§ EARL RUSSELLMy Lords, in presenting (by Command) Papers respecting the Termination of the Reciprocity Treaty, of 5th June, 1864, between Great Britain and the United States (North America, No. 2 1865), I wish to make a statement in regard to the relations between this country and the United States. My Lords, one of these papers is a letter from Mr. Adams, in which he states that he is commanded by the President to deliver to the British Government a notice, dated March 13, in regard to the termination of the Reciprocity Treaty between this country and the United States, and stating that this treaty will terminate twelve months from the date of the acknowledgment of that notice. Mr. Adams also encloses the vote of the Congress, which has been approved by the President, declaring that it was no longer for the interest of the United States that that treaty should continue. Coupled with this notice is a notice given with respect to the armament of the Lakes. These may perhaps be considered evidences of hostility towards this country; but I think that this is not really the case. I think it must be admitted that recent occurrences on the Lakes—namely, the seizure of vessels by the agents of the Confederacy and other acts of hostility—completely justify the United States in giving notice of the termination of the convention. My Lords, it was not to be expected that the United States would allow itself to remain open to the repetition of such acts of violence, or would submit passively to such acts without availing themselves of all the means of repression within their power. With regard to the Reciprocity Treaty, although I will not say there are sufficient grounds, yet there are grounds with respect to the admission of articles duty free into the United States which may induce the United States Government to wish for a renewal of the treaty with modifications that may be more advantageous, and which the United States Government may consider more just, to the United States. Accordingly, when Mr. Adams informed me of the result of the negotiations which had taken 69 place between the President of the United States and the agents of the so-called Confederate States, I expressed to him a hope that when he should present to me the notice of the termination of the Reciprocity Treaty I should find that the Congress and Government of the United States would be ready to consider propositions, by which a small and limited armament might he kept up on the Lakes, for the purposes of police, on both sides; and also that a renewal of the Reciprocity Treaty, upon terms to be agreed upon by both parties, might be negotiated during the twelve months to elapse before the existing treaty ceased its operation. Of course, Mr. Adams was not authorized to give me any assurance upon the subject, but the language he used induces me to trust that such an assurance would be given. I am sure your Lordships will all be anxious that the relations between this country and the United States should continue as they are now, of a pacific and friendly character; and, for my part, I should be very sorry that anything should occur, or be done in this country, that would tend to prevent such a satisfactory result. But, my Lords, I cannot but think that expressions which have been used, and speeches which have been made, may tend to excite in the United States a disposition unfavourable towards the end which we thus desire to see accomplished. I allude to speeches declaring that this country has behaved wrongfully to the United States, has given the United States just cause of complaint, and that an unfriendly spirit has been shown by the English people throughout these transactions. My Lords, the obvious effect of speeches such as these must be that individuals in the United States who are in favour of hostilities with this country—and there is such a party there—must know that there is in this country a party ready to take up the view that the United States are in the right, and, therefore, that they will be wanting in proper spirit and in proper regard for the national interests and the national honour if they do not complain loudly of the conduct of this country. I ask your Lordships to attend for a short time to the statement which I have to make; because I cannot but think that the Government of this country and this country itself have been wrongfully accused upon these various points. One of the chief complaints put forward is, that this country, in a great hurry and without proper 70 consideration, granted belligerent rights to what are called the Confederate States. Now, every one who knows anything of the law of nations knows perfectly well that although a country may put down insurgents who rise against, its authority, yet that a country has no right or power to interfere with neutral commerce unless it assumes the position of a belligerent. But that is what the United States did. The President of the United States by his proclamation declared that the coasts of particular States were in a state of blockade, and that armed vessels belonging to those States were to be treated as pirates. There came representations on this subject from Her Majesty's Minister in the United States but in the first instance these merely covered despatches from Admiral Sir Alexander Milne, commanding Her Majesty's squadron in those waters, asking how he was to treat the armed vessels of the two parties. At that time Lord Campbell held the high office of Lord Chancellor, and of course we consulted him and the Law Officers of the Crown as to what should be done. Lord Campbell declared, as we all