HL Deb 22 July 1864 vol 176 cc1879-96
VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE

rose to draw attention to the prevailing rumours concerning a supposed revival of the so-called Holy Alliance, and to inquire whether Her Majesty's Ministers have any information thereon which may be communicated to Parliament without prejudice to the public service; and said—My Lords, I rise to address your Lordships in pursuance of the notice which I placed on your Lordships' table some time ago. It was my intention to have brought forward the subject at an earlier period, but circumstances, independent of myself, have caused me to defer it until the present time. I need not tell your Lordships that the subject of my notice is of the greatest delicacy and importance. It may be said that the question which I ask your Lordships to consider is one merely arising from newspaper reports; but I think it may be shown that appearances are such that there is a reality which is well worthy of your Lordships' attention. It is now, my Lords, almost half a century since the Holy Alliance was first formed; but even now, at this distance of time, the impression that it made on the world is fresh in our recollection. It was thought a strange thing that three despotic Powers should have joined together in an alliance for purposes of personal understanding at a moment when so many of the States of Europe were engaged in settling the great questions which had been disturbed by the wars of revolutionary France. It was thought ominous that Powers of their immense extent and immense resources should have taken upon themselves to overlook the claims of other Powers, and that they should have embarked in a separate negotiation—and that, too, on principles which naturally created jealousy, distrust, and alarm throughout the greater part of Europe. The Treaties of Vienna and Paris that had been recently concluded had had for their object to compose existing differences, and to settle the affairs of Europe upon a permanent basis of justice and stability. Those great Powers were the principal agents in these negotiations; yet scarcely were the treaties put into action than it was found that those Powers were taking a separate position, and well-founded alarm was felt at the character of the engagements which they had contracted. It is very true that plausible explanations were given, and it is but fair to do justice to whatever may have been the good intentions of the Powers that founded that alliance. No doubt there were many people who thought that not much harm could result from that combination; but those who looked below the surface were well convinced that these engagements, whatever might be the intentions of the Powers who contracted them, were sure to degenerate into operations subversive of the liberty of Europe and dangerous to the independence of the weaker States. I must say, my Lords, while doing justice to those great Sovereigns who at that time rendered such eminent services to Europe, that they would have better consulted their own glory, and, perhaps, their own quiet, if they had been content to remain in concord with the other Powers without entering into any separate and more intimate coalition among themselves. The personal recollections of many of your Lordships go back to this period, and you may remember that the attention of Parliament was early called to this subject, and that, notwithstanding the votes of courtesy which accompanied its action, it substantially did its duty in the persons of many of its Members, who directed the public attention to the dangers and probable consequences of the so-called Holy Alliance, and raised their voices against it. I may appeal for confirmation to a noble and learned Friend of mine who took a prominent part in all the condem- nations of that hour, and whom it is a great satisfaction to me still to see in your Lordships' House. I may call upon him to carry back his recollection to those times, and I shall be gratified to hear upon this occasion the well-known tones of his voice, which has been so often raised in the service of humanity, and which is always listened to both here and elsewhere with attention and respect. Courtesy prevented the Government of that day from expressing its opinion upon the course pursued by friendly Governments, but it declined to join the Alliance, and, seconded by the general feeling of the country, did what depended upon it to throw discredit upon it. The Alliance fell gradually into a state of abeyance; but that circumstance did not prevent it from showing, as occasions offered in subsequent years, what was its true character. Above all, upon the occasion which was referred to by my noble Friend opposite (Earl Russell) the other night, your Lordships will remember that in 1823, when Spain was struggling for its liberties, a French army—the army of the Restoration—commanded by the Duc d'Angoulème, and hounded on, I may say, by these potentates, disregarded the protests of this country (protests which proceeded from every party in the country) and succeeded in overpowering the efforts of the Spanish people for freedom, and placed King Ferdinand on an irresponsible throne. These things cannot be forgotten; and, therefore, when we witness circumstances which lead us to apprehend that there is danger of the revival of such an Alliance, we naturally take an interest in the matter, which, I believe, will not be confined to a few individuals in this House, but when the subject is understood, will, no doubt, be shared by the public at large. It may be said that this apprehension of a revival of the Alliance rests in the first instance on rumours which may have been of an evanescent kind, which passed from mouth to mouth, but may have had no solid foundation in fact. But circumstances have followed, which give importance to these rumours, which, I think, may fairly be brought forward, and which, in their combination, will show that there is, at least a plausible, though possibly not a clear and solid foundation for the apprehension of the revival of that Alliance. The newspapers have published statements echoing the public apprehension on this subject. I may be told that newspaper