Lords Sitting of 8 June 1866

MINUTES.
Took the Oath—The Lord Stuart de Decies.
SELECT COMMITTEE—On Private Bills, nominated. PUBLIC BILLS—Second Reading—Customs and Inland Revenue* (137).
Report of Select Committee—On Ecclesiastical Commission* (148).
Committee—Exchequer and Audit Departments (108); Landed Property Improvement (Ireland)* (117); Nuisances Removal* (132); Life Insurances (Ireland)* (122); Naval Savings Banks* (129).
Report—Exchequer and Audit Departments (108); Landed Property Improvement (Ireland)* (117); Law of Capital Punishment Amendment* (145); Nuisances Removal* (132); Life Insurances (Ireland)* (122); Naval Savings Banks* (129); Ecclesiastical Commission* (149).
Third Reading—Pensions* (144); Burials in Burghs (Scotland)* (112).
HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCE ALFRED ERNEST ALBERT—having been created Earl of Ulster, Earl of Kent and Duke of Edinburgh, was introduced between His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales and His Royal High-
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ness the Duke of Cambridge, the Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod, the Garter King of Arms, the Deputy Earl Marshal, and the Deputy Lord Great Chamberlain attending, and was placed in the Chair on the left Hand of the Throne.

LANCASTER ELECTION—JOINT ADDRESS FOR A COMMISSION OF INQUIRY—ELECTION COMMISSIONS.
Order of the Day read for resuming the adjourned Debate upon the Motion made on the 29th of May last to agree with the Commons in the Address to Her Majesty respecting, and to fill up the Blank with ("Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and"): (The Earl Russell: To which an Amendment has been moved to leave out from ("That") inclusive to the end of the Motion, and to resolve,
1st. That the Address to the Crown in which this House is asked to concur by the House of Commons has for its Object to cause the Extent to which corrupt Practices have prevailed in the Borough of Lancaster to be inquired into by a Commission in the Manner provided for by the Act 15th and 16th Viet. Cap. 57.:
2nd. That since the passing of the above Act Inquiries have been instituted under its Provisions as to the Prevalence of corrupt Practices in Ten Boroughs:
3rd. That the Commissioners by whom these Inquiries have been conducted have reported that in Eight out of the Ten Boroughs to which they related, corrupt Practices have been extensively and systematically carried on, and that in Six of these Boroughs such Practices have prevailed for many Years:
4th. That in consequence of the Reports so made by Commissioners of Inquiry Bills were introduced into the House of Commons in the Year 1854 for the Prevention of Bribery in Barnstaple, Canterbury, Kingston-upon-Hull, and Malden; and in the Year 1858 a Bill for the Disfranchisement of the Freemen of Galway was also brought into the House of Commons; but none of these Bills were proceeded with:
5th. That these Inquiries have thus failed to lead to the Adoption of any Measures for the Prevention of Bribery in the Boroughs to which they related; they have also failed to elicit Information calculated to assist Parliament in passing any general Act for the Prevention of Corruption; and it was stated in Evidence before a Select Committee of the House of Commons in the Year 1860 that they have occasioned much Perjury and Demoralization:
6th. That although these partial Inquiries as to the Prevalence of Corruption in particular Boroughs have produced no useful practical Results, even when gross and systematic Corruption in these places have been established, there is Reason to believe that a comprehensive Inquiry into the various Methods by which Corruption is practised in Elections, and into the best Means of checking it, might afford useful Assistance to Parliament in legislating on a Subject on which its Interference is urgently required:
7th. That this House is not therefore prepared to assent to the Address in which it is asked by the House of Commons to concur, but would be ready to join that House in praying Her Majesty to cause a general Inquiry on the Subject of Bribery at Elections to be instituted by Means of a Commission:
8th. That the above Resolutions be communicated to the House of Commons in reply to their Message inviting this House to concur in addressing the Crown for an Inquiry into the alleged Prevalence of Bribery in the Borough of Lancaster.—(The Earl Grey.)
Debate resumed accordingly.
LORD EBURYsaid, he was desirous of saying a few words on this subject. He had had considerable opportunities during the thirty-five years he was a Member of the other House of observing the working of our electoral system and of the law applicable to it. There had recently been a violent outburst of indignation against bribery and corruption—not that be intended to imply that the indignation was greater than the occasion deserved—but it was invariably the case after a general election. But whatever might be the state of opinion the necessity of expressing an opinion on the subject had been laid upon their Lordships by the Resolutions moved by the noble Earl (Earl Russell), and even
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if they did not concur in the Resolutions they were bound to assign their reasons and state the manner in which they intended to effect that which it was the object of them all to accomplish. Re was inclined to agree with the noble Earl on the cross-benches (Earl Grey) that they should not concur in the Commons' Resolutions, and for the reasons which that noble Earl had stated; but he could not exactly concur in the method by which the noble Earl proposed to deal with the difficulty by a general and not by a special Commission. If these special Commissions had such a demoralizing character as had been attributed to them, why extend the anticipated evil by sending a general Commission to every borough? If the House agreed to the first Resolution, he should be prepared to propose an Amendment to the sixth Resolution, which referred to a comprehensive inquiry into the subject. Some persons considered bribery at elections was on the increase; but he (Lord Ebury) was not aware of the period of purity with which these persons compared these demoralized times. There were times when the electors of a borough, whether the borough was contested or not, received a certain money payment. He remembered that in the first borough which he had the honour to represent, a time-honoured custom prevailed—he did not know if it was to be considered bribery—that whether the election was contested or not, the electors should receive the sum of £10 each from the candidate. He begged to say that upon the occasion of his election the money was not paid, but it was commuted by the patron of the borough, and a town hall was built instead; and he was happy to say that, although the borough still returned Members to Parliament—and there had been since many candidates for that borough—no improper practices had, since that time, been imputed to it. He was most decidedly of opinion that bribery and corruption were not nearly so prevalent now as they were formerly, and he defied any one to point to a borough where such a custom as that to which he had referred was in force at the present day, or where such shameless bribery had been practised as at a certain well-known election in Liverpool. They must all regret the large amount that was now spent in what were called legitimate election expenses, and they ought to deal with it as speedily as possible. He regretted to find that, undeterred by past failures,

