Lords Sitting of 11 February 1864

UNITED STATES.
  THE AMERICAN CORRESPONDENCE.

    QUESTION.
    THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, seeing the noble Earl the Foreign Secretary in his place, I Wish to repeat a Question which I put to him on Tuesday last, and respecting which I would now ask the noble Earl to furnish me with more satisfactory information. In doing so I must ask your Lordships' indulgence while I make a few remarks in explanation of my reasons for putting it, which may, perhaps, induce him to reconsider the answer he then gave. The Question I then put to the noble Earl was, Whether he would lay on the table any Correspondence, not only with regard to the Alabama, but also as regards the complaints made by the United States of the injuries they had sustained, or apprehended, from other vessels which had left, or may leave, the ports of this kingdom? The noble Earl told me that as that Correspondence included the case of the steam rams seized in the Mersey, it would not be consistent with his duty to furnish it, inasmuch as that question was under judicial consideration. With all respect to the noble Earl, the question before the Courts is one in no degree to be affected by the production of this Correspondence. My Lords, I understand these rams were detained by order of the Government in the month of September last, that they were finally seized on the 27th of October; and that from that time to the present—or at any rate before the meeting of Parliament—no step was taken to bring the case before the Courts. But I am informed that on Saturday informations were filed—a step which I humbly conceive might have been taken in November or December at least; and even since those informations were filed, I am informed that Messrs. Laird have heard from the Treasury that it will be necessary now—four months after the seizure—to send a commission abroad for the purpose of taking evidence to be used in the proceedings. It is quite obvious, therefore, that if we are to have no information on this subject until the case has been brought to a conclusion, it is perfectly in the power of the Government to protract the proceedings, and we shall get no information at all. What I would urge upon the noble Earl
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    is, that the production of the Correspondence between the British Government and the Government of the United States, can have no effect on the case before the Courts; which is simply this,—Have the Messrs. Laird in building these vessels infringed the municipal law of England? I do not ask the noble Earl to produce any information bearing on the legal question which may prejudice his case when it appears before the Courts; but the question between him and the United States' Government is a totally different question. All that the United States have to do with it is this—have we fulfilled towards them as belligerents the duties of international law? Nothing can be more clear than this—that the utmost which any belligerent can claim under the international law is, that from a country with which it is at peace there shall not be sent armed vessels to commit hostilities against him. As far as I can learn, it is not asserted that armed vessels have been sent out from this country—armed for the purpose of committing hostilities against the United States. I quite admit to the noble Earl that the violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, and the non-execution of our municipal law in time of war, must be a very unfriendly act towards one of the belligerents. If the law is either repealed or not executed, for the purpose of giving advantage to one of the belligerents, it would be just as much an unfriendly act, just as much against the spirit of neutrality, as it would be to strengthen the existing law (which, by the way, has been proposed) for the purpose of making it more favourable to the other belligerents. Either of the two courses is in violation of the spirit of perfect neutrality, and liable to be considered as an unfriendly act. But how is it possible that the question whether we have or have not maintained the obligations of international law towards the United States can be affected by the question now pending in the Courts, whether Messrs. Laird have violated the enactments of our Foreign Enlistment Act—a municipal Act with which the United States have nothing to do? How can any complaint of the violation of international law be affected by this trial? I cannot admit, therefore, that the fact of the rams being before the Courts is a sufficient reason for the non-production of these papers. But, on the other hand, there are some strong grounds why we should have the papers before us at an early period, The noble Earl will

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    perhaps tell me that I cannot want this information, because I have the means of obtaining it at present:—that is to say, the whole of the papers which the noble Earl refuses to produce have been laid before the public—have been laid before Congress and sent over to this country. I have seen a very thick volume containing those papers, which is open to the world. However, I want to see not the American version of this Correspondence, but the English version. I want to see how far the charges made against Her Majesty's Government in connexion with this matter are substantiated, or whether they may not have been replied to by despatches of the noble Earl, showing that he has not sacrificed the honour of the country or violated international law. It was only by the merest accident the other evening, when commenting on Mr. Seward's despatch of the 11th of July, I obtained from the noble Earl the very gratifying information—information which I was very glad to receive—that the despatch in question had never formed any part of the Correspondence, and that it never was presented to the noble Earl. I think Mr. Adams took upon himself a grave responsibility—a very grave one it was—in not presenting it; and I think that in doing so he acted as a friend of peace and a friend of the good relations between the two countries. I think it required no small degree of moral courage to take the course he did, and that he did good service to both countries by withholding the despatch. But in the papers laid before Congress this despatch is included, as if it had been presented to the noble Earl, with no intimation, as I understand, that it had not been so presented. From the way in which it has been laid before Congress it would seem as if there was an intention to show the way in which the United States had menaced England, and the way in which England had received the threat. I do not know why Mr. Seward laid it before Congress unless to gain a favourable opinion from the party who are supposed to be in favour of strong measures against this country. I am, therefore, anxious that we should have the English version of this Correspondence in order that the noble Earl may be able to satisfy the country that, while showing his anxiety to preserve friendly relations between the two nations, he has at the same time failed to uphold the honour of England. And here I must observe that, in all the communications which
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    it was his duty to make to the noble Earl, Mr. Adams has acquitted himself with the strictest courtesy, and acted as well, under the circumstances, as it was possible to do. Now, my Lords, with respect to those steam rams, I venture to call attention to some communications which I have not seen in the Correspondence as officially published by the American Government, but which I have seen in papers as copied from that Correspondence. Before doing so I beg to correct a mistake into which I fell the other evening when I said that, in the subsequent correspondence, Mr. Adams referred to the despatch of the 11th of July, which the noble Earl says never was presented to him. The despatch which I alluded to was not Mr. Seward's despatch of the 11th of July, but one addressed by Mr. Adams himself on that date to the noble Earl. The similarity of the dates misled me. On the 1st of September the noble Earl, writing to Mr. Adams, says—
    "In the first place, Her Majesty's Government are advised that the information contained in the depositions is, in a great measure, mere hearsay evidence, and generally that it is not such as to show the intent or purpose necessary to make the building or fitting out of these vessels illegal under the Foreign Enlistment Act."
    He then goes on to say—
    "Whatever suspicion may be entertained by the United States' Consul at Liverpool as to the ultimate destination of these vessels, the fact remains that Mr. Bravay, a French merchant residing at Paris, who is represented to be the person upon whose orders these ships have been built, has personally appeared, and has acted in that character at Liverpool. There is no legal evidence against Mr. Bravay's claim, nor anything to affect him with any illegal act or purpose; and the responsible agent of the Customs at Liverpool affirms his belief that these vessels have not been built for Confederates."—Correspondence, No. 4, p. 12.
    That was written on the 1st September. It so happens—I do not know how—that it did not reach Mr. Adams till the 5th; and on the 3rd of September, before he received this answer from the noble Earl, he wrote a letter to the noble Earl in which he states that he had received from the United States' Government a full approbation of the contents of one of his former communications; and then adds—
    "At the same time I feel it my painful duty to make known to your Lordship that, in some respects, it has fallen short in expressing the earnestness with which I have been in the interval directed to describe the grave nature of the situation in which both countries must be placed in the event of an act of aggression committed against the Government and people of the United States by either of these formidable vessels."—p. 13.