reports are little better than public rumours; but that I can hardly admit at a time when the public journals are conducted with so much skill and attention to facts, and when persons are employed by them abroad, who would do credit to the service of any Government—gentlemen of education, gentlemen who are not only capable of reporting what passes before their eyes, but of obtaining the greatest distinction by the exercise of their powers. The statements to which I refer must be fresh in the recollection of your Lordships, and although I have them at hand, so recent are their dates that it is perhaps hardly necessary that I should refer to them in a more particular manner. We all remember the circumstances which attended the mission of Baron Manteuffel from St. Petersburg to Vienna, and what remarkable occurrences followed upon that event. Scarcely was it known that he had succeeded in the object of his mission when it was perceived that the war in Denmark was taking a more aggressive character, the troops of Russia on a large scale were put in motion, and Austria, notwithstanding the line which she took last year, placed Gallicia and Cracow in a state of siege. When all these circumstances are put together and joined with others which were known at the time, hardly a doubt can remain that the communications which passed between the three Sovereigns at that period were of a nature which went far beyond the ostensible object of the mission. The conclusions which we must draw are of a nature to arouse apprehensions, and to justify the adoption of a serious view of this most important subject. There are also other circumstances which come in aid of these. I would allude particularly, with all due reserve, to that correspondence which has occasioned some communications in this House, and the authority of which has been on the part of one or two of the Powers concerned seriously denied. There are, however, parts of that correspondence, which is well known to your Lordships, to which, as far as I am aware, no formal refutation has been given. There are circumstances which give a great probability of authenticity to that correspondence, to which I will call the attention of my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary and the House. It is stated in a despatch, alleged to be from Prince Gortschakoff, that a certain line was taken, or was to be taken, with regard to operations in Denmark; and the same thing is referred to in another despatch of a private character, in which it is mentioned that Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg was apprised by Prince Gortschakoff of that communication to the Prussian Government. Now, it would be the duty of Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg to communicate what passed on that occasion to his Government; and I would ask the noble Earl opposite whether, in his official correspondence with the Ambassador, there is any trace of such a communication having been made. There is also a reference in another despatch to a conversation between the Austrian Ambassador and the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. If that is true it may be a question whether, although the whole correspondence may not be accurately given, it may not be in substance correct, and well worthy of attention. There are other circumstances which confirm the belief, that although the whole of the published despatches may not be authentic, in substance the correspondence may be correct. The well-known policy of the three Sovereigns, the interests they have at stake, the spirit which pervades their conduct, all give an à priori notion of its credibility and a strong presumption of its substantial truth. Now, my Lords, if it should happen that that which rested on rumour in the first instance and on the occurrence of particular circumstances in the second place—not to mention the meeting of the Sovereigns, who might have done all that they thought fit by means of secret negotiation being accompanied by their confidential advisers—should turn out to be substantially correct, it is not, I think, going too far to say that we find ourselves in the presence of a great danger. What, I would ask, are those Powers to whom the intentions to which I have referred are ascribed? Your Lordships are aware of their resources, of the extent of their population, of the military force which they possess, and of the position which they occupy in Europe. They are strong in all those elements which give strength, particularly strength of an aggressive character. Suppose, then, danger to exist in the manner which I have represented, I can hardly suppose it to be greater than as it exists arising out of such a combination; nor is this danger confined to the power which may be wielded by those great Sovereigns. Neither is it confined to the community of interest by which they may be actuated. It extends to other points which cannot be overlooked. There is a provocative to popular reaction on the Continent of a very dangerous character. I would ask your Lordships whether the state of Europe and of the world at the present time is such that we can view the principles maintained by those great Sovereigns without a feeling of great apprehension for European society? If all the instruments of armed power were brought into play for the purpose of keeping down those who would naturally wish to vindicate their claim to better treatment, can that, I would ask, be done without stirring up a strong feeling of reaction throughout the world? This is a state of things which it has been the main object of our statesmen to avoid; yet we now see, day after day, despotism advancing on the one side and democracy on the other; despotism armed to carry its views into effect in the most oppressive manner, and democracy fostering a spirit which may rise into aggression. This Alliance may have the effect of bringing both these forces into action—for the extension of the aggressive power on the part of the Sovereigns would inevitably stir up a strong spirit of resistance over Europe. This very morning, when bearing in mind that I would have to address your Lordships this evening, I saw a manifesto of the revolutionary party in