Lords Sitting of 1 July 1864

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS—First Reading—Lunacy (Scotland) * (No. 172); Thames Conservancy * (No. 173); Local Government Supplemental* (No. 174).
Second Reading—Public and Refreshment Houses (Metropolis, &c.) * (No. 135).
Report—Cathedral Minor Corporations* (No. 166).

JAPAN.—RESOLUTIONS.
EARL GREY,who had given notice of Resolutions to the effect that the relations between this country and Japan appear to this House to be at present in an unsatisfactory state, and to move an Address to Her Majesty thereon, said: My Lords, the subject to which I am about to draw your Lordships' attention is one which has on more than one occasion been under the consideration of the House. Up to the present moment, however, no decided opinion has been pronounced by your Lordships as to the policy which has been pursued in Japan by Her Majesty's Government; and therefore, thinking the time has now arrived when your Lordships should be asked to deal more decisively with the matter, I have placed upon the paper the Resolutions which I shall conclude by moving. But, before I proceed further, I may be allowed to observe that my Resolutions are not intended to imply any censure on the Government. Not that I approve their
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policy—far otherwise; but what has been done cannot be undone, and while it is very unlikely that I could induce your Lordships to agree to a Vote of Censure, my asking you to do so would greatly diminish the probability of your Lordships being prevailed upon to express a practical opinion as to what ought to be the policy of the country for the future.
The Resolutions I am about to move have, accordingly, been so drawn as not to express any opinion as to the past; they begin by setting forth the various facts of our intercourse with Japan, and they then proceed to state the inferences which I think ought to be drawn from the facts narrated in the papers which have been laid before the House. I trust it will not be necessary for me to take up more than a small portion of your Lordships' time in showing that my statement of facts is correct, and supported by the papers. After a Resolution, which is merely introductory, the second states—
"That it is shown by the papers laid before Parliament, by command of Her Majesty, that the treaty concluded between Her Majesty and the Tycoon of Japan, on the 26th of August, 1858, gives to British subjects in Japan rights and privileges which the Government of that country was avowedly reluctant to grant, and was only induced to confer upon them through dread of British naval and military power."
And the next—
"That the Government of Japan has also been induced by this same fear to make with other European nations and with the United States, treaties generally similar to that which it has concluded with Her Majesty."
I might quote many passages from the despatches to show that the treaties concluded by Japan with the Western nations were not entered into willingly, but were obtained from Japan by coercion; but the fact is so notorious, and has been so explicitly avowed by Sir Rutherford Alcock (whose authority is conclusive) in his work called The Capital of the Tycoon, that it is needless for me to take up your Lordships' time by quotations in support of a statement which can hardly be questioned. The next Resolution proceeds to state—
"That under the above-named treaty British subjects are entitled to claim admission into certain portions of the territory of Japan without being subject to the jurisdiction of its Government, Her Majesty having taken upon herself the obligation of enforcing on their part good conduct and obedience to the law."
This Resolution has reference to the fifth Article of the Treaty, commonly called the "exterritoriality clause," which is to the

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effect that Japanese subjects guilty of any criminal act towards British subjects shall be arrested and punished by the Japanese authorities, according to the laws of Japan; and any British subjects who may commit any criminal act against Japanese, shall be tried and punished by the Consuls, or other public functionaries, according to the laws of Great Britain. Your Lordships will observe that this is a distinct stipulation of reciprocity on the part of both countries. We are bound to enforce the good conduct of our own subjects, as Japan is bound also to enforce the good conduct of hers; but, unfortunately, on neither side had that obligation been fulfilled, as neither party has been able to perform what it had promised. The next Resolution I have to submit accordingly is that
"The Reports of Her Majesty's diplomatic servants show that Her Majesty has not been able to fulfil this obligation; the provisions of the statutes authorizing Her Majesty's Consuls to try and punish British subjects for offences committed in Japan, and the means available for carrying these laws into effect, having proved altogether insufficient to prevent gross outrages and insults from being inflicted on the people of Japan by British subjects and persons assuming that character."
Now, I think that those who have paid attention to the papers that have been laid upon the table of the House must be aware that that is not an over-statement of the facts; and I will refer you particularly to the despatch of Sir Rutherford Alcock of the 21st of November, 1859, in which he describes the lawless violence which he says in less than five months after the opening of the trade had become habitual on the part of British sailors and others in the ports of Yokohama and Kanagawa. He states in this despatch that drunken sailors have been allowed to land and go about singly or in bands, offering violence to the Japanese whom they have met, or into whose shops they have intruded. He describes these outrages and the insufficiency of English law to put them down still more fully in his book than in the official correspondence; but the statements contained in his despatches were considered so strong that they produced from the Foreign Secretary a letter in severe condemnation of such conduct on the part of British subjects in that country. A letter was written on the 1st of February, 1860, by Mr. Hammond, to the East India and China Association, under the direction of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in which, after describing the state of things,
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he went on to say that Her Majesty's Government had a right to expect that the extension of the commerce of the country should not be neutralized by such proceedings, and that the whole weight of the commercial interests of this country should be brought to bear upon a state of things which was at once discreditable to the British name, and which was incompatible with the successful progress of our trade with Japan. Sir Rutherford Alcock, in his work on Japan, has expressed in strong language his sense of the misconduct of unscrupulous adventurers in that country. He shows that persons of higher position than common sailors have also shown a contemptuous disregard for the prejudices and long-established customs of the Japanese. I fear that the fault extends still further than Sir Rutherford Alcock alleges, and that even our diplomatic agents there are not exempt from this charge. It has been asserted that in spite of the laws of Japan, which impose the penalty of death on firing a gun within a certain distance of the residence of the Tycoon, the members of our Legation have set the example of shooting within the prohibited distance. Your Lordships will find that Sir Rutherford Alcock records in his own book an act which I will venture to call one of the greatest violence and illegality committed by himself. Sir Rutherford Alcock found a private road, leading to a coal mine, the property of one of the Daimios, stopped by a barrier guarded by two sentinels. When he was going to pass the barrier the sentinels endeavoured to prevent him, but, by his own account, he pushed passed them, so that they were unable to stop him without actual force, which it seems they abstained from using, so that he succeeded in getting by. Why, under such circumstances, the sentries, according to the practice of all Europe, would have been justified if they had shot Sir Rutherford Alcock on the spot; and if he had been so shot he would only have got what he deserved. My Lords, I have already mentioned that the treaties entered into by Japan with this country and with other Western nations were not conceded willingly but from fear. It is important to add that this concession was made against the wish of a very powerful party in Japan, which desired at all hazards to maintain the long cherished policy of the Empire by continuing the rigorous exclusion of foreigners. It is not surprising that

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this party was greatly increased in strength, and that the disposition to receive foreigners kindly, which had in the first instance been shown by a large part of the population, was unhappily changed into a very different feeling by such misconduct on the part of foreigners as I have described; and this misconduct produced a more intense feeling of animosity in Japan than it might have done elsewhere, owing to the peculiar state of society that exists there. Your Lordships are aware that for many centuries Japan has been ruled by a feudal nobility, and that the law of honour is there carried to the greatest extreme. In Japan an insult to an individual can only be washed out with blood. It is illegal to draw a sword there except in self-defence; but the person who does draw it in self-defence is punished with death if he puts it in the scabbard again without having despatched his adversary. The only alternative given to him is that of suicide in the form prescribed by ancient custom. It is scarcely to be expected that a people so sensitive of their honour will submit to outrages at the hands of Europeans. Accordingly, very dreadful crimes have been committed by Japanese in revenge for what they have suffered in that way. The English Embassy has been attacked, and murderous assaults have been made on several British subjects, some of whom have lost their lives. These crimes are referred to in the next Resolution I have to submit to your Lordships, which is in the following terms:—
"That the animosity against foreigners excited in the minds of the Japanese by these outrages and insults has increased the repugnance long felt by the most powerful classes among them to renewed intercourse with European nations, and has led to the perpetration of some murders and several daring and desperate attacks upon foreigners; diplomatic servants and other subjects of Her Majesty having been among the sufferers from these acts of violence."
In support of what that Resolution asserts, I may refer to despatches of Sir Rutherford Alcock and to an able Report on the state of Japan by Admiral Hope, dated August 20, 1861, and presented to Parliament in 1862. Both these high authorities state that the acts of violence committed by the Japanese arose out of the provocation that had been given, though often it was not the individual who had been guilty of the original insult who became the victim of the revenge it provoked. The murder of the Secretary of one of the Embassies was traced to the fact that the
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servant of one of the Daimios had been struck by a person connected with the Embassy, and the person who received the blow had been reproached for having dared to appear before his master without having avenged the insult. The next Resolution which I have to submit to your Lordships states—
"That the Government of the Tycoon has professed the strongest desire to prevent the commission of these crimes and to punish their perpetrators, but has declared itself unable to do so; nor docs there appear to be any reason to doubt the truth of these declarations, since two Tycoons and a Regent of Japan have themselves been murdered, and one of the principal Ministers narrowly escaped the same fate, owing to the hostility they had incurred from being supposed to favour an increased intercourse with foreigners."
The accuracy of this Resolution, so far as regards the professions made by the Government of Japan, is beyond question, since the whole Correspondence is full of the expression of their earnest desire to comply with the demands of the British Minister, by affording better protection to British subjects, and by punishing the perpetrators of the sanguinary outrages complained of. Nor is there the slightest reason for doubting the sincerity of these professions; on the contrary, everything combines to show that the Government was totally unable to control the excited passions of that large part of the population which had become bitterly hostile to foreigners. Strong evidence of the sincerity of the Government of Japan may be drawn from what befel those who held the highest posts in it, from their being supposed to be too favourable to foreigners. One Tycoon had been poisoned; another was otherwise murdered. The Regent, in the midst of his guard, was set upon in open day by a band of conspirators, who sacrificed their own lives for his destruction, and succeeded in butchering him, and carrying away his head. A similar attack was made upon the Foreign Minister, who escaped with difficulty, after an affray in which several of his own followers and of his assailants were killed. These things are quite inconsistent with the supposition that the outrages on foreigners could have been prevented by the Government; but the strongest proof of their sincerity is afforded by the fact reported by Colonel Neale. The Government of Japan, in the hope of guarding against collisions which it felt that it was otherwise unable to prevent, had determined to close against its own subjects, and reserve for the exclusive use of foreigners,