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    Your Lordships will remember that on the 1st of September the noble Earl stated the opinion of the Government that there was no cause of complaint; but I find that on the 4th he writes to Mr. Adams stating—
    "I have to inform you that the matter is under the serious and anxious consideration of Her Majesty's Government."—Correspondence, No. 4, p.17.
    On the same day, the 4th, Mr. Adams writes—
    "I have the honour to transmit copies of several papers transmitted to me by Mr. Dudley, the Consul of the United States at Liverpool, relating to the preparation for immediate departure of the steam-vessel fitting out at that place for the purpose of carrying on war against the Government and people of the United States. Begging your Lordship's permission here to record, in the name of my Government, this last solemn protest against the commission of such an act of hostility against a friendly nation, I pray your Lordship to accept the assurances of the highest consideration with which I have the honour to be, my Lord, your most obedient servant."—p. 16.
    Your Lordships will observe that in that communication Mr. Adams begs the whole question as to the character of those vessels, and speaks of "the immediate departure" of a vessel which, for six weeks, it would be impossible to have ready. On the 5th, Mr. Adams again writes, and in his communication uses this language—
    "I trust I need not express how profound is my regret at the conclusion to which Her Majesty's Government have arrived. I can regard it no otherwise than as practically opening to the insurgents free liberty in this kingdom to execute a policy described in one of their late publications in the following language."
    He then quotes from a Confederate paper, and in the latter part of his letter states—
    "Under these circumstances I prefer to desist from communicating to your Lordship even such further portions of my existing instructions as are suited to the ease, lest I should contribute to aggravate difficulties already far too serious. I therefore content myself with informing your Lordship that I transmit, by the present steamer, a copy of your note for the consideration of my Government, and shall await the more specific directions that will be contained in the reply."—p. 17.
    Now, my Lords, that is a very plain indication of the view which would be taken by the United States' Government of the decision formally announced by Her Majesty's Government five days before. The noble Earl, in his letter of the 4th of September, announced that the matter was "under the serious and anxious consideration of the Government;" but in the meantime, having to go to Scotland, he loses no time in again communicating with
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    Mr. Adams. On the 8th of September he says—
    "Lord Russell presents his compliments to Mr. Adams, and has the honour to inform him that instructions have been issued which will prevent the departure of the two iron-clad vessels from Liverpool."—p. 18.
    Now, I do not say that the decision at which Her Majesty's Government arrived was a decision come to in consequence of the letters of Mr. Adams; but I must express my opinion that the Correspondence, as laid before Congress and laid before the public, gives the significant step announced in the noble Earl's letter, the appearance of being the consequence of increased pressure. How is the announcement received? Listen for a moment to the jubilant letter of Mr. Adams in reference to the altered tone of Her Majesty's Government. Writing on the 9th of September, he says—
    "I have the honour to acknowledge the reception of your Lordship's note of. yesterday, announcing the determination of Her Majesty's Government to prevent the departure of the war vessels now fitting out at Liverpool. I shall take great pleasure in transmitting a copy for the information of my Government."—p. 18.
    After referring to this letter of the noble Earl, in a despatch which he writes to Mr. Seward, on the 10th of September, Mr. Adams adds—
    "But a still more significant manifestation of the altered tone of the Government is to be found in the speech made by Lord Russell at the opening of the new park at Dundee yesterday, a report of which is published in the newspapers of this morning. He seems to have rather gone out of his way to take up the subject, in order to announce the policy of the Government. You will not fail to observe the greatly increased firmness of his language, and more especially his intimation that new powers may be solicited from Parliament, if those now held should prove insufficient. This is, at last, the true tone. I confess that I have more hopes of our prospect of being able to preserve friendly relations than at any moment since my arrival in England. Unless some new and untoward event should occur to make other complications, I see no barrier of a serious character to our continuance in peace."
    This is laid before Congress, and I defy any one, even the least prejudiced, not to infer from it a great triumph to the diplomacy of the United States, and that the British Government had given to intimidation and menace that which they would not yield to a sense of justice. I should hope this is not the case; but I am anxious that there should be the most emphatic contradiction that can be given to it by the production of the whole Correspondence; and I should anticipate that the counterpart of that which has been kid before the United

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    States' Congress will be laid before the British Parliament. What mischief can be done by the publication of this Correspondence on the part of Her Majesty's Government, when it has already been published and printed in a book which I have not myself read, but which is open to any one? There is an American version, and we have no English answer to it to show the English people, and the American people also, the mode in which the Correspondence between the two countries has really been carried on, and the way in which our Ministers have vindicated the honour of England. I say that for the Government themselves, it is important that no time should be lost in laying before the world our version of the Correspondence. I ask it on two grounds; first, that its production can in no way affect the question before the courts of law; and, secondly, that we are entitled to an English version of the Correspondence, to neutralize, modify, or reply to that given to the American Congress. I prefer to appeal to the noble Earl rather than make a Motion on the subject; and again, I ask him what practical mischief can be done by the publication of those papers? The second Question I asked the noble Earl to answer was, Whether he would also lay before the House a correspondence relating to complaints and remonstrances made by Her Majesty's Government in various cases where acts of violence, or acts beyond international law and the rights of nations, have been committed by American cruisers upon our vessels; and also any judgments which have been given by Prize Courts of the United States which appear to be founded on principles inconsistent with the recognized principles of international law? The noble Earl said there would be a difficulty in giving a general summary of these transactions; but that if I would move for the papers relating to any particular case, he would consider whether he would or would not produce them. But it is not into any particular case that I want now to enter. I want to ascertain the general principles of international law which have been maintained by Her Majesty's Government; and those, on the other hand, which are contended for by the United States. These cannot be collected from the history of any single transaction. It is for the Government to volunteer a statement to Parliament as to the course they have followed upon these questions. At the same time, in the suppressed document —the despatch which was very judiciously
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    withheld by Mr. Adams—I find the principle laid down, that if the present law of this country should not be altered, and if it remained in conformity with the ruling of the Lord Chief Baron, there would be left for the United States "no alternative but to protect themselves and their commerce against armed cruisers proceeding from British ports, as against the naval officers of a public enemy." Now, I have not the slightest objection to that course; and, upon the assumption that the Georgia, the Florida, and the Alabama are meant here, I only wonder that long ago the Americans, with their large navy, have not taken the step here spoken of, and have not proceeded hostilely against vessels which have been defying all the force of the American navy, and inflicting upon American commerce great injury, for which we are held responsible. I shall join the noble Earl in entering a protest against the possibility of admitting any such claim whatever. But we must not confound with the cases of armed vessels the case of the ordinary blockade-runners, with regard to which strong measures have been taken by the vessels of the United States' navy. Your Lordships are not ignorant that in consequence of the extreme inefficiency of the American blockade there has arisen a very profitable trade in vessels which are employed in running the blockade. But these are unarmed vessels; they have not offered the slightest resistance. They are smugglers if you please, and are liable to be dealt with accordingly; but they are not to be subjected to any harsher measures than what may be legitimately taken against vessels engaged in unlawful traffic. Now, it has happened that one of these vessels, being pursued by an American cruiser, takes refuge close by one of the British islands, lies at anchor within a short distance of the land, and in that position is fired into by the cruiser, so near to the land that shots fired on this unarmed vessel actually pass over her and lodge on the adjoining territory. This, if true, is a gross infraction of international rights, and I want to know in what temper and tone Her Majesty's Government have dealt with a question of that kind, and in what manner their remonstrances have been met by the American Government. There is a very suspicious paragraph in the despatch of the American Government from which I have quoted, because it is distinctly stated that to this end—namely, the taking of effectual proceedings against these armed vessels,

