Lords Sitting of 15 July 1867

MINUTES.
SELECT COMMITTEE—On Vaccination, The Earl of Shaftesbury and Earl De Grey added.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Trades Union Commission Act (1867) Extension* (225); Barrack Lane, Windsor (Rights of Way)* (226).
Second Reading — Local Government Supplemental (No. 5)* (221).
Committee — Inclosure (No. 2)* (158); Trusts (Scotland)* (195).
Report—Trusts (Scotland)* (195).
Third Reading—Pier and Harbour Orders Confirmation (No. 2)* (187); Real Estate Charges Act Amendment*(191); Public Records (Ireland)* (210); Court of Appeal Chancery (Despatch of Business)* (215), and passed.
Royal Assent—Chester Courts [30 & 31 Vict. c. 36]; Public Libraries (Scotland) Acts Amendment [30 & 31 Vict. c. 37]; Metropolitan Police [30 & 31 Vict. c. 39]; Bunhill Fields Burial Ground [30 & 31 Vict. c. 38]; Houses of Parliament [30 & 31 Vict. c. 40]; National Gallery Enlargement [30 & 31 Vict. c. 41]; Hypothec Amendment (Scotland) [30 & 31 Vict. c. 42]; Drainage and Improvement of Lands (Ireland) Supplemental [30 & 31 Vict. c. 43]; Statute Law Revision [30 & 31 Vict. c. 59]; Vice Admiralty Courts Act Amendment [30 & 31 Vict. c. 45]; Lis Pendens [30 & 31 Vict. c. 47]; Sale of Land by Auction [30 & 31 Vict. c. 48]; County Treasurers (Ireland) [30 & 31 Vict. c. 46]; Court of Chancery (Ireland) [30 & 31 Vict. c. 44]; British White Herring Fishery [30 & 31 Vict. c. 52]; Land Tax Commissioners Names [30 & 31 Vict. c. 51]; Bridges (Ireland) [30 & 31 Vict. c. 50]; Local Government Supplemental (No. 3) [30 & 31 Vict. c. 49]; Lunacy (Scotland) [30 & 31 Vict. c. 55]; Limerick Harbour (Composition of Debt [30 & 31 Vict. c. 53]; Charitable Donations and Bequests (Ireland) [30 & 31 Vict. c. 54]; Pier and Harbour Order Confirmation
1492
(No. 3) [30 & 31 Vict. c. 61]; Galway Harbour (Composition of Debt) [30 & 31 Vict. c. 56]; Blackwater Bridge [30 & 31 Vict. c. 57]; Linen and other Manufactures (Ireland) [30 & 31 Vict. c. 60]; Edinburgh Provisional Order Confirmation [30 & 31 Vict. c. 58].

ARMY—MARCH OF TROOPS TO HOUNSLOW.—QUESTION.
EARL DE GREYsaid, he rose to ask the noble Earl the Under Secretary for War a Question, of which he had given him private notice, relating to the conduct of the officers who commanded the troops that recently marched from Aldershot to Hounslow to attend the proposed review in Hyde Park. He understood that rumours were abroad that a certain degree of blame attached to these officers, and particularly to the General officer commanding the brigade for moving the troops at too early an hour in the morning. He hardly expected to hear from one who had had so much military experience as the noble Earl that any officer was to blame for moving his troops early in the morning in hot weather. He believed that that was in accordance with the regulations of the service, and it was the proper course to adopt during the months of summer. Then it was said that the officer in command should have supplied the troops with rations before starting, and that it was frequently the custom so to do. The noble Earl would be able to tell him whether this was really the case—whether there was any regulation in the service to that effect—or whether the practice was sufficiently general that an officer should be censured who had neglected that duty? He should further like to know from the noble Earl whether it was true that a Staff officer had been sent to Hounslow in advance of the troops to make arrangements, and had found on arriving that no Commissariat officer was there. It was quite right that those who were in fault should be reprimanded, but it was unfair that aspersions should be cast on those who had not deserved them.
