 March 1867

MINUTES.
SELECT COMMITTEE—On Traffic Regulation (Metropolis) Report.
PUBLIC BILLS—Report—Traffic Regulation (Metropolis)* (5).
Third Reading—Public Schools (29); Marriages (Odessa)* (30), and passed.

DISTURBANCES IN IRELAND.

  QUESTION.
  THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEasked the noble Lord at the head of the Government for any information he might have received from Ireland.
  THE EARL OF DERBY: I have not received anything from Ireland this morning; but I requested the Secretary of State for the Home Department to send to me here the latest information he might have received, and I have this instant received from him this telegram—
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  "No important event reported, except at Kilteely, eight miles from Limerick Junction, where a number of men are assembled. Troops have gone to the place. Some farmhouses and barns have been robbed in the neighbourhood of Abbeyfeale. The neighbourhood of Dublin, including Drogheda, tranquil."
  The telegram is without date.

INSURRECTION IN CRETE.

  MOTION FOR PAPERS.
  THE DUKE OF ARGYLL,in rising to move for a Copy of a Note addressed to the Porte by the Three Powers, Great Britain, France, and Russia, on the 8th of April, 1830; and to call the attention of the House to the Papers (presented to Parliament by Her Majesty's command) respecting the late Insurrection in the Island of Crete, said: My Lords, having read with very close attention the Papers which have been laid upon the table of your Lordships' House, I confess I am compelled to question the propriety of the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government upon one point, but upon one point only. The advice given by Her Majesty's Government to the Government of the Porte has on all occasions been timely, just, and humane; and I think I may add that as regards the suggestion made by the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office for the settlement of the Cretan question—as far, at least, as the question can be settled under present circumstances—I really do not know that any better suggestion could have been made. My objection to the course taken by Her Majesty's Government has reference, as I have already stated, to one point alone; but that point appears to me to be of so great importance, not only in itself, but also as regards the principles connected with it, that I felt it incumbent upon me to bring it under the consideration of your Lordships; and I think I shall best do so first by giving to your Lordships a short narrative of events, not necessarily in the order in which they occurred, but in the order in which they became known to Her Majesty's Government; and secondly, by directing the attention of your Lordships to the general principles to be applied to those events. But, before doing so, there are one or two observations of a general character which I trust I may be allowed to make upon this question. We all know that the Christian provinces of Turkey are in a state of chronic disaffection and of occasional insurrection; nor need I explain

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  to the House what the causes of that disaffection are. First of all, there is the fact which is alluded to and dwelt upon by the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office in these despatches—namely, that in these provinces there is a large majority of Christians, having no share whatever in the government, but ruled over by a Mussulman minority. Secondly, there is the fact that in these provinces there are generally great and real and practical grievances suffered by the people. And lastly, there is the fact of a free Greece, which, however ill-governed it may be—and I believe that next to Turkey it is perhaps the worst-governed country in Europe—is in close proximity to those provinces; while such is human nature that men prefer almost any grievances to the state of subjection in which these provinces are now placed. Whenever an insurrection occurs in the Christian provinces of Turkey we are always told by the partisans of Greece that the inhabitants are groaning under innumerable practical grievances; and, on the other hand, we are always told by the partizans of Turkey that the people had no grievances whatever to complain of, but that the insurrection has been entirely raised by the Greek nation. Now, I believe the truth lies between these two statements. You cannot separate the exclusive dominion of a Mussulman majority, the practical grievances which the Christian inhabitants labour under, and the example of free Greece. These causes act and re-act, and you cannot separate them, because each one of them has had some share in producing the insurrections which have taken place from time to time. Now, as to the grievances complained of, let me, in passing, make one remark. Even in those cases where the Turkish Government means to act fairly the administration under that Government is generally so bad and corrupt as to perpetuate those grievances rather than redress them. I need not state to you in detail the nature of those grievances, because they are stated in this blue book; and the very same grievances have uniformly been complained of by the inhabitants of all the Christian provinces in Turkey. The principal are excessive taxation of farmings of the revenue of compulsory ports of export, to which there were bad roads; but, above all, there is a universal allegation that the promise made to the Christian population in 1856, in the face of all Europe, in re-
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  ference to the perfect equality before the law of Christian and Mussulman, is a promise which has not been kept. Under these circumstances, I fear we must look for frequent insurrections. And now let me say one word with regard to the spirit and temper with which we ought to regard such insurrections when they do arise. I will venture to say that every Government in this country must desire to stave off as far as it can what is called the Eastern question. But every one of these insurrections is calculated to raise the question which every statesman in this country must be desirous to postpone. This is a natural feeling on the part of every Foreign Minister, and to a certain extent it is legitimate. All I say is that when insurrections do take place, as they will do in the Christian provinces of Turkey, we should remember the high probability that they are justified by the grievances which the Christian populations have to endure. Indeed, we know that under the Turkish Government such grievances must exist. If we had to endure even a thousandth part of those grievances we should be rising against the governing power, and therefore we ought always to look upon these insurrections as only a natural attempt on the part of the people to throw off a government which to them is certainly odious, and to a large extent really oppressive. Therefore, we ought not to regard these insurrections solely in a selfish spirit, or merely as injuries to ourselves because of their inconvenience. It must necessarily be inconvenient to have the Eastern question raised; but still, when these insurrections occur we are bound to look that question in the face and to perform our duty, whatever it may be, after due consideration and reflection. My Lords, I do not make this remark in reference to any despatch which has proceeded from the British Government. Indeed, the tone of those despatches has been uniformly gentle, considerate, and humane. But I regret to find in the blue book some remarks of a French diplomatist which do not appear to me to be deserving the same praise. Having said thus much, I will narrate to the House the circumstances respecting this Cretan insurrection. The disaffection and the discontent of the people of Crete have been, as your Lordships are aware, of longstanding. I think that, since the year 1830, there have been two or three insurrections, and several assemblages of

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  people which almost amounted to insurrections, and which compelled the Turkish Government to make some concessions. Very early in 1866 these feelings of discontent seem to have reached a head, and in the month of May, I believe, the Christian inhabitants assembled, as they are accustomed to do in Crete, in large bodies, and addressed to the Sultan a petition complaining of their grievances, and, in perfectly respectful language, asking for redress. Now, as far as I can learn, the allegations contained in that petition have never been contradicted. Well, no answer was given to that petition by the Government at Constantinople for a period of between two and three months; and when at last the reply did come, it was in the shape of an order to the inhabitants to disperse and lay down their arms—for I ought to have mentioned, that the Cretans always go armed—but no promise was given that any of the grievances complained of should be redressed. On this point I will read the opinion of Lord Lyons, our Minister at Constantinople—and certainly Lord Lyons was not the man to overstate the matter. On the contrary, he would be likely to mean a little more than he said. His words were—
  "The instruction contains a peremptory summons to the Christians to disperse, but they do not hold out much hope that the grievances alledged in the Memorial will be seriously examined or redressed."—p. 27.
  Well, when that answer arrived in Crete the assembly broke up, took up arms, and betook themselves to the mountains, where a few days afterwards they expressed their determination to fight for their own independence and their annexation to the kingdom of Greece, That happened in the beginning of September. Here, however, I wish to remark—what ought always to be borne in mind—that all these wars in the Christian provinces of Turkey assume an internecine character. They are emphatically savage wars, embittered by the antagonism of race against race, and religion against religion, and the most terrible brutalities are committed on both sides. There is always one special circumstance which aggravates very much the horrors of war, and that on the side of the Turks. In putting down such insurrections the Turkish Government employs not only their regular troops, but also Albanians, Circassians, and other semi-savage hordes, whose brutality very far exceeds that of
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  the regular soldiers. This aggravation of the horrors of war does not exist on the part of the native population. So far as I can see in the papers before your Lordships' House, the intentions of the Turkish Government—by that I mean of the few enlightened Turks who form the Government at Constantinople—are, on the whole, humane. In the blue book there is repeated mention of instances in which volunteers from Greece, who, having been interfering in the war and having been caught by the Turkish troops, were treated in a most humane manner by Mustapha Pasha; and I find cases too, I rejoice to say, in which Egyptian officers who had been interfering, as the Cretans had a right to think unduly, were treated by the Christian population in the most humane and handsome manner, after the latter had captured them and thus got them into their power. It appears that it was on the 22nd of September Her Majesty's Government first heard that the insurrection had assumed the character of a civil war. Instructions were at once issued by the Foreign Office, in which it was laid down that we should pursue a course of complete neutrality between the two parties. On the 29th of September our Government heard that the Turkish Government had landed in Crete between 5,000 and 6,000 of those mercenary troops to which I have referred. On the 2nd of October Her Majesty's Government heard from Consul Dickson at Crete that murder and rapine prevailed over the island, and that there was a general flight from all the villages of such of the Christian families as could escape to the neighbouring country of Greece. On the 9th of October Her Majesty's Government heard that 1,200 more Albanian mercenaries were to be hired by the Turkish Government, and let loose on the Christian population of Crete. On the 12th of October they received from our Minister at Athens a despatch which I think must have opened their eyes to the spirit in which this war was too likely to be conducted. Mr. Erskine writes—
  "I am informed by the French flag-captain on this station that there is so much ill-feeling towards all Christians, on the part of the Egyptian troops in Crete, that even the commander of the French gunboat Biche was insulted by some of these men, when on shore in Suda Bay; and that to avoid the repetition of such conduct, the Turkish Admiral has undertaken to send off water to the Biche, and thus prevent the necessity for the landing of her crew. If such be the conduct