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    and also to obtain indemnity for injuries that may have been inflicted by them—
    "This Government is now preparing a naval force with the utmost vigour; and if the national navy which it is rapidly creating shall not be sufficient for the emergency, then the United States must bring into employment such private armed naval forces as the mercantile marine shall afford. British ports, domestic as well as colonial, are now open, under certain restrictions, to the visits of piratical vessels, and not only furnish them with coals, provisions, and repairs, but even receive their prisoners when the enemies of the United States come in to obtain such relief from voyages in which they have either burnt ships which they have captured, or have even manned and armed them as pirates, and sent them abroad as auxiliaries in the work of destruction. Can it be an occasion for either surprise or complaint that if this condition of things is to remain and receive the deliberate sanction of the British Government, the navy of the United States will receive instructions to pursue these enemies into the ports which thus, in violation of the law of nations and the obligations of neutrality, become harbours for the pirates?"
    Fortunately, this despatch was not presented to the noble Earl, but it has been presented to Congress, and we find it there announced as the policy of the American Government to pursue vessels into British ports and there carry on actual hostilities, notwithstanding they are lying under the protection of the British flag, and in British waters. Now, I think it is quite expedient that there should be a thorough understanding upon this question. It is not one to be dealt with at the conclusion of a war, at a period when it may be convenient for the United States to take it up. The question ought not to be left in abeyance, and Parliament ought to be informed what course the Government have taken for the purpose of vindicating our rights and protesting against such doctrines. As an instance of the decisions of the American Prize Courts, I will refer for a moment to the case of the Springbok. That case was brought before these Courts, and Mr. Justice Betts laid down his reasons for confirming the seizure of the vessel—a vessel which had nothing contraband on board, and which was in a direct line for the port to which it was ostensibly bound, that port being 100 miles from the blockaded port to which she was supposed to have been proceeding. The doctrines which Judge Betts enunciated were so extravagant in many particulars that they attracted the attention of the French newspapers, which said, in effect—"This is not merely a dispute between the English and the American Governments; it is a decision which affects all maritime nations, and is contrary
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    to all international law." I do not know whether the case has gone before the Supreme Court of the United States. I presume, however, that an appeal has been entered, and, pending that appeal, it is, perhaps, quite right that no further steps should be taken. Sometime ago, however, I read the whole of the proceedings in this case, and if they be correctly recorded, it is quite obvious that neither upon the evidence nor upon the principles laid down by the Judge, was there the slightest ground for the seizure and condemnation of the vessel. That is an instance in which the American Courts have apparently, at all events, violated international law; and I want to know how the Government have dealt with this and other instances in which the American cruisers seem to have gone beyond their rights. We ought to have before us the Correspondence in all these cases in order to show, not by the examination of one particular case, but by the examination of the general course which has been taken by the Government, how far the honour and the interests of this country have been guarded and vindicated, as I hope they have. My Lords, I am aware that in bringing forward this subject I have trespassed on your indulgence, but I was anxious to give the noble Earl the opportunity of re-considering his negative answer as to the production of the Correspondence respecting the steam rams, and also that the noble Earl might state whether he would or would not lay on the table documents illustrative of the course pursued in the cases which I have brought under your notice.
    EARL RUSSELL: My Lords, I think the best course I can pursue will be to refer as shortly as I can to the case of the ironclad vessels, and state why I do not produce these papers, taking also some notice of the Correspondence with Mr. Adams, to which the noble Earl has referred. Early in the summer it was a question productive of great anxiety at the Foreign Office to the Under Secretary of State and myself, that two ironclads should be building at Birkenhead, which, as was generally believed by persons who, though they may have been prejudiced, were well informed, would be used in the service of the so-called Confederate States against the ships of the United States employed in blockading the Southern ports. This subject, I say, naturally caused us great anxiety, and we endeavoured, as far as possible, to ascertain by inquiry the truth with respect to these vessels. Now, it is well known to

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    your Lordships, and so appears from the intercepted correspondence of the Confederate States which has been published, that it was part of the policy of those States to employ in this country agents who were to fit out and equip vessels of war for service against the United States. We naturally endeavoured to ascertain how far these instructions had been acted upon, and what had been done. But we were met at first, as we might have expected, by every kind of evasion. It was declared very positively that the French Consul at Liverpool had said that these vessels were building on French account, and that they were intended for no other purpose. When, however, I came to inquire about this, the Secretary of the French Embassy in this country and the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris entirely denied the truth of the assertion. Still, we had not evidence sufficient to show that it was intended that those vessels were to be engaged in the Confederate service; and therefore I wrote not only to Mr. Adams, but to others who applied to me, and stated that for the purpose of enforcing the Foreign Enlistment Act, under which it was proposed that these vessels should be detained, it was necessary to show that they were intended for war purposes, and intended to be used by a belligerent against a State in amity with Her Majesty. Mr. Adams, not acting, I think, entirely with the same discretion which induced him to decline to present to me the note of July 11, wrote rather complainingly and hastily the notes to which the noble Earl has referred. I replied to him on the 1st of September that we had not at that time evidence sufficient for the purpose of convicting the persons engaged in fitting out these vessels; but I added that we were still making inquiries, and that the utmost vigilance would be used in order to obtain evidence as to the real object for which these vessels were designed. Mr. Adams unfortunately did not notice that part of my letter. He complained that we had come to a final decision upon the case of these vessels. But in this he was completely mistaken. Inquiries went on, and then another story was put forward —that the vessels were intended for the Viceroy of Egypt, and were being fitted out in pursuance of a contract made by the French subject to whom I have before alluded with the Pasha of Egypt. It was then necessary to ascertain whether that story was true; and we found that it was as unsubstantial as the other statement.
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    Having done this, and no further evidence having been put forward, which convinced Her Majesty's Government of the real destination of those vessels, these vessels were ordered to be detained, and a few days later were ordered to be seized. Mr. Adams, naturally enough wishing to gain credit for himself with his own Government, attributed the seizure to the effect of his own notes; but, in point of fact, before the most vigorous of those notes to which the noble Earl has referred had been written, the decision of Her Majesty's Government had been come to. At the same time I took care, in a private note, to acquaint with the facts Mr. Stuart, then in charge of affairs at Washington.
    THE EARL OF DERBY: I am afraid the noble Earl must be under some misapprehension on that point. I do not refer to all the vigorous notes, but to the last note dated the 5th of September, and the noble Earl says the decision of the Government was taken before that; but upon the previous day, the 4th, the noble Earl wrote to Mr. Adams to say that the matter was still under the serious consideration of the Government; and it was not until the 8th that the decision was announced.
    EARL RUSSELL: If not before the most vigorous notes were written, at least before we received them, the decision had been come to. I cannot say exactly the date of Mr. Layard's note, but it was written before Mr. Adams was informed of the decision. As to the general question, I must say I think Mr. Adams is not wrong in saying, that if a considerable number of vessels are sent from this country armed and equipped and furnished with crews, and that those vessels go as armed vessels to attack the blockading vessels of a country with which this country is at peace—if such expeditions are fitted out in the ports of Her Majesty's dominions, it is, in the first place, a great affront and insult to the authority of Her Majesty, and in defiance of Her Majesty's Proclamation of neutrality; and next, it is taking part in the war in favour of the Confederate States, and against the United States. We, therefore, were most anxious to ascertain what were the real facts concerning these vessels — whether they were intended for any other person than the so-called Confederate States. The noble Earl complains of delay —which, however, is proverbial in law— and that no decision has yet been come to. The noble Earl complained of Commissions having been sent abroad to obtain evidence;

