Lords Sitting of 25 July 1864

MINUTES.
Sat First in Parliament—the Viscount Gordon, after the Death of his Father.
SELECT COMMITTEE—Report—Judgments, &c, Law Amendment (No. 194); Local Government Supplemental (No. 2) (No, 190).
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Fortifications (Provision for Expenses)* (No. 247).
Second Reading—Criminal Justice Act (1855) Extension * (No. 231); Armagh Archiepis-copal Revenues* (No. 232); Consolidated Fund Appropriation (£15,000,000)* (No. 64); New Zealand (Guarantee of Loan) (No. 233); Pilotage Order Confirmation (No. 2) (No. 235); Public Works (Manufacturing Districts) (No. 237); Poor Removal (No. 239); Sheriffs Substitute(Scotland)* (No. 210); Drainage and Improvement of Lands (Ireland) Supplemental* (No. 221); West Indian Incumbered Estates Act Amendment* (No. 225).
Committee—Expiring Laws Continuance* (No. 208); Pier and Harbour Orders Confirmation* (No. 151); Contagious Diseases* (No. 234); Bank Post Bills (Ireland)* (No. 230); Corn Accounts and Returns * (No. 238); Westminster Bridge Traffic* (No. 240); Stamp Duties Act (1864) Amendment* (No. 241).
Report—Harwich Harbour Act Amendment* (No. 210); Portsmouth Dockyard (Acquisition of Lands)* (No. 215); Judgments, &c, Law Amendment* (No. 194); Railway Companies Powers* (No. 230); Contagious Diseases* (No. 234); Bank Post Bills (Ireland)* (No. 236); Corn Accounts and Returns* (No. 238); Westminster Bridge Traffic* (No. 240); Stamp Duties Act (1864) Amendment* (No. 241); Thames Conservancy* (No. 226); Railways Construction Facilities * (No. 222).
Third Reading—Turnpike Acts Continuance, &c.* (No, 214); Registration of Deeds (Ireland)* (No. 218); Ionian States Acts of Parliament Repeal* (No. 212); Turnpike Trusts Arrangements* (No. 211); Bank Notes, &c, Signature* (No. 217); Bleaching and Dyeing Works Act Extension* (No. 242); Exchequer Bonds (£1,600,000)* (No. 224), and passed.
Royal Assents—Inland Revenue (Stamp Duties) [27 & 28 Vict. c. 56];
Valuation of Rateable Property (Ireland) [27 & 28 Vict. c. 52];
Penal Servitude Acts Amendment [27 & 28 Vict. c. 47];
India Office [27 & 28 Vict. c. 51];
Summary Procedure (Scotland) [27 & 28 Vict. c. 53];
Ecclesiastical Courts and Registries (Ireland) [27 & 28 Vict. c. 54];
Factory Acts Extension [27 & 28 Vict. c. 48];
Indemnity [27 &4 28 Vict. c. 49];
India Stocks Transfer Act Amendment [27 & 28 Vict. c. 50];
Street Music (Metropolis) [27 & 28 Vict. c. 55];
Lunacy (Scotland) [27 & 28 Vict. c. 59];
Admiralty Lands and Works [27 & 28 Vict. c 57];"
Pilotage Order Confirmation [27 & 28 Vict. c. 58];
Public and Refreshment Houses [27 & 28 Vict. c. 64];
Clerks of the Peace Removal [27 & 28 Vict. c, 65];
Militia Ballots Suspension [27 & 28 Vict. c. 63];
College of Physicians [27 & 28 Vict. c. 60];
Trespass (Ireland) [27 & 28 Vict. c. 67];
Militia Pay [27 & 28 Vict. c. 69];
Local Government Act (1858) Amendment [27 & 28 Vict. c. 68];
Cathedral Minor Corporations [27 & 28 Vict. c. 70];
Railways (Ireland) Acts Amendment [27 & 28 Vict. c. 71];
Drainage and Improvement of Lands (Ireland) [27 & 28 Vict. c. 72];
Thames Embankment and Metropolis Improvement (Loans) [27 & 28 Vict. c. 61];
Isle of Man Harbours Act Amendment [27 & 28 Vict. c. 62];
Inclosure (No. 2) [27 & 28 Vict. c. 66].

DENMARK.

  ADDRESS FOR CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO TREATIES.
  LORD CAMPBELL* said: My Lords, I trust that I shall not oppose the wishes of the House in now proceeding with my notice, in spite of that which has been given by a noble Earl over the way, and which opens a wider field in regard to foreign policy. I should have been inclined to withdraw mine, although his was subsequently given and stands for a later day, were it not that such a course would deprive a noble Marquess near me (the Marquess of Clanricarde), long versed in these affairs, of the latest opportunity for discussing our present situation. My Lords, it will be easy to explain the question I propose to put, as to whether the Treaty of 1852 and the older Treaties relative to Schleswig have any further international validity, and the Motion I submit for recent correspondence on the subject. According to a general impression, the reverses and the losses our diplomacy has suffered impose some line of action, or at least suggest it, to redeem our credit, to reinstate our influence, and to indemnify the Continent to the greatest possible extent for the evils our discomfiture has lately brought upon it. But until these treaties are in some degree considered and disposed of, no such compensating line appears feasible or open. They bind us to uphold a past or at least an evanescent situation, and do not well admit of our being parties to a new one. They pledge us to sustain a fabric which is crumbling, and hardly seems to warrant us in building on the vacancy. At the same time, my Lords, it is far from my intention to disparage them. The proposition I have hazarded—namely, that a new line of action is required, would rather make it logical and just to dwell upon their gravity. The clearest ground for the necessity of diplomatic and political repair is that in the torrent of events we have departed from engagements not to be denied, and hitherto held sacred. As regards the Treaty of 1852, which is so familiar, nothing need be said, except that its apparent
  1980
  ruin is a serious disparagement to the country under whose auspices it came into existence, and by whom it has been so frequently and ineffectually appealed to. The gravity of those treaties by which the Duchy of Schleswig has been guaranteed to Denmark is based on more than one consideration. Although they date from 1720 they also date from 1814. It is a fallacy to think that they are buried like an ancient temple in the dust which ages heap upon it. At the end of the great war, the Treaty of Kiel revived and re-established them. Besides this, in 1826, Great Britain recognized and acted on treaties identical in scope, in character and circumstances. Mr. Canning, in defending the British expedition to the Tagus, stood upon two guarantees of Portugal—given, one in 1661, the other in 1703, and of which both were re-established at the Treaty of Vienna. It will thus be seen by your Lordships that the guarantees of Schleswig were coeval in their second birth with those of Portugal, and less remote in their original concession. The principle of Mr. Canning with regard to those of Portugal went to the extent that the faith and honour of the country were involved in their observance, no matter how great the risk it might contain, no matter how doubtful or minute the British interest connected with it. Mr. Canning, in his famous speech of December, 1826, was not the leader of a party only, but the organ of an empire. The country acted on the doctrine he advanced, and took a measure which, although it ended in the quick and bloodless victory of right, might have embroiled us not only with Spain, but France, and the three despotic Powers which impelled them against Portugal. If, therefore, and the point will hardly be contested, the guarantees of Portugal and the guarantees of Schleswig stand on the same basis, the indirect acknowledgment which the last received in 1826 was brilliant and emphatic. No English politician can see Schleswig torn from Denmark without the same regret, at least the same humiliation he would feel if Portugal was conquered. He must desire a compensation and a balance for a result by which the credit of Great Britain is so injuriously altered. But the lapse of treaties and oblivion of engagements is not the only ground for seeking a new policy. The general position of the Continent can hardly fail to offer us another. We cannot help observing every tendency and move-

