Lords Sitting of 8 March 1864

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILL—Sir John Law-rence's Salary (No. 10), considered in Committee and reported,*

DENMARK AND GERMANY—INVASION OF DENMARK—THE CORRESPONDENCE.—QUESTION.
THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, as I do not intend to raise any discussion upon the Question of which I have given notice, Whether it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to lay upon the table any further Papers relating to the Danish Invasion extending to a later period than those already published—perhaps the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs may think it convenient to answer it before we proceed to the ordinary business of the day. Upon the very voluminous and important papers which have been laid upon the table of both Houses of Parliament I do not intend to offer any observations. Those papers certainly disclose a condition of our foreign relations which imperatively requires, and will doubtless receive at no distant day, the deliberate consideration of Parliament. But circumstances are changing so rapidly, events are succeeding each other so fast, and such a total change in the position of affairs has taken place since the date of the last paper laid upon the table of the House, that I am sure I shall be excused for pressing the noble Lord to give us the latest information in his power as to the progress of the conflict between Denmark and Germany. The papers which have been presented to Parliament close with the unsuccessful attempt on the part of the noble Earl to obtain from the German Powers a postponement of the military operations in the Duchies. Since then, the noble Earl, I believe, has proved unsuccessful in three several instances—first, in obtaining an armistice for the purpose of agreeing to a Conference, to effect, if possible, a settlement of the differences; secondly, in obtaining a Conference, even without an armistice; and thirdly, in preventing—what I cannot doubt his having remonstrated against—the further steps which have been taken by the Austrian and Prussian forces. At the date of the last papers, Prussia and Austria had refused any delay of their advance to occupy the Duchies; but that occupation, according to their own statements, was at the time confined to taking possession of them as a material guarantee for the subsequent fulfilment by Denmark of the engagements entered into by her in 1851. Since then the circumstances have entirely changed by the occupation of Schleswig in a totally different character.
1616
Schleswig is no longer held as a material guarantee; the invading forces have taken it on themselves to do acts entirely inconsistent with the mere holding of the Duchy as a pledge, to be subsequently restored to its rightful owners. They have, for example, determined to destroy the Dannewerk, an act which, I believe, to be totally inconsistent with the position they assume, although it is quite true that the Dannewerk is a great fortress, and in future times might be of the greatest importance to Denmark. They have also taken on themselves to dismiss the Danish authorities, and by their sole authority to introduce German as the judicial language, even in purely Danish districts. At present they hold, though certainly in the face of some resistance, the whole of Schleswig, excepting the island of Alsen; but they have gone much beyond—they have commenced operations in Jutland, and the important town of Fredericia, commanding the passage to the Island of Funen, is now the subject of attack. Under these circumstances, the war certainly assumes a very different character from that which it presented at the date of the last despatches of which we are in possession. I will not comment on any of these documents. I have no doubt the noble Earl has done his best to prevent these unfortunate occurrences. But I wish now to ask him, Whether, under these altered circumstances, and with matters becoming day by day more critical and dangerous to the peace of Europe, he will consent, without loss of time, to lay further papers before your Lordships, extending down to the latest period to which his information has reached?
EARL RUSSELL: My Lords, the way in which the noble Earl has put his Question makes it necessary for me to state my views with regard to what has taken place. The noble Earl is aware that the German Powers—that is to say, Austria and Prussia—having declined to accede to the representations of Her Majesty's Government, and also to those of France and of Russia, entered on what I consider a most unjustifiable war. I say "a most unjustifiable war," because it has been generally laid down, with the consent of Europe, that, whatever cause of war may exist on the part of one State against another, that right of war must be postponed until reparation has been asked for and refused. Now, in the case of which we are speaking, though reparation was not given in the first

