Lords Sitting of 15 February 1864

PRIVATE BILLS.
Ordered, That this House will not receive any Petition for a Private Bill after Tuesday, the 22 nd Day of March next, unless such Private Bill shall have been approved by the Court of Chancery; nor any Petition for a Private Bill approved by the Court of Chancery after Thursday, the 12 th Day of May next.
Ordered, That this House will not receive any Report from the Judges, upon Petitions presented to this House for Private Bills, after Thursday, the 12th Day of May next.
Ordered, That the said Orders be printed and published, and affixed on the Doors of this House and Westminster Hall. (No. 8.)

RAILWAY SCHEMES (METROPOLIS).
Reports of the Select Committee of last Session on Metropolitan Railway Communication, referred to the Select Committee on.
UNITED STATES. — CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. —QUESTION.

  EXPLANATION.
  EARL RUSSELL: My Lords, the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) put some questions to me the other evening to which I was not at the time prepared to give an answer. He referred to certain despatches and notes of Mr. Adams, and expressed an opinion that the conduct of Her Majesty's Government had been influenced by those communications. I have since been looking to the dates in relation to the course I had taken in the matter, and I find that so far from the conduct of Her Majesty's Government having been influenced by the notes of Mr. Adams of the 4th or 5th of

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  September, which did not reach me until a day or two later, I find that on the 3rd of September the decision was taken to detain and prevent the departure of the ironclad rams from Birkenhead. On that day Mr. Layard wrote to the Treasury desiring that they should be stopped. On referring to private letters of my own, I find that I wrote from Scotland to Lord Palmerston on the 3rd of September—
  "The conduct of the gentlemen who have contracted for the ironclads at Birkenhead is so very suspicious that I have thought it necessary to direct that they should be detained."
  And on the 4th September I wrote to the noble Lord—
  "The pressing matter, however, is that of the ironclad rams. I have desired they should not be allowed to leave the port of Liverpool."
  It is therefore impossible that the course then pursued could be influenced by letters written by Mr. Adams on the 4th and subsequent days. Some reference has been made to the Correspondence presented to the Congress of the United States with reference to the language Mr. Adams was instructed to use in reference to these vessels. Now, with regard to the language used in the correspondence between Mr. Adams and myself, I do not mean to say that if the language had been more intemperate I should at all have desisted from the course which I took. As soon as I had come to the conviction that the ironclads were intended for the Confederates, it appeared to me my duty to take steps to detain them until we could obtain full evidence of their destination. I am quite of the opinion of Mr. Canning, that whatever we do we ought not to sneak into a war; and I thought it my duty to detain the ironclads, believing that they were intended to depart from this country for the purpose of carrying on war against the Federal States. The noble Earl (the Earl of Derby) went much into the question as to what it was my duty to represent to the United States' Government; and although he has not directly charged me, he has insinuated that I failed to take due notice of Mr. Adams's language. In answer to that I beg leave to read some extracts from the papers presented to Congress, which will show the tone of the correspondence. Referring to his letter of the 16th of September, I said to Mr. Adams on the 25th of September—
  "I can assure you that I am not less anxious than yourself that the duties of neutrality should be performed strictly and impartially by the Government of Great Britain. There are, however, passages in your letter of the 16th, as well as in
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  some of your former ones, which so plainly and repeatedly imply an intimation of hostile proceeding towards Great Britain on the part of the Government of the United States, unless steps are taken by Her Majesty's Government which the law does not authorize, or unless the law, which you consider as insufficient, is altered, that I deem it incumbent on me, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, frankly to state to you that Her Majesty's Government will not be induced by any such consideration either to overstep the limits of the law, or to propose to Parliament any new law which they may not, for reasons of their own, think proper to be adopted. They will not shrink from any consequences of such a decision."—Correspondence, No. 5, p. 24.
  That was the language which the noble Earl must have read in the papers laid before Congress, but, having access to those Papers, he did not think fit to quote it. Anxious as he was to know what language was used by me after the notes of the 4th or 5th of September, he never reverted to the despatch which I have now read. In return I got a letter from Mr. Adams in the following language:—
  "Legation of the United States, London,
  "Sept. 29, 1863.
