§ THE EARL OF DERBYMy Lords, as I do not intend to raise any discussion upon the Question of which I have given notice, Whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to lay upon the table any further Papers relating to the Danish Invasion extending to a later period than those already published—perhaps the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs may think it convenient to answer it before we proceed to the ordinary business of the day. Upon the very voluminous and important papers which have been laid upon the table of both Houses of Parliament I do not intend to offer any observations. Those papers certainly disclose a condition of our foreign relations which imperatively requires, and will doubtless receive at no distant day, the deliberate consideration of Parliament. But circumstances are changing so rapidly, events are succeeding each other so fast, and such a total change in the position of affairs has taken place since the date of the last paper laid upon the table of the House, that I am sure I shall be excused for pressing the noble Lord to give us the latest information in his power as to the progress of the conflict between Denmark and Germany. The papers which have been presented to Parliament close with the unsuccessful attempt on the part of the noble Earl to obtain from the German Powers a postponement of the military operations in the Duchies. Since then, the noble Earl, I believe, has proved unsuccessful in three several instances—first, in obtaining an armistice for the purpose of agreeing to a Conference, to effect, if possible, a settlement of the differences; secondly, in obtaining a Conference, even without an armistice; and thirdly, in preventing—what I cannot doubt his having remonstrated against—the further steps which have been taken by the Austrian and Prussian forces. At the date of the last papers, Prussia and Austria had refused any delay of their advance to occupy the Duchies; but that occupation, according to their own statements, was at the time confined to taking possession of them as a material guarantee for the subsequent fulfilment by Denmark of the engagements entered into by her in 1851. Since then the circumstances have entirely changed by the occupation of Schleswig in a totally different character. 1616 Schleswig is no longer held as a material guarantee; the invading forces have taken it on themselves to do acts entirely inconsistent with the mere holding of the Duchy as a pledge, to be subsequently restored to its rightful owners. They have, for example, determined to destroy the Dannewerk, an act which, I believe, to be totally inconsistent with the position they assume, although it is quite true that the Dannewerk is a great fortress, and in future times might be of the greatest importance to Denmark. They have also taken on themselves to dismiss the Danish authorities, and by their sole authority to introduce German as the judicial language, even in purely Danish districts. At present they hold, though certainly in the face of some resistance, the whole of Schleswig, excepting the island of Alsen; but they have gone much beyond—they have commenced operations in Jutland, and the important town of Fredericia, commanding the passage to the Island of Funen, is now the subject of attack. Under these circumstances, the war certainly assumes a very different character from that which it presented at the date of the last despatches of which we are in possession. I will not comment on any of these documents. I have no doubt the noble Earl has done his best to prevent these unfortunate occurrences. But I wish now to ask him, Whether, under these altered circumstances, and with matters becoming day by day more critical and dangerous to the peace of Europe, he will consent, without loss of time, to lay further papers before your Lordships, extending down to the latest period to which his information has reached?
§ EARL RUSSELLMy Lords, the way in which the noble Earl has put his Question makes it necessary for me to state my views with regard to what has taken place. The noble Earl is aware that the German Powers—that is to say, Austria and Prussia—having declined to accede to the representations of Her Majesty's Government, and also to those of France and of Russia, entered on what I consider a most unjustifiable war. I say "a most unjustifiable war," because it has been generally laid down, with the consent of Europe, that, whatever cause of war may exist on the part of one State against another, that right of war must be postponed until reparation has been asked for and refused. Now, in the case of which we are speaking, though reparation was not given in the first 1617 instance, it was promised some time before the Austrians and Prussians could enter the Duchy of Schleswig, and therefore the allied troops—the troops of Austria and Prussia—entered the dominions of the King of Denmark, having before they occupied the Duchy of Holstein been aware that the King of Denmark was ready to consider their demands, and, I believe, had promised to take measures for the reparation of the wrong which had been done. I ought to mention, as there appears to have been an incompleteness in the statement made formerly, that the Danish Prime Minister alleged, that if the Constitution was to be repealed it would be necessary to re-organize the Danish monarchy, and that he was prepared, with the advice and consent of the non-German Powers, to do so. Having brought the question to this point, I consider that the Danish Government would have been fully justified in taking either of two courses. Had they thought proper, they might have treated the question