1617
instance, it was promised some time before the Austrians and Prussians could enter the Duchy of Schleswig, and therefore the allied troops—the troops of Austria and Prussia—entered the dominions of the King of Denmark, having before they occupied the Duchy of Holstein been aware that the King of Denmark was ready to consider their demands, and, I believe, had promised to take measures for the reparation of the wrong which had been done. I ought to mention, as there appears to have been an incompleteness in the statement made formerly, that the Danish Prime Minister alleged, that if the Constitution was to be repealed it would be necessary to re-organize the Danish monarchy, and that he was prepared, with the advice and consent of the non-German Powers, to do so. Having brought the question to this point, I consider that the Danish Government would have been fully justified in taking either of two courses. Had they thought proper, they might have treated the question merely as one of material guarantee, and have silently submitted to the occupation of portions of their territory for a temporary purpose; they would, on the other hand, have been fully justified in considering the invasion as an unjustifiable aggression, forming a ground for war, and in resisting it as such. The latter was the course which they took; they resisted the entry of the German troops, and although they abandoned the line of the Dannewerk they occupied the first strong position which they found in the rear of it. Then followed the decision that the Austrian and Prussian ships at sea should be captured. But beyond that, the Danish Government maintained that they had a cause of war against the other German Powers which, having ordered the Federal Execution in the Duchy of Holstein, had not confined their soldiers to the proper duties of troops of execution, but had permitted, had encouraged, had favoured the assumption of the sovereignty of that Duchy by a Pretender, who claimed it as against the King of Denmark, and thereby endeavoured to deprive that Monarch of part of his dominions. They therefore alleged, and I think justly, that they had a cause of war against the German Powers, and they ordered all the German ships that might be found at sea to be captured by Danish cruisers. My Lords, it is said that the beginning of strife is like the letting out of water, and certainly the conduct of Austria and Prussia affords an illustration of the truth of that maxim.
1618
They declared that this being war, they were no longer bound to consider it as a question of material guarantee, and that they would carry it on as a matter of war. They directed their troops, in the first instance, to take possession of a town in Jutland, and they have since declared that they mean to occupy the whole of that province. The noble Earl asks whether, in this condition of affairs, I shall not think fit to give further papers illustrating the course of these events and the conduct of Her Majesty's Government. I should say—and I think the noble Earl will agree with me— that it is not for the advantage of the public, or of any negotiations, that papers should constantly be laid upon the table. Either at the close, or at a break in the course of events, papers may be given; but it certainly would not be advisable that each step in the negotiations and every despatch, to which in some instances an answer might not have been received, should be made matter of Parliamentary discussion. There is, however, approaching a period when there must be a break in the course of these events. The noble Earl has referred—not very accurately—to the steps which Her Majesty's Government have taken in order to restore peace. We first endeavoured to procure an armistice. That did not succeed, the German Powers declaring that they would not consent to it. We next proposed that the belligerents should meet in conference to endeavour to restore peace without any cessation of hostilities. Two of the Powers, Austria and Prussia, stated that they were quite ready to enter into a Conference for that purpose, and they have since declared that they are ready to agree to an armistice based either upon the maintenance of the military status quo or upon other conditions. Her Majesty's Government did not think it advisable to propose to the other Powers, who are not belligerents, to enter into that Conference until the decision of the belligerent Powers had been received. Therefore, these proposals were addressed only to Austria, to Prussia, and to Denmark. I have told your Lordships that Austria and Prussia were ready to agree to that Conference. The answer of Denmark has not yet been received. Her Majesty's Government said, that as it was reported that great excitement existed at Copenhagen upon this subject, they would not press for an immediate reply; but, at the end of this week, we expect that Denmark will answer either in