  "My Lord,—I have the honour to acknowledge the reception of your note of the 25th inst. I shall take pleasure in transmitting a copy to my Government. I must pray your Lordship's pardon if I confess myself at a loss to perceive what portions of my late correspondence could justify the implications to which you refer. So far from intimating 'hostile proceedings towards Great Britain, unless the law, which I consider as insufficient, is altered,' the burden of my argument was to urge a reliance upon the law as sufficient, as well from the past experience of the United States as from the confidence expressed in it by the most eminent authority in the kingdom. Neither do I feel any ground for the other implication. It is very true that I have deeply regretted the supposition that Her Majesty's Government should admit itself powerless to execute any of those obligations which are recognized by the consent of civilized nations as well as the faith of treaties to be binding equally upon all; and I have taken the liberty to point out the consequences which follow that inability, in the absolute necessity imposed upon an aggrieved party to defend itself from the worst of injuries. This is the principle which I have been directed to maintain not from any idea of presenting any form of condition whatever to Her Majesty's Government" but from a confident expectation that an address to its sense of right may avail to gain for the United States exactly the same measure of justice which it would expect from that country in return were the respective situations reversed. If in any respect I have appeared to transgress the line of argument here laid down, I pray your Lordship to consider the fault as one not of intention on my part, and not at all belonging to my Government. In transmitting your Lordship's note, without further comment, I shall hope to be able to submit the question in what degree its sentiments may have been in any particular misinterpreted by me. I trust that it is unnecessary for me to

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  make any assurances to your Lordship of the earnestness with which I have ever striven to maintain to the utmost of my power the relations of amity and goodwill between the two countries.
  "I pray your Lordship, &c.
  Correspondence, No. 5, p. 25.
  "C. F. ADAMS."
  I will not quote any more, but there was afterwards a despatch from Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams expressing a hope that the relations of the two Governments might be carried on with goodwill on both sides without any misinterpretation of each other's intentions. I consider, therefore, that if there had been any intimation of a threat, that threat has been entirely withdrawn, and that the assurances given to us by the Government of the United States were that they wished to maintain the most friendly relations with us.
  THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, what has now fallen from the noble Earl only confirms me in the opinion I have already expressed in regard to the refusal of Her Majesty's Government to place before Parliament the Papers which have been already submitted to Congress, and thus compelling us to collect from scraps here and there what has been the course really pursued by Her Majesty's Government. The noble Earl might, I think, have vindicated himself, without charging me—very gratuitously, I think—with having studied those letters which he has read, and deliberately forborne to quote the language which lie had really used. The fact is, my Lords, I have never seen or read one word of the letters referred to by the noble Earl. I told your Lordships, I think the other evening, that I would read certain extracts from the Correspondence which had been laid before Congress, which had been published in an evening newspaper; and I also said, I had seen the whole of the Papers laid before Congress, in this country, because I had seen the volume. It is certainly true that I had seen the volume, but I had not read one word of it. Therefore, the charge made against me of having read and abstained from quoting language used by the noble Earl, is utterly inconsistent with the facts. I find now that the tone of the noble Earl's Correspondence, so far as the extract with which he has favoured us goes, is more becoming his position and more satisfactory than that which appears in the Papers laid before the House. But there is one point upon which I should wish to receive some little explanation from the noble Earl. The noble Earl states, referring to the dates, that it was on the 3rd of September became to the determination that the
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  ironclad rams should be stopped and should not be allowed to proceed to their intended destination. Now, I want to know, if that be the case, how it is that on the 4th a letter was written by the noble Earl, stating that the matter was still under the serious consideration of Her Majesty's Government; and that it was not until the 8th the decision was come to that they should be stopped. If the noble Earl had come to the determination to detain the ironclad vessels on the 3rd September, how was it that the noble Earl stated in his letter of the 4th that the matter was still under the serious consideration of Her Majesty's Government? There is another question I should like to ask the noble Earl—whether he had asked for any explanation from the United States' Government, why the despatch of Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams, which had never been submitted to the noble Earl, was laid before Congress without any intimation that it had not been transmitted to the noble Earl—whereby the American people have been led to believe that that letter had been presented to and received by the noble Earl, and that it had excited a considerable influence over the determination of our Government. That despatch, it appears, had exercised a considerable influence in the United States. Now, I would ask the noble Earl, whether he does not consider, since he has seen the publication of the whole Correspondence, that it is necessary for the honour of this country to ask for some explanation about a despatch which had never been delivered, but which, nevertheless, is made a portion of the diplomatic Correspondence laid before Congress?