THE EARL OF LONGFORDsaid, this march had become almost as famous as the march of the Guards to Finchley; but the illustrations of the period show refreshments on the Finchley road, which appear to have been wanting at Hounslow. The facts were these:—On the 25th of June a brigade of cavalry was ordered to march from Aldershot to Hounslow Heath on the 3rd of July, and after having taken part in the proposed review in Hyde Park, to return on the following Saturday, the 6th. Instructions

1493
were at the same time sent to the Deputy Commissary General in London to supply the troops during their stay at Hounslow with rations and forage. It appeared that troops on moving from Aldershot sometimes drew their rations for the day before they started, consuming part and taking the rest with them. It was, however, not unusual for troops to wait for their rations until they finished their march. In this case, the Deputy Commissary General, although he had a week's notice of the march, made no inquiry, but assumed that the troops would be supplied before starting. He, consequently, made preparations at Hounslow to issue rations on the 4th, not on the 3rd; and when a Staff officer was sent from Aldershot, on the evening of the 2nd, to communicate with the Deputy Commissary General, who, it was expected, would be at Hounslow, he found that his mistake and consequent absence had overthrown all arrangements, and that no preparations had been made for the next day. Under these circumstances the Staff officer did his best—telegraphed to the proper authorities, obtained the assistance of a subordinate Commissariat Officer, and in the course of the day the supplies were obtained. The march from Aldershot was commenced at a proper hour, and nothing, as far as the reports went, could have been more regular than the proceedings of the officers at Aldershot. All that could be said was that there had been a blunder on the part of a Commissariat officer; and the Secretary for War had marked his sense of the Deputy Commissary General's conduct by removing him from his appointment. He hoped it would be understood that there had been no conflict of authority between the Horse Guards and the War Office, and no conflicting or contradictory orders between Departments, nor that the Commissariat Department was in any way deficient or incapable of carrying out any duties that might be imposed upon it. Indeed, the fact that the department was for some years more or less under the control of the noble Earl (Earl de Grey) was a pledge for its efficiency.
THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGEsaid, he had no desire to throw blame on any department of the War Office for what had occurred, nor on the Commissariat Department in particular; but what had occurred certainly reflected no credit on it. When it was found that, owing to the neglect of an officer connected with the Department, a body of troops had been left
1494
for some time without provisions within ten miles of London, certainly some inquiry was necessary. He could not conceive how the Deputy Commissary General could offer such an excuse as he had made. His simple duty was to carry out his orders, and on the 25th of June the following instructions were sent to him by the Horse Guards:—
"The undermentioned troops (giving the number and description of them) will be encamped on Hounslow Heath on Wednesday, the 3rd prox., and will return to Aldershot on Saturday, the 6th idem., and it is requested that the necessary arrangements may be made for the issue of rations and forage to the men and horses during their stay at Hounslow Heath."
Nothing could be more plain, clear, and simple. This was eight days before the march; and on the 28th another letter was addressed to him, notifying him of an alteration in the numbers of the troops. No instructions could have been more explicit, and his excuse was, he must say, perfectly ridiculous. How an officer like the Deputy Commisary General could say that he did not know that the troops would require supplies at Hounslow he was at a loss to comprehend. He could not allow any blame to rest upon the officers commanding the troops, who had simply done their duty. There was nothing unusual in marching troops early in the morning—if he were to find any fault at all it would father be for the lateness of the hour at which they were sent—particularly in the summer, when there were 1,200 men to encamp, and there was a distance of twenty-six miles to march. Then it had been said that the Commissariat ought to have been made acquainted with the hour at which the troops were to arrive. In his opinion, that was not necessary. When due notice was given of the march of troops it was the business of the Commissariat to have everything prepared by the time the men arrived. If the Commissariat officer could not do so he was quite unfitted for the position. The rations ought to have been ready. As for troops taking their rations with them, he had asked general officers and colonels commanding regiments what they thought of it, and their answer was that they had never heard of such a thing in the whole course of their experience. If troops ever took their rations with them the circumstance was entirely exceptional. He contended, therefore, that no blame of any sort attached to the officers commanding the troops. He hoped that it would be understood not only by that House, but by the public generally,

1495
that the General officer commanding the brigade and the officers commanding the regiments in question did everything they ought to do to carry out the instructions which they had received. The fact was the Commissariat officers in London ought not to be attached to the War Office at all, but to the Horse Guards, exactly as were the Commissariat officers at Dublin, Portsmouth, and elsewhere. If that had been the case the Commissariat officer could have come to the Horse Guards and been instructed directly and promptly; but being attached to the War Office, it was impossible that the military authorities could have that frequent communication with him which might be necessary. He quite admitted it was proper that the Commissary General should be attached to the War Office, but the Deputy Commissary General in London ought, as he said, to be attached to the Horse Guards, and if that were done, it would be almost impossible to have a repetition of what had occurred in this instance.
THE EARL OF CARDIGANsaid, he had never heard of troops being expected to carry their rations with them on the march, except under very extraordinary circumstances. Though the Deputy Commissary officer was to blame for what had occurred, and had been very properly removed from the London district, one thing struck him and it was this—if the officer commanding the brigade determined to march from Aldershot at an unusually early hour—and the earlier in the summer months the better—it would have been well that some Staff officer should have written a letter or some messenger have been sent to say such was his intention.
THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGEsaid, that an officer was sent by the General commanding, and when he arrived at Hounslow there was no Commissariat officer of any description there to whom he could apply, and the answer he got was to that effect.
THE EARL OF CARDIGANagreed with the illustrious Duke that it was quite clear that the fault lay with the Commissariat officer.
