Lords Sitting of 20 July 1866

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—Second Reading—Postmaster General (75); Pier and Harbour Orders Confirmation (No. 2)٭ (187); Extradition Treaties Act Amendment (200).
Committee—Standards of Weights, Measures, and Coinage٭ (208); Sheriff Court Houses (Scotland) Act (1860) Amendment٭ (57); New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land Government٭ (195); Revising Barristers' Qualifications٭ (196).
Report—Sheriff Court houses (Scotland) Act (1860) Amendment٭ (57); New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land Government٭ (195); Revising Barristers' Qualifications٭ (196); Pier and Harbour Orders Confirmation٭ (185).
Third Reading Crown Lands٭ (114), and passed.

THE DANUBIAN PRINCIPALITIES.

  MOTION FOR PAPERS.
  VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE,in rising to move for papers respecting the Danubian Principalities, said, that he desired, in the first place, to offer some explanation with respect to the delay that had occurred in bringing forward the Motion. The notice had been on the paper for some weeks; but in the interval circumstances had occurred, over which he had no control, that had obliged him to postpone it; and finally, when he was about to fix a day on which he thought he could rely he was requested by the late Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to postpone the Motion still further, as the negotiations were then going on and inconvenience might have arisen from the subject being brought forward. Of course, he complied with the noble

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  Lord's request. The matter was again put off on the change of Administration, when his Motion shared the general fate of all public business. He confessed, indeed, that so many delays had occurred that at one time he doubted whether it would be worth while to bring the subject forward at all at so late a period of the Session. After careful consideration, however, he had come to the conclusion that the reasons for proceeding with the matter preponderated over those which could be urged on the other side. The subject related to countries with which, notwithstanding their great distance from England, we had connections which ought not to be overlooked. Whether we approached the Danubian Principalities by Russia or by Austria, no doubt the distance was very considerable; but their geographical position was not sufficient to destroy those interests which brought them into connection with this country. We had sufficient commercial intercourse with these countries to justify our taking peculiar interest in them, and we also had with them political interests of great importance. Their position between Austria, Russia, and Turkey was alone sufficient to give them a considerable importance in our eyes, connected as we were with the Turkish Empire. They had also an importance belonging to themselves. We could not view without interest a number of communities joined together by ties of race, language, and religion, and at the same time connected with a Power so very much at variance with them in all these respects. He presumed that there were but few persons of liberal minds in this country who did not desire that they should be in a situation to enjoy as much as possible the advantages which nature had designed for them; but the connection they had with the Turkish Government was one which had been sanctioned by the Conference to which Great Britain was a party, and that connection tended to considerably modify, if not to neutralize, the advantages which they had derived from their position. At the same time it was one which could not be easily set aside, inasmuch as we had guaranteed the integrity of the Turkish Empire by the Treaty of 1856, and inasmuch as the withdrawal of the Principalities from the Turkish Empire would inflict a considerable blow on the maintenance of that integrity. Moldavia and Wallachia stood in an interesting relationship, not only
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  towards Turkey, but likewise towards her neighbours. In respect to Russia they had stood for a long time as a kind of barrier, or something interposed between what was thought to be the tendency of Russian encroachment and the integrity of the Turkish Empire. A population which coincided with them in race, language, and religion still formed part of the Russian Empire; while in the same manner there was a considerable population of the same description within Austrian territory. There had, he believed, been two treaties which affected their position; but it must be borne in mind that from the very remote period when Trajan conquered their barbarous Princes they had never enjoyed national independence. They were at one time connected with Transylvania, and also with the kingdom of Hungary; but at last they found it more convenient to enter into a voluntary connection with the Turkish Empire. They accordingly did so, and thereby secured at a small sacrifice their independence and their own separate Legislature, while they enjoyed a sort of protection which was given by the Turkish Empire. Indeed, there could be no doubt that their position was thereby improved. With regard to any danger which might possibly arise to Turkey in consequence of the establishment of the two Provinces, he might remark that the union of the two Provinces with their population of about 5,000,000 would in itself give activity to their desires, and tend to develop their resources. Of course, however, there would be a proportionate danger to the Turkish Government from which they were divided by religion and language. The difficulty connected with the union of the two Provinces was settled by giving each of them a separate Administration under the common government of one Hospodar. But a great deal of dissatisfaction having arisen in consequence of the manner in which Prince Couza had governed the Principalities, an insurrection had taken place, and he was driven from power. After that an invitation was sent to more than one person connected with Royal Families, asking them to accept the office of Hospodar. Prince Charles of Hohenzollern was one of those invited, and he accepted the invitation. It was said at the time that Prussia had nothing to do with his election; but circumstances which had since occurred bad thrown considerable doubt on that assertion, and