  EARL RUSSELLHaving heard the noble Earl say that the Correspondence laid before Congress was contained in a bulky volume, I concluded, perhaps somewhat too hastily, that he had read it. If he did not, of course what I said on that point entirely falls to the ground, and must be withdrawn. As to the last question of the noble Earl, I think it more affects the conduct of the United States Government towards their own people than their conduct towards us. It is the habit—and the wise habit, I think—of Mr. Adams to weigh over the despatches which he receives, and to consider what it is his duty to do; and when they contain complaints, to consider how he can most effectually urge these complaints, and to endeavour to perform his duty in the most conciliatory spirit possible. I can only say that Mr.

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  Adams has pursued that course from the first. Almost the first time I saw him he told. me that he had several despatches couched in strong terms, but he did not think it discreet to read them to me, and he then went on to describe in his own language what the complaints of his Government were. So far as regards the conduct of Mr. Adams, I think it is calculated to maintain friendly relations between the two Governments. I certainly, at present, do not see the necessity for asking Lord Lyons to call Mr. Seward's attention to the presentation of this despatch to Congress. No doubt, a certain effect may have been produced in the United States by the publication of that despatch; hut that effect will, of course, be reversed when it is discovered that the despatch has never been presented.
  THE EARL OF DERBY: I beg to say, that I never for one single instant threw out the slightest imputation against Mr. Adams. On the contrary, I think that Mr. Adams has exercised a wise discretion, and that from the first he showed himself a friend to both countries in the course which he pursued. It is, therefore, quite unnecessary for the noble Earl to enter into any defence of Mr. Adams on the present occasion. The noble Earl quite surprised me by saying that, in regard to the despatch of the 11th, Mr. Adams had communicated to him the substance of it.
  EARL RUSSELL: No; what I said was, that it was Mr. Adams's habit, when there was any substantial grievance to complain of, to communicate to me his views of the despatch.
  THE EARL OF DERBY: Then how did it happen that, having come to the decision of stopping the ironclad rams on the 3rd September, you wrote upon the 4th that the matter was still under the serious consideration of Her Majesty's Government?
  EARL RUSSELL: The matter was still under correspondence at the time. Mr. Layard had written a letter to the Treasury, and the matter was under consideration still in the Treasury, and we had to wait for their answer. I being in Scotland at the time, my letter, I suppose, would not reach Mr. Adams until a day or two after. When the matter was under consideration between two Departments, we did not think it necessary to tell the parties that it was determined.
  THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEthought it would be of great advantage if some means could be devised for ex-
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  changing Parliamentary Papers with Foreign Legislatures. This had been done with France in former times. He would suggest to the Government to lay this American volume before Parliament, for, of course, Lord Lyons had communicated it to his Government. He communicated last year's volume, and it was laid in due course before Parliament.
  EARL GRANVILLEthought it would hardly be advisable for the Government to take upon themselves to lay before Parliament the blue-books, yellow-books, and other papers published by foreign Governments.

DENMARK. INTEGRITY OF DANISH MONARCHY. THE DUCHY OF SCHLESWIG.

  OBSERVATIONS.