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  of the Egyptians towards the French sailors, it is quite conceivable that they may have been guilty of any of the excesses against native Christians, which have been laid to their charge."—p. 52.
  My Lords, on the 20th of October the Government heard of another most significant fact. Your Lordships are probably aware that about one-fourth of the inhabitants of the island of Crete are Mussulmans. In consequence of what was actually going on, and of what was coming, the Mussulman authorities were taking-care that the Mussulman women and children should be put out of reach of the war. Of this the Government were informed by Lord Lyons in his despatch of that date. On the 26th they were informed by Mr. Erskine that Consul General Saunders had reported to the Government that mercenaries were being shipped from Albania for the purpose of carrying on the war against Crete; and he added, that the Porte would do well to reflect before having recourse to the assistance of these reckless, sanguinary mercenaries; that even any momentary success obtained through their agency might be dearly purchased by the additional exasperation which could not fail to be imported into the conflict by the use of such allies. On the same day the Government heard from Lord Lyons his opinion, that the contest was being carried on with an animosity on both sides productive of most deplorable consequences. On the same day the Government received the first petition from the Cretans, praying that Her Majesty's ships might be allowed to remove from Crete any Christian women and children who might escape to the shore and find refuge on board ship. Three days after that petition was received the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary—of course, after consultation with the Government—despatched his first refusal to allow Her Majesty's ships to remove those women and children. The noble Lord's refusal was founded on the ground that to do so would be virtually a violation of the principle of neutrality. I think it only fair to say, with reference to the course taken by Her Majesty's Government, that the request had come through a channel that was most objectionable. The Cretan people petitioned, through the King of Greece, asking His Majesty to use his influence with the protecting Powers to send ships for the purpose to which I have alluded. Again, up to that time—whatever might be the
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  probabilities of the future—Her Majesty's Government had not heard of any fact showing that any attack had been made, or was intended to be made, on the women and children. Therefore, though I cannot agree in the conclusion at which they arrived, I can understand the principle upon which they acted. Put, my Lords, whilst this direct refusal to comply with the prayer of the petition was sent to Greece, no discretion was given to our local authorities on the spot—no instructions were given to Lord Lyons to the effect that he might exercise his own discretion in extreme cases; no directions were given to Consul Dickson, a person of the highest character, that under circumstances of an urgent character he might exercise his own judgment in respect of those unfortunate people. No such direction was given to our local authorities, but a simple blank refusal was returned to the petition. On the 31st of October Her Majesty's Government heard from Consul Dickson that whole villages were being destroyed, and of specific acts of atrocity with which he would not trouble the House. On the 6th of November there was an account of the wholesale burning of, I think, ten or twelve Christian villages; and on the 9th of November Her Majesty's Government hoard from Lord Lyons that he had remonstrated with the Porte against the employment of those sanguinary mercenaries. On the 11th of November they received this news from Mr. Erskine—
  "M. Manos, an officer in the Greek artillery, who was taken prisoner in the redoubt at Vrysses, has written to his family to say that he has been most humanely, and even generously, treated by Mustapha Pasha, to whom he stated that, for three days before the engagement, neither he nor his companions had tasted food. Another officer, Colonel Zimbrakaki, writes that, in the mountains, the unfortunate women and children are dying by scores every night from want and exposure, many of the poor creatures being literally without covering of any sort. Another, a German volunteer, endeavours to comfort his friends by the assurance that there is but little danger of his being shot, as the insurgents are careful to keep at a respectful distance from the enemy. On the other hand, I have seen letters from three different persons in Candia, all foreigners, who speak of the conduct of the Turkish and Egyptian troops as simply atrocious. One gentleman describes the massacre of 200 persons, chiefly old men, women, and children, and the barbarities committed by the troops as beyond all belief. Another states that the Turks refused all quarter to the Christians, and mercilessly chopped off the heads of the unfortunate wounded as well as dead, a reward of 100 lira having been offered for each head

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  thus brought to the camp. The writer of this letter adds, it is true, that similar barbarities are committed by the Christians. If these statements at all resemble the truth, it may be conceived how difficult it will be ever to reconcile the Christians to the Turkish rule, or to persuade them to live harmoniously with native Mussulmans whom they accuse of such horrors."—p.: 93.
  On the 14th of November the Government heard from Consul Dickson of the severe privations which the poor Christian families were suffering in the mountains. On the 17th of November Consul Lloyd reported to the same effect from Syra. Now, on the same day, 17th November, the Government, in a despatch from Lord Lyons, heard what course he was disposed to take under the circumstances of the case. Lord Lyons had been informed of the nature of the petition sent to England, and he says—
  "The original of Mr. Erskine's despatch must have been in your Lordships' hands before the copy of it reached me; and had this been otherwise it would have been beyond my province to decide upon the prayer of the petition, and out of my power to give effect to it. I have, however, lost no opportunity of pressing upon the Porte the importance of taking thought for the families deprived of food and shelter, and I have sent instructions to Her Majesty's Consul in Crete to urge the Ottoman authorities to take, and to take himself, every feasible and proper measure to save the women and children not only from insult or insult or injury, but also from hunger and cold."—p. 97.
  Now, my Lords, it appears from that despatch that on receipt of the petition at Constantinople Lord Lyons, knowing the character of those mercenary troops who had been let loose, had not contented himself with making representations to the Porte, but had sent those instructions to the Consul at Crete, which left him a wide discretion, and gave him powers of independent action. On the 6th of December, a fortnight after the last despatch, the Government heard that Consul Dickson, acting under the orders of Lord Lyons, had placed himself in immediate communication with the commander of one of the gunboats on the station, with a view to relieve persons upon the coast; but he had hardly done so when the order from home arrived that perfect neutrality was to be maintained, and the interpretation put upon that was that no such step should be taken. Consul Dickson also, on receipt of the order, and finding that there were at the moment no specific applications from families wishing to be taken off, cancelled the orders which he had given. Six days afterwards, however, the Government heard from Consul
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  Dickson that he had determined to disobey the orders which he had received from them. I wish to direct your Lordships' attention to the remarkable despatch in which he explains the reasons for his conduct. He says—
  "During the brief stay here of the Imperial Commissioner and the Commander of the Egyptian contingent, I ventured to make a few remarks officiously to their Excellencies. I stated that the insurrection must have, by this time, attracted the notice of Europe, and every incident connected therewith, whether good or evil, would surely sooner or later be divulged. That although I entertained no doubt of the strict orders issued by the commanders in regard to the maintenance of discipline, and that humanity should not be outraged in any way, there might be instances in which such orders would be disregarded. I alluded more particularly to the treatment of Christians wounded on the field, and when made prisoners, including women and children. That the presence of Bashi-Bazouks with the army appeared to me to be all the more uncalled for, that their unfitness in legitimate warfare had been acknowledged, and the misdeeds they so often committed might reflect seriously on the conduct of the present war."—p. 124.
  Further on he refers to the tragedy which took place at the monastery of Arkadi—
  "The refectory hall, with its tables and benches, was found intact, but the floor was strewn over with the mangled bodies of Christians, all stripped naked. It is said that the Bashi-Bazouks signally distinguished themselves in that particular act of butchery and plunder. Some women and children have also been massacred."—p. 124.
  Another paragraph says—
  "All the strict orders and humane exhortations issued by the Imperial Commissioner and his son Salih Pasha have been in many instances unavailing to restrain the infuriated soldiery from acts of barbarism. In the church at Therisso, during the engagement, a priest and a woman were hacked to pieces, and there burnt, the murderers observing at the time that they were only roasting pigs."—p. 125.
  He goes on to say—
  "In my anxiety to save the lives of some at least of these misguided men, now that the Imperial troops are about to encounter them in their last strongholds at Kissamos and Selino, I have ventured to transgress the instructions conveyed to me by Captain Hillyar (as per my despatch of the 17th ult.), and have now addressed a letter to the commander of Her Majesty's ship Assurance. Your Lordship will perceive thereby that the circumstance is one of extreme urgency, and I therefore hope that my conduct may be pardoned."—p. 125.
  I have now to direct your Lordships' attention to the report of Commander Pym, acting under orders of Consul Dickson, showing what horrors were prevented, but would have taken place had the instructions from the Home Govern-