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    but that was not an unusual course in proceedings at law, and in this case it was peculiarly necessary. When we consulted the Law Officers of the Crown about giving to Parliament the papers in this case, their observation was, "These papers can only be given in a partial form; the partial production of the papers would lead to public inquiry and discussion, and the Government must either suffer from having their case only partially stated, or they must suffer by having their case in a court of law forestalled by a discussion in Parliament;" and therefore it was their earnest request that Her Majesty's Government would not produce the papers. I feel myself bound by that opinion. I feel that I should be doing an injustice to the Law Officers of the Crown and to the case of the Government, if I were to prevent the due consideration by a court of justice by having their whole case previously debated in Parliament, with the assistance of papers which the Government had produced. Therefore, upon every consideration—upon the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown, and upon the best judgment I can form—I say it would be prejudicial to the course of justice if I were to produce these papers. With respect to the other cases, as to which the noble Earl has inquired—and I have informed him, as he has said, that if he would give me the name of any case about which he wished for information, I would be ready to give it—I must now say, not having very recently turned my attention to the case of the Springbok, although I did consider it some time ago, yet, without notice, I am not able to state at once the precise position of that case at present. But there are a great number of cases, and if the noble Earl will leave it to me I will look over the papers. There have been more than a hundred cases, I suppose, in which we have had complaints to make, and have received from the Government of the United States more or less satisfactory answers. I will endeavour to determine what information can be published. But there is a statement which I made last year, and which I beg to repeat now, which is this:—When it is declared that a case has been sent to a Prize Court, and when we know that there is an appeal from that Court to the Supreme Court, which is a tribunal of very high authority, and belonging to a friendly nation, I will not make it a matter of discussion; and I would appeal to your Lordships and to the other House of Parliament not to allow
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    yourselves to be placed in the position of a court of appeal against the Supreme Court of America, but that you will allow that Court to pronounce such decision as it may think proper. If that decision should be of an extraordinary character, or that we should have any cause of complaint against that Court, of course there would be further discussion; but at present it is not so. I will also say again in reference to all these often intricate and difficult cases in which the rights of neutrals are concerned, but in which are likewise concerned the rights of belligerents, we have had controversies and correspondence with the American Government; but with respect to all these questions I must request that your Lordships will allow me to consult the Law Officers of the Crown and to act according to their advice. When the Law Officers tell mo that an effective blockade has, in their opinion, been established at certain ports in the Southern States of America, I take that as a good legal opinion and abide by their authority. So, again, when they tell me that a judgment of a prize court of America is just and in conformity with the law of nations as it has been laid down in the courts of this country, or that there are reasonable doubts which would justify a Judge in deciding one way or the other, I do not think it would be right to go to the United States' Government with complaints about that case and ask for redress. But that the United States' Government have in every case done justice to our people and to the owners of our vessels, I am far from maintaining; but all those cases have been matters of discussion. The noble Earl spoke of blockade runners. Now, undoubtedly, the penalty of blockade running is no more than that which is imposed by the law of nations—that is, that vessels attempting to break a blockade, or carrying contraband of war, are liable to capture. But I am sorry to say we have had cases lately in which we had to complain of the unnecessary detention of persons belonging to the crews of such vessels. The American Government on their side say—and they are borne out to some extent by the correspondence which has been found—some of these vessels, bearing British colours, and apparently doing no more than breaking the blockade with goods, are, in effect, vessels belonging to the so-called Confederate Government, and are the property of that Government, although sent out from the blockaded ports

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    under British colours. If that case can be made out in respect of a particular vessel, of course that vessel becomes a belligerent vessel. But that, like many other matters, remains still under discussion, and full information has not yet been obtained. I can only repeat that I will endeavour to look over the papers, and shall be prepared to produce the correspondence with respect to any cases in which I think the noble Earl and the House likely to take an interest; and that if the noble Earl will name any particular case upon which he wishes information, I will either produce the papers, or state what I believe to be valid reasons for withholding them.

  CHINA.—DEATH OF LIEUTENANT TINLING.—QUESTION.
  LORD CHELMSFORDrose to call the attention of the First Lord of the Admiralty to the particulars of the death of Lieutenant Tinling, of H. M.'s Ship Encounter, at Shoushing, on the 5th of March, 1863; and to ask for an explanation of statements made by the Secretary of the Admiralty respecting the same. He begged to assure the noble Duke that his object in doing so was simply to rescue the name of a gallant young officer from an unfounded imputation of having lost his life by his own temerity, while, in fact, he had honourably fallen in the discharge of his duty. Lieutenant Tinling was an officer of the Encounter, then lying at Ningpo, under the command of Captain Dew, and had been promoted to the rank of lieutenant for his gallant behaviour at the capture of that place. He was a young man of great promise, and the estimate formed of him by his brother officers would be best shown by two papers which he (Lord Chelmsford) would read to their Lordships. The noble and learned Lord then read extracts from certificates by brother officers, testifying to the generous disposition and gallantry of the deceased. On the 28th of May last, the father of this gallant young man received a communication from the Admiralty to the effect, that they had received a letter from Captain Dew reporting the death of his son from the effects of a wound received under the walls of Shoushing. In the affliction into which the family was thrown by this intelligence, it would have been some consolation to reflect that the son had died fighting gallantly for his country; but even this poor consolation was de-
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  nied them. The intelligence having been received by an hon. and gallant Member of the House of Commons (Colonel Sykes), with reference to the proceedings at Shoushing on the 29th of May, he put a question to the noble Lord the Secretary of the Admiralty, in answer to which the noble Lord stated that no official intelligence had been received at the Admiralty respecting the death of Lieutenant Tinling, but that he had seen a letter from Captain Dew, stating that he had accompanied the French officers to Shoushing as an amateur. It was a mistake to say that no intelligence had been received by the Admiralty; for the father of the young man had received a letter from the Admiralty the day before announcing his son's death. It was unfortunate that this had been forgotten, otherwise the noble Lord would have hesitated before he wrote a private letter which was so calculated to wound the feelings of this young man's family, He was quite sure the noble Lord did so unintentionally, and that he was quite incapable of doing anything to wound the feelings of any one, much more of those who were suffering under such a bereavement. The painful impression which the statement of the noble Lord produced on this family was indeseribable. They were bending under the weight of the blow they had received from the intelligence of the death of this gallant young man, when they learned that the life whose loss they deplored had been sacrificed to the gratification of an idle curiosity. In the House of Commons the same hon. and gallant Member who had before put a Question on the subject again asked explanations from the noble Secretary of the Admiralty (on July 21: see 3 Hansard, clxxii. 1172). The noble Lord, in reply, said that he regretted very much the statement he had formerly made, and bore testimony to the gallantry and meritorious conduct of the youth! As to the statement that Lieutenant Tinling had received his death-wound when acting as an amateur, he said he would wait for further information, and that a further and more detailed report had been ordered, and if he were satisfied, he should have the greatest pleasure in apologizing to his family. He did not know whether the Admiralty had received further information, but as far as he understood, the objection of the noble Lord the Secretary of the Admiralty was founded in the fact that Captain Dew had been acting beyond the prescribed range of his instructions, and therefore could not be considered