  LORD CAMPBELL: My Lords, If an apology is needed for calling the attention of the House to the Treaties and Conventions in which the Duchy of Schleswig is guaranteed to Denmark by Great Britain, it may be found in the silence with regard to them, which has hitherto prevailed in both Houses of Parliament since the beginning of the Session. They affect so clearly and indisputably the obligations and position of the country, that I am more inclined to reproach myself for not having adverted to them in the debate on the Address, than I am for now attempting to submit them to your Lordships. At that time it did not seem to me improbable that my noble Friend, who has lately been at Copenhagen (Lord Wodehouse), might have entered on the subject, and anticipated all I had to offer as regards them. It will not, I trust, be thought that this notice is in any way designed to precipitate discussion on the conduct of the Government in the Danish question, which cannot properly begin until the papers are before us. The engagements of the country, and the merits or demerits of the course which Ministers have followed, will hardly be confounded by your Lordships. To refer to those engagements if forgotten, is most essential at this moment. It tends directly to obtain the armistice our policy is seeking. If it is thought that Great Britain is at liberty to abandon Schleswig, overrun and occupied by Germany, to a foreign grasp, that grasp, no doubt, will be tenacious. If it is seen that Great Britain is bound by ancient and surviving treaties to maintain Schleswig in the Danish monarchy, that grasp will most

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  probably be loosened. In that view, not another day and not another hour ought to elapse, before these treaties are again impressed upon the memory of Parliament. And had they been distinctly blazoned before the Session opened, and before the war began, they might, perhaps, have done something to avert the wrongs and the disasters of which, in the last few days, Great Britain has been the startled and indignant, but at the same time, the baffled, humiliated, and incapable observer.
  My Lords, before proceeding to refer to the instruments which contain the guarantee itself, it is essential to insist upon this point—namely, that the Treaty of London of 1852, of which we have heard so much, in no way disturbs or supersedes them. It would be quite useless to advert to them, while noble Lords were under a vague and undefined impression that the Treaty of London reproduces or annuls all previous engagements between Denmark and Great Britain. The prevailing disposition to overlook the guarantee, which, as I shall show the House, a few years ago was universally acknowledged, must, in the want of any other cause, be traced to an impression of that character. But the Treaty of London is exclusively directed to provide against a vacancy in the Danish throne, and has no reference whatever to the case of an aggression upon Denmark. Neither in the Protocol of London of 1850, or the Protocol of Warsaw of 1851, by which the treaty was prepared, nor in the treaty which was based upon them, can you find a word enfeebling or altering our previous engagements to the Danish monarchy. The Treaty of London cannot supersede a former guarantee, because no guarantee is found in it. It cannot annul a former guarantee, because it never mentions or alludes to one. On this essential point I refer with confidence to the noble Lord the President of the Council, who, in 1852, at the Foreign Office, must have studied the preliminaries; to the noble Lord the Postmaster General, who, as Under Secretary in 1851, enjoyed the same advantage; to the noble Earl over the way (Lord Malmesbury), who signed the treaty for Great Britain; to my noble Friend who has lately represented us at Copenhagen, and who, from that and other circumstances, is more familiar, perhaps, than any other man with the provisions of the treaty. So far from cancelling the former guarantees, it strengthens and establishes them by pointing out the
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  object they aspire to, and the consideration which defends them. The Treaty of London declares, in the name of all the States subscribing to it, that the balance of power requires the integrity of Denmark. It is well known that the integrity of Denmark cannot outlive the loss of Schleswig, and that the monarchy could never be upheld if the two lines of the Eider and the Dannewerke were taken from it. The Treaty of London, therefore, without impugning former guarantees of Schleswig, explains their scope, and thus increases their authority.