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  which certainly did justify the strong suspicion that if Prince Charles had not been sent to the Principalities by the Prussian Government, at least the experiment had been sanctioned by them. It appeared that after some discussion and some difference of opinion Prince Charles of Hohenzollern was accepted not only by the Natives themselves but also by the Conference of Paris, and, notwithstanding the strong objections which were entertained on the part of the Turkish Government, though he was not actually installed, he was in the way to being installed in the office of Hospodar. This would seem to be in direct contravention of the arrangements of the Convention of 1858, and therefore it was desirable the country should be informed what was the real position of the English Government in the Conference of Paris. There appeared to be no visible reason for inducing the English Government to favour the views of those who supported Prince Charles of Hohenzollern, and, therefore, some might feel inclined to ascertain the reason which induced the English Government to give their consent to the proceedings which had taken place. Of course, if we had acted from consideration for others, in contradiction to the previous arrangements to which we had been parties, it was of consequence that Parliament and the country at large should be acquainted with the reasons which justified the change. All these facts derived additional importance just now from the present state of affairs in other countries. It was impossible to look around us without seeing that there was a dissolving principle at work which attacked in the strongest manner, though sometimes by invisible agencies, those relations between State and State on which the peace of Europe had been based during the last thirty years, and owing to which we had enjoyed a long period of tranquillity. When we saw the war that was now raging in Germany, when we called to mind the debates on the Danish question, and when we thought of the principles put forward to justify the aggressive policy of Prussia, he must say there was enough to induce us to carefully reflect on the present state of things and what those things now going forward might bring about. Was it not desirable to anticipate danger, and to give to Parliament and the country an opportunity of expressing an opinion on this subject? God forbid that he should recommend anything which should lead to hostilities between
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  this and any other country; but if there was contingent danger we ought to consider how far we should be doing our duty and providing for our future interests if we remained silent and unconcerned when such a state of things existed around us. Men who had lived through the past half century might well be surprised at the events which now astonished the world—they must perceive that what was now taking place surpassed in consequence everything which had occurred since the French Revolution. Were we to see a great Power struck out of the list of nations without showing some interest, or intimating that we entertained some opinions on the subject? Was it possible for us to view without concern what had already taken place? We could not arrest the progress of the war—we could not, perhaps, prevent the catastrophe which now seemed to threaten one of the great Powers of the Continent—but, at the same time, when established principles had been so strongly violated, it behoved this country—and, he would say, it especially behoved their Lordships' House to give expression to an opinion in favour of those principles. It was said that in the war now going on in Germany the great success of the aggressive Power was due to an arm of peculiar construction; but he must say that from the accounts which he had read it appeared to him that it was due more to a scheme of aggressive policy concocted and prepared for a number of years ago. No doubt the sentiments of this country had rarely gone with the administration of affairs in Austria—we had little sympathy with her in a variety of respects; but there was one ground of sympathy which he trusted would never be lost sight of in this country—respect for principle and the consideration of right. And if ever there was a clear right on the part of any Government it was that of Austria to exercise her discretion—however erroneous that discretion might be—in regard to the possession of Venice and in regard to the affairs of Germany. If the great battle which was about to be fought should be in its results only a repetition of those already fought, were we prepared to see a great Power like Austria struck out of the list—were we prepared to see so great a change in the European system? It might be that, without our being able to prevent it, so great a change might take place; but what we had to complain of was the open violation of principle and the manner in which treaties had been torn asunder and