  1981
  ment which Great Britain would desire to avert. "We see France—to avoid all exaggeration—colder than she used to be. We see Russia and the German Powers obviously combining. If they were not combined, could Denmark have been trampled on? Do you believe the German Powers would have ventured on that course had Russia actively discountenanced it? If they had not combined, could Poland have been cast into a deeper tomb than that which formerly compressed her? If they had not combined, would Austria have been detached from the path on which a year ago it was the triumph of the Foreign Office to have set her, and from which she has relapsed into the ancient mire she had quitted? We see upon the Continent—these are facts which cannot be disputed—the objects of the country baffled, and her remonstrances despised. Let any one compare in foreign policy the Britain of 1815, or that of 1826, or that of 1841, with that of the present moment, and he must be tempted to indulge in terms which I, in order to avoid the semblance of heat, shall studiously refrain from. But what, my Lords, enhances the regret and adds to the desire of reparation; in any foreign capital we should hear something of the errors from which the situation had arisen. In Copenhagen we should hear that the despatch of September, 1862, had lent an impulse to the German movement which never afterwards subsided. This very day, a well-known journal has a letter from that city, alleging, what indeed we knew before, that its inhabitants attribute to that despatch the tide of evils which engulfs them. At Paris we should be informed that the obstacles presented by Great Britain to the Congress in November had altered the alliance, had estranged the Emperor, at the very moment when the death of the King of Denmark and the impending crisis made such consequences doubly alarming. And will any one at present venture to assert that the latent and contingent inconveniences, which, perhaps, resided in the project of a Congress, outweighed the broad and palpable calamities which its refusal has inflicted upon Europe. At St. Petersburg we should be told of the delusion which led our Foreign Office to count on Russia in the autumn, when our conduct on the Polish question had excited her resentment; when the Russian and the German objects were identical upon the Baltic; when the neces-
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  sity and policy of Russia was to exchange; support and succour both at Berlin and Vienna. In any capital the English traveller would hear that to insist upon the Conference without preliminary measures to support it was to run into inevitable failure. It was said before the Conference I began—and this will be admitted—that success alone can vindicate a measure which at the outset all the world condemns as idle for its purpose. If it is true, my Lords, after a brief and unimpassioned view of what has happened, that our treaties have been sacrificed; if it is true that our objects have been baffled, and also that our errors are conspicuous, I venture to maintain that a desire must suggest itself for something in the nature of an indemnifying policy. To rescue Denmark is assumed to be impossible. But the fragment of that kingdom cannot stand alone without the territory which we have not been able to secure to it. It is hardly requisite to show that a nation; composed of North Jutland and the Islands, reduced in population and revenue, no; longer leading on the Baltic, without a military frontier, assailable by Germany from Schleswig, assailable by Germany on the sea coast, and at the same time the object of its wishes, would not be able to maintain itself. Eventually it must become absorbed in Germany, unless a Scandinavian union happens to preserve it. Both in Sweden and in Denmark a considerable party are known to lean to such an union. If the Treaty of 1852 is gone, dynastic circumstances favour it. Before now its advantages to Europe have been stated. But they are summed up in the jealousy with which—as the despatches before your Lordships show—it is regarded at St. Petersburg. What inspires that jealousy? A Scandinavian union could not act aggressive on Russia. Its population could not go beyond 10,000,000, while that of Russia, as your Lordships well know, is 70,000,000. The jealousy arises from the fact, and only from the fact, that such an union would retard the growth of Russian power on the Baltic. While Russia menaces the East, defies the Treaty of Vienna, detaches Austria from the wholesome concert in which the Western Powers had succeeded in engaging her, it is not our policy to encourage her maritime ambition on the Baltic. On the contrary, it seems to be our policy to check it. No doubt, my Lords, the union of the Scandinavian