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forty miles of the imperial highway to the capital. Suppose we had been asked to give up forty miles of the Great Western road to foreigners, and go to the expense of making a new road for our own people in order that they might not be exposed to meet these foreigners? In order to make this case intelligible, your Lordships must observe that the old law of Japan allowed no person to remain on horseback in the presence of a Daimio. Our countrymen, however, refuse to obey this law, and claim the right, not only of not getting off their horses when they meet the Daimios, but of riding along the road when they are coming. I do not pretend that the notions entertained by the Japanese on this matter are consistent with civilized ideas; but if Englishmen for their own purposes choose to go to Japan and find among the people certain opinions and certain prejudices which have existed for centuries, I think they are bound to consider those feelings and prejudices in their treatment of that people. What makes their proceedings more offensive is, that by long tradition persons in trade are looked upon in Japan as of an inferior class. In Japanese society the lowest workman and handicraftsman ranks higher than the richest merchant; and, therefore, when our merchants meet these Daimios in the way I have described, great offence was taken by the Japanese. Nor have our countrymen been content to ride along the roads in a manner to violate only an unreasonable law, and unreasonable customs of the people. The Bishop of Victoria in his account of his visit to Japan, describes as highly reprehensible the reckless manner in which Englishmen were in the habit of riding at full speed through the crowded ways, often causing serious injury and sometimes risk of their lives to the inhabitants, and I hold in my hand an official notice issued by the Consul at Kanagawa condemning this practice. In these circumstances, the Japanese might very fairly have said, that in order to prevent collisions it was our duty to execute our treaty obligations, and compel British subjects to respect the law; and it shows no ordinary desire on their part to preserve peace, that instead of doing this they were willing to deprive themselves of the use of their principal road to the capital, and abandon it altogether to foreigners. It is more important to bear these facts in mind, because it was in riding along a road when one of the greatest Princes of
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the land was approaching that Mr. Richardson was murdered. Undoubtedly this was a violent outrage for which Her Majesty's Government were entitled to ask redress; but still, in my opinion, what they asked as redress was unreasonable, and the measures taken to enforce their demands were contrary alike to the law of nations, to the plainest principles of amity and justice, and to good policy. Though I cannot conceal from you that this is the view I myself take of what has been done, I do not ask your Lordships to adopt it. I have been content to waive the expression of any opinion, and I have strictly confined myself to a naked recital of facts as to which there can be no dispute, in the following Resolution which I have next to submit to you.
"That in order to enforce a demand made by Her Majesty's Government of redress for the murder of a British subject, it was found necessary to undertake hostile operations against one of the Daimios, in the course of which considerable loss was experienced by Her Majesty's ships, and a large and flourishing Japanese town was burnt to the ground."
My Lords, I trust that what I have now said will be sufficient to satisfy your Lordships that the brief statement of facts contained in the first eight of the Resolutions I have laid before you is strictly accurate, and is fully borne out by the papers on your table. It remains for me to show-that these facts properly lead to the conclusions which I have drawn from them in the remaining Resolutions of which the next is as follows;—
"That this experience of what has already taken place leaves little hope for the future of its being possible to avert fresh collisions between Her Majesty's subjects and the Japanese if the existing arrangements for regulating the intercourse between them are maintained unaltered; and if such collisions should occur they must sooner or later lead to a war which would necessarily cost many lives and much money both to this country and to Japan, and would probably bring upon the latter the heavy calamities of general anarchy and confusion from the destruction of its existing Government, while there would be no means of creating any other authority to replace it."
In submitting to you this Resolution I would ask you to consider whether there is any ground for hoping, that if the existing arrangements for regulating the intercourse between our countrymen and the Japanese remain unaltered, they will produce any other effects than they hitherto have? Can it be supposed that if British subjects are left in Japan without any effective control either by the Japanese or

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the English law they will act otherwise than they have done? But, if British subjects continue to ill-treat and insult the people among whom they live, fresh murders will follow, and new demands for redress, which the Government of Japan will be unable or unwilling to comply with, and which we shall think it necessary to enforce. This, indeed, seems to be what is anticipated by Her Majesty's Ministers; for, on the 14th of November, 1863, the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs addressed a communication to the Lords of the Admiralty, intimating that he had instructed Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Japan to take measures for protecting British subjects, and for resenting any outrages upon them, and he requested that the Admiral on the station might receive such orders from their Lordships as would authorize him to act for that purpose, so far as the means at his disposal enabled him to do so. The British Minister is further authorized to send for 500 troops in addition to those already in Japan. But the effect of these instructions is to give authority to the British Minister and Admiral to begin a war with Japan at their own discretion Now, my Lords, I would remind my noble Friend that, during his own administration, a very strong opinion, and, I may add, a very just one, was expressed by the late Duke of Wellington as to the danger and inexpediency of intrusting Her Majesty's servants abroad with the power of making war without direct instructions from the Government at home. That power is in reality one of far too dangerous a character to be intrusted to the discretion of any subordinate officer. Local circumstances, the opinions of those by whom they are surrounded, and the feelings with which Englishmen are apt to regard semi-civilized nations with whom they are brought into contact, necessarily exercise so much influence over the minds of those who are employed in the service of the Crown in these countries as to render them unfit to be intrusted with the power of involving the nation in war. Her Majesty's Government have recently had calamitous proof of the effect of leaving such large discretionary powers to subordinate officers in what had recently occurred on the Western Coast of Africa. Her Majesty's Government seem also to have formed a most inadequate notion of the difficulties they would have to encounter in a war with Japan. If, unfortunately, we should
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be involved in such a war, not the 500 soldiers they propose sending there, nor even 5,000, would prove sufficient for the operations it would require. Our wars with China have been attended with heavy expense in money if not in blood. If I am not mistaken, the Chancellor of the Exchequer estimated the cost of the last short war at £8,000,000, but a war with Japan would cost us far more both in money and in blood. Its people are of a very different character, and its Government of very different efficiency from those of China. They are a high-spirited people, always accustomed to carry arms of a most formidable character, in the use of which they are skilful. Instead of undervaluing the arts and knowledge of the West, they show an anxious desire to acquire them. Already they have learned to construct steam-engines, and have purchased steam-vessels. They are turning their attention to modern improvements in artillery: it is said, and I believe with truth, that they are purchasing rifled guns in the United States, and are endeavouring to obtain instruction in their use. Nor is it likely that the Government of Japan will, like that of China, allow a British force to wage war with them in one place, while British subjects in other parts of the empire are allowed to enjoy all the advantages of peace and continue their trade unmolested. Judging from what we know of the feelings and the character of the people, we may anticipate that if war is begun it will be carried on by them in earnest, and that our merchants and their property at Yokohama and the other open ports will be exposed to attacks from which it will be difficult to protect them. Bear in mind how large is the value of British property in those ports exposed to the torch of the incendiary, and how difficult it will be to defend English residents from the midnight attacks of men who have shown how ready they are to sacrifice their own lives in order to kill the foreigners whom they hate. The nature of the war we shall have to wage, if we allow ourselves to be involved in it, deserves also to be considered. We shall have no means of carrying it on except by measures which will fall most severely upon the part of the population which is best affected to us. Already in trying to punish Satsuma we have burnt a rich and flourishing town, and if we have to attack other batteries we shall in like manner (either unavoidably or by design) destroy the property if