1619
the affirmative or negative the proposal that has been made. As soon as that answer has been received, there will obviously be a break in these affairs. Either the Powers will enter into Conference—I have no doubt from the intimations which I have received that France, Russia, and Sweden would be ready to go into these Conferences—and then negotiations will begin on a new footing, or the Conference will be refused by Denmark, and then again the war will take a new shape. I therefore consider that when we have received the answer which we are expecting from Denmark, and which cannot, I think, be received later than the beginning of next week, will be the proper time to prepare the papers for production. I trust that the noble Earl will feel that it is fitting that papers should not be given constantly; and that he will think that the publication of documents giving an account of what has happened from the 1st of February to nearly the middle of March will be a production of papers such as Parliament has a right to expect.
THE EARL OF DERBY: I hope that we shall receive the papers before the Easter recess. They must be in course of preparation, and it cannot be necessary that at the close of these negotiations any lengthened period should be occupied in preparing them. It would be convenient that they should be in the hands of noble Lords before we adjourn for the Easter recess.
EARL RUSSELL: They shall be prepared as soon as possible. I cannot pledge myself to produce them by a particular time, because every one at the Foreign Office is so busy with the papers which have been asked for relating to China and America, that it will be very difficult to get them ready immediately.
VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE: My Lords, I do not rise with the intention of prolonging this conversation. The subject on which it turns is indeed most interesting and important. But I feel, in common with the noble Earl opposite, that the time is not yet come for going into its merits as fully and decidedly as a more complete knowledge of the correspondence would enable us to do. We have reason, I conceive, to thank my noble Friend on the Treasury bench for the additional information which he has now supplied. I confess that I came down to the House this evening with the intention of asking another and perhaps a more decisive Question than that which has been put
1620
by my noble Friend on the other side. I meant to ask, whether we might expect to hear from Her Majesty's Government, before the two Houses separated for the approaching holidays, some distinct announcement of the policy they are prepared to adopt on the close of that long series of endeavours for peace by which they have displayed their earnest anxiety to compose those unhappy differences which have converted the territory of Denmark into a theatre of war? Such a declaration we are entitled to expect, if the pledge already given, some little time ago in the other House of Parliament, is to be redeemed. I enter fully into all the difficulties of the question before us. I should be sorry to embarrass those who are responsible for our part in them; I would make full allowance for the complications which beset them on every side; but I cannot disguise my impression that any unnecessary delay in coming to a decision—any useless protraction of the present uncertainty—would be not only inconsistent with what is due to Parliament and the country, but highly prejudicial to the public tranquillity and to the interests of our immense and sensitive trade. Hesitation and an absence of all precipitancy in the earlier stages of a question involving such vast interests and perilous chances may be, and often is, a paramount duty; but such indecision ought to find limits in the probability of success and the requirements of national credit and the national prosperity. What I now understand from my noble Friend the Secretary of State is, that the line of negotiation has not been yet spun out to its extreme end, and that some few days must still elapse before a sufficient break in the course of proceedings can warrant the production of more papers, and also a decision between continuance in the same course, or the adoption of a new one. Of all the Members in your Lordships' House I should be the last to require any communication inconsistent with the interests of the State and a fair consideration for the Government; and therefore I am content to reserve the question which I had intended to put, and which, in my mind, would have been warranted by the increasing complication of events, by the apparent preparations in Sweden, by the undisguised concurrenc of Austria with the aggressive operation of Prussia and in general by the impending danger of a more extended war, at the eventual cost to Denmark of its strength and independence, and perhaps to all Europe

