§ THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHsaid, as the Conference meets to-morrow, and the suspension of arms will terminate in nine days unless a final arrangement is made, this probably is the last opportunity on which it may be possible, with any chance of producing the least good, to bring under your consideration the actual position of the Danish Question. I prefer to consider great questions before any final decision is taken by the Government with respect to them, rather than to wait till that decision has been made, and then, in the event of not approving that decision, to concur in a vote of censure. I had much rather endeavour to do good, and prevent rather than punish evil. Before I put the question, of which I have given notice, to the noble Earl, I hope I may be permitted very shortly to state what is the actual position of the Danish Question and our own. The Treaty of 1852 is not the basis of the arrangement which, as we are told, it is proposed to make. It is but three years since Prince Gortschakoff, unless I am greatly mistaken, considered that treaty—agreed to by almost all the Powers of Europe—to be in the nature of a guarantee of the integrity of the Danish dominions, and, because it was assented to by so large a number of the European 1918 Powers, to be more valuable than a particular guarantee by a certain number of Powers, as was proposed by the noble Earl. That treaty was entered into for the purpose of establishing the succession to the throne of Denmark, and with it, and through it, the integrity of the Danish dominions. It was declared in that treaty that it was of the highest importance to the interests of the balance of power in Europe and the peace of Europe that the integrity of the Danish dominions should be maintained. Are there any new views with respect to the balance of power in Europe which have induced those Powers to retire from the obligations of that treaty? My Lords, it appears to me to be a matter of ominous import that a treaty agreed to only twelve years ago should, upon a futile pretence that circumstances have changed, be abandoned now by every one of the Powers by whom it was signed. Are other treaties of more ancient date, where circumstances have indeed altered, to be maintained in their integrity if this recent treaty, where circumstances have not been changed, is to be abandoned? Where is to be the security of the obligations of any treaty if so recent a treaty is to be broken? The circumstances have not changed. Then, as now, the people of Schleswig and Holstein were led by the press of Germany to believe that they would be in a better position if united with Germany; and, through the intrigues of Prussia, they rose in rebellion against their Sovereign. The same circumstances exist now. The people have not gone beyond what they did in 1848, yet the circumstances of the present dispute are relied on as a reason for depriving Denmark of Schleswig and Holstein. What effect must this have oh the security of the small States of Europe? If the great Powers unite to dismember a State by taking from it that which is declared by treaty to be a permanent portion of it, what occurs to-day with respect to Denmark may occur to-morrow with respect to Sweden, with respect to Holland, with respect to Belgium, and with respect to Switzerland, but still more with respect to those medieval curiosities the small States of Germany, which, if this innovation be carried out, probably, will be the very first States to suffer from its further application. My Lords, I expect that when we read the papers which have passed in this Conference we shall find on the part of the noble Earl a very able 1919 statement of the reasons why this course should not be adopted. We have all read with a feeling of sympathy that paper which appeared a few days ago stating the views of Denmark with respect to the proposals made at the Conference. Denmark bows to the opinion of the Powers, and consents to adopt the proposal of the noble Earl with respect to the line of demarcation, but with the conditions that her diminished territory shall be preserved to her in independence and autonomy, and that the people whom it is proposed to separate from Denmark shall have the opportunity of expressing their own opinions as to their future government. Now, what are the different lines of demarcation proposed? The German Powers proposed line from Apenrade to Tondern, which would leave the Danes only a very small portion of Schleswig. It is also stated, though not on strictly official authority, that a second line was proposed by Prussia—one from Flensburg to Tondern. This latter would leave the Danes in possession of Alsen, which the Prussians and Austrians have not hitherto been able to take. The first line would take Alsen away from Denmark; but there is this to be observed with respect to both lines—that they would deprive Denmark of every port in the North Sea, and by doing so they would cut off her communication with the other States of Europe in winter, when the Sound cannot be passed. I believe that France as little as England could consent to such an arrangement as that. The noble Earl proposes a different line. He proposes a line that would leave