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  countries could not be promoted except by France and Great Britain cordially cooperating. Such a line could only be pursued with tenderness to vested rights, to popular ideas, and diplomatic complications. It could only be pursued by cautious steps and well concerted movements. But before it is denounced as visionary or irrelevant, your Lordships ought to glance at the alternative. The alternative contains a series of intelligible evils. When Denmark lapses altogether into German, you have to bear the unmitigated triumph of that false and hypocritical aggression, which has shocked us; the no less complete humiliation of the power whose diplomacy endeavoured to restrain it; the aggrandisement of Russia in the Baltic through her influence on Germany; the defencelessness of Sweden no longer fortified by Denmark; the right of any country strong enough to kindle war in Europe when its balance had so materially altered; the general decline of public law after the blows it would receive and the encroachments it would suffer in the event I am supposing. But whether or not we ought to favour Scandinavian union as the best result of the misfortunes which have happened to ourselves and to the world—dismissing altogether such a topic—it is still essential to determine the operation of the treaties which the notice has referred to. Were it our policy to make Denmark German, or to sustain her weak, denuded, and dismantled in her islands, the question would not be irrelevant. No line of action seems to be legitimate until we understand the manner in which the treaties bear upon us. It would be satisfactory, no doubt, if the Government would say that they continued to acknowledge them, that combinations might be yet formed for giving them effect, that it was not too late to rescue Denmark, and recover our honour. Such language all would hail, and nobody anticipates. It would be admissible, although not a source of pride, if the Government declared that overruling circumstances rendered it impossible to execute the treaties that their utility was gone, and that the ground was cleared for a line of action they had hitherto debarred us from. But to connive at them, ignore them, hush them up; at one time to call them immaterial because the casus fœderis has not arisen, and when it has disastrously occurred to bury them in silence; to pretend that we are ready to enforce
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  the guarantee of Prussian Saxony, while that of Schleswig perishes without apology before us, is inadmissible, derogatory to the Crown, and not to be encouraged by the Legislature. That course the Government will now have the opportunity of quitting. I will not detain your Lordships but move for the Correspondence I have asked for.
  Moved,
  "That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for Copies of any recent Correspondence relating to the Treaties between Denmark and Great Britain."
  EARL GRANVILLE: My Lords, I do not think it necessary to follow my noble Friend in that part of his speech which relates to the position which this country holds in Europe. That subject has recently been ably discussed in both Houses of Parliament, and both Houses came to a decision upon it. To re-open that question would, to use a vulgar phrase, be like "serving mustard after dinner." I believe it would neither tend to promote the interests of the public service nor to advance the dignity of this House. The question, however, which the noble Lord has put is one of very considerable importance. The noble Lord asks whether the Treaty of 1720, with the additional sanction which it received from the Treaty of 1814, is still obligatory. The noble Lord stated that the validity of our ancient treaties with Portugal was recognized by Mr. Canning in 1826. But the facts of the two cases are perfectly dissimilar. We had had no war with Portugal to put an end to those treaties, but with Denmark we had had hostilities; and it is not only my opinion, but the opinion also of the Law Officers of the Crown, that the obligations of the Treaty of 1720 were put an end to by the war. The Treaty of Kiel, in 1814, prevented that treaty from having any force or obligation on this country. With regard to the Treaty of 1852; it contained no guarantee of any sort; and although the preamble showed the importance which the great Powers of Europe attached at that time to the independence and integrity of Denmark, yet the only obligations imposed upon this country, in common with the other signitaries, was to acknowledge the succession as settled by that treaty. This we willingly and readily did as soon as the occasion presented itself. With regard to the present position of that treaty, on going into the Conference we found that we were the only nation who

  1985
  were satisfied to adhere to the treaty. Under those circumstances it became necessary to join with our co-signitaries in agreeing to certain modifications of that treaty; and no doubt to that extent the treaty has been modified.
  THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEdoubted whether the noble Earl had quite correctly represented the fact as to the Treaty of Kiel, because he was under the impression that that treaty renewed all others which had been entered into with respect to Denmark. However, as we were not to support our opinions by force, he was glad that we were to have no more protocols about the Treaty of 1720. He was sorry to hear from his noble Friend that the Treaty of 1852 was still to be considered in force.
  EARL GRANVILLEexplained that he had stated the very reverse. He said that in the Conference the British Government finding themselves alone in their adherence to that treaty, had thought it politic to join with their co-signitaries in agreeing to certain modifications of it.
  THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEshould then like to know what were the modifications which were agreed upon—because in the papers which had been produced there was no mention of any agreement as to modification. He regretted that there should be any agreement the effect of which might be to draw us into I Conferences upon this subject again, either at Vienna or elsewhere; because he attached no importance to any conference or negotiations into which we might enter after a declaration more or less openly avowed that, come what might, we would not enforce our views or opinions as to the rights or obligations which were imposed upon other Powers either by the public law of Europe or by special treaties. [Earl GRANVILLE: I said nothing about going into another Conference.] He (the Marquess of Clanricarde) knew that, but he was afraid from what his noble Friend had said, and from other circumstances, that there was such a risk. When his noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs was good enough to attend that House and take part in their debates, he told them that no faith could be placed in the declarations of Austria, because she had not the power to control either her allies or her subjects, or to overcome contingencies which must force her to depart from her engagements. Should not that circumstance of itself act
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  as a warning to prevent our entering into any more Conferences upon this subject? His noble Friend had in his speeches talked a good deal about moral influence; but moral influence was only effective when it was known that you were ready to support your views by force. If they were not prepared to do so he entreated the Government to go into no more Conferences. They had greatly injured the power of, Denmark by the course which they had already taken, and no interference on their part would do her any good unless they were prepared to say that in certain cases, or in some case, or in any case, they were prepared to assert their opinions by force. He had as great a horror of revolution as any man, but it was better than total loss of liberty or submission to a foreign yoke. The revolutionists at present were not the Democrats but the Sovereigns. Could there be a greater revolutionist than he who now sat upon the throne of Prussia? A revolution had been effected in that country, and in order to carry it out and put down the constitution the King had not hesitated to invade Denmark.
  LORD CAMPBELL,in reply, stated that according to Dr. Twiss in his well known work on the Danish Duchies, the Treaty of Kiel revived all our former treaties of amity with Denmark, and among them the guarantee of 1720. The controversy was between the noble Lord the President of the Council upon the one hand and Dr. Twiss upon the other. Since all parties in the State had acknowledged the guarantees in 1848, Dr. Twiss could not be denied to have the balance of authority. A t the same time he (Lord Campbell) admitted that if the guarantees were not enforced, it was better for the country and the world they should not be held valid.
  Motion (by Leave of the House) withdrawn.

NEW ZEALAND (GUARANTEE OF LOAN) BILL—(No. 233.)

  SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  EARL GRANVILLE,in moving that the Bill be now read the second time, said, he thought it was, as a general rule, undesirable that this country should guarantee loans raised for colonial purposes. Such a course must tend, in his opinion,

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  to encourage a large increase in the expenditure of a colony. At the same time, it was impossible for the mother country to divest herself entirely of responsibility for her colonies, especially in case of war; and the circumstances of the present case were so exceptional and so strong, that he thought it impossible for their Lordships to refuse their assent to this Bill. With regard to the origin and commencement of the war now being waged in New Zealand, he believed it to be a just war, for there could be no doubt that the immediate cause of it was the murder of British subjects by the Maories. The struggle which ensued had been a very severe one, and there could be no doubt that in the struggle the colonists had greatly exerted themselves. There was, he believed, no foundation for the charge that they had supplied arms and ammunition to the Natives, to be used against themselves and us. No doubt, in a free country, and in peaceable times, the Natives had had abundant opportunities of providing themselves with arms; but it was utterly incredible that at a time when the whole male population of the colony were combined against the Natives, that any portion of them would be allowed by the rest to furnish arms to the insurgents to be used against themselves. In consequence of the expenses occasioned by the war, and the consequences of the disturbed state of things, the colony were compelled to have recourse to a loan; but they experienced great difficulty in obtaining it, and they then applied to the Government for a guarantee. One of the great objections, so far as he had been able to ascertain, against the proposed guarantee was founded on the alleged insufficiency of the resources of the colony, but, after the most careful consideration of the point, both on the part of the Colonial Office and the Treasury, the conclusion had been arrived at that the security was satisfactory. The revenue of the colony was largely increasing, and although no doubt the expenditure was also increasing, yet on a comparison of the ordinary income with the ordinary expenditure, there was a surplus of revenue of £260,000; and besides the ordinary revenue there was a large sum derived annually from the sale of waste lands. Moreover, and above the advantage of assisting the colony in its difficulty, there would be this further advantage in giving the Imperial guarantee asked for by the Bill, that the mother
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  country would receive out of the loan to be raised the immediate repayment of the sum of £500,000, in which the colony was already indebted to us. He did not attach much importance to this, except in one respect—that it at once wiped away a cause of irritation between the mother country and the colony which had at various times been found to be exceedingly inconvenient. With respect to the termination of the war, he could only say that the Government were anxious that it should be brought to a close at the earliest possible moment; and, to that end, they had by their last despatch invested Sir George Grey with summary powers over the movements of the troops in New Zealand; and Governor Sir George Grey, in writing on the subject on the 7th of April last, said—
  "I can have no hesitation in saying that the wishes and instructions of his Grace the Duke of Newcastle impose on me as a duty that which is entirely in consonance with my own feelings and with yours—namely, that I should instantly listen to any reasonable overtures that the Natives in arms may make, and that I should avail myself of any opportunity that offers of obtaining permanent peace for this colony. I am quite confident that general public opinion in this country will support me in taking this course and would expect me to do so. With regard to the confiscation of portions of the lands of the Natives now in arms, this point has to be considered—that mercy requires that future contests between the two races should in as far as practicable be prevented, and that there are many tribes in New Zealand who have taken no part in the present lamentable conflicts, yet who might hereafter be led into similar acts; while nothing would more certainly lead to the extermination of the Native race than a series of contests such as that which is now being carried on. The object of the local Government, therefore, has been to secure to that numerous part of the Native population who have taken no active share in the present war the whole of their landed possessions, and also by laws passed expressly for this object, to give to the lands held by such Natives a value greater than they have previously had for their owners, by in all respects giving them equal rights in their landed possessions with those enjoyed by their European fellow-subjects, the intention in this respect being to show that the rights of peaceable citizens of whatever race are carefully respected, and to give the Natives so valuable a stake in the country that they are not likely hereafter to regard it lightly. On the other hand, it was thought necessary by an example to show that those who rose in arms against their fellow-subjects of another race, suffered such a punishment for doing so as might deter others from embarking in a similar career. It is therefore proposed to deprive such persons of a considerable portion of their landed properties, and to provide for the future safety of the colony by occupying such lands with an European population. But even in the case of these persons it is intended

  1989
  that sufficient lands shall be reserved for themselves and their descendants, to be held on the same tenure as lands are henceforth to be secured to the rest of the Native population. That these measures will be carried out in a spirit of liberal generosity and mercy I earnestly hope, and will do my best to insure, and I believe that I shall be supported by a large majority in this colony."
  The despatch of his right hon. Friend at the head of the Colonial Office giving the general support of the Home Government to the policy would, he believed, enable Sir George Grey to carry out his liberal and just scheme in a manner which would have the effect of securing permanent peace for the colony.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a"—(The Lord President.a)
  THE EARL OF MALMESBURYsaid, he had not intended to make any observations on the Bill, but in the absence of his noble Friend the Earl of Carnarvon, who took a great interest in the subject, he could not allow the Bill to pass without making a few observations on the nature of the proposal. The apologetical tone in which the noble Earl had introduced the Bill, was certainly by no means misplaced, for a more questionable measure had never come before Parliament. The feeling of the country had been unmistakably manifested against the principle of the Bill, and there was now firmly established in the public mind a complete conviction that a colony, when once it had arrived at a certain point of power and prosperity ought to defend itself against its natural enemies, and ought not to call on the mother country for the aid of Imperial troops. With respect to Canada, we could not too soon persuade the people of that country that it was impossible for them to obtain Imperial assistance in the way of English troops. If they were attacked by the Indians, or by their neighbours of the same race with themselves, they were now strong enough, prosperous enough, and populous enough to do without British troops, and any help which they asked from us must be in the way of naval assistance and guns and materiel of war; but they ought to find their own men, and defend their own frontier. The same principle applied to New Zealand. There certainly were no restless aggressive elements in Canada, but the same compliment could not be paid to the Government of New Zealand. Colonists of New Zealand had obtained from this country powers of self-government, and since then they had kept
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  up a constant quarrel with the Natives. They had done nothing to reconcile the Natives to their rule, and if they became engaged in consequence in a war with the Natives—which should be regarded in the light of a civil war—they ought to learn how to take care of themselves, and not to call on this country for some 10,000 or 12,000 soldiers, thus draining our small army, and staving off the retribution for their mismanagement at our expense. If they had had themselves to pay and to bleed for their own defence, we should have heard very little of the present difficulties, and when people had to pay their own expenses, the amount was far less than if they could send in their bills to other parties for payment. There was another point with respect to the defence of the colonies by our troops. He saw no reason why British soldiers alone should be sent to carry on these colonial wars. The Romans did not send Italian soldiers into Syria, Britain, or any of their colonies; they sent the troops of the countries which they had conquered and occupied, and in the same way he never could understand why some of our Indian regiments, the Sikh regiments, should not be employed in our colonial wars. He looked on this Bill as an encouragement to all colonies in the same position as New Zealand to quarrel with the Natives, and get up little wars of which they were sure not to bear the burden. He had no wish to divide the House against the Bill, but he looked upon it as a most impolitic measure, and was astonished how it could have received the assent of the House of Commons. He believed that if the public purse were in the hands of their Lordships instead of in the hands of the House of Commons, a much more economical system would be adopted. The House of Commons was by far too generous in many respects, and it sanctioned many things which never would have passed their Lordships. He thought this war in New Zealand was unholy and unjust, and that every drop of blood shed and every guinea spent upon it was wasted.
  LORD LYVEDENsaid, he believed there was a pretty general concurrence in the principle laid down by the noble Earl (the Earl of Malmesbury), that every colony should bear its own expenses; but though this principle was undoubtedly sound, the difficulty lay in the application of it; and he would take the liberty of reminding