  My Lords, the treaties which contain the guarantee of Schleswig by Great Britain are easy to explain, and it requires no research or industry to state them. They are only three in number. They are all recited in the well-known work of Dr. Twiss upon the Danish Question, which must be known to every statesman and diplomatist. And this learned and impartial master of public law, after thoroughly elucidating and discussing them, has acknowledged in the fullest way their obligation and validity. The first treaty which undertakes to guarantee Schleswig to Denmark, on the part of Great Britain, is that of Gottorp, June 26, 1715. The guarantee is renewed in a better known and more memorable instrument—namely, the Convention between Great Britain and Denmark, of July 26, 1720. It is afterwards repeated in the Treaty of Copenhagen, between France, Denmark, and Great Britain, on the 16th April, 1727; when the two Western Powers unite in guaranteeing the perpetual and peaceable possession of the Duchy to the King of Denmark. My Lords, I should feel bound to cite the language of these documents, or at least to give the House a more exact impression of their substance, were it not possible to spare your Lordships the fatigue, without injustice to the object which engages me. The House has only to accompany me from the beginning of the last century, to a period we all of us remember, in order to convince itself that these instruments are binding on the faith and honour of the country. In 1848, when Prussia had invaded Denmark on pretences as weak as those which now support the recklessness of Germany, the subject was debated in the House of Commons under the auspices of Mr. Disraeli and Lord Palmerston. Mr. Disraeli, on the 19th April, came down to that House, and, speaking for the great party with which he acted then, and acts at pre-

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  sent, brought on a Motion upon Denmark. After doing justice to the liberal concessions of the Danish King, and denouncing the invasion of which Denmark was the object, Mr. Disraeli dwelt upon the guarantee of Schleswig as the very basis of our system towards that country. Lord Palmerston replied, and endorsed the guarantee with equal frankness and decision. Not a breath of difference stirred the House of Commons after the Opposition and the Government had so conspicuously declared themselves. The noble Lord the Foreign Secretary, who was then First Minister, gave a silent acquiescence. Responsible, however, as he was for what had fallen from Lord Palmerston, of him it may be truly said, dum tacuit clamavit. The late Sir Robert Peel and his supporters, at that time an active and independent party in the Legislature, rather wont to have opinions of their own on points of foreign policy, did not intimate dissent from the grave position as regards the duty of Great Britain they had listened to. The followers of Mr. Hume, habitually averse to guarantees and the expenditure which may occasionally flow from them, never even whispered hesitation. Into these four parties the House of Commons was divided. But, will the House permit me to add another circumstance which renders even more expressive the unanimity adverted to, as regards the guarantee of Schleswig by Great Britain. Chevalier Bunsen, the Prussian envoy, had just done his utmost to attack and undermine it. Renouncing all the forms of diplomatic etiquette, he had just addressed a memorandum to the Foreign Office, and also to the Members of the House of Commons, in which the German claims on Denmark were laboriously stated, and no effort spared to show that the guarantee of Schleswig did not any longer bind us. And yet, in spite of all the heavy ordnance just discharged upon them, the House of Commons was united and immovable. My Lords, these facts are so remarkable, that they ought not to rest on Parliamentary assertion which may be colored or inaccurate. The House may fairly ask, what really passed on that occasion, what kind of language was employed upon the guarantee of Schleswig by Great Britain? These, then, were the words of Mr. Disraeli, republished in a pamphlet which contains his speech and that of Lord Palmerston together—
  "Now, by the treaty still in force, England has
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  guaranteed this Duchy of Schleswig, its peaceable and complete enjoyment, to the King of Denmark. It is of great importance that we should clearly understand the nature of that engagement. I have been told by some persons that the treaty is of very remote date. This is certainly a most extraordinary observation. The date, in point of fact, is no more remote than the accession of the present family to the throne, and it binds the successors and heirs of the King who ratified it. We have not even a revolution or a change of dynasty intervening in the period; and, if there are any treaties which ought to bind us, I think I shall be able to show the House that this is one of that character."
  My Lords, I have cited Mr. Disraeli, to illustrate the concurrence of opinion at the time. What was the language of the noble Lord (Lord Palmerston) who followed him? He said—
  "The hon. Gentleman, no doubt, has exercised a very proper discretion in calling the attention of the House and of the country to the engagements we have entered into with regard to the Duchy of Schleswig. I have here the original treaty, by which the guarantee is given; but the hon. Gentleman has read the words so fully and correctly that it will not be necessary for me to trouble the House with a recapitulation. The hon. Gentleman is perfectly correct in saying that the guarantee, which was given by this country to Denmark, was also given on the same occasion by the Government of France."
