Lords Sitting of 27 June 1864

MINUTES.
Sat First in Parliament—The Duke of Cleveland, after the Death of his Brother.
PUBLIC BILLS—Second Reading—Superannuation (Union Officers)* (No. 154); Civil Bill Courts (Ireland) (No. 67); Servants Hiring (Scotland)* (No. 146); Coventry Free Grammar School* (No. 153).
Committee—Army Prize (Shares of Deceased)* (No. 106); Countess of Elgin and Kincardine's Annuity * (No. 149).
Report—Army Prize (Shares of Deceased)* (No. 106); Countess of Elgin and Kincardine's Annuity* (No. 149).
Third Reading—Beer Houses (Ireland)* (No. 134), and passed.

DENMARK AND GERMANY. THE CONFERENCE. MINISTERIAL STATEMENT.
EARL RUSSELL: My Lords, I have to lay upon your table, by command of Her Majesty, the Protocols of the proceedings of the Conference upon the affairs of Denmark and Germany, which has just been brought to a close. In laying these papers upon your Lordships' table I propose to follow the course which was pursued by the Earl of Liverpool in 1823, and I am confident that in following that example I am pursuing a course which is perfectly fair to this House and to the country. In that case the English Government had been carrying on negotiations first at Verona, the Conference at which place was attended by the Duke of Wellington, and afterwards at Paris, on the subject of the invasion of Spain. The Government of that day declared that the invasion of Spain was contrary to all the principles of English policy, and that it was an interference which was entirely opposed not only to the sentiments of this country, but to the settlement of Europe which had been come to some years before.

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They, therefore, protested against it, while at the same time they thought it advisable to preserve peace and declare a neutrality between this country and France. Upon the present occasion I have to discuss a question which is of a very intricate nature, and which for a long time was considered to be one that might go on for many many years without raising any exciting interest, and which was almost too complicated and too wearisome to engage much of the public attention. For the last year, however, that question has been in a very different condition.
My Lords, before I refer to the proceedings of the Conference it is necessary to take some notice of those engagements which have been the origin of these disputes, though they were intended to put an end to all differences between Germany and Denmark. Your Lordships are well aware that in these times it is necessary that a treaty should not only have the signatures of envoys and the ratifications of Sovereigns, but that in its working it should be made to accord with the sentiments and wishes of the people who are to be governed under it. A remarkable instance of difference in this respect has occurred with regard to the operation of the Treaty of Vienna of 1815 with respect to Lombardy, and the operation of the same treaty with reference to Genoa. Your Lordships are aware that for many years great discontent prevailed in Lombardy, which was only removed by the separation of that province from Austria. On the other hand, in Genoa, by the wise and patriotic conduct of the Kings of Sardinia, all the objections, all the repugnance, which originally existed in Genoa against their rule have been finally overcome and removed, and Piedmont and Genoa are now in perfect harmony. Unfortunately the Treaty of 1852 in regard to Denmark, and the engagements which were entered into in the previous year, 1851, with respect to an arrangement between Germany and Denmark, were in their operation exceedingly unsatisfactory. It was declared, and has lately been repeated in the Conference, that an attempt was made by the King of Denmark, contrary to the engagements of 1852, and contrary also to all sound policy, to make the people of Schleswig change their national character, and so to interfere with their churches and schools as to keep up a perpetual irritation, thereby violating the spirit of the engagements
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between Denmark and Germany. How far those accusations were true as regards the exact letter of those engagements I will not stop to inquire; but it is quite certain that there was prevailing in Schleswig great dissatisfaction at the manner in which the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein were governed, and that great complaints were made on that account against the Danish Government. It was for a long time the public opinion in this country that Germany had no reason to complain of Denmark as violating her engagements; but I am afraid that, by an impolitic course at all events, the Danish Government produced the feeling in Germany that the subjects of the King of Denmark of the German race were not fairly governed. Oppression there could not be said to be. The Government was a free Government, and, generally speaking, the people living under it were prosperous; but there was in the two Duchies much of that irritation which prevailed in Belgium previous to its separation from Holland. On the other side, it must be said that the German Governments, instead of asking that which might fairly have been demanded—instead of asking that the engagements should be kept in their spirit, and that arrangements should be made (which could easily have been devised) to give satisfaction to the people of the Duchies—made proposals inconsistent, as it appeared to me, with their engagements, pushing beyond their legitimate sense the words of those engagements, and suggested arrangements which, if they had come into operation, would have made Denmark completely subject to Germany. Among other proposals—indeed, one of the chief—was that the 900,000 people who were said to be of German race, and even the 50,000 of the Duchy of Lauenburg, should have a representation equal to that of the 1,600,000 inhabitants of the kingdom of Denmark. This was evidently so unfair and calculated to be so destructive of Danish independence and nationality, that Denmark refused to accede to it. It was, in fact, such a proposal as if Scotland and Ireland were to demand each an equal number of representatives with England in the Imperial Parliament. The consequence of these disputes, unfortunately, was, that instead of the treaty taking root and fully satisfying the wishes of the people of the Duchies, there was a kind of never-ceasing irritation which burst forth as occasion

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arose; and, as Germany was greatly more powerful than Denmark, it was but too probable that the latter would have to Buffer one day on account of the complaints which were made by the Germans. It was impossible not to foresee that such would probably be the consequence, and that the irritation to which I allude would not go on for ever without exciting great dissension and perhaps war. Therefore in September, 1862, when I was at Brussels in attendance on Her Majesty, I explained to Sir Augustus Paget, who was shortly about to return to Denmark, a plan of pacification which it appeared to me would keep the Duchies under the rule of the King of Denmark; which would be satisfactory to themselves; which would give them a Minister for Schleswig and a body of representatives; a Minister for Holstein and a body of representatives, and would thus put an end for ever to the demand that at Copenhagen there should sit a majority of representatives for the Duchies. The Danish Government—as I think unfortunately—utterly rejected that proposal, and matters went on in the same unsatisfactory state. The diplomatic correspondence which the British Government proposed should take place did take place between Germany and Denmark, but it only produced increased bitterness and further irritation. At length in October, 1863, the German Governments at Frankfort declared that they must proceed to Federal Execution. If, my Lords, that Federal Execution had been founded on any infringement of the rights of Holstein—if it had been founded solely upon the misgovernment of Holstein, or on any violation of the rights of the Confederation, no Power would, I think, be entitled to complain of it. It embraced, however, a point which had nothing to do with Federal rule—the point of an equal representation at Copenhagen. It was, then, that the British Government declared that that could not be a matter of indifference, because it aimed, in fact, not only at the integrity, but at the independence, of Denmark. Things remained in this state until the death of the King of Denmark, which produced an entire alteration in the state of affairs. It was then contended on behalf of Germany that, after looking closely into some very intricate questions of representative and hereditary succession, they were bound to declare that the King of Denmark had no right to succeed to the Duchies, but that by the law
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of the Confederation the Prince of Augustenburg was the proper heir to the throne. This declaration, adopted almost throughout the whole of Germany, was received with applause not only by the popular, but by the Conservative party; by persons of the highest rank as well as by the general mass of the community; and every Government that pretended to adhere to the Treaty of 1852 was denounced as recreant to the cause of Germany. In this state of affairs the Governments of Austria and of Prussia took a somewhat singular and not very defensible course. In the beginning they declared in the Diet that, having a majority in favour of this declaration, they would proceed to Federal Execution—thereby, to all appearance, making the present King of Denmark responsible for that which was done by the late King, and to all intents and purposes, as it would seem, acknowledging his sovereignty over Holstein. They, at the same time, however, somewhat privately and without the general knowledge of Europe, declared that they reserved the question of the succession. It did not appear to the Danish Government, nor did it appear to Her Majesty's Government, that Federal Execution could be resisted without increasing the complications of the position. But, immediately after that took place, Austria and Prussia declared that they must occupy the Duchy of Schleswig in order to obtain the fulfilment of the engagements of 1852. Your Lordships are well aware that shortly before that declaration the Government of Denmark announced that they were ready to repeal the Constitution of November, 1863, which was the apparent ground of the proposed Federal Execution. Unfortunately, they had not acceded to that proposal when Lord Wodehouse went to Copenhagen, and when the concession might have been effectual. The German Governments, in their hurry to go to war, and being evidently determined on going to war—in the first place in order to gratify the German sentiment on the subject—took no heed of the proposal which was made by the British Government, and which was supported by France and Russia, that a protocol should be signed by the different Governments, binding Denmark to a repeal of the Constitution of November, and the German troops of Austria and Prussia entered Schleswig. I think it was impossible for the British Government to give any advice on this occasion. It was evidently the invasion of a