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some persons had revived the cry for treating this subject with very stringent penalties, and he believed they would continue to fail in attaining their object because public opinion did not approve of them and would not concur in them. Much was to be done without having recourse to such stringent measures, and it was on account of what could be done in reference to the expenditure of money that he was induced to address their Lordships on that occasion. Up to 1832 he might say that bribery and corruption was the rule and not the exception, because as borough elections occupied fourteen days and county elections three weeks the respective agents were able to calculate the necessity with the greatest accuracy; but when the period of election was reduced in boroughs to four days, and afterwards to two days, and then to one, a great blow was struck at the system. His opinion was that Parliament should in the first instance pass a Bill which should absolutely forbid the payment of the voters' expenses by the candidate, and next that the employment of paid canvassers should he absolutely forbidden, and, that any one who received payment from a candidate should be disqualified from voting for that candidate at that election. He would also forbid the hiring of an unreasonable number of committee-rooms, and agents being engaged merely for influencing in fact their votes. The constituencies must be no longer treated as spoilt babies—who could do nothing for themselves, and left all for the candidates to do. They should endeavour to establish a sound moral and independent feeling in the constituency. He did not make these assertions in the security of a Peer of Parliament and as one who had no necessity to go to the country, because on a former occasion when he contested Middlesex he informed the electors that if they expected him to expend some thousand pounds he should consider that he sat for his money more than their votes. And the consequence was that they concurred in his views, and he was re-elected. Another remedy to which he attached great importance was that borough or county should pay the expenses of taking the poll by a local tax imposed for that purpose, which would reduce the expenses by two-thirds. He had himself introduced a Bill into Parliament placing the expenses of the polling on the electors, but the measure did not get beyond the second reading. He had
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never altered his opinion, that if they wanted independent Members they must first have independent constituencies. He would, therefore, propose, as an Amendment to the Resolution affirming the propriety and necessity of a general Commission, the following:—
"That this House is not therefore prepared to assent to the Addresses in which they are asked to concur, but they are ready to join that House in concerting measures for suppressing bribery at elections, which in their opinion is capable of being dealt with with the knowledge they already possess."
EARL GREYthought that as several Peers were present who did not hear the previous discussion on this subject, it would be for their Lordships' convenience if he stated the real nature of the Amendment which he had ventured to propose. His noble Friend (Earl Russell) invited them to concur with the other House in an Address to the Crown, the effect of which, under the Corrupt Practices Act, would be to cause an inquiry to be instituted as to the extent to which bribery had been practised in the borough of Lancaster at the last election; and this, if agreed to, would be followed by a similar step with regard to three other boroughs. Now, he (Earl Grey) asked their Lordships, instead of concurring in those Addresses, to adopt a Resolution pointing out the undeniable fact that the ten previous inquiries that had taken place under this Act had been totally without result, although in eight of those cases gross bribery was proved to have been practised. It was true that Bills were introduced into the other House to disfranchise the electors of certain of these places who were shown to have been bribed; but it was held that such a measure would be inconsistent with the terms of the indemnity under which they gave their evidence, and by a general concurrence of the House the Bills were abandoned. Moreover, it had been stated before a Select Committee of the House of Commons that these Commissions had a very mischievous tendency, and rather tended to promote than to check bribery, for men came forward under the shelter of the indemnity conferred upon them by the Act of Parliament, and actually boasted of the bribes they had received—so that the effect was rather to raise the price of votes than anything else. A noble Friend of his, whom he did not see present (Earl Fortescue), had confirmed this from his personal experience, stating that these inquiries