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not the lives of the unarmed and peaceable population. And when we have destroyed the batteries on the coast and the trading towns what are we to do next, and what shall we have gained? The Daimios and their armed retainers will probably retire inland, and it requires to be explained how it will be possible to follow them into the mountainous and difficult country which composes the greater part of Japan. What measures of coercion can we bring to bear upon them, and of what use will it be to occupy a few spots on the sea coast, if the rest of the territory is in the hands of those who will then be our bitter enemies. It seems to me, therefore, that while a war with Japan would certainly be attended with a fearful sacrifice of lives and of treasure, there is no small hazard that in the end we might be foiled by an enemy totally incapable of meeting us in the field. But assuming that our arms are as successful as you can desire, it remains to be considered whether the war would not be one in which success would be even more calamitous than defeat. The extension of our trade certainly will not be promoted by burning other towns as we have burnt Kagosima, or by the devastation of the country which will be the seat of war, since the destruction of their property will not increase either the power or the willingness of the Japanese to purchase our manufactures, or to supply us with the commodities we wish to buy. But it is not merely the direct consequences of the war which we ought to regard; we ought also to take into consideration results which, though indirect, would be found to be still more important. If we succeed in overcoming the resistance of the Japanese, the result will in all probability be the exaction of a new treaty imposing more onerous conditions upon the people of that country than they have hitherto laboured under. It is well, in considering the question, to glance for a moment at the effect of such treaties. What has been their operation in China? When we first employed our arms to establish closer relations with that country some twenty-five years ago we found the empire peaceful and prosperous, its provinces in a high state of cultivation, and supporting a numerous and a happy population. But by the effects of our wars the authority of the Government in China has been completely broken down, and a state of anarchy has been brought
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about which has caused the deepest misery throughout that vast empire. Provinces which, on our first entrance into China, were rich and flourishing, are now utterly ruined, hundreds of thousands of human lives have been sacrificed, and in the newspapers of this day I find the latest accounts from China state that some provinces are so completely ruined that the inhabitants have been driven to support life by that last and most dreadful resource—cannibalism. The same process is now in its first stage in Japan. If our present policy be persisted in, it will not be many years before all the authority of the Japanese Government would be entirely destroyed, and we should not be in a position to substitute an authority in its stead to maintain order throughout that extensive empire. A successful war with Japan can hardly lead to any other result. Its institutions are not such as to withstand the effects of defeat, and it is the nature of Asiatic Governments to be easily overthrown, while it is impossible when their strength has once been broken to re-establish their authority, or to create another to take its place. Such are the grounds upon which I submit to the House that it is our duty to avert these evils, and therefore I propose a Resolution—
"That, apart from all higher considerations, the true interests of this country, and especially its permanent commercial interests, require that such calamitous results should not be risked by maintaining the existing treaty with Japan unaltered, and that it is desirable that the provisions of this treaty should be so modified as to place the future intercourse of the two nations on a better footing for the future."
The truth of this assertion can hardly, I think, be disputed, and, if not, I think there can be no objection to the next Resolution which I propose—
"That it would therefore he advisable that Her Majesty's servants should without delay enter into friendly communication with the Government of Japan and with the Governments of other nations having treaties with Japan similar to our own, for the purpose of determining what changes it would be expedient to make in the provisions of these treaties."
In this Resolution I have not ventured to prescribe what modifications should be introduced into the treaty, as I do not consider that it falls within the province of Parliament to do so, since it properly belongs to Her Majesty's servants to consider in the first instance what changes might advantageously be made. When they have made up their minds as to what changes it

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would be desirable to make in the treaties with Japan, it would be well to have an understanding with other civilized Powers, and especially with France. If the concurrence of these Powers could be Boomed, after the experience of our power which the Japanese have recently had, there would be little difficulty in obtaining their concurrence to any modifications of the treaty which might be suggested. But although I have not thought it right to point out in the Resolution what modifications should be introduced into the treaty, because upon constitutional grounds I think it beyond the province of Parliament to prescribe them, yet I do not think there is any impropriety in my stating what are my own views upon that point. I will therefore express my conviction that if we wish to remain on good terms with Japan, that it is in the first place indispensable greatly to restrict the operation of what is called the "exterritoriality" clause. At present British subjects in certain ports of Japan, and for a considerable distance beyond them, are altogether exempted from the control of the Native authorities. I will venture to say that such a system could not possibly be worked in Europe. If English sailors at Havre or New York, or American and French sailors in Liverpool, were exempt from the interference of the local police, and if they could only be dealt with by their own Consuls, it would be impossible for a single day to maintain order and peace in these towns. It is exactly the same in China and Japan, where we have no machinery to control our own subjects. Indeed, without taking the government of those countries into our own hands, it would be impossible to have an efficient police or proper tribunals for the maintenance of order or the administration of justice. If, therefore, it should be thought necessary to adhere to the principle of "exterritoriality" at all, and I am by no means sure that we ought, for I am far from being convinced that a substitute for that system might not be provided with the assent of the Japanese Government, which would ensure to foreigners all necessary protection without the present abuses—if, I say, that principle is to be maintained at all, it ought to be confined within the narrowest limits possible, and the privilege should be enjoyed within a very restricted space set apart in the different open ports for the residence of foreigners and for carrying on their trade. I do not mean to say that British subjects should be pre-
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vented from going beyond the ports. There would be no occasion for prohibiting of reigners from going, or even from residing beyond the defined limits, provided it were distinctly understood that if they thought proper to do so it would be at their own risk, that they would be amenable for any misconduct to the Native authorities, and must look also to these alone for protection from violence or wrong without having a claim to call upon the British Minister or Admiral to relieve them from any danger or difficulty. No doubt a great clamour would be raised against such a restriction of the privileges now enjoyed by foreigners in Japan, but with this restriction all that is really necessary for trade, and surely it is not expedient that we should risk all the calamities of war in order that a few merchants and some drunken sailors should be allowed to seek for amusement, without control, for thirty miles round the trading ports. And under this system men who would really act with prudence and consideration for the feelings and customs of the people would have no difficulty in safely visiting the interior, as we may infer from the kind treatment met with by Mr. Fortune and Mr. Veitch. The evils which must necessarily spring from the absence of police have not yet been developed in Japan. To judge of their extent, we should look to China. I have a trade report from Shanghai, which describes the population as in a state of utter lawlessness; and the evils of such a state of things are greatly increased by the mutual jealousies of the Consuls of the Foreign Powers. The English Consul cannot punish an American subject, nor the American Consul an English subject; and the result is that utter lawlessness prevails among the population. I especially complain that vessels are allowed to hoist the British flag on the coast of China, under cover of which they commit depredations which bring odium on this country. Strict measures should be taken to prevent the growth of a similar system on the coasts of Japan.
My Lords, this is the main alteration which is required in the treaty, but I think it would further be advisable to simplify a good deal the stipulations we have imposed upon Japan with respect to trade; and there are some other points on which I should have wished to touch, were it not that I am ashamed of having so long occupied your Lordships' attention. I will, therefore, only state generally what appears to

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me to be a wise policy to pursue. In the first place, we ought to restrict as much as possible the engagements we impose on Japan, and we should reduce and simplify as much as we can the stipulations of our treaties, in order that the Government of that country might not be tempted to break them, and thus impose on us the necessity of applying coercion. Then I contend that it is on every account in the highest degree desirable that we should be able to reduce the very large force we have in China and Japan. It appears from the papers produced that it has been found necessary to order 1,000 additional men to China, partly with a view to the demands it may be necessary to make on the force in China for service in Japan. And in addition to the land forces, I find, on reference to the naval papers, that we have at this moment in Japan or China no fewer than thirty-five vessels of war—all steamers, including gunboats. This is a very large force, kept up at great expense to the country, and on the principle of my noble Friend we ought to reduce these demands on our resources as much as possible. This is advisable also for another reason—the maintenance of so large a force kept up the feeling of suspicion in the minds of the Japanese. The Bishop of Victoria has stated that the people are quite aware of the origin and history of our connection with India. They know we went there as traders, and ended by subduing all the Native Princes and Powers of India. They are very much afraid of the same fate themselves, and most anxious to maintain their independence. It appears to me that a really profitable trade between the two nations can never be carried on unless goodwill and friendship be established. It is in vain to go on as we are now doing. So long as their object is to thwart or cripple our trade, they will always find out some new means of accomplishing it, apparently within the letter of the treaty. But if we go on the opposite principle—if we make them feel the value of our trade—if we endeavour to remove their just suspicions and just fears as to the consequences of what is now going on—if we do that, the commerce is so mutually advantageous that we may rely on it the people and Government of Japan will learn to see its benefits, and gradually relax their restrictions upon it. I have it upon the authority of my noble Friend himself (Earl Russell) that it was the misconduct of British subjects, their overbearing and lawless behaviour,
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which has been the source of all these evils. It is the knowledge that they are backed by the force of this country which leads them to adopt such a line of conduct, and nothing would have so good an effect in inducing them to alter their behaviour as the withdrawal or diminution of the force at their command. I may remind my noble Friend how well this policy succeeded in China during his own administration. Almost immediately after my noble Friend formed his Administration (in which I had the honour of holding the office of Secretary of State for the Colonies), in July, 1846, the Government received intelligence of an expedition which had been sent without instructions from the Government at home by the Governor of Hong Kong to destroy the forts in the Canton river in order to punish the Chinese for certain offences which they were said to have committed. With the full assent of my noble Friend and the Cabinet, I addressed to the Governor of Hong Kong a despatch containing a severe reproof for this unauthorized exercise of power; and, in order to prevent the possibility of such an attempt being repeated, followed it up by greatly reducing the strength of the garrison of Hong Kong. That had the very best effect in producing a conciliatory disposition on the part of the British authorities, and for six years there was no quarrel between them and the Chinese. No sooner, however, was the Crimean war at an end than an additional force was sent to Hong Kong; and in a very short time the Governor picked a quarrel with the Chinese, which led to a war, all the ill consequences of which have not yet been fully experienced.
My Lords, my last Resolution proposes that a humble Address should be presented to Her Majesty setting forth the substance of the preceding ones. I must express my earnest hope that my noble Friend will not regard this as a censure upon the policy of the Government. Although I recommend a change of policy, I do not consider this to imply blame of those who are now in office, because the responsibility for the policy hitherto pursued does not rest entirely with Her Majesty's present Government. It rests in part, at least, with their predecessors, and still more with Parliament, which has tacitly approved that policy. I ask the House to pronounce no censure; I only ask it to express an opinion that our experience of the working of the treaty concluded six

