§ House in Committee (on Re-commitment) (according to Order).
§ Clauses 1 to 3 agreed to.
§ Clause 4 (No Action for Beer, &c., consumed on the Premises to be brought).
§ THE EARL OF ROMNEYsaid, that the object of this clause was, that no trader should be allowed to recover payment for beer or liquors of that sort consumed on the premises. He objected to the clause on the ground that it would open the door to frauds being committed by persons who might deliberately incur debts of this description with the express purpose of evading them, and it would be most unjust to the trailer that he should be left without a remedy. The object of the clause was, he presumed, to protect persons against their inclination to drink, but he thought it was a mistake to attempt to do that by treating men as children. We did not protect young men in the army, in the navy, and in the colleges against themselves in that way. He moved the omission of the clause.
THE LORD CHANCELLORobserved, that his noble Friend who moved the Amendment seemed to think that the principle of this clause was a new one; but as long ago as the reign of George II. an Act was passed to prevent persons from recovering for the sale of wine and spirits in cases where the quantity purchased did not come to 20s., and the present clause only extended this wholesome provision to the consumption of malt, liquor, cider, and the like drinks. It was the duty of the landlord to exercise due caution in trusting none but persons of whose respectability he was assured, while a great check would be put upon the habits of excessive tippling by making it necessary that the expense should be paid at once, instead of being deferred. There was no greater temptation to the poor man who might be inclined to drink than to feel that the day of reckoning was put off. The trader would always be safe with respectable customers. The persons who would get 1930 into his debt for drink consumed on the premises were just those against whom it would be well not to give him a right of recovery.
§ LORD CRANWORTHsaid, that the object of the clause was simply to extend the Tippling Act to beer and cider.
§ Amendment negatived.
§ Clause amended, and agreed to.
§ Clauses 5 to 9 agreed to.
§ Clause 10 (Court may try Cases where Title comes in question, where neither Value nor Rent of Property exceeds £20).
§ LORD CAIRNSsaid, he did not object to the County Courts having jurisdiction in cases of ejectment where the amount did not exceed £20; but it often happened that such action would determine the right to other large properties, the validity of a will, and questions of legitimacy and marriage; and he would therefore suggest the addition of the following Proviso:—
Provided that the Defendant in any such Action of Ejectment, or his Landlord, may, within One Month from the Day of Service of the Writ, apply to a Judge at Chambers for a Summons to the Plaintiff to show Cause why such Action should not be tried in One of the Superior Courts on the Ground that the Title to Lands or Hereditaments of greater annual Value than Twenty Pounds would be affected by the Decision in such Action; and on the Hearing of such Summons the Judge, if satisfied that the Title to other Lands would be so affected, may order such Action to be tried in One of the Superior Courts, and thereupon all Proceedings in the County Court in such Action shall be discontinued.
§ Amendment agreed to.
§ Clause, as amended, agreed to.
§ Clauses 11 to 18, inclusive, agreed to.
§ Clause 19 (Trustees may pay Trust Monies or transfer Stock and Securities into the Court of Chancery, 10 & 11 Vict. c. 96.)
§ LORD CAIRNSsaid, that the clause proposed to give to the Registrars of County Courts the custody of trust monies of small amounts, over which the Courts would in future exercise administrative powers. But he would suggest to his noble and learned Friend whether this was desirable. He desired to speak with the greatest respect of these officers; but when appointed it was not contemplated that they were to have the custody of large sums of money; and, inasmuch as these monies, though restricted in individual 1931 cases to £500, would be large in the aggregate, it might be that the securities required of the registrars might be inadequate. He thought the better course would be that the money should be paid in to the credit of the Accountant General of the Court of Chancery, but that the power of making orders for its distribution should remain as proposed with the Judges of the County Courts. The investment of the money must always take place in London, so that practically no difficulties would arise.
THE LORD CHANCELLORagreed with his noble and learned Friend as to the propriety of the quarter to which he proposed to intrust the funds. The difficulty arose originally, he believed, from a feeling on the part of the Accountant General that he was properly responsible only for monies belonging to the Court of Chancery; and some machinery would be necessary to overcome this formal difficulty.