LORD REDESDALEsaid, he did not wish to express any opinion of his own upon the subject, but he had been requested by Major-General Lord Henry Percy to state what he knew and felt with regard to the gentleman who had been so much blamed in this matter. Lord Henry Percy wrote to this effect—
"He served under me when I was organizing
1496
the Italian Legion (at the time of the Crimean war), and I can testify to his energy and efficiency under very difficult and unpleasant circumstances. If I were ordered upon any expedition, he is the man I should select to take with me."

METROPOLIS—THE LONDON WATER SUPPLY.—OBSERVATIONS.
LORD DE MAULEYrose to call the attention of the House to the expediency of supplying water to the metropolis from the superfluous water of the upper part of the Thames. The noble Lord was understood to say that he confined his observations altogether to the upper part of the Thames, because it appeared to him to be the natural store-house for the wants of the metropolis. That water-shed extended over 875 square miles, the supply it afforded was practically unlimited; the water was also of excellent quality. Under these circumstances, there was no excuse for the defective arrangements at present in force for supplying the inhabitants of London with that great necessary of life.
THE DUKE OF RICHMONDsaid, that Her Majesty's Government had regarded the subject as of sufficient importance to issue a Royal Commission in the early part of the year, and he had the honour to preside over the Commission, which was composed of four gentlemen who were perfectly competent to enter into the inquiry. The Commission had sat from time to time since February, and had examined a great number of scientific witnesses, but had not yet been able to draw up a Report, as it had been necessary to wait for the analysis of certain water collected in different parts of England, in consequence of schemes to draw water to London from Wales and elsewhere. The question of procuring a supply from the upper waters of the Thames had not been lost sight of, and in course of time he hoped that, after digesting the voluminous evidence which had been offered, embracing a good deal of scientific testimony, the Commission would be able to embody their opinions in a unanimous Report upon this important subject.

NEW ZEALAND—WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS.—ADDRESS FOR A RETURN.
THE EARL OF CARNARVON, in moving an Address for a Return of the Regiments in New Zealand since the 1st of January 1865, and the Dates of their Embarcation, said: I bring this subject forward with no intention of embarrassing the action of Her Majesty's Government in this matter. Personally, indeed, I should have preferred

1497
not to bring it forward; but the answer of the noble Duke the Secretary of State for the Colonies on a late occasion, and the unsatisfactory position of the question, induce me to trouble your Lordships in this matter. Your Lordships will remember that when my noble Friend (Lord Lyttelton) raised this question on a former occasion the noble Duke the Colonial Secretary urged him to postpone the matter on public grounds, and after some demur my noble Friend agreed to do so. I considered the whole matter very carefully, and I came to the conclusion, from my recollection of the transaction, that there must be some mistake, and that the public service could not be prejudiced by the discussion my noble Friend would have invited. Accordingly, a few nights afterwards I pressed the noble Duke for some reason why discussion should be postponed; and he replied that there were no more papers to be issued on the subject—which I think hardly applies to the question—and repeated that the Motion would be prejudicial. No one pays more regard to the plea of public convenience than I do, but I must be allowed to say that there is a broad difference between public inconvenience and inconvenience which apparently is rather personal to the Minister. In bringing forward this question I must ask the House first of all to remember the change which has of recent years taken place in our relations with the colony of New Zealand. It has been a very great one, and has amounted to the surrender of the control of the Home Government over the Native population and Native policy. That change dates further back than perhaps many are aware. It owes its origin to the New Zealand Constitution Act of 1852—an Act which, by-the-by, was premature and unfortunate in a good many provisions. Up to that time the Crown had exercised undisputed authority over the affairs of New Zealand. That Act substantially transferred the power over Native policy from the Governor, as the representative of the Crown, to the colonial authorities in New Zealand. I say it "substantially transferred the power," because there was still left a shadow of authority and of power, which, however, acted as a source of jealousy, irritation, and of difference, between the Governor on the one hand and the colonial authorities on the other. During the short time I was connected with the Colonial Office in 1859, like every one else, I became aware how difficult the Constitution
1498
was to work in this particular respect. But when the late Duke of Newcastle became Secretary of State, the then Governor of New Zealand, feeling this difficulty, wrote and recommended the formation of a Crown Council, to consist in part of representatives of the Crown and in part of representatives of the colony, with a view to strengthen the hands of the Crown in the management of Native affairs. The Duke of Newcastle fell in with that proposal, and he embodied the recommendation in a Bill which passed your Lordships' House, but which in the Commons was subsquently lost, upon grounds which were afterwards endorsed and re-affirmed very warmly by the colony. It seems after this to have been felt by the Duke of Newcastle that it was hopeless to expect support in this respect either from the House of Commons or from the colony. At the same time the position of affairs was a very inconvenient one, because, on the one hand, we were maintaining a large military force, and on the other the colonists were really directing our policy as regards the Natives—that is to say, the conditions of war or peace rested with the colonists, but it was incumbent upon us if war ensued to carry it on. As a matter of fact, war did ensue before very long; and Sir George Grey was, I think, almost immediately sent out as Governor. One of the first acts of Sir George Grey was to inform the Duke of Newcastle that he could not govern the colony in respect of Native affairs, except, through the medium of his responsible advisers; and he even went further and said he had communicated that conclusion to his own local advisers. Unless Sir George Grey had been then and there disavowed it was obvious that he had committed this country and the Home Government to the surrender of our control over Native policy; but as a matter of fact the Duke of Newcastle acquiesced in Sir George Grey's proceeding, and in the completest terms. Perhaps it is worth while to quote the language of his despatch, dated May 26, 1862—
"I am ready to sanction the important step you have taken in placing the management of the Natives under the control of the Assembly. I do so partly in reliance on your own capacity to perceive, and your desire to do, what is best for those in whose welfare I know you are so much interested. But I do it also because I cannot disguise from myself that the endeavour to keep the management of the Natives under the control of the Home Government has failed. It can only be mischievous to retain a shadow of responsibility when the beneficial exercise of power has become impossible."