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took away any little shame that might have formerly attached to the receipt of bribes, that they led men to boast of their proceedings, and that they made persons who had not hitherto shared in such corruption anxious to participate in the advantages. That such was the practical effect of these special inquiries was a fact which he (Earl Grey) believed no one could deny, and he therefore asked their Lordships, instead of concurring with the Commons in the Address to the Crown, to agree to a Resolution setting forth the failure of former Commissions, this be followed up by a Resolution proposing a more general inquiry. Now, the nature of that proposal had been greatly misunderstood. It seemed to be supposed that what he suggested was a roving Commission to travel about the country and inquire into the prevalence of bribery in various places. Nothing, however, could be more foreign to his intention. What he proposed was, that a Commission should be appointed to assist Parliament in the very difficult task of legislating against bribery. For that purpose it would be necessary to obtain evidence as to the method by which bribery was now commonly carried on, the devices by which the law was evaded, and the best means of meeting those devices. Such an inquiry, if intrusted to competent persons, need only last a very short time. The witnesses whom it would be advisable to call would be a few Parliamentary and electioneering agents and barristers who had had personal experience of these special Commissions. All the necessary information would thus be obtained to enable the Commissioners to judge by what means the law could be best improved. It appeared to him that every discussion on the subject had shown the desirability of a general inquiry of that kind before Parliament proceeded to the work of legislation, for he believed there was no subject in the world on which legislation was more difficult. The law, it was true, was stringent enough if they could only bring it into full play; but so many devices were resorted to, and money was given by such indirect means, that bribery was extremely difficult of detection. Moreover, when speaking of bribery, they ought to consider not merely what came strictly within that category, but the general expense of elections. The enormous cost of elections at the present time was, he thought, one of the greatest evils which had to be contended with. Printers, public-house keepers, proprietors
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of hackney carriages, and other persons had a great interest in keeping up contests for the sake of sharing in the money that was expended, and a general inquiry such as that he proposed might properly inquire into the means by which that expenditure could be reduced. It had been said, indeed, that they had already sufficient information on the subject, and that it was the duty of the Government to propose measures for dealing with the question. But it should be remembered that on questions of a much less difficult nature both the Government and Parliament had derived great assistance from the investigations of Commissions as to defects in the law, and the means by which those defects could be remedied. Everybody admitted that the last Act on this subject had been utterly useless, and in many respects worse than useless; and he was quite sure that though the responsibility of proposing a measure on the matter must ultimately rest with the Government, they had a right to claim the assistance that could be given them by qualified Commissioners. Every discussion that had taken place showed how very vague were the ideas that were entertained as to the nature of the remedies that were required. He believed the effect of increasing the stringency of the penalties on bribery would be to revolt public feeling against the law and increase the difficulty of obtaining evidence to convict those who were guilty of the offence. He was not one of those who were very sanguine as to the entire success of measures for putting a stop to it. He was afraid the causes of it were such that it was impossible to suppose the evil could be entirely eradicated. Still, the evidence which had been obtained did prove that there were measures which might be adopted that would have a great tendency to diminish the disposition to give and take bribes, and at the same time to diminish the great cost of elections, which in itself was a kind of corruption. His noble Friend (Lord Ebury) had pointed to one of these—namely, the preventing of candidates paying for the conveyance of electors to the poll. But if that measure were adopted in a large constituency where men were much occupied, except where a very great interest was felt in the result of the contest, only a very small percentage of the electors would come to the poll. It would, besides, have a very unfair effect in many contests. On one side there might be no difficulty whatever in providing private carriages or other means of convey-

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ante to the voters; while the other, having little or no connection with the gentry of the county, would have the greatest difficulty in bringing the voters to the poll. Other suggestions had been made. It had been strongly urged by two or three gentlemen of great experience on this subject, that instead of having votes given at the poll some authorized and responsible public officer should leave voting papers at the houses of the electors, and after a reasonable time allowed for having them filled up call for them again. This would not only prevent that form of bribery which consisted in carrying voters to the poll, but also those payments for loss of time which the friends, in spite of the most earnest wishes of candidates, could hardly be prevented from making. It was, undoubtedly, an immense hardship where a man was earning not more than was required for the wants of his family that he should lose half a day's wages in order to give his vote; and in London and many other large places, according to the evidence of electioneering agents, it appeared that half a day's labour would be lost in many instances. His noble Friend (Lord Ebury) had also called attention to the fact that bribery very often first showed itself in cases where parties were very nearly equally divided. That was the case the other day in Windsor. Where parties were nearly balanced, a number of persons held back to the last moment in order to make the most of their votes. As these persons had it practically in their power to turn the election, one party began to purchase their votes, and the other was almost sure to follow the example. In such cases bribery was a very contagious disease. When a man saw his neighbour get a £10 note, he said to himself it would be a great convenience to him, it would pay his rent, exempt his family from much privation, and he might as well have it as his neighbour. Another suggestion was that voters should be able to give as many votes as there were candidates, and either divide or give them all to one candidate. That would diminish the number of contests and the enormous expense of elections. It had been stated that at the last general election the sum expended was not less than £2,000,000. This had not only been wasted but spent to a great extent in demoralizing the people. He had mentioned these suggestions not because he was prepared to recommend the adoption of any one of them, but because the fact that they
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had been made showed how desirable it was that the whole matter should be carefully scrutinized and considered. With that view lie had ventured to recommend that they should propose to the other House that, instead of having partial and useless inquiries into the extent of bribery in particular boroughs, they should have an inquiry into the means by which corruption and expense at elections generally might be best avoided. But in the first instance that was not the question before them. The first question was whether they should concur with the House of Commons in the Address to the Crown proposed. If their Lordships declined to concur in that Address they would not be in the slightest degree pledged to adopt all or any one of his Resolutions. These Resolutions would afterwards be separately and deliberately considered, and of course they were liable to be amended—especially the sixth, on which his noble Friend (Lord Ebury) stated he had an Amendment to move, to which he had no objection except that his noble Friend proposed legislation before inquiry had taken place. These Commissions were not only useless, but did mischief. But it might be said it was a strange thing for that House to refuse its concurrence in measures taken by the other House on such a subject. He could not, however, see the force of that objection. The Act of Parliament rendered the concurrence of both Houses necessary to the issuing of these Commissions. Their Lordships therefore had a discretion to exercise on the point. They also learnt from the ordinary channels of information that these Addresses were adopted rather as a matter of course on the Motion of the Chairman of Election Committees. Very different opinions in regard to them had since been expressed in the House, many Members declaring that they could lead to no possible useful result, and that they were adopted only to beget an impression on the public mind that Parliament had a holy horror of bribery while taking care to do nothing real on the subject. Their Lordships were not only at liberty, but were bound, to exercise their discretion in considering whether these Commissions of Inquiry were or were not calculated to check bribery. If they thought that the Commissions were not calculated to effect that result, then it was their duty to withhold their concurrence in the proposed Address to the Crown.
EARL RUSSELLthought that there would be great difficulty in refusing to