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  thrown aside. Other principles might be established as the result of the present war; but we ought not to allow existing treaties to be torn up leaf by leaf without protesting against such a proceeding, and maintaining that as long as the principles upon which the European system was based were supposed to be in existence, no sanction should be given to an aggressive policy which was in plain violation of those principles. It might turn out that the danger to which the attacking party was exposed would produce a degree of moderation and tend to peace, and that, with the assistance of that Power which appeared to have exerted itself as a mediator, this very desirable end would be effected. It would be a sad and melancholy thing if the historian of these times should have to describe the fate of that great country—which, with all its faults, had been so useful to Europe—in the language which had been familiar to their Lordships since their schoolboy days—
  "Hæc finis Priami fatorum; hic exitus illum Sorte tulit, Trojam incensam et prolapsa videntem Pergama, tot quondam populis terrisque superbum Regnatorem Asiæ; jacet ingens litore truncus, Avulsumque humeris caput, et sine nomine corpus."
  In that event there would be reason to look back with regret to the beginning of the second series of negotiations in respect to the Duchies fifteen years ago, when, perhaps, by a word properly spoken, a judicious, temperate, non-compromising word, Prussia might have been made to understand that if she persisted in the enterprize she might have to face a danger which, in all probability, would be overwhelming. While on this subject, he wished to say a word or two on the wellknown principle of interference or noninterference. Now, the idea of a great country like ours pledging itself to noninterference in an unlimited sense was to him perfectly absurd. He did not think it was possible for a country situated as England was to carry out the principle of nonintervention altogether. We must have friends with whom we sympathized, and there would be times of danger and circumstances which might compel interference. What was required of a Government, whatever its politics, was that everything should be done to avoid war which could reasonably be done without the loss of national honour and dignity; he would even go as far as to say that
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  great sacrifices of a certain kind might be necessary in order to the preservation of peace; but though from our insular position we might be better placed for carrying out the principle of non-intervention than other nations, and although we might have every desire to avoid war, yet it could not always be done without sacrifices which no great country could afford to make. There were times and circumstances when war might be avoided and peace preserved by combination with other Powers. There was also another subject on which he desired to make a few observations—namely, the subject of nationalities, which was a word which had been introduced into the political dictionary within the last fifteen or twenty years. In carrying out the principle of non-intervention he would ask where a stop could be made? No country had a greater claim to act on this principle than Italy; but even she had not been able to realize her expectations under it without seeking the dangerous assistance of another Power, and making a great sacrifice. There were also similar difficulties with regard to the Danubian Principalities and Germany. Supposing Prussia to gain her end—which seemed probable—was it supposed that these difficulties would be removed, and that she would be able calmly and quietly to sit down in the uninterrupted enjoyment of what she had obtained? He believed that this would not be the case. Territorial considerations and commercial interests would go much further in securing peace with neighbouring nations than anything arising from nationality. The principle in question appeared to have originated in what was a family feeling in the early stages of mankind, and expanded into its present dimensions. But under present circumstances, if it was to be acted upon, where, he asked again, was it to stop? Might not the Fenians find in it something to support them in their endeavours to raise an Irish Republic? He doubted whether France even, the most compact of European countries, would be free from danger under the action of such a principle. During the last month Bohemia, having discovered an old traditional name, had made a claim for national independence. What he contended was that, although some States had a stronger case for acting on the principle of nationality than others, it was a principle fraught with much danger, and at the same time brought but little advantage to the com-