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  as acting in the discharge of his duty, when he was, in fact, disobeying those instructions. At all events the term "amateur" most inaccurately described the character of the service at Shoushing. This was clear from the letter in which Captain Dew reported the death of Lieutenant Tinling to Admiral Kuper. Shoushing was, he believed, between eighty and ninety miles from Ningpo, where the Encounter was lying, and the instructions were that the ships should not engage in hostile operations beyond a radius of thirty miles from one of the treaty ports; but Captain Dew was actually, it appeared, watching the proceedings, and preventing, if possible, any false step of the Chinese, which would have at once imperilled Ningpo, and he stated that he felt himself responsible for the sad fate of this promising young officer. The fact was that Lieutenant Tinling was at Shoushing under the orders of Captain Dew, for the purpose of carrying on the operations of the siege. It appeared that the French officers required a siege gun, and one was borrowed from the Encounter. Captain Dew sent Lieutenant Tinling and twelve men with the gun, and they were followed by Captain Dew himself. The gun was taken to Shoushing, and placed upon the carriage by the men of the Encounter, about 500 yards from the battery, in the presence of Captain Dew. The French officers placed it in position, and it was while watching the effect of that gun in the siege that Lieutenant Tinling received his death-wound. He was not, therefore, an amateur, but was acting at the time under the orders of his superior officer, Captain Dew. But, even admitting that Captain Dew had been engaged in hostile operations contrary to his instructions, that could not be fairly imputed as blame to Lieutenant Tinling. Lieutenant Tinling was at Shoushing, under actual orders, for the purpose of conveying assistance to carry on the operations of the siege, and he received his death-wound when sent by his captain with a message to the front. Captain Dew might have exceeded his instructions by being engaged in those operations, but that did not prevent a subordinate officer, who was obeying the orders of his superior, being in the discharge of his duty. All he desired in this case was that justice should be done, and that an acknowledgment should be made that Lieutenant Tinling's short and honourable life was nobly ended by a death in the service of his country.
  THE DUKE OF SOMERSETsaid, he would readily admit that the noble and learned Lord had brought the case forward with the best feeling; and he could himself assure their Lordships that he also felt sincere sorrow for the fate of this gallant young officer, as well as sympathy with his bereaved family. It was, he understood, merely an honourable acknowledgment that he had fallen in the service of his country that Lieutenant Tinling's family sought to obtain; and all that the Government aimed at was to ascertain the facts of the case and to do what was strictly right. It was true that his noble Friend the Secretary of the Admiralty, when first questioned on the subject in the other House, said that he had no information about it; but his noble Friend had been engaged on Committees for several days, and was not then aware that a letter had on the previous day arrived at the Admiralty in reference to the matter. Next day, however, he learned that he had made an error, and the information which the Government possessed was immediately forwarded to the unhappy father, while his noble Friend also took the first opportunity of setting himself right in the House of Commons (on June 1). His noble Friend had been asked to say that Lieutenant Tinling had fallen in the strict discharge of his duty. On that point they had then no complete intelligence; but they immediately wrote to Admiral Kuper, requesting him to call upon Captain Dew to state whether he had ordered Lieutenant Tinling to proceed to the siege of Shoushing, and whether when he fell he was acting under his orders, or as a volunteer. Captain Dew's answer was as follows:—
  "H.M.S. Encounter, Yokohama, Sept. 25, 1863.
  "Sir,—In reply to your memorandum of this date, referring to my letter of the 13th of April last, wherein I acquainted you under what circumstances Acting-Lieutenant Tinling met his death from a wound received at Shoushing, and wherein you call on me to report, for the information of the Lords' Commissioners of the Admiralty, whether that officer was ordered by me to proceed to the siege of Shoushing, and whether at the time he was acting under my orders or merely as a volunteer, I have to inform you that that much-lamented officer did not proceed to Shoushing by my orders or on duty, but accompanied me at his own urgent request on that as on a previous occasion, when I deemed it necessary for the safety of Ningpo to pass beyond the thirty miles radius, not for the purpose of engaging in hostilities with the Taepings, but rather by my presence and advice to ward off disaster from the Imperial forces. All

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  the officers who accompanied me on these occasions perfectly understood their own and my position, and considered themselves on leave. I repeatedly warned them against exposure to fire, especially on the eve of the assault on Shoushing, when I particularly cautioned Lieutenant Tinling, knowing his fearless nature, and told him and them to bear in mind that I held myself personally responsible for their safety. I feel confident, moreover, that Lieutenant Tinling's last days would have been much embittered could he have foreseen the steps his family have thought right to take regarding his death. I now most respectfully lay before you, Sir, and, if you think right, for the information of their Lordships, a short statement as to my peculiar position at Ningpo, and the grave responsibilities I was continually called on to undertake for the safety of that city and others within the thirty miles' radius. I had instructions from Sir James Hope to carry out the policy of Her Majesty's Government and clear the thirty miles, and this was most happily effected, with a trifling loss, against overwhelming odds, by a small squadron under my orders, assisted by Chinese troops, drilled by ourselves and the French. So highly did Sir James Hope appreciate this service, effected, as he was pleased to state, not as at Shanghai, with a large field force and guns, but simply with our own resources, that he forwarded me no less than five public letters of thanks, to be read on the quarter deck to the ship's companies. I may now mention my reasons for proceeding to Shoushing, so that you and their Lordships may understand why I passed the thirty miles' boundary, and incurred your own and their censure, and I trust that when that explanation has been given some latitude may be allowed me for transgressing my orders, and if I erred in judgment it will be seen my motives for so doing had at least the public service entirely at heart. Shoushing is the key of Ningpo and the province of Che-kiang, and so long as it was held by the Taepings, who continually threatened Ningpo from it, it would be necessary to keep a large naval force for the protection of the latter city. I had received a communication from you, Sir, to the effect that you were anxious, if the safety of Ningpo would admit of it, that I should join your flag in Japan with a gunboat. The fall of Shoushing alone would enable me to leave Ningpo, so I went to the front, not at first intending to be present at the attack, but merely to urge on the French commander the necessity of making one. General Taidif requested me to remain, as, in the event of an accident to himself, he feared his force would disperse. His worst fears were realized; he fell early on the day of the assault, his officers and men became dispirited, and my presence alone saved a great desertion; malgré moi, I had to take the direction of the siege till Admiral James sent up competent officers to relieve me; and in a fortnight, so hard were the besieged pressed, that they evacuated the city, and one of the first provinces in China was regained to the Imperial Government, and I was enabled to leave Ningpo, with a gunboat alone for its protection. Since that time prosperity has returned to Ningpo and its neighbourhood, and it will be a lasting satisfaction to myself and those under my command to know, that through our efforts those ruthless plunderers the Taepings were driven away from their work of spoliation, rapine, and murder. Trusting that you, Sir, and their Lordships will give me at
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  least credit for disinterestedness in my conduct at Ningpo,
  "I have, &c,
  "R. DEW, Captain."
  "To Vice-Admiral Augustus J. Kuper, C.B.,
  Commander-in-Chief."
  Now, he should have acted very discreditably if he had not said that he was satisfied with the explanation which Captain Dew had given. He thought that Captain Dew had acted under the circumstances as a gallant officer would act. He went up to the front, like many others, to see the fighting; but when he got there the French commander told him that he must stay there, because if anything happened to himself, Captain Dew must take the command. Therefore against his judgment, and against his orders in fact, he did stay; but his stay, as it happened, was a most fortunate circumstance. As to Lieutenant Tinling, he behaved, there was no doubt, with the same courage and spirit as he had done before. The Government had had the pleasure of promoting him previously for his conduct in one of the most gallant actions at Ningpo. Lieutenant Tinling served in one of the two or three small gunboats which went to Ningpo. The town had then been for a long time in the possession of the Taepings, who, seeing the smallness of the force, fired upon it. Upon that Captain Dew, as he wrote in his despatch, felt it necessary to attack the town, a place of many thousand inhabitants, which was done with two or three gunboats and the assistance of the French officer's small force. There was no question, therefore, of Lieutenant Tinling's gallantry and courage. There could be no doubt that Lieutenant Tinling was a most gallant officer— he wished the service had more like him— but he was one of those who could not be prevented from putting themselves in danger. On such occasions even the highest officers did not hesitate to risk their lives unnecessarily. When Admiral Hope was expostulated with for having galloped to the front during one of the battles between the Imperialists and the Taepings his reply was, that he wished to see how the Chinese fought, "and besides," he added, "I thought they wanted a little cheering up." The Government deeply deplored the death of Lieutenant Tinling, but with so many gallant young men in the service all over the world such occurrences would take place. For his own part, he was anxious to say anything that would be satisfactory to the unfortunate father, because the service had lost a promising young officer;