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concur with the House of Commons in an inquiry of this kind. His noble Friend (Earl Grey) had said truly that, as the law stood, their Lordships had to concur in an Address to the Crown before any inquiry such as this could be set on foot; and it was perfectly true that it was never meant that their Lordships should be bound by the decision of the House of Commons in these matters; and that if their Lordships thought that in any particular case there was not sufficient evidence to justify an inquiry by Commission, that would be a sufficient reason why they should refuse to concur in the Address to the Crown. The question now was whether, their Lordships having no measure before them to diminish or check bribery, there was any sufficient ground for refusing to join in this Address, and leave these boroughs, in which it was alleged extensive corruption prevailed, to perfect impunity. It did not matter how these inquiries were conducted. Formerly they were carried on at the Bar of the House of Commons, and forty-seven years ago he himself conducted an inquiry, which was carried on at the Bar of the House, and he examined the agents and other witnesses as to the bribery committed. But at the present time it would hardly be possible, with the great increase of business before the House of Commons, to carry on inquiries such as these at the Bar of the House, and therefore of late years Parliament had adopted the mode by which these inquiries could be delegated to Commissioners. The question was whether they should have an inquiry, and not as to the mode of the inquiry. They must either leave these boroughs with perfect immunity from a punishment for the great corruption which was said to exist, or they must join the House of Commons in the Address to the Crown. With regard to Totnes, the Committee reported that corrupt practices prevailed at the last election, and that on former occasions corrupt practice had extensively prevailed. Were their Lordships to say, because that there was no general measure ready to check corrupt practices they would not join in proposing the only mode of inquiry that was open to them in reference to this particular borough? Such would be the effect of their refusing to pass the Resolution. With respect to the efficiency of this mode of inquiry, he might mention the instances of three or four boroughs. In the cases of Shoreham and Aylesbury, the result of inquiry was that the boundaries of these boroughs were enlarged; and in the
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cases of Sudbury and St. Alban's the result was the disfranchisement of those boroughs. The Members for the disfranchised boroughs were transferred to the county of York and the borough of Birkenhead, and he challenged any one of their Lordships to say that the bribery which formerly prevailed was transferred to these places. If he were right in his opinion upon this matter, then it was plain that the remedy which had been provided in those cases was efficient. He did not say that measures might not be adopted to render the law as to bribery still more efficient; but in the absence of a remedy of a different character, he thought their Lordships ought to agree to apply the remedy that existed. He had no objection to inquiry into the general law as to bribery, but their Lordships had not taken any steps towards such an inquiry. If there had been a Commission which had made a Report, and a Bill had been founded upon that Report, he could then have understood this Amendment in favour of adopting improved remedies instead of having the old mode of inquiry. They ought not, however, to abandon the old and accustomed mode of inquiry until they were prepared to adopt some other mode in its stead. His noble Friend (Earl Grey) had said that the expenses of election had much increased, but he (Earl Russell) conceived that they somewhat exaggerated the existing evil from a forgetfulness of the extent of the evil as it prevailed in past days. He remembered that on one occasion when Lord Fitzwilliam contested the county of York, each party spent the enormous sum of £100,000. Of this sum he had heard that no less than £7,000 was spent in supplying the ribbons to the wives and daughters of electors, which was in itself a kind of bribery. He remembered also speaking to Lord Fitzwilliam, when his Lordship said that he and his father had determined to be more economical at the then coming election; and when asked how much they intended to spend, he said that they had agreed not to spend above £30,000. He (Earl Russell) therefore said that when it was said that matters had become much worse of late years, there was some exaggeration in the statement. His belief was that no general measure would extinguish bribery at elections. A gentleman did not go to a borough with the intention to commit bribery; but wishing for the great distinc-

