HL Deb 09 May 1864 vol 175 cc177-88
LORD CAMPBELL

My Lords, in rising to call attention to the Correspondence upon Poland, I wish it to be understood that I was quite ready to give precedence to the notice upon Denmark had it been the pleasure of the House, as I was told on Friday that it would be. The noble Earl (the Earl of Carnarvon) having just withdrawn his notice, I have no course left except that of troubling your Lordships. My Lords, I am well aware of the nearly fatal disadvantage under which I do so. When Parliament has been and is engrossed by a transaction geographically nearer, still more critical, and still more vitally affecting our interest and honour, every other subject comes to be regarded with aversion. But it does not in the least follow that no duty remains to be fulfilled by us in reference to Poland. And should there be one, the events in Denmark, agitating as they are, can hardly supersede it. They increase, no doubt, the difficulty of suggesting it, and require brevity from any one who does so, but will not, I trust, preclude, on the part of this House at least, a limited indulgence. But, if it is essential in some degree to vindicate allusion to the Polish question at this moment, a fact well known to the House may be sufficient for the purpose. My noble Friend the Foreign Secretary delivered in the autumn a speech of much political significance. In that speech he uttered the opinions which form the basis of the present Resolutions. Addressing not only the people of Blairgowrie, but the country and the world, he informed them that the Czar had violated the conditions upon which the Treaty of Vienna had made him Sovereign in Poland; and that in consequence his title there could hardly be maintained. The speech caused a general vibration on the Continent, where, at that time, the Polish question overruled all others. I happened to be in Paris, coming back from Warsaw, at the moment, and I can speak in some degree of the impression which the noble Lord produced whose foreign policy was canvassed. For many days the press abounded with remarks upon his statement. It gave the Poles the liveliest assurance not of material support, but of such a diplomatic line as it appeared to promise and foreshadow. The question in Paris was—will a despatch be issued to St. Petersburg in the same sense and the same spirit. The despatch which followed in October was very far indeed from corresponding with the language at Blairgowrie. It rather dwelt on the benevolent intentions of the Czar, than on the wrongs of Poland and the violations of the treaty. Soon; afterwards a strong impression gained, currency in Europe that a despatch had reached St. Petersburg, of the very kind which might have been anticipated; that before it was presented the Russian Government objected to it; that, in obedience to their wishes, it was modified or mutilated, or in some degree transformed. In the other House of Parliament this Session, questions have been put, and the answers which the First Minister has given do not clash at all with such a version of what happened. If this notice elicits from the noble Lord an avowal that he was true to the opinions he delivered at Blairgowrie, until new events controlled the Foreign Office; if it elicits from him an avowal that he still maintains the view which in September he pronounced, the Polish cause will gain, according to the judgment of its highest representatives. Whether or not the Resolutions are accepted by the House, I may thus hope to be humbly instrumental in effecting an advantage for a people with whose objects it is easy to connect the balance of power, and in some contingencies the safety of Great Britain, although it is not requisite to touch upon the reasoning which leads to a conclusion of that nature. My Lords, if it is now clear that the subject ought not to be excluded, I can explain in a word the political result the Resolutions aim at. It is not to shake the power of the Czar, a result which some Members of the House desire and others deprecate. It is not even to give encouragement to Poland, a result which some noble Lords regard as inconsistent with our policy. The object they propose may challenge approbation from all parties, since it is merely to repair, so far as it is possible, the dignity and honour of the country which are compromised and tarnished by the attitude in which we stand upon the Polish question. At the same time, they do not call upon the Government to renew or to extend the correspondence with St. Petersburg. They allege that it has not reached a satisfactory conclusion, and that the Government are not bound to recognize the sovereignty in Poland, which the Treaty of Vienna called into existence, while that treaty is neglected; in other words, that at their own time, Ministers would be justified in taking the very course my noble Friend is understood to have adopted, or, at least, to have began and afterwards recoiled from. Were such Resolutions voted, although Government did nothing for the present, our diplomacy would have a very different end from that which now belongs to it. Reluctant as I am to detain the House, it is essential to advert to the Correspondence in order to ascertain how far it requires such a step as I propose. It is not at all requisite to dwell upon the early stages which came last Session before Parliament. A few words ought to revive a picture once familiar to your Lordships. Two despatches to Lord Napier, dated March 2 and April 10, 1863, contained the views of Her Majesty's Government on the Polish question. Their effect was to array nearly all the Powers who had signed the Treaty of Vienna in a remonstrance to the Czar, as to the misgovernment which had brought about the Polish insurrection. The reply of Prince Gortschakoff, dated April 26, and interpreted by Baron Brunnow, in an interview with the noble Lord on May 2, was accepted as in some degree encouraging. It led at least to a new effort in which France and Austria participated. On the 17th of June an elaborate despatch was addressed by the noble Lord to Lord Napier at St. Petersburg, in which Russia was advised to make six concessions to the Poles, in which an armistice was recommended between the Czar and the Insurgents, and, last of all, a Conference of all the Powers which had signed the Treaty of Vienna. The reply of Prince Gortschakoff was dated July 1. It forms an epoch in the Correspondence. It excited much uneasiness in Parliament. It rejected all the propositions of the Foreign Office; it dropped the mask which had been worn, and would hear of no arrangement for the Poles until the insurrection was annihilated. We now pass beyond the boundary of last Session, and come to the despatches which have never yet been brought before your Lordships. The noble Lord answered Prince Gortschakoff on the 11th of August, and-after copious refutation of his arguments, informed him that if Russia persisted in defiance