Denmark the Dannewerke, and I believe all the neutral Powers have accepted and supported the noble Earl's proposition. I hold, then, that the noble Earl on the part of this country and the neutral Powers, by the support they have given to his propositions, have practically pledged themselves in honour to maintain that frontier line, and not consent to any other which may be proposed. When, by means of this proposition, they replace the flag of Denmark on the line of the Dannewerke, they incur an obligation in honour to maintain it there. And they could not have selected a frontier more agreeable to good policy. To take from Denmark anything above the Dennewerke would have this effect—that in any future war between Germany and Russia, or between France and Germany, France or Russia would be sure to 1920 have the cordial support of Denmark against Germany, and troops could be brought to bear on the right of the German army in a manner that would be well calculated to insure success against Germany. We ought to look to the settlement now proposed as a final one, and no settlement can be final which is not at the same time just and honourable. I can hardly think it possible that Austria can hesitate about accepting the noble Earl's proportion. She must surely admit that the position she has lately taken up of subordinate co-operation with Prussia is one not worth of the place which she has hitherto occupied in Europe. She must feel that the objects which Prussia has in view are not German, but purely Prussian objects, and, therefore, that they are not her own objects. She must see that Prussia is adopting principles which are entirely incompatible with the integrity of any of the States of Europe. And may we not hope that Russia will give her strenuous support to the noble Earl's proposition—Russia, which for ninety year has honourably and generously supported Denmark? It is surely to be expected that, looking back on that long series of years, Russia will not, in the moment of her weakness and difficulty, desert Denmark, whom she has so long supported. And what should be the course of France? Denmark through her long and faithful connection and alliance with France during the revolutionary war, lost Norway. Is it possible to believe France can stand by and see Denmark, her ancient friend and ally, dismembered and disabled by that very State on which she trampled at Jena? Must France not feel that a treaty concluded by her consent which would dismember and destroy Denmark would bring upon herself a dishonor greater than that of the defeat at Rosbach, which at Jena she had redeemed. Then, what are the rights which the German Powers claim in this case? The right of conquest. The conqueror has no right of conquest in an unjust war. He has as little as the house-breaker who enters a dwelling at night to despoil it. But the conqueror in an unjust war, thought he cannot acquire a right can confer one. He confers upon all States the right of intervention to redress a wrong and re-establish rightful possession. Again, my Lords, will any one maintain the broad doctrine that every man who speaks German is to be under a German Sovereign? 1921 Why, that is a principle which would dismember every State in Europe. There is no country, including our own, in which there are not thousands of men who speak I a language different from that of the Government under which they live. I do not ask, under present circumstances, what England intends to do; but I Infer that at least the Government will go to this extent, that they will not permit an Austrian fleet to enter the Baltic. I think they will interfere to protect Denmark in the possession of her Islands. But what greater right have the inhabitants of those islands to be protected from Prussian bar barity than have the people of the north of Schleswig and Jutland? Depend upon it, the Prussians would prefer an arrangement of this kind to any peace; they would prefer to be kept out of the Islands if they were allowed to remain in Schleswig mid Jutland; and they would remain find barbarously despoil the inhabitants of those provinces. But is that consistent with the honour of this country and with the honour of the other States of Europe? There is only one way to make Prussia give up its hold on Jutland and North Schleswig, and that is by distinctly intimating that the British Government will not only protect the Islands but will protest Jutland and Schleswig—that they will give the assistance of a British force to blockade the ports of Germany in order to protect Schleswig and Jutland. I certainly have always maintained the opinion that there is no material difference between the moral obligations of a Stale and those of an individual. I cannot understand how that which confers reputation on a man can bring discredit and injury upon a country. I think that no country can greatly err in following the dictates of generosity and of honour in making timely preparations against a great and coming danger, and least of all when innocence and weakness clasp its knees imploringly, in raising its hand to restrain and to strike down the aggressor. It now only remains for me to ask the noble Earl whether measures have been taken by Her Majesty's Government to re-inforce the fleet, so as to make it equal at once to the blockade of the German ports and the defence of the Danish Islands.
