OBSERVATIONS. (Hansard, 15 February 1864)

LORD CAMPBELL

My Lords, If an apology is needed for calling the attention of the House to the Treaties and Conventions in which the Duchy of Schleswig is guaranteed to Denmark by Great Britain, it may be found in the silence with regard to them, which has hitherto prevailed in both Houses of Parliament since the beginning of the Session. They affect so clearly and indisputably the obligations and position of the country, that I am more inclined to reproach myself for not having adverted to them in the debate on the Address, than I am for now attempting to submit them to your Lordships. At that time it did not seem to me improbable that my noble Friend, who has lately been at Copenhagen (Lord Wodehouse), might have entered on the subject, and anticipated all I had to offer as regards them. It will not, I trust, be thought that this notice is in any way designed to precipitate discussion on the conduct of the Government in the Danish question, which cannot properly begin until the papers are before us. The engagements of the country, and the merits or demerits of the course which Ministers have followed, will hardly be confounded by your Lordships. To refer to those engagements if forgotten, is most essential at this moment. It tends directly to obtain the armistice our policy is seeking. If it is thought that Great Britain is at liberty to abandon Schleswig, overrun and occupied by Germany, to a foreign grasp, that grasp, no doubt, will be tenacious. If it is seen that Great Britain is bound by ancient and surviving treaties to maintain Schleswig in the Danish monarchy, that grasp will most 551 probably be loosened. In that view, not another day and not another hour ought to elapse, before these treaties are again impressed upon the memory of Parliament. And had they been distinctly blazoned before the Session opened, and before the war began, they might, perhaps, have done something to avert the wrongs and the disasters of which, in the last few days, Great Britain has been the startled and indignant, but at the same time, the baffled, humiliated, and incapable observer.

My Lords, before proceeding to refer to the instruments which contain the guarantee itself, it is essential to insist upon this point—namely, that the Treaty of London of 1852, of which we have heard so much, in no way disturbs or supersedes them. It would be quite useless to advert to them, while noble Lords were under a vague and undefined impression that the Treaty of London reproduces or annuls all previous engagements between Denmark and Great Britain. The prevailing disposition to overlook the guarantee, which, as I shall show the House, a few years ago was universally acknowledged, must, in the want of any other cause, be traced to an impression of that character. But the Treaty of London is exclusively directed to provide against a vacancy in the Danish throne, and has no reference whatever to the case of an aggression upon Denmark. Neither in the Protocol of London of 1850, or the Protocol of Warsaw of 1851, by which the treaty was prepared, nor in the treaty which was based upon them, can you find a word enfeebling or altering our previous engagements to the Danish monarchy. The Treaty of London cannot supersede a former guarantee, because no guarantee is found in it. It cannot annul a former guarantee, because it never mentions or alludes to one. On this essential point I refer with confidence to the noble Lord the President of the Council, who, in 1852, at the Foreign Office, must have studied the preliminaries; to the noble Lord the Postmaster General, who, as Under Secretary in 1851, enjoyed the same advantage; to the noble Earl over the way (Lord Malmesbury), who signed the treaty for Great Britain; to my noble Friend who has lately represented us at Copenhagen, and who, from that and other circumstances, is more familiar, perhaps, than any other man with the provisions of the treaty. So far from cancelling the former guarantees, it strengthens and establishes them by pointing out the 552 object they aspire to, and the consideration which defends them. The Treaty of London declares, in the name of all the States subscribing to it, that the balance of power requires the integrity of Denmark. It is well known that the integrity of Denmark cannot outlive the loss of Schleswig, and that the monarchy could never be upheld if the two lines of the Eider and the Dannewerke were taken from it. The Treaty of London, therefore, without impugning former guarantees of Schleswig, explains their scope, and thus increases their authority.