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  ment been rigidly adhered to. Commander Pym stated that—
  "At the request of Her Majesty's Consul he proceeded on a cruise to the western and southwestern coast of Crete, for the purpose of affording' shelter to any person whose life might be endangered by the part he had taken in the civil war now raging in that island; that, on his anchoring at Selino Castelli on the 10th inst., he was requested to take off a number of women and children and wounded men, who were living in caves and grottoes in the mountains, and whose lives would certainly be forfeited in the event of Mustapha Pasha defeating the body of insurgents now defending the mountain passes of Selino, only two hours off. Commander Pym felt so persuaded that these unfortunate persons would either perish from exposure or would be massacred by the Turks, that he consented to carry off as many as his vessel could contain, and he eventually embarked 25 men (all wounded or maimed), 160 women, and the rest children. Many more would have come if there had been room for them, and, in fact, about 1,000 more are now waiting at Suja, in the hope that the Assurance will go back and rescue them."
  In consequence of the instructions given by Consul Dickson, and carried out by Commander Pym, we find that between 300 and 400 persons were thus providentially rescued by the agency of that British vessel. In a few days afterwards the Government were informed by Mr. Erskine of their arrival at Athens in a state of extreme destitution. It is worthy of remark that at that time the Turks spoke of the removal as a proceeding to which they had no objection. They entered no protest whatever against it, believing that Consul Dickson was simply acting on a principle of humanity, and knowing that instructions in that sense had been sent to him some time before by Lord Lyons. But as soon as they heard of the counter instructions from the Government at home to Lord Lyons and our Consuls, they of course began to express objections to the course that had been pursued. On the 29th of December a second request to sanction the removal of some of these people reached the Government, this time from Lord John Hay, who was connected with a charitable fund for their relief. Addressing the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary, he said—
  "If you could send a ship, or let one call round the coast with, if necessary, a Turkish official on board, in order to carry off these people, the last difficulty would have been disposed of."—p. 134.
  The people referred to in that letter were about 1,000 women and children, who were anxiously awaiting the return of Her Majesty's ship Assurance at Selino. On the 2nd of January the Government again re-
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  fused, and on the same grounds. On the 4th of January the Government again received from Lord Lyons the expression of his opinion as to the inhumanity with which the war was characterized. On the 7th of January, Consul Dickson's defence of his own conduct and account of the grounds upon which he had acted was received. That gentleman referred to the attitude and language of the Turkish Government, and then proceeded to say—
  "All the above-stated considerations, however serious they might be, had no weight on my conscience when I felt the cries of humanity were at stake. After the heartrending accounts that reached me of the tragic affair at Arkadi, and seeing despite my remonstrances, and contrary to the wishes even of Mustapha Pasha, that a host of Bashi-Bazouks (with a strong sprinkling of Seliniotes burning with the desire to expel from their homes the Giaour intruders) was swelling the expeditionary force as it marched on to Selino; these appeared to me cogent reasons for despatching the Assurance on Her Majesty's service. The Imperial Government, and I trust your Lordship likewise, are sufficiently satisfied with the conduct I have observed hitherto, and even long before the insurrection broke out to need any further protestations of loyalty on my part. For while I have always deemed it a duty to uphold the legitimate authority of the Sultan, I equally desire to see the general system in operation make way for a more enlightened Turkish Administration in Crete, conducted on Christian principles."—p. 144.
  I cannot, my Lords, offer these observations without expressing my sincere admiration of the conduct of Consul Dickson under these circumstances. His conduct did him the highest honour, and showed an amount of moral courage of which few men would have been capable. There were many men who would face any danger in war who would not have done what Consul Dickson has done. For myself, I admire the act of Consul Dickson more than I do the act of Nelson, when before the batteries of Copenhagen he refused to see the signal of recall. On the 8th of January Lord Stanley answered the letter of Consul Dickson, saying, as to the removal of the wounded men and women, and children, desirous of leaving the island—
  "I had been under the impression that this operation took place with the entire sanction of the Turkish authority, but, from the enclosures in your letter, there seems some doubt in the matter. But, be that as it may, I am willing to make every allowance for the motives by which you were actuated; and, although the proceeding was perhaps in strictness open to objection as being not altogether consistent with the neutrality of the British Government in regard to the contest in Crete, yet, looking to all the circumstances of the case, and to the difficulty of your

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  position, I will not disapprove your conduct."—p. 150.
  The circumstances of the case! But were not those circumstances precisely such as the Government knew Consul Dickson would certainly, or at least in all probability be placed? It appears to me that if, under those circumstances, the conduct of Consul Dickson was held to be justifiable, acting, as he did, in direct opposition to the orders of the Government, it is a clear proof that those orders had been wrong—or at least too stringent. They ought at least to have vested in him all the discretionary power compatible with the circumstances of the case. Lord Stanley goes on to say—
  "I will only further express my hope that you will carefully avoid being led into any course of action incompatible with the neutral character which it is incumbent on you to uphold."—p. 150.
  Now, considering that it was known that other women and children were hoping that they would be carried away as their companions had been, I maintain that some more definite instructions than these should have been sent to Consul Dickson with reference to them. No instruction whatever was sent to him; he was simply given a general order to maintain neutrality. This was placing Consul Dickson in a position hardly fair to a public servant; because, although he knew that the Government had at first deemed the removal of women and children a violation of neutrality, he also knew that when they came to know what he had done they declined to disapprove his conduct. He was therefore left in a most embarrassing position, with most ambiguous instructions, and the whole circumstances of his situation were trying in the extreme. On the 14th January the Government heard from Lord Lyons certain information which proves that the English Government was in the whole of this matter far more Turkish than the Government at Constantinople. In the last paragraph I read—
  "Aali Pasha has not made any remonstrance to me against the proceeding of Her Majesty's ship Assurance, and I have not been desirous of bringing on a discussion of the subject with him. I contented myself yesterday with observing that if, in fact, the insurrection was completely suppressed, the removal of dangerous characters and of destitute women and children must be a benefit to all parties."—p. 152.
  This is dated the 2nd of January, so that at that time the Turkish Government knew what Consul Dickson had done, and that the Russian Government was about
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  to follow the example he had set; this knowledge, however, led to no remonstrance whatever, and it appears to me that if, instead of acting against the instructions of his Government, Consul Dickson had acted with them, the Turkish Government would have had quite as little ground to consider what actually occurred as a violation of neutrality. Immediately afterwards the Government heard that the action of Her Majesty's ship Assurance had very naturally drawn to the shore a number of women and children, scantily dressed, and half starved, in the hope they would be afforded protection in the same way as the others. In the mountains whence they had come they were able to secure a scanty maintenance; but on the shore they had absolutely nothing. Thus they were entrapped into a worse position than before, simply because no further instructions had been sent out to the Consul. These unfortunate women were left to their fate. On the 21st of January the Government received another petition, making the same prayer as its predecessors, and two days afterwards was made the final answer of the Government, which I will read. Lord Stanley writes—
  "In reply, I have to acquaint you that, even if Her Majesty's Government had seen reason to alter the decision which has already been communicated to you in regard to the removing of refugees from Greece, the necessity for their doing so would now appear to be much less required, inasmuch as they learn from Lord Lyons that the Greek Minister at Constantinople has been informed by the United States Minister that all refugees who may present themselves will be received on board the ships of the American squadron, which has been ordered to Candia for that purpose."—p. 167.
  Thus we have official record of the fact that those offices of common humanity which were refused by the British Government were willingly undertaken by the fleet and the Consul of the United States.
  Having concluded my narrative of the facts, I now address myself to the principles which appear to me to be applicable to the events which I have related. I confess that when I read this account I was afraid that the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office had committed himself in some extraordinary manner to the purest abstract doctrines of non-intervention, which were at one time, I believe, erroneously attributed to him. I rejoice, however, to find that this reproach is wholly undeserved by the noble Lord. On reading the despatches I find that