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  munity. Nothing could be further from his intention than to say anything likely to increase the prospects of a general war. His were merely the words of an individual, giving expression to nothing but his strongest convictions, respecting which he could not consent to be silent. He trusted that he had said enough to justify the Motion which he intended to make. If Her Majesty's Government would consent to furnish the House with the whole of the papers he asked for he should be glad; if, however, they resolved, from sufficient reasons, to withhold some of them, he would cheerfully consent to their decision. He could not profess to be in possession of special information beyond what was in the possession of the public; but he confessed that he was under the impression that the negotiations with respect to the position of Prince Charles were so far completed that no inconvenience would arise from presenting the papers to Parliament. If he were mistaken on that point, his noble Friend (the Earl of Derby) would doubtless have the kindness to correct him. Seeing that their Lordships were in a great measure shut out from dealing with matters connected with the taxation of the country and supplying the necessities of the State, and were in other respects less closely associated with general legislation, they were, in his opinion, more particularly called upon to express opinions with regard to those high matters of national honour and good faith to which he had alluded than they would otherwise be; it thus fell to their lot to fulfil the higher duties of the statesman's office, in expressing with a fearless voice opinions which might support those who were suffering from unjust aggression. He trusted he would be permitted to enjoy some share of their Lordships' concurrence and sympathy in the task he had undertaken, and with that hope he moved for the production of the official papers relating to the subject.
  Moved, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for all official Papers of an ostensible Character relating to Negotiations which have taken place between Her Majesty's Government and any other State or States respecting the Two Danubian Principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia, whether in the Form of Conventions, Protocols, or diplomatic Correspondence, dated subsequently to the Paris Convention of 19th August 1868, and hitherto not communicated to Parliament.
  THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, I certainly did not anticipate from my noble
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  Friend's Notice, which simply consisted of an announcement that he would move for Papers respecting the Danubian Principalities,that he would have thought it necessary to refer to so many subjects as he has. Having regard to the respect due to my noble Friend's long experience in foreign affairs, and the intimate knowledge lie possesses, more especially of the affairs of the East, I trust it will not be deemed disrespectful upon my part if I decline to follow him over the wide range of subjects on which he has commented, but rather confine my observations within a narrow compass, and above all if I abstain, in the present state of the affairs on the Continent, from following him into a general discussion of the affairs of Europe. I must confess that some of the principles laid down by my noble Friend were listened to by me with some surprise, because, if they were followed to their natural conclusions, I cannot but think that his object must have been to impress upon your Lordships' mind his opinion that it was necessary, in vindication of our own character and our own principles, to take an active and prominent part in the unfortunate war now raging in Europe. [Viscount STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE made a gesture of dissent.] My noble Friend shakes his head, but did he not say, "Will you allow Austria to be humiliated? Will you permit her to have Venetia taken from her?"
  VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE: I asked, Will you view these things with unconcern and indifference?
  THE EARL OF DERBY: Be it so then; but my noble Friend knows what that means. He asks whether we will allow Austria to be placed in a position of humiliation and have Venetia wrested from her? and he asks us whether we will, with indifference, permit treaties to be broken through? My noble Friend must know perfectly well that if his question were followed to its legitimate conclusion it would lead to the inquiry—shall we interfere with the war that is now taking place in Europe, and shall we by active interference stay the triumphant progress of Prussia and the realization of the ambitious views of Italy. Now, my Lords, I say the spirit of these questions is entirely at variance with the principles entertained by Her Majesty's Government. I do not pretend to lay down the principle of absolute non-intervention and non-interference with the affairs of foreign countries, no country