  But what are the words which Mr. Disraeli had given so fully and correctly? I should have read the passage sooner. After replying fully to the memorandum of Chevalier Bunsen, Mr. Disraeli quotes them from the treaty—
  "The King of Great Britain, for his heirs and successors, agrees and binds himself to guarantee and maintain, in a continual and peaceable possession, that part of the Duchy of Schleswig which His Danish Majesty has in his hands; and to defend it, in the best manner possible, against all and everyone who may endeavour to disturb it, directly or indirectly."
  Such, in 1848, was the opinion of all parties on a guarantee which since that time has never been invalidated. Such was the opinion of the Minister who then directed foreign policy, and now presides over the Cabinet. It may be thought, however—few would venture to surmise it—that he yielded inadvertently and suddenly, the point on which the leader of the Opposition had insisted, and that his language did not fully indicate the resolution and the judgment of the Cabinet. I will therefore bring under the notice of your Lordships the resolution and the judgment of the Cabinet before Parliament had acted on them, and before the Opposition had pronounced itself. I have here the copy of a despatch from Lord Westmoreland, our represen-

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  tative at Berlin, to the Foreign Minister of Prussia, of which the substance is conclusive. Instructed by the Cabinet in London, Lord Westmoreland expressed their deep concern at hearing that Prussian troops had entered Schleswig, or were about to do so. Instructed by the Cabinet, he intimated their lively hope that the design may be abandoned, if not executed—and that the troops may be withdrawn if they are now beyond the frontier of the Duchy. Instructed by the Cabinet, he sends a copy of the guarantee of 1720 to the Minister of Prussia, as the wand which ought to check the Prussian army in its enterprize. The despatch is dated April 18, 1848. And the instruction must have issued before Parliament had lent its impulse to the Government.
  No question will be, therefore, raised as to the force of the guarantee in 1848, either by the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs or by the First Minister, who at that time insisted on it in a manner so remarkable. And I have proved to-day, that since 1848 nothing has disturbed it. Has it been forfeited by Denmark? No doubt a guarantee of this sort may be forfeited by the Power which enjoyed it if it engages in aggression, or provokes a war against itself, or declines a salutary course the guaranteeing Power urges on it. To none of these reproaches Denmark is obnoxious. It is said, indeed, that she has not fulfilled her engagements of 1851 to Germany. In reply to such an allegation volumes might be written. The celebrated work of Mr. Gosch, an attaché of the Danish Embassy in London, has gone at length into the question. But no man, even refusing to concur with Mr. Gosch, can do less than admit the argument to be a balanced one. And if it is, would Great Britain be entitled to decide in favour of the party which had every motive to attack, and against the party which had every motive to be just and to conciliate? The reason of the case forbids such a conclusion, although a desire to escape the guarantee may unfortunately prompt it. What is the wrong which Denmark has committed against the counsel of Great Britain? Once only has a British counsel been rejected by her. The counsel of the noble Lord in the well-known despatch of September 24, 1862, to subject her legislation to four co-ordinate assemblies, was undoubtedly rejected by the Government of Denmark, as inconsistent with the safety of the kingdom.
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  But that counsel never found an advocate in Parliament or out of it; and no one more decidedly condemned it in this House than my noble Friend the former Under Secretary, who has lately been our representative at Copenhagen. Who would venture to assert that Denmark forfeited the guarantee when she declined to execute the project I refer to. On every other point, in deference to British views, concession has been heaped upon concession. It is therefore certain that the guarantee exists in its original integrity.
  By what line of action can we satisfy it? My Lords, I will not presume to hazard an opinion on that question, but will remark, with the permission of the House, that an armistice alone—at which we seem to aim —will not fulfil our engagement, unless Schleswig is restored by it to Denmark. In 1848 you had an armistice; but two years elapsed before peace was made, and a longer time before Denmark was evacuated. The settlement which came at last, imperfect as it was, and as events have proved it, arose from certain agencies and forces we cannot count upon at present. At that time, Russia, guided by the Czar Nicholas, embarked in a crusade against the revolutionary movement of which the war against Denmark was regarded as an offshoot. The policy of Russia was to overrule the German enterprize in Denmark. It is not so at present; and if it was, the Polish insurrection would effectually neutralize it, by giving Germany retaliatory weapons against Russia she was not formerly possessed of.