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  nothing can be more reasonable and more free than his correspondence from any abstract theory of non-intervention, which, in my opinion, is most unwise and un-statesmanlike. All such cases as these should be judged upon their own merits, and not upon any abstract doctrine. The noble Lord, I am glad to say, has been most reasonable as far as statements of principle are concerned. I find, at page 38 of the blue book, that the French Government wished their suggestion to the Porte, with a view to procure inquiry into the grievances of the Christians, to be endorsed by Her Majesty's Government. Upon this Lord Stanley wrote to Lord Cowley, giving an account of his reply to the French Minister here. He said—
  "I was as yet scarcely in a position to judge satisfactorily of the sufficiency of the causes which had led to the insurrectionary movements in Crete, but that I thought the proposition of the French Government one which, in its nature, was not open to serious objection, while it indicated the interest taken by the protecting Powers in the well-being of the subjects of the Porte."—p. 33.
  I see no allusion there to the abstract doctrine of non-intervention. Lord Stanley did not meet the French Government by saying, "We have adopted a new policy in this country, and propose in future to have nothing whatever to do with the affairs of other nations." That was not the line he took, and I rejoice that I can say so. But I find a remarkable despatch on page 39, in reference to a proposition made to him by Baron Bruno w, the Russian Minister in London. Baron Brunow, in his remarks to Lord Stanley, uses the well-worn arguments of the Russian Government in reference to the East. He repeats the arguments used by the Russian Government in the case of the disturbances in the Christian provinces in Turkey; he lays down the principle that "the point of departure should be the engagements contracted in 1830;" and then he lays down the principle—which, as it appears to me, is just up to a certain extent—that in the face of the obligations which were contracted by the Turkish Government before Europe in 1857, the European Powers have a right, I will not say of intervention, but of interest, in all those questions which entitle them to be heard if they choose to speak. What, then, is the answer which Lord Stanley makes to this? He says—
  "I agreed with him in principle as to the expediency of joint action among the three Powers in the event of necessity for such action arising."
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  And, at the close of the despatch, he adds—
  "It is far better that whatever is done should be done by the Porte itself, whose authority will be weakened rather than strengthened by foreign intervention. That intervention, however, will not be refused should circumstances appear imperatively to demand it."—p. 39.
  I rejoice to find in these despatches an emphatic though implied contradiction of a dogma which has been commonly laid down of late years—that England should pursue a policy of total abstention from the affairs of the East; and that our relations with Turkey are of such a nature as to place our obligations and our duty of neutrality towards her precisely in the same position as that in which we should stand to any of the more civilized Powers of Europe. Your Lordships will observe that Lord Stanley speaks of such intervention as the French and Russian Governments atone time contemplated as, under certain circumstances, justifiable—that is, if the necessity should arise. I accordingly asked myself what were the circumstances which, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, would justify intervention with the internal affairs of Turkey; and I found an answer, with which I perfectly agree, in a despatch from Lord Stanley to Lord Lyons. The noble Lord says—
  "I could not deny the possibility of such occurrences, but said that it did not seem to me possible to refuse to the Porte the right which every State possessed of putting down insurrection by armed force, provided the use of force did not degenerate into mere brutality, and that the recognised customs of war were observed."
  This is precisely the point; I assent to every word of this passage:—but, I ask, when the despatches I have quoted clearly show that Bashi-Bazouks, Circassians, and Albanians were let loose upon the Christian population of Crete, and were proved by eye-witnesses to be in the habit of murdering the wounded, the women, and children, whether the war was conducted on principles of civilized warfare, and whether Her Majesty's Government were not fully justified—nay, even compelled, as a public duty—to interfere in such a case?
  But now I come to another ground. I have pleaded the cause of those women and children upon the grounds of humanity only; but I am also prepared to maintain that there are other grounds, and that there are other reasons, which ought to have induced Her Majesty's Government to have, at the very least, given a certain discretion to our authorities upon the spot.

  1527
  I cannot deny, nor do I see how it can he denied, that there is some force in the appeals which the Cretans made to the transactions of 1830. Your Lordships will probably remember that in 1830 the Cretan population had very nearly achieved their independence. They had obtained possession of the whole country, with the exception of a few fortresses, which were occupied by Turkish troops. It was at that time in the contemplation of the three Powers to have included Crete among the islands which were made free. Very much, however, against the opinion of Lord Palmerston, Lord Russell, and other statesmen of the time, it was determined that this course should not be adopted; and I fully admit that there were special circumstances connected with Crete, especially the fact that the population was to the extent of nearly a quarter composed of Mussulmans, which justified the course that was adopted. But that course was not determined upon without I serious remonstrance on the part of the Cretans; and the three Powers agreed to address to the Porte a collective Note, fora copy of which I have moved to-night—a Motion which, as your Lordships are aware, is merely formal, inasmuch as the document is to be found in the Library. The Protocol of the 8th April, 1830, constituted a considerable claim on the part of the Cretan population to the protection of the European Powers.
  THE EARL OF DERBYbegged to remind the noble Duke of a passage in that Protocol, which he seemed to have overlooked.
  THE DUKE OF ARGYLL: I am aware of the language referred to; but it is not upon those words I wish to dwell. I am perfectly prepared to admit, what the noble Earl seems to imply by his interruption, that the main object of that Note was to secure to the Cretan population protection against the repetition of the occurrences which had recently taken place; but I think that the language of the Note goes beyond that, and holds out an expectation—for I will use no stronger term—to the people of Crete that their interest and welfare should in future be a matter of benevolent consideration to the Western Powers. I am not, however, going to dwell upon this point, because I put the duty of the Western Powers upon, as I think, a much stronger basis. I ask you to consider the connection between this question and the policy which was secured
  1528
  in Europe by the Treaty of Paris in 1856. It is now between eleven and twelve years since the termination of the Crimean War—eleven years and a half since the last grave was closed upon those melancholy hills where so many of our friends fought and fell. Twelve years form a very short period in a nation's life, still shorter in the history of Europe; but so many and so great have been the changes which have taken place, not only in the old world, but also in the new, during the time, that we seem to be separated from that period by a great length, and, indeed, almost an age of time. I have often tried to look back upon the contest and agitation of that time, and have endeavoured to judge of it as I think it will be judged in the light of history. I am not insensible to the strength of some of the arguments used by the noble Earl near me (Earl Grey), and by other eminent statesmen, against the Crimean war; but this I will say, that a very large proportion of these arguments are founded upon a total misapprehension as to what the objects of that war really were. I am bound to say, too, that the language of diplomacy and of diplomatists has only tended—in this case as in so many others—to hide and to obscure the truth. I cannot but remember that the object for which we were always said to be fighting was the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire. Now, my Lords, we all of us know—those at least of us who have any knowledge of the affairs of Europe—that the words "integrity" and "independence," as applied to Turkey, have not the same meaning as the words would have if applied to any other country. Its integrity is not the same; its independence never can be the same; and yet many of us who were Members of that Government, forced into the war by circumstances over which we had no control, were held to be fanatics in the belief that there was such a thing possible in the world as the regeneration of Turkey. For myself, I will say that I did not then believe, and I do not now believe, in the regeneration of Turkey. If the signs of decay and death were ever depicted upon a human countenance, if they were ever perceptible in any political society, their mark is now to be found upon the face of the Turkish Empire. But what had that to do with the Crimean war? Our object was not to preserve Turkey, except as a means to other things; our object was to resist the