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  holding the position of England can afford to do so; but I believe I express the opinion of all on both sides of the House, of whatever particular shade of opinion they may be, when I say that nothing could be more inconsistent with our public duty than that we should take an active part on either one side or the other in the present conflict—much as we may lament the events now taking place we should not be justified in interfering by force or by remonstrance which must lead to force: The Emperor Napoleon has been appealed to by one of the belligerents for his mediation and good offices. He has offered that mediation and those good offices; but with what success remains to be seen. If our assistance or good offices should be needed to co-operate with those of France for the purpose of restoring peace to Europe, nothing would be nearer the desires of Her Majesty's Government than to afford them. But until our good offices or mediation have been applied for, I hold that we should be stepping out of our proper province if we were obtrusively to interfere between the conflicting parties, and still more so if we were to hold out a threat or menace to enforce our views with regard to the differences between the belligerents. I will not, besides, discuss those principles which my noble Friend has laid down with regard to nationalities, but will confine myself to the subjects which more immediately concern his Motion. If I had proposed to deal largely with them, I should have cause to regret even more than I do the absence through indisposition of my noble Friend the late Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (the Earl of Clarendon); because it rests more with him and with his late Colleagues to vindicate the course which has been pursued with reference to the Danubian Principalities than with myself and those with whom I am acting. But I may very shortly state to my noble Friend what course has been taken, and what is the present actual state of affairs. My noble Friend has referred very minutely to the provisions of the Treaties of 1856 and 1858, whereby the Danubian Principalities were guaranteed, not by a single Power, but by a Conference of the- six great Powers of Europe, their independence and privileges consistently with the maintenance of the suzerainty of the Sultan of Turkey. It is quite true that at a very early period those objects were departed from with the acquiescence and consent of the Powers which had composed the Conference, because in
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  the first instance it was thought desirable that Moldavia and Wallachia should continue to form two separate and independent Principalities unconnected with each other; and it was thought that the union of these provinces would be a source of weakness to Turkey, while their separation would be adding to her strength. The second proposition which must be borne in mind was that the Hospodarship should be in the hands of a native and not of a foreigner. Now, the first infraction of these principles was the election of the same individual Prince Couza by the two Principalities. This deviation from the original terms agreed upon was, however, sanctioned by the Conference, and if any danger be likely to arise from the union of the two Provinces, that danger has now lasted for at least eight years, and the present course of events does not in any way tend to its increase or its diminution. For my own part, I think this union of two Provinces forming together not a powerful country, is more likely to prove a source of strength than of weakness to the frontiers of Turkey. These Provinces continued under the administration of Prince Couza until the 22nd or 23rd of February last, when Prince Couza was deposed, and was compelled to abdicate on the following day. The revolution which brought about the event was perhaps the most peaceful, quiet, and bloodless recorded in the history of the world. Prince Couza was permitted to depart unmolested from those Provinces over which he had for some time held sway. There was no symptom of disturbance among the population; and immediately after his deposition a Provisional Government was formed. After these events had occurred the Conference assembled, and its members at once laid down the principle that, notwithstanding what had been done on former occasions, it was, nevertheless, desirable to leave the Provinces themselves to decide in favour of separate or of united Government. In the meantime the Provisional Government had offered the Hospodarship of the united Provinces to the Comte de Flandres, by whom it was distinctly refused. Throughout the whole of the proceedings everything that was done was communicated and made known to the Conference, and from first to last the Conference laid down the doctrine that while the rights and independence of Moldavia and Wallachia were to be respected regard was equally to be paid to the rights