1499
He proceeds to say—what is very important with reference to what subsequently occurred—
"I cannot hold out to you any hopes that a large military force will for any length of time be kept in New Zealand. It is for the colonists themselves to provide such a military police force as will protect their out-settlers. If it is not worth while to the colony to furnish such protection, it would seem to follow that it is not worth while to retain these out-settlements. You must therefore expect, though not an immediate, yet a speedy and considerable diminution of the force now employed."
So long as the war lasted, and a large number of troops remained in the colony, it was obvious that the Governor could, indirectly and morally, retain a certain voice in the management of affairs; but, by-and-by, it came to an end, and Mr. Cardwell succeeded to the Colonial Office. He adopted the policy of the Duke of Newcastle entirely, and he made in substance the following proposals to colonists: — First, that we should withdraw a large portion of our force; second, that we should leave a portion on the condition that it would be paid for by the colonists at the same rate as are paid by the Australian colonies and thirdly, that one regiment — namely, the 18th — should remain in the colony free of all charge to the colonists upon condition that they appropriated a sum of £50,000 a year for the benefit and improvement of the Native race. A portion of the troops were as a matter of fact withdrawn; the colonists declined to make the Australian capitation payment for the troops that remained, and the only point therefore which remained was the detention of the 18th Regiment in the colony. I am not aware that there is any serious difficulty on that point. At all events, it is a question of detail which might be adjusted. That was the position of affairs when I succeeded to the office of Secretary for the Colonies. I found a large body of troops still retained in New Zealand. I found that my predecessor had re-called those troops by positive orders, and I determined to insist upon their withdrawal with the least possible delay. I accordingly issued instructions to which I will presently refer. The despatch in which I issued them has been a good deal criticized and subjected to considerable misinterpretation. I may therefore be allowed to notice the principal points in respect of which it has been misunderstood. First, it is said I gave instructions that the 18th Regiment was to be kept under orders to embark at the earliest notice. I am at a loss to
1500
understand how that interpretation could by any one who attentively read the despatch, be placed upon my words; and I hope that I settle this part of the question by assuring your Lordships that it is a complete misunderstanding. I never had any intention to place them under orders to embark so long as the colonists should adhere to the condition of appropriating £50,000 a year for the improvement of the Native race. The second misunderstanding is that I am supposed to have said that the 18th Regiment must remain in New Zealand, not to be useful to the colony, but to be handy for removal elsewhere should its services be required. I am again at a loss to understand how any one reading my despatch carefully can suppose I ever said anything of the sort; and I have only on this point to assure the House that here there is altogether a misconception. In the third place, it was charged against me that I had directed that the 18th Regiment should be withdrawn from outpost duty and concentrated for garrison duty in the principal towns of the colony. I am bound to say that this charge is perfectly true; I did give these instructions, and I fully intended them to be carried out, and that every man in Her Majesty's service should be withdrawn from outpost duty, and concentrated in the principal centres of population. That was Mr. Cardwell's view as well as my own, and I think it was a right one; because from the moment you had really abandoned all control over Native policy it was right that the Crown should be released from the responsibility which had previously accompanied its rights; otherwise you would be in a false position. It seemed to me that in order to guard the frontier against semi-civilized races you needed not Her Majesty's troops, but such a police as you have at the Cape. I could not blind myself to the fact that the colony had entered upon a large policy of land confiscation. I do not want now to say anything for or against it; I only wish to observe there was that policy. If it was to be carried out it was clearly better it should be carried out by a force responsible to the Colonial Government, and not by Her Majesty's troops. I cannot think it was in any way a desirable service for regular troops to be employed in. Lastly, I ought to say I have always understood that it is injurious to military discipline that a regiment should be broken up into small detachments for these police duties. That is my answer to the third

1501
charge. But there is yet another charge which, may be said to include almost everything else. It is said that, failing to get these troops brought home by the ordinary methods, I took the extraordinary step of transferring the power over their disposition from Sir George Grey, the Governor, to the commanding officer, General Chute. Now, it is quite true that I did transfer that power knowingly, and after full reflection, I am quite aware that it was a serious and unusual course; but in my judgment, there was no alternative open to me; I felt that it was desirable, in the interests of this country, to recall these troops; I remembered the pledges which had been given to Parliament on this subject; I saw how useless every other effort to bring them home had been, and I think that, if I had not adopted the course I did, the troops would have remained in New Zealand up to the present time. If I were to go into all the propositions and