  1529
  encroachments of Russia—to prevent Russia from serving herself heir by force and fraud to the rich and splendid inheritance of the East. And, in spite of the eloquence and logic of my noble Friend near me (Earl Grey), I am still unpersuaded that it was a matter of indifference to Europe that by force and by fraud an Empire should be established stretching from the Bosphorus to the Arctic Sea. But I never can forget, and do not now forget, that in conducting that contest and, in concert with France, in leading it to a triumphant issue, we were at the same time running counter to the natural tendencies and natural rights of a portion of the Turkish people. It is not for nothing that by the providence of God so vast a proportion of the population of the world shares in one common religious faith. And I, for one, admit that as in human affairs it is natural that certain sympathies should be established, it is still more natural that a general sympathy should always exist between persons who profess the same faith, and are members of the same church. And what have we done? The result of that war—right as I maintain it to have been for the purpose for which we entered upon it—has driven Russia from that protectorate of the Christian people in the East, to which, from the sympathies and the religion of the people, she was naturally entitled. And now, having so driven back Russia, we, the Western Nations of Europe, occupy her place to a certain extent, and to a certain extent, too, are bound to fulfil her obligations. I must confess I think it is an intolerable thing that the Western Nations of Europe, out of the jealousy which they bear to Russia, and perhaps out of the jealousy which they bear to each other, should deprive the Eastern Christians of their natural protectorate, and that they themselves should refuse to touch it with one of their fingers. I think it an intolerable thing that the Christians of the East should be left, under the pretext of neutrality, to be murdered by Bashi-Bazouks and Albanians. Every one of us must see that the dominion of Turkey has been maintained by our means, by our jealousies, by our advice, and by our determination that Russia should not exercise the protectorate which was natural under the circumstances of the case. Upon these grounds, and looking at the transactions which have taken place, and those in which we took part, supported as they were by all parties in this country—
  1530
  because although there was a difference of opinion whether we should go to war or not, there was no difference of opinion, except on the part of a small minority, that we were bound to resist the aggressions of Russia—under these circumstances, we are bound to consider such claims as I have brought before you with more than mere humane feelings for the sufferings which on such occasions are endured.
  But before I sit down there is another point to which I feel bound to call your Lordships' attention. No doubt an impression prevails at the present day—not merely in respect of one particular Government or of one Foreign Minister—that the Foreign Office of this country has during the past half century been somewhat too active in its interference with foreign affairs. I feel no interest in opposing this current of public feeling, and, indeed, to some extent I go along with it; but I could not help being amused by the serious air with which a very eminent foreign diplomatist informed me lately that in the 500 or 600 pages of diplomatic matter which he had to go through, in the course of the past year, the name of England had not occurred once. I confess I heard that statement with the greatest indifference. Where neither the interests nor the honour of England are concerned, I do not see why her opinion should be given, or her action required; but I trust that the Foreign Office will never shrink from defending to the utmost her honour and her interest where they are in any way imperilled. Let us not forget what we are going to do. We are about to bring the House of Commons into much closer relations with the great mass of the people. Ignorant and prejudiced men are in the habit of telling the people of this country that the past wars in which we have been engaged were the work of the aristocracy and of the upper classes—my Lords, there is not one of the wars, not even the most foolish or wicked in which this country has been engaged, which has not been at the time thoroughly popular. We are about to bring the House of Commons into closer connection with the masses, whose feelings are quicker, whose sympathies are warmer, and, shall I add—yes, I will add—and whose instincts sometimes are truer than those of the classes immediately above them. I shall be much mistaken and I shall be much disappointed if the change which we are about to undergo in the direction of democracy is to inaugurate a foreign policy

  1531
  founded upon pure selfishness. I believe, on the contrary, that you will find the masses of the people of this country quicker in both their anger and their sympathies than the class above them; and this I do say, that if you are to s found the doctrine of non-intervention upon secure grounds, and to guard it against the reaction which is sure to come, you must take care that your conduct shall not represent that policy as sacrificing the rights of others, and doing violence to the consciences and to the hearts of men.
  Moved, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for, Copy of a Note addressed to the Porte by the Three Powers Great Britain, France, and Russia on the 8th April, 1830.—(The Duke of Argyll.)
  THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords—The noble Duke has moved for papers which he plainly confesses are not of the slightest importance, as they are already in the Library of your Lordships' House, and can be referred to, and which fully record the transactions of the period, and all the events to which the noble Duke has referred. But I must confess that I was not prepared by the Notice which the noble Duke gave for the very discursive, though very able, address that he has just offered to your Lordships, and which it appears to me goes far beyond the question under immediate consideration—the affairs of Crete. The noble Duke has stated that it is his earnest desire to postpone, as far as possible, the agitation of the Eastern question; but if that be his desire he has not acted strictly up to his intentions, for I cannot conceive that any speech by a person holding the high position of the noble Duke would have a more direct effect in stimulating discussion of the Eastern question, and of forcing on and of rousing the passions of all parties, and creating a more hopeless antagonism, than the speech which the noble Duke has thought fit to address to you this evening upon the subject of the affairs of Eastern Europe. When the noble Duke so freely commented upon the course that Her Majesty's Government had pursued, I was in hopes that he was about to tell us what course he would recommend as to the affairs of Crete. So far as I can understand the noble Duke, he considers the obligations of the Great Powers are precisely contrary to what I consider them to be. He considers that the obligations of the Great Powers go to encourage the aspirations of nationalities and insurrections
  1532
  in all parts of the Turkish Empire. The noble Duke tells us that the Turkish Empire is falling into a state of decadence. It is possible it may be; but it is not the duty of the British Government to lend a hand to overthrow or precipitate its fall; it is, on the contrary, rather the duty of the British Government, if that fall is to take place, to make it as easy and gradual as possible; and perhaps the very last thing to be done is to point out in the British Parliament the defects of the Turkish Government, and thus to aggravate any instances of misgovernment on the part of the Turkish authorities, and to show unbounded sympathy for those who are in open revolt against the constituted authority of the country. The noble Duke should remember that one of the conditions upon which the kingdom of Greece was established as an independent State was this—that while every protection was to be given against re-action on the part of Turkey, in consequence of the transactions that had occurred, it was also laid down as a fundamental principle that the Great Powers of Europe would not tolerate for a moment any attack or invasion on the dominions of Turkey. They settled by the Act of 1830 that it was their determination not to tolerate any such attack or aggression? Now, what is this insurrection in Candia? I am not going to defend all the acts of the Turkish Government. I do not say that there has not been much oppression and much hardship sustained by the Cretan population; but this I am bound to say—that every report that we have had from the days of Consul Longworth down to the present time has declared and shown that the complaints of the Christian population have been greatly exaggerated, that many of them, as regards taxation, are without foundation, and that, in point of fact, Crete is the least heavily taxed portion of the Turkish dominions, and that if they have no roads it is because they object to pay a tax for the making of roads. I find that among the number of complaints in the petition addressed to the Sultan in May last—and no doubt there was some foundation for some of them—that there was injustice on the part of the Pashas. No doubt there were many acts of oppression committed by the Pashas; yet I venture to say that these things were done without the authority and against the will of the Turkish Government, and that moreover even these were greatly exaggerated. But does the

