§ LORD LYTTELTON
presented a Petition from Taranaki, New Zealand, on the Subject of the Distress brought upon them by the Native War; and to call the Attention of the House to the Subject, and to that of the Military Defence of the Colonies. The noble Lord proceeded to say, that the world had perhaps seen the two extremes of policy as to the relations between a country and its Colonies. The first was the old Greek system. The Greek colonists could hardly be called so in our sense of the word; for while they carried with them their household gods, and a great part of the civil and political system of the country in which they had lived, there was no political dependency, 1597 and there wore scarcely any political relations between the Colony and the mother country. There were friendly relations, which continued for very considerable periods between them, and sometimes produced very striking effects;—but that was all. That was one extreme. The other was our modem English system, of monopoly and restrictions, protection and obedience even in very minute particulars to an office at home. But that was not our earliest plan, that plan bore a considerable resemblance to the old Greek system. The charters granted to the North American Colonies gave them almost complete independence. But those charters were infringed upon at a very early period. The cupidity of the mother country introduced commercial restrictions, as by the Navigation Laws. That system went on till it reached its climax just before the American War of Independence. This plan used to be called emphatically the Colonial system, as if there could be no other; and even a man of the large and liberal views of Burke, at the very moment when he was pleading for the Colonies, had not the slightest scruple in speaking of the monopoly of our Colonial trade as the system that of course prevailed, and that ought to prevail; as when he assumed that the Colonies ought to be compelled to send us everything we wanted in a raw condition, and should be compelled to take everything we sent them in a perfectly manufactured state. This commercial system had of late been so completely abandoned, that a distinguished writer, Mr. Herman Merivale, was able to say, that whereas formerly we gave great political independence to the Colonies provided we could benefit by commercial restrictions on them, now we were willing even to pay large sums for the pleasure of governing them. For concurrent with the disuse of the commercial system there had sprung up the system of governing the Colonies by "Mr. Mother Country" from an office at home. That system, in its turn, had also come to an end, with one single exception. We now gave them constitutions and great powers of local self-government, and we had removed all the commercial restrictions we formerly imposed upon them: the exception was the organization of the colonists for their own defence. There could be no doubt that this exception involved a great anomaly, for in every other respect the colonists had the management of their own affairs, We did not 1598 now found Colonies; but we allowed our people to found them. No doubt, his noble Friend (the Duke of Newcastle) had recently had an application made to him, respecting the formation of a Colony in Northern Australia. It was according to right principle for the persons who intended that undertaking to make inquiries for themselves, not only with regard to the climate and the capabilities of the soil, hot also with regard to the enemies they might have to encounter and to include that among their other preparations. It was therefore with great pleasure that be bad read in a recent despatch sent out to New Zealand, by his noble Friend the Secretary for the Colonies, that the Government had disclaimed the responsibility of relieving the inhabitants from the duty of self-defence as a matter of right which the colonists could demand. The first, the second, and the third lesson which settlers in a new country ought to learn, was the lesson of self-reliance; and among its most important points was the responsibility which, in the first instance, rested upon themselves to lake charge of their own defence. Whatever modifying circumstances there might be in New Zealand with regard to that primary responsibility, it was useful to keep the general principle in mind—a principle which he found enunciated in the despatches of his noble Friend, in terms which met with his (Lord Lyttelton's) most complete approval. The two cases which had given most dissatisfaction were New Zealand and the Cape of Good Hope; and of those. New Zealand was the one that offered the most favourable opportunity for applying this principle. Unlike the Cape, it had no enormous frontier, on which there were powerful native tribes; and in many respects it reproduced the leading features of the mother country. There were, in fact, grounds for believing that the sneer of Gibbon, and the more earnest and oft-quoted expression of Lord Macaulay, might he realized, and that New Zealand might hereafter represent England in the Southern hemisphere. It was at our very antipodes. It was not very dissimilar to England in point of size and shape; and it resembled the mother country in climate and natural productions. Moreover, any dangers that could arise to the colonists were internal. Therefore, the case of New Zealand was one admirably adapted for enforcing the policy for which he was contending. But be had hitherto spoken in 1599 the abstract. With regard to the present generation of colonists in New Zealand, there were two strong points in favour of their claim to be aided by us in their Native wars at present. He could not, indeed, admit all that bad been urged on their behalf; as, that the war had been for Imperial, and not for colonial objects, or had not been entered into with their approval. But the first of those points was, that the colonists had been sent out with the ideas and under the regulations of the