1621
of its best and dearest interests. I learn with pleasure that there is still a chance of settlement, though it be only a chance, and the more so, as that failing, nothing would seem to remain but the sad alternative of total inaction—if you please, a dignified abeyance—or an attitude of resolute interference in co-operation with such friendly Powers as have sincerely at heart the claims of justice and the welfare of Europe.
THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH:—Will the noble Earl the Secretary of State inform us what were the precise conditions as to the armistice which were proposed by Austria and Prussia?
EARL RUSSELL: It is impossible that I should state precisely the conditions of the armistice, because those received from Vienna and Berlin do not entirely agree. I would, therefore, rather not attempt to state precisely those conditions; but, as I understand, the Government of Berlin is quite ready, and probably that of Austria would not object, to conclude an armistice on the condition that each Power should maintain its present military position, or the position, whatever it may be, at the moment the armistice is made. There is another proposal, that the whole of Schleswig should be given up to the Austrian and Prussian troops which have invaded it, and that the whole of Jutland should be occupied by the Danes. I cannot say anything as to the acceptance of that proposal.
THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH: I hope the noble Earl will at once reject it.
EARL RUSSELL: It is not proposed to me. It will be for the Danes to consider what is for their own interests. My noble Friend asks a Question which it is difficult to answer. There is no sort of complication which seems to be left out in this case. We have not only the complications between Denmark and Austria and Prussia, relative to the understanding of the somewhat obscure conditions of 1851, but there is in addition the Question, how far Austria and Prussia on the one hand and Denmark on the other are ready to abide by those conditions? What we have stated, and what was stated on the 31st of January, before Parliament met, and again by Austria and Prussia within these few days, is that they abide by the condition that the integrity of Denmark should be preserved and respected. There is, however, no very definite statement made as to how far the conditions of 1851 are to be abided by. Austria and Prussia, it would seem,
1622
will not be content with the conditions then laid down, but require some further arrangement. Now, anybody who looks into these conditions must see that there might be variations made in them which would still leave Denmark free and independent, and others which would make the Government at Copenhagen dependent on foreign Powers. It would therefore be difficult to say what course the Government might, under these circumstances, feel called upon to take. But beyond what I have stated, there are complications existing in Germany itself. About one-third, or nearly the whole, of the Federation are in favour of the Pretender, who we thought had consented to renounce all claims, and never to disturb the King or the family of the late King of Denmark. Then, again, there were several Powers changing from time to time—at one time declaring for the Prince of Augustenburg and at another time for the King of Denmark. These things make it exceedingly difficult for the Government at this moment to announce its intentions. All I can say at present is that Austria and Prussia solemnly declare that they do not mean to go beyond the declaration of January, 1831, and are prepared to maintain the integrity of Denmark.

CURTIS'S STEERING SCREW—PROPELLING AND STEERING STEAM SHIPS.

  PETITION.
  THE EARL OF HARDWICKE presented a Petition from Mr. W. J. Curtis, praying for a favourable consideration of his invention for propelling and steering steam ships. The noble Earl said, the inventor felt himself aggrieved by the policy and conduct of the Admiralty. This was a time of great change in the construction of ships, and among other matters of difficulty which had arisen was the difficulty of steering, and many attempts had been made to enable them to steer long ships in an easier way than the present mode. It was quite right that all inventions should be subjected to a thorough test before they were submitted to the Admiralty; but this was a peculiar case, as the rapid steering of the ships of the navy was more important to them than it was to merchant ships, which, when once out of port, went straight away on their voyage, whereas the power of a ship's armament depended very materially on the power of manœuvring her rapidly. Mr. Curtis suggested to the Admiralty that he