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years ago with Japan has shown that it is desirable that that treaty should be revised and its terms amended. If Her Majesty's Government are inclined to take that course, it is most desirable that they should have the declared support of Parliament, because it cannot be done without provoking some clamour out of doors, I trust that your Lordships will agree to the Resolutions which I am about to move, I have asked for your support only upon the ground that our commercial interests render desirable the course which I am recommending; but I am persuaded that your Lordships will agree with me that this question involves far higher considerations than that, and that we are bound to consider not only what is for our interest, but what is consistent with our notions of right and wrong. Even if it can be proved—which it cannot—that it is necessary to adhere in Japan to a system by which we should inevitably become involved in a war with the Japanese, we should be bound to abstain from taking a course so contrary to the plainest rules of justice and right.
The noble Earl then moved to resolve,

1. That the Relations between this Country and Japan appear to this House to be at present in a highly unsatisfactory State:

2. That it is shown by the Papers laid before Parliament by Command of Her Majesty, that the Treaty concluded between Her Majesty and the Tycoon of Japan on the 26th of August, 1858, gives to British Subjects in Japan Rights and Privileges which the Government of that Country was avowedly reluctant to grant, and was only induced to confer upon them through Dread of British Naval and Military Power:

3. That the Government of Japan has also been induced by this same Fear to make with other European Nations and with the United States Treaties generally similar to that which it has concluded with Her Majesty;

4. That under the above-named Treaty British Subjects are entitled to claim Admission into certain Portions of the Territory of Japan without being subject to the Jurisdiction of its Government, Her Majesty having taken upon Herself the Obligation of enforcing on their Part good Conduct and Obedience to the Law:

5. That the Reports of Her Majesty's diplomatic Servants show that Her Majesty has not been able to fulfil this Obligation: the Provisions of the Statutes authorizing Her Majesty's Consuls to try and punish British Subjects for Offences committed in Japan, and the Means available for carrying these Laws into effect, have proved altogether insufficient to prevent gross Outrages and Insults from being inflicted on the People of Japan by British Subjects and Persons assuming that Character:

6. That the Animosity against Foreigners excited in the Minds of the Japanese by these
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Outrages and Insults has increased the Repugnance long felt by the most powerful Classes among them to renewed Intercourse with European Nations, and has led to the Perpetration of some Murders and several daring and desperate Attacks upon Foreigners; diplomatic Servants and other Subjects of Her Majesty having been among the Sufferers from these Acts of Violence:

7. That the Government of the Tycoon has professed the strongest Desire to prevent the Commission of these Crimes and to punish their Perpetrators, but has declared itself unable to do so; nor does there appear to be any Reason to doubt the Truth of these Declarations, since Two Tycoons and a Regent of Japan have themselves been murdered, and One of the principal Ministers narrowly escaped the same Fate, owing to the Hostility they bad incurred from being supposed to favour an increased Intercourse with Foreigners:

8. That in order to enforce a Demand made by Her Majesty's Government of Redress for the Murder of a British Subject it was found necessary to undertake hostile Operations against One of the Daimios, in the Course of which considerable Loss was experienced by Her Majesty's Ships and a large and flourishing Japanese Town was burnt to the Ground:

9. That this Experience of what has already taken place leaves little Hope for the future of its being possible to avert fresh Collisions between Her Majesty's Subjects and the Japanese if the existing Arrangements for regulating the Intercourse between them are maintained unaltered; and if such Collisions should occur they must sooner or later lead to a War which would necessarily cost many Lives and much Money both to this Country and to Japan, and would probably bring upon the latter the heavy Calamities of general Anarchy and Confusion from the Destruction of its existing Government, while there would be no Means of creating any other Authority to replace it:

10. That, apart from all higher Considerations, the true Interests of this Country, and especially its permanent Commercial Interests, require that such calamitous Results should not be risked by maintaining the existing Treaty with Japan unaltered, and that it is desirable that the Provisions of this Treaty should be so modified as to place the future Intercourse of the Two Nations on a better Footing for the future:

11. That it would therefore be advisable that Her Majesty's Servants should without Delay enter into friendly Communication with the Government of Japan and with the Governments of other Nations having Treaties with Japan similar to our own, for the Purpose of determining what Changes it would be expedient to make in the Provisions of these Treaties:

12. That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty to lay before Her Majesty the Substance of the foregoing Resolutions, and humbly to pray that Her Majesty will be graciously pleased to take the same into Her serious Consideration, with the view of adopting such Measures as may be found best calculated to avert War between this Country and Japan, and to promote an Increase of Trade and friendly Intercourse between the Two Nations to their mutual Advantage.

EARL RUSSELL: My Lords, after the long and able speech which my noble Friend has made, I am, I confess, somewhat disappointed to find that he should have sat down without having thrown any light on what I thought was the main purpose of my noble Friend in addressing you—our relations with Japan might be amended. He thinks it desirable that there should be an increase of trade between the two nations, and I had hoped he was about to point out the means whereby this object might be obtained: but although he was profuse in his censures on the existing state of things, yet as to the manner in which that intercourse might be improved my noble Friend was very nearly silent. My noble Friend began his speech by finding fault with the manner in which our intercourse with Japan was begun. And here I must remark that, both on this subject and on the subject of what our policy should be, he aimed at subverting our policy, not only in that country but in China, and with regard to all Eastern nations. My noble Friend says that our treaty with Japan was obtained by force and intimidation. In the case of China, no doubt the treaty of Tien-tsin was brought about by our entering the Peiho with a considerable force; but my noble Friend is hardly correct in the assertion which he made in reference to Japan. Lord Elgin went to Japan with one steam frigate and, I believe, two gunboats, which is hardly such a force as could be fairly said to have so intimidated the Japanese Government and to have forced the treaty upon them. There were, I may add, other treaties made before that time. There was one entered into between Japan and America on the occasion when Commodore Perry went to that country with a considerable force; and I cannot see that Lord Elgin was so much to blame because he went with a frigate and two gunboats to make a similar treaty. Other nations, says my noble Friend, have followed the same policy of intimidation. Now, one of those Powers which have intimidated Japan is Switzerland, which my noble Friend will, I think, hardly contend is a Power calculated to inspire the Japanese with such fear as to force them to conclude a treaty of commerce. That being so, the foundation of my noble Friend's argument falls to the ground, for it appears that it was not by intimidation that we obtained the treaty, and that, even if it was obtained by force on our part, greater
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force had been employed on the part of other countries. But what, let me ask, have been the fruits of these treaties? One would have thought that if the origin of these treaties had been so objectionable, as my noble Friend describes, the fruits of the treaties would have been of a kind equally undesirable; but the results have been that, in the course of a few years, there is a commercial intercourse of foreign nations with Japan to the value of £7,000,000. What, let me ask, is that but the intercourse of friendship—an intercourse whereby the Japanese obtain what they want from foreigners, and foreigners what they want from them, to the mutual benefit of both. Is that the friendly intercourse which my noble Friend wishes to stop? Why, he declares himself that he wishes to increase the trade with Japan. But then, he says that the Japanese having been induced to make the treaty through fear, we entered into a stipulation that British subjects should be entitled to obtain admission to certain portions of the territory of Japan without being under the jurisdiction of the Japanese authorities, but that they should be amenable for any offences they might commit only to our own authorities. He complains of the law called the "extraterritorial law." But what, I would ask, has been the whole course of our intercourse with Eastern nations? What is the history of our intercourse with China and with Turkey? Have we not entered into arrangements with China of this very, character? Would we be justified, then, in adopting an entirely new plan in regard to Japan, saying that the Japanese laws should be allowed to prevail in the case of any British subject who might be accused of having committed an offence against them? Your Lordships must bear in mind that the Japanese laws are most sanguinary. What should we say if we heard in England that a young English merchant had been brought before the Japanese tribunals subjected to torture, put to death, being disembowelled, and, in short, suffering all the horrid tortures which the code of the country inflicts? And what would be said if we were to admit the application of the Japanese law to British offenders, that all the relations of the criminal should be put to death for his offence? Is it desirable, under those circumstances, that we should abandon a plan which has now been acted upon for three centuries, in accordance with which, when we enter Oriental na-