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tion of being a Member of Parliament, he trusted to his agents, who applied the money placed in their hands for bribery. He remembered asking Mr. Charles Austen, an able advocate before Committees, how he would prevent bribery and the answer was, that he would not bring up before the Committee three or four wretched persons who had received bribes, but he would go to the bankers and ask how much money had been deposited with them, and if they confessed that they had received £3,000 or £4,000, and paid it over to the election agents, and those agents were afterwards proved to have been guilty of bribery, the whole truth of the matter would be ascertained. His (Earl Russell's) own opinion was that one of the chief means of checking bribery at elections was, no doubt, the presentation of a petition against the return of the member elected under its influence, but then it often happened that the defeated candidate was not in a position to incur the expense which the adoption of that course would involve. If, however, an inquiry before an Election Committee was instituted, and that Committee reported that they had reason to believe that in several instances bribery had prevailed in a particular borough, a Commission might then be appointed to take evidence upon oath; and if the result of their investigation proved the Report of the Committee to be justified by the facts of the case a Bill for the disfranchisement of the borough might be introduced. That was at present the most effectual mode of putting a stop to corrupt practices, although it was hardly to be hoped that it would do away with them altogether. He quite concurred in the opinion that too great immunity was now given to persons who confessed themselves guilty of bribery under the existing Act, which, while it guarded them against the consequences of a penal prosecution, did not prevent their being disfranchised by Parliament. He would not say that he was very sanguine that any steps which the Legislature might take would completely check bribery, but he had less faith in the suggestion made with that object by his noble Friend who moved the Amendment than in the course which he invited the House to adopt. That being so, he hoped their Lordships would give their assent to the original Motion.
LORD BROUGHAMwas of opinion that the issue of a Commission, whatever punishment might result to individual boroughs,
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would scarcely prove to be otherwise than a most inefficient and partial remedy for the evil against which it was directed. The bribery which had of late prevailed was a scandal to the country; it affected the character not only of the Legislature, but that of the people at large. He had no doubt that when the House of Commons was anxious and determined to put an end to it, it would find that it had to a great extent the means in its own hands: for he could not help thinking that if every Member were obliged, in conformity with a Standing Order of that House, to make, on taking his seat, a declaration to the effect that no money beyond the legal expenses had been laid out by himself, or so far as he was aware, by his agents, to procure his election, a considerable check would be placed on the commission of an offence of which there was so much reason to complain. No person could make this declaration who had paid a large sum for the purposes of his election, because he must be perfectly aware that such sum could not be expended in legal expenses. He was told, however, that legislative measures, in addition to the declaration, were necessary, and that these measures should provide for the punishment of the bribers. He might remind their Lordships that previous to 1811 the profits accruing from the slave trade were so large that the measures taken to put it down had proved ineffectual, but that things assumed a very different aspect after passing the measure which he had in that year introduced, making the trade in slaves a felony. He did not, indeed, mean to contend that bribery should be placed in the same category; but then it might be made a misdemeanor punishable by fine and imprisonment. If that course were taken, he was certain that candidates for Parliament would not run the risk, not only of losing their money, but of being put upon the treadmill.
On Question, Whether the Words proposed to be left out shall stand Part of the Motion? Their Lordships divided:—Contents 77; Not-Contents 17: Majority 60.
Resolved in the Affirmative: Then the Original Motion was agreed to.

CONTENTS.

Cranworth, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Somerset, D.

Bristol, M.

Cleveland, D.

Normanby, M.

Devonshire, D.

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Airlie, E.

Churston, L.

Bantry, E.

Clandeboye, L. (L.Dufferin and Claneboye.)

Belmore, E.

Caithness, E.

Chichester, E.

Clermont, L.

Clarendon, E.

Dacre, L.

De Grey, E.

Feversham, L.

Devon, E.

Granard, L. (E. Granard.)

Ducie, E.

Effingham, E.

Hatherton, L.

Granville, E.

Heytesbury, L.

Leven and Melville, E.

Hunsdon, L. (V. Falkland.)

Lucan, E.

Malmesbury, E.

Keane, L.

Manvers, E.

Kilmaine, L.

Minto, E.

Minster, L. (M.Conyngham.)

Morley, E.

Nelson, E.

Mont Eagle, L. (M. Sligo.)

Powis, E.

Russell, E.

Mostyn, L.

Stanhope, E.

Northbrook, L.

Stradbroke, E.

Oxenfoord,L. (E. Stair)

Strafford, E.

Panmure, L. (E. Dalhousie.)

De Vesci, V.

Ponsonby, L. (E. Bessborough.) [Teller.]

Eversley, V.

Falmouth, V.