My Lords, the treaties which contain the guarantee of Schleswig by Great Britain are easy to explain, and it requires no research or industry to state them. They are only three in number. They are all recited in the well-known work of Dr. Twiss upon the Danish Question, which must be known to every statesman and diplomatist. And this learned and impartial master of public law, after thoroughly elucidating and discussing them, has acknowledged in the fullest way their obligation and validity. The first treaty which undertakes to guarantee Schleswig to Denmark, on the part of Great Britain, is that of Gottorp, June 26, 1715. The guarantee is renewed in a better known and more memorable instrument—namely, the Convention between Great Britain and Denmark, of July 26, 1720. It is afterwards repeated in the Treaty of Copenhagen, between France, Denmark, and Great Britain, on the 16th April, 1727; when the two Western Powers unite in guaranteeing the perpetual and peaceable possession of the Duchy to the King of Denmark. My Lords, I should feel bound to cite the language of these documents, or at least to give the House a more exact impression of their substance, were it not possible to spare your Lordships the fatigue, without injustice to the object which engages me. The House has only to accompany me from the beginning of the last century, to a period we all of us remember, in order to convince itself that these instruments are binding on the faith and honour of the country. In 1848, when Prussia had invaded Denmark on pretences as weak as those which now support the recklessness of Germany, the subject was debated in the House of Commons under the auspices of Mr. Disraeli and Lord Palmerston. Mr. Disraeli, on the 19th April, came down to that House, and, speaking for the great party with which he acted then, and acts at pre- 553 sent, brought on a Motion upon Denmark. After doing justice to the liberal concessions of the Danish King, and denouncing the invasion of which Denmark was the object, Mr. Disraeli dwelt upon the guarantee of Schleswig as the very basis of our system towards that country. Lord Palmerston replied, and endorsed the guarantee with equal frankness and decision. Not a breath of difference stirred the House of Commons after the Opposition and the Government had so conspicuously declared themselves. The noble Lord the Foreign Secretary, who was then First Minister, gave a silent acquiescence. Responsible, however, as he was for what had fallen from Lord Palmerston, of him it may be truly said, dum tacuit clamavit. The late Sir Robert Peel and his supporters, at that time an active and independent party in the Legislature, rather wont to have opinions of their own on points of foreign policy, did not intimate dissent from the grave position as regards the duty of Great Britain they had listened to. The followers of Mr. Hume, habitually averse to guarantees and the expenditure which may occasionally flow from them, never even whispered hesitation. Into these four parties the House of Commons was divided. But, will the House permit me to add another circumstance which renders even more expressive the unanimity adverted to, as regards the guarantee of Schleswig by Great Britain. Chevalier Bunsen, the Prussian envoy, had just done his utmost to attack and undermine it. Renouncing all the forms of diplomatic etiquette, he had just addressed a memorandum to the Foreign Office, and also to the Members of the House of Commons, in which the German claims on Denmark were laboriously stated, and no effort spared to show that the guarantee of Schleswig did not any longer bind us. And yet, in spite of all the heavy ordnance just discharged upon them, the House of Commons was united and immovable. My Lords, these facts are so remarkable, that they ought not to rest on Parliamentary assertion which may be colored or inaccurate. The House may fairly ask, what really passed on that occasion, what kind of language was employed upon the guarantee of Schleswig by Great Britain? These, then, were the words of Mr. Disraeli, republished in a pamphlet which contains his speech and that of Lord Palmerston together— Now, by the treaty still in force, England has 554 guaranteed this Duchy of Schleswig, its peaceable and complete enjoyment, to the King of Denmark. It is of great importance that we should clearly understand the nature of that engagement. I have been told by some persons that the treaty is of very remote date. This is certainly a most extraordinary observation. The date, in point of fact, is no more remote than the accession of the present family to the throne, and it binds the successors and heirs of the King who ratified it. We have not even a revolution or a change of dynasty intervening in the period; and, if there are any treaties which ought to bind us, I think I shall be able to show the House that this is one of that character. My Lords, I have cited Mr. Disraeli, to illustrate the concurrence of opinion at the time. What was the language of the noble Lord (Lord Palmerston) who followed him? He said— The hon. Gentleman, no doubt, has exercised a very proper discretion in calling the attention of the House and of the country to the engagements we have entered into with regard to the Duchy of Schleswig. I have here the original treaty, by which the guarantee is given; but the hon. Gentleman has read the words so fully and correctly that it will not be necessary for me to trouble the House with a recapitulation. The hon. Gentleman is perfectly correct in saying that the guarantee, which was given by this country to Denmark, was also given on the same occasion by the Government of France. But what are the words which Mr. Disraeli had given so fully and correctly? I should have read the passage sooner. After replying fully to the memorandum of Chevalier Bunsen, Mr. Disraeli quotes them from the treaty— The King of Great Britain, for his heirs and successors, agrees and binds himself to guarantee and maintain, in a continual and peaceable possession, that part of the Duchy of Schleswig which His Danish Majesty has in his hands; and to defend it, in the best manner possible, against all and everyone who may endeavour to disturb it, directly or indirectly. Such, in 1848, was the opinion of all parties on a guarantee which since that time has never been invalidated. Such was the opinion of the Minister who then directed foreign policy, and now presides over the Cabinet. It may be thought, however—few would venture to surmise it—that he yielded inadvertently and suddenly, the point on which the leader of the Opposition had insisted, and that his language did not fully indicate the resolution and the judgment of the Cabinet. I will therefore bring under the notice of your Lordships the resolution and the judgment of the Cabinet before Parliament had acted on them, and before the Opposition had pronounced itself. I have here the copy of a despatch from Lord Westmoreland, our represen- 555 tative at Berlin, to the Foreign Minister of Prussia, of which the substance is conclusive. Instructed by the Cabinet in London, Lord Westmoreland expressed their deep concern at hearing that Prussian troops had entered Schleswig, or were about to do so. Instructed by the Cabinet, he intimated their lively hope that the design may be abandoned, if not executed—and that the troops may be withdrawn if they are now beyond the frontier of the Duchy. Instructed by the Cabinet, he sends a copy of the guarantee of 1720 to the Minister of Prussia, as the wand which ought to check the Prussian army in its enterprize. The despatch is dated April 18, 1848. And the instruction must have issued before Parliament had lent its impulse to the Government.