§ EARL RUSSELLMy Lords, before I reply to the Question of the noble Earl, I must beg leave to make a very few remarks upon the statement which he has just 1922 addressed to your Lordships. Of course, I am not going to enter into anything that has taken place in the Conference or into the state of the negotiations at the present moment; but as the noble Earl has referred to the Treaty of 1852, as he is perfectly aware of the nature of that treaty, and as he has had before him the papers which have been laid upon the table of both Houses of Parliament, I must call his attention to some of the circumstances connected with that treaty. My Lords, the Treaty of 1852 was not a treaty of guarantee. I believe it was stated expressly at the time, and this I know from one who negotiated the treaty, that it was then a matter of discussion whether there should be a treaty of guarantee, or only a treaty recognizing the right of the King of Denmark to regulate the succession to the throne, and stating the reasons why the Powers of Europe should agree to the mode proposed by the King of Denmark for regulating that succession. That treaty bound, I think, all the Powers who signed it, to recognize the present Sovereign of Denmark, King Christian IX., both as successor to the throne of Denmark and to that of the Duchies, and thereby he became, at the death of the late King, Duke of Holstein, Duke of Schleswig, and Duke of Lauenburg, as much as he became King of Denmark. That was the obligation of the treaty; but it did not do more than that which I have stated; it did not bind any of the Powers who signed it to guarantee its execution. It was no more than those Treaties of 1815, one of which provided for the union of Belgium with Holland, and another for the possession of Lombardy by the House of Austria. The noble Earl will probably recollect that at the commencement of this discussion in the present year the French Government, in a State paper—which was at all events contained in the newspapers, and which, I think, was laid before Parliament—referred to the Treaty of 1815 with respect to Belgium, as showing that this country, though it did agree to that treaty, and though it might be unwilling to see it disturbed, yet concurred in arrangements differing from that which was provided in 1815. In a similar manner, when there was a question of war for the purpose, among other things, of separating Lombardy from Austria, no person was more emphatic than the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Malmesbury), who then held the office of Foreign Secretary, in advising Austria not 1923 to incur the perils of war, and in declaring that this country intended to be neutral in such a contest, and would not feel herself bound to support Austria in the maintenance of her Italian possessions. There are many more papers that those presented to parliament, all to the same effect. I think they do the greatest honour to the noble Earl and that they are conceived in a spirit of wise policy. The noble Earl who introduced this subject (the Earl of Ellenborough) must be aware of the sentiments both of France and Russia with respect to the maintenance of the Treaty of 1852— how explicitly France has stated her determination not to go to war for the purpose of maintaining that treaty, and how, though not so explicitly, Russia clearly let it be perceived that it was not her intention to take up arms to enforce that treaty. Whether that be any justification for the course which the Government of this country has pursued in another question, and it is a question upon which I may hereafter have to address your Lordships. I can assure your Lordships that it is a great inconvenience, as well as a great disadvantage to Her Majesty's Government, that they have not been able hitherto to lay before Parliament an explanation of the course of their policy; and no one will more rejoice that I shall when I am able to lay the protocols of the Conference upon the table of this House, and to explain to you Lordships the course which Her Majesty's Government have pursued. In the meantime, in order to show the sort of misrepresentations which are current with respect to the course pursued by the Government, I may mention that in an article which I believe, was first contained in German journal but which I saw translated into a French paper, and there commented upon, it was stated that Her Majesty's Government had declared that the Duchy of Holstein and any part of Schleswig that might be separated from Denmark ought not to be disposed of without the consent of the British Plenipotentiary and the Government of Great Britain. Now, the declaration of Great Britain. Now, the declaration really was that, whatever might happen, the future destinies of the two countries should not be disposed of without their own consent; and as I suppose that was a very fair and just proposal, those who wish to malign England on every occasion thought it well to pervert the meaning of this expression, and turn the consent of the Duchies themselves into the 1924 consent of the British Plenipotentiary. I will not enter any further into this question, but nothing will be more agreeable to the Government than to give a full explanation of the whole course of their policy upon this matter. With regard to the Question asked by the noble Earl, I must say that during a period of negotiation, and while the Conference still continues, it has rather the air of drawing from me a statement as to our preparations for war. I will, therefore, only state, disclaiming any intention of uttering a threat of any kind, that Her majesty's fleet is fully prepared for any service which it may be called upon to render.