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territory which did not in any way belong to Germany, and a territory to which according to our view the King of Denmark had the fullest right. It was said that it was to be occupied as "a material guarantee;" but no country is, I conceive, obliged to submit to an occupation of its territory which it believes it has the power and right to resist. Your Lordships are fully aware of the events of the war which subsequently took place. It resulted, as must naturally be expected, in the defeat of the Danes and the occupation of the Duchies by an overwhelming force of Austrian and Prussian troops. That being so, and the Austrian Government having always said that they were ready to agree to a Conference, and Prussia assenting to that proposal, Her Majesty's Government proposed that a Conference should be held. The Danish Government refused an armistice, but declared themselves ready to enter into a Conference. The Austrian and Prussian as well as the French Government expressed a wish that it should be attended by a Plenipotentiary of the German Confederation, and after some delay one was sent. The Conference was not assembled regularly until the 25th of April, and some delay then took place with a view of obtaining, if not an armistice, at least a suspension of arms for a considerable period. The Danish Government would not agree to an armistice; but a suspension of arms they did agree to, which was only to last for the period of four weeks. My Lords, it was difficult in matters so intricate, and on which passions had been so much roused, to come to any agreement beforehand; but Her Majesty's Government thought it their duty to proceed to the Conference, in the interests of peace, even without any such agreement. On the 12th of May, after the suspension of arms had been agreed to, I asked the Austrian and Prussian Governments to declare what it was they asked for in the interests of peace. Now, be it observed that although the Prussian Government, and the Austrian Government likewise, had continually declared that they had certain engagements to insist upon which had not been fulfilled, they never yet had agreed to specify what these engagements were which would secure peace, and by which they would be bound. When Lord Wodehouse went to Berlin on his way to Copenhagen he endeavoured, according to the instructions he had received, to obtain some explanations from the Prussian Government
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on this point. The Prussian Government replied, "Let the Danish Government first repeal the Constitution of November, and we will afterwards see what arrangement they propose to put in the place of that; we will judge of that proposal and give our opinion upon it." Nothing, I must say, could be less explicit, or a less justification for the course they were pursuing; because at the same time they were ready to carry on war to the extremity, to use all their means to invade Schleswig with all the dreadful consequences, without making a distinct declaration of their terms. When, however, the Powers were assembled in Conference, and the Plenipotentiaries of Austria and Prussia were obliged to meet the Plenipotentiaries of Russia, France, and Sweden as well as of Great Britain, they found themselves compelled to make some statement of the terms which they would require. Be it observed that throughout—even up to the 31st of January—the two German Governments had declared that they adhered to the Treaty of London, and the execution and occupation were proofs that they still adhered to the integrity of the Danish Monarchy. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, had no reason to suppose that their proposal would be of a different character. We were told, however, upon authority so high as to be almost official, that there was an intention on their part to propose what was called a personal union; and that personal union was to be of this nature—that the whole Duchy of Holstein and the whole Duchy of Schleswig were to be united; they were to have a separate army and navy from those of Denmark; that they were to have complete self-government; and, in fact, that the King of Denmark was to have scarcely any influence over the two Duchies. In one of the last meetings of the Conference M. Quaade, one of the Danish Plenipotentiaries, declared that if that personal union had ever been proposed, it would have been impossible for the Danes to agree to it. Indeed, it was likely that, with the disposition which prevailed in Germany, German agitation would have produced a declaration of separation on the part of the two Duchies, and German arms would then have supported the Duchies in that wish for separation. Therefore, though nominally maintaining the integrity of Denmark, and though nominally adhering to the Treaty of 1852, the proposition of a personal union would have been, in fact, a separation of the Duchies from Denmark