Portman, L.

Halifax, V.

Saltersford, L. (E. Courtown.)

Hawarden, V.

Lifford, V.

Saye and Sele, L.

Stratford do Redeliffe,

Seymour, L. (E. St. Maur.)

Torrington, V.

Silchester, L. (E. Longford.)

London, Bp.

Stanley of Alderley, L.

Peterborough, Bp.

Stuart de Decies, L.

Ripon, Bp.

Sundridge, L. (D. Argyll.)

Abinger, L.

Talbot de Malahide, L.

Belper, L.

Taunton, L.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Vaux of Harrowden, L.

Camoys, L. [Teller.]

Wensleydale, L.

Chaworth, L. (E.Meath.)

Wrottesley, L.

Churchill, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Albemarle, E.

Charlemont, L. (E. Charlemont.)

Fortescue, E.

Grey, E. [Teller.]

Ebury, L. [Teller.]

Shrewsbury, E.

Lovel and Holland, L. (E. Egmont.)

Zetland, E.

Northwick, L.

Clancarty, V. (E. Clancarty.)

Somerhill, L. (M. Clanricarde.)

Oxford, Bp.

Stewart of Garlies, L. (E. Galloway.)

Blantyre, L.

Stratheden, L.

Brodrick, L. (V. Midleton.)

Wenlock, L.

Then the Joint Addresses in respect to the Great Yarmouth Election, Reigate Election, and Totnes Election were severally agreed to.

EXCHEQUER AND AUDIT DEPARTMENTS BILL—(No. 108.)—(Earl Granville.)

  COMMITTEE.
  Order of the Day for the House to be put into a Committee read.
  Moved, "That the House do now resolve itself into Committee."—(Earl Granville.)
  LORD BELPERrose to move the Amendment of which he had given notice, that the Bill be referred to a Select Committee. He had stated some objections to the Bill on the second reading, and he could not consider the answer which he had then received as satisfactory. The Bill proposed an important change in the constitution of the Audit Board, and the principal question which their Lordships had to consider was whether the duties of audit could be better performed by a Board as hitherto, or by a single individual as proposed by the Bill? The Lord President bad referred to the constitution of other public departments as an authority for the present measure. But it must be remembered that those departments had been constituted for executive or administrative purposes, whereas the Audit Board possessed no executive powers, but was entirely a deliberative body; and it was important that this distinction should not be overlooked. He should endeavour to show—First, that the duties of the Audit Board were such as could not be satisfactorily discharged by a single person; and second, that even were this possible, that person would not be in a position to exercise due control over other departments, and to resist the pressure which would be brought to bear upon him. He would shortly explain the nature of the duties of the Board. The examination of the public accounts was in the first instance intrusted to inspectors with the assistance of clerks, whose duty it was to ascertain—First, that there was due previous authority for making every payment; and second, that there was a proper receipt or voucher for every payment when made. But questions of some difficulty and importance often arose in the performance of these duties. There might be doubts as to the construction of the Act of Parliament containing the authority for the payment; or in cases where an ordinary voucher could not be produced, questions might arise as to the evidence of the payment which should be required; or, lastly, the payment might, on the face of it, appear to be so extravagant or improper as to require further explanation. In these, and all similar cases, the question was referred for the decision of the Board,—in ordinary cases to two of the Commis-

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  sioners; but in all questions of difficulty or importance to the whole Board. The question was then fully considered and discussed, and the decision of the Board was given in writing and was signed by the Commissioners. Under the Bill it was proposed that the whole of these duties should be transferred to one man—namely, the Auditor General; the Assistant Auditor being authorized to act only in the absence of the Auditor General. It would be for their Lordships to consider how far it would be practicable for these duties to be performed by a single officer, who would thus be deprived of the advantage of consulting with colleagues equally responsible with himself, and of hearing the question thoroughly sifted and discussed by intelligent men of different views. He was assured by those who must be best qualified to form an opinion on this subject, that it was impossible that these duties could be satisfactorily performed in such a manner. He might also refer to the Report of the Committee of the House of Commons on Public Monies, which sat a few years ago, and which inquired very fully into the duties of the Board of Audit. This Committee made no recommendation for reducing the number of the Commissioners; but, on the contrary, it had been stated by the noble Lord near him (Lord Northbrook) on the second reading of the Bill, who spoke with authority as Chairman of the Committee, that in the opinion of the Committee the Board would require to be strengthened in case additional duties should be thrown upon it. If, therefore, he might thus assume that four Commissioners were not more than sufficient for the discharge of these duties at present, how were they to be satisfactorily performed by a single person? It was true that the Auditor General might get through his business by signing, after little inquiry, the papers which might be laid before him by the Inspectors; but it would be for their Lordships to consider how far it would be desirable that the decision of these important questions should be practically left to subordinate officers, who were subject to no responsibility in such matters, and who had been appointed with a view to very different duties. But assuming, for the sake of argument, that these duties could be satisfactorily performed by a single person, how could it be expected that any one man could resist the pressure that would be brought to
  18
  bear upon him, or could act as an effective check and control on the Treasury and other great public departments? When an important question has been fully discussed by four intelligent men, differing probably in their politics and characters of mind, they have come to a unanimous decision, which has been recorded in writing with their signatures attached to it, it must be difficult to set aside such a decision. The members of such a Board will be a check upon, and also a support to, each other in the performance of their unpopular duties. But how could any single person set himself in opposition to the Treasury on any such question? He might reasonably distrust his own opinion when he found it opposed by such an authority as the Treasury; and he would feel that it would not be likely to have weight either with Parliament or the public. If it was intended to make the Audit Department entirely subordinate to the Treasury, the Bill would, no doubt, have that effect; but if it was desired to uphold its independent jurisdiction as a check and control on the Treasury and other departments, he believed that the Bill would be an entire failure. It was obvious from the Report of the Committee on Public Monies, to which he had already referred, that that Committee had never contemplated the abolition of the Board; and he thought that he was justified in assuming that they would have been opposed to its abolition altogether. It was true that that measure had been approved by the Committee on Public Accounts, though on what grounds they had come to that conclusion did not appear. But even that Committee had never recommended a single Auditor. The Bill, as reported by that Committee, contained provisions for the appointment of two Auditors under the names of Auditor General and Assistant Auditor, who were both to hold patent offices, and to possess co-ordinate jurisdiction; but the Bill had afterwards been altered in the House of Commons so as to deprive the Assistant Auditor of all such powers, and to confine his functions to the representation of the Auditor General in his absence. It seemed strange that, when two Auditors were considered necessary for the accounts of every joint-stock company and charitable institution throughout the country, the duty of superintending the audit of the public accounts of this great nation, and of deciding all questions relating to them, should be intrusted to a single person.

