§ THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHMy Lords, I rise to put a Question to the noble Earl at the head of the Foreign Office, of which I gave him notice on Monday last. As the Conference, after a somewhat long adjournment, will meet on the 28th, it is important that we should know how far the engagements entered into by the belligerent powers on the 9th have been fulfilled; for if we should find that, in point of fact, these engagements have not been faithfully performed, we shall have but little confidence in any future promises that may be made. If I am not misinformed, the engagements entered into by the belligerent Powers on the 9th were to this effect—that they would not; interfere with the commerce or with the communications of the country which they occupy, not interfere with the existing civil administration—that they would not levy any war contributions, and that they would pay for everything that their troops received. Now, unless I am greatly misinformed, it can hardly be said that any one of these five engagements has been thoroughly performed. The commerce of 607 the country has been interrupted by impounding and placing under lock and seal large quantities of valuable goods intended for commercial purposes. The communications of the country by road are dependent entirely upon the caprice of the officers in command. The communication by telegraph has been broken entirely by the removal of the wires. I do not know for certain that any new war contributions have been imposed, but rations for men and horses have been exacted without payment, and those for the soldiers of the most extravagant kind. It was stipulated that, on the contrary, so far from exacting contributions, everything should be paid for. I understand that on the 12th an order was given for the delivery of rations, and that not one word was said about payment; and the contributions not having been delivered on the 13th, an order was given for their immediate delivery, with a threat that if the delivery did not take place, those who did not comply should be placed upon bread and water. That, I understand, is the state of things at this moment. There may have been some cases of payment, but I am informed the payments have not been made in money. The payment has only been in receipts for goods delivered, acknowledgments of indebtedness on the part of the Prussian Government; documents which, of course, are of no market value whatever. It is possible that subsequent orders may have been issued from Berlin. That may have been in consequence of the representations of the noble Earl or of the other Powers on the Continent, or in consequence of the evidently rising indignation of the people of this country. But certainly the Prussian Government did not commence the armistice by acting according to the stipulations they had agreed upon. Of that I apprehend there can he no doubt whatever. They contracted at the Conference, not with the Danish Government alone, but with all the Powers assisting in the Conference; and, therefore, in departing from their engagements, they have committed an offence, not against Denmark alone, but against every one of the contracting Powers, each of which is justified in resenting that offence by the blockade of the ports of the belligerents, or by any other suitable measure. I hope that a better state of things may now have commenced. But it is impossible for me not to feel that this state of things could not have happened had the 608 influence of this country been what it once was. I cannot conceal from myself that there prevails in Germany an impression that, do what they may, say what we may, we shall not lift our arm for the purpose of arresting the progress of their wrong doing. My Lords, I am very ready to acknowledge the zeal, the earnestness, and the great ability of the noble Earl at the head of the Foreign Department. I think that the position of the noble Earl has been beset by difficulties of an unusual character, which, under any circumstances, would have been embarrassing; but I cannot abstain from declaring my opinion that these difficulties have been greatly increased by the conduct of the noble Earl himself. My Lords, last year, the premature and inconsiderate declaration, that under no circumstances would this country go to war for the sake of the establishment of a better state of things in Poland, deprived our diplomacy of all its efficacy, of all hope of success in the negotiations that were then being carried on. It is a vain idea indeed—it is a perfect dream—to hope that mere moral opinion can produce any effect whatever in diplomacy. The strength of diplomacy resides altogether in the force by which it is supported, and in the belief that, under the circumstances which may arise, that force may be employed for the purpose of maintaining its rightful demands. If you take away that supposition, the despatches of the Foreign Secretary can have no more weight than that which would attach to the collective opinion of any twelve or fifteen respectable gentlemen meeting in Downing Street to discuss any public matter; authority it can have none. This was the state of things so far as it affected Poland. This year what have we done? This year the noble Earl has most distinctly expressed his opinion upon the policy to be pursued. Substantially and in effect what the noble Earl said was this—