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYMy Lords, concurring, as I do, with a great portion of the observations which have been made by my noble Friend (the Earl of Ellen bourough), and made with his usual force and eloquence, I cannot but say with great respect that I certainly dissent, in some degree, from a proposition which he laid down in commencing his speech, and which appears to me to involve a considerable constitution error. My noble Friend stated that his object was—and there could be no doubt what his object must be—to prevent evil being done and assist in promoting beneficial results rather that to allow matters to take their own course, and then censure those who are responsible. Now, if you could be perfectly certain that the interference of Parliament upon all occasions during the progress of negotiations and during the communications and which are passing between various countries would have the effect of preventing evil, of promoting good, and of giving to Her Majesty's Government the support which they may need under the circumstances of the case, I should say that such intervention by Parliament, although exceptional, might at the same time be justified. But, as a general rule, I lay down a doctrine entirely different from that propounded by my noble friend. I conceive the true principle to be, that while matters are in progress—while the Government are engaged in negotiation— it is not the duty of Parliament, with imperfect information, to interfere by advice or by vote. I am opinion that with Her majesty's Government in all matters of this kind must be left the exclusive responsibility for the course and issue of negotiation; and I hope I may take this opportunity of expressing my earnest anxiety, that if I have refrained during the 1925 whole of this Session—as I have refrained — from passing any opinion, from putting any question, from raising any partial discussion—a course which I thought greatly to be deprecated—that abstinence on my part will not be supposed to arise from indifference, still less from approval, of the course pursued by the Government. My Lords, whatever temptations I may hate felt to enter upon partial discussions of that state of Europe—more especially as connected with the Banish Question— which keeps this country in feverish anxiety from day to day, I have laid down for myself a rule from which I have not shrunk and will not shrink—namely, that, while matters are in their present state, I will not afford the slightest excuse for any man to allege that by anything I have said or done I have in the least degree embarrassed or impeded the action of the Government. I will leave to them, according, as I apprehend, to the constitutional fluty of Parliament, the whole and undivided responsibility for the course which they have pursued, and the condition to which they have brought the honour of the country. But, my Lords, I must at the same time say that the time is approaching when this transition state of things cannot long continue—that a few days must decide whether the Conference is to succeed in promoting a peace, and, above all, an honourable peace, for this country. Dearly as I love peace I love honour more, and the time must come when we shall see whether that happy effect is to be produced by the negotiations carried on by Her Majesty's Government, or whether, in the course of a few days, the hopes of Europe will be dashed to the ground, the war recommenced, the negotiations ended, and the whole question left open, as it was previous to the assembling of the Conference. Should that be the case, I say it will not only be the right but the duty of Parliament, without an hour's delay, to call upon the Government for a distinct and specific statement of the policy which they have pursued and the course which they mean to pursue. Nay, more—I say it will be the right and the fluty of Parliament, upon hearing such a statement, to pronounce judgment, "Aye" or "No," upon the policy of the Government and the position in which they have placed the country. We are now advancing to a very late period of the Session, and I think it is of the utmost importance that Parliament should not separate with- 1926 out having an opportunity of expressing its opinions before this Conference has come to a determination as to the course which is to be pursued, be it for peace or for war. And notwithstanding what I have said as to not interfering with the course of Her Majesty's Government while negotiations are in progress, I may say that I think Parliament would not—indeed, I think Parliament ought not — patiently to sit by and watch protracted