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under a very thin transparent disguise. That, however, was not the exact proposal of the German Plenipotentiaries. In the meeting of the 17th of May the first Plenipotentiary of Prussia declared that—
"What the Austrian and Prussian Governments wished was a pacification which would assure to the Duchies absolute guarantees against the recurrence of any foreign oppression, and which, by thus excluding for the future any subject of dispute, of revolution, and of war, would guarantee to Germany that security in the North which she requires in order not to fall again periodically into the state of affairs which brought on the present war. These guarantees can only be found in the complete political independence of the Duchies and their close connection by means of common institutions."—Protocol, No. 5.
Now, this declaration on the part of the two Powers is not a little remarkable. Your Lordships will observe the phrase, "guarantee against foreign oppression." That oppression meant the oppression of the Government of the King of Denmark. But he was Duke of Holstein de facto and de jure, his title had never been disputed, and his government, if it was oppressive, could only be a domestic oppression. The two Powers, therefore, of Austria and Prussia, to whom Europe had a right to look for respect for the faith of treaties, declared at once that the government of the Danish Duchies was of the nature of a foreign oppression. At the same time, the declaration "for a security against any subject of dispute, war, and revolution," was so ambiguous that none of the Plenipotentiaries could tell what its meaning was. The Russian Plenipotentiary said he was quite at a loss to know what it meant. The French Plenipotentiary followed in the same tone; and for a long period we were quite unable in the Conference to say what was really the intention of the two Powers. We asked who was to be the Sovereign of these two Duchies which were to be thus governed? The answer of the German Plenipotentiary was that that was a question to be decided by the Diet. Austria and Prussia, but more especially Austria, had declared hitherto that the Treaty of 1852 was a question that was decided—that the late King of Denmark had a right to settle the succession, and that his decision in favour of Prince Christian, the present King of Denmark, would be respected by those Powers. It was equally notorious that the Diet, if it met, would, by a considerable majority, declare against the title of the King of Denmark. Count Bernstorff did not deny that, and the Plenipotentiary
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of the German Diet declared at once that the majority of the Diet would never consent to an arrangement which, even in an eventual or conditional form, would sanction a union between the Duchies and Denmark. Thus, while the two Powers, Austria and Prussia, were in appearance consenting to the maintenance of the Treaty of 1852, telling us that the Diet might ultimately decide in favour of the King of Denmark as the legitimate heir, the German Plenipotentiary, who, in fact, had greater Power than either the Plenipotentiaries of Austria or Prussia, because they never at any time ventured to oppose that which he declared to be the will of Germany, declared that Germany would never consent to the restoration of the Duchies to Denmark.
My Lords, at the next meeting of the Conference, which took place on the 17th of May, there was a more positive declaration. Austria and Prussia then declared that they could no longer acknowledge the King of Denmark as Sovereign of the Duchies; that the whole of the two Duchies ought to be separated from Denmark and placed under the sovereignty of the Prince of Augustenburg; that he should be declared the rightful possessor of the throne of these Duchies, and that that was a declaration which would be hailed throughout Germany and would meet the wishes of the German people. Before this declaration was made, in preparation for such an event, the Plenipotentiaries of the neutral Powers had met to consider the situation. The Government of France had had some communication with the Government of this country. The French Government had declared that they thought the personal union could not be the foundation of a lasting peace, and that the only mode of obtaining such a peace would be to separate the Danish nationalities in the Duchies from the German nationalities. After these communications I consulted the other neutral Plenipotentiaries, who met at my private house for the purpose of considering the matter. We came to the conclusion that it was useless to propose that the two Duchies should remain under the King of Denmark. It was quite obvious that unless we had been prepared— I should say all of us prepared—to carry on a great war for the purpose, after the hostilities which had taken place, after the declarations which had been made by the German Powers, if anything like a personal union had been established there would at once have been a declaration on

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the part of the Duchies and on the part of the German Confederation, supported by Austria and Prussia, that the Prince of Augustenburg was entitled to hold the Duchies, and that he was the rightful Sovereign; and that if the Danish troops entered to dispute possession of the Duchies, they would be opposed by Austria, Prussia, and the whole Confederation. We had therefore to consider what we could propose which would be most favourable to Denmark under the circumstances which I have stated to your Lordships. Of course we could only propose something of a diplomatic nature, which we thought likely to be accepted. We accordingly prepared a proposition, which I as President of the Conference was to submit, and which I was assured would be supported by the Plenipotentiaries of France and Sweden, and as far as possible by the Russian Plenipotentiary, though he had not then received definite instructions. What we proposed was that the King of Denmark should yield to Germany the Duchy of Holstein and the Southern portion of the Duchy of Scheawig—that the boundary should be drawn as far as the Schlei, and should go along by the Dannewerke; that there should be no menacing fortresses on the boundary; that the German Powers should not interfere any further or any more in the internal affairs of Denmark; and that a general guarantee should be given by the European Powers for the rest of the Danish possessions. With regard to this proposal, the Danish Plenipotentiaries made a declaration which I think did that Government the highest honour. They declared that the King of Denmark had accepted the Crown of that country according to the Treaty of 1852, thinking that his doing so would tend to the peace of Europe and to preserve the balance of power; but, as the surrender of a great part of his territory was now demanded, he was ready to make that concession, provided that entire independence and self-government were left to the remainder of his dominions. The King of Denmark declared he was ready to accept the line of the Schlei as proposed; and without defining it he declared it was necessary there should be a military and commercial line drawn for the sake of the independence of Denmark; and he declared moreover that there should be an European guarantee for the possession of the remainder of his territory. The German
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Governments, while they accepted the proposal for the partition of Schleswig— while they no longer demanded the whole of that Duchy—declared that, according to their views, the line of demarcation must go much further north. They said that the line must be from Apenrade to Tondern; and that they could not assent to the line proposed on the part of the neutral Plenipotentiaries. They declared, at the same time, they were perfectly ready to agree that, with regard to the territory to be left to the King of Denmark, there should be no right of interference and no interference whatever with the independence of Denmark. I confess, my Lords, it appeared to me that the proposal we submitted was the best arrangement that could be made. It was not to be expected that those Duchies could be retained under the nominal sovereignty of the King of Denmark without giving rise to fresh disputes and fresh complications. It was obvious, also, that if that sovereignty had been admitted to be vested in the King of Denmark, there would be constant interference on the part of Germany, and that interference, which has gone on for the last twelve years, giving rise to continual disputes, would cause constant contentions in future. It would be far better that Denmark should have a restricted territory, with the understanding that in her restricted territory her own Government should have absolute control, than that she should be subject to perpetual interference and control on the part of the German Powers. The French Government more especially took that view. The French Plenipotentiary declared it had always been the opinion of his Government that the division of the nationalities was the cause of all the complications which had taken place, and that nothing could be settled satisfactorily until there had been a separation of the nationalities; but he declared in the name of the Emperor, at the same time, that it was necessary great forbearance should be shown towards Denmark as the weaker Power; that the part evidently and confessedly German should be given to the Duchy of Holstein; and with regard to the mixed districts, as well as the Danish part, they should be left to Denmark as a means of preserving her independence, and giving her a mercantile and military line. Unhappily, my Lords, upon this occasion, as throughout those questions, the German Powers, instead of taking