counter-propositions, the various changes and details of this long transaction, I should be taxing too much the patience of the House, I will therefore, in general outline only, place before your Lordships the state of the case. In February, 1865, there were ten regiments stationed in New Zealand, a war having just ended in which two or three thousand natives had been in arms. Mr. Cardwell issued two sets of Orders for the recall of nine of these regiments; and if I read to your Lordships the dates of the Orders, and the dates of the embarcations of the different regiments, I shall best be able to show how these Instructions were carried out, and the position in which I personally was placed. The first Order issued by Mr. Cardwell was dated the 27th of February, and ought therefore to have been received by Sir George Grey about the end of April. Nevertheless, five months elapsed after the latter date before a single regiment was removed. At the expiration of that period one regiment—which, by the way was, I think, a weak battalion, only some 200 or 300 strong—was despatched from the colony. Three months more elapsed, and then, on the 2nd of January, 1866, another regiment was sent off. Then two months more passed over before another regiment was sent away. There were other delays—the first of one month and the second of two months — before the last of the regiments recalled under these Instructions sailed for England—that is to say, it took about fourteen months to bring home the five regiments ordered to be
1502
embarked under the first set of Instructions. The second set of Instructions may be said to date from the 26th of October and the 27th of November, 1865 — for though different in details they agree substantially in the conclusions which they were intended to enforce—and they must have been received about the end of January, 1866. The purport of these Instructions was to send home four regiments and to leave one regiment in the colony upon certain conditions. Eight months, however, were allowed to pass away before a single man was despatched in pursuance of that Order. It was not till the 3rd of October, 1866, that the first regiment sailed. On the 15th of October a second regiment was despatched; but the third regiment did not sail till April, 1867. Thus, in fact, nearly fifteen months, after the receipt of the despatch in the colony, were occupied in carrying out the Instructions given by the Secretary of State, Indeed, those Instructions have never been fully carried out, for there remains one regiment in New Zealand in excess of what ought to have remained there. Under such circumstances I do not think that any one can say that I acted precipitately. It may, however, be fair to Sir George Grey to state that, in January last year, he wrote to the Secretary of State, stating that he had recommended General Chute to send home the troops at the rate of one regiment every two months. My answer however to that is that this proposal was unauthorized; and without the sanction of the Secretary of State; next, that that advice was given to General Chute on the ground of military expediency; but that General Chute—whose opinion on purely military matters, must necessarily be preferred—denied that there was any necessity for such a step. Therefore, I was in this position—I had before me repeated despatches from my predecessor, ordering the troops to be sent home; I saw that those Instructions had produced little visible effect, and that delays had arisen, first from one cause, and then from another; I saw that Sir George Grey was engaged in the same hopeless variances with General Chute as he had been with General Chute's predecessor, General Cameron; I perceived, on the other hand, that General Chute was anxious to obey the Instructions which he received from his military superiors. I had before me a letter written by General Chute to Sir George Grey, and printed in the last issue of Parliamentary Papers, complaining that

1503
he had already addressed three separate communications at considerable intervals of time to him with regard to the removal and disposition of certain troops, and had received no answer to any one of those communications. That letter was dated the 26th of July, and the House will find some difficulty in believing that Sir George Grey seems to have allowed nearly three months to elapse before he answered this letter. I had also before me repeated communications describing the affairs of the colony. I had, for instance, the following letter written by the Deputy Commissary General to the Secretary of the Treasury on the 8th of November, 1866:—
"I would wish to draw particular attention to the actual state of affairs in the colony at this moment. 1st, Imperial troops are retained in the colony although no appropriation has been made by the colony for them; 2nd, a portion of the troops are actively engaged in an aggressive warfare at an increased expense to the Imperial treasury; 3rd, another and a large portion is still dispersed over the colony, defending lands confiscated from the rebels. No one can foresee an end to the petty desultory war now being waged in the colony, and it is alleged that it occasions a necessity for the employment of Imperial troops as described; but as colonial forces are not enrolled in numbers sufficient to replace Imperial troops, even in their present diminished numbers, it results that Imperial troops may possibly be retained in the colony contrary to orders for an indefinite time; and it is to be observed that the colony not only omits to contribute to the support of these troops, employed on colonial service, but calls upon the Imperial commissariat to ration the colonial forces. … All these orders notwithstanding, confiscated lands are still being protected in various parts of the colony by Imperial troops; the troops are not concentrated as directed, and the cost of inland transport is made to bear heavily upon the Imperial Treasury."