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tions, we carry with us our own tribunals and our own notions of justice? When Japanese subjects commit an offence against the English we ask them to punish their own criminals; but when an Englishman commits an offence we do not surrender him up to be dealt with by the Japanese laws. In that respect we can, I think, make no alteration without incurring great danger; and I believe that the very danger which my noble Friend pointed out—that of getting into repeated disputes with the Chinese and Japanese authorities—would be promoted and not prevented by our taking the position which my noble Friend suggested in reference to our merchants in those parts, I cannot say, therefore, that in this respect the suggestion of my noble Friend would bring about any advantages; whilst, however, fully convinced of the advantages arising from our trade with China and Japan, I am obliged to admit with sorrow that that trade is undoubtedly accompanied by great abuses on the part of Englishmen themselves. Their manner and demeanour when living in those Eastern countries is not always what it ought to be, I this very morning received a letter from Sir Frederick Bruce, written in the same admirable tone and temper as so many others, in which he laments the insolence and disregard of Chinese customs, the want of courtesy, and the improper behaviour in many respects towards an inferior race, which characterizes some of our countrymen, and which he says is a disgrace to several who go apparently for the purposes of trade to China. The same thing, I am sorry to think, may be said in the case of Japan; nor is it confined to these two among Eastern nations. I hope that in time to come these persons will be influenced by more civilized views, and more regard to the customs of the persons among whom they live. All that we can under the circumstances do is that which men like Sir Rutherford Alcock are disposed to do—that is, to refuse to take up the cause of any of these men who may bring trouble on themselves by their own misconduct, and thus show them that it is not because they belong to a powerful nation that they are to be countenanced in their misconduct. I know of no alteration in the treaty, of no particular provisions which could be introduced, which could remedy the present state of things; and we can only hope that while the commercial intercourse itself with Japan is productive of great benefit, the abuses which
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attend upon it will be in time removed by the exhibition of better conduct on the part of our own countrymen, who have the remedy entirely in their own hands. I would add that the Government of the Tycoon has shown every disposition—being fairly treated on our part—to do all that is necessary on their side to improve the trade between the two countries. But it is not attributable to our policy that there are great dissensions in Japan. There are the Prince of Satsuma, the Prince of Nagato, and many others of the high feudal aristocracy—one of them said to have 200,000 men under his command, and immense revenues—whose privileges and feudal powers were secured to them some two or three centuries ago. There is, besides, the Mikado, a sort of supreme spiritual chief, and there is the Tycoon, who is said by the best authorities to have the treaty-making power. How can we prevent these different authorities from quarrelling among themselves and from being jealous of one another? The Daimios say, and perhaps with truth, that the Tycoon has managed in providing that certain ports shall be the ports at which English ships shall enter, to take the greater part of the profits to himself, and to prevent the ports which belong to these Daimios from being the places of commerce for foreign merchants. If that be so, as it it well known that the profits of this trade are enormous, it is no wonder that these Daimios wish to have some share in it, and that many of them wish, in conjunction with the Mikado, to overpower the authority of the Tycoon. But that is not a matter with which the English are concerned; that is not a result for which British power is responsible. It is a matter that may at any time produce civil war—civil war not brought about by England, but by the dissensions and jealousies of the Japanese themselves. A noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Carnarvon) who brought forward the question of Japan last year, concluded—as, sitting in Opposition, it was perhaps natural for him to conclude—that we were about to do everything that was foolish upon this subject—he said that the Government were going to punish the Tycoon, as the Tycoon was our friend, and that the Daimio, who was our enemy, we intended to leave alone. Now, the fact is that we were quite as wise as the noble Earl opposite. We did say, no doubt, that the Tycoon ought to pay a considerable fine because he had allowed a public road to be the

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scene of a disgraceful murder on the part of one of the Daimios; but we called upon the Daimio himself to bring the murderers to justice, and pay his share of the fine. We did not, therefore, commit the folly that the noble Earl supposed we should commit. My noble Friend who brought forward this question to-night meant, it seems, to be particularly civil; but he told us that our conduct with respect to the murder of Mr. Richardson was against all principles of international law, against all principles of justice, and against good policy. For a particularly civil person, this, I think, was rather hard upon the Government. But I do not see the matter in that light. Here were three or four English people—one of them a lady—riding upon a road which was assigned by treaty as a road upon which British subjects were able to pass on foot or on horseback when they pleased. Being there when one of these great Daimios passed, they stood on one side of the road, where one of them was murdered, the lady and the others being attacked, and escaping with many bruises and wounds to Yokohama. We thought that was an injury which required some reparation, and we did not think it was contrary to the law of nations to ask for reparation. We said that the murderers ought to be tried; and as the Prince of Satsuma refused any redress, we sent ships to his harbour and took by way of reprisals two of his vessels. The Prince of Satsuma, I must say, behaved in one respect with great humanity, for he sent a notice to his own people that there would probably be some firing, and advised them to leave the town. The batteries of this town fired upon our men-of-war. What were our men-of-war to do? Were they not to return the fire? Were they to go off immediately as fast as they could without returning the fire, and with all the appearance, and, indeed, the reality, of running away from the forces of the Daimio? What would have been the consequence of such conduct? Why, my Lords, how unsafe would have been the life of every Englishman in Japan! The Admiral who was in command of the British squadron ordered fire to be opened. It was opened against those batteries; the batteries were in a great degree silenced; but as a high wind was blowing at the time, and the houses were entirely built of wood and paper, the town caught fire and a great part of it was burnt. Well, I think, though this was a lamentable oc-
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currence, that a great deal too much horror was expressed at it. In consequence of the notice that had been given hardly any persons were killed except the soldiers in the batteries; there really was not that great mortality which has been so much lamented; the town has been since rebuilt, and people say that it is a handsomer town than it ever was before. I cannot believe, then, that that proceeding was of the character which my noble Friend states; and certainly with regard to the followers of Prince Satsuma, it was a good lesson for them, for they owned that they did not know that the English were so strong; that they should beware how they offended them again; and the Prince of Satsuma himself has shown since that time the most friendly disposition towards us. My noble Friend says that these collisions must lead to war. But is it more likely that war will result by inflicting some punishment upon the murderers of our people, or by allowing those murderers to go unpunished until there shall be a large accumulation of murders and other injuries? My belief is that the taking notice in this way of such an injury as a horrible murder is the way not to lead to future collisions and war, but rather to prevent them. We know very well what has happened with regard to the French. One of the Japanese princes, the Prince Nagato, as a French ship was passing through a narrow strait, fired upon it and inflicted considerable injury. The French Admiral thereupon attacked the battery, the Japanese soldiers ran away, the battery was destroyed, and every gun was made useless for the future. Here, then, according to my noble Friend, would have been the origin of a great war between France and Japan. But Japan thought better of it, and sent an Embassy to beg pardon for the outrage, and a new treaty has been made between the French and Japanese Government. Such was the effect of an order very similar to that for which I am so much blamed in the case of the Prince of Satsuma. I quite agree with my noble Friend that these Japanese are most ingenious people. This Prince of Satsuma himself has more than once been on board our steam-vessels, and has been very curious in making inquiries, and has bought several steam-vessels himself; and I am told—by Colonel Neale I think—that the Japanese would buy a foreign steam-vessel in a port, and that, the European crew being out of it, they would