§ Clause agreed to.
§ Clauses 20 to 23 agreed to.
§ Clause 24 (Repeal of so much of 3 & 4 Vict. c. 110 as enables Loans to be recovered before Justices.)
§ LORD CAIRNSsaid, the subject involved in it, that of imprisonment for debt, must ere long come under the serious consideration of their Lordships. At present, imprisonment for debt, under process from the Superior Courts, was almost abolished. Acts of Parliament, curtailing the power of imprisonment for debt, and providing for the speedy release of debtors, had so operated that the power of imprisonment was practically gone; and, if he mistook not, before long their Lordships would be asked to apply the finishing stroke, and abolish imprisonment for debt altogether. But in the meanwhile there remained in very active operation a system for imprisonment for debt in the County Courts for debts under £50 recovered therein, and for debts under £20 recovered in Superior Courts. With regard to this class of debts, it was said that the parties who contracted them had generally speaking no property, that they earned wages, and that the only means of recovering debts from them was the power of imprisonment possessed by the County Courts. To render the power more palatable to the public, he supposed, it was euphoniously called a committal for contempt of court; but the only contempt committed was the non-payment of the money, and therefore, however disguised, 1932 it was simply a power of imprisonment for debt. But the absurdity of the power was this—that the only property of the persons imprisoned consisted of the wages which they earned, and in order to encourage them to earn they were shut up in prison, and their creditors, themselves, their wives, and families deprived of the only money which they could possibly acquire. He trusted their Lordships would consider this question either on a future stage of the present Bill, or on the question of altering the law of bankruptcy. It had always seemed to him to be a blot in the English system that persons contracting large debts should be free from imprisonment, or free to a certain extent, while imprisonment should be continued in the case of those whose only means of payment, as well as of supporting their families, depended entirely on their not being imprisoned.
THE LORD CHANCELLORthought it would be inconvenient to continue the discussion on this occasion. When the subject was previously discussed by their Lordships on the occasion of a Bill introduced by Lord Westbury, circulars were sent to the County Court Judges for their opinions as to the expediency of abolishing the power of imprisonment; and only two of them were in favour of the abolition. The subject required full consideration. He understood that the Judges awarded imprisonment only where the defendants would not pay although they had the power. Take away the power of imprisonment, they said, and we might as well shut up the County Courts altogether.
§ LORD CRANWORTHpointed out that the order to imprison recited that the punishment was inflicted only because the debtor had means to pay and would not.
§ LORD CAIRNSsaid, he was glad his noble and learned Friend had mentioned this because it illustrated still further the absurdity of the practice. These recitals were not warranted by the facts. The only means a man had apart from his labour must be his property, and since the law provided ample means for getting at a debtor's property, the recital of a County Court order for imprisonment could only relate to the debtor's labour; and as the order prevented the utilization of this labour, the law defeated its end. He knew that the County Court Judges had replied almost unanimously against the abolition of their power of imprisonment; but as for the argument that County Courts might be shut up if the power were abolished, he 1933 said that if it meant that County Courts would be virtually closed to the prosecutors of actions for debt, the country would gain; no cause of action would arise, because credit would not be given, and ready money payments would be the order of the day, to the advantage of the sellers, and buyers as well.
THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, that they had drifted into a discussion of a great question. He objected to depriving a man of the privilege of getting credit, and thought that it was better to punish a man by depriving him of his liberty, even at the sacrifice of his labour, than that his property, which would, of course, consist only of his furniture, should be seized, to the great oppression of a debtor's wife and children.
§ Clause agreed to.
§ Clauses 25 to 27 agreed to.
§ Lord CRANWORTH and the LORD CHANCELLOR moved the addition of several new clauses, which were agreed to, and added to the Bill.
§ The Report of the Amendments to be received on Friday next; and Bill to be printed as amended. (No. 156.)