Now, I do not found my course of action upon this one letter, or upon any one single letter such as this. I had rather to take into account a variety of such communications and considerations, and knowing what I desired and believed to be necessary, to adopt such measures as were conformable to that opinion. And I must again remind the House that the colony was engaged in a large policy of land confiscation. Without saying whether such a policy was right or wrong, it was, at all events, a policy which was not unlikely to lead to disturbances, and I was apprehensive lest fresh difficulties, and perhaps a fresh outbreak, might occur which would result in an indefinite postponement of the withdrawal of the troops. Nor could I close my eyes to the fact that one Colonial Minister, if not more, had used very strong terms in favour of
1504
the reduction of the colonial forces. I have no fault to find with such language; but at the same time, it is perfectly obvious that that reduction of the colonial forces would proceed far more easily if Her Majesty's troops were maintained in the colony. Under these circumstances, I came to the decision which I have stated to the House, and withdrew the troops in the manner which I have described. I think I am justified by the result of that course of proceeding, for if your Lordships bear in mind the dates which I have mentioned, you will perceive that between October and April, about which time my despatch reached the colony, not one single soldier appears to have left, and it became necessary, in General Chute's opinion, to use the authority conferred upon him by my despatch, and to carry out the instructions previously given for the withdrawal of the troops. There is but one other point, which, being somewhat personal, I have reserved until now. About the time that I wrote the despatch in question my attention was called to paragraphs in the colonial papers detailing hostilities between the Natives and the colonists, and I remember that there was one case in particular in which it was stated that a whole Native village had been cut off, I think to a man, under circumstances which at the first blush were somewhat open to question. In writing to Sir George Grey on other subjects I alluded to this, and implied, in fact, a regret that I had not received any information from him on the subject. I went on to say that if at any time these affairs which had been described in the colony as brilliant successes by the colonists, were to be represented in this country as merciless and unwarrantable attacks upon unoffending persons, I had no means of reply or vindication at my command. As far as I remember, these were the very words I used. That expression has been very warmly commented upon by the responsible Ministers of Sir George Grey, and has been described as conveying an imputation upon them of an unjust character. It is fair to observe that a short time afterwards I stated in a subsequent despatch that I had received the desired information from Sir George Grey, and that I expressed my full satisfaction at the explanation which he tendered. At the same time, I have always felt that whenever either in public or private life anyone casts an imputation upon another unjustly, he is bound, in common fairness, to admit the error into which he has fallen. I therefore admit my error

1505
in this instance, and readily express my regret, because I think now that the words in question were not unreasonably open to complaint on the part of the Colonial Ministers. I have some excuse, perhaps, in the fact that those newspaper paragraphs were worded in a way especially calculated to excite alarm; I had been unable for some time previously to obtain official information upon several other subjects besides this, and it is possible that I permitted my anxiety in one case—my just and well-founded anxiety as I must maintain—to colour my judgment in another case, and to lead me to make use of expressions which I should not have used had I been in full possession of the facts. Certainly, nothing was further from my intention than to give cause of offence, for I hold that while the Secretary of State is the guardian of Imperial interests, and is bound for the sake of those interests to say and do many things which are personally distasteful to him, yet it is his duty to abstain from any word or expression which can needlessly cause irritation or ill-will between the colonists and the mother country. I have to thank your Lordships for the patience with which you have listened to my remarks upon a somewhat dry subject; I have endeavoured accurately to describe the position of affairs; I am confident that I have said nothing which can in any way embarrass the action of the Government; and after what has passed I hope to receive from the noble Duke at the head of the Colonial Office some rather clearer and fuller information than we have yet had with regard to the views of Her Majesty's Ministers upon the subject to which I have drawn attention.
Moved, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, for a Return of the Regiments in New Zealand since the 1st January, 1865, and the Dates of their Embarkation.—(The Earl of Carnarvon.)
