QUESTION. (Hansard, 26 June 1863)

THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDE

said, that in asking the Question of which he had given notice on this subject, he was not going to discuss the propriety or the justice of the decisions of the American 1505 Prize Courts—and specifically, not in the case of the Dolphin. But he thought that the proceedings of those Courts should be closely watched; for if doctrines were admitted there contrary to those maintained in the highest Courts of this country, great confusion would be the result hereafter. With respect to the amount of evidence necessary to condemn a ship, he thought no man of common sense would support the dicta of the American Courts in this respect. The principle upon which a sentence of condemnation and another sentence of conditional condemnation had been pronounced differed entirely from those laid down by the English Privy Council during the last war. It was now maintained in America that suspicion was sufficient to justify the condemnation of a vessel—that the onus of proving innocence was upon not merely the captain and crew, but upon the owner of the ship. The owner was called upon to prove a negative. Moreover, it was held that where a ship was going avowedly and confessedly to a neutral port, a strong presumption arose of the intention to run the blockade, because before the war there was no demand in the port for the goods which she carried. Now, that was a monstrous doctrine. There might be a market of goods to be run, or those goods might be sent legitimately by land to the Confederate States; but that was not a ground on which we ought to permit our ships to be condemned, for we had a perfect right to establish a depôt for every kind of goods at Nassau if we chose to do so. It was necessary that not only our merchants, but the officers of the Royal Navy should clearly understand what would suffice for the condemnation of a vessel and to constitute an infringement of belligerent rights. He had no wish to press for a discussion upon the subject now that there was a hope of this unhappy war coming to an end, in which case the confusion and irregularities arising from it might be expected to cease. He hoped that this horrible and now unnecessary war was about to terminate, because it had been stated, in what appeared to be an authoritative form, that the Emperor of the French had made or renewed a proposal to the British Government to recognise the existing Government of the Confederate States. That was a most important step, and he could not but think that the time had come when we could not permit a continued hindering of our com- 1506 merce. He did not desire that we should interfere in any way, but it was quite compatible with our position as neutrals that we should recognise a Government which had shown itself to be capable of conducting its affairs at home and abroad and of performing all the functions of a Government. If England and France, and he might add Spain, were to recognise that Government, he had no doubt that a speedy termination would be put to this war. He would ask the noble Earl, Whether any proposition had been received from the Government of France; and, also, whether any Reports of the Proceedings in the Prize Courts of the United States of America, especially in reference to the Case of the Dolphin, have been received at the Foreign Office?

§ EARL RUSSELL

I will first answer toe Question of my noble Friend whether any report of the proceedings of the Prize Courts of the United States, especially with reference to the case of the Dolphin, has been received at the Foreign Office. In answer to that Question, I have to state that what appears to be an authentic report of the judgment in the case of the Dolphin was received at the Foreign Office last evening. I should think it right, certainly, that all these cases should be watched. I find the doctrines relied upon in that judgment are those laid down by Sir William Grant and Lord Stowell. Whether these doctrines are rightly applied to the circumstances of this particular case is another question, and one upon which I offer no opinion. I shall not re-enter upon a discussion which we had upon a former evening, but I still think that the opinions held upon international law by my noble Friend are not in accordance with the high authorities upon the subject. As to the second Question, whether any communication has been made to the Government of this country by the Government of the Emperor of the French, proposing or suggesting a recognition of the Southern States of America, I have to say that no such communication has been received. Upon the general subject of recognition, I do not think the circumstances are much altered since my noble Friend (Lord Stratheden) brought forward his Motion in this House, and I entertain the same opinions which I then expressed.