  1623
  should be allowed to make use of a gunboat, and he obtained one 160 feet long, and applied it to his steering apparatus, and a series of experiments was made, and he was to supply all the means of making these experiments at his own expense. The experiment appeared to be one of sufficient importance to induce the public journals to send their reporters to be present, with a view of giving an account—as they generally did with so much intelligence—of what was going on, and the statement made by the reporter of The Times with respect to the particular experiment of Mr. Curtis which had been tried on board the Charger gunboat, was of a most flattering character. There was, besides, a certificate, making satisfactory mention of it, from two marine surveyors, as well as a statement made by Sir Edmund Belcher, and another emanating from a Russian Rear Admiral, expressing their approval of the invention, the opinion of the latter being that by its means the vessel was enabled to manœuvre with a rapidity which would be impossible in the case of an ordinary screw. The pilot who went in the gunboat from the Thames to Portsmouth reported that the screw and steering apparatus acted admirably in a gale of wind, and allowed the vessel to turn round quicker than any other screw which he had seen. The assistant pilot confirmed that statement, and added that the vessel was easily brought head to wind and tacked in a manner to excite the admiration of all on board. Throughout the whole of a trying passage the screw, he said, worked satisfactorily without damage to the vessel or machinery. The petitioner had set out these statements in his petition to show their Lordships that the experiments had succeeded, and in carrying out these experiments he had incurred an expense of £2,000, and after that he was dropped by the Admiralty, and heard no more on the subject, nor could he learn in what he had failed, and therefore he came to their Lordships. He (the Earl of Hardwicke) thought this a case for investigation, as if the Admiralty availed themselves of the labour and of the minds of these gentlemen who made inventions, and then rejected them without giving any reason, it must have a discouraging effect on that very useful body of men.
  THE DUKE OF SOMERSETsaid, he was glad the noble Earl had brought the subject forward, because it afforded a good illustration of there being two sides to a question. Their Lordships had heard the
  1624
  opinion of the inventor as to the value of his invention. He would state shortly the reports which he had received of the same invention. In November, 1862, Mr. Curtis proposed his invention to the Admiralty. It was sent to him (the Duke of Somerset), and, as he did not pretend to be a judge of a question which really involved a great deal of engineering skill, he sent it to the Controller's Department. The Engineer-in-Chief in London, who was a gentleman of great experience, after looking at it, said he had no confidence in it, and pointed out that whereas the chief difficulty as to steerage in all vessels was in the after part not being sufficiently strong, this plan tended to weaken the after part of the vessel, instead of strengthening it. He was anxious to get another opinion, and he sent the model down to the Engineer at Portsmouth, and, without telling him that he had received any report, asked for his candid opinion upon it. That opinion was against the invention as being of no practical value, and that it was not desirable that the Government should incur any expense in trying it. He then told Mr. Curtis that, in the face of those opinions, he did not feel authorized in putting the public to any expense in experiments. Mr. Curtis proposed to fit up a gunboat at his own expense if the Admiralty would lend him one; and, as he thought there was nothing like trying a thing practically, he assented. Accordingly, a gunboat was placed at the disposition of Mr. Curtis, who went to Portsmouth and had it fitted up under his superintendence and to his perfect satisfaction. Mr. Curtis then begged leave to be allowed to bring the gunboat round to the river Thames; and as it was said the invention added to the speed of the vessel, and therefore was of equal value in merchant ships as in Her Majesty's ships of war, he thought those connected with the private trade would, at all events, have an opportunity of seeing the experiment in the river. The vessel was not finished until August, 1863. The moment it was ready for trial he sent directions to an officer of the steam reserve at Sheerness to make the trial, in order to see how the steering apparatus answered in comparison with the ordinary mode of steering, and whether it affected injuriously the machinery of the vessel. Another gunboat of about the same size was taken out, and the report was that in turning she did it in ten seconds less time than the gunboat with the improved rud-

  1625
  der. The officers who made the trial also reported that when the engines stopped, from the peculiar mode in which the rudder and screw were connected, the vessel was totally unmanageable, and that there was a very objectionable rattling of the screw, which would certainly increase with the working of the vessel. Another trial was made, and afterwards a letter was sent to Mr. Curtis, telling him that it was of no use trying it any further, and that the vessel might go back to Portsmouth. He might also mention that when in the river, in the course of one manœuvre, the gunboat ran over an oyster vessel. When she got back to Portsmouth, with the consent of Mr. Curtis, Captain Cochrane, of the Warrior, tried her, but it did not lead to any more favourable report. He then received from Mr. Curtis a letter attacking all the persons who had been concerned, saying that every one had been most dishonest, and had conspired and leagued together against him. The newspaper at Portsmouth did not think the trial successful, and immediately Mr. Curtis wrote to Captain Cochrane accusing him of having written the article. Captain Cochrane, however, replied that he had neither written the article nor given any suggestions for it. Mr. Curtis further attributed all that had happened to the fault of the Admiralty, notwithstanding that they had incurred some expense in trying the invention. The Admiralty had, from the first, been informed by all practical men, that the invention would not succeed, and the trial by officers who had not been previously consulted confirmed their opinion. This showed the state of mind at which the inventor arrived—declaring that he had been ill-treated from beginning to end, and laying all the blame of his failure at the door of the Admiralty. The last letter which he had received from Mr. Curtis was to the effect that he should petition Her Majesty, and should lay the whole case before both Houses of Parliament. The noble Earl was the first person who had brought it before Parliament, and he hoped he had given him a satisfactory answer. At the trial there certainly was an advantage on the side of Mr. Curtis's invention in the matter of speed; but the trial was not for speed. The gunboat which was taken out to try against her had her boilers leaky and her bottom foul, and there was very little difficulty in beating her. The trial had been very fairly conducted, and he could only point out to the inventor that if his invention were as valu-
  1626
  able as he maintained, the whole shipbuilding and commercial interests of the country would be certain to take it up.
  Petition ordered to lie on the table.