Hear Mr. Gladstone—'look around, see the vast progress of our prosperity and the enormous amount of our commerce. It would be a sin to risk for the defence of innocence and of weakness, and for the protection of right against might—the might of the wrong doer—any portion of that wealth which Providence has bestowed upon us for our own especial enjoyment.'My Lords, I differ altogether from those who can entertain that opinion. I do not hold that power, and strength, and wealth are given to a state, any more than they are given to an individual, for his own personal enjoyment and satisfaction. The 609 State and the individual stand under the same circumstances of responsibility. They are each subject to the obligation of doing good and of preventing evil; and we have done neither. My Lords, I cannot help feeling at the same time that there is another difficulty beyond that which has arisen out of the conduct of Her Majesty's Government. There is another difficulty of the greatest magnitude which has materially affected the influence of this country with Foreign Powers. I cannot but think there is a strong impression on the Continent, and especially in Germany — an impression which it would be contrary to constitutional principle to admit to have any real foundation—but which certainly does exist on the Continent, and is gradually pervading society in this country, that in all public questions relating to Germany Her Majesty's Ministers have as much difficulty in carrying out a purely English policy as was experienced in former times, as history teaches us, in the reigns of the two first sovereigns of the House of Hanover, When George III. came to the throne, and first met his Parliament, he declared, in his own words, that born and educated in this country, he gloried in the name of Briton. By that declaration he won the hearts and obtained the confidence of his people. He at once relieved his Government from that unpopularity and weakness which had attached to the Governments of his predecessors, from the persuasion that they were swayed by German partialities. The people believed him to be an Englishman and nothing but an Englishman—to be one of themselves—to feel as they did —to be identified in all respects with the English people. That feeling inspired the loyalty which enabled him to go through without danger the difficulties of the revolution with which he had to contend, I do trust that in this question of Denmark, Her Majesty's Ministers will so act as to show to Germany and the whole world that the policy and feelings of George III.—those truly English feelings which regarded only English objects—still animate the Government of this country, and that they will succeed in overcoming that impression which is now extending itself on the Continent, and overspreading this country, and in restoring to our diplomacy the authority and influence which it has now lost. I will ask the noble Earl whether the proceedings of the Prussians in Jutland, since 610 the armistice has commenced, have been conformable with the engagements entered into in the Conference?
§ EARL RUSSELLMy Lords, the noble Earl certainly gave me notice a few days ago that he should make some inquiries as to the manner in which the engagements entered into in the Conference for the suspension of arms had been carried out in Jutland; but the noble Earl did not give me notice that he meant at the same time to make observations upon the conduct of the Government in relation to foreign affairs in matters extending far beyond Jutland— beyond the question, large, difficult, and intricate as it is—the question between Germany and Denmark—extending even to the question of Poland. I think it would have been fair—I think it would have been more in conformity with the course usually practised in Parliament, and certainly practised in that House in which I have spent the greater part of my political life—if the noble Earl, intending to make this attack, had given me notice that he meant to do so. As to the Questions which he has asked of me, I will answer, in the first place, with respect to the manner in which the agreement for the suspension of arms has been carried out in Jutland, The Danish Government have stated that it is their intention to collect in as accurate a form as possible all the facts, and when they are in possession of those facts, and can rely upon them, then only they will lay a statement—containing, at all events, an accurate statement of facts, before the Powers with whom they have agreed to negotiate. I consider that to be a prudent and wise mode of proceeding; and until they have done so it is not for us to assume that mere rumours or statements in newspapers or private letters are perfectly accurate and true. But with regard to the assertions which have been made here and elsewhere, the Prussian Government was applied to and they have made this statement upon that subject. I am about to give your: Lordships, as well as I can, the statement made by the Prussian Government, without at all attempting to defend their conduct or making myself responsible for the statement. The Prussian Government say that they thought fit, I think on the 28th of April, to make an estimate of the value of the ships captured by the Danish cruisers, and finding that estimate to amount to £50,000 for Prussian ships, and £40,000 as the value of other German ships, they 611 directed Marshal Wrangel to levy contributions in Jutland to the amount of £90,000. I believe that proceeding to be in itself a novelty in the history of war; but be that as it may, their answer is, "We are at war, and we believe this to be one of our belligerent rights." A part of this amount was raised; but the Prussian Government say that immediately the King had sanctioned the agreement for a suspension of arms, orders