Italy calling on their fellow-subjects to prepare for some attempt, the nature of which was only indicated by the name of Mazzini. Surely I do not err when I say that we should be likely to find no place for our interests in either extreme. We in this country fortunately enjoy a constitutional form of government, to which we are attached. We have a throne, a free Legislature, and the means of preserving those privileges which we hold so dear. If the principles which are well known to belong to the Governments of which I have spoken should come into operation, or if, on the other hand, the popular reaction to which I have referred should take place, where shall we find an intermediate course to check the dangers on both sides? I know of no other except that which is to be found in war or in preparatory negotiation. So far as negotiation is concerned, I am not aware that we have anything to replace those earlier alliances of the last century, which gave us support on many pressing occasions; and it becomes a question whether the public obligations of our position are sufficient to demand that we should risk the hazard of war. I trust that if I need any justification in the eyes of your Lordships the apprehension of an alliance which would bring together certain Powers in a spirit dangerous to the world will justify me in laying the question before you, and in extending the scope of my observations to subjects which are connected with it, although they may not appear to have any direct bearing upon it. Considering the dangers to which I have alluded, it would be most satisfactory if we could see some system of foreign policy adopted in a direction favourable to the recovery of that position towards the other Powers which appears of late to have been considerably weakened—a position in which we might count on the support of other Powers, and above all on the support of that powerful neighbour so near to us in position, and brought so close to us by the sympathies of a generous competition. It would be a great satisfaction to know that Her Majesty's Government are not neglectful of the duty of keeping up a I friendly understanding with the illustrious Sovereign of that country—a man who has deserved well of us on many occasions, and who has earned his position in Europe by the exercise of remarkable abilities—abi-lities so great as to throw into the shade those matters which in former times were justly considered to deserve censure. I should be glad if the principle of a friendly understanding with that great Power were reverted to, and also if the tendency of our foreign policy were such as to rely not merely on the effects of our wide-spread commerce to bring us nearer to those from whom we have lately been estranged. We are told that the interests of commerce may be relied on to bring together all countries, and to relieve us from all anxiety for the preservation of peace. My Lords, I cannot place my entire reliance on that doctrine. I say, on the contrary, that in proportion as our commerce increases we are exposed to greater risks of collision. We have ships in every port, and interests in every sea, and on one point or another we are constantly coming into contact with other Powers. Scarcely a month passes without something happening which may bring us into the danger of a difference with some other country. The state of our relations with more than one Foreign Power at the present moment justifies me in saying that. Therefore, although our extensive com- merce is the source of great national prosperity, yet I recognize also in it a constant source of danger from collision with the interests of other countries. We always find ourselves under the necessity of being prepared to defend our fellow-subjects, and to defend our interests against the jealousies on the one side, and encroachments on the other, which may always be expected from the strife of human passions, and which we cannot hope to escape. We may wrap ourselves up in the intention of being just towards others, and of giving up what there was of encroachment in our ancient system; but we have to consider the disposition of other nations, and we have to consider what we are exposed to by our constantly coming into contact with nations of every kind, and interests of every description. I can see no means of making head against contingencies of this kind, except by maintaining our military defences, and by keeping our alliances in such a position that we may have something to rely upon on the day of trial. We are told that interference in foreign affairs is sure to bring us into the danger of collision with other countries. My Lords, this is altogether a matter of judgment. There are cases when a timely and wise interference is the best security against war, and the best preservative of the peace of Europe. It is entirely a matter of discretion and judgment with respect to the time and the manner of applying the principle of interference. We can no more dogmatize or indulge in general abstract professions of opinion on the principle of interference than on the question of peace or war. Of late we have heard opinions expressed which would make it appear that we are drifting into an attitude where the interests of our commerce are to supersede all other considerations. I have learned in my life that those who profess themselves most pacific are often most exposed to attack. If we wish to be safe and to escape that which has been the almost proverbial fate of all commercial countries, we must preserve that high spirit of nationality and that nobility of heart which tells us that our best interests are not based on mere sordid calculations of profit and loss. I am afraid that I have trespassed too long upon your Lordships' attention, and though I am conscious that I have not done it full justice, yet the importance of the question is such that it may be left with perfect safety to your Lordships' reflection. The noble Viscount concluded by asking, Whether Her Majesty's Ministers have any information with regard to the prevailing rumours concerning a supposed revival of the so-called Holy Alliance which may be communicated to Parliament without prejudice to the public service?