RESIGNATION OF SIR ROWLAND HILL.

  QUESTION.
  LORD TRUROrose to ask Her Majesty's Postmaster General, Whether the Rumour of Sir Rowland Hill's Resignation is well founded; and, if so, whether he has any Objection to state the Circumstances under which that Resignation has taken place? The noble Lord said he put the Question to satisfy the strongly expressed desire of the public to know the truth of the rumour to this effect which had got abroad. He was sure that it would cause general regret to hear of the existence of any cause for the retirement of a man who had conferred such an immeasurable benefit upon the country, and, indeed, upon the whole civilized world?
  LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEYsaid, it was true that Sir Rowland had recently resigned his position in the Post Office in consequence of the state of his health. Six months ago he applied for six months' leave of absence, in the hope that he might then be enabled to resume his duties; but at the end of that period—the beginning of this month—he forwarded his resignation, saying that the six months' leave of absence had not restored his health, and accompanying it with a medical certificate stating that it would not be safe for him to resume his duties in the Post Office. Those were the whole circumstances connected with Sir Rowland Hill's resignation, as far as he was acquainted with them. He was sure that he should meet with their Lordships' concurrence in expressing the deepest regret at the retirement of this able public servant. The name of Sir Rowland Hill would be inseparably connected with the establishment of the penny post system—one of the greatest improvements of the present age—and which had, perhaps, conferred more benefit on mankind than any other recent reform. Those who recollected the state of things before the penny post would know that to the poorer classes correspondence by letter was at that time almost practically interdicted, that to the class above them the cost of a letter was a very serious matter, and that in the commercial and mercantile world intercourse was injuriously

  1627
  restricted by the expense of correspondence. Since its first introduction the penny post system had been greatly extended; facilities of all sorts were given; money orders and savings banks had been connected with it, and in every way it had been largely developed. It had become popular all over the civilized world, and with it the name of Hill would be for ever connected. Their Lordships would confirm him in expressing the general regret which would be felt by the public at his retirement, and the universal acknowledgment of the value of his services would, no doubt, be a great satisfaction to Sir Rowland Hill.

THE AUSTRIAN FLEET IN THE BALTIC.

  QUESTION.
  THE EARL OF SHAFTESBURY: My Lords, I rise to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Whether he can give to the House any Information respecting the Movements of the Austrian Fleet towards the Baltic? My reason in putting this Question will be obvious. Never have I known the people of this country more profoundly stirred than at present, never have I known greater anxiety displayed than in the contemplation of the struggle between the little and gallant kingdom of Denmark and the two great overgrown German Powers—50,000,000 against 3,000,000. It is very strange that this country should find itself now in opposition to Austria and Prussia, the two great Conservative monarchies from whom we looked for nothing but peace and order, and from whom we now expect nothing but conflagration. But, my Lords, so it is. We cannot look without dismay—and I am sure the whole country feels what I say—at these two great Powers resuming their old career of insult and spoliation. Now, I must say the feelings of the country have been very much touched by the conduct of the King of Denmark. The concessions the King of Denmark has promised to make must be considered as a sufficient reparation for any wrongs which may have been committed. It is not necessary to argue here whether the Danes were in the right or not with regard to the Patent of Holstein and the Constitution of Schleswig. They have agreed to recall those Constitutions and to make the utmost concessions which were originally asked. This little kingdom comes before its mighty oppressors, saying, "Have patience with me, and I
  1628
  will pay you all;" but the oppressors seize her by the throat, invade her territory, have inflicted on her unutterable calamities, and have instituted a, war which for wantonness and needlessness is one of the most disgraceful to be found in any page of ancient or modern history. It is an ominous feature of that war that the Austrian fleet is said to be making its way towards the Baltic. Perhaps it is singular that one should hear at all of an Austrian fleet; certainly it is singular to hear of it with any misgivings; and I therefore ask my noble Friend, whether he can furnish us with any information on the subject. Upon this point I will make but one remark. We may receive a reply to the effect that the Austrian fleet is making its way in great force to the Baltic. If that be so, we can have no doubt as to its destination or its purpose. Or, we may be told that there are only one or two vessels. That will be most unsatisfactory, for we shall regard them as precursors of a larger force. I do not hesitate to say—and I am sure I do not stand alone in the country of England in saying it—that whether the force of Austria be great or small, I trust it will be met at the entrance of the Baltic by a British fleet, and that this British fleet will have the instructions of Her Majesty to watch its movements, to restrict its operations, and, if necessary, to defend by force of arms the integrity, and, I will say, the sanctity of the Kingdom of Denmark?
  EARL RUSSELL: I will only answer my noble Friend as to the facts which have come to my knowledge with respect to the intention of the Austrian Government. When we first heard that ships of war were to be sent from the Adriatic, I wrote to our Minister at Vienna, and I inquired of the Austrian Minister in London as to the intentions of the Austrian Government. We were told that there were many Austrian ships in danger in the Mediterranean and the Adriatic from Danish ships, and that it was necessary to protect them; and we were told also that there were about 140 ships bearing the Austrian flag coming from America about this time, and bound to English ports, and that it was the intention of the Austrian Government to send two or three vessels of war to the mouth of the Channel in order to save those ships from any Danish cruisers that might be on the look-out for them. But within the last few days another rumour has been circulated, and I have received further information. It is said, in the first