old system, and they were on that account entitled to every consideration before any new principle was adopted. The second point in their favour was, that we had absolutely withdrawn from them all effective power over legislation with regard to the Natives, in reference to the latter point, it had been stated in another place by Mr. Adderley, a gentleman who spoke with considerable authority oh colonial questions, that the colonists had had a constitution given to them, and that the Crown acted in New Zealand, as it did here, in all matters affecting the Natives as well as any others. But the question was, in what way the Crown acted. In the mother country the Crown acted through it's responsible ministers; while in the colony of New Zealand on this single question of dealing with the Natives the Governor was not responsible to the Parliament of the colony, but to the Colonial Office at home. On the one hand, he (Lord Lyttelton) thought that the Government of this country should see the Government of New Zealand out of their present difficulties; but, on the other hand, he thought it desirable that there should be a speedy termination of the present system, and that the people of New Zealand should have the entire control over every subject relating to their own internal affairs. With regard to the particular case of Taranaki, he admitted it was difficult to devise a remedy for the unhappy state of affairs referred to in the Petition, and it would be idle to expect that Parliament should make a specific grant for that purpose. The Colonial Legislature had voted a large sum—he believed not less than £250,000—for the relief of the distress that had arisen in that settlement. But a colony like New Zealand would necessarily experience great difficulty in raising such an amount at once, and it had been suggested that the Home Government might assist the colony by guarantee or otherwise in raising the whole or a portion 1600 of that amount without difficulty, and so as to be immediately available.
§ THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE
My Lords, my noble Friend, in presenting a Petition, seems to me to have gone round the whole subject of colonization, and yet Mot to have touched the special point referred to by the Petitions. My noble Friend was, no doubt, placed in a very difficult position, for in presenting a Petition containing sentiments in which he does not concur, and ending with a request of which he does not approve, he had no doubt some difficulty in making a speech which would call for a reply from me; and accordingly I do not find very much in his speech to reply to. In fact, he appears to me, as far as principles are concerned, to go beyond anything which I have expressed in the despatch to which he has referred, in respect to the liability of the colonists for the expenses of the war; for he said most emphatically, that though he is unwilling to lay down any general principle, yet he thinks there is one rule of universal application—that all Colonies are bound to bear the expenses of their own defence, which includes the control of the natives within their borders. Now, I am not prepared to go quite that length, and I have been misunderstood upon that point both by my noble Friend and by the colonists. During the time that I have held the seals of the Colonial Office, I have always felt it objectionable to lay down general principles to apply to varying circumstances. But it must be borne in mind under what circumstances this despatch was written. A year ago I wrote a despatch to the colony of an essentially practical character; and in answer to that the two Houses of Parliament of New Zealand sent over a memorial to Her Majesty of the most extraordinary character I ever heard of as coming from a Crown Colony. Though I have laid it down as a general principle that the Colonies should provide for their own defence, I have never said that all assistance from the Home Government should be withdrawn from New Zealand, and that the colonists should be left to fight out their own battles with the Natives. On the contrary, in the despatch of May 1862, although I said that that principle would be in future maintained, yet that it would not be enforced in the present circumstances; and I said expressly that the troops would not be withdrawn for the present. Now, with regard to the Petition immediately before the House, 1601 your Lordships will not hear from me any expression other than of commiseration for the inhabitants of Taranaki; but, at the same time, I must in justice say that they have a good deal to answer for themselves in connection with the present condition of things in that province. Their Petition begins by denying—and it has been denied by the agent of the Colony in this country—that this war arose from any wish or desire, any motive or object, on the part of the settlers. To that assertion I distinctly demur. I say that the war, whether right or wrong, justifiable or unjustifiable, originated with the settlers; that the war was for the benefit of the settlers; and that the war was carried on for the advantage of the settlers—for their benefit and by their desire. How did it begin? There had for some time been much difficulty in obtaining those large tracts of land from the Natives which had been obtained in the earlier days of the Colony. The colonists had increased greatly in numbers; in ten or eleven years from 25,000 to over 100,000. Of course, the demand for land became greater every day; and the Native chiefs, apprehensive of the land falling entirely into the bands of the settlers, formed leagues with a view of preventing the sale of land. The settlers complained that under the system that prevailed in the Colony the difficulties of obtaining land were much increased. The inhabitants of Taranaki were prominent among those who made that complaint. In consequence of the representations of the colonists, the Governor held interviews with the settlers and