merely as one of material guarantee, and have silently submitted to the occupation of portions of their territory for a temporary purpose; they would, on the other hand, have been fully justified in considering the invasion as an unjustifiable aggression, forming a ground for war, and in resisting it as such. The latter was the course which they took; they resisted the entry of the German troops, and although they abandoned the line of the Dannewerk they occupied the first strong position which they found in the rear of it. Then followed the decision that the Austrian and Prussian ships at sea should be captured. But beyond that, the Danish Government maintained that they had a cause of war against the other German Powers which, having ordered the Federal Execution in the Duchy of Holstein, had not confined their soldiers to the proper duties of troops of execution, but had permitted, had encouraged, had favoured the assumption of the sovereignty of that Duchy by a Pretender, who claimed it as against the King of Denmark, and thereby endeavoured to deprive that Monarch of part of his dominions. They therefore alleged, and I think justly, that they had a cause of war against the German Powers, and they ordered all the German ships that might be found at sea to be captured by Danish cruisers. My Lords, it is said that the beginning of strife is like the letting out of water, and certainly the conduct of Austria and Prussia affords an illustration of the truth of that maxim. 1618 They declared that this being war, they were no longer bound to consider it as a question of material guarantee, and that they would carry it on as a matter of war. They directed their troops, in the first instance, to take possession of a town in Jutland, and they have since declared that they mean to occupy the whole of that province. The noble Earl asks whether, in this condition of affairs, I shall not think fit to give further papers illustrating the course of these events and the conduct of Her Majesty's Government. I should say—and I think the noble Earl will agree with me— that it is not for the advantage of the public, or of any negotiations, that papers should constantly be laid upon the table. Either at the close, or at a break in the course of events, papers may be given; but it certainly would not be advisable that each step in the negotiations and every despatch, to which in some instances an answer might not have been received, should be made matter of Parliamentary discussion. There is, however, approaching a period when there must be a break in the course of these events. The noble Earl has referred—not very accurately—to the steps which Her Majesty's Government have taken in order to restore peace. We first endeavoured to procure an armistice. That did not succeed, the German Powers declaring that they would not consent to it. We next proposed that the belligerents should meet in conference to endeavour to restore peace without any cessation of hostilities. Two of the Powers, Austria and Prussia, stated that they were quite ready to enter into a Conference for that purpose, and they have since declared that they are ready to agree to an armistice based either upon the maintenance of the military status quo or upon other conditions. Her Majesty's Government did not think it advisable to propose to the other Powers, who are not belligerents, to enter into that Conference until the decision of the belligerent Powers had been received. Therefore, these proposals were addressed only to Austria, to Prussia, and to Denmark. I have told your Lordships that Austria and Prussia were ready to agree to that Conference. The answer of Denmark has not yet been received. Her Majesty's Government said, that as it was reported that great excitement existed at Copenhagen upon this subject, they would not press for an immediate reply; but, at the end of this week, we expect that Denmark will answer either in 1619 the affirmative or negative the proposal that has been made. As soon as that answer has been received, there will obviously be a break in these affairs. Either the Powers will enter into Conference—I have no doubt from the intimations which I have received that France, Russia, and Sweden would be ready to go into these Conferences—and then negotiations will begin on a new footing, or the Conference will be refused by Denmark, and then again the war will take a new shape. I therefore consider that when we have received the answer which we are expecting from Denmark, and which cannot, I think, be received later than the beginning of next week, will be the proper time to prepare the papers for production. I trust that the noble Earl will feel that it is fitting that papers should not be given constantly; and that he will think that the publication of documents giving an account of what has happened from the 1st of February to nearly the middle of March will be a production of papers such as Parliament has a right to expect.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYI hope that we shall receive the papers before the Easter recess. They must be in course of preparation, and it cannot be necessary that at the close of these negotiations any lengthened period should be occupied in preparing them. It would be convenient that they should be in the hands of noble Lords before we adjourn for the Easter recess.
§ EARL RUSSELLThey shall be prepared as soon as possible. I cannot pledge myself to produce them by a particular time, because every one at the Foreign Office is so busy with the papers which have been asked for relating to China and America, that it will be very difficult to get them ready immediately.
§ VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFEMy Lords, I do not rise with the intention of prolonging this conversation. The subject on which it turns is indeed most interesting and important. But I feel, in common with the noble Earl opposite, that the time is not yet come for going into its merits as fully and decidedly as a more complete knowledge of the correspondence would enable us to do. We have reason, I conceive, to thank my noble Friend on the Treasury bench for the additional information which he has now supplied. I confess that I came down to the House this evening with the intention of asking another and perhaps a more decisive Question than that which has been put 1620 by my noble Friend on the other side. I meant to ask, whether we might expect to hear from Her Majesty's Government, before the two Houses separated for the approaching holidays, some distinct announcement of the policy they are prepared to adopt on the close of that long series of endeavours for peace by which they have displayed their earnest anxiety to compose those unhappy differences which have converted the territory of Denmark into a theatre of war? Such a declaration we are entitled to expect, if the pledge already given, some little time ago in the other House of Parliament, is to be redeemed. I enter fully into all the difficulties of the question before us. I should be sorry to embarrass those who are responsible for our part in them; I would make full allowance for the complications which beset them on every side; but I cannot disguise my impression that any unnecessary delay in coming to a decision—any useless protraction of the present uncertainty—would be not only inconsistent with what is due to Parliament and the country, but highly prejudicial to the public tranquillity and to the interests of our immense and sensitive trade. Hesitation and an absence of all precipitancy in the earlier stages of a question involving such vast interests and perilous chances may be, and often is, a paramount duty; but such indecision ought to find limits in the probability of success and the requirements of national credit and the national prosperity. What I now understand from my noble Friend the Secretary of State is, that the line of negotiation has not been yet spun out to its extreme end, and that some few days must still elapse before a sufficient break in the course of proceedings can warrant the production of more papers, and also a decision between continuance in the same course, or the adoption of a new one. Of all the Members in your Lordships' House I should be the last to require any communication inconsistent with the interests of the State and a fair consideration for the Government; and therefore I am content to reserve the question which I had intended to put, and which, in my mind, would have been warranted by the increasing complication of events, by the apparent preparations in Sweden, by the undisguised concurrenc of Austria with the aggressive operation of Prussia and in general by the impending danger of a more extended war, at the eventual cost to Denmark of its strength and independence, and perhaps to all Europe 1621 of its best and dearest interests. I learn with pleasure that there is still a chance of settlement, though it be only a chance, and the more so, as that failing, nothing would seem to remain but the sad alternative of total inaction—if you please, a dignified abeyance—or an attitude of resolute interference in co-operation with such friendly Powers as have sincerely at heart the claims of justice and the welfare of Europe.
§ THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH—Will the noble Earl the Secretary of State inform us what were the precise conditions as to the armistice which were proposed by Austria and Prussia?
§ EARL RUSSELLIt is impossible that I should state precisely the conditions of the armistice, because those received from Vienna and Berlin do not entirely agree. I would, therefore, rather not attempt to state precisely those conditions; but, as I understand, the Government of Berlin is quite ready, and probably that of Austria would not object, to conclude an armistice on the condition that each Power should maintain its present military position, or the position, whatever it may be, at the moment the armistice is made. There is another proposal, that the whole of Schleswig should be given up to the Austrian and Prussian troops which have invaded it, and that the whole of Jutland should be occupied by the Danes. I cannot say anything as to the acceptance of that proposal.
§ THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHI hope the noble Earl will at once reject it.
§ EARL RUSSELLIt is not proposed to me. It will be for the Danes to consider what is for their own interests. My noble Friend asks a Question which it is difficult to answer. There is no sort of complication which seems to be left out in this case. We have not only the complications between Denmark and Austria and Prussia, relative to the understanding of the somewhat obscure conditions of 1851, but there is in addition the Question, how far Austria and Prussia on the one hand and Denmark on the other are ready to abide by those conditions? What we have stated, and what was stated on the 31st of January, before Parliament met, and again by Austria and Prussia within these few days, is that they abide by the condition that the integrity of Denmark should be preserved and respected. There is, however, no very definite statement made as to how far the conditions of 1851 are to be abided by. Austria and Prussia, it would seem, 1622 will not be content with the conditions then laid down, but require some further arrangement. Now, anybody who looks into these conditions must see that there might be variations made in them which would still leave Denmark free and independent, and others which would make the Government at Copenhagen dependent on foreign Powers. It would therefore be difficult to say what course the Government might, under these circumstances, feel called upon to take. But beyond what I have stated, there are complications existing in Germany itself. About one-third, or nearly the whole, of the Federation are in favour of the Pretender, who we thought had consented to renounce all claims, and never to disturb the King or the family of the late King of Denmark. Then, again, there were several Powers changing from time to time—at one time declaring for the Prince of Augustenburg and at another time for the King of Denmark. These things make it exceedingly difficult for the Government at this moment to announce its intentions. All I can say at present is that Austria and Prussia solemnly declare that they do not mean to go beyond the declaration of January, 1831, and are prepared to maintain the integrity of Denmark.