were sent to Marshal Wrangel not to levy any further contributions; and that if contributions had been levied since the 11th, the persons who had paid the contributions should be reimbursed the sums received from them. The account we have received from our Ambassador is that orders were sent from Berlin on the 10th, and he thinks it probable, and it appears to me very likely, that although the orders might have reached Marshal Wrangel on the 12th, yet they were not in the hands of all officers commanding corps or divisions of regiments upon the morning of that day. It appears from some accounts which have reached us, that demands were made on that day. There is a Danish statement that upon the night of the 11th the Prussian seals were placed upon several magazines and stores of private merchants and manufacturers, as security for the payment of contributions. The seals were afterwards taken off from some, but I cannot say whether they were taken off from all. That is the Danish statement, although it does not come from the Danish Government. With respect to provisions, it appears that orders were certainly given that all demands for provisions and rations for the troops should be paid for. It is probable from what we have heard that the payments have not been made in specie, but it is asserted that payments are made in the shape of acknowledgments. I do not know whether care has been taken to avoid making further requisition, or whether, if any further requisitions have been made, they have been paid for in money. The Prussian Government are bound by the terms they have made for a suspension of arms, which the noble Earl has correctly represented; they are bound to see that no further contributions should be levied; and if further demands of provisions should be made, then that they should be fully paid for. We all have in our recollection the terms upon which the suspension of arms took place; but we have thought it 612 bteter, however, to wait for the statement of the Danish Government rather than to rely upon mere rumours. The noble Earl (the Earl of Ellenborough) went on to say that all this had been done because it was not expected that Her Majesty's Government would have recourse to force to prevent them. But the noble Earl must recollect that in this instance the engagements were made, not with the British Government alone, but with the Governments of France, Great Britain, Russia, and Sweden, who were all represented in the Conference; and if these things were done—if the suspension of arms was set at defiance—the Prussian Government is liable to be called to account by all the Governments for the violations of their engagements which they have committed. It cannot be said that such conduct is a wanton indignity or insult to the British Government alone; what has taken place is an indignity and an insult to all the Powers who were represented at the Conference. The noble Earl, not satisfied with putting his Question, has spoken of the general course which Her Majesty's Government have pursued in regard to foreign policy. I must say, with reference to this particular Question, as I told a noble Friend of mine who raised the point some time back, that while this country is bound to defend its honour and any paramount interest it may have in any part of the world, it is not alone responsible for maintaining the balance of power in Europe. I think in the engagements which this country has made—whether the engagements of 1852 or those of a more ancient date — whenever the question of this general balance of power in Europe has arisen, the obligation has been one, not of this country alone, but of this country along with several other Powers, bound, whenever the case arose, to consult those Powers as to what the obligations were, and what ought to be done in the circumstances. If I may advert to the conduct of the person whom I consider to have been the great founder of the foreign policy of England in modern times — namely, King William III. — he always sought out for allies on the continent of Europe, and acted with those allies to the great benefit of Europe and to the reputation and glory of England. I certainly stated on a former occasion, that the flourishing condition of our finances and trade is a reason not lightly to imperil such a 613 state of things. I might have stated also this other ground—that no country can really keep up its character for strength, and its power of asserting its position in Europe, unless its finances are in a satisfactory condition. I reminded you how the Peace of Amiens—the most disastrous peace we ever made, by which France was left in possession of the greater part of Europe after an unavailing contest—was brought about by the distressed and disordered state of our finances; and I implored you to take care, lest when your honour or interests may be attacked, it may be impossible to assert that honour and give effect to those interests if your finances are disordered by useless and unnecessary wars. The noble Earl referred also to the case of Poland. When that question arose Her Majesty's Government, following the example set by the Government of Earl Grey, made remonstrances to Russia, founded on the Treaty of Vienna. An answer was given to those remonstrances, addressed to England, France, and Austria. A reply was sent and further representations made; but the general answer was that, when tranquillity was restored, the condition of Poland should receive the consideration of the Russian Government. That, in fact, closed what may be called the negotiations, although there was much subsequent