with the Native chiefs in 1859 for the purpose of bringing about an arrangement. I am bound to say that the language which the Governor hold was most fair, for he expressed his determination not to interfere in any Native quarrels, and offered to mediate between the contending parties, but he strongly represented to the Natives that it would be for their own advantage to sell land at a fair price. A bargain was made with one of the chiefs, who promised to sell land—two other chiefs refused to allow that bargain to be carried out—and it appeared that things were merging into getting this bargain carried out by force. The proceedings adopted on the occasion were not taken on the recommendation of the Native Council, but on the recommendation of the Executive Council The order so much commented on before now for enforcing martial law was signet by the Chief Minister connected with the 1602 Executive Council. The settlers presented addresses to the Governor thanking him for what he had done, and asking him to prosecute the measures he had begun uutil the object in view was obtained. Under those circumstances, how can it be said that this war—whether right or wrong, justifiable or unjustifiable, I am not now saying—was not carried out for the benefit of the settlers, and for their benefit alone? In what way were Imperial interests to be promoted by the hostilities? Without doubt, anything that leads to great expense must be prejudicial to Imperial interests; and when it is said that this war was waged for the Queen's supremacy, it ought to be remembered that this supremacy had to be defended only in order that the object of the settlers might be carried out. I do not deny that the province of Taranaki has suffered severely; but that does not involve the question of compensation from the Imperial Treasury. The sum voted for the inhabitants of Taranaki by the inhabitants of New Zealand is £200,000, of which £25,000 has been paid from money which was raised in this country two years ago. There is at present an agent of the Colony in England with the view of raising a loan of from £500,000 to £600,000, to be applied in payment of the balance of the sum voted to the inhabitants of Taranaki, and about £200,000 to the English Government. Mr. Sewell, the Commissioner appointed to inquire into the matter, estimated the compensation to the inhabitants of Taranaki at £158,000; and the colonists are prepared to pay a larger sum than that, £200,000 having been voted by the Legislature, of which £25,000 has been actually paid to the claimants. But my noble Friend says the Colony is too poor to pay this compensation. I am happy to say the Colony is so prosperous, that notwithstanding the war, the revenue of New Zealand has, during a period of three years, increased from £230,000 to £460,000—or just double—and the imports and exports more than doubled between 1861—the year in which the war commenced—and the following year. I therefore hold that there is no justification for asking this sum from the Imperial Parliament. I now come to another point which I wish to touch upon lightly. I may remind the House that in 1852, by the Act giving a Constitution to the Colony, the islands of New Zealand were divided into six provinces. The present Governor of New Zealand, Sir George Grey, expressed his regret 1603 that this Taranaki was constituted a province; he thought it would give rise to difficulties. It contains very considerably less than 1,000 adult male settlers; yet this small body has a Superintendent and a Legislative Council of its own, to deal with its legislative, municipal, and administrative affairs, and it returns three members to the General Legislative Assembly of New Zealand. The consequence is that the province exercises upon the central Government a pressure, which is most mischievous, though I give the Government credit for resisting it to the utmost of their power. In Taranaki there is—I will not say a large body—but a fair proportion of individuals who are at this moment declaring that the only good result for which they can look is a renewal of the war with the Natives, and something like the extermination of that unfortunate people. As long as such language is held, the Government must be placed in much difficulty in restoring peace and tranquillity; but I do trust that they will support the humane, yet determined action of the Governor, and will refuse to sanction anything which will tend to such a frightful result. Let me remind your Lordships that we are discussing these matters without any very recent papers upon the subject; but other and more recent papers are now preparing. It is necessary to be careful what papers are produced, because, while it is the duty of the Governor to keep Her Majesty's Government informed upon all that is going on, there is a danger in printing speeches reflecting on the Natives or measures contemplated by the Governor, since these are speedly carried back and translated into Maori, and there are plenty of people ready to place a false construction upon them, and instigate the Natives to deeds of violence which, if they were properly informed, they would not be inclined to commit. My noble Friend said that things were looking no better than they were looking many months ago. But I am happy to say that despatches received by the last mail show a very considerable improvement. There are two blocks—that is, districts of land which are bought from the Natives—which have been in dispute ever since the war concluded, or was suspended, two years ago—it is impossible to say which is the ease. Following their own customs, which existed before Englishmen ever touched the islands, the Natives consider that these blocks belong to them by right of conquest. The settlers having been driven out of them, and not having re-occupied them, 1604 the Natives maintained that they belonged to them, and refused to give them up. Now, I need not not say that Sir George Grey has not allowed the