THE DUKE OF BUCKINGHAM: My Lords—I thought it better to pause for a moment, because I rather expected some other noble Lord would speak upon the subject before I replied. The noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon) asks for some clear expression of opinion on my part with regard to the views of the Government on the removal of troops from New Zealand. What I have to say on that point is very little. Her Majesty's Government is carrying out the policy which has been repeatedly laid down by successive
1506
Secretaries of State during the last four or five years, and which provides for the withdrawal of the troops from New Zealand with certain exceptions. Those exceptions were made in conformity with the policy of the Imperial Government respecting the Native force and the land question. When the noble Earl lately held the position of Secretary of State for the Colonies Her Majesty's Government issued further instructions for the withdrawal of those troops—for there is no doubt that their journey homeward had been much delayed from various causes. The despatch written by the noble Earl last December contained the same exception as was made by his predecessor—namely, that one regiment was not to be withdrawn while the New Zealand Government continued to appropriate the sum of £50,000 a year towards certain objects. That despatch has reached New Zealand, and one communication has been received with respect to it; but no opinion upon the subject has been received from the Governor, and consequently no further action has or could have been taken upon the matter—the question therefore remains where it was left by the despatch of the noble Earl. With regard to the causes of delay in removing the troops, I may say that they have probably been added to by the unfortunate differences of opinion which have arisen between the Colonial Government and the military authorities, and the difficulties in the way of corresponding with so distant a colony as New Zealand. I may say, however, that the troops in New Zealand had, by the last Returns, been reduced to two regiments — one beyond the regiment which was to be left in accordance with the exception made by Mr. Cardwell—and I probably by this time all except that one regiment have left the colony. What will be done in the future, of course, much depends upon the replies we look for from the colonists; but there is no reason to expect that any departure from the arrangement made by Mr. Cardwell will be thought necessary by us, or be asked for on the part of the colonists. I confess, it seems to me a misfortune, that, after the colony had taken upon itself the conduct of Native affairs, and the Imperial troops had been ordered to be withdrawn, they were not withdrawn at an earlier period. With regard to the opening remarks of the noble Earl I may say that when I asked the noble Lord (Lord Lyttelton) to postpone his Motion I did so because I

1507
thought it unwise to enter upon the discussion of a subject with respect to which we were expecting further and important information; and I still think it inexpedient that discussion should take place upon that matter upon a basis which must to a great extent be hypothetical. With regard to the Returns moved for, there certainly can be no objection to granting them.
EARL DE GREYsaid, he was astonished to hear the noble Duke, the Colonial Secretary, express surprise that none of their Lordships had followed his noble Friend (the Earl of Carnarvon), because it was usual when a question was asked of a responsible Minister of the Crown that he should reply before any further remarks were made; but after hearing what the noble Duke had to say he was no longer surprised, for the noble Duke had spoken briefly and added nothing to their information, except indeed, that he had thrown some doubt upon the question as to whether the Government intended to carry out the policy of his noble Friend (the Earl of Carnarvon) to its legitimate conclusion—namely, the withdrawal of all the troops in New Zealand, with the exception of the single regiment. No doubt it was proper to give the Governor of New Zealand an opportunity of expressing his views upon the policy of the noble Earl; but the intention to withdraw the troops was not a policy initiated by the noble Earl in the despatch of the 1st of December; it dated from several years back, and was the necessary corollary of the policy which had been adopted — that the Imperial troops should not be left in New Zealand to be used by the Colonial Government for purposes over which we had no longer any control. He expected that we should have had some definite and distinct declaration of the views of the Government on this simple though important question. The noble Duke, however, said it would hereafter be a subject for consideration as to what should be the number of troops to be left in the colony.
THE DUKE OF BUCKINGHAMsaid, that he spoke of the course to be pursued with regard to the one regiment left in accordance with the exception made by Mr. Cardwell.
THE EARL OF CARNARVONsaid, he understood the noble Duke to say that the Government would consider what steps should be taken with regard to the regiment which remained in excess of Mr. Cardwell's exception.
THE DUKE OF BUCKINGHAMrepeated, that he doubted only as to what would be done with the one excepted regiment.