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put their own crew on board and steam out of the port at once, with complete command of the machinery, as if they had been taught the use of it from their earliest youth. Nay, more—in another case one of our officers was receiving two Japanese officers of rank, and immediately they came on board they began discussing the merits of the Armstrong and Whitworth guns, showing great knowledge of all the mechanism of those guns. I am in hopes that, so far from leading to the stoppage of further intercourse between us, so far from leading to hostilities, the policy of Her Majesty's Government will lead to the maintenance of friendly relations with the Japanese; that their display of the more than ordinary anxiety found among Eastern nations to profit by European intercourse will establish that intercourse on a footing of mutual advantage; and that, though there may be on the part of some of the Japanese a good deal of murmuring like the rumbling of distant thunder, the advantage of commercial relations between the two countries will gradually be seen in Japan, and will gradually insure a friendly and a peaceful intercommunication. Coming to the last Resolution of my noble Friend, I must say I had expected from him information and instruction as to the way in which we should improve our relations with Japan. Had be pointed out any mode by which we could effect that object, Her Majesty's Government would have gladly availed themselves of my noble Friend's suggestions. But when he came to that part of his speech, after he had thought fit to blame every part of the policy of the Government of this country—not only of the present but of former Governments—he said it belonged to Her Majesty's Government to find out the way in which an improvement could be effected. Now, my Lords, I must say I so far agree with this Resolution as to see much difficulty in the present state of affairs; but I think if we were to say to the Japanese that we should modify our treaty—that we were prepared to make new arrangements—I think the effect would be that which such a course would have upon other Eastern nations—we should only inspire the Japanese with the idea that we were afraid of their hostilities, and that we were ready to conciliate them by needless and unworthy concessions. I do not see, therefore, that we should gain by any measures of that sort. I am not at all reluctant to enter
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into some friendly relations with the Japanese, though I must remind your Lordships that friendly relations have been going on between the Government in this country and the Government in Japan, and also between our Minister in Japan and the Ministers of the Tycoon. Sir Rutherford Alcock was prepared to do everything that was courteous towards the Tycoon, and he showed himself ready to do anything which our laws enabled him to do in order to punish any young Englishman who went beyond the rights to which British subjects were entitled according to the terms of our treaty. My noble Friend has said that I have lately spoken as if this country was perfectly helpless. I am quite aware that this country can do great hurt to other countries; but I do not let out of sight that other countries may do some hurt to us. I own that I contemplate not only with repugnance, but disgust, such a state of things as boasting of nothing but the injury which we could do to other countries, while they, on the other hand, should be boasting of the injury which they could I do to us. Certainly that is not a pleasant subject of contemplation; but we know we have power—all foreign nations know we have by our naval and military forces power—to inflict great hurt on any nation attacking us. My noble Friend says, that as regards this country and Japan, we are not behaving according to the laws of nations. I am afraid that for a very long time to come it will be necessary to keep a considerable naval force in the seas of Japan. There are, as I have said, various: parties in Japan, and one of them is very likely to say they will not permit foreigners to come there any longer, and that they will drive them from Japan. That, no doubt, might lead to scenes of bloodshed; but I cannot see that we ought to retire from Japan for that reason, or forego those rights which are of great benefit to us and at the same time of great benefit to the Japanese. My belief is, that we should endeavour to behave justly, and on every occasion repair any wrong of which the Japanese may have reason to complain, but at the same time seek redress for any wrong which may be done by them to British subjects. Under existing circumstances, that is all I can say, while, of course, I should be glad that our relations with Japan could be closer and more secure. But we must recollect that this is a new commerce. The treaty only dates from, I think, 1858, and there is much to be

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smoothed away in regard to our relations with a people who for a long time would not admit foreigners into their country. At the same time, the commerce between the two nations has been in many respects rapid. During the first four years after the Treaty of Nankin our imports of silk from China amounted to 20,000 bales; in the first four years after our treaty with Japan our imports of silk from that country have been 25,000 bales. That shows a considerable willingness on the part of the Japanese to enter into commerce, and to establish those relations with us which may tend to the promotion of trade. It is impossible for us who have such commerce in every part of the world not to see that in Japan, as elsewhere, some misunderstanding may arise; and all the British Government can do is not to modify or alter those treaties which we have with the Japanese—not to say we will give further concessions in addition to those which we have already made. Last year we engaged to put off the opening of two ports, which were to have been opened this year, for seven years more, and we have shown every disposition to agree to any concession which the Japanese could reasonably ask for; but it appears to me that it would be more advantageous for all parties to go on steadily and quietly, but maintaining our rights, rather than to inaugurate a new system and policy, more especially if that new system and policy were in contradiction of all we have ever done in our dealings with Eastern nations from the time when we first had intercourse with them.
THE BISHOP OF OXFORD: My Lords, I feel bound to express my thanks to the noble Earl opposite (Earl Grey) for having brought this subject before your Lordships and the country ns he has done. I watched closely the speech of the noble Earl, and have carefully considered his Resolutions, and it does appear to me that so far as possible he has avoided all unnecessary blame for the past, and has rather directed the attention of your Lordships to the future and its dangers, and the mode in which those dangers might be averted, than indulged in anything like recrimination in regard to events which have already taken place. I waited with great anxiety to hear the answer given by the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, confident that everything that could be said on the other side would be said with that terse and telling eloquence which the noble Earl always uses. I confess I have listened
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with great disappointment to that answer. So far as it concerns the removing from my mind the apprehension which the speech of the noble Earl (Earl Grey) had excited, I think the answers to the special points made by my noble Friend were not conclusive, The first and main answer, as I understand it, of the noble Earl to the objections taken by the noble Earl opposite (Earl Grey) to the system by which we undertook on our part to exercise our own laws against our own people in that distant country, and to leave the Japanese to exercise their laws against their own people, is that such is the universal custom of this country with regard to Eastern nations, and that the noble Earl who introduced this subject wished to sweep that entirely away. The noble Earl at the head of the Foreign Office then drew a picture of what would be the result if that arrangement was departed from and the Japanese loft to execute their laws on our countrymen. But, my Lords, I distinctly understood the noble Earl (Earl Grey) proposed to guard against any such supposition. I understood him to say that at the principal ports and at the factories where we had our goods—at those places where we were able to enforce on our own people the reasonable obedience to the Japanese laws, that there he would maintain that principle; but that what he complained of was that we undertake what we cannot perform, because we undertake to throw around individual members of this country in all parts of Japan the ægis of the security of a British subject, and thus have led them to ignore in a most reckless manner the laws of Japan; that we have no power of preventing the breach of those laws, and scarcely any power of punishing them. My noble Friend argued—and I have waited to hear the point answered—that these two were correlative obligations; that where we undertake to protect our own people by our own laws we are bound to show we have sufficient power to make the people obey those laws to which by coming into the country they subject themselves, and to punish those who break them. Therefore the answer of the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary is not satisfactory. I see no reason why this country should confer that which the Government themselves have admitted tends to make our people act in a way that will provoke hostility—the power of recklessly asserting their supposed British independence—which is so dangerous an element in the

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character of our people. Then the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary said that he broadly denied that the treaties with Japan were chiefly brought about by intimidation, and he quoted Sir Rutherford Alcock in support of that position. But, if there is any point on which Sir Rutherford Alcock is more explicit and emphatic than another it is his declaration that these treaties were brought about by intimidation. He says the Americans went there, and appealed to what we were doing in China, alarming the minds of the Japanese by asking them whether they would bring all this upon themselves, they being unprepared. Then came the news of our successes in China, and the appearance of a small flotilla, which the Japanese took for the avant courier of a great fleet, and the treaties they entered into were distinctly in fear of this country. So strongly did Sir Rutherford Alcock feel this, that he says—
"I know it is alleged that there is a party in the country who are in favour of progress and who desire to see the foreigner admitted into the country to trade, but I have never been able to find that it exists."
There are, he says, there, as everywhere else, two parties—one more extravagantly attached than the other to what they consider their own national habits. And he described them as being known in Japan as the toad-in-the-well party and the non toad-in-the well party; but he says that the most liberal he had been able to find were hostile to doing away with restrictions against foreigners coming amongst them, and that feeling has increased everywhere He says that whereas at first foreigners on going there were received in the houses of the poor with something of welcome and hospitality; but he adds, "I dare not say they would meet any where with such a welcome now." Therefore that which originally began in intimidation is continued now, according to Sir Rutherford Alcock's statement, under increasing disgust, only repressed through the terror of our violence. And, again, we were told by the noble Earl (the Foreign Secretary) that the burning of the Prince of Satsuma's town had been productive of good, and had led him to behave courteously and well since. When we know that he, in common with the other Daimios, is concerting a plan by which they hope, as they believe, to deliver their country—when we know that they are purchasing rifled cannon, and making every provision for that blow which they
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hope to strike—can we not see that the treaties have been granted with reluctance, that they have been extorted by violence, and that this is the preparation for the certain vengeance which is so much more a characteristic of the Japanese than concession? This is really the strength of the statement of my noble Friend (Earl Grey). The perpetual complaint of the more thoughtful Japanese has been that we are hurrying things too fast. "We grant," they say, "that it may be well, as you tell us, that we should become a trading community, that we should increase our wealth by dealing with the nations of the West; but there must be time for such a trade to grow up. At present it is but an injury to us; at every turn you take our vegetable wax, and you do not leave enough for our own people; you have tricked us as to our gold and exported it in masses, though we have treaty obligations to the contrary; you have suffered your people to insult us and you have set up a shadow man to evade the stipulations of our treaty. All this you have done because you will barter to a degree which we as a people cannot bear the introduction of your commerce and your merchandise. Give us time;"—that is a note sounded in their representation that must reach every heart. I What they in reality say is, "If you are to be enriched by this sudden traffic, have you no regard for us? Can you: not feel for our sufferings? Is it just: to force this upon us that you may a little sooner acquire so much more wealth?" My noble Friend the Secretary for Foreign Affairs did not attempt to answer, and I think he did not because he felt he could not answer it, the allegation of the exceeding danger we are running of absolutely destroying the internal Government of Japan by the course we I are now taking. Can it be the intention of this country to reduce Japan to the miserable state of an utterly ungoverned anarchy? Yet that must be the effect if you shake the existing power and cannot substitute another. All the injuries that have been brought upon China must come upon Japan, and many of them with tenfold severity, if you succeed in your policy. We have heard to-night of the great jealousies between the different parties in the Government of Japan. I believe, as far as there exists any difference between the Tycoon and Mikado it could be easily removed; but there is a fierce feud amongst