of the treaty she would incur a very grave responsibility. On the 1st of September, in a manner which can only be described as a contemptuous one, Prince Gortschakoff declared the readiness of his Government to accept the whole responsibility of the course they were pursuing. The speech of my noble Friend on September 28th at Blairgowrie forms the next stage in the proceedings. Then follows the despatch of October 20, which seemed to contradict its tenor and to neutralize its value. As the question now before the House turns upon that document, the last which left the Foreign Office for St. Petersburg, its very phrases ought to be before your Lordships. After acknowledging the despatch of Prince Gortschakoff of September 9, it runs as follows:— Her Majesty's Government have no wish to prolong the correspondence on the subject of Poland for the mere purpose of controversy. Her Majesty's Government receive with satisfaction the assurance that the Emperor of Russia continues to be animated with intentions of benevolence towards Poland, and of conciliation in respect to all foreign Powers. Her Majesty's Government acknowledge that the relations of Russia towards European Powers are regulated by public law; but the Emperor of Russia has special obligations in regard to Poland. Her Majesty's Government have in the despatch of the 11th of August, and preceding despatches, shown, that in regard to this particular question, the rights of Poland are contained in the same instrument which constitutes the Emperor of Russia King of Poland. The House would look in vain through the despatch for a protest against the title which, according to the noble Lord, the Czar had forfeited in Poland. Its tone is one of acquiescence rather than reproach. But by far the most powerful and striking comment on its tendency is found in the remarks which it led to from Prince Gortschakoff, and which Lord Napier has reported. On the 27th of October, Lord Napier wrote to Earl Russell from St. Petersburg as follows:— The Vice Chancellor read your Lordship's despatch through aloud without offering any remark. In conclusion his Excellency observed, that in the communication with which I was charged, he saw a proof of the friendly disposition of Her Majesty's Government, and an act conformable to the true interest of Poland; for the moderation of Her Majesty's Government must discourage the exaggerated expectations of the revolutionary party, and hasten the moment when the Emperor would be enabled to carry into effect his benevolent intentions towards his Polish subjects. Great Britain, in the eyes of Prince Gortschakoff, was no longer the reprover, but bad sunk into the accomplice of St. Petersburg. Great Britain, in the eyes of the Vice Chancellor, by the despatch of October 27, had become an instrument in hastening the moment when the insurrection would succumb, and Polish nationality be stifled. This was the conclusion of the labours for the Polish cause by which Europe had been roused, and which France and Austria had conspicuously supported. Would any man presume to rise in either House of Parliament and call it satisfactory or tolerable? Would anybody venture to deny that the country was dishonoured until by some method she flung back the revolting praise which Russia had inflicted on us? And can it be done with greater moderation than by stating that Parliament is not responsible for the humiliating close of our diplomacy, and that in their opinion the Government are not bound to recognize a sovereignty which he Treaty of Vienna had created while its stipulations are forgotten, and while its objects are defied. In the full conviction that my noble Friend has held the very language which the Resolutions would suggest—that the despatch of October 27 was not the one originally contemplated—that the speech at Blairgowrie represented the genuine convictions and half accomplished measures of the Foreign Office, I shall not undertake myself, but leave to him the vindication of his doctrine. To such abilities as his the task would be an easy one. It would not be an effort to point out, by referring to the 1st article of the treaty, that Russia is bound to uphold the Polish nationality wherever it existed, and not only in what is now known as the kingdom. It would be still less difficult to show that the Russian system is directed to exterminate the very race which the Treaty of 1815 aspired to perpetuate. It follows that the sovereignty of the Czar, in every part of ancient Poland, is illegal. But in reply to those who think that such a declaration, although unanswerable, would be useless, my noble Friend might urge that the leading representatives of Poland have assiduously demanded it with a view to the position it would give them in their struggle. He might show that such a manifesto must pave the way for every legitimate solution of a question by which Europe has been agitated. Above all, he might dilate on the magnitude and stages of the crime involved in the dismemberment of Poland, and to which Great Britain is a party when she acknowledges the title of the Czar reposing as it does upon that crime, and not upon the treaty as its basis. My Lords, I stated that the practical result to which the Resolutions looked was one which all parties in the House would admit to be desirable, namely, to recall the dignity and honour of the country which the startling end of our diplomacy on this question has eclipsed. But there is one collateral advantage which they seem to me to promise. It cannot be denied that the alliance with France has suffered by our Polish Correspondence. On that side of the Channel it was felt that we had yielded too much to Russian influence and menace, and too suddenly renounced the path which in the spring of 1863 the French Government had joined us in attempting. When, indeed, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg could venture in October to describe us an ally against the Polish insurrection, the opinion could not be considered an unfounded one. A temperate and guarded declaration of what we feel as to the Polish title of the Czar, would do something to remove impressions of that character. Such an effect will not be underrated by your Lordships at a moment when the union of the Western Powers is seen to be more than ever indispensable to the integrity of free States, the peace of Europe, and the safety of the world. On this ground, as much as any, I commend the Resolutions to the favourable judgment of your Lordships, and move— That, in the Opinion of this House, the Correspondence of Her Majesty's Government with the Cabinet of Saint Petersburg on the Polish Question has not as yet reached a satisfactory Conclusion: That, in the Opinion of this House, the Czar having failed to comply with the Conditions upon which, according to the Treaty of Vienna, he acquired his Sovereignty in Poland, it is no longer binding on Her Majesty's Government to acknowledge it.