  1629
  place, that there is no intention whatever of sending any Austrian ships into the Baltic; that neither to the Cattegat nor further through the Baltic is it intended to send any Austrian ships. That is the statement of the Austrian Government. But they say that if the blockade of the Elbe is instituted there is danger that a great deal of German commerce may fall into the hands of the Danes, and that they think it necessary to contribute an Austrian squadron in order to protect that commerce. Now, my Lords, without stating at all what course should be pursued, or what may hereafter be found to be the actual course which the Austrian Government will pursue, I must say that, considering what the Austrian fleet is, and considering what the Danes are, it seems to me that Austria sending a fleet into the North Sea to protect nationalities oppressed by a foreign race, is a course which every true friend of Austria must deplore.
  THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH: My Lords, I wish I could hear declarations made by the Austrian Government with the same feeling with which I should have heard them two or three months ago; but when I look at the conduct of Austria, in not only giving her sanction to the invasion of Jutland, but in sending troops there, and to assist in the siege of Fredericia, after we had heard that her efforts were to be confined to the occupation of Schleswig, for a special purpose, I confess I feel bound to look to inferences and probabilities rather than to her representations; and I must think that the Austrian fleet in its whole force is destined for the Baltic, there, in conjunction with Prussia, to establish a maritime superiority, in addition to the military superiority which Austria and Prussia have already established. If the statements made as to the respective strength of these fleets be correct, there can be no doubt that would be the result of the arrival of the Austrian fleet in the Baltic. Nothing could affect their maritime superiority there; and I cannot but believe that such a superiority is their object. We are told—and I suppose there is no doubt of it—that Duppel, the important position which protects the Island of Alsen, is now flanked right and left by Danish vessels of war. If Austrian and Prussian ships of war should occupy the place now filled by Danish ships, such a movement will make the protection of Alsen impracticable. Besides, Duppel is united to Alsen by two bridges, and if these were under the fire
  1630
  of an hostile fleet it would be impossible to hold the fortifications. No doubt shortly after the arrival of this fleet the fort and the Island of Alsen will fall; so also must Fredericia; and, practically, this will be the fall of Funen, the second important island. In point of fact, to allow the Austrians and Prussians to have the maritime as well as the military superiority is to sacrifice the independence—nay, the very existence—of the Danish monarchy. I therefore ask the noble Earl—though he is unwilling to say what he will do—whether he will stand by and see that atrocity perpetrated on a weak Power. It is only because she is weak that such a proceeding is attempted. This is a war against Denmark in the spirit of the Partition of Poland, in the spirit of the League of Cambrai. This is a union of great Powers to dismember and destroy a small one. And, my Lords, what is done to-day with respect to Denmark will be done to-morrow with respect to Holland—will you permit that also?—and the next day with respect to Belgium. I ask the noble Earl will it be permitted? Is there no point at which it is considered the honour and the interest of England to protect the weak against the strong? My Lords, I am informed that in the course of eight or ten days we are no longer to be sitting. We are to be adjourned for three weeks. During the whole of that time Government is to be deprived of the support of Parliament. They may require the support of Parliament at any moment. In war, time is of all things the most essential. The danger may arise when you will not have the power of meeting it. I confess I do not think it right that Parliament should separate without having assured the Crown that, having considered the correspondence laid before us by the command of the Queen, we will support Her Majesty in any measures which may become necessary for the maintenance of the independence of Denmark. Without that declaration the Government are powerless. Four weeks may elapse before they can lay any further despatches before us to enable us to pronounce an opinion on their conduct; and during the interval that may be done which never can be undone. We may witness the degradation and ruin of a brave people, who might have been saved by a strong and friendly hand, when weak and pusillanimous motives withheld it.
  EARL GREY: My Lords, there is hardly a word that has fallen from the noble Earl