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  their Lordships that every successive Colonial Secretary had, in his own despite, been dragged into a colonial war, with all its attendant cost. The noble Earl suggested the employment of Indian troops in New Zealand; but did the noble Earl mean to saddle the Indian exchequer with the cost? He was afraid that this important measure had not been sufficiently considered. It was introduced to the House of Commons at a very late period of the Session—so late, in fact, that a discussion was out of the question even in that House; and if their Lordships could, according to the rules of the House, discuss the measure—which he believed they were not able to do—there was not time for it. The only valuable part of the Bill was that which was not in it when it was introduced into the Commons. He alluded to the proviso at the end of the second clause, which provided that the guarantee should not come into operation until the Colonial Legislature had passed such measures as were required by the Secretary of State to secure the repayment of the loan, as well as the cost of the British troops employed in the colony. But this was a new clause. If the Bill had passed in its original shape it would have been quite possible that the Colonial Legislature might not have taken steps to provide for the repayment of the loan. The colony was at war. We said it was the war of the colonists; they said it was an Imperial war, produced by carrying out the measures of the Home Government, and compelling them to deal with the Natives in a particular manner of which they did not approve. The colonists added that they would not have been in their present unfortunate position if they had been left to themselves. Being in this state of distress, they sought a loan, which they asked the Home Government to guarantee. They wanted a loan of £3,000,000; and the Government consented to grant a guarantee for £1,000,000. What was to be done with regard to the other £2,000,000? The colonists said they found a difficulty in procuring a loan themselves. Doubtless there must be a difficulty in obtaining the money at 4½ per cent; but there would be no difficulty if they gave the market price, say of 7 per cent. We should adopt the principle of refusing to guarantee any loans whatever. We had refused to do so in the case of India, although we should have thereby saved to the Indian treasury a very large sum of money. It was unfair
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  to say that the murders which had been the origin of this war could be traced to any other source than the question of land. Sir George Grey, in one of his despatches to the Duke of Newcastle, expressly said that if the colonists were resolved to take the lands of the Natives they must be prepared to abide by the consequences. He (Lord Lyveden) was of opinion that the war was not likely to be brought to a speedy conclusion, for but little had been done to mitigate the hostility between the Natives and the settlers. He quite agreed in thinking that guaranteeing the loan was guaranteeing everything that had been done by the settlers to the Natives, and, while the saving would be small, the loss in point of principle would be great. Everyone must regret the loss of life which had taken place, and they were told that the troops were utterly disgusted with the service on which they were engaged. That might or might not be true, but it was an awful responsibility for any one to incur to proceed with a war which it was believed at home could not be proved to be quite just, and which was certainly not one upon which this country would be justified in expending its resources. In the present state of the House it would be useless to divide against the Bill, but he thought it right to enter his protest.
  THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE: My Lords, I cannot allow an observation which has just fallen from the noble Lord (Lord Lyveden)—namely, that the war is viewed with utter disgust by the British troops—to pass unnoticed. We all must regret the misfortune which has happened to a distinguished regiment; but I wish in the strongest manner to protest against the impression getting abroad that any of Her Majesty's troops, in whatever service they are employed, so long as they are employed by Her Majesty's Government, perform the service on which they are sent with the slightest disgust. Discipline and obedience constitute the means by which an army is held together and prevented from becoming a useless collection of men. It is the duty of the Government to decide on what service the troops shall be employed; and, as is well known, Parliament can dissent from any measure adopted by the Government; but it is the duty of the troops implicitly to obey any order and command they receive from those under whom they are placed. I firmly believe that there is no foundation for the impres-