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  noble Duke mean to tell me that the removal of the grounds of these complaints is the real motive of the insurrection? No; at the very time when with all professions of loyalty to the Sovereign, they were praying humbly for the removal of these grievances; at that very time they were through other agents, addressing other Powers, and saying, "In these petitions we mean nothing; nothing will satisfy us but annexation to Greece—without that everything will be illusory." That was the real object of the Cretan population; nothing less would satisfy them than the dissolution of the ties that bind them to Turkey and annexation to Greece. The noble Duke did not confine himself to Crete; he talked of other provinces of Turkey, and the oppressions under which they were suffering. He has put himself forward as the friend of the injured, who, instead of appealing to the Government, or to the friendly offices of the Great Powers, have appealed to arms for the establishment of a Greek kingdom, and the Greeks all over the world are doing their best to light a flame throughout the Turkish dominions. What was the course of the Turkish Government on receiving that petition? The noble Duke says that for three months that petition was not answered. But when it was answered it was answered by sending over to Crete, with a message of peace and reconciliation, a man of singularly mild character, a man perfectly well known to the Cretans and who was very much attached to the population, over whom he had ruled for about thirty years. He went with his message of conciliation; he hoped that they would send in their grievances, and he promised to attend to them. He sent this message to those who were at that moment in arms, and by two chiefs who were prisoners of war, and whom he released for that purpose; but he accompanied it with a statement that so long as they remained in arms against the authority of their Sovereign it would be his imperative duty to put down rebellion with the strong hand, although at the same time he was perfectly ready to give a fair consideration to their complaints. That message was treated as a mockery; and the people in arms, instead of stating their grievances, betook themselves to the hills, and then defied the Governor of the country. What was he to do? Was he to abstain from putting down this revolt? It was his duty to assert the powers in-
  1534
  trusted to him, and to use them as far as he could with moderation and humanity. I must say that in the whole of these papers there is nothing to prove any allegation that he acted in any other manner, but everything to disprove any barbarity on the part of superior officers. The instances are numerous in which it is shown that prisoners were treated with the greatest possible kindness, and that the noble Duke fairly admits. It was no doubt a great misfortune that the Turkish Government did not confine themselves to the employment of Turkish regular troops instead of introducing into the island bands of irregulars—Albanians and Egyptians. I certainly believe that great atrocities were occasionally committed by them upon the Cretans; and, on the other hand, there is evidence equally strong of atrocities on the part of the Cretans against the Mussulmans, the similarity of which to those committed by the Turkish irregulars seems to suggest something like rivalry in outrage. During the progress of this insurrection nothing could be more difficult than to obtain accurate information as to the real facts of the case. It was almost impossible that any accounts could be more dissimilar and contradictory than those that were received day by day from Turkish and Greek sources, and those received from the Greek friends of the insurgents are greatly exaggerated. It is perfectly well known that the support of this Cretan insurrection came from Athens and Greece. It was thence that inflammatory papers were put forth; it was thence that lying statements were issued of splendid successes which were without foundation in fact; it was thence that supplies of ammunition, arms, volunteers, and every description of military provision were sent. I think it was unfortunate that the blockade by the Porte was so inefficient that it is notorious the Panhellion made I do not know how many trips, and over and over again landed volunteers, arms, and ammunition; and when the insurrection was on the point of being suppressed, with less cruelty and more humanity, perhaps, than any revolution ever was, the fresh arrivals of these volunteers gave fresh encouragement to the insurgents. This constant stream was poured in from Greece with the connivance of the Ministers—I do not say the King, for I must do him the justice to say that he endeavoured to do a painful and difficult task with the utmost good faith and fide-

  1535
  lity; but it is notorious that the leading men in the Greek Ministry were among the most active agents in forwarding of supplies. But for these constant supplies, and I am afraid I must say, but for language such as the noble Duke has made use of to-night, the insurrection would long since have been put an end to; and it is to them that is to be attributed in a great degree a large portion of the miseries that have befallen an unoffending population; it is owing to them that peace has not long since been restored to Candia, and that the Porte has not had an opportunity of carrying into effect those wise and judicious measures of pacification which have been pressed upon it by Her Majesty's Government in every despatch it has sent. In every one conciliation and moderate measures have been urged on the Porte; in every despatch to us the Porte has intimated its readiness and anxiety to fall in with our views as soon as it could put down armed insurrection. The very last paper in this book is a communication from Aali Pasha of the last firman, in which it is intimated that Server Effendi has been sent to Crete on a special mission; that he is instructed to make a faithful report on the actual condition of the island; that he is charged with conciliatory proposals to the inhabitants; and in particular with an invitation to them to send delegates to Constantinople to represent their wishes, wants, and grievances to the Porte. I do believe that it is the earnest desire of the Porte to deal equitably and impartially between the Mussulman and the Christian populations in Crete; but the fanaticism on the one side and the other, the feelings of mutual hostility and exasperation, render it extremely difficult for the most popular and benevolent Governor in Candia not only to keep down revolts of the Christians, but also to curb the fanaticism of the Mahomedans; and your Lordships may depend upon it that if you attempt to give encouragement and support in any form to the separation of Crete from the Turkish Empire, you encourage that which cannot take place without a war more sanguinary and envenomed than the Christian world has ever yet known. Scattered over the face of the island, there is a Christian population three times the number of the Mussulman population and, on the other hand, you have the Turks, proud of their superiority of race, possessed of all the important posts of the island, united in themselves, armed and
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  warlike. Do you believe that if all Europe were leagued against the Turks they would tamely submit to be expelled as a governing class from the island of Crete and subjected to the dominion of the King of Greece? The idea is preposterous. Does the noble Duke think it is our duty, does he think it is consistent with our obligations, to favour and support the separation of Candia from Turkey against the will of the Turkish Government? [The Duke of ARGYLL: No!] Well, I should like to know what is the course the noble Duke desires to recommend. He says he does not complain of the despatches nor of the course pursued; on the contrary, he says these are deserving of credit; he does not complain of the wishes and desires of the Turkish Government; he says they have displayed a spirit of humanity and conciliation, but he says that in a civil war some portion of the troops—the irregular troops—have committed atrocities which every human being would say are deeply to be deplored. Well, what is the issue? What have we recommended? We have given our advice to the Turkish Government, and have left the Turkish Government to deal with it as it may think fit. We have suggested such an autonomy in Candia as exists in Samos and Albania. But there is this distinction. In Samos the population is almost wholly Christian; in Crete it is mixed, in the proportion of three-fourths Christians and one-fourth Turks, which is a difficulty in the way of introducing an autonomy. We have suggested to the Turkish Government an autonomy as the means of restoring peace and order in Candia; but we have not thought ourselves at liberty to say to the Turkish Government that they shall act on our suggestion. We have offered them our advice as friends, but we do not feel ourselves justified in judging the internal regulations and government of Turkey. If we did, we should impose upon ourselves a hopeless task, and we should contravene the principles of International Law, and take a course inconsistent with the independence of Turkey. I do not say that Turkey is in the same position as many other countries. As European Powers we may have a right to offer advice, and, if necessary, even more than advice with regard to the treatment of some of the Christian subjects of the Porte; but to endeavour to persuade the Porte to sacrifice, to amputate from its Empire, a large and important colony, is to press

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  upon him that which Turkey will resist as long as she has a man to spare or breath to resist. If the noble Duke is desirous of raising that issue, he is raising the issue he professes to avoid—namely, the immediate and bloody renewal of the whole Eastern question. The only point on which the noble Duke found serious fault was the course adopted by Her Majesty's Government in refusing to give assistance to fugitives from Crete. As regards the action of the Foreign Office, I am sure no man ever came with deeper reluctance or greater pain to the discharge of that which he considered to be a duty imposed upon him by strict neutrality than did my noble Relative to the conclusion that he could not give aid to those fugitives. But, my Lords, he was bound to consider, and Her Majesty's Government was bound to consider, not only the sufferings of those fugitives, but what would be the effect of such interference as would be involved in giving them assistance. It was, as I have said, from Athens that this war was chiefly maintained. One of Her Majesty's ships conveyed from the coast of Crete a large body of persons, including some wounded men, but no doubt a majority of women and children; and had she continued taking fugitives to Athens and returning for fresh cargoes, in the excitement of Greece it would have been instantly said, "Here is intervention in favour of the Cretans," and we should have had the whole of Europe joining in a protest against intervention. The effect of any such encouragement given to the Cretans would have been that they would have said, "We will not for a moment relax our efforts. We see the prospect of ultimate success; we will persevere, notwithstanding all the miseries we inflict, with the satisfactory consciousness that these miseries, notwithstanding our prolongation of the war, are certain to be relieved and alleviated, and that the withdrawal of the non-combatants will leave the combatants in a better position than they were in before?" It was upon these considerations that my noble Relative felt himself bound to discharge the painful duty of disregarding the appeals that were made, and of refusing to put in the scale the sufferings of a certain number of individuals, and as against the serious consequences which would have arisen, and the evils which might have resulted to this country had he in the slightest degree taken such a part as would have been construed into actual support of the insur-
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  rection. It was a painful alternative to have to choose. I do not blame Lord Lyons for giving way to natural and humane instincts in assuming the responsibility of sending the Assurance to remove some fugitives; but my noble Relative was bound to act upon other considerations, and to see that nothing was done which could be regarded as an infringement of our neutrality; and, therefore, while he did not disapprove Lord Lyons' course of action under the circumstances, he sent out instructions against the renewal of proceedings which, however laudable and humane in their object, were calculated to create false hopes and expectations. I do not think that there can be any difficulty or embarrassment as to how we should act in the future. My noble Relative said—"The course you adopted has been considered an infringement of neutrality. We admit the difficulties in which you were placed, and, making all allowance for them, we do not disapprove your conduct in the present instance, but take care that it is not continued, because it may tend to increase the horrors and asperities of the war." Now, I do not wish to follow the noble Luke through the whole of the examination, which, with great labour, he has made of these despatches; and, indeed, I should not be competent to do so, unless called upon by your Lordships, because the noble Duke has admitted that the general course pursued by Her Majesty's Government has met with his approval, and that the advice we have given to Turkey is, on the whole, sound and humane; that we have not unduly interfered with the independence of the Turkish Empire, while we have not failed to press upon it the necessity of conciliatory measures towards those whose armed resistance they had put-down. The noble Duke does not say that the Turkish Government has shown any indisposition to act upon that advice; and I confess that, such being the case, I think I am absolved from entering upon any laboured examination of the various points which have been dwelt upon by the noble Duke. While I regret that the noble Duke finds it necessary to disapprove one particular part of the course we took after full consideration of the subject, under a most painful sense of duty, yet I rejoice that as regards the general course we pursued we have been happy enough to meet with the noble Duke's approval. And now one word as to the course pursued by the Turkish Government. I have already