Natives to believe for a moment that he would recognise such a claim. And I will draw this moral from what has taken place—that it is most important when you have a Governor of the knowledge, discretion, and humanity which characterize Sir George Grey, to place confidence in him, and not be too hasty in condemning him because we do not see immediately the results from his policy which we should all desire. For the last two years Sir George Grey has been pursuing a quiet, steady, but resolute policy, of which we are now reaping the fruits. He began, as a statesman and a soldier would begin, by making roads through this difficult country, intersected by morasses and jungle. After doing this, General Cameron, at the head of a few troops, took possession of both those blocks, established a redoubt on each, and had done this without shedding a drop of blood; while, instead of the resistance with which he was threatened by the Natives—but still more by those who for their own purposes and objects profess to speak on behalf of the Natives—the Governor, with the General and the troops, were received with the utmost cordiality and good-will. By the last accounts—and I have a private letter from the Governor dated three or four days later than the last despatch—he informed me that the Natives, who had so lately been fighting against us, were bringing in potatoes and other commodities for sale for the use of the troops. Now, this is a very hopeful sign, and looks like the beginning of the end. Under such circumstances, I hope that in this country and in the colony patience will be shown, and that in New Zealand the voices of those men whose object is war will be extinguished. In conclusion, I cannot help repeating my high approval of the manner in which Sir George Grey has conducted the affairs of the Colony ever since he returned to it; while nothing can be more admirable than the assistance rendered to him by the distinguished General who was sent out by the illustrious Duke (the Duke of Cambridge) to take charge of the military operations at the commencement of the war. Sir George Grey always speaks in the highest terms of the aid which General Cameron has given him, and of the discretion and good sense shown by that officer on every occasion; and I rejoice that the Commander-in-Chief has requested the General 1605 to continue his services there for some time longer. I earnestly hope that nothing will be said with reference to the Natives in this country, whatever may be said in the Colony, tending to instigate them to measures which will end in a renewal of the war.
§ EARL GREY
said, he could not allow the discussion to close without expressing his entire dissent from the views expressed by his noble Friend (Lord Lyttelton), and also his regret at the principles of policy which he feared the Government had determined upon pursuing with respect to this matter. His noble Friend had not exaggerated the distress which had been brought upon a portion of New Zealand by the Maori war. He had heard with satisfaction from the Secretary of State that by the last account appearances were more promising, and that we were not immediately threatened with a renewal of the war. But he could not help thinking, that though the danger of a renewal of the war might be averted for the present by the ability of Sir George Grey, unless a more decided policy was adopted, New Zealand would remain a slumbering volcano, ready at any moment to break out and involve not Taranaki alone, but other settlements, in ruin. He held this opinion because, when they considered what was going on, it was impossible not to see that the late war arose from the just discontent on the part of the Maoris. His noble Friend laid it down as a general principle that this country ought never, under any circumstances, to interfere for the internal defence of Colonies; that this ought to be left exclusively to the colonists, even when they were placed in the midst of numerous and savage enemies; and that, on the other hand, we should not attempt to interfere with the measures which they thought it right to pursue for themselves. Now, he differed entirely from his noble Friend, believing it to be necessary both to contribute to their defence under such circumstances, and also to exercise some control over the measures which they adopted. What would be the consequence of doing otherwise? Some time after the colonization of New Zealand a war broke out with the Natives, and Sir George Grey was sent out with large power. Sir George, by a judicious use of his powers and a prudent display of military force, put an end to the war, and subsequently sanctioned many laws of great benefit both to the settlers and to the natives From 1846 to 1852 peace continued, the Colony enjoyed complete tranquillity, and made great progress in wealth and prosperity; 1606 while the natives were conciliated, and were becoming attached to the Queen's rule. In 1852 Parliament thought fit to grant representative institutions to New Zealand, and had they been framed in a judicious manner would probably have been of great service. But, unfortunately, the Act which was passed for the purpose of creating these institutions contained provisions which left the Governor no executive authority in the Colony. The Superintendents of the different provinces were made elective; and afterwards Colonial Acts were passed which established the system of what has been styled responsible Government, but might more correctly be described as party Government. He had always held, that until a Colony had made considerable progress in wealth and population, such a Government was not one calculated to promote its real interests, and that the more simple form of representative institutions which was alone known in our Colonies twenty years since, was more calculated to advance their prosperity. But whatever opinions might be held upon the general question of policy, no one, he thought, would believe that such