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those views of generosity and forbearance which were urged so well by the Emperor of the French, determined to insist on what, undoubtedly, was their right if the right of conquest was the only one to be considered. They stood on the right of conquest; they stood on the victory they had gained on the disputed territory; but with respect to generosity and forbearance towards a Power so disproportionate to themselves—with respect to a due consideration for the peace of Europe—with respect to the absence of a desire to rush again into war in order to retain that which by right of conquest they might say they had acquired—I should not be treating your Lordships with sincerity if I said there was any such forbearance, any such generosity, any such regard for the peace of Europe, manifested on the part of Austria, Prussia, and the German Confederation. I must say likewise, my Lords, that there was an assumption which was not justifiable on the part of Denmark, and in reference to which my noble Friend Lord Clarendon made a clear and pointed statement at a subsequent meeting of the Conference, The Danish Government considered that the line which we had proposed in the name of the neutral Powers, and after consulting the neutral Powers, as a basis of pacification, was an English proposal—an English proposal by which England was bound to abide, and which she was bound to maintain at all hazards. Nothing of the kind, however, was ever stated by the British Plenipotentiaries; nothing of the kind had Denmark a right to expect. I did inform the Danish Plenipotentiary, when there was a question of continuing the Armistice, that I should not propose nor support any division but the line of the Schlei without the consent of Denmark; but I never gave him to understand that England would support that line otherwise than by urging its adoption in conjunction with the other neutral Powers at the meetings of the Conference. The last suspension of arms was only for a fortnight, and it remained for us to consider what should be done—the two parties being obstinately bent on the maintenance of their different rights—the Germans insisting on the line from Apenrade to Tondern, and the Danes insisting first upon a line extending more to the south than that which the British Plenipotentiary had proposed in the Conference, and afterwards agreeing to that line, but declaring that they would make no further concessions. What could
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be done to bring about an amicable understanding? In this situation of affairs, knowing that Denmark would not consent to any other line—indeed, not knowing whether the German Powers would concede any other line—the Prussian Plenipotentiary said that he was ready to recommend to his Government a line which should proceed from the north of Flensburg to Tondern, but that he was not authorized to propose that line in the name of his Government. The Austrian Plenipotentiary did not accede at first, but afterwards said that he would recommend it to the consideration of his Government. But the Danes at once refused it, and the proposal fell to the ground. It then remained to be considered whether, without proposing any other line, some means could not be found by which peace might still be preserved. We considered that question very anxiously, and it came to be a subject of reflection whether we could not, even at the last moment, propose something which might bring the two Powers to an agreement. It was obvious that many and great difficulties had to be removed. The King of Denmark was ready to yield a part of his dominions of which he had been deprived by war. The German Plenipotentiaries were ready to say that a part of the Duchy of Schleswig should remain under the rule of the King of Denmark. Both Powers were ready to accept the proposal that there should be no interference in future in the internal government of Denmark; and all the Powers, I think, would have been ready, if there had been an agreement on other points, to give a guarantee—a European guarantee—to Denmark, which would have left that Power, indeed, without any sovereignty over the German population, but still possessed of an independent territory, and still possessed of a free and happy Government, not subject to foreign interference. Well, the question was, whether, there remaining only this line of frontier to be decided, it could not be arranged in some way to which both Powers would agree. We thought it possible that in that case the spirit of the Protocol of Paris might be adopted. The Protocol of Paris said, that when serious differences arose between any Powers, and there was danger of those differences being carried to hostilities, the good offices of a friendly Power might be resorted to, and it appeared to us that if this principle could be brought into action, the continuance of the war might be obviated. It was stated at the same

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time by the French Plenipotentiary at Paris, and by others, that where the honour or the essential interests of a country were mainly concerned, it could not be expected that such differences should be submitted to a friendly Power. But, in our opinion, this was not such a case. It appeared to us that sooner than rush into war—sooner, above all, than expose Denmark again to such an unequal contest—it was possible to propose the good offices of a friendly Power, with this condition—that both Powers should submit to the decision respecting the line of frontier offered by the arbitrator to whom the matter might be referred. In fact it was to be an arbitration rather than good offices. Now, I cannot but believe that any impartial arbitrator would have fixed upon a line far more favourable to Denmark than that which the German Powers had proposed. A Power which was impartial and without passion would probably have given, not the line as far as the north of Flensburg, but a line to the south of Flensburg, whereby that important town might have been preserved to Denmark, and that Power would have had a port in the Northern Sea by which her independence might have been maintained. It was, however, entirely a question for the two Powers to accept or to refuse that arbitration. I may say further that my noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon) and myself, who were the British Plenipotentiaries at the Conference, thought that after the fairness and the impartiality which the Emperor of the French had shown throughout this question, his friendliness, and at the same time his wish for the maintenance of peace, the two Powers might well have accepted his good offices. The opinion was, however, expressed by one of the Plenipotentiaries—an opinion afterwards confirmed by an official declaration—that no Power represented at the Conference, and therefore committed to a certain degree as to the questions before the Conference, could properly be accepted as the arbitrating Power. It then appeared to us, and we so informed the Plenipotentiaries, that in our opinion the King of the Belgians, whose impartiality is likewise well known, and whose long experience of European affairs makes him most desirous to preserve the peace of Europe, might perform these functions to the satisfaction of the Powers concerned. But the question of who should be the arbitrator never arose. Austria and Prussia said that they could accept the good
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offices of a friendly Power in accordance with the Treaty of Paris, but that they could not accept the decision of that friendly Power as final; and in the mean time they asked for a long armistice. Now, my Lords, it appeared to us that if that proposal were accepted, then, after a period of two or three months of armistice, during which the naval operations of Denmark would be suspended, a decision would have been announced which, if it in any way displeased the German Powers—if it did not go to the full extent of all their demands—would have been refused by them. The Plenipotentiary of the German Confederation completely confirmed our view of this question by declaring that in his opinion this territory of Schleswig belonged altogether to the Prince of Augustenburg, or rather belonged to the competency of the German Confederation; that they could therefore accept no arbitration, and could not be bound by anything that was decided. They evidently meant that every foot of territory in Schleswig might, if they chose it, be demanded at the end of the good offices by the German Confederation. Thus, according to what I am sorry to say has been the usual manner of the German Powers, their refusal was not a direct and straightforward one. It is somewhat like their declaration at the beginning, that they went into Holstein for the purpose of Federal Execution, that they went into Schleswig for the purpose of material occupation, and that they wished the question of the sovereignty of Holstein and Schleswig to be decided in the German Confederation, knowing perfectly well how that decision would be made; and then, lastly, they wished to have the appearance of accepting the good offices of an arbitrator without really intending to accept them. The Danish Plenipotentiaries, most unfortunately in my opinion—most imprudently in my opinion—gave a decided refusal to the proposal. Of course, it was for them to judge as to the security of their own country and the prospects of war; but I certainly regret deeply that they should have rejected the arbitration. The proposal that I made certainly did not exactly agree with the line of the Schlei, but it was a proposal which we, the British Plenipotentiaries, thought was for the benefit of Denmark, and was most likely to obtain for the Danes a peace which would have been satisfactory to them. And now, my Lords, all other means having failed, one other proposal