  1631
  in which I do not concur. I do think it a most objectionable thing that Parliament should separate for a considerable time without our knowing what is to take place in the interim. I make this remark because, never since I entered Parliament, have I read any correspondence with such deep-felt humiliation for this country as I hare read the papers now on the table. I will not enter into the subject at present; but I do feel, with the noble Earl who has just sat down, that this affair of Denmark has advanced step by step without our having the opportunity of expressing our opinion or of doing anything to check the danger, and that we are taking a course which involves the surrender of a weak Power to the unprincipled violence of stronger Powers. This is a state of things full of danger and disgrace. I venture to express the feeling I entertain on the subject of a separation of Parliament under such circumstances; and I trust some opportunity will be given for a full consideration of this grave question even now before Parliament separates for the Easter recess.
  THE EARL OF HARROWBY: I cannot bat think it of the highest importance to Her Majesty's Government to have some expression of the opinion of Parliament on this question. It appears to me that, after the unsuccessful interference of last year, and after the passive attitude we have since assumed, Her Majesty's Government cannot go properly into negotiations at the present moment without being supported by an expression of the feeling of the people of England. It is most important to them that they should have ascertained that feeling before conferring with other Powers, in order that they may be able to say to those Powers, "This is a point beyond which the feelings of the people of England cannot be trifled with." I have no wish to express a doubt even of the virtue of Austria. I cannot but hope that her intentions are better than her actions; but I think it would be a great support to the failing virtue of Austria if the were able to point to an English fleet in the Baltic.
  EARL RUSSELL: I will say but one word on this subject. I am sure there is no noble Lord who would imagine that, having received this information in the course of to-day, I could come down to this House, and on my own responsibility make a declaration that would bind this country, or would be likely to lead this
  1632
  country into war. Anything to be done must be maturely considered. What Her Majesty's Government have done is to negotiate, but also to maintain themselves at liberty to act, with other Powers, or if it should be thought necessary, to act alone, in case the honour and paramount interests of England should require it. My noble Friend who sits near me on the cross benches (Earl Grey) said he had read these papers with "humiliation." I believe these papers agree, in spirit, with the general opinion of the country. If my noble Friend thinks that the Government ought to have acted in a different manner, he can at once move a vote of censure. If he thinks that we should act differently, and, without negotiation, and, without examining what those Powers propose, resort to extremities, he has only to move a Resolution to that effect. All I can say is, that the Government will best consult, according to their own opinion, the honour and the interests of this country; they will not make war when the safety and the interests, the integrity and the independence, of Denmark can be secured otherwise; and they will not neglect any means by which that safety and independence can be secured. With regard to the fleet, some ten days or a fortnight ago, with a view to have that fleet at command, it was directed to rendezvous at one of the home ports, so that orders might be at once conveyed to it. If it were thought necessary to give any orders to that fleet, it would be at once within our reach; and, certainly, I could not expect that any fleet of Austria or of Prussia would venture to encounter the squadron of Her Majesty.
  House adjourned at half past Six o'clock, to Thursday next, a quarter before Five o'clock.