EARL RUSSELL

My Lords, the remarks made on this subject by my noble Friend are of very grave importance, coming as they do from one of his talents and high authority. My noble Friend cannot but be sensible that in calling the attention of your Lordships to this subject, and addressing you at considerable length with regard to the apprehensions which he appears to entertain, he must give force to similar apprehensions in the minds of others, and help to spread the alarm which he himself feels. Therefore, my noble Friend must excuse me, and I hope your Lordships will excuse me, if I enter somewhat fully into the subject on which he has spoken. This question of my noble Friend is, in fact, three questions. The first is as to the genuineness of the documents which have lately appeared in the public papers; the next is as to whether there is anything like a revival of the Holy Alliance; and the third is as to the amount of apprehension which we ought to feel, supposing the existence of such an Alliance to be a matter of fact. Now, my Lords, with regard to the first of these questions, I cannot say that I myself have any belief in the genuineness of the documents which have been published. My noble Friend has alluded particularly to two of those documents. There certainly is a despatch addressed by Prince Gortschakoff to the diplomatic representative of Russia at Berlin. That despatch was read by Prince Gortschakoff to Lord Napier; and the substance of it was afterwards communicated to me by the Russian Minister at the Court of St. James's. In looking over the accounts which Lord Napier gave me of that document, and comparing it with what has appeared in The Morning Post, I see but a very distant resemblance between the two; and my memory of what was read to me by the Russian Minister leads me to the same conclusion. It appears to me that any one conversant with the politics of Europe—either through the Courts, or by commerce—might have obtained such an idea of what was going on as would have enabled him, without seeing the original, to fabricate a despatch as closely resembling the genuine one. Another of the published despatches seems to have been fabricated for the purpose of making the English Government believe that the course of the Russian Government was one of fraud and duplicity. It appears that that despatch is altogether false. It is stated to be so, and I entirely believe the statement. The other document is one giving an account of a conversation between the Count Apponyi and Mr. Layard, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Such a conversation did take place, and there is some resemblance, though not a close one, between the real conversation and the reported one, as far as the topics are concerned, but it is in some respects singularly erroneous—particularly in regard to dates. There are various circumstances which give an air of improbability to the genuineness of those documents. One of these circumstances is that the Foreign Minister of Prussia is supposed in this correspondence to have written to one of the representatives of that country, and in his despatch to have referred to a difference of feeling as between the King and himself. Now, that is highly improbable. There is another part of the correspondence which represents Austria, Prussia, and Russia as having come to an agreement that they would consider all questions relating to Poland as referring to internal policy, and therefore to a subject on which they ought not to be called on to render an account to any other Power. Now, such a proceeding on the part of the Sovereigns of those three countries would have been an unnecessary one; for if they had arrived at the conclusion that they would not fulfil their treaty obligations, they might have violated them without making that formal declaration. The next question is, supposing those documents not to be genuine, are there circumstances which give a certain support to the belief of some action of the kind having taken place, and a union having been formed between the three Powers? Well, there have been transactions within the past month which it is not very difficult to account for, and which do give a certain semblance of truth to the substance of those documents. For instance, it is well known that in Austria, Russia, and Prussia there is very extreme apprehension that those Powers are constantly expressing their desire that all the European Sovereigns should unite in order to resist revolutionary movements. But I believe that for the language represented by those documents to have been used on that subject, there is not more than that general foundation which might easily be obtained by commercial men who, for their own interest, are anxious to obtain the most recent accounts of what is doing in Europe, and may affect prices in the various markets. I am told that those documents were derived from commercial men. I now come to another question, which appears to be the gravest of those upon which my noble Friend touched—namely, what is this, Holy Alliance, and what are the apprehensions which we should entertain if it were established? Looking hack—but putting aside the "Holy Brotherhood" of 1815, which was rather a form of expression used by the Emperor Alexander of Russia, when expressing his anxiety for united action between Sovereigns—putting that aside as of no practical account, we know that in 1820 there was an agreement which has been popularly described as "the Holy Alliance." About December, 1820, an agreement was entered into between Austria, Russia, and Prussia. I shall read an extract from a circular issued to the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian Ministers at Foreign Courts, and dated Laybach, May 21, 1821, in order to show what the purpose of that Alliance was, and in order that we may be able to form an opinion as to whether it is likely such an agreement should be come to at the present time. The