negotiations delayed by postponements and adjournments day after day and week after week, until a time of the year shall arrive when Parliament will not be able to pronounce effectively any opinion of a judicial character upon the conduct of Her Majesty's Ministers. Therefore, while I earnestly hope that by a speedy settlement of this question one way or the other, the lips of Parliament will be opened, and Parliament will be permitted to express its opinion, I think it my duty at the same time to say that if, contrary to my hopes and belief, negotiations should Be carried on from week to week, and from month to month, without leading to any definite issue, that circumstance will entirely alter our position, and it will be competent and justifiable — nay more, will be necessary—that Parliament should take some course to prevent, its voice from being entirely stifled in respect to the great affairs of Europe.
THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEsaid, he could not remain silent when he heard such constitutional doctrine as this laid down by the noble Earl. He agreed that it would be indiscreet at the present time, when a Conference was sitting to consider affairs so important, that Parliament should interpose any opinion upon the great questions at issue; but he denied that because negotiations were going on it was necessarily incompetent or injudicious, on the part of Parliament, to seek for information. Such was not the doctrine laid down and acted upon by high authorities upon constitutional procedure, which the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary surely would not hesitate to acknowledge. Had not Earl Grey, Mr. Fox, and others, over and over again moved Resolutions and Addresses to the Throne while negotiations were going on? It was often only when negotiations had commenced that Parliament became aware that questions of peace or war were pending. He maintained that since Parliament had assembled there had been many opportunities when Parliament, 1927 without any risk of doing harm and with great prospect doing good, might have considered the course which the honour and interests of this country required to be pursued at the present time. They had been told in the Speech from the Throne, that the Treaty of 1852 was to he upheld. What had, become of that treaty now? No one speaks of it, and it is entirely put on one side. Without saying whether that was right or not, he would ask their Lordships to remark how it had been justified by his noble Friend in reply to the frequent remarks of the 'noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Ellen borough). The noble Earl the Foreign Secretary referred to other treaties which has been Set aside; and alluded to them not as exceptional instances, but rather: as examples, implying that as so many treaties had been disregarded there would be no harm in breaking one or two more. The observations of the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Ellenborough) were, he, thought, most wise and well deserving of their Lordships' consideration; but the question which he had put, and which perhaps it was as well had not been an swered, seemed to be founded upon a. misconception. The noble Earl had jumped at the conclusion, that under some circumstances the Government would be inclined to go to war upon the question. It was hard to see what grounds; the noble Earl had for thinking that, happen what might, the present Government would ever be induced to take up arms in the cause of Denmark. It was a matter of notoriety that propositions for partitioning the kingdom of Denmark had been entertained by our Ministers, and no one could doubt that events were tending towards a total extinction of the kingdom of Denmark, He would not say whether such a result was desirable or not for this country, but there could be no doubt that there was a great probability that within a few years Denmark-would either become a part of the German Empire, or a portion of a Scandinavian kingdom. These things had: been going on and we had not stirred in the matter, and therefore it was difficult to understand how it was that the able Earl assumed that in any case we should go to war for Denmark, If a Vote of Censure were proposed, and Parliament was-left without information, it would be difficult to say in what manner their Lordships would vote. He believed that if Parliament had interfered; in 1853 there 1928 would have been, no Russian, war, and he had always regretted that he had not at that time brought, forwards Motion which would have enabled Parliament by an expression of its opinion, to relieve, the country from the misfortunes, of that war.
§ EARL RUSSELLMy Lords, in reply to the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) I must render my tribute of thanks to him for the course he has pursued in this matter—a course which is entirely constitutional, fair, to the Government, and creditable to himself. With respect to the noble Earl's remarks as to the silence of the Government may say that I think that in a very, few days either arrangements will have been made for preliminaries of peace, or, the negotiations will have been totally, broken off, and the war will then of course be resumed.