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the Daimios, and a continuous tendency to resist the power of the Tycoon, when the Tycoon seems to commit the country to what they consider steps fatal to its welfare. It is said that every step of these treaties has been written in the blood of successive Tycoons. Not one of the treaties has been executed that has not been followed by the poisoning or assassination of the Minister who signed it, and the banishment and degradation of all his subordinates. Does this show that the treaties have been gladly entered into by the Japanese? Does it not tend at once to prove that the treaties were forced upon them by acts of intimidation? What must be the result of continuing such measures? First, the breaking down of the wealth and power of the only central controlling authority which tends to keep these different feudal chieftains in any measure of order. Then, to national dissension among themselves and the misery of the whole Native population. And in the midst of that what attitude are we to assume? Are we to occupy the country, to administer its revenues, to administer its justice, to reform its laws—in short, to make it a part or dependency of our own country, or are we to leave it in the midst of its anarchy? What is to become of your trade if you leave it in a state of anarchy? And how, if you took the other course, are you to have a force sufficient in that remote country to operate amidst a hostile people united against you, with every advantage by nature for repelling invasion? How are you to make head against them except at a cost which I believe the people of Great Britain will not knowingly incur, in order that they may a little hasten the growth of commerce in Japan? It is on these points that the speech of the noble Earl opposite (Earl Grey), which I think exhausted the subject, remains unanswered; and I feel with him, that having passed through all these considerations, which I may call considerations of expediency, we come to the still stronger grounds of the natural principles of right. I maintain that we have no right, no authority, in the sight of Him who governs the universe, to force on an independent people by arms a treaty of commerce which they refuse. I maintain that having established that commerce, we have no right whatever to undertake engagements as to our own subjects which we cannot fulfil, and that the treaty, as it is now constructed, does lead this country
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to undertake to make its subjects do that which it has no power to make them do. The natural instincts of a people stand ready to avenge themselves when they find we cannot make our subjects obey the laws which they were bound to obey and we have undertaken to enforce. When reading Sir Rutherford Alcock's letter and-book I found the greatest efforts were made by the authorities to induce our people to abstain for three days from making use of a certain road where the Daimios were passing, it being contrary to their law that foreigners should meet them. Although every other road was open for the pleasure of our people they refused to comply with the request of the authorities, although the use of that road was not necessary either for business or pleasure. We have no right to undertake for these people what we have not the power to exact; and I, for one, believe that introducing into the commerce of this country such doubtful and, I may say, such unjust principles, is the way not to its final extension, but is the surest way to lead to its ruin. There is an eating canker upon every extension of national prosperity that is founded on injustice, which by a law more certain than the returns of any mercantile adventure, avenges the cause of right and justice upon the people by whom those principles have been violated. It is written, and will be fulfilled—"Woe unto him that buildeth his chamber on unrighteousness and his house upon wrong."
THE DUKE OF SOMERSETsaid, he did not think it was necessary to go back to the origin of the treaty with Japan; but he would remind their Lordships that a treaty was obtained in the first instance by the American Government, and all that we and other nations asked was to be put on the same footing as the Americans. He entirely concurred with the noble Earl opposite (Earl Grey) as to the importance of our showing forbearance and moderation in our dealings with the Japanese, and in regretting the misconduct of many Europeans in that country. No doubt there had been many cases of gross tyranny perpetrated towards the Natives of Japan, not by Englishmen only but by other Europeans; but that was a question quite apart from the treaty. The noble Earl said they should make a new treaty with Japan; but whilst he said that, his Resolutions affirmed that we on the one side and the Tycoon on the other could not enforce the present one. Then of what

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use would it be our entering into fresh negotiations with them for another treaty? His (the Duke of Somerset's) main objection to the Resolutions was that, if adopted, they would inevitably lead to war; for if we were to depart from our present treaty rights the Japanese would say we had given them a great advantage—that they had obtained a great victory, and that all they had to do was to insist on further concessions. The objection raised by the British and French Admirals to the erection of the batteries at Yokohama was, he thought, very well founded, for those batteries would, as they stated, have placed the lives and the property of foreigners there at the mercy of the Japanese. The House would remember that when Admiral Hope went to the Peiho, batteries were insidiously raised, and his ships being allowed to come in quite close were then suddenly fired into. If we had allowed these batteries to be erected at Yokohama the Europeans would have been in a similar manner entirely at the mercy of the Japanese, and the English and French Admirals felt it their duty to resist their construction. The noble Earl said that Her Majesty's Government protected British subjects wherever they went in Japan. That was not the case. It was an entire mistake. What Her Majesty's Government did was to protect them at Yokohama, and along a road which by treaty they had a right to use.
EARL GREY: For twenty-five miles.
THE DUKE OF SOMERSET: Yes. He had seen a great many persons who had returned from Japan, and they complained that they were kept just to one spot, and that they could only go up and down that one road to get a little exercise. The noble Earl had said that foreigners could go into the interior quietly for the purpose of studying botany; but that was not the case. He sent a gentleman there for that purpose, and when he got to Yokohama he was willing to submit to anything for the love of science; but he was sent back, and the Japanese authorities would not let him go anywhere. The noble Earl also said that the Daimios had a great objection to trade, and looked upon traders with contempt; but there also he was totally wrong. The noble Earl's speech was full of errors from the beginning to the end. The fact was Satsuma was jealous. He did not object to trade, but said the Tycoon was getting all the profit out of the trade, and that he ought to share in it. Here was this
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proud Daimio, who could not bear trade, longing to share in the profits of it. The noble Earl asked, by his tenth Resolution, that the provisions of the treaty might be so modified as "to place the future intercourse of the two nations on a better footing." But how were Her Majesty's Government to do that when they could not obtain the rights secured to them by the treaty already in existence? In his opinion the best way would be to keep the treaty already made, and by firmness on the one hand and forbearance on the other, its provisions might be fairly carried out. We had certain rights by the treaty in Japan, and the Japanese knew it, and admitted it. Satsuma's people admitted that we had a right to inflict punishment for the murder, and that they were liable for it; and so far from the burning of their town having had an ill effect, it had had a most excellent effect, and when the people came back they were ready to enter into another treaty. As for the burning of the town, the Japanese attached little importance to this loss as it could be rebuilt in a few days. He saw a gentleman a short time ago who came from Yokohama, who informed him that whilst at Yokohama he saw a large establishment used for the education of young Japanese ladies burnt down on the Monday, and to his surprise it was all built up again on the Friday following. That was a specimen of how rapidly these paper and wooden houses were burnt down and rebuilt. He confessed he was sorry to hear the attacks that bad been made upon Admiral Kuper, and he felt certain that however much they might wish to complain of the Government, they ought not to blame an officer who had strictly performed his duty. When Admiral Kuper heard of the attacks that were made upon him in Parliament he forwarded to him a letter, in which be expressed his great regret that such attacks should have been made upon him in his absence, he stated that at the time he deeply regretted that in firing on the batteries he should have destroyed the town, adding, that when he forwarded his despatch to the Government he certainly did not refer to that regret so much as he ought, because two of his officers were killed by his side on the bridge of the steamer, and he wrote the despatch in a hurry immediately after. He, however, did express his regret, and he had frequently since done so, for the sufferings of