circular states— Useful or necessary changes in legislation, and in the administration of States, ought only to emanate from the free will and the intelligent and well-weighed conviction of those whom God has rendered responsible for power. All that deviates from this line necessarily leads to disorder, commotions, and evils far more insufferable than those which they pretend to remedy. Penetrated with this eternal truth, the sovereigns have not hesitated to proclaim it with frankness and vigour; they have declared that, in respecting the rights and independence of all legitimate power, they regarded as legally null, and as disavowed by the principles which constitute the public right of Europe, all pretended reform operated by revolt and open hostility. They have acted conformably to this declaration, in the events which have taken place at Naples, in those of Piedmont, and in those even which, under very different circumstances, though produced by combinations equally criminal, have recently made the eastern part of Europe a prey to incalculable convulsions. My Lords, when that circular was issued it became a very serious question for the Government of this country what part they should take with respect to a combination so formidable, and founded on such principles. The consequences of such a policy could not escape a man of the sagacity of Lord Castlereagh, and on the 19th of June, 1821, he wrote a circular on the subject. That circular was as follows:— These measures embrace two distinct objects—first, the establishment of certain general principles for the regulation of the future political conduct of the Allies in the cases therein described. … The system of measures proposed under the former head, if to be reciprocally acted upon, would be in direct repugnance to the fundamental laws of this country. But, even if this decisive objection did not exist, the British Government would nevertheless regard the principles on which these measures rest to be such as could not safely be admitted as a system of international law. They do not regard the Alliance as entitled, under existing treaties, to assume in their character as Allies any such general powers, nor do they conceive that such extraordinary powers could be assumed, in virtue of any fresh diplomatic transaction among the Allied Courts, without their either attributing to themselves a supremacy incompatible with the rights of other States, or, if to be acquired through the special accession of such States, without introducing a federative system in Europe, not only unwieldy and ineffectual to its object, but leading to many most serious inconveniences. When Parliament met, this circular was laid before it, and it excited, as might be expected, great discussion. Lord Lansdowne brought the subject before this House, the noble Lord whom I see opposite (the Earl of Ellenborough) protested against the conduct of the Allies, and Lord Liverpool spoke strongly to the same effect. There was also a debate in the House of Commons, at the instance of Sir James Mackintosh, in which similar sentiments were expressed. Rut in spite of the protests of the representatives of England the plans of the Holy Alliance were carried into effect, A largo Austrian army was marched to Naples, the existing Government was overthrown, and 40,000 Austrian troops put an end to all hopes of the revival of any popular spirit. The English Government, therefore, had no influence in regard to the practical measures adopted by the Allies. In 1823 another Congress met at Verona, and it was then considered that the revolution which had taken place in Spain and the constitution there established called for interference, and should be the subject of another armed intervention by the Holy Alliance. Upon that occasion my noble and learned Friend whom I see opposite (Lord Brougham) delivered a speech of such eloquence that there is not a greater to be found in the records of ancient or modern times. The feelings which my noble and learned Friend expressed were those which prevailed throughout the country. Lord Castlereagh said that this system was repugnant to the fundamental principles of British law; and Mr. Canning, who was Foreign Minister at that period, said that the system struck at the root of the British Constitution. There could be no doubt whatever, therefore, of the feelings which prevailed in this country on the part both of the Government and the Opposition. But there, again, the influence of England failed in producing any practical effect. An army of France was marched to Madrid, and afterwards to Cadiz, the Revolutionary Government was overthrown, and Ferdinand VII. was restored to absolute power. It might have been asked then, what was the use of those despatches of Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning? They might as well not have been written, for any practical effect which they produced. But, my Lords, my belief is that the assertion of sound principles—of the principles of freedom and justice—by a British Minister on the part of his Government, and their assertion also in the Parliament of this country, are by no means without effect. Although at any particular moment it may not be advisable to enforce those principles and sentiments by arms, yet, if they are just and sound, they will have their effect, and will finally pervade the general policy of Europe. Having adverted to what occurred on those occasions, let us now see what happened not a great many years after. In 1823 a French army was marched into Spain, where it remained for some time, and overthrew the Revolutionary Government. But in 1830 France herself was disturbed by revolution, the reigning dynasty was overthrown, and a Government founded on revolt was established. What then did the Holy Allies? Did they say that a Government founded on revolt was null and void? Did they attempt to suppress it as they had suppressed the Governments of Naples and Spain? No, they