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  sion that the cause of the misfortune which has recently occurred is that the troops did not like the service on which they were engaged. If there were the slightest foundation for such a suspicion, I should sincerely deplore that any of Her Majesty's troops should have become so undisciplined. I cannot concur in some of the observations which have fallen from the noble Earl (the Earl of Malmesbury). So long as this country possesses colonies it cannot be expected that the British troops I shall not be employed in them, and I; cannot imagine that the noble Earl meant to say that Indian troops would have behaved better than British troops.
  LORD LYVEDENexplained that what he said was that he believed that an impression, however false, prevailed in the colony that the troops felt disgust with the service on which they were employed.
  THE EARL OF MALMESBUBYsaid, that in speaking respecting the employment of British troops in the colonies he had in mind that the colonies were of two descriptions. He never intended to suggest that we were not to employ British troops in Gibraltar, Bermudas, and Malta, which were not so much colonies as military stations. But when colonies had increased to such an extent of prosperity as to have 7,000,000 or 8,000,000 of inhabitants, it seemed hard that they should not find men enough to form regiments to defend themselves. He did not pretend to say that the Indian troops were superior to the English troops; but he was sure the illustrious Duke would agree with him that they were very good troops. He considered that the Sikhs might be made available for service in the colonies, and thus release the British troops for other service.
  EARL DE GERY AND RIPONsaid, he would not follow the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Malmesbury) into the very large question of the employment of British troops in our colonies. But there was one thing which he wanted to know, and that was, where the colony was to be found in which there were seven millions of in habitants? When we arrived at that time in which colonies of ours should have such a large population, the whole question would have assumed a very different aspect. The question was a wide but was altogether one of relative population and wealth; but, at any rate, it could not be discussed in the present state of the House and of the Session. With regard
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  to the war which had arisen in New Zealand, noble Lords had spoken as if it had its origin entirely in the policy, and was the fault of the Colonial Government, and as though the Natives were in no wise to blame. But such was not the case. The war had its origin in a cruel and cowardly murder committed upon a body of English troops passing from one station to another, who were surprised by an ambush, and two officers and seven men were killed and others wounded. That outrage took place, it should be remembered, after the arrival of Sir George Grey, a Governor in whom the Natives professed to have the greatest confidence, who had always been regarded as their friend, and who had been sent out after the outbreak of the previous war on account of the special qualifications which he possessed for the office. It was not, then, from any desire on the part of the Colonial Government to exterminate the Natives that this war had arisen. Under these circumstances, he did not think there was any one of their Lordships who would say that it was right to let such an outrage as that to which he had alluded pass unpunished. Measures were in consequence resorted to which led to general hostilities; but it was the desire of Her Majesty's Government to bring the hostilities to a conclusion at the earliest possible period. Noble Lords had talked as if Her Majesty's Government were determined to bear the whole expense of the war, to send out any number of British troops, and to leave the colonists to reap the benefits of supplying the commissariat. But that was not true. In the first place, the colonists bore a considerable portion of the expenditure; next, they had raised 10,000 volunteers who had served with credit in the field; and the illustrious Duke would bear him out when he said that their officers and men had been often mentioned with distinction in the despatches. The colonists were bearing the expenses of that force and various other charges incident to the war. Besides, the Colonial Secretary had lately given notice that, from the 1st of January of the next year, the colony would have to pay £45 a man for every one of our troops employed there, a payment calculated to cover the entire expenses of the troops. Under these circumstances, Her Majesty's Government were not open to the charge of being ready to expend the blood and treasure of this country for the objects of the colonists of New Zealand. But we ought not to have

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  left our countrymen in that colony entirely without protection. He thought the course which had been adopted would bring the war to a speedy conclusion; because the colonists, if what noble Lords said was true, would, when they had to pay the whole expenses of the war, take measures to bring it to an end as soon as possible.
  VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE RED-CLIFFEsaid, the Bill now before their Lordships had been brought from the House of Commons, and being a money Bill it was not competent for their Lordships to alter it. At the same time it was matter of surprise to hear the arguments put forward on both sides of the House—first, on the side of the Government, who entered into a protest against the application of the principle, while his noble Friend opposite (the Earl of Malmesbury) not only protested against the application of the principle, but was decidedly opposed to the measure itself. Now, it was a painful thing to one holding an independent position in that House, to observe so often a contradiction between the principle enunciated and its application; and he must say it would be far better for the honour of that House and the interests of the country if greater harmony was observed between the two. Now, if there was one principle more clear than another, it was that where a colony had been allowed by Act of Parliament to have a Constitution and Legislature of its own it ought at least to incur the expenses consequent on managing its own affairs. Some assistance might, in the first instance, be accorded by the mother country in order to help the colony in getting into a proper condition; but it would not be too much for the mother country to expect after a short time that the charge of administering its own affairs and protecting itself should be borne by the colony. It was, however, a painful thing for any one who had the honour of his country at heart to hear doubts thrown out as to the capacity of this country to protect our colonies. If unfortunately it should happen at some future time, either from the increase of the power of other countries or the reduction of our own, that we should be reduced to the necessity of abandoning our colonies, there was no necessity for anticipating any such thing, and it was much to be regretted that those anticipations could have only the effect of adding to the chances of such an event. The interests of this country
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  would be much better consulted by waiting until such circumstances should arise and then meeting the matter with calmness. He quite agreed with the illustrious Duke that any course which seemed to admit a choice on the part of troops employed in the field would be utterly subversive of discipline and most injurious to the country whose servants they were.
  LORD TAUNTONsaid, that it was a folly to expect that we could give representative institutions to a colony, and yet protect the land of the Natives from encroachment. All the late difficulties in New Zealand might, in his opinion, be traced to the Treaty of Waitangi, which was a great mistake in every respect. The moment that we gave the colonists popular institutions—the moment we obliged the Governor of New Zealand to follow the advice of responsible Ministers, who were themselves dependent on the votes of the Assemblies—the Government at home was placed in a position of the utmost embarrassment with the Colonial Government, and was placed in a position with regard to the Natives which it was impossible to carry out. He had heard with the greatest gratification the statement of his noble Friend (Earl Granville), that Her Majesty's Government were doing all that could be expected in order to place all the parties in New Zealand on a more satisfactory footing. He should be sorry that the present opportunity should be lost without obtaining some guarantee from the colonists for the future security of the Natives. Sir George Grey was a friend of the Maories, and he was sure that everything that could be done by him would be done to remedy existing evils. It was very easy to say, leave the black men and the white men to settle matters between themselves. If any Government in this country were to do so, it would excite a cry of indignation from one part of this island to the other. He had heard declamations against the employment of British troops in the colonies, and it was undoubtedly right to encourage the colonists to fight for themselves; but it was utterly impossible to say that circumstances might not arise in a wide-spread empire like ours in which British soldiers might be usefully employed in the colonies for the interests of this country. His experience in colonial affairs satisfied him that a few British troops were often of essential service in a colony. At the time of the gold discoveries a very few English soldiers saved Australia from