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the Japanese. They were an industrious and amiable people, and if they could be separated from some of the Daimios who were hostile to all foreigners, they would be very fond of trade, for he had been informed by letter that many of the Daimios put the people to death because they traded with Europeans; and notwithstanding the danger they ran they would continually bring down their goods and silks in order to trade with the foreigners; which, so far from showing that they hated trade, proved that they were fond of it. He (the Duke of Somerset) had thought it his duty to justify Admiral Kuper's conduct from the attacks that had been made upon it, feeling that he had only been actuated by a strict regard to his duty, which had compelled him to fire upon the batteries. The noble Earl objected to his firing on the batteries, and thought he should have ran away. [Earl GREY: No, no!] When the Japanese fired on our ships, was our Admiral to return it or not? Was he to run away? Nothing was so injurious as not to deal effectually with these people, and the French had just had a difficulty with the Japanese in consequence of one of their ships having fired upon them. The fact was it was very difficult to deal with the Japanese. We knew but little of their habits and prejudices, and it was not very easy to go on with them amicably. We must have occasional outbreaks and misfortunes of this kind with the Japanese unless we were prepared to leave the country. But how could that be done? The Americans, the French, the Russians, the Prussians, the Swedes, the Dutch, and, in fact, all the European nations, were trading under the same treaty rights, and were we to run all round Europe, and ask the different nations to give up their treaty rights also? Certainly not. It could not be done. If we withdrew from Japan we should leave all the other nations there, and instead of having a hold on Japan we should have none, and they would trade with us under the American flag. Lord Elgin said we required a force in that country as much to keep our own people in order as the Japanese. He believed the best course to pursue was to adhere faithfully to the treaty, and at the same time practise all moderation and forbearance towards the Japanese; and while punishing those who misbehaved themselves, to hold the Japanese Government strictly to the fulfilment of their obligations.
THE EARL OF CARNARVONsaid, the
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noble Earl and also the noble Duke had acted somewhat inconsistently, for they had both of them devoted a considerable portion of their speeches to the affair of Kagosima, which his noble Friend (Earl Grey) had distinctly stated he would not then enter into, as it was a very large question, and had already been discussed this Session by their Lordships. The speeches, however, of the noble Earl and the noble Duke had been devoted to disinterring that old question. He fully admitted the great difficulty in which the Government were placed in dealing with the question of the treaty with Japan. The fact was, that during the last few years the class of traders who had gone out to Japan had been of an inferior order. In former years those who traded with China were persons of respectability and influence, connected with large firms—houses of immense wealth and responsibility; but now most of those who went to China and Japan were small traders—lawless and reckless men, who were allured there simply and solely by the enormous profits that were to be made on those coasts. Those were the men who committed outrages in Japan, and in defiance of treaty obligations established settlements for the purposes of contraband and illicit trade. The noble Earl opposite (Earl Russell) said he lamented these outrages, and asked how they could be prevented. He (the Earl of Carnarvon) submitted that it was the bounden duty of Her Majesty's Government to exercise as far as possible a check and a restraint through the Foreign Office; and to show that he was not speaking at random, he would refer to a recent case of a very atrocious description which had taken place in Japan. An outrage was attempted on the person of a young Japanese girl by an Englishman. He was reproved at the time for his conduct, but a few months after he was promoted. That was a case for the interference of the Foreign Office, which might have exercised a wholesome restraint by marking its deep sense of the wrong that had been committed. He was afraid that it was not always the foreign traders who were to blame for such conduct, because the papers which had been laid upon the table with regard to China showed that the Consuls themselves, who were really placed there for the purpose of exercising judicial power, and to maintain fair dealing between man and man, very often acted more like partizans than judges, and were frequently guilty of very high-handed and violent con-

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duct. The argument of his noble Friend (Earl Grey) went to that complaint, for he would either plaice in the hands of the Consuls greater power, or by some local tribunal enable justice to be dealt out alike in all cases. He concurred in all that had fallen from his noble Friend (Earl Grey) on the question of what was called "extraritoriality," which had already led to great mischiefs in China, and was still going on in that country. The system was mischievous to all concerned. It sapped and undermined the Native authority, and did not establish a complete and satisfactory authority in its stead. Its direct result was the extension of political still more of territorial right, and every morsel of ground annexed involved a fresh body of troops. They were drawing severely on their resources as regards men; and when they calculated their army in India, in the colonies, and in England, he must say he would be a bold man that would say those resources were unlimited and inexhaustible. While acknowledging all the difficulties and abuses that existed in China, and which, indeed, could not be denied, they seemed deliberately involving themselves in precisely the same difficulties in Japan. The state of things was almost identical in the two countries, with this exception, that while in China they had to deal with a nerveless, weak, tame-spirited people, they had in Japan to deal with a military, warlike, and vigorous race, second probably to none in the East except the Sikhs. There was also the same condition of things, the same lawlessness, the same powerlessness of the consuls to restrain outrage, the same difficulty with regard to export and import duties, the same aversion on the part of the Natives to receive us, the same determination on our part to force ourselves upon them by means of treaties extorted from them, which they accepted for the moment, but with the distinct determination to violate their engagements when the first opportunity offered. He remembered reading in one of Sir Frederick Bruce's despatches a statement to this effect, that "the conclusion of a treaty with an Oriental nation was not the termination, but really the beginning of the difficulties with which they bad to deal," and that was the precise truth. They had found this in China, and would find it in Japan; and Sir Frederick Bruce went on to say that "even measures of a beneficial and progressive character, extorted by force against the will of the population in such countries,
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were of very little avail." Well, the noble Earl said matters after all were improved. Kagosima had been burned down, and the noble Earl seemed to make rather merry over it. It was true that Kagosima had been burnt down, and that for the moment there was peace; but he defied any one who had read the papers upon this subject to say that it was more than a temporary breathing space. All through the Correspondence matters went from bad to worse, fresh murders and fresh acts of incendiarism were committed, the very Legation was in a state of siege, with stockades, guards, and camp fires lighted at night; in fact, the state of things was something between peace and war. The noble Earl did him the honour to allude to some observations which he made last year, and said that be spoke, as might have been expected, from a Member of the Opposition. Now, much as he valued party Government, he regarded this question of Japan as much too grave a one to be treated as a party matter. It was one of the most serious questions that could engage the attention of Parliament, and he thought it unfortunate that the country was not thoroughly alive to its importance. But, unfortunately, while our attention was distracted by other matters nearer home, we had little time to devote to matters which were growing up so many thousand miles away in China and Japan affecting our relations with those two countries. The noble Earl complained of his having said that the Government were putting a pressure upon the Tycoon, who was their friend. It was true that he did say that, and he maintained that that was the real state of the case. The only person whom the Government were touching was the only one in the State who was favourable, and who they acknowledged had, so far as he could, dealt fairly with them. He was at variance with a great many of the Daimios, who were continually attempting to subvert his authority; and thus the Government, by the course which they were taking, were playing the game of their enemies. It was perfectly clear that a great constitutional revolution was going on in Japan. About two centuries and a half ago the constitution was altered. Since that time the power of the Mikado had been in abeyance, the power of the great Daimios had been neutralized by their factions, and consequently the power of the Tycoon had been supreme. Now, for the first time, there was a change. The present Mikado, who was a young

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and ambitious man, was recovering some of his former power; of the Daimios some were making common cause with him, and others were bitterly and vehemently opposing the Tycoon, who, on account of the favour which he had shown to foreigners, had become probably the most unpopular man in Japan.
From all these causes we were, by interfering, as we had done, in danger of pulling down about our ears the whole fabric of the existing Government in Japan, which, bad or good, was at least a Government, and of having to undertake the responsibility of governing the country ourselves. That was a danger from which the Government had escaped in China owing to circumstances which they could not have anticipated, and for which they have not themselves to thank. He agreed substantially with everything which had fallen from the noble Earl and with all his Resolutions. The only one about which he entertained any doubt was the last but one, which proposed that our Government should enter into friendly communication with the Government of Japan and other Powers for the purpose of revising the treaty. If he thought that that Resolution was intended to compel the Government to take instantaneous action he could not support it; but as he believed that that was not its meaning he had no hesitation in accepting it according to the spirit rather than the letter, and agreeing to it as well as to the others.
EARL GREYsaid, that his noble Friend had rightly interpreted the meaning of his 11th Resolution. Throughout the discussion the Members of the Government had not contested these two facts—that the treaty being reciprocal, we were bound to enforce good conduct on the part of our own subjects in Japan, and that we had utterly failed to do so. That was established both by the statement of Sir Rutherford Alcock and by the despatches of the noble Earl himself. The noble Duke (the Duke of Somerset) charged him with inconsistency, because he asked that as the treaty could not be enforced it should be revised. There was nothing inconsistent in his proposal. There were parts of the treaty which neither the Japanese nor ourselves could enforce, and therefore he proposed that they should be modified. The noble Earl (Earl Russell) had complained that he had suggested nothing for the future, but in another part of his speech he said that he had suggested too much.
On Question, Whether to agree? their Lordships divided—Contents 11; Not-Contents 30: Majority 19.
Resolved in the Negative.

CONTENTS.

Canterbury, Archbp.

Hawarden, V.

Carnarvon, E.

Lincoln, Bp.

Grey. E. [Teller.]

Nelson, E.

Dinevor, L.

Romney, E.

Stewart of Garlies, L. (E. Galloway).

Verulam, E.

Wynford, L. [Teller.]

NOT-CONTENTS.

Westbury, L. (L. Chancellor).

Clandeboye, L. (L. Dufferin and Claneboye).

Somerset, D.

Dartrey, L. (L. Cremorne).

Foley, L. [Teller.]

Ailesbury, M.

Leigh, L.

Monson, L.

Caithness, E.

Overstone, L.

Clarendon, E.

Ponsonby, L. (E. Bessborough). [Teller.]

Ducie, E.

Granville, E.

Rivers, L.

Russell, E.

Rossie, L. (L. Kinnaird).

Saint Germans, E.

Sydney, V.

Seymour, L. (E. St. Maur).

Torrington, V.

Stanley of Alderley, L.

Stratheden, L.

Chichester, Bp.

Sundridge, L. (D. Argyll.)

Cork, &c. Bp.

Down, &c. Bp.

Talbot de Malahide, L.

Wodehouse, L.

Camoys, L.

House adjourned at a quarter before Nine o'clock, to Monday next, Eleven o'clock.