EARL RUSSELL

said, he thought their Lordships would agree with him in thinking that there could be no practical utility in coming to a Resolution in conformity with his noble Friend's Motion. On the contrary, he thought it would tend rather to impair than to increase the authority of the House. Out of respect to his noble Friend, he would, however, go over very briefly the different steps of the diplomatic negotiations in regard to Poland. Their Lordships knew that in 1831 a struggle took place in the Kingdom of Poland, similar to that of last year. His noble Friend Lord Palmerston, who was then Secretary of State under the Premiership of Earl Grey, carried on a correspondence in which he strongly protested against the acts of the Russian Government in Poland. The reply of the Russian Government was that the insurrection had put an end to the obligations of the Treaty of Vienna, and that the Kingdom of Poland was in the position of a conquered territory. In the beginning of last year, Lord Palmerston being then himself Premier, I reproduced the same arguments that my noble Friend had used, and the Russian Government replied very much to the effect—that they were not disposed to agree in principle to the proposals made by the Governments of England, France, and Austria. They acknowledged fully the authority of the Treaty of Vienna, and the obligations under which the Russian Government lay; but they urged that during a period of insurrection it was impossible, without de- stroying the legitimate authority of the Russian Government, to carry out the conditions laid down in that treaty, and that therefore their consideration must be postponed until a time of tranquillity; they alleged, moreover, that those conditions would not at all fulfil the expectations of the Polish insurgents, because what the Poles asked for was the restoration of the ancient Poland—not merely of the Kingdom of Poland, but of all the provinces which formerly belonged to that kingdom. Without finding fault with the Polish insurgents (for it was, of course, for them to consider what was their best part to take), still he must say that they had placed themselves on a ground where it was impossible for the parties to the Treaty of Vienna to follow them. At the end of July, there was a good deal of discussion between the three Governments of England, France, and Austria as to what should be the terms of a despatch to be sent in reply to the Russian Government. As appeared from the papers laid on the table of the French Legislative Body, the French Government wished that an identical despatch should be adopted; but Her Majesty's Government thought that that would imply action on the part of this country; while the Austrian Government, as is well known, were most averse to war on behalf of Poland: and every despatch and telegraphic communication from Vienna expressed over and over again the desire that Her Majesty's Government would do nothing to force the Austrian Government into war, as the state of their finances and other circumstances forbad them to look to war with any other feeling but the greatest apprehension. Her Majesty's Government, for reasons already explained in a former debate, were not likely to go to war on behalf of Poland, and for this obvious reason — that that country, unlike Greece and Belgium, in which insurrections had taken place, and where Governments had been set up which could be acknowledged, had effected nothing in the shape of successful insurrection, nor set up any Government which could be acknowledged and supported by the Governments of England, France, and Austria. In these circumstances the Austrian Government proposed to write a despatch to the Russian Government, containing the following expressions:— In again communicating our views to Prince Gortschakoff there would remain to us, at all events, an imperious duty to fulfil. It is that of calling his most serious attention to the gravity of the situation, and the responsibility which it imposes on Russia. Austria, France, and Great Britain have pointed out the urgency of putting an end to a state of things in itself deplorable, and full of perils for Europe. They have, at the same time, described the means which it appears to them should be employed to reach this end, and they have offered their concurrence with a view of attaining it with greater certainty. If Russia does not effect all that depends upon her to second the moderate and conciliatory views of these three Powers, if she does not enter upon the path which is pointed out to her by friendly counsels, she exposes herself to the grave consequences which the prolongation of the troubles of Poland may produce. This despatch was accepted by this country and by France. It did not pledge this country to war, but left England, France, and Austria at liberty to say at any time that they had warned Russia of the consequences of