HL Deb 27 July 1863 vol 172 cc1440-53
VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE

rose— To call attention to the proposed Guaranty of the Ionian Islands, when transferred to Greece, as appearing from the First Article of the Fourth Protocol of the Conference held at the Foreign Office relating to Greek Affairs, and recently presented to the House, by Command of Her Majesty. The question to which he referred might be best explained by the Notice which he had placed on their Lordships' book, and which related to the Conference which appeared to have taken place at the Foreign Office on the 26th of last month; and the particular point to which he wished to direct attention was the guaranty which it was proposed to extend to those Islands, similar to that which had hitherto been extended to the monarchy of Greece. He wished for a moment to refer to the cession of the Ionian Islands, and he would confine himself to reminding their Lordships of what he considered the main objections to that cession. The first objection was the want which we might feel, particularly with regard to Corfu, in case of war in the Mediterranean. When the Ionian Islands first became an object of policy with this country, an expedition was sent out against six of the Islands, which were taken possession of by His Majesty's forces after a considerable expenditure of blood and treasure. That expedition did not attack Corfu, and the reason was to be found in this—that it was occupied by the French, and could not probably be attacked with success. Another point of which he would remind their Lordships was the objection which appeared to be entertained by the Government of Austria; and—what went further than a mere expression of opinion—the positive diplomatic objection on the part of Turkey. Then there were other points, such as the loss of the money which had been expended on the fortifications of those Islands, and especially of Corfu, during the last forty-five years. Of course, if we transferred the Islands to another Power, we not only lost all that money, but placed in their hands what might be turned against ourselves in the course of events. There were other points which must be present to their Lordships' minds with respect to this transfer, which he held to be most objectionable, and the more so as they now found that this application of a guaranty seemed to be considered as a necessary part of the transfer. Another point was whether the cession was well calculated to carry out the generous intentions of his noble Friend (Earl Russel). He confessed he was of opinion, that while it would create additional embarrassment for Greece, it would not add to the happiness of the Ionian Islanders themselves. It was said that the Islanders were left to choose for themselves, and that there would be no change if the Ionians did not themselves sanction it by their votes. But perhaps those who were standing by might form as just an idea of the position of the parties as those who were more immediately interested. With respect to Greece itself, he would read an extract from a letter which he received a few days ago from Athens, and which presented a vivid picture of the state of things. It was dated the 16th— Of these disturbances, in which I believe that from 150 to 200 men were killed and wounded"—the reports from other persons made the numbers much more, but his correspondent was a moderate man—"you will, no doubt, have seen the accounts. The fighting was more or less for a couple of days at intervals in different parts of the town. The Palace, the Bank, and the Acropolis were occupied or attacked. The most flagitious affair was the attack on the Bank by the well known Koronéos. Canaris and his sons appear to have been deeply mixed up in all these affairs, and Christides, Grivas, and others. Canaris has had a son killed in these skirmishes. Bulgaria is not altogether free from blame, although I acquit him of having done anything wilfully to bring on this state of civil war. The chief cause of it was the nomination of Koronéos to be Minister of War. He was only Minister for about a day, in which time he discharged and arrested all the commanders of corps supposed not to be friendly to him. That was the match which caused the general explosion. The three Ministers (foreign) at length interfered and tranquillity was restored to this distracted town. But how long it will last I don't know. A new Ministry has been formed, but it is difficult to get good men to accept office, as the composition of the National Assembly is such that it is difficult, if not impossible, for a good Minister to do his duty. We hear nothing from Denmark, see nobody thence; consequently intriguers make many people believe that there is no question of a King coming here. He would ask their Lordships whether the present state of things in Greece—although he admitted that the people of that country had behaved with remarkable moderation after the retirement of King Otho—gave any guaranty of the future tranquillity of Greece, or any encouragement to hand over the Ionian Islands to that country. If there were anything in the character of the inhabitants of those Islands to warrant the belief that they would, after their annexation to Greece, give to the Government of that country a different tone and character, he could understand the course taken by the Government. He could only hope, that as the transfer of these Islands was not completed, something would yet occur to prevent it; if not, he feared we should one day lament that we had been parties to a transaction that promised so ill for the tranquillity of both countries. He would remind their Lordships, that if the Ionian Islands were transferred to Greece, various circumstances might arise in the course of European policy which might render it necessary for us again to interfere, and which might render the possession of the Ionian Islands a source of danger both to themselves and others. It was a point of statesmanship in this country to avoid giving international pledges and guarantees which would compel us to interfere. More than one English Ministry had been compelled to go to war to redeem, at whatever cost, pledges that had been previously given, because the honour of the country was supposed to be involved in the redemption of those pledges. This danger belonged to all guarantees, and he therefore regretted that the principle of guarantees was so greatly extended as scarcely to leave a part of Europe where we were not in danger of war in consequence. Their Lordships could scarcely be aware of the extent to which this system of guarantees now prevailed. We had guaranteed the integrity and neutrality of Belgium. The Kingdom of Greece had likewise been taken under the guarantee of this country. The independence of Turkey had also been guaranteed by a treaty, which it was hoped would keep the Porte steady to those principles of reform without which Turkey would have no chance of escaping the dangers by which she was threatened. One of the greatest objections to such guarantees was, that after having entered into them we were no longer masters of our own policy. We were exposed at any moment to consequences of the most dangerous and hazardous kind, in which we might find our honour and our interest at variance. It had been his fortune to be connected with affairs that were attended with violent commotion, and it had been thought by some that his disposition had been rather to aid than to keep back the inclination to bring matters to the last extremity. His conscience, however, acquitted him of any feeling of this hind, and he could appeal to all the varied diplomatic correspondence in which he had been engaged to show that no such accusation was well founded. Their Lordships might recollect that his noble Friend (Earl Grey), in a former debate, brought a heavy charge, not against himself in particular, but against diplomacy in general, for having caused the war with Russia. He believed that the Emperor of Russia, in consequence of the affair of the Holy Places and the negotiations which followed, thought he had lost a great deal of prestige both at home and in Turkey, and considered it absolutely necessary to take some step in consequence. He was, no doubt, confirmed in this determination by the disposition evinced by the Turkish Government to adopt improvements in regard to internal administration, and to connect Turkey more closely with European policy. Perhaps the Emperor thought, that unless something were done, the object of his ambition would escape him. The only way to recover lost ground in the eyes of his subjects, and to establish an exclusive protectorate over the Greek population in Turkey, was by undertaking a war with that object; and to that desire, and not to any failure of diplomatic action either on the part of the Ministers at home, or their agents abroad, might be traced the war which had taken place. It was impossible not to perceive the dangers which were threatening the country at this moment, and it would give him great pain to use language in the smallest degree tending to increase the risk of an unpleasant solution of existing difficulties. But it was impossible that any conclusion satisfactory to this country, or to those more intimately concerned, could be arrived at till the positive duty which this country had to perform was clearly ascertained. There was first a duty of a general kind arising from considerations of humanity; next, the duty, more or less positive, imposed upon us by treaty obligations; and lastly, the duty of maintaining peace and putting an end to a state of things which, if it were allowed to continue, would prove far more injurious to general tranquillity than any mistakes of a diplomatic character. Having gone so far into the Polish matter, he thought it would be wise, considering the present state of the public mind, if the Government were to take some step to induce