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  of Turkey. Whatever difference there might have been as to matters of detail that principle was always upheld. After the refusal of the Comte de Flandres the offer was made to Prince Charles of Hohenzollern, by whom it was accepted. My noble Friend has expressed an opinion that this offer was an underhand proceeding on the part of Prussia, and that it was in fact instigated by Russia. But Prussia has entirely and absolutely disclaimed having supported the candidature of Prince Charles, and there is nothing in the papers relating to the subject which would tend to throw any suspicion upon that statement. A communication was made by the Provisional Government to the Conference. The Conference—I think very properly—declined to recognize the election of Prince Charles, or to notice the communication. It was determined that the principle of the union or the separation of the two Provinces should be decided by the new Parliament which was about to be elected, and in order that there should be no suspicion of collusion, or of any attempt to overbear one Province by the voice of the other, it was further determined that the Provinces should decide for themselves whether their decision upon this subject should be given by separate or united Legislatures. It was still further decided that in case either Moldavia or Wallachia objected to a union, that should be held a conclusive argument for separate Legislatures. The result was that neither Wallachia nor Moldavia would consult separately on the question of union: an united Parliament assembled, and 110 out of 166 Members decided in favour of the union of the two Provinces under the Hospodarship of Prince Charles. This decision was communicated to the Conference. There was no doubt that the proceeding was irregular, and at variance with the understanding of the Conference. But the question was, shall we proceed by force to support the claims of Turkey, if she should desire it, against the united wish of Moldavia and Wallachia—and shall we force upon those Provinces at a time when all Europe is in a state of convulsion a Government to which they are opposed—and by so doing add to the state of disturbance that already exists? The course which has been pursued is this:—The parties to the Conference have not recognized the accession of Prince Charles; but we have endeavoured successfully to induce the Government of Turkey to abstain from pressing by force
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  of arms the rights which she might have enforced; and we have recommended Turkey to ascertain whether terms cannot be agreed upon between the de facto Government of the two Provinces and herself, that while they maintain their own independence they will respect the rights of the suzerain Power. That is the state in which things remain. There are negotiations going on between Turkey and these Provinces, and an agent has been received at Constantinople. He has been consulting with the Turkish authorities, and I believe there is every prospect of the result being satisfactory; the rights of the people of the United Principalities will be maintained, and at the same time the rights of the suzerain Power will be maintained. I hope in the course of a short time the matter will be brought to an issue. But in the meantime it would be inconvenient to lay before the public all the negotiations that have taken place, and it will be better to wait until the negotiations are brought to a close or broken off, when the whole course of proceedings will be laid before Parliament. Under these circumstances, I hope my noble Friend will not press the Motion.
  EARL RUSSELLsaid, he thought their Lordships would acquiesce in the decision at which the noble Earl had arrived—that until the negotiations were brought to a termination it would be unwise to produce the papers which had been asked for. He desired, however, to make a few remarks on the subject, as he and his Colleagues had been concerned in the recent negotiations. Under the Treaty of 1858, which contained five. Articles in reference to the Danubian Provinces, their rights and privileges and those of the Porte were clearly and precisely laid down—the chief point being that with the exception of paying to the Porte a small sum of money by way of tribute, the Principalities should be entirely free and independent. The Convention of 1858 determined that no foreign Prince should have any power in the Principalities, but that a Native Hospodar should be elected. There were fifteen or twenty Princes from amongst whom the selection could be made, and, unfortunately, that had led to a series of jealousies amongst them, and hence the election of a foreign Prince. That being the case, and the Convention of 1858 having declared that no foreign Power should interfere in the internal affairs of the Principalities, when the Powers came together they were obliged

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  to recognize that obligation, and they would not depart from it. But he confessed that his own opinion was that if the Porte acknowledged Prince Charles of Hohenzollern as Hospodar, and if he should turn out to be a man of sense and judgment, he would be far more likely to administer the Provinces successfully than any Native Prince would do. It had for a long time been the favourite wish of the people of the Principalities to have a foreign Prince to rule over them. It was a matter upon which they had set their hearts; and, according to the general principle which had been laid down in modern times for action in these matters, the rule was, that the wishes of the people ought to be consulted and ought to prevail, but not so far as to threaten the security of other States. He therefore hoped that the Porte would be induced to recognize as Hospodar Prince Charles of Hohenzollern, the Prince agreeing to the terms of the instrument of 1856 by paying tribute and obtaining a firman from the Sultan. On the other hand, if the Porte were to send an army into the Principalities there was the great danger that hostilities would extend farther, and that a war of religion might arise should the people of the Principalities think that it was intended to interfere with their religious liberties. Therefore, he was glad to hear that Her Majesty's Government were prepared to advise the Porte not to interfere by force of arms. As the other question had been raised, he could say that he thought it would be most unwise for us to interfere at present in the affairs of Central Europe; but, at the same time, he fully admitted the force of the general principle that had been accepted by all the statesmen of this country, that no one State of Europe ought to have such a preponderance over other States as to threaten their independence and security. This was not the moment to pass any opinion upon the policy of Her Majesty s Government, but nothing had been said to lead them to suppose that the Government would not exercise the vigilance and patience which it was their obvious duty to exercise in existing circumstances.
  THE EARL OF DERBYsaid, he would take the earliest opportunity of laying upon the table the papers connected with the subject.
  Motion (by Leave of the House) withdrawn.