a system of government was fitted for a Colony where British settlers were mixed up with large numbers of a Native race in a very low stage of civilization. The consequence of such a system was simply this—that an educated minority obtained all the powers of Government, and almost necessarily administered the affairs of the Colony without any reference to the interests or feelings of the Native population. Thus in the case of New Zealand the immediate consequence of the change of system was, that the Natives, who had become loyal and attached to the British Sovereignty, were rendered discontented by seeing all power transferred from those whom they regarded as their friends and protectors to the hands of a party whose expressed views were opposed to the interests of the Natives. They found that their interests were neglected, that measures which had been passed appropriating for their benefit a portion of the revenues to which they largely contributed were discontinued, and that those in whom they had confidence were dismissed from the public service through party motives. Those circumstances produced feelings of disaffection; and then occurred the events at Taranaki which led to the outbreak of the war. He had always held the belief, that whatever might be the truth on the much-disputed question as to the technical right to the land in question, 1607 the act of taking possession of it at that time was an act of extreme imprudence, for which the colonial Ministry were solely responsible. It led to war, in the course of which a dreadful waste of life and property occurred, which were ultimately stopped mainly by the cessation of attempts to enforce the obnoxious measures. Peace had since continued, owing to the judicious measures adopted by Sir George Grey. But still there remained this state of things. There was an Assembly of fluctuating opinions, upon which the authority of the Ministers depended, and except through these Ministers the Governor could do nothing. There were elected Superintendents, who were practically exempt from all control of the Governor; and there still remained among the natives feelings of jealousy and suspicion, which might at any time lead to an outbreak. That was not a state of things which should be permitted to continue. He must confess that he had read the despatches with some surprise, because he found in them no suggestions of a remedy for the present unsatisfactory condition of affairs. If it were desired to prevent a renewal of the war, sooner or later there could be no doubt that we must to some extent retrace our steps. With Colonies situated as New Zealand was, the mother country should deal more generously with the colonists, and ought not to call upon them to bear the whole burden of defending themselves before they were in a condition to undertake the task. He had always held that as a Colony became prosperous and populous it should be required to take upon itself a share—and even a large share—of the burden of self-defence; but he could not approve of the doctrine of the duty of Colonies to defend themselves being pushed to an extreme, and that in circumstances of difficulty and danger like those of New Zealand and the Cape we should throw the Colonics upon their own resources. What would he the consequence of doing so? It was well described in that memorial which the noble Duke had referred to, and which, among some easily-refuted arguments, also contained some just complaints, which had not been dealt with in the despatches. In the memorial it was truly pointed out, that if the colonists were left entirely to their own defence, any future war must degenerate into a guerilla war—a life-and-death struggle between the contending races. That statement was perfectly true—if there were no impartial authority to control the war, and to prevent abuses, any future war must become one of extermination. The 1608 noble Duke thought, it would be unjust to the colonists to expect they would act upon such extreme principles; but they would not be able to avoid it, and all past experience proved that it was almost inevitable under such circumstances. The case of North America had been referred to:—hut in North America the process of colonization was a process of the gradual extermination of the natives—a process disgraceful to Europe, although in those days these matters were less understood than at present. But in New Zealand that was not necessary. The Maoris had shown themselves capable of government, and anxious to submit to a fair and impartial government; and it had also been shown, that by the authority of the Crown, properly supported and exercised, a state of peace and good order might be preserved which, in the course of a few years, or perhaps he should rather say generations, might lead to the amalgamation of the two races and the formation of a happy and contented community. If the present state of things were allowed to go on, the war of extermination predicted by the Assembly might result; other settlements besides Taranaki would be involved in similar calamities. That was a state of things which they were not justified in allowing to arise. The measures to avert these consequences were not difficult to discover. It was not necessary that the war should be revived, or to deprive New Zealand of the benefits of representative institutions. What was necessary was that they should have such institutions as formerly prevailed in the Colonies; that the executive authority of the Crown should be re-established; that what was called responsible Government should be got rid of; that the Governor should be responsible to the Crown and the British Parliament for his executive administration, and that while the Colonies should have, through their representatives, the power of making known both to him and to the Imperial Government their wants and wishes, the executive authority should be wielded by the Governor, assisted by Ministers who were servants of the