neglecting their friendly counsels. The French Government, contrary to the opinion of Austria and England, were for taking a course which, according to the judgment of Her Majesty's Government, would have ended in war, and there were reasons why Her Majesty's Government should not commit themselves to war. Under these circumstances, it was an easy matter for Prince Gortschakoff to say that he was willing to accept the responsibility imposed on him; but, at the same time, Prince Gortschakoff did not say, as he (Earl Russell) had supposed that Prince to have said, that Russia was in any degree freed from the obligations of the Treaty of Vienna. It was under the supposition that Prince Gortschakoff had made that statement that he delivered the speech alluded to by his noble Friend; and, in reply to the inquiry of his noble Friend as to what communication was made to the Russian Government, he had to observe that, in a despatch of the 20th of October, it was stated that— Her Majesty's Government have, in the despatch of the 11th of August and preceding despatches, shown that in regard to this particular question the rights of Poland are contained in the same instrument which constitutes the Emperor, of Russia King of Poland. After that despatch he received an assurance that the Russian Government fully acknowledged their obligations under the Treaty of Vienna. Then the question arose whether, without the hope of obtaining some practical benefit, it would have been wise to lose all the advantages which might hereafter arise from that acknowledgment by pressing certain demands on the Russian Government. If the Polish Insurgents had asserted their independence, and established an insurrectionary Government, it might have been possible to press those demands on the Russian Government; but as this was not the case, and as Austria and England were not willing to go to war, Russia was then reminded of her obligations arising out of the Treaty of Vienna. With respect to his opinion on the subject, he could only say that it had not at all altered. He did not think that the Emperor of Russia, if he persisted in a time of tranquillity to disregard all the obligations of the Treaty of Vienna, could make any just appeal to that treaty as the title of his sovereignty in Poland. The case, however, did not now arise, and he thought it would be imprudent on the part of Her Majesty's Government to raise it at the present time. He thought that they had better rest on the diplomatic Correspondence, very unsatisfactory as it appeared to him, which had taken place, rather than urge pressing demands which the Emperor of Russia might think freed him from his obligations. Looking to the future, he could not think that an Emperor of Russia of intelligent views could continue to govern Poland as if it was a country in perpetual insurrection. When some years ago some Polish friends spoke to him (Earl Russell) on the subject of Poland, he ventured to say to them— You have now among the Russians many who are anxious to obtain political freedom and a constitutional form of Government; and it seems to me that instead of promoting further animosity between Russia and Poland, it would be for the interest of Poland to wait until the Russian party who are in favour of freedom should obtain the privileges which they seek, and then, instead of having the Russian nation against you and opposed as they have always been with violent hostility to the Polish cause, you will have a large body among them in your favour, and you will have a greater prospect of gaining those rights which justly belong to you. The gentlemen to whom he had spoken were, he believed, anxious to take that advice, but the violence of the Viceroy of Poland had driven the Poles in anger and despair into insurrection. As a question of general policy, he believed the Poles were far more likely to obtain their rights when there was a greater appreciation of the value of liberty in Russia than there was at present. Unfortunately, in every contest between the Government of Russia and the Polish people, there had been a strong national feeling among the Russians that the greatness and glory of their country were concerned in putting down anything like resistance on the part of Poland. When that feeling was entirely done away with, the Poles might look for a better future. He thought there had been great forgetfulness on the part of the Poles of the changes which had taken place not only in the Duchy of Poland, but, to a still greater degree, at Dantzic and in Galicia, making it hopeless to think that those provinces would ever form part of Poland again. If, however, their views were confined to Poland only, they might look forward to a better state of things; and, after a time, to a Government conducted on principles of liberty by the Poles themselves. He trusted the noble Lord would not persevere with his Resolutions.