  19
  Before he sat down he would briefly refer to other clauses of the Bill which confirmed him in his apprehension that it was intended to render the Audit Department subordinate to the Treasury. The Public Monies Committee had spoken of the Audit Board as a great Department of the State which was responsible to Parliament alone, and they had accordingly recommended that the Board should communicate with Parliament direct. But by the Bill it is expressly enacted that they shall communicate with Parliament only through the Treasury. There are also various other clauses giving the Treasury the power of directing them, and interfering with them, in the performance of their duties. He thought it right also to call their Lordships' attention to the fact that by this Bill it was proposed to unite permanently the office of Comptroller of the Exchequer with that of Auditor General. The question of the union of these two offices had been very fully considered by the Committee on Public Monies, who had come to a different conclusion. He thought, therefore, that the grounds upon which their decision was to be set aside ought to be explained. The question, however, to which he more particularly wished to call the attention of their Lordships was that of the abolition of the Board of Audit. Previously to the establishment of that Board, the subject had been fully considered by Mr. Pitt and Mr. Huskisson, and the Bill for its establishment was carried by Lord Henry Petty sixty years ago. During that time the system was admitted to have worked well, and to have been a great improvement on the previous system; and he would be sorry to see the present Board abolished unless it could be shown that a better tribunal would be substituted in its place. As it would be impossible to consider the details of such a Bill in the whole House, he proposed to refer the Bill to a Select Committee. He had been told that the alteration of the Bill by their Lordships would be inconsistent with the privileges of the House of Commons. But if that should prove to be so, and if the Bill should be found in the Committee to be liable to the objections which he had stated, he was of opinion that it would be much better to withdraw the Bill altogether, and to introduce an amended measure hereafter. In conclusion, he wished to state that he had felt great reluctance in addressing their Lordships on this subject, and that
  20
  he had done so only under a strong sense of duty.
  An Amendment moved, to leave out from the word ("That") to the end of the Motion, and insert ("the Bill be referred to a Select Committee.")—(Lord Belper.)
  EARL GRANVILLEsaid, he fully concurred with the noble Lord as to the importance of the subject, but he thought the arguments employed by the noble Lord were insufficient to convince their Lordships of the inexpediency of adopting the course he proposed. He had it from the highest authority in their Lordships' House and in another place that there was hardly any alteration they could make in the Bill which would not involve its rejection as an interference with the privileges of the other House. The Bill dealt with the audit of Public Accounts, and that was a function which belonged peculiarly and primarily to the House of Commons, by whom the provisions of the measure had been fully discussed at each of its various stages. It had also received consideration, he believed, at the hands of the Public Monies Committee, composed of such men as Mr. Bouverie, Mr. Laing, Sir Stafford North-cote, Mr. Walpole, and other Gentlemen, who had paid great attention to the subject. He thought, therefore, that if their Lordships did deem it necessary to make any alterations in the measure, such as were likely to induce its rejection by the House of Commons, it was due to the other House that such alterations should be proposed and discussed where their opinions were heard, rather than that they should be made in a Committee upstairs, where their decisions constituted the only information afforded to the public. There could be no objection to the Report going through the Treasury, instead of going direct to the House of Commons through the Board of Audit, as it would be impossible for the Treasury to garble such a document. At all events, the matter was not of sufficient importance to be made the ground for endangering the Bill. Another question of more importance related to the proposal for the combination of the offices of the Comptroller of the Exchequer and the Board of Audit. The matter had been fully considered by the Public Monies Committee, and, with the exception of Sir George Bowyer, scarcely anybody would agree with the noble Lord behind in the strong opinions he held upon the question. The weight of authority was decidedly against the separation. The other impor-