argument. But when I made the statement in this House that I could not advise this country to go to war to re-establish Poland, I considered that negotiation with Russia, so far as it could have influence on Russia, was at an end, and there was nothing to do but to resolve whether, in that state of circumstances, you would go to war for Poland or not. Now, of all the wild, imprudent, and extravagant wars that were ever engaged in, a war to establish Poland would have been the most wild, the most imprudent, and the most extravagant. When you consider that no Government had been established by the insurgents, and that even the insurrection had not raised its head with effect—when you look to the vast extent of the country to be re-established, and consider that it would have amounted to nothing less than the dismemberment of the Russian Empire, which everybody who had the conduct of affairs in that empire was bound to resist to the utmost — to have gone to war then for the re-establishment of the Polish Government, however much the Poles by their bravery, generosity, and conduct had merited the sympathy 614 of Europe, would have been most unjustifiable. Well, but what was I to do? I have always considered that if you do not mean to go to war for a nation in a state of insurrection, nothing can be more immoral, more perfidious, more destructive of confidence, than to hold out hopes to men which must afterwards be disappointed. Therefore I was between these two conditions—either I must speak in favour of the Poles and go to war in their favour, or I must tell them plainly that it was not the intention of Her Majesty's Government to go to war. Well, the latter was the course I took. I proclaimed here, and proclaiming here I proclaimed it to the world, that it was not our intention to go to war for Poland; and from that moment no Pole could with authority or reason say that he relied on British support, and was betrayed by the want of it. I cannot but think it is a source of satisfaction to me that, in the first place, I did not advise war for Poland; and, in the next place, not advising it, that I did not hold out to the Poles that we were about to do that for them which we did not intend to do. The noble Earl may think that we ought to have gone to war for Poland; he may have thought—though I hardly believe it—that not intending to go to war for Poland we should have endeavoured to impose on the Government of Russia the belief that we were about to make great sacrifices to rush into a war without any definite object in view, and by so doing to sacrifice the lives of men as brave, as generous, and as patriotic as ever lived. My Lords, my resolution was to do neither the one nor the other. The question of going to war is a serious matter, not to be lightly talked of. The noble Earl has referred to the example of George III.—a most patriotic Sovereign, with every feeling in his heart that prompted him to defend the honour of his Crown, and the welfare of the country over which he reigned. But as to his views of policy and the Ministers by whom he was advised, it is not to he forgotten that in this House a Member of that Cabinet, on entering into a war for the purpose of subduing insurrection in America, declared that the Americans were a parcel of cowards, and that this country would easily get the better of them, and suppress the revolt. In the course of that enterprise you spent £100,000,000 and lost thirteen provinces. On another occasion a great revolution took place in France—France changed her Government; and the Govern- 615 ment of George III. must go to war to change republicanism in France to monarchy, and bring back the Bourbons to the throne. In that enterprise there was £550,000,000 spent, and oceans of blood were shed. I consider these two wars two of the most unwise—two of the most unjustifiable wars in which this nation ever engaged. The noble Earl has referred to other matters which I think he might have spared. He has referred to the advice which Her Majesty's Ministers hare given to their Sovereign. All I can say is this, and I say it with perfect truth—that however much Her Majesty may have, as other Princes have, their private affections—connected as she may have been by marriage with a Prince who derived his birth from Germany—much as she is connected by the alliance of her daughter with German families—Her Majesty's great object has been to maintain intact the honour, to maintain high the reputation, to maintain the interests of this country. And however much Her Majesty may desire that every step, whether relating to Germany, or Denmark, or any other subject, should be carefully weighed by her advisers, there has been no one occasion on which, when those advisers have deliberated and have given the result of that deliberation to Her Majesty, Her Majesty has not wholly followed their counsels, and adopted the Resolutions to which they had come. Therefore, my Lords, having stated this, I need hardly state that which follows, that if the interests of this country have been deserted— if there is any stain on its honour—if there has been any abandonment of those great interests which we are bound to preserve— if there has been any abandonment of the interests of Europe, which we with others are bound to look to—it is upon the heads of Her Majesty's advisers that the responsibility must rest. Let that responsibility be as great and as heavy as it may be, we can transfer it to no other quarter; we must take it all upon ourselves—and, for my part, I am perfectly willing to be held responsible for the course we have adopted.