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was made on the part of France by the French Plenipotentiary, who was directed to make this proposal—that, leaving the Danish part of Schleswig to the Danes, and the German part to the Germans, the line to be drawn in the disputed district should be decided by a vote of the population, to be taken in some fair manner, the details of which might be considered afterwards. [The Earl of CLARENDON: The votes were to be taken in each commune.] Yes, and these votes were to decide the line to be drawn and the district which was to belong to Germany and to Denmark respectively.
THE EARL OF DERBY: May I ask the noble Earl if that decision was to be taken during the occupation of the province by the German troops?
EARL RUSSELL: No; the French proposition was clearly that the Prussian troops should evacuate the district before the vote was taken by means of Commissioners. At the same time, it was the opinion of the Danes—and I believe that opinion to have been well founded—that although the people of Schleswig generally were perfectly satisfied to remain united to Denmark, such had been the effects of the occupation, such had been the agitation on the part of Germany, the political societies in Germany having sent persons to agitate all over the country, that the decisions would through that influence have become corrupted, and the plan of the Emperor, which otherwise might have been successful, would have been rendered unjust. The proposition was accordingly refused. My Lords, it was with great regret that the Plenipotentiaries of the neutral Powers received this decision.
My Lords, I must say that my noble Friend (the Earl of Clarendon) and I have received from France and from the other neutral Powers the firmest support during the continuance of the Conference. We held frequent private meetings with the neutral Powers, in which we discussed the proposals to be made. There was nothing exhibited in those meetings but the most earnest desire to provide for the safety and independence of Denmark, and I must say that the utmost harmony prevailed on all sides; and the French, Russian, and Swedish Plenipotentiaries alike did all in their power to contribute towards the success of the proposals we made. We shall, therefore, leave the Conference with a strong sense of our obligations for the support which we received from them.
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After this decision there remained nothing more for the Conference but to accept the declaration which was made at the last meeting—and which has been repeated to me to-day by the Austrian Ambassador— it is simply that the two Powers, Austria and Prussia, have no intention of carrying on hostilities with the view of obtaining possession of any territory beyond the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, and that they have no intention of making any conquest of any portion of the Danish territory on the continent or of the Danish islands. That declaration is purely voluntary, and is not in any way extorted as to the manner in which these Powers propose to act. At the same time it comes rather late—though they make the declaration I suppose they cannot intend us to accept it—and we certainly cannot accept it as one upon which we can implicitly rely. After that which has happened with respect to the Treaty of 1852, and after that which has happened with respect to the treatment of the Danes after the pledges given, but more as I am afraid owing to German popular opinion, which Austria is desirous to conciliate, which Prussia is desirous to conciliate, which the German Confederation, above all, is anxious to conciliate, I am sorry to say that, greatly as I have respected Austria, greatly as I have respected Prussia, we can no longer rely, as we have done, upon their declarations.
Well, my Lords, but the question comes as to what, at the end of the Conference, is our position, and what will be our course? And without intending, or being able to pledge, the Government in case of contingencies which have not arisen, I think it is due to Parliament and to the country—especially at this period of the Session—to declare what is the view which the Government take of the position, the duty, the interests, and the future policy of England. My Lords, with regard to our honour, I conceive that in honour we are in no way engaged to take part in the present war. Although it has been stated to the contrary on the part of Denmark more than once, there has been at no time any pledge given on the part of this country or Her Majesty's Government promising material assistance to Denmark in this contest. Three times Her Majesty's Government during the period I have held the seals of the Foreign Office have endeavoured to induce Denmark to accept propositions which we regarded as favourable to her interests. In 1862 I made propo-

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sitions to her, but those propositions were rejected. When Lord Wodehouse went to Denmark, he and the Russian Plenipotentiary proposed that Denmark should repeal the Constitution which she had concurred in but a few days before; but she would not at that time receive the proposal. We believe that, if she had consented to the arbitration which we proposed in the Conference, the result would have been as favourable to her as, under the circumstances in which she was placed, she could have expected. My Lords, I do not blame Denmark for the course she has thought fit to pursue. She has a right—I should be sorry to reproach her in any way in her present state of weakness—she has an undoubted right to refuse our propositions, but we on our side have also a right to take into consideration the duty, honour, and interests of this country, and not to make that duty, that honour, and those interests subordinate to the interests of any foreign Power whatever. My Lords, our honour not being engaged, we have to consider what we might be led to do for the interests of other Powers, and for the sake of that balance of power which in 1852 was declared by general consent to be connected with the integrity of Denmark. My Lords, I cannot but believe that the Treaty of 1852 having been entered into, if there had been at an early period—say in December or January last —if France, Great Britain, and Russia, supported by the assistance which they might have counted upon receiving from Sweden, had declared for the maintenance of the Treaty of 1852—the succession of the King of Denmark might have been established without difficulty, and might have been peaceably maintained, and that the King and his Government would have remedied all the grievances of which his German subjects complained. I believe the King of Denmark would have found it to his advantage to grant to his German subjects that freedom, those privileges, and that self-government in their internal and domestic matters which they had demanded, and that they would thus have become quite contented as subjects to the King of Denmark. That desirable result, however, could not be brought about. In reference to the Treaty of 1852, I have to repeat what I stated on a previous occasion—that it was not a treaty of guarantee, that the Governments of France and Russia were competent to acknowledge the treaty, but that they had not pledged themselves to
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maintain the connection of Schleswig and Denmark, that not being a question of the general balance of power in Europe. Well, the French Government have frequently declared and have repeated to us only within the last twenty-four hours, that the Emperor does not consider it essential to the interest of France to support the line of the Schlei. He declares he does not think that France would be inclined to go to war for such an object. He urges that a war with Germany would be a most serious thing to France, that our armies would not be marshalled to oppose the invasion of Denmark, and that such a war would consequently be attended with great cost and great risk. I think that if that war were successful, France would expect some compensation on account of her participation, and that compensation could hardly be granted without exciting general jealousy among the other nations of Europe, and thus disturbing the balance of power which now exists. I cannot deny that if the Emperor of the French puts forward these considerations—if he declares that for these reasons, though he would give us moral support, he would afford us no material assistance in such war—I must say I think he is justified in that refusal, and in adopting such a line of conduct. I cannot but admit that if a great war with Germany arose, whatever might be the issue, it might reproduce those great contests which took place in 1814, and which led to such unsatisfactory results. The Emperor of the French is a Sovereign singularly wise and sagacious, and I will say valuing, as he has proved that he values, the peace of Europe, I am not in a position to find fault, nor can Her Majesty's Government find any fault with the decision to which the Emperor has come. But the Emperor of the French having thus declared his policy, and the Emperor of Russia having constantly refused to join with us in affording material support to Denmark, our position, of course, must be greatly influenced by those decisions. In the first place, is it the duty of this country—if we are to undertake the preservation of the balance of power in Europe as it was recognized in 1852—is it a duty incumbent on us alone? The French Government sees very clearly the dangers to which France might be exposed by interfering, but it says at the same time that it would be an easy operation for England; that England, with her naval power, might