supposed he would do, that there was no course but one to pursue—namely, to regard the blockade on the part of the United States as the exercise of a belligerent right, and a3 belligerent rights cannot be confined to one party, but are necessarily exercised against somebody else, our advisers told us that we were entitled to recognize the existence of belligerent rights on the part of both the combatants, and to declare Her Majesty's neutrality between the two parties. And this, accordingly, was the course which we advised Her Majesty to pursue. The proclamation in that sense was approved, if not actually drawn up, I believe, by my learned Friend the present Lord Chancellor, then one of the Law Officers of the Crown. The course of neutrality thus adopted was certainly received with favour, and, I believe, commended itself to the sentiments of the country as the right course for us to take. It is said now that we ought to have awaited the arrival of Mr. Adams. I know not what Mr. Adams could say on the subject. If I had told my Colleagues that we must wait for him and consult him, I believe it would only have caused embarrassment in the relations between the two countries. He could scarcely have approved anything which we did short of taking the part of the North against the South. But then, it is said, if the proclamation of neutrality 71 was not altogether wrong, at any rate it ought to hare been delayed, and that unfriendliness was shown in the manner of its promulgation. I conceive that there was nothing unfriendly, nothing uncourteous in the declaration; but, on the contrary, that it was the proper course for this country to declare at the earliest moment that it meant to take part neither with the North nor with the South, but to remain entirely neutral in the contest. Be it observed also that from the issue of that proclamation, on the 13th of May, Her Majesty's subjects were bound to take no part in the contest, and were warned that they would disobey Her Majesty's injunctions if they gave aid to one side or the other. Your Lordships all remember the affair of the Trent. It is said with regard to that affair, as with regard to the proclamation of neutrality, that the proceedings of the Government were unfriendly and uncourteous; and I am accused—not for the first time certainly, nor probably for the tenth time, but with as little justice now as on any of the former occasions—of having had a despatch put into my hands which ought to have been published, because it contained an assurance on the part of the United States Government that they did not intend to resist the delivery of the Commissioners. My Lords, that was very far from being the case. Although Mr. Adams did bring me a despatch on that occasion, it was a despatch relating chiefly to other questions between the two countries, and merely ending with a declaration that if any demand were made upon the subject of the Trent, that question would be fairly considered by the United States Government. The despatch was read to me by Mr. Adams, but it was not put into my hands, and therefore I could not publish it. Even had it been left with me, and had I published it, it would have given no satisfaction, because I certainly believed, and my noble Friend at the head of the Government also believed, up to the last moment, that it was entirely a matter of uncertainty whether the United States Government would give up these Commissioners, or whether they would refuse to do so, and withhold arbitration. And now, as to the manner in which these demands were made. In the first place, I wrote to Lord Lyons, and begged him not to make any demand in the first instance, but to see Mr. Seward and acquaint him with the nature of the despatch, and request that he would name a day when the 72 despatch could be put into his hand, so that he might have the opportunity of consulting the President before he gave his answer. That appeared to me the course which it was most courteous to take. And I am bound to say, in mentioning these facts, that there is one circumstance connected with them which does the highest credit to the memory, good taste, and discretion of one whose loss the House and the nation have not yet ceased to regret—the late Prince Consort. At the last moment, after her Majesty had approved the despatch, my noble Friend (Viscount Pal-merston) received a letter from the Prince Consort, in which His Royal Highness said that some of the expressions used in the despatch might be considered too abrupt, and suggested other phrases, which he thought might make it more easy for the Government of the United States to accept the request which it conveyed. These phrases, in deference to one who was so great a master of diplomatic language, were adopted by the Government and embodied in the despatch, and, doubtless, tended in some degree to render the document more acceptable to the United States Government, who were called upon by its terms to perform a duty in conformity with the law of nations and regarded by the people of this country as an act of justice. But it is said that, while we displayed great haste in acknowledging the South as belligerents, we were guilty of great supineness in the case of the Alabama; and upon this point I have only to state that the evidence on this subject was furnished to us by Mr. Adams, and that the information which we received was immediately laid before the Law Officers of the Crown. Their Report was received on the morning of the 29th, and it was immediately considered; but on the morning of that day the Alabama, having obtained some intimation of what was