  Another force which tended greatly to a settlement in 1850 was, the violent antagonism which sprung up between Austria and Prussia after the great events of 1848, which nearly lighted up a war between the whole of northern and the whole of southern Germany, and was only just kept under at the Conference of Olmutz. So Denmark got rid of her aggressor. But now, the same division of the German Powers cannot be relied on. What force have we to look to, to put an end to this unhappy complication? The united and material exertions of Sweden, Denmark, and Great Britain might suffice. But who expects to see them? The French alliance is the only agency remaining. But the man would be a sanguine, or even an unreflecting one, who expected that alliance while the Emperor remains upon the throne, and the noble Lord presides over the Foreign Office, to recover the solidity with-

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  out which it would in vain aspire to restore integrity to Denmark.
  But if it is not easy to point out any manner of fulfilling our unquestioned guarantee, it is important to refer to the lines of action it prohibits, and towards which we might be drawn if it did not bind us. It would obviously be violated if Schleswig became like Holstein, a part of the Confederation. And even this has been demanded. It would be violated if Schleswig was parcelled out into allotments between Germany and Denmark. And this has been suggested. The guarantee would not permit us to subscribe to a fusion of the two Duchies, according to the fabulous hypothesis, which Germany has so long employed as a fulcrum of attack, or rather as an instrument of torture. It would not permit us to subscribe to an arrangement which gave Germany the right to interfere or dictate on the northern boundary of the Eider. The guarantee would not have been observed if Kiel became a German harbour, or Rendsburgh a German fortress; because, in neither of these cases would Denmark have the peaceable possession of Schleswig we have undertaken to secure for her. All these propositions may be mooted; and into any of them, the too great desire of tranquillity might drag a Minister, by whom the guarantee had been forgotten.
  My Lords, imperfectly as I have touched upon the question, these points, at least, will be admitted—namely, that, in 1720, Great Britain guaranteed Schleswig to the monarchy of Denmark; that so far from the guarantee having expired in 1848, all parties in the State at that time conspired to recognize its vigour; that the Government of the day, which, as regards foreign policy, is the Government of our day, of their own resolve insisted on its cogency through the Ambassador at Berlin; that the Treaty of 1852 has done something to confirm and nothing to invalidate it; and that the Danish Government have not adopted any step by which they lose their title to its benefit. The policy it indicates I have not ventured to describe, adverting only to the lines of action it forbids Great Britain to subscribe to. One fact ought not to have been passed over—the solemnity with which George I., on the "word of a King," engaged his faith, and that of all his heirs and successors, to its observance. It is not easy to deny, that its observance, beyond the balance of power, the reputation of the country, and the ge-
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  neral authority of treaties, concerns, and vitally, the honour of the dynasty we cherish. A few nights ago, we heard the expression of an animated hope that that dynasty might long outlive the masses who look up to it at present, and stand among the Nati natorum, et qui nascentur ab illis. To such a hope, the people of the country might add a further aspiration: —that it may always reign without a blemish on its glory, and that its faith to guarantees may never be impeached in the remotest age to which its destiny advances it.
  EARL RUSSELL: My Lords, I think my noble Friend is entirely justified, having the opinion he has expressed with regard to the guarantee given to Denmark in 1720, in bringing this question under the consideration of your Lordships; and undoubtedly it is one which Her Majesty's Government cannot lose sight of in any negotiations that may take place. But I own I cannot think it desirable, for my part or on the part of your Lordships, that we should now, when there is no immediate question before the House, enter into a discussion as to the engagements between this country and Denmark. There is a general question with regard to any treaty of guarantee of this kind. It is necessary to examine under what circumstances it was made—whether certain views of policy that determined it did not likewise limit its scope. It is necessary to examine what war occurred afterwards between the Power giving the guarantee and the Power to whom the guarantee was given. It is necessary to examine whether the treaty of peace that afterwards occurred confirmed or did not confirm the original guarantee. I think that any Government of this country would be very rash to give a positive opinion on these questions without a thorough examination. That examination Her Majesty's Government have begun. The matter has been already deliberated upon and discussed; but I cannot say that we have arrived at such conclusions on the various points I have mentioned, as to induce me to say at this moment what is the final decision of the Government on the subject. There is one thing, however, perfectly clear,—that the consideration of the Treaty of 1720 must have an influence on any transaction in which we may engage with Foreign Powers on the subject. Now, with regard to 1848, my noble Friend very properly and truly alluded to the despatch which was sent to Berlin, and the discus-

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  sions which took place in the House of Commons; but it is a remarkable thing— no less remarkable than creditable to the Government of that day—that they did not immediately declare to Prussia that England was prepared to carry into effect that guarantee by force if it was at all infringed by the Prussian Government. On the contrary, the Prussian Minister said that there was no question of the guarantee, because there was no intention of the Prussian Government to infringe it. At a subsequent period Lord Palmerston was referred to, and he said—
  "Great Britain has now undertaken the office of a mediator; it would be inconsistent with the office of a mediator to be asserting the cause of one party against the other, and therefore I will not at the present moment enter into the question of guarantee."