EARL GREY

concurred with the noble Earl in thinking that the Resolutions ought not to be pressed. He also agreed with his noble Friend that the Correspondence had come to an unsatisfactory conclusion —so unsatisfactory that it was better not to carry it any further. The only remark he wished to add was this—that he greatly lamented that last year, before the Correspondence began, his noble Friend had not considered to what it was likely to lead. He ventured last year to express an opinion that it could lead to no useful issue, that it was impossible for us to take up arms in behalf of Poland, and that if we did, evil only could result from our interference. All that had since occurred had shown the justice of that opinion. Our interference had only tended to encourage the Poles in a useless resistance to overwhelming force, to bring upon ourselves a rebuff which a nation like England ought not to be exposed to, and to leave matters in a worse state than we found them.

LORD CAMPBELL

said, that as no other noble Lord had risen to address the House, he must ask leave to trespass on them for a moment. No argument of any sort had been adduced against the Resolutions. But, without assurance of support, he should not deem it right to run the hazard of dividing. The noble Lord the Secretary of State had made a remark which in justice to himself he (Lord Campbell) was bound to notice. He had implied that a protest against the title of the Czar would release him from the obligations which the Treaty of Vienna had imposed upon him. How was it possible to release him from the obligations of that treaty by vindicating and asserting it? If the most limited assertion of the treaty did nothing to release him, why should he be released by the most solemn and the most conspicuous assertion of it? The declaration would be in substance that the Czar could not profit by the Treaty of Vienna while he defied the Treaty of Vienna; but must observe what it required in order to enjoy what it conceded. Such a manifesto would be obviously designed to circumscribe his action by the treaty, and not to disengage him from it. If it had the latter tendency, the noble Lord would not surely have made the speech he did make in September. There was one other observation which, in justice to the Polish leaders, he (Lord Campbell) could not leave unanswered. The noble Lord had charged them with attempting to withdraw from Austria and Russia the Polish territory which belonged to them. The Insurgents had studiously avoided the attempt, obeying policy instead of yielding to ambition. They had resolved to localize the struggle between Russia and themselves, in order that the German Powers might have no pretext for conspiring against them. He (Lord Campbell) disagreed altogether with his noble Friend in one opinion he had stated, namely, that the Resolutions, if adopted, would lower the dignity of Parliament. He felt convinced they would increase it, on the grounds he had already brought before their Lordships; and he was glad to find, that although the noble Lord was unwilling to accede to them, he had not deemed it right to question either of the propositions they embodied.

Resolutions, by leave of the House, withdrawn.

House adjourned at half past Six o'clock, till To-morrow, half past Ten o'clock.