No question will be, therefore, raised as to the force of the guarantee in 1848, either by the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs or by the First Minister, who at that time insisted on it in a manner so remarkable. And I have proved to-day, that since 1848 nothing has disturbed it. Has it been forfeited by Denmark? No doubt a guarantee of this sort may be forfeited by the Power which enjoyed it if it engages in aggression, or provokes a war against itself, or declines a salutary course the guaranteeing Power urges on it. To none of these reproaches Denmark is obnoxious. It is said, indeed, that she has not fulfilled her engagements of 1851 to Germany. In reply to such an allegation volumes might be written. The celebrated work of Mr. Gosch, an attaché of the Danish Embassy in London, has gone at length into the question. But no man, even refusing to concur with Mr. Gosch, can do less than admit the argument to be a balanced one. And if it is, would Great Britain be entitled to decide in favour of the party which had every motive to attack, and against the party which had every motive to be just and to conciliate? The reason of the case forbids such a conclusion, although a desire to escape the guarantee may unfortunately prompt it. What is the wrong which Denmark has committed against the counsel of Great Britain? Once only has a British counsel been rejected by her. The counsel of the noble Lord in the well-known despatch of September 24, 1862, to subject her legislation to four co-ordinate assemblies, was undoubtedly rejected by the Government of Denmark, as inconsistent with the safety of the kingdom. 556 But that counsel never found an advocate in Parliament or out of it; and no one more decidedly condemned it in this House than my noble Friend the former Under Secretary, who has lately been our representative at Copenhagen. Who would venture to assert that Denmark forfeited the guarantee when she declined to execute the project I refer to. On every other point, in deference to British views, concession has been heaped upon concession. It is therefore certain that the guarantee exists in its original integrity.