  POSTMASTER GENERAL BILL.
  (The Earl Nelson.)

  (No. 75.) SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  EARL NELSON,in moving the second reading of this Bill, said, that its object was to legalize the holding of the office of Postmaster General by a Member of the House of Commons. The 25th section of the 6th of Anne disqualified the holders of certain offices for sitting in the House of Commons; but from time to time nearly every office in the Government had been freed from the operation of that Act—beginning with the Presidency of the Board of Control, and ending with the Secretary of State for War. There was no reason why the office of Postmaster General should not be held by a Member of the House of Commons; and, remembering the difficulties the present Prime Minister had in forming his Government, it was expedient to give additional facilities to the First Lord of the Treasury in the organization of an Administration, while the passing of the Bill could not by possibility be construed into a reflection upon the noble Duke (the Duke of Montrose) who had so lately accepted the office.
  Motion agreed to: Bill read 2a accordingly;. and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Monday next.

EXTRADITION TREATIES ACT AMENDMENT BILL—(The Lord Chancellor.)

  (No. 200.) SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  LORD TEYNHAMdirected attention to the change which the measure would effect in the law of evidence, and expressed a wish to know whether, under cover of this alteration, it was intended that the magistrates before whom the accused parties were brought should alter the view they had hitherto taken in determining whether the accused were primâ facie guilty of the offence alleged against them. He desired also to point out that no provision had been made for ascertaining the relation of the depositions sent over with the crime charged in the warrant of arrest.
  THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid, that in order to remove any alarm from the mind of the noble Lord, be might state that there was no foundation whatever for the notion that any change in the law of

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  evidence would alter the opinion which the magistrate might entertain of his duty. It was sufficient, he thought, to give that answer to the noble Lord, who, he regretted, had not urged his objections yesterday, on the occasion of the Bill being introduced and read a first time. For his own part, as he had taken up so much time yesterday in explaining the objects of the Bill, and taking into consideration the deserted state of the Benches on the side of the House where the noble Lord sat, he hoped the noble Lord would not consider it disrespectful if he declined to trespass any further on their Lordships' time.
  Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Monday next.

REFORM MEETING IN HYDE PARK.

  NOTICE OF MOTION WITHDRAWN.
  THE EARL OF SHAFTESBURY,who had given Notice—
  "To call the Attention of the Government to large Placards stuck up in various Parts of London, announcing the Assemblage of vast Numbers of the People in Hyde Park, on Monday, the 23rd, under the Summons of the Reform League,"
  said: My Lords, when I gave the notice which appears upon your Lordships' Paper, I was not aware that the subject of the proposed Reform Meeting in Hyde Park had been discussed in the House of Commons, where a satisfactory answer was given by the Secretaries of State, both of the present and of the late Government. I hope and trust that the Government will persist in reserving the Parks exclusively for the recreation of the people. Let them be kept solely and entirely for the recreation of the people without any respect to partizans, whether of Reform, or of Garibaldi, or of the Pope. I do not say this because I am adverse to public meetings, for perhaps no man in England is so much indebted to public meetings as myself. I have carried a great portion of my measures by their means, and it is my intention, if God gives me health and strength, to hold a great many more. But I have always held them at convenient times, and in convenient places; and therefore I hope that the working classes will respect the rights of others, and not inflict upon others an inconvenience which they would be the first to resent if inflicted upon themselves.
  House adjourned at a quarter past Seven o'clock, to Monday next, Eleven o'clock.