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add most materially to the strength of Denmark and assist in bringing the war to a conclusion. My Lords, I must say there are many considerations which induce me to arrive at a different conclusion. I cannot but think, in the first place, that we should suffer perhaps considerably if our commercial marine was exposed to depredations such as might take place in the event of our being at war with Germany. That is one consideration which ought not to be overlooked. But there are other considerations of still greater moment. One is—Would our interference bring this war to a conclusion? Without giving military aid could you recover Schleswig and Holstein, and even Jutland from the Austrian and Prussian forces? Well, my Lords, we have for a long time in our conduct of foreign affairs shown great forbearance and patience. I think we were right in being forbearing, and think we were justified in being patient. But if our honour or our interests or the great interests of Europe should call upon us to interfere, I think such interference ought to be clearly effectual, as nothing would more tend to diminish the influence of this country than a course of action which would show that while we were predominant at sea, and that no Austrian or Prussian ships of war could venture to leave port, yet at the same time our interference could not insure, as we hoped it would, the safety of Denmark, nor lead to a speedy termination of the war. But, my Lords, the whole position and influence of this country with regard to foreign countries ought to be fully considered by Parliament and by the country; for we have great interests with multiplied complications arising from various connections and various treaties with every part of the world. It is no longer a question with reference to the balance of power in Europe. There are other parts of the world in which our interests may be as deeply involved, and which we may some day or other find it necessary to maintain the honour and interests of this country. The civil war now raging in America, ending how it may—whether by the establishment of an independent republic in the South, or whether it ends most unexpectedly, as it would be to me, I confess, by restoring the Union—still the United States of America or the Northern States, or whatever they may be called, will then be in a totally different position to that which they were in a few years ago. A great army will then be maintained by the
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United States, A formidable navy will also be kept up. Our relations with that Power are liable at any moment to interruption. I hope and trust that our friendly relations may continue uninterrupted; still, those relations must be considered and kept in view as well as our interest in the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. My Lords, let us look at other parts of the world. Look at the great commerce which has grown up in China, where it is necessary for us always to maintain a considerable naval force to protect it. Look at our immense possessions in India and see how necessary it is that they should be considered at all times. In any question, therefore, of peace or war—while it is very probable that this country with allies could carry on a war successfully—yet when it comes to be a war to be carried on by England alone, there are other contingencies to be looked at, and the position of this country is to be considered with reference not to Europe alone, but with reference to our interests in every quarter of the world. My Lords, these are considerations to be borne in mind with respect to this question of Denmark. It may be said that other combinations might be made—that although we could not ourselves attack the German Powers with any great amount of success, yet there are vulnerable points upon which they, and especially Austria, may be open to attack; that those doctrines and theories which Austria and Prussia have put forward, with regard to foreign nationalities, may be retorted upon them, and especially upon Austria with effect—they may be applied to other parts of Europe than Schleswig and Holstein; that the German nationality is not the only nationality in Europe; that the Italian nationality has as much right to be considered as the Germans; and that if we were to enter upon a course of supporting nationalities, we should be perfectly justified by the doctrines and conduct of Austria. This, no doubt, would be sufficient if the object were merely to show to Austria and Prussia that they are vulnerable on their own ground. But, my Lords, I think it is the duty of England to show a greater attachment to peace than Austria and Prussia have shown, and not, if possible, to light a flame which might extend to every part of Europe, but rather to endeavour to confine the war within the narrowest limits possible. Therefore, my Lords, with regard to this question, it is the opinion of Her Ma-

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jesty's Government that we should maintain the position which we have occupied, and that we should be neutral in this war. I do not mean to say that contingencies may not arise in which our position might become different, and in which our conduct might be altered. It may be said, "Will you allow these German Powers to act as they please? If, contrary to their professions and promises, they should decide upon sending a combined Austrian and Prussian force to Copenhagen with the declared object of making Denmark assent to terms which would be destructive of her independence—will you then remain entirely indifferent to such proceedings?" My Lords, I can only say in answer to such a question, that every Government in this country must retain to itself a certain liberty—as long as it possesses the confidence of Parliament—a certain liberty of decision upon such points. All I can now say is, that if the Government should think it necessary to come to any fresh decision—if the war should assume a new character—if circumstances should arise which might require us to make another decision, it would be our duty, if Parliament were sitting, immediately to apply to Parliament upon the subject; and if Parliament should not be sitting, then at once to call Parliament together in order that it may judge the conduct which Her Majesty's Government should pursue.
In the meantime, my Lords, I have given you an outline of the course of these negotiations. I have given you an account of the efforts we have made for peace, which, like the efforts made in 1823 by the Governments of Lord Liverpool and Mr. Canning, have been unfortunately unsuccessful. I say that our policy at the present time is to maintain peace. If there is any party in Parliament—if there is any individual in Parliament—who thinks as Lord Grey thought in 1823 that we ought to go to war, it will be competent for them to ask Her Majesty to interfere materially in the contest. If they think that in any respect we have failed in our duty, it is competent for them to take any line of conduct they may think proper. But, for ourselves, I say with confidence that we have maintained the honour of the country, that we have done everything in our power to preserve the peace of Europe, and that, those efforts having failed, we can rest satisfied that nothing has been wanting on our parts which was needed by the honour or the interests of this country—that nothing has
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been left undone which it was our duty to do.
THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, the almost unprecedented attendance of your Lordships on the present occasion clearly indicates that you are keenly sensible of the gravity of the statement which has just been made by the noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. My Lords, it is impossible to overrate the magnitude and importance of the interests involved in that statement. Interests of such vast importance are hanging in the balance at the present moment—the peace of Europe—I do not say the present, but the ultimate peace of Europe—is placed in fearful peril—anything which may pass in this House may have for good or evil so serious an effect—that if I have risen to follow the noble Earl in the statement he has made, it is not for the purpose of going through the various topics on which he has touched, or commenting on the different parts of his speech, but for the purpose of expressing my earnest and anxious hope that your Lordships may see, not only the propriety, but the absolute necessity, of abstaining on the present occasion from all partial and, consequently, unsatisfactory expressions of opinion. The noble Earl has entered at very great length upon three distinct topics, which he has treated, no doubt, with very great ability and with great clearness. He has entered on a justification of the course which Her Majesty's Government has pursued in relation to the Conference; he has given a statement of what has passed in the Conference; and somewhat vaguely, certainly, but with sufficient explicitness for the present, he has stated what is the policy which Her Majesty's Government are prepared to pursue in the position in which we are now placed. My Lords, of the first part of the noble Earl's statement I have no complaint whatever to make. It was perfectly natural that in laying on the table, by Her Majesty's command, the Protocols of the late Conference held in London on the affairs of Denmark he should have brought under your Lordships' notice the circumstances in which the Conference originated, the position of Europe at the time it assembled, and the result at which it has arrived. And I do not complain of the general statement which the noble Earl has made, although, undoubtedly, there were some very material facts he altogether omitted, and some circumstances to which, perhaps, he gave a colouring in