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  but he could do no more than read the despatch of Captain Dew, and express his belief that in writing that document Captain Dew was only actuated by a desire to give a true statement of facts.
  EARL GREYsaid, it must have been painful to the family of Lieutenant Tinling that his conduct had not been properly represented on a former occasion. From the statement of the noble Duke, he (Earl Grey) gathered that Lieutenant Tinling on the occasion on which he met his death, if not actually was virtually on duty; for although it might be that the instructions were that no officers should engage in hostilities beyond a thirty miles radius from the Treaty ports, yet it was perfectly clear that he was acting under the authority of his superior officer. He went up in charge of a gun, and although, no doubt, he was told that the service was not quite a regular one, yet any officer who volunteered for it must be regarded as practically acting under orders. He (Earl Grey) should not, however, have risen to notice this matter, had it not afforded matter of serious consideration in a public point of view. It threw much light upon the inconvenient and most dangerous position which Her Majesty's Government were assuming in China. Two years ago he called attention to the remarkable change which had taken place in the policy of Ministers. They began by prescribing strict neutrality between the Taepings and the Imperialists. Then they issued instructions that Shanghai was to be protected. Our officers were next told that they might protect any of the Treaty ports which might happen to be menaced. At last they were ordered to protect the country within thirty miles of the Treaty ports, because, said Ministers, unless they protected the country it would be of no advantage to protect the ports themselves. Perhaps their Lordships would recollect that he had ventured to point out that this was a line of conduct which must lead to inconvenience. It was neither war nor neutrality. If Ministers were determined to take up the cause of the Imperialists they should send out a force worthy of the British nation, and one which could interfere with effect; on the other hand, if they wished to remain neutral, they should remain really neutral but, as it was, they were halting between two policies. They could neither make up their minds to see that disorder in China which was the natural result of our breaking down the authority of the native Government, nor yet were
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  they prepared to take upon themselves the difficult task of attempting to restore peace and virtually to protect the Chinese Empire. No doubt they felt that this was a duty which would task to the utmost the whole strength and resources of this country; but, he asked, could any good come of half measures—of ineffective but irritating interference? The public orders to our officers were that they were not to interfere beyond thirty miles from the Treaty ports; but when engaged in the execution of these orders they found, as Captain Dew found, that properly to protect a radius of thirty miles they must extend their operations to a distance of eighty or ninety miles, and to attack a town which was the basis of the operations of the Taepings. It was impossible, as the noble Duke admitted, to complain of Captain Dew for going beyond the thirty miles, considering the instructions he had received to protect the country round the Treaty ports, and the impossibility of otherwise effecting this object; but it was right that their Lordships and the country should ask the Government to adopt in this matter some more decided policy. The lives of gallant English officers and men should not be exposed by expeditions of such inadequate force into the heart of China. If Ministers were resolved upon interfering in the internal troubles in China, notwithstanding their own original determination to the contrary, and notwithstanding the enormous difficulties in which they would thereby be involved, they ought to interfere in such a manner as to have a chance of accomplishing their object. The only effect of their present policy was to prolong the war, preventing either party having a decided advantage. He must add that the Government should lay on the table further papers as to the measures they were taking. Two years ago they told their Lordships that they had authorized an officer of the British navy to organize a force which was to act on behalf of the Emperor of China. Everybody now knew that a considerable force was sent out, but that, in consequence of a dispute with the Chinese Government as to the terms on which it was to be employed, it had been disbanded. Their Lordships had a right to expect Ministers to lay before them information as to the grounds upon which they took the strong and unusual course of issuing an Order in Council giving permission to raise that force, and also as to the causes which had led to its disbandment,
  THE EARL OF HARDWICKEsaid, the statements made by the noble Duke, the First Lord of the Admiralty, would be most discouraging to young officers in the navy. The first lesson taught a young officer was obedience; he was to obey above all things. That which the noble Duke called volunteering was in the case of Lieutenant Tin-ling simply an act of duty. When an officer was directed to undertake any duty of an arduous kind, a younger officer of spirit who might wish to accompany him could ask the senior officer to allow him to go; the moment he consented, the young officer was under orders and was not a volunteer. Lieutenant Tinling went up the country with a gun which was intended for warlike operations, and everything he did was done under the eye of Captain Dew. The noble Duke said that Captain Dew did not act under orders; and yet he approved of his despatch on the ground of his brilliant services, and in the same breath he said Lieutenant Tinling, who obeyed orders, did not die in the execution of his duty. In this the noble Duke did not understand the nature of the business over which he was placed, or know the gallantry or the character of the British navy.
  THE DUKE OF SOMERSETsaid, he had carefully abstained from expressing any opinion of his own, contenting himself with reading the despatch of Captain Dew, who plainly stated that Lieutenant Tinling was not acting under orders, but that he was on leave, and in a position to act for himself. As to the remarks of the noble Earl on the cross benches (Earl Grey), that Her Majesty's Government ought either to undertake the Government of China or to abandon that country altogether, he (the Duke of Somerset) maintained that neither course would be wise. On the one hand, everybody would admit that it would be preposterous to undertake the administration of the Government of China; while, on the other hand, to abandon Shanghai, where a large number of English merchants resided and where we had an enormous trade, would be equally out of the question. It would not be tolerated in this country that the Government should say, "We will give up our port because the Taepings are coming, and we must not take part with one side or the other." A couple of years ago the Taepings found they were losing ground in the country, and they declared their intention to make up for it by the plunder of Shanghai; and, had it not been for the English and
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  French officers who defended the town, it would have fallen into the hands of the rebels, who would soon have made it as desolate as Nankin and the other places of which they had gained possession. If Parliament really thought that we ought not to maintain our hold on China, then it had better say so in a distinct and decided manner. The experiment of allowing the Taepings to take towns had been tried. Ningpo was a treaty port; it was a place of immense commerce, and its river swarmed with vessels. When the rebels threatened it, it was the opinion of the British authorities in China that it was not our business to defend Ningpo. What was the result? The insurgents came, murdered all the inhabitants who did not succeed in fleeing across the river, and plundered and destroyed the town. The English and French vessels were fired at by the Taepings after they had been for some in possession of the town, but Captain Dew and the French commander would not tolerate such treatment, so they retook the place. The Chinese who were gathered on the opposite bank watching the affair, returned as Boon as the town was reconquered. Order was then re-established, shops were reopened, and in about a month the town was restored to its former state of prosperity. The Taepings, however, while they held it kept it in ruins. For his own part he could not approve a policy which encouraged plunder on shore and pillage at sea. As to the pirates, they had caused great havoc among European vessels along the coast of China, and it became a question whether we could continue to carry on our trade in those seas. No doubt it was very desirable that the Chinese Government should possess the power to control their subjects both by land and water; but unfortunately they had not the power, and as long as we traded with China we were in the anomalous position of having to defend ourselves against the rebels and against the pirates. If the Imperial Government could have been furnished with an efficient force under their own command, they might have put down piracy in those waters, and we should then have been relieved from the burden of the extensive, costly, and continuous operations which we had to carry on year after year, and in which gallant officers lost their lives. It would not do to Bay in a hasty, off-hand way, we must choose between two alternatives, either siding with one party or quitting China altogether. We must