likely to occur, left Birkenhead, and was no longer within our reach. On this question, however, I will say no more, because it may form a matter for discussion between the Government of the United States and our own. I do not wish in any way to forestal that discussion, but I think I may say that we have done everything which either International Law or the laws of this country demanded of us in order to prevent the attacks made on the trade of the United States. There was, however, another case which was the subject of much discussion, and in respect to which 73 considerable irritation was created, and some discussion has been raised which was entirely unnecessary. After the Alabama had sailed from Birkenhead, the same firm which built that vessel began to build other vessels, the construction of which amounted in itself to an armament, and furnished evidence of a hostile purpose. The owners of those vessels were known to be in correspondence with Captain Bullock, the agent of the Confederate States, and we had every reason to believe that those iron rams were intended to break the blockade of the Southern ports, which had been established. Now, it seemed to me that if those vessels, with armament so completed, were allowed to proceed from the port of Liverpool, the utmost danger to the friendly relations existing between this country and the United States would have been the result. I could not conceive it possible that the United States would have allowed those armed vessels to break the blockade, which had been acknowledged by the authorities of this country, and not make demands with which we might not have found ourselves able to comply. I, therefore, took what was a very strong measure on this subject. I ordered those rams to be detained, and afterwards directed that they should be seized for the purpose of preventing them from committing acts of hostility. We subsequently had placed in our hands the contract by which the agents of the Confederate States had agreed to sell those rams to M. Bravay, who said they were not intended for purposes of hostility against the United States. The question, however, remained to be tried, and we came to the conclusion that, though the moral evidence was complete, and though we believed the legal evidence to be complete, that there might still be circumstances which would prevent a conviction from being obtained. I am, however, convinced that it would not only have been unfortunate, but that it would have been an ignoble and ignominious thing if we had been obliged to go to war, not for the honour of England, because that was not engaged; not for the interests of England, because they were not involved, but for the sake of private considerations, where no injustice has been done. I therefore regret very much that the noble Earl opposite took the course which he has taken, and that he should have done everything in his power to prevent our stopping those vessels, which might otherwise have gone and broken the blockade. 74 I have now stated the course which Her Majesty's Government have taken in these matters. I will now say that there is every reason to hope that, as the ports of the Southern States have been captured by the arms of the United States, many questions which have hitherto arisen as to the breaking of the blockade, the imprisonment of the crews of vessels, and several other questions touching the maritime rights of the two countries, will disappear, and that there will be the less reason to apprehend the occurrence of hostilities between us and the United States. I must at the same time observe that the impartial course which Her Majesty's Government has pursued has from time to time been impeded and endangered, on the one side by those partisans of the North who were constantly stating that we were acting in a manner hostile to the North, and, on the other, by those who were as constantly violating the neutrality which Her Majesty had proclaimed in the pursuit of their own private ends. But, be that as it may, am satisfied that there is not the slightest pretence for saying that the course which the Government has pursued has not been strictly neutral. Tomorrow a new Minister will set out from this country to represent Her Majesty at Washington. We greatly lament that Lord Lyons is, owing to the state of his health, unable to return to his post. There is no person to whom the country is more indebted for the wise, calm, and conciliatory line of conduct which he has pursued than that noble Lord, who has never failed, at the same time, to maintain the dignity and honour of the country; and I am happy to do justice to his eminent acquirements and talent. Sir Frederick Bruce, who is about to take his place, has distinguished himself greatly in China by the firmness of his policy. He has acted in such a manner towards the Chinese Government as completely to win their confidence; his conduct towards the representatives of the other European Powers has been such as to obtain their concurrence in every step which he has taken. Towards the British merchants and British interests in China he has so acted that, while willing to listen to their complaints and to obtain redress for their just grievances, he has never shown himself prepared to support their unreasonable demands, or make any proposal contrary to the spirit of the treaties with this country. That being so, he appears to me to be 75 exactly the man whom it is desirable Her Majesty should choose to represent her in the United States, and I hope that under his auspices the friendly relations between the two countries will be maintained.