  21
  tant point that was raised by the noble Lord was whether it was right that a single person, with an Assistant, should be substituted for a Board. On this subject he must repeat the opinion he had expressed on the previous evening—namely, that where it was necessary that knowledge of a special and different character should be represented at the head of a Department—such as the Admiralty or the Indian Department, a Board might possibly be desirable—though even that was a question on which different views might be entertained; but that where as in the present case the duties to be performed, although difficult, were straightforward and uniform, they would be best discharged by an individual. From his own experience, and the experience of almost all with whom he had conferred on the subject, the responsibility of the office would be much more deeply felt when thrown upon one single individual than when shared by four, five, or six persons. The noble Lord said the other day that the duties of the Audit Board had been greatly increased of late, and that, therefore, an individual would not be capable of properly discharging them. It should not, however, be forgotten that the head of the Department would be assisted by inspectors, examiners of accounts, and assistant examiners of accounts, by whom all the business would be prepared for the eye of the chief. The noble Earl (Earl Granville) said the other day that the difficult questions arising in the Department were decided by a Committee of either two or four Members of the Board; but in truth they were usually determined by a Committee of one Member of the Board. But it was quite clear that when the business was brought up to a certain stage one competent man assisted by a highly paid subordinate could easily perform all the duties that would be required of him. The noble Lord (Lord Belper) had also suggested the possibility that if an individual were substituted for the Board he might not be able to endure the pressure which would be periodically put upon him by the Treasury. The noble Lord had requested him to consult the officers of the Audit Board as to the pressure put upon that Department in getting up the Report of the Public Accounts for Parliament. He had not spoken to those officers upon the subject, but he was authorized to state that the Report was drawn up exclusively by two Gentlemen connected with the Department, one being Mr. Macaulay, who had written with so
  22
  much ability upon the subject of finance, and the other being Mr. Vine, who was well known to be thoroughly conversant with the subject he had to deal with. Under these circumstances, the extra pressure would not be felt by the individual at the head of the Department. The noble Lord further argued that the decisions of a Board carried more weight than did those of an individual: but surely the instances of the Courts of Law, where single Judges sat daily to decide most important judicial questions, was a sufficient answer to such an argument. The House of Commons, whatever opinions they might formerly have entertained upon the subject, were now almost unanimously in favour of the Bill, and the Committee of the House which had passed a Resolution in favour of an Amendment rather adverse to its principle had since informed the Chancellor of the Exchequer that they now desired that the Bill should proceed in its present form. It had been suggested that the Department should be under the control of two persons having equal authority; but if the business were to be properly conducted, it must be conducted by one responsible head. The Bill proposed to substitute for a Board a person of high position, who would receive a large salary, who would be responsible to Parliament for the manner in which he performed his duties, and who would hold his office for life. He appealed to their Lordships whether it was desirable to send the Bill before a Select Committee, after the opinion that had been expressed in its favour by the House of Commons.
  LORD NORTHBROOK,having stated objections to the details of the Bill, said, that his main objection to it was that the Auditor appointed under the Bill would be virtually the servant of the Treasury, and would not have that control over the public expenditure which he ought to possess.
  On Question, Whether the Words proposed to be left out shall stand Part of the Motion? Resolved in the Affirmative: Then the original Motion was agreed to: House in Committee accordingly; Bill reported without Amendment; and to be read 3a on Monday next.

PRIVATE BILLS.

  STANDING ORDER NO. 184.
  Select Committee nominated, to consider Alterations in Standing Order No. 184. proposing that a Subscription Contract shall be entered into in certain Cases by the Promoters of Second Class

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  Bills: The Lords following were named of the Committee:

  Ld. President

  E. Stradbroke

  D. Cleveland

  V. Eversley

  M. Lansdowne

  L. Redesdale

  M. Salisbury

  L. Somerhill

  M. Bath

  L. Portman

  E. Lucan

  L. Stanley of Alderley

  E. Belmore

  L. Overstone

  E. Grey

  LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEYsaid, that the noble Lord the Chairman of Committees, who had reserved to himself the power of nominating the Committee, had certainly not neglected the opportunity of selecting the names of Peers favourable to his own view. He felt it necessary to give notice for Monday of the addition of four other names.
  LORD REDESDALEdenied that the Committee was a packed one.
  EARL GRANVILLEthought both sides of the House should have been equally represented.
  LORD REDESDALEsaid, that nine of the Members had been taken from the Ministerial side of the House and only six from the other.
  LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEYwould make this compromise with the noble Lord: he would be satisfied with the addition of three names: Lord Taunton, Lord Halifax, and Lord Bessborough.
  House adjourned at Eight o'clock, to Monday next, Eleven o'clock.