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which I can hardly concur. But, as I said, I am not going to enter upon a discussion of the statement of the noble Earl as to the position in which we are placed; still less of the more important, yet totally different, circumstances to which that position may be owing—to what conduct on our part or on the part of foreign Powers, to what policy pursued by the Government, it may have been owing that we were placed, at the period of the assembling of the Conference, in the unfortunate position in which we now stand. My Lords, that may—probably will—form the subject of further discussion, if not in this, at all events in the other House of Parliament —and probably in both Houses of Parliament. But on the present occasion, certainly, your Lordships would not deem it expedient to enter on all the various phases which the Schleswig Holstein question— simple enough in its commencement and complicated enough in its progress—has presented since 1852, or from an earlier period. But I must say the noble Earl has taken a course this evening not in accordance with ordinary practice, and perhaps not with the ordinary procedure of the House, when he proceeded to enter on a discussion and give his own account of various proceedings which passed in the Conference, reading from a number of papers which he laid on the table, but of which, not being yet in the hands of any one of your Lordships, we are bound to accept his statement without discussion. But I confess, for my part, my Lords, while I think the most important part of the question which Parliament has to consider is the course of policy which Her Majesty's Government have pursued—whether they have taken the course best suited to effect their own objects—namely, to obtain a satisfactory arrangement between the different belligerents and, at the same time, maintain inviolate the honour of England—while I say they are of the utmost importance, I think all these questions must have much greater reference to an earlier period—namely, to that before the commencement of the Conference, and to things which then took place of which we know nothing. Because, with all respect to the opinions of the noble Lords and the right hon. Gentlemen who have stated that as soon as you could get the Plenipotentiaries assembled around the table there would be no sort of difficulty in coming to a satisfactory conclusion—without in the slightest degree
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disparaging the ability which the two noble Earls engaged in the Conference have conducted its affairs—I think I may venture to say that, beyond the limited circle of the Members of Her Majesty's Government, there were few, if any, persons who could anticipate from the circumstances under which we entered upon that Conference any other than a signal and lamentable failure—although many there were, of course, who wished for a very different conclusion. Why, what were the circumstances? There were at that moment eight parties who had been called to the Conference, which was composed of thirteen gentlemen representing eight different interests. Of these eight different interests four were belligerents—three engaged on one side and one on the other; and there were also the four neutral Powers—England, France, Russia, and Sweden. With regard to the belligerents, what was the position of affairs on which they were invited to enter? It is true that with regard to the three belligerents on the one side, their aims, their notions, their ulterior objects appear to have had considerable diversity; but all three were from various motives unitedly bent on destroying the Kingdom of Denmark—all three were not quite so equally united, perhaps, in the ulterior objects of their spoliation, or their portion in the division of the spoil; but all were combined in the determination to carry war and spoliation into the territories of Denmark. It was at this moment when, flushed with the triumph of their arms, and with the glory of their successes, which had been gained by their enormous numerical superiority, and the superiority of their ammunitions and artillery—it was at this moment when flashed with the prospect of success, proud of the military, glory they thought they had obtained, and seeing before them nothing but a feeble and more than half-vanquished enemy, they consented most reluctantly to be arrested in their career, and they hardly yielded—from no unappreciable motive— to the pressing solicitations of England— not of the four neutral Powers, but of England alone—to a temporary suspension of hostilities, and would not even consent to an armistice between the belligerents. On the other hand, there was the Kingdom of Denmark—a small, gallant nation, who were fighting with the inmost determination and the courage of despair in behalf of all they held dear and sacred—in behalf of their homes, in behalf of their constitu-

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tion, in behalf of their King, in behalf of their families—fighting against overwhelming odds—and seeing themselves deserted by the whole European community, from which, whether with or without reason, they had undoubtedly entertained strong hope that they would receive support—finding themselves pressed to the very uttermost, I say, in their position the courage despair would give might naturally induce them to refuse another suspension of hostilities which they might naturally consider unfavourable to themselves at the moment, and say, "Rather than enter into such discreditable terms, let us die in the face of day and in the face of Europe, which, to its shame, has permitted us to do so." Now, such were the circumstances under which the Plenipotentiaries came to the Conference—unwillingly, all of them— with different views—three on one side and one on the other—the subject of oppression and violence—on the part of the small and weak Kingdom of Denmark. On the other hand, the four neutral Powers entered into discussions without the slightest previous agreement between themselves as to what they should ask, what they should recommend, and what they should insist upon. Eight different interests were collected together in Conference in the middle of the excitement of a war, without any previous basis of negotiations being agreed upon, without anything being settled, except that which the noble Lord at the head of the Government is reported to have described when he said that the basis of the Conference was the restoration of the peace of Europe. On that basis, and on that basis only, you entered into the Conference, without previous communications, without previous agreement, without previous understandings—and you profess to be astonished that the Conference led to nothing but failure! It is a matter of comparative indifference—the two noble Lords charged with the interests of England may have conducted the affairs of the Conference with more or less ability, with perfect sincerity, no doubt, to maintain the peace of Europe—I have not the slightest doubt on that subject—Prussia and Austria may have been more or less unreasonable, Denmark may have been more or less firm in her decisions, the Diet may have been more or less exacting—the belligerents may have placed themselves more or less in opposition to all their previous declarations before entering into the Conference—all these questions are matters of compara-
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tive indifference, because, in my judgment, from the time the Conference began to sit it was a doomed Conference from which it was impossible to hope any practical result could arise. Therefore the absence of these Protocols do not place your Lordships under the slightest disadvantage in judging of the position and policy of Her Majesty's Government in bringing this matter to the position in which it now stands; still less will the imperfect statement which has been made, and in the absence of any important information as to the facts of the case, enable you to express any opinion whatever upon that most important decision which it appears Her Majesty's Government have arrived at—namely, to acquiesce in the present state of affairs, and remain in the position of passive neutrality. At the commencement of the Session I ventured to express, in terms as strong as it was possible for man to use, the infinite danger which I saw in even the possibility of a war with Germany—with that Power with which we had been so many years associated—which has been, and, unless modern aggressive ideas have too far prevailed, is the great conservative central counterpoise to the ambitions of the East and of the West—a Power naturally connected with us by many ties, and a war with which could not but be productive of the most lamentable consequences, not only to them but to ourselves also. But, my Lords, what I also said was this. I feared—and that is the great question that we shall have to discuss hereafter—I feared the Government had, by the course of policy they had pursued, placed us in the position in which we must be subjected either to the lamentable consequences of such a war or to the discredit in which we should be held—and in which, I fear, we are held—by the whole of Europe, not for having abstained from war now, but for having for a long period held out to the contending parties menaces on the one hand, and encouragement on the other—a course entirely inconsistent with that policy which Her Majesty's Government now profess, and properly profess—namely, an earnest desire and determination to maintain unbroken the peace of this England, so far as that can be done with honour. That is the question on which serious discussion must take place; that is the question the decision of which will solve in the mind of Parliament and the country whether Her Majesty's Government have maintained inviolate the honour of the country,