By what line of action can we satisfy it? My Lords, I will not presume to hazard an opinion on that question, but will remark, with the permission of the House, that an armistice alone—at which we seem to aim —will not fulfil our engagement, unless Schleswig is restored by it to Denmark. In 1848 you had an armistice; but two years elapsed before peace was made, and a longer time before Denmark was evacuated. The settlement which came at last, imperfect as it was, and as events have proved it, arose from certain agencies and forces we cannot count upon at present. At that time, Russia, guided by the Czar Nicholas, embarked in a crusade against the revolutionary movement of which the war against Denmark was regarded as an offshoot. The policy of Russia was to overrule the German enterprize in Denmark. It is not so at present; and if it was, the Polish insurrection would effectually neutralize it, by giving Germany retaliatory weapons against Russia she was not formerly possessed of.

Another force which tended greatly to a settlement in 1850 was, the violent antagonism which sprung up between Austria and Prussia after the great events of 1848, which nearly lighted up a war between the whole of northern and the whole of southern Germany, and was only just kept under at the Conference of Olmutz. So Denmark got rid of her aggressor. But now, the same division of the German Powers cannot be relied on. What force have we to look to, to put an end to this unhappy complication? The united and material exertions of Sweden, Denmark, and Great Britain might suffice. But who expects to see them? The French alliance is the only agency remaining. But the man would be a sanguine, or even an unreflecting one, who expected that alliance while the Emperor remains upon the throne, and the noble Lord presides over the Foreign Office, to recover the solidity with- 557 out which it would in vain aspire to restore integrity to Denmark.

But if it is not easy to point out any manner of fulfilling our unquestioned guarantee, it is important to refer to the lines of action it prohibits, and towards which we might be drawn if it did not bind us. It would obviously be violated if Schleswig became like Holstein, a part of the Confederation. And even this has been demanded. It would be violated if Schleswig was parcelled out into allotments between Germany and Denmark. And this has been suggested. The guarantee would not permit us to subscribe to a fusion of the two Duchies, according to the fabulous hypothesis, which Germany has so long employed as a fulcrum of attack, or rather as an instrument of torture. It would not permit us to subscribe to an arrangement which gave Germany the right to interfere or dictate on the northern boundary of the Eider. The guarantee would not have been observed if Kiel became a German harbour, or Rendsburgh a German fortress; because, in neither of these cases would Denmark have the peaceable possession of Schleswig we have undertaken to secure for her. All these propositions may be mooted; and into any of them, the too great desire of tranquillity might drag a Minister, by whom the guarantee had been forgotten.

My Lords, imperfectly as I have touched upon the question, these points, at least, will be admitted—namely, that, in 1720, Great Britain guaranteed Schleswig to the monarchy of Denmark; that so far from the guarantee having expired in 1848, all parties in the State at that time conspired to recognize its vigour; that the Government of the day, which, as regards foreign policy, is the Government of our day, of their own resolve insisted on its cogency through the Ambassador at Berlin; that the Treaty of 1852 has done something to confirm and nothing to invalidate it; and that the Danish Government have not adopted any step by which they lose their title to its benefit. The policy it indicates I have not ventured to describe, adverting only to the lines of action it forbids Great Britain to subscribe to. One fact ought not to have been passed over—the solemnity with which George I., on the "word of a King," engaged his faith, and that of all his heirs and successors, to its observance. It is not easy to deny, that its observance, beyond the balance of power, the reputation of the country, and the ge- 558 neral authority of treaties, concerns, and vitally, the honour of the dynasty we cherish. A few nights ago, we heard the expression of an animated hope that that dynasty might long outlive the masses who look up to it at present, and stand among the Nati natorum, et qui nascentur ab illis. To such a hope, the people of the country might add a further aspiration: —that it may always reign without a blemish on its glory, and that its faith to guarantees may never be impeached in the remotest age to which its destiny advances it.