EARL DE GREYsaid, that if that was the intention of the Government he fully approved of it, and he hoped they would adhere to the policy of the noble Earl and of his predecessor (Mr. Cardwell), and would take whatever measures might be necessary to insure the return at the earliest period of all the troops in New Zealand in excess of the single regiment which under certain conditions was to remain there. In writing the despatch of the 1st of December, the noble Earl, no doubt, took a strong and unusual course; but he thought the circumstances justified his doing so. It was in February, 1865, or more than two years ago, that Mr. Cardwell directed the regiments to be sent back, and he only allowed the detention of any of them on condition of payment being made for them at the same rate as was paid by the Australian Colonies. New Zealand had not, however, as far as he was aware paid a single shilling, and, first on one pretext, and then on another, the troops had been detained by the Governor, notwithstanding reiterated orders from home. In this state of affairs it was necessary, if the authority of the Imperial Government was to be maintained at all, that strong measures should be taken, and he was not sure that it would not have been better if the noble Earl had at once recalled both the Governor and the troops. He trusted that the Government would not deviate from the policy they had indicated, which had received the sanction of both Houses of Parliament. He was not one who desired the disruption of the ties between the mother country and the colonies, for he believed the connection was advantageous to both; but if Colonial authorities were allowed to employ our troops and spend our money in order to relieve themselves from the consequences of their own policy, complications would certainly arise in our relations with them which would probably result in disruption. It was evident that Sir George Grey had not shown that readiness to obey the instructions of the Home Government which his position demanded of him, and he should not have been surprised if the noble Earl had thought it right to take the stronger step as regarded him to which he had referred. In conclusion, he desired to thank the noble Earl for his despatch in regard to the step taken concerning the memorandum of the Ministry in which reflections were

1509
thrown on the conduct of the British troops. It was certainly a singular proceeding on the part of the Governor, who was the Queen's representative in the colony, to forward this memorandum without a word of comment or regret; and that it thus should have been left to the noble Earl to vindicate, as he had done so ably, the character and conduct of our soldiers. He hoped the Government would shrink from no measure which was necessary to carry out the only policy which would be acceptable to this country, and the only policy on which, under present circumstances, satisfactory relations between us and our colonies could be based.
LORD LYTTELTONentirely approved the determination to withdraw our troops, which successive Colonial Secretaries had endeavoured, hitherto ineffectually, to carry out. It was necessary, no doubt, to employ the services of our troops in the colonies, but there was a great difference between the case of the Cape and that of New Zealand; for colonists whose frontier was menaced by enemies who far outnumbered them might have some claim on the mother country for their defence. He could not see that New Zealand had any such claim; it was a colony founded by a private company of speculators for commercial purposes; the colonists knew very well what they were about and were nearly, if not quite as numerous as the natives, and if troops were to be kept there at all the colonists were bound to bear the expense. He desired to express his opinion, which was a very strong one, with respect to the ousting of the Governor from a portion of his authority. The fact was, nothing else could be done. They all recollected when a Constitution was devised for New Zealand, and the Secretary for the Colonies sent it out to Sir George Grey to put it into operation, the Governor instead of doing so, put it into a box and sent it back, saying that he would have nothing to do with it. Ever since that distinguished person had enjoyed a sort of chartered liberty. If they were to give the colony a long day, and having fixed the time, say that at the end of that time they certainly would throw the colonists absolutely upon their own resources, it would in his opinion be the best and wisest policy that could be adopted.
THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGEsaid, it was not his intention to say a word with respect to the policy adopted by the Secretary of State, but he wished to express a strong opinion as to the impolicy of making
1510
the military independent of the civil authorities. Their Lordships might rely upon it that no more dangerous step could be taken—and for this reason—that the military authorities must and ought to be subordinate to the civil. In order to effect that object every Governor was made Commander in Chief, and if they were to take away his power in that respect they would do an act which would be fatal to the position of the Governor, detrimental to the Imperial interests, and extremely embarrassing and inconvenient both to the officers and troops. Under these circumstances, he could not but express his conviction that the time had arrived when a strong policy must be adopted. He knew the difficulties which successive Governments had felt in dealing with the colony of New Zealand, but the taking away of the troops was a step which he would rather not have seen adopted. He hoped that what had been done in this case would not be turned into a precedent, because otherwise it would be impossible that the civil and military authorities could work harmoniously and cordially together. On the contrary, the utmost distrust would be produced between them. It was most important in a constitutional State that the General should understand that it was his duty to be subject to the sway and control of the civil authorities; because these authorities were really responsible either to the Crown or to the Governor of the colony, who was exercising the authority of the Crown. He desired to say a word with respect to another question. He happened to be absent when the last discussion was brought on, but he must be permitted to say that he took great exception to the remarks of the noble Earl with regard to the Cape colony. In the Cape Imperial interests were at stake, and therefore it would be impossible to throw upon the Cape colonists the responsibility of maintaining the whole of the troops which might be stationed there. It was quite true that at present we were making the utmost efforts for the transmission of the troops to India through Egypt, But it was only in a time of profound tranquillity and peace that the route by Egypt was secure, the route by the Cape would, therefore, be required to be retained. To say, then, that there were no Imperial interests which required the maintenance of the authority of the Crown at the Cape by retaining a considerable body of troops in that colony was a statement from which he must express his dissent.

1511
He contended that we had great Imperial interests at stake, such interests as would make it necessary that the mother country should retain a garrison there. Our commercial interests connected with the route round the Cape were also of the highest importance. Any charges which might not be connected with the requirements he had pointed out, they might leave to the colonists to defray, but there must be a large proportion of the military expenditure at the Cape which it would be most unfair to call upon the colonists to bear.
Motion agreed to.
House adjourned at Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, half past Ten o'clock.