found the effort would be too great—that the power of the revolution was too strong for them to cope with. They did not acknowledge the new dynasty, which the Duke of Wellington, to his honour, acknowledged almost the next day after its creation. But, though they did not acknowledge, they did not attempt to overthrow it. And with respect to the changes which took place eighteen years afterwards, when a Republic was proclaimed in France, and a few years after that Republic was changed into an Empire, those Allies, who had declared that nothing was legal but what emanated from Sovereigns, that every other political change was null and void, and force must be used to suppress it, those Allies were powerless when the greatest country in Europe was in the throes of revolution, and when the people said they would have a Government according to their own views, and not according to the views of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Well then, my Lords, I do conceive that, although the Government of England did not go to war, it by no means followed that those principles of the Holy Alliance were everywhere established, or that they had that success which their authors expected. On the contrary, from 1830 an alliance was formed between England, France, Spain, and Portugal in support of the dynasty established and favoured by the people. After 1848 other changes took place. Your Lordships will recollect that only a few years ago, when the French army had entered Italy, the Emperor of Austria gave up Lombardy, which was ceded to the King of Sardinia, who is now King of Italy, and that the Power which had attempted to interfere in Naples, in Tuscany, and in the Pope's territories, was obliged to retire into Venetia. Then, at all events, was given a great blow to the principles of the Holy Alliance. But it did not stop there, because, after the Treaty of Villa-franca and the Treaty of Zurich, a question arose whether or not Tuscany and Naples should have a Government according to their own wishes—whether the existing dynasties should be maintained or destroyed? That question arose at the time when I first had the honour of holding the seals of the Foreign Office, and I had occasion to discuss with the Austrian Government the preliminaries of the Peace of Villafranca. Those preliminaries stated in general terms that the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena should return to their States. Two different senses might be attributed to this article—either that any resistance on the part of the population of those States might be overcome by force, or that the Sovereigns should return only with the consent of the people. In writing to Mr. Fane, August 16, 1859, I said— I propose to discuss these two interpretations. With regard to the general question of interfer- ence in the internal affairs of other countries, Her Majesty's Government hold that non-intervention is the principle on which the Governments of Europe should act, only to be departed from when the safety of a foreign State, or its paramount interests, require it. But in the present instance they maintain that neither the interests of Italy, nor the interests of Europe, nor the real interests of Austria or France, require foreign interference in the internal affairs of Italy. The Treaty of Villafranca, as I have said, makes no provision for imposing a Government by force upon Tuscany or Modena, supposing the people of those Duchies to oppose the return of the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena. A provision for the employment of French or Austrian forces, to put down the clearly-expressed will of the people in Central Italy would, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, not be justifiable. The people of Tuscany, for instance, have the right, which belongs to the people of every independent State, to regulate their own internal government. To interfere by force with the exercise of that right would not be defensible on any principle of public law. Neither the safety nor the paramount interests of Austria are menaced by the choice of a new dynasty to reign over Tuscany. On the contrary, the restoration of the Grand Duke of Tuscany or the Duke of Modena by foreign forces would be to return to that system of foreign interference which for upwards of forty years has been the misfortune of Italy and the danger of Europe. It may be added that for the last ten years the same system has been a cause of weakness and peril to Austria. It has afforded vantage-ground to her enemies, and has alienated her friends. Great Britain would, therefore, feel it to be her duty to protest against a supplement to the Treaty of Villafranca of that nature, if any such were in contemplation. She would equally pro-test against the practical application of foreign force to carry into effect the vague article of the preliminaries of Villafranca. Well, then, in the former instance we have seen that in 1821, notwithstanding the protest of Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning, an Austrian, army marched to Naples, Turin, and Tuscany; but in this instance the French Government, which before had connived at the act of the Austrian Government, not only held aloof, but it was generally understood that the French Emperor would oppose any attempt to restore the Dukes to their territories by force. In like manner, when a small force of a thousand men made a revolution in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the plan of the Holy Alliance entirely failed, and the Austrian Government did not venture to interfere. Your Lordships will, therefore, see that there is no great reason for the apprehension that my noble Friend (Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe) has expressed, since the Holy Alliance of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, which was able to carry out its objects in 1821 and 1823, was not able to carry out its objects in 1859 