LORD BROUGHAMdid not wish to prolong that discussion, but his noble Friend near him having referred to the indignation of the people of this country in regard to the acts of plunder committed in Jutland, he must say he never yet knew so unanimous an opinion or so strong a feeling to exist among all classes, all ranks, and all parties in this country on any ques- 616 tion, either of foreign or domestic policy, as now prevailed in favour of Denmark and against Prussia. By saying against Prussia he meant against the Government of Prussia, whose frauds and cruelties and wrongful deeds had not brought them the least glory. They had pillaged and oppressed the weak; they had gained a certain accession of territory and taken a considerable booty; but glory they had gained none. But these were the acts of the Government alone; the people of Prussia were not at all responsible. Their case was very different from that of the people of America, who were responsible as a people for the violence and bloodshed unhappily desolating their country. But, as regarded Prussia, the responsibility was confined to the Government.
§ EARL GREYMy Lords, I cannot allow what was said by my noble Friend at the head of the Foreign Office, as to what took place in 1831 with reference to Russia and Poland, to pass altogether unnoticed. I deny that my noble Friend can draw any justification or defence for his recent policy with regard to Poland from what occurred in 1831. Speaking on the spur of the moment, without having any opportunity of referring to papers relating to transactions that took place so long ago, I cannot, of course, trust my memory as far as details are concerned. But I can say, with the most perfect recollection of the fact, that the whole tone and effect of the correspondence on the part of this country with Russia at that time was totally different from that of the recent despatches of my noble Friend on the subject of Poland, Your Lordships will allow me further to explain, as one of those who objected to my noble Friend's policy with respect to Poland, that I never did object to it because it had not plunged this country into war. I never did object to his openly declaring that he intended to avoid war on that question. I agree with him that as it was clear that this country ought not to enter into such a war, it was but fair and just to the Poles that that determination should have been made known to them. But what I think may be most legitimately found fault with is this—that, being determined not to go to war, and that determination being made publicly known, the noble Earl should have thought fit to engage in an irritating correspondence with Russia on the subject of Poland, which could not but be most impolitic and injurious to the character of this country. 617 Where was the wisdom or advantage of bringing forward impracticable proposals to which he called on Russia to agree, or; of holding aggravating language about the iniquity of her conduct, and then laying before Parliament all those scolding despatches, which might have been very good; as school boys' themes, but which, as they, were to lead to nothing, were unworthy of statesmen sitting in a Cabinet? A great country certainly ought not lightly to engage in war; and it is not for us to be the general redressers of the world's grievances. But, on the other hand, I hope the rule is not to he laid down, that England is to remain an indifferent spectator in all cases of any amount of wrong committed among nations, and that, because other States think fit to shrink from the common duty of defending the weak against the strong, when there is a favourable opportunity, and we have the power to do it, we are to abstain from doing so. I say that there are cases in which the power of this country ought to be exerted to prevent wrong being done. But when you satisfy yourself that a case is not one for your interference, and that you clearly ought not to take up arms in regard to it, I say it is not for the credit, the character, or the dignity of this country that its Government should address to another Government scolding language, like an impotent; old woman. That is the opinion I have always entertained, and the results of the course taken by the noble Lord have only confirmed me more strongly in it than ever I do not, however, mean to enter into this question now. We have already partially discussed it, and perhaps a future opportunity may arise of further discussing it even in the present Session. But considering my relationship to the person who was at the head of the Government in 1831, I could not sit by and hear my noble Friend defend his policy with respect to Poland by comparing it with the policy then adopted.