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  be guided by circumstances as they arose, interfering, however, as little as we possibly could.
  EARL GREYsaid, the noble Duke had misunderstood him. He did not say that we ought either to take upon ourselves the Government of the country or to leave it. What he had always said, and what he now held, was that we ought either to remain neutral between the Imperialists and the Taepings, or if we interfered, to do so in a manner worthy of this country. We ought not to send an English naval officer and a dozen men—volunteers—accompanied by a Chinese rabble and a collection of the adventurers of all nations, to risk their lives in the heart of the country. We ought either to stand aloof, or carry our operations in a serious and effectual way. In 1861 the noble Earl (Earl Russell) laid down the rule that we ought not to defend the towns, lest we should teach the Chinese to rely on us, and have the whole burden thrown on our shoulders. What he (Earl Grey) had all along said was, that we committed a great mistake in breaking down the power of the native Chinese Government, and that before we did so, we should have considered how difficult it was, when such an authority had been overthrown, to establish another in its place. The troubles from which we were now suffering were the natural consequences of the policy, or rather no-policy, we had adopted. The noble Duke told them we must be guided by circumstances as they arose. Now this was precisely what he (Earl Grey) complained of; it certainly seemed that Her Majesty's Ministers had never had a clear and definite idea of the policy they meant to pursue, but determined upon each successive step which they adopted with a view to the convenience of the moment, without considering to what consequences it would ultimately lead. But he would not go farther into the subject at present, because this was a question which would have to be fully discussed during the Session, and he hoped the noble Duke would give them every facility for doing so, by furnishing all the papers relating to the formation and dismissal of Captain Osborne's force.
  EARL RUSSELLsaid, his noble Friend who had just spoken maintained that the Government should have taken one of two courses in China—they should either have remained perfectly neutral, or they should have acted, to quote his vague general phrase, in a manner worthy of the dignity
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  and reputation of this country. The former course—the course of being perfectly neutral—was that which was taken in the first instance. We said that the rebellion of the Taepings against the Emperor of China was not a matter in which it was necessary for us to interfere, and that the insurgents might possibly carry on relations of trade and amity with the people of this country. But we discovered the fallacy of that idea. We found that the Taepings never attempted to establish any order or authority whatever; that they had only two notions —murder and plunder; that they killed men, women, and children, even infants in arms, and spread devastation wherever they went. Under these circumstances, we deemed it impossible to refrain from defending our Treaty ports against barbarians of that kind. It was now said that we ought to have acted in a manner worthy of our dignity and reputation. But what did that mean? We could not take part with the insurgents, and in order to espouse the Imperial cause, we should have required a large force. The sacrifices we should have had to make would have been enormous, and the cost immense. Our troops would have had to go to every part where rebellion broke out, now to the north-west, now to the south-east, and they would have been exposed to great hardships and loss of life. Therefore, neither of these two modes of procedure would have suited the interests of this country. We must have had 10,000 men constantly marching through the country to carry out this policy. There remained, however, a third course, which was to protect our Treaty ports, to defend the trade we were carrying on, to check the ravages of the Taepings, and from time to time to allow persons, no matter of what nation, whether English, French, or American, to lend their aid to the Imperial arms. That was the course taken by Her Majesty's Government—it was a course which did not involve any great sacrifice of life or expense, and, moreover, it had been successful. His noble Friend (Earl Grey) spoke as if the consequences of our policy had been most deplorable, but that was a mistake. In the first place, we had developed an extended and flourishing trade. All the evidence showed that the unhappy people whose towns were assailed by the Taepings fled from the houses in which they knew they would be murdered if they remained, and abandoned the cultivation of the soil, which they could not carry on. Whenever,

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  on the other hand, a place had been recovered from the rebels, the inhabitants flowed back again, the peasants resumed the cultivation of their fields, returned to their trade with us, and there arose an amount of prosperity which was impossible under the Taeping rule. Such were the consequences which the noble Earl deemed so melancholy. The policy which produced such results, and imposed no considerable burden on the country, he should always hold to be the best.
  EARL GRANVILLEsaid, be thought it rather unfortunate that the noble Earl on the cross benches should have introduced into an incidental conversation a question of such serious magnitude as our Chinese policy. He desired to say only that he was a personal friend of the father of the gallant and distinguished young man who had so unfortunately fallen. He respected that gentleman as one who had made, to his knowledge, great sacrifices for the benefit of the public service. The letter read by the noble Duke had completely satisfied him as to the official designation which should be given to the particular service on which the young man was engaged at the time of his death. Though there might be some official difficulty in the way of recognizing this service as being "the service of the country," yet the value of the young man's previous services was now fully recognized, and it was acknowledged by all that he was in the fullest possession of all those eminent virtues which distinguished the sailor. In fact, his death was owing to his superabundance of those noble qualities which were characteristic of the British sailor.
  LORD CHELMSFORDsaid, the noble Duke must remember the objection to the expression used by Captain Dew in his letter, that Lieutenant Tinling acted only as an "amateur;" and as he understood the noble Duke had not withdrawn that expression, but rather justified the use of it, he himself thought that a very different character should be given to those services, especially as there was no doubt Captain Dew himself was engaged in hostile operations, and Lieutenant Tinling acted under him. The noble Duke admitted that Captain Dew was so engaged, and Lieutenant Tinling was taking up a gun to be used against Shonshing; though it was said that the officers who accompanied the captain were to be considered as on leave. He thought, that the noble Duke having justified the conduct of Captain Dew, who
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  acted outside his orders and according to his discretion, ought also to have justified Lieutenant Tinling, and to have withdrawn the expression which was offensive to his family, and even to have gone further, and said that he had fallen performing his duty.
  THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGHsaid, he had heard with great interest the letter read by the noble Duke, and the impression left on his mind was that Captain Dew was acting not only without orders, but against orders. All the young officers who were with him knew that perfectly well, and Captain Dew's object in writing that letter clearly was to take all the responsibility on himself, and to relieve those young officers from it. It was an act of generosity on the part of a gallant officer. Of course, these officers were acting practically under Captain Dew's orders; but, like a generous man, he wished to take all the responsibility on himself.
  THE DUKE OF SOMERSETsaid, he had never used the word "amateur" himself; and Lord Clarence Paget, who had hastily used it, when he was told that it had given pain, got up in the House of Commons and retracted it.
  LORD CHELMSFORDwas understood to say, that if the noble Duke would turn to the debate of the 21st of July last he would see that the word had not been retracted.

  RAILWAY SCHEMES (METROPOLIS).— THE COMMONS' MESSAGE.—SELECT COMMITTEE.
  Message from the House of Commons of Tuesday last on the Subject of Railway Schemes (Metropolis) considered. Then—
  EARL GRANVILLE: Your Lordships will recollect that last year much alarm existed on the subject of the proposed railways through the metropolis, and that there was considerable discussion in your Lordships' House as to whether there should be a preliminary inquiry on the subject of the railways in the metropolitan district; and also whether that inquiry should be carried on by a Committee, or a Royal Commission appointed by the Government. Ultimately it was decided in the first instance that a Committee should be appointed. That Committee sat, and reported several special recommendations. They pointed out various things that ought not to be permitted, and they suggested r various things which ought to be done, and

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  laid down certain principles which ought to govern railway communication in the metropolis. One of their recommendations affected the future conduct of this House with reference to these Bills, and the Committee thought it desirable that there should be a preliminary inquiry, sifting the whole of the schemes which might be proposed. I anticipate, therefore, no opposition now to the appointment of the Committee which I propose. Another point discussed in the matter was as to the manner in which these Bills might be dealt with by both Houses; but, after a full review of this point, and looking to the delicate consideration involved in it, and wishing to avoid any appearance of dictating to the other House, it was thought better to confine the recommendations of the Committee entirely to what could be done in our own House. Certain recommendations were made with reference to reports to be made on these Bills by the Board of Trade and other public Departments, and those have been complied with. A Report of the Board of Trade is already before your Lordships, and to-morrow I shall probably be able to lay before you a supplementary Report of an engineering character, describing the effect of those schemes. The Board of Works and the Corporation of London have also published reports, as recommended by the Committee. The Government are most anxious to act in the spirit of the Resolutions adopted by the Committee of your Lordships' House last year, and they therefore thought that a Committee ought to be appointed in the other House, and your Lordships asked to appoint a Committee of this House—both Committees to sit together and draw up a joint Report. That certainly is going somewhat further than your Lordships' recommendations; and I must add that the precedents for a Joint Committee of this kind are of ancient date, and are rather meagre. There was one in 1695; and there was one in the reign of George III. to conduct an inquiry as to the state of the King's health; but in this latter case the Commons insisted on having double the number of Members on the Committee as compared with the number from your Lordships' House, and this made it impossible to do more than examine witnesses jointly. It became impossible to have a joint Report, and each House therefore presented its separate Report. The fact that your Lordships have power to examine witnesses upon oath, while the
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  Commons do not possess that power in such matters as will form the subject of the proposed inquiry, affords another advantage that will be gained from a Joint Committee. I cannot help thinking that this is an exceptional case, in which the experiment of such a Committee may be very well made. This year the alarm in the metropolis is greater than it was last, and I think it desirable that a body having the authority of a Joint Committee should have the subject before them for calm and mature consideration. I should have been glad if the Members of the Government were not to be called to take any part in the inquiry; but an opinion has been expressed that the Government should give every assistance in their power, and we yield to that opinion. I am glad to be able to state to your Lordships that I believe my noble Friend the Chairman of Committees will find time, notwithstanding his other engagements, to serve on this Committee. If your Lordships agree to my Motion, I shall afterwards move the names; and it is proposed that, after the Message to the Commons, the Committee should meet on Monday next. The noble Earl then moved—
  "That a Select Committee be appointed to join with the Select Committee appointed by the House of Commons, as mentioned in the said Message, to consider the best Method of dealing with the Railway Schemes proposed to be sanctioned within the Limits of the Metropolis by Bills to be introduced in the present Session, and to report their Opinion whether any, and, if any, what Schemes should not be proceeded with during the present Session."
  THE EARL OF DERBY: I am not surprised, my Lords, that there should be almost a panic in the metropolis when we contemplate the number, extent, and variety of the schemes with which the whole of the metropolis is threatened. I am told that the total estimated cost of constructing those lines is £35,000,000, and that 8 per cent of the capital, has been deposited. No less than 160 streets of the metropolis will be seriously interfered with by these lines, which are to pass in every direction and by every form of construction—some overground, some underground, and some on the level; they are to run in every possible direction, and appear to have been brought forward without any general scheme, or without any reference one to another. This being the case, I think it is expedient that the matter should be taken up in the way the noble Earl has suggested. Though the course he pro-