and 1860 against the simple protest of this country. So far as Italy is concerned, an united Italy has been established by the people of that country, and the Holy Alliance has entirely failed to prevent it. Well, in regard to Spain, it has been much the same. In 1823 Spain was overrun by French forces, but the people of Spain now have the full power of making their constitution just as they please, and of regulating their internal affairs according to their own views. Therefore, it has happened by the great change of circumstances and events, that the influence which the Government of this country did not possess in 1821 and 1823 for the last five years they have fully possessed, and the people of different countries have established Governments according to their own notions of what is necessary for their own interests. The extract I have read referred to the affairs of Greece. One of the Allies—the Emperor of Russia—protested formerly in the most peremptory manner against the revolution established by the people against the Sovereign; but a year or two ago, when the revolt took place in Greece, the Sovereign reigning there by the choice of the protecting Powers was overthrown, a new Sovereign was called to the throne, and the Emperor of Russia and the Holy Alliance consented to acknowledge—and not only to acknowledge, but to guarantee—the throne of the new Sovereign. I hold, therefore, for all these reasons, that whatever the Holy Alliance may have been, its revival at this time need not give cause for apprehension. I cannot believe that those sovereigns, seeing the change of times, have any wish to do more than protect their own dominions and secure themselves against democratic innovations that may seek to overturn them. My noble Friend who began the debate spoke of despotism, and, unfortunately, all those Sovereigns who rule over despotic countries confound constitutional government with democracy. The party of reaction in Italy confound constitutional monarchy with despotic sway. But the influence of the English Government has always been used in favour of constitutional monarchy whenever the people of a country thought that the best form of Government for themselves. And now, my Lords, where is the danger that we have to fear from these alliances at the present moment? If we look to the South of Europe—to Italy and Spain—we find that the Powers which formed the Holy Alliance have given up every attempt to carry into effect those principles against which Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning protested, and there is, therefore, no danger either in Italy or Spain of the principles of the Holy Alliance being restored. "Where, then, is the danger? The only country in which any question of the kind can now arise is in regard to the Duchies of Denmark. It is now said that an attempt will be made—and possibly it may be so—to dispose of the sovereignty of those Duchies according to the views of the Diet of Frankfort, should the King of Denmark consent to give up those Duchies to Austria and Prussia. I confess that that appears to me to be a question for Germany rather than for us to consider. If the King of Denmark should give up the sovereignty of those Duchies—and it is now said on good authority that the Duchies of Lauenburg, Schleswig, and Holstein are demanded by Austria and Prussia as the price of peace—supposing those Duchies are given up to the control of Austria and Prussia, it is for those Powers to settle with the people of Germany, and for the people of Holstein and Schleswig to say whom they will consent to obey. With respect to the part taken by ourselves in the late Conference, we snowed what our principles were. We and the Government of France both said that these Duchies, if they were given up by Denmark, ought not to be disposed of without the consent of the people of the Duchies. The King of Denmark said exactly the same thing. The Swedish representatives were of the same opinion. At all events, we declared the views which we held. Our principle is a principle in which we concurred with the Emperor of the French, and on which we did not concur with Austria or Prussia. Now, my Lords, the consequence of this great difference of opinion with the latter Powers is, that we should draw nearer to France and be less connected with those Powers which declare that the sovereignty ought to be separate from the wish of the people, My noble Friend who has just spoken said it was our interest to be closely connected with France. It so happens that a question lately arose of great importance and delicacy—namely, what was to be done with regard to the Danubian Principalities? Her Majesty's Ambassador and the French Ambassador at Constantinople entirely concurred in the settlement of this question. The Grand Vizier and other Ministers of the Porte agreed upon a plan which was approved by the Conference, and thus a question that at one time threatened to disturb the tranquillity of Turkey, if not the peace of Europe, was amicably settled by wise and judicious negotiations. I cannot help remarking how much Her Majesty's Government, in co-operation with the French Ambassador, have been able to do in obtaining a settlement of that question; and the answer to my despatch read to me to-day from M. Drouyn de Lhuys expresses the hope that the accord which has existed between France and Great Britain on this important subject will be the harbinger of our agreement on other important subjects which may come before them. Her Majesty's Government heartily hope that this may be so, for there can be nothing more conducive to the peace of Europe than a cordial agreement between England and France. While that agreement exists there is not the least apprehension of the revival of a Holy Alliance, even if the Sovereigns who formerly belonged to it should be so ill-advised and so little aware of the state of feeling in Europe as to enter into so inauspicious a combination.