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  stated that a great number of the atrocities reported to have been committed were grossly exaggerated, while many rumoured cases of cruelty were totally without foundation. There was one story, for instance, about 500 women being destroyed. Why, there was not a vestige of foundation for such a charge. [The Duke of ARGYLL: I did not mention that.] No; the noble Duke did not mention it, but it is stated in the blue book, and the noble Duke's remarks would-lead your Lordships to believe that the stories contained in this book, instead of being—at least some of them—a tissue of lies, are really entitled to the utmost credence. In mentioning one particular case the noble Duke laid very little stress upon it, but went on with the significant remark, "If these remarks are anything like the truth." Now, my Lords, many of them are nothing like the truth. That there have been excesses committed on both sides I do not deny, but they were committed against the wishes of the Turkish Government. And what has been the conduct of the Turkish Government? I should like to know whether there is an instance in history where an insurrection was put down with less loss of life, except in actual conflicts? Is there any other instance of the conquerors furnishing the vanquished with food, shelter, and raiment? The Turkish Government even sent away to their own country persons who, not being connected with Crete, had gone there for the purpose of promoting the insurrection; more than that, they sent their baggage with them. "What other country in the world would have acted so? I am sure that this country would not; and I do not believe that any country except Turkey would send back to their own country volunteers who had gone to assist the rebellion in Crete—would send them back with their arms and baggage and under the protection of Turkish troops. Then a general amnesty has been promised. Deputies have been invited to go to Constantinople, and lay before the Committee there the wrongs and the grievances of Crete. They will be listened to patiently, and I hope they will be dealt with kindly. It is our duty, as friends of Turkey, to encourage her and advise her, and to lose no opportunity of pressing on her how much it is for her own interest that she should pursue a conciliatory course. It is no part of our duty, and shall be no part of our policy, so long as I have a voice in the direction
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  of it, by means of exciting speeches, or by strong expressions of sympathy, or by coloured representations of the wrongs of the Christian populations in all the provinces of Turkey—in the Epirus, in Thessaly, and in the immediate neighbourhood of Greece—to encourage exaggerated hopes and expectations; and thereby to accelerate that which it may not be possible finally to avert—namely, the ruin of the Turkish Empire; for, if that is to happen, it is our duty to see that it takes place as gradually and as safely as possible.
  THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYsaid, the question raised by the noble Duke (the Duke of Argyll) involved considerations of foreign policy so important that he wished to make some remarks on the subject. The history of this Cretan affair might, in his opinion, be summed up very shortly. The Cretans were in much the same position as the Christians in the other Turkish provinces. Now, they not only addressed a petition of grievances to the Ottoman Government, but they likewise addressed a letter to the three protecting Powers, stating that-their object was to redress their grievances by means of separation from Turkey and annexation to Greece. That was the state of things which the Turkish Government had to deal with. Of course, it was impossible that a Christian Power should not feel a natural sympathy with the Christians in the Turkish dominions; but he maintained that the course to be taken by Her Majesty's Government could not be decided merely by considerations of sympathy, but by grave considerations of policy; and he could not help thinking that his noble Friend (the Duke of Argyll) had been to some extent carried away by his feelings when he spoke of the struggles by which the Greeks had achieved their independence. But if the noble Duke wished to persuade the House that the Government had not interfered sufficiently, there were other arguments which he was bound to bring forward. His noble Friend had referred to the Crimean war. He (the Earl of Kimberley) must say that we undertook that war in order that Turkey might be relieved of the undue pressure put upon her by Russia. In 1856 we obtained from the Porte distinct promises that it would treat its Christian subjects in a better manner than it had hitherto done, and it must be admitted that the Powers who signed the treaty had acquired a special right to remonstrate

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  with the Porte on that subject, and were justified in insisting that the treatment of those subjects should be consistent with the promises then made. But the case now under consideration was of a totally different kind. If we had interfered in this matter at all, we must have interfered between a Sovereign Power and its revolted subjects. In one of his despatches, Lord Stanley had distinctly stated that if there was one sovereign right more paramount than another it was that of asserting its power over its own subjects. There might be exceptions to that rule, but the Cretan insurrection was not one of them. The voice of humanity should be heard, but true humanity dictated that no expectations of assistance should be held out when it was impossible it could be given. It would have lowered the character of this country if such a course had been pursued. The course taken by the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office in this question had been, in his opinion, a wise and considerate course. If anything were needed to show that it would have been neither wise nor judicious to allow British I ships to convey women and children from Crete it was furnished by the papers before them; for it was clear that such a permission would have been regarded as a promise of active interference. In one of them it was stated that when an English vessel of war was sent to take the insurgents from the Island of Crete, ovations were given to our Consuls in Greece, and the people there would not be convinced that it was not a step in the direction of intervention on the part of England. We must not only consider what we meant ourselves in such cases, but also what other persons would suppose that we meant. He must say he thought the conduct of Consul Dickson was natural as far as it was directed to the protection of the women and children; but he was bound to add that he thought that Consul Dickson was imprudent in referring, as he had clone in his letter to Commander Pym, to the case of the foreign insurgents. He would ask his noble Friend (the Duke of Argyll), what would be the feeling of the people of England if the United States sent ships at this moment to the coasts of Ireland to remove any foreign insurgent volunteers who might be found there. We ought to apply to others the rule that we desired should be applied to ourselves. On looking at the circumstances impartially, he thought one must come to the conclusion
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  that the course adopted by Her Majesty's Government was the right one. With respect to our general policy in the East, he would observe that he believed the future was extremely dark. He thought no one could venture to say what would be the end of the troubles which from time to time were arising in that part of the world. It might be that the fall of the Ottoman Empire was approaching; or it might be that we should see what he should prefer to the sudden fall of so great an Empire, which, in all probability, would not occur without a bloody war throughout Europe—he meant the progress in civilization and independence of Christian populations, such as those of Roumania and Servia, so that they would be able to take a place by the side of Turkey. Either of those results might occur; but, in any event, he held it to be the duty of this country, while adhering to any engagements into which she had entered, not to take any steps which would prevent her in any emergency from adopting that course which might be best for her own interests and those of Europe.
  EARL GREYsaid, that he thought the noble Earl who had just spoken and the noble Earl at the head of the Government had been so successful in showing that there was no ground for finding fault with the Government for the course it had pursued that there was no occasion for his adding anything to what they had said on this point:—and painful as it must have been to refuse our assistance in conveying those women and children from the coast, he (Earl Grey) thought the Government had acted rightly in the matter. But he could not help expressing his opinion that though his noble Friend (the Duke of Argyll) had failed in showing the Government to have been wrong in this matter, he had yet succeeded in proving very satisfactory that the policy now acted upon was not very consistent with that which had been pursued at the time of the Crimean war. They had been then told that we entered into the Crimean war to maintain the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire; but that in doing so we took upon ourselves to protect the Christian populations from misgovernment at the hands of the Porte. He was glad to hear now on the high authority of his noble Friend (the Duke of Argyll) that our professing to maintain the "independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire" was a mere diplomatic phrase, which was not to