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  a state of things that would have been most disgraceful. In California, under similar circumstances, all law was set aside. But public opinion in this country would not have allowed such a state of affairs to arise in Australia. He could by no means agree with those who laid down the principle that, under no circumstances should British soldiers be employed in our colonies. Averse as he was to the principle of giving the security of this country for loans to the colonies, there were, he thought, exceptional cases in which the credit of the Imperial Government might usefully step in to the relief of the colonists, and that without loss to this country. The Legislature had done this on similar occasions, and there were very few cases in which the mother country had lost by the guarantee, while a great deal of good had been done. He thought that if ever there was a case in which the assistance of the Imperial Government might be properly given this was one, and he would therefore support the Bill.
  THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHsaid, that if he understood correctly the circumstances of the loan, and the new regulations with respect to the payment of troops, he could not understand how the various charges upon the colony could be met. He understood that the colony had now a surplus revenue of £200,000 a year. It was about to raise a loan of £3,000,000—£1,000,000 upon the guarantee of this country, and £2,000,000 upon the credit of the colony. The colonists would have to pay upon the first loan at 4 per cent £40,000, and upon the remainder £120,000, making altogether an annual charge of £160,000, which would leave £40,000 clear surplus. But then, after the 1st of January next, the colony would be called upon to pay £45 a man for every British soldier employed there, making for 10,000 men a sum of £450,000 a year. This would leave a deficit of £400,000 a year from the 1st of next January.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMOREagreed with the Secretary for "War that it was impossible to withdraw Her Majesty's troops under existing circumstances, and leave the colonists to bear the whole brunt of the present war. But a very serious question remained behind—what was to be the policy of this country when the present war was concluded? There were two distinct courses of policy—one, imitating the policy of our ancestors with respect to the North American colonists,
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  to leave it to the settlers to deal with the Natives as they thought fit, and to leave it also to them to fight it out if any quarrel arose; or, on the other hand, the Imperial Government might take into their own hands the whole of the relations between the settlers and the Natives, placing the government of the colony in reference to dealings with the Natives under the command of the Colonial Secretary without any interference on the part of the Government of the colony. If they adopted the latter course they would necessarily have to support the Governor in the event of any dispute between the two races. He could conceive Her Majesty's Government adopting one or other of the two courses; but the Government did not seem to have made up their minds either to give the settlers control of their affairs in reference to the Natives, or to take the control themselves. Now if Her Majesty's Government halted between these two opinions and allowed the colonists to interfere to a certain extent, whilst the Imperial Government themselves also interfered somewhat, they would have the disadvantages of both systems and the advantages of neither. He must join in protesting against the guarantee being given, and for his part he would rather that a sum of money should be given to the colony than that the debt should be guaranteed.
  THE EARL OF HARROWBYsaid, it was not always safe to leave these affairs in the hands of the colonists as our experience in North America showed. In North America the colonists waged a war of extermination with the Natives and the Red Indians, in which the Indians were shot down like kangaroos. That might be an economical system, but he doubted whether the country would allow it to be pursued in the present day. Each of these causes must be judged distinctly and on its own merits. In time of war the mother country could form alliances for its protection; but the colonists were not allowed to have allies, and we must, therefore—wisely and judiciously of course—give them assistance in periods of difficulty. He did not recollect that noble Lords opposite while they were in office proposed to throw all these burdens upon the colonists.
  EARL GRANYILLEthought that the principles which had been laid down during this debate were excellent, provided that they were accompanied by

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  certain checks; but that it was wrong to lay down those principles without any restriction whatever. As to what the noble Earl (the Earl of Ellenborough) had said in reference to financial matters, it must be borne in mind that it was not contemplated that the colonists should keep 10,000 troops there for an indefinite time; and one purpose of this loan was to provide for the extra expense incurred whilst the additional troops were there. It was proposed that £1,000,000 only should be borrowed at present; and it was to be hoped that there, would be no occasion for the further loan of £2,000,000. This being so, he believed that the surplus revenue in the colony would be amply sufficient to pay the interest which was guaranteed.
  Motion agreed to: Bill read 2aa accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House To-morrow.

PILOTAGE ORDER CONFIRMATION (No. 2) BILL—(No. 235.)
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2.a"—(Lord Stanley of Alderley.)
LORD REDESDALEopposed the Motion. The Bill was not introduced into the House of Commons until the 30th of June—the very day which, according to their Lordships Sessional Order, was the last upon which Bills should be read a second time. This Bill was to carry into effect certain regulations in reference to the Tyne, and persons interested in the matter had no opportunity of stating their objections to the Bill. If the Bill were pressed forward he did not think that justice would be done to those who desired to oppose it, and therefore he should vote against the second reading.
LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEYobserved, that the Provisional Orders upon which this Bill was founded had been well considered, and the parties objecting had had an opportunity of being heard. The Sessional Order fixing the time beyond which Bilk should not be read a second time in their Lordships' House did not apply to a Bill of this kind. He thought the noble Lord had hardly treated him fairly in asking him to postpone the Bill from Friday until to-day, to give time for presenting petitions, and now opposing the Bill. As to the petitions which had been presented against the Bill, there was
2000
plenty of time for the Select Committee to consider them in the usual course.
VISCOUNT MELVILLEobjected to the Bill being forced on without proper time being allowed.
THE EARL OF DONOHGHMOREthought that the Bill should have been introduced earlier into the other House.
THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEfelt that an useful measure ought not to be sacrificed upon a mere matter of form; but this being an important Bill, against which petitions had been presented, it certainly could not be fairly considered by a Select Committee sitting in the last week of the Session.
EARL GRANVILLEreminded their Lordships that he had promised, on the part of the Government, that they would not advise Her Majesty to prorogue Parliament this week, if the Select Committees of that House required a few days more to get through their business. The Government would not advise proceeding with the Bill if the Select Committee thought further time was required.
THE EARL OF HARROWBYthought that there was no excuse for this Bill not being brought up to their Lordships' House before Friday last, and he objected to their being called on to proceed in a hurry with it. He should like to know what excuse the Board of Trade had for not introducing this Bill earlier in the Session.
LORD REDESDALEadmitted that the Sessional Order did not prevent this Bill being read a second time. It was his own fault that it did not. The Bill belonged to a class of Bills which, under the Act which gave power to the Board of Trade to introduce them, were to be treated in the same way as Private Bills, namely, by reference to a Select Committee. In-closure and Board of Health Bills were under the Sessional Orders relating to Private Bills, and no doubt Pier and Harbour Bills ought to be included. He did not believe that the parties who were opposed to this Bill could receive justice if it were now proceeded with.
LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEYthought, as Metropolitan Railway Bills had been considered in Committee up to that very day, there could be no reason against proceeding with this, which was essentially a public measure. There was no reason why a Select Committee should not do justice to the case of the petitioners.
THE EARL OF MALMESBURYreminded the noble Lord that he had not informed the House why the Bill was brought in so late.
LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEYsaid, that it was often late in the Session before the parties interested could come to such an agreement among themselves as to apply to the Board of Trade to confirm an order. This Bill had been under discussion in the district to which it was to apply for the last six months.
THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEthought that justice required that the Bill should not be read a second time at that period of the Session.
Amendment moved to leave out ("now") and insert ("this Day Three Months"): Question, That ("now") stand Part of the Motion? Resolved in the Affirmative :
Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed: The Committee to be proposed by the Committee of Selection.
Report from the Committee of Selection, That the following Lords be proposed to the House to form the Select Committee for the Consideration of the said Bill. Select Committee nominated: The Lord Steward (Chairman), The Earl of Devon. The Earl of Romney, The Earl of Ducie, The Lord Silchester, agreed to; and the said Lords appointed accordingly: The Committee to meet To-morrow, at Eleven o'clock.