  Looking at the present position of things, we find that that position, while extremely complicated, is evidently very different as regards some of the Powers of Germany, and as regards the Powers of Austria and Prussia, who are now making war on the Duchies of Denmark. Some of the Powers of Germany, Bavaria more especially, have not hesitated to declare that they consider the Prince of Augustenburg is entitled to be acknowledged as Duke of Holstein, and also as Duke of Schleswig; and it might follow from that that they will endeavour to put him in possession of the Duchy of Schleswig. Now, if that attempt were made to put the Duke of Augustenburg in possession of the Duchy of Schleswig, then it would follow that England must declare whether or no she was bound by the Treaty of 1720; and, if so bound, it would be her duty to come to the support of Denmark in the Duchy of Schleswig. But the position of Austria and Prussia is very different. The communications we have received from Austria and Prussia, contained in the despatch of the 31st of January, which I have laid before this House, do not contemplate in any way the dismemberment of Denmark. On the contrary, they say that they go into Schleswig maintaining the principle of the integrity of Denmark, and that the very cause of their entrance into Schleswig is to obtain the fulfilment of the obligations which the King of Denmark has taken as Duke of Schleswig, and has taken in no other capacity. Unless he were the Duke of Schleswig, they could have no claim to ask from him the fulfilment of the engagements of his predecessor. Well, I must say, in that
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  position of affairs—a most complicated and difficult position of affairs—with the war still raging, but with the declaration of those Powers that they go to Schleswig to take it as a material guarantee, I think it is most desirable to endeavour rather to settle all these questions by pacific means, than to resort at once to anything of the nature of a threat founded on the guarantee to which my noble Friend has alluded. Austria and Prussia are conscious—all the principal Powers of Europe must be conscious—that the Duchy of Schleswig and the Duchy of Holstein cannot be transferred to any other Power than the King of Denmark without a general concert and general consideration of the whole question among the European Powers. That, likewise, is contained in the letter to which I have alluded. These Powers admit, that if there is any change in the situation—if anything new is proposed—it should be a matter of concert and consideration. I quite admit that Her Majesty's Government must make up their minds, with the best light they can receive and the best advice they can obtain, as to the binding obligations of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1720. Still I say it is desirable, for the sake of the peace of Europe, that everything that can be done by conference and communication ought to be done, before any action is taken which might very soon assume an attitude of hostility between some of the great Powers of Europe. My noble Friend is perfectly aware that in 1727 a similar guarantee was given by France to Denmark of the Duchy of Schleswig. He is also aware that in 1767 and in 1773 communications were entered into, and finally a treaty of peace was signed between Russia and Denmark upon the same basis. It is not desirable to know what is the opinion of France—to know what is the opinion of Russia with regard to the effect of these engagements on them? These are matters intimately affecting the peace of Europe, as well as affecting the position of Great Britain. I must decline to give any positive opinion at this moment; but while I thank my noble Friend for having gone into this subject, I must repeat that I cannot declare any positive intention of Her Majesty's Government without further reflection.
  House adjourned at half past Six o'clock, till To-morrow, half past Ten o'clock.