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or whether, on the other hand, their policy has not been such as to expose them to the charge of a feeble and vacillating opposition, yielding at every step when encroachment was threatened, always suggesting that that encroachment would be met by a firm resistance, but whenever the encroachment took place yielding and protesting only that further encroachment would not be tolerated. That is the charge against which Her Majesty's Government —not now, but hereafter—will have to defend themselves. That is the feeling which I believe is very prevalent in the minds of the people of this country. That is the feeling which has taken deeply hold of the Parliament and of the country. And if I wanted any confirmation of its application to the course which Her Majesty's Government have pursued, and to the course which they may be expected to pursue, I should find it in the concluding portion of the noble Earl's speech, in which, after elaborately discussing all the disadvantages and all the dangers of going to war—all the injury we should sustain, all the loss to our commerce, and all the serious consequences, not merely present consequences, but even the fear of consequences as possibly leading to a rupture with the States of America at some future time— the noble Earl, to my astonishment, concluded by saying—not "Nothing on earth shall induce us to go to war," not "We hold ourselves altogether aloof from this question," not "Our interests are so vitally concerned, our commerce is so extensive, our relations so various, our treaties so numerous that we are determined, coûte qui coûte, to keep the peace, and we appeal to the country to give us credit for having maintained the country in a state of peace, prosperity, and wealth" —but "We reserve to ourselves, if further steps should be taken, a perfect right to alter our course," to sacrifice all these considerations upon which he laid so much stress, to enter upon that war which he so justly and so seriously deprecated, and altogether to depart from the principles which the Government have laid down, and upon which they have acted for the last two years. Why, my Lords, that is exactly what the noble Earl and the Government have been saying all along. First of all, Germany is to take into its serious consideration the dangers which must ensue, and must incur all the responsibility of Federal Execution in Holstein. Then Denmark is recommended, "As this
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is only Federal Execution in Holstein, we advise you to submit to it; but if the Germans go beyond Holstein, if they once cross the Eider, if they enter Schleswig, if the Diet is permitted to turn Federal Execution into an international question, then the case will be altogether altered; then Her Majesty's Government may see the necessity of departing from the course which they have hitherto laid down in certain contingencies, and afford you material assistance." Schleswig was occupied; but we were assured it was taken only as a material guarantee for the fulfilment of certain other engagements. "Oh, if it is only occupied as a material guarantee for the fulfilment of other engagements, that alters the question; but if you mean a permanent occupation of Schleswig, that is a thing the Government cannot for a moment tolerate." Schleswig was occupied. "Then, at all events, you cannot pass into Jutland; you must not think of Jutland." Well, into Jutland walked the troops—for strategic reasons, as the noble Earl has observed, which he does not presume to justify; but the entrance of troops into Jutland was not a contingency which, although it was seriously threatened before, induced Her Majesty's Government to depart from their pacific intentions. Now, I ask the noble Earl, what is the contingency which will? And I think that Parliament is hound to have some assurance on that point. "We will not go to war," says the noble Earl, "but we may see reasons to alter our course." I think the noble Earl went so far as to say that if Copenhagen should be blockaded and bombarded, then possibly—possibly Her Majesty's Government might think that the contingency had arisen which should induce them to depart from their prudent resolutions. But, short of the capture of Copenhagen, we want to know, and the country wants to know, how far the noble Earl will be—I was going to say—driven before he departs from the prudent resolutions—and I do not deny that they are prudent if they can be maintained with honour—which he has laid down. I hope I may be pardoned for having gone as far as I have in pointing out the questions to which I think it will be the duty of Her Majesty's Government hereafter to give a distinct answer, and upon which I hope that Parliament will insist upon having, not only a distinct answer from the Government, but a distinct decision upon the

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judgment of Parliament. For the present, however, I confess that I should be very sorry that this discussion should be prolonged. Perhaps, as I certainly have gone beyond my own intentions, I may have gone beyond what was desirable in the temptation of following the noble Earl for the purpose of pointing out, not that which we are to discuss now, but that which we shall have to discuss, and must discuss hereafter. For the present, I repeat, I earnestly hope that, neither with regard to the past, nor with regard to the more important future, will your Lordships be led, upon the partial statement which has been laid before you, to enter upon an impromptu discussion, still less to pledge yourselves individually or collectively to any line of conduct, either of condemnation of the Government for the past or of assent to or dissent from the course which they have propounded for the future.
EARL GRANVILLE: I think that the House ought to come to a clear understanding as to the course which it intends to pursue; whether it is to be that which was recommended by the noble Earl at the commencement and again at the end of his speech, and cheered by the House, of abstaining from any discussion upon this great subject until your Lordships have in your hands the papers which are necessary to explain it, or that which the noble Earl has adopted in the course of his observations, touching upon all those points which appear to him most vulnerable, and making statements and using arguments with reference to the Conference which appeared to me to be applicable to any Conference whatever which might be assembled for the purpose of establishing peace between a stronger and a weaker nation, the stronger nation being flushed with victory and the weaker one not assured of the support of the neutral Powers. That may go on. On both sides of the House declamatory arguments may be used without reference to facts, which may create popular prejudice, but cannot affect the reason of the country; and we may all imitate the example of the noble Earl who has put into the mouth of my noble Friend statements which neither in his speech today nor in the course of the negotiations has he ever made. To such alternatives as the noble Earl has put to us, asking us either to declare to Europe and the world that, whatever our honour and interests may require, we will pronounce ourselves determined never to go to war at all, or
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that we should—as has often been demanded by Members of the Opposition— pledge ourselves as to the future, our answer must be that we should not be justified, as representing Her Majesty's Government in this House, in exactly defining every possible contingency without knowing what course events may take in the future. I cannot help thinking that the feeling of the House is in favour of the course recommended at the beginning and end of the noble Earl's speech, and that your Lordships do not desire to discuss this question at present. All that I can say on behalf of Her Majesty's Government is, that if the House is of a different opinion we are ready at once to take the whole discussion, but we beg that it may not be of a piecemeal description.
LORD BROUGHAMwas understood to express his regret that the belligerent Powers had refused to submit the questions in dispute between them to arbitration, and especially to condemn the roundabout manner in which the German Powers had intimated their refusal.

CIVIL BILL COURTS (IRELAND) BILL.

  [No. 67.] SECOND READING.
  Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a—(The Lord Chancellor.)
  THE EARL OF LEITRIMsaid, that the Bill did not embody all the improvements which were desirable. The Bill proposed a very important alteration in law; but it was very imperfect.
  THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEsaid, that although undoubtedly the Bill was very imperfect, still he thought it was a measure which deserved the support of the House. He would further express a hope that the Government would go still further in the path of law reform, and that they would not abandon the Irish Court of Chancery Bill, which had been introduced into the other House.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMOREwas understood to remark upon the power given to the sheriffs to appoint the bailiffs who were to execute the civil bill decrees.
  THE EARL OF BELMOREsaid, that he wished to make two or three observations before the Bill was read a second time. He quite agreed with all that had fallen from the noble Earl who spoke last; and from his own experience as a magistrate, he found that a great part of the crime to be dealt with in his part of Ireland consisted of assaults committed in resisting

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  the execution of civil bill decrees. It was, therefore, very important that the bailiffs who executed these decrees should be under proper control. By the 37th clause of this Bill it was provided, that the Judges of the Court of Queen's Bench should have the power to make and alter rules with regard to appeal cases stated for their decision. Now, his (the Earl of Belmore's) attention had been called to the fact that appeals were made to the other Superior Courts of common law as well as to the Queen's Bench. He would, therefore, give notice of an Amendment in Committee to provide for those cases. By the 6th clause of the Bill the Chairman was to have power to fine the bailiffs for neglect or misconduct. These bailiffs were generally taken from a very low class, and not possessed of any property, so that the power to fine them would not be productive of much effect, and he thought that the Chairman should have some further control over them. These were minor points, and he would give due notice of Amendments to be proposed in Committee.
  After a few words, in reply, from The Lord CHANCELLOR,
  Motion agreed to: Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the whole House on Monday next.
  House adjourned at a quarter before Eight o'clock till to-morrow, half past Ten o'clock.