PUBLIC WORKS (MANUFACTURING DISTRICTS) BILL—(No. 237.)

  SECOND READING.
  Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
  Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a."—(The Lord President.)
  THE EARL OF LEITRIMwished to know why the Government did not propose to assist public works in Ireland, especially as the blow which had fallen on the manufacturers of Lancashire had been felt with double severity in the sister country?
  EARL GRANVILLEsaid, that when some years since great distress prevailed in Ireland this country cheerfully agreed to a large loan of money for public works in that country, but he believed that a large portion of it had not yet been repaid. This was not a grant of money, but a loan on excellent security.
  THE EARL OF POWIScalled attention to the rate of interest to be paid under the Bill. Since 1859 the rate of interest for
  2002
  money to be employed on public works that were executed not for profit, had been reduced by a Treasury Minute to 4 per cent, and he asked why in this case the interest required to be paid was only 3½ per cent?
  Motion agreed to: Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House To-morrow.

POOR REMOVAL BILL—(No. 239.)
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a"—(The Lord Wodehouse.)
LORD REDESDALEprotested against the practice so frequently adopted with regard to Government Bills, of hurrying through important measures without allowing sufficient time for considering their provisions. The decision in the Queen's Bench that had rendered this Bill necessary was given on the 28th May, but this Bill was not introduced into the other House until after midnight on Monday last, the 18th July; it passed all its other stages after midnight; and was read a third time on Friday night; it was brought info their Lordships' House on Saturday, and was now to be read a second time tonight. The Poor Law Board ought to have brought the Bill in much earlier, so as to have allowed their Lordships more time for its consideration.
Motion agreed to: Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House To-morrow.

PEERS ROBING ROOM.
  THE FRESCOES IN THE NEW HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT.

    MR. HERBERT, R.A.
    LORD REDESDALEin moving an Address for
    Copy of the Report of the Commissioners lately appointed on the Fresco Paintings in the Palace of Westminster, and of a Letter addressed by Lord Redesdale to those Commissioners in relation to the continued Occupation of the Peers Robing Room for the purpose of such Paintings by which the Peers attending certain Committees have been so long subjected to great Inconvenience,
    said, it would be in the recollection of the House that three years ago a Commission had been appointed to inquire into the manner in which a certain room appropriated to one of the Committees of the House had been kept from that use by being occupied by an artist who was decorating it. The Committee was very indul-

    2003
    gent to the artist, and contented itself by expressing a hope that he would give up possession of the room at the earliest possible moment. Three years had since elapsed, and he had felt it his duty to call attention to the fact. He thought that the room should not be decorated by any more paintings. The artist, Mr. Herbert, had managed the lights with great skill on the wall which he had selected; but he believed that if any further paintings were placed on the other walls the arrangement of the light was such that they would not be seen to the same advantage as the excellent work with which the artist had already decorated the room. Besides it was not altogether desirable that paintings should be placed in a room intended for business. It always attracted a constant flow of visitors, but being placed opposite the door persons coming in could see it without much moving about; if, however, paintings were placed on all the four walls, the visitors would be always moving about the room, to the great disturbance of business. If any further paintings were desired, the Painted Chamber was open to decoration; but he hoped something would be done to restore the Committee-room to which he referred as soon as possible to the use for which it was intended.
    LORD TAUNTON,as a member of the Commission, said, the Commission had presented its Report, and there would, no doubt, be no objection, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, to produce the documents moved for. In the present case the Commissioners had thought it right to recommend a considerable increase upon the sum agreed to be paid for Mr. Herbert's picture, which he believed the public had seen with the greatest admiration. In doing that, however, the Commissioners had recommended that the contract should be broken, and that either party should be free to enter into a fresh engagement, before any new work was begun. There was but one circumstance which they thought justified the re-opening of such a contract, and that was the novelty of the process employed—namely, the water-glass process; but as sufficient experience had now been obtained, he hoped that the precedent would not hereafter be followed. The Commissioners had expressed their opinion that it was not for the honour of British artists, nor was it just to the British public, that engagements they had entered into of this nature should be violated, and nothing could tend more to discourage the
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    Government from entering into engagements with artists than to find that they were afterwards subject to great expenses which they had not contemplated, and that it was impossible to lay on the table of the House any reliable estimates of the cost of these pictures. The noble Lord would see that it was for the Government to say whether they would think it right to go on with the work in the rest of the room. The noble Lord had alluded to a letter which he wrote to the Commissioners. That letter had engaged the attention of the Commissioners, but they had not inserted it in the appendix to their Report, as it was not on the subject immediately referred to them.
    EARL NELSONthought it due to Mr. Herbert to state that that gentleman was not justly liable to the accusations which had just been brought forward. The original work which Mr. Herbert had undertaken was of a very different character from the one he had executed, and which might have been finished in a much shorter time. Indeed Mr. Herbert had made considerable progress in it; what he had done was destroyed at the suggestion of the late Prince Consort, who desired to see it executed in work of a more permanent character. He (Earl Nelson) would venture to express a hope that some arrangement would be made by which, at least, another picture, corresponding to the one completed, would be secured from the hand of the same distinguished artist.
    EARL GRANVILLEunderstood the noble Lord (Lord Taunton) to make no accusation against Mr. Herbert, but rather to justify, by anticipation, an increased remuneration to that artist. There was no objection to produce the papers moved for.
    Motion agreed to.
    House adjourned at half past Eight o'clock, till To-morrow, half past Ten o'clock.