Crown, holding their places technically during pleasure, but virtually during good behaviour. He was perfectly persuaded that the Colonies were not able to provide such forces as were necessary, and that it was necessary that this country should take on itself the charge of maintaining for some years to come a considerable military force in the Colony. By these measures, while the European settlers would enjoy all the real benefits of representative 1609 Government, they would, on the other hand, conciliate the Maoris, and secure to them a just and impartial government. He did not want to go further, except to say this—he deeply lamented to observe, from the despatch of the noble Duke, that Her Majesty's Government had a totally different notion of the principles which ought to be acted on, not only in regard to New Zealand, but in other Colonics. They seemed to think that they should abdicate all authority in the affairs of the Colonies, and throw them entirely on their own resources. He totally dissented from that policy. He was as much opposed as any of their Lordships to a system of vexatious interference in the internal affairs of the Colonies; but, he said, if the British Colonies were to continue to form part of a great Empire, it was absolutely necessary that the Imperial authority should be maintained, in order to insure that the government of every part of the Empire should be carried on in such a manner as to promote the general interests of the whole. The degree of interference that was required in different Colonies varied greatly, according to their several circumstances. As they became more advanced, the interference of the mother country in their administration might be gradually relaxed; but in none of them, not even in the most advanced, ought the reins to be thrown down altogether. If they were to abdicate all control, let them get rid of the mere name of sovereignty. If the Imperial Government is to exercise no authority over the Colonies, it ought to be relieved from all responsibility on their account—they ought to cease to form part of the British Empire and to use the British flag. But he was of opinion that the abandonment of our Colonics would be a mean and unworthy policy, and he was one of those who should most regret to sec it adopted; but, mean and unworthy as he regarded that policy, still worse and still less to be defended on any principle of reason was that policy which should retain possession of the Colonies, and shrink from the performance of the obligations and the fulfilment of the duties which their connection with us involved. That was a policy which England could not pursue without deep disgrace. Such were the views he entertained. He could not read the despatch of the noble Duke, or listen to his speech, without entering his protest against the doctrines laid down in them. He entirely concurred with the noble Duke as to the propriety of exercising 1610 great discretion and judgment in choosing the despatches from New Zealand which, in the present state of things, should be laid on the table and published. He, for one, should never find fault with the noble Duke for exercising a large discretion in withholding any documents he thought it dangerous to publish; but, on the other hand, he must complain that they had been kept so long in ignorance of the policy which the Government intended to pursue. He found this despatch which the noble Duke wrote to New Zealand, containing an exposition of what the policy of the Government was in future to he, bore date February 26, and it had only been laid on the table and ordered to be printed on the 10th of the present month, so that it had been in their hands only a few days. They had thus been kept these three or four months in absolute ignorance as to the policy of the Government in a matter of vital importance. For his own part, had he known earlier of the existence of that despatch, and if no other noble Lord had done so, he should have felt himself called on to bring it under their consideration. At the present period of the Session, however, he felt that the subject was one to which justice could not be done. He deeply regretted that despatch had been so long withheld.
§ THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE
wished to explain. His noble Friend complained that the House and the public had been kept in ignorance of the policy of the Government by the delay which had taken place in the production of this despatch; and primâ facie his noble Friend was quite correct in saying that the despatch was ordered to be printed on the 10th of this month. But the despatch had been laid on the table of the House of Commons within a week after it was written; and it was entirely a mistake that it had not been delivered to their Lordships. It was only when his noble Friend at the table, who intended to use it, stated that although he had seen a copy of it, it had not been produced, that his attention had been called to the fact, and it was then laid on the table and ordered to be printed. The despatch, however, he repeated, had been laid before the House of Commons three months ago.
§ LORD LYVEDEN
said, he entirely approved of the last despatch of his noble Friend, and could not concur with the noble Earl as to the expense incurred for the defence and government of our Colonies. The real history of all the wars was, that the settlers, confiding in an immense force being sent out from this country in case of hostilities, were always ready to pursue an oppressive course towards the Natives. No doubt there were remedies for this evil; but he hoped the Government would never resort to the course of retracing their steps by upsetting responsible government in the Colonies; for if they did so, the whole Colonies would revolt against it. As regarded the treatment of Native races, he feared that wherever the Anglo-Saxon race obtained a permanent settlement there was a tendency to the gradual extermination of the aborigines.