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  poses—the appointment of a Joint Committee—is not one for which there is a precedent of very recent date, I do not object to try the experiment. Neither do I object to members of the Government serving on the Committee; for if I entertained any feeling on the subject of the interference of the Government, it is one of regret that they did not in the first instance take a more active and prominent part— that they did not themselves lay out for consideration what appeared to them to be the best general scheme for accommodating the traffic throughout the metropolis, without having the slightest reference to this company or to that, but considering only the convenience of the public. Then, if such scheme was approved, applications might be received from companies to take it on something like the French system of concession by the Government. That, no doubt, would be a great innovation on our practice, and with regard to other parts of the country, I would not have supported it, but, with regard to the metropolis, the question is so large that it would have been better to have it decided in such a manner as to exclude all private interest or personal consideration from any influence in the decision. I have to present to your Lordships two petitions on this subject— one from the Institution of British Architects, and the other from the Architectural Association—in which they represent the great inconvenience which will arise from the conflict of railway interests; and they also state that no adequate street thoroughfares have been proposed. They express their opinion that the question of street communication should be first and forthwith considered and determined, and that lines of streets should be laid out, having reference more especially to railway termini, and they suggest that all railway projects should be postponed until the question of the great leading thoroughfares have been considered; and they pray that a Committee or a Commission should be appointed on the subject. I cannot say I concur in the entire prayer of the petitioners, because, I think, its practical effect would be to put off the construction of metropolitan railways for an indefinite period; and I do not envy this preliminary Committee the labour they will have to go through. I am glad my noble Friend the Chairman of Committees will be able to find time to serve on the Committee, for his doing so will give the public additional confidence in the mode of conducting the
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  investigation. I should rather like to know on what principle the Committee are going to act—whether the Government are themselves going to put forward any general scheme, which possibly it would be desirable to recommend to the Committee?
  EARL GRANVILLEsaid, he might, as an individual, have some notions as to what the Committee ought to do, but he did not think it would be prudent of any one who was likely to serve on the Committee—a Committee on which he would be happy to have the noble Earl's (the Earl of Derby) assistance—to make his views on the subject known to the public beforehand— views which might be modified or entirely changed by the evidence.
  LORD REDESDALEsaid, he entirely approved of a joint Committee under the circumstances—not, however, as an experiment, but by way of exception, for he considered this to be an exceptional case. The precedents for such a Committee were of ancient date and exceptional character, and appeared to refer to proceedings in which both Houses were jointly concerned, and in which concerted action was necessary, such as when a peer was to be tried on impeachment. The only other course they could take except that now proposed was to appoint separate Committees for both Houses. But inasmuch as the inquiry proposed was an exceptional one of a preliminary character, to determine what Bills, out of a large number, should alone be submitted to the consideration of Parliament, a great difficulty would arise in the event of those Committees arriving at opposite conclusions. A joint Committee was therefore the only feasible plan by which the important subject in question could be satisfactorily considered and disposed of. He did not consider that the appointment of a Royal Commission would be attended with much advantage, inasmuch as it was found in practice that the reports of these bodies on railway matters possessed little weight, and he doubted whether a Commission would have the requisite boldness to deal effectively with these schemes, and decide which should and which should not go forward. Under all those circumstances he was of opinion, that the course proposed for adoption, though an exceptional one, was the best, and he trusted that the joint Committee would be able to present a Report that would give satisfaction. He hoped, however, that in assenting to it, it would

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  be upon the distinct understanding that it should not be considered a precedent for the future action of that House. It was a ease of considerable difficulty, and lie hoped that a satisfactory report would be, the result.
  THE EARL OF CARNARVONsaid, lie admitted that in dealing with these schemes it would be of great public advantage to take such a course as would prevent unnecessary litigation and competition. It gave him much satisfaction to hear that the noble Lord the Chairman of Committees had consented to act on the Committee. But he should be most unwilling to assent to the appointment of a joint Committee, unless it was distinctly understood that the inquiry being an exceptional one, the appointment of a joint Committee should be considered as an exceptional course, and should not be drawn into a precedent in reference to the course of dealing with ordinary railway Bills. They were now practically entering into a new era of railway legislation, and the appointment of this committee would, at all events, have the effect of preventing the construction of useless or improper works, and putting a stop to unfair or unnecessary competition. But the greatest caution would be necessary in dealing with the double machinery at present in use for sifting the merits of private Bills. He was far from saying that the present system of railway legislation was satisfactory; and, though his own experience was limited, he defied any noble Lord who had served upon railway committees to say he had risen from this task with any feeling of satisfaction. At the same time, it was not so easy to suggest a remedy, and their Lordships should be cautious in adopting any course which might commit them to a policy of joint Committees. This House had always been jealous of any unnecessary or arbitrary interference with private rights; and in dispensing with any of the existing machinery by which their Lordships exercised control over companies of enormous power, backed by enormous capital, there must be great care that private interests should not hereafter be seriously compromised.
  THE EARL OF DERBYwished to ask a question in regard to the working of the Committee. Was it intended that those railway schemes should be represented by separate counsel before the Committee? Or did they propose to pass judgment upon their merits without according to railway companies the right of being heard
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  by learned counsel? If it were intended to allow those companies to be represented by counsel, they would be imposing upon the Committee the necessity of hearing lengthened arguments and speeches previously to their coming to a decision upon the several schemes. At the same time it might be considered rather unfair to the promoters of those railway projects, if they were to refuse hearing any representation on their behalf.
  EARL GRANVILLEsaid, he could not of course answer as to what course the Committee would be likely to take in regard to hearing counsel upon the merits of the respective railways proposed. Last year, however, the Committee practically avoided going into the merits of particular schemes. They confined themselves to a consideration of what they believed to be consistent with general legislation upon railway communication.
  Motion agreed to.
  Then it was moved,
  That such Select Committee should consist of Five Lords, Three to be a Quorum, agreed to. The Lords following were named of the Committee:—Ld. PRESIDENT, E. ROMNEY, V. EVERS-LET, L. REDESDALE, L. STANLEY of ALDEBLBT. That a Message was Ordered to be sent to the House of Commons, in answer to their Message of Tuesday last, to inform them of the Appointment of the said Select Committee by this House, and to propose to the House of Commons that the joint Committee do meet in the Painted Chamber on Monday next, at Half past Three o'Clock.
  House adjourned at a quarter before Eight o'clock, till To-morrow, half past Ten o'clock.