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  be understood in the ordinary sense of the word; because he had ventured from the first to say that in attempting to maintain the Ottoman Empire, and at the same time to prevent the oppression of its Christian subjects, we were undertaking a task beyond our strength. He believed with his noble Friend that the Empire of Turkey bore on its face the unmistakable signs of approaching dissolution, and that no efforts which we could make would be effective in keeping it together for any long time. He hoped they would not be. It ought not to be the policy of this country to keep alive such a government. He avowed his regret at seeing one of the fairest portions of Europe subjected to the barbarous government of the Turks; for wherever that Government prevailed civilization and the happiness of the people disappeared under its influence. On the other hand, it was not their business to interfere to regulate its affairs so far as its Christian subjects were concerned. These subjects were in a semi-barbarous state, and the whole question was so complicated that if this country were to interfere it would only be undertaking a task beyond its power to accomplish. In his opinion if we had acted less on feeling and more on calm consideration of what our policy ought to be it would have been better for ourselves and for Turkey, and for the Christian populations now ruled by the Porte. From the battle of Navarino down to the present time there had been too much interference in Turkish affairs. What had resulted from the Crimean war, in which we spent £100,000,000, which had cost the lives of 500,000 men, and which had produced an amount of distress in families which it was frightful to contemplate? That war, of which the professed object was the maintenance of the Turkish Empire, had by its results advanced probably by many years the inevitable day of its destruction. It had crippled the resources of Turkey, and every one admitted that since that war the Ottoman Empire had made gigantic strides to dissolution. What had we fought for? We were afraid of the preponderance of Russian rule. Well, he thought that if Russia had been let alone she might have made Turkey treat her Christian subjects better, but that there had existed any danger to us from Russia he utterly denied. But if there was we had only increased it by the policy we had pursued, for he could
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  not doubt that by the Crimean war we had increased Russian influence in the East, because that war had made the Christian populations—the advancing races—look upon Russia as their friend, and the Western Powers as their enemies. When he said that we had interfered too much in the East, and that our interference there had done harm instead of good, he did not wish to be understood to approve of that policy of mere selfishness on which it was now the fashion to insist under the name of "non-intervention." Far be it from him to say that we never should use our power for the protection of the weak against the strong. On the contrary, he regarded the great power we possessed as carrying with it great responsibilities. It was the interest of this country also as well as its duty to endeavour as far as possible to prevent the oppression of weak States and to maintain the cause of justice in Europe. We neglected to do that three years ago when we might have done it; and perhaps the youngest man among us would not live to see the last of the misfortunes which our policy on that occasion would produce.
  THE DUKE OF ARGYLL,in reply, said, his opinion was that a friendly communication might have been made by this country, through Lord Lyons, to the Porte, on the subject of the women and children whom we were asked to carry off the coast. He believed, if that had been done, no objection would have been made at Constantinople. He concurred with his noble Friend (the Earl of Kimberley) in thinking Consul Dickson had gone too far in interfering for the insurgent volunteers; but he could not admit that the case of a ship of the United States Government carrying away foreigners from Ireland was at all in point. There was no analogy between what was being done by this country in Ireland and what the Turks had been doing in Crete. Women and children were not in need of conveyance from the shores of Ireland. No one suspected that Irish women and children would be ill-treated by our troops. There was no argument so false as that founded on false analogy.
  Motion (by Leave of the House) withdrawn).

CASE OF THE "TORNADO."

  POSTPONEMENT OF MOTION.
  THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDE,who had given notice

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  "To inquire whether a Reply has been received from the Spanish Government to the Despatch of Her Majesty's Secretary of State, dated 8th February, relating to the Tornado and her Crew; and to move for further. Papers upon the Case of that ship,"
  said, he desired to postpone the Motion, and hoped that, on the day to which the matter would stand adjourned, the noble Earl at the head of the Government would not object to produce any fresh correspondence which might have taken place.
  THE EARL OF DERBYsaid, that in anticipation of a debate on this subject, he had brought down to their Lordships' House some further papers. He feared, however, it would not be possible to produce all the Correspondence up to the present, matters in Spain being in a state of such complete uncertainty. As soon as anything like a termination, or even a stopping point, was reached, he should be happy to do so.
  THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEsaid, that whether the papers were produced or not, he certainly should feel it his duty to go into the discussion on the subject. He very much approved the mode in which the Correspondence had been conducted by the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, but he thought the time had now arrived for something else.

THE MILITIA.—QUESTION.
EARL COWPER,in asking, Whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to increase the Period during which the Militia shall be assembled this Year for the annual Training, said, the subject was one which, in the face of the efforts making by all Continental nations, deserved and would receive a large share of the attention of the country, were this not concentrated on one all-absorbing topic. The question was coming on, and would have to be answered, how long England would be able to hold her own with her present military system. Everybody seemed to be agreed that the safeguard must be looked for in the militia. The Volunteers, although an admirable force, and useful in its way, never could be permanently embodied, because the men composing the force were men of daily avocations. He was glad to perceive that among the high authorities who had declared the necessity of maintaining and strengthening the militia force General Peel was included. The country, he was persuaded,
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would not grudge any expenditure which might be necessary for the purpose. One of the greatest difficulties which he experienced, and he believed it was the case with many lords-lieutenant of counties, was in officering the force. Sons of country gentlemen could not be procured in sufficient numbers, and a man who accepted a commission in a county with which he had nothing to do must be hard up for occupation. With a militia command there was too much to do to make it a pleasant occupation, like the Yeomanry, and too little to do to make it a permanent employment, like the army. The extension of time from the present limit of a month to six weeks would very greatly add to the efficiency of the force. No doubt men could badly spare the extra time; but if they could afford six weeks in the year that they were recruits, he did not see why they could not manage to be equally long under arms in other years.
THE EARL OF LONGFORDagreed that it was the duty of all concerned to promote by every means in their power the efficiency of the militia, and hoped the noble Earl would soon receive from competent gentlemen applications for the vacant commissions. He could only reply that the Estimates this year had been framed upon the usual plan, and there, was no intention of extending the time of the annual training of the militia.

PUBLIC SCHOOLS BILL—(No. 29.)
(The Earl of Derby.)
PUBLIC SCHOOLS BILL—(No. 29.)

  THIRD READING.
  Order of the Lay for the Third Reading read.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 3a."—(The Earl of Derby.)
  EARL MORLEYexpressed his regret that the Bill as it left this House should contain the restriction introduced last year. Governing bodies, they knew, whether educational or ecclesiastical, governors or trustees, were always unwilling to reform themselves; and yet the circumstances of the time being wholly different to those existing when these governing bodies were first appointed rendered some modifications absolutely necessary. The restriction, he believed, was calculated to impair the efficiency of the Commission itself, and very greatly calculated to neutralize the good effects of the other provisions of the Bill.
  THE EARL OF DERBYsaid, that he had last year been instrumental in introducing

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  the restriction complained of, and thought it inexpedient that the House of Lords should this year reverse its decision. At the same time, if a different view were taken in the House of Commons, he had no wish to make this a Government question, and if expunged in that assembly he should not feel it necessary to reinstate the clause, though he still believed it to be an improvement.
  EARL GRANVILLEaccepted with very great satisfaction the statement of the noble Earl. Very strong opinions had been expressed with regard to this restriction, and by no one more so than by his noble Friend the Earl of Clarendon, who originally introduced the Bill. It was the hope and expectation of the clause being expunged in the House of Commons that mainly led to its passing sub silentio through their Lordships' House. The very candid statement just made by the noble Earl would be of great use in discussing this matter elsewhere.
  Motion agreed to: Bill road 3a and passed, and sent to the Commons.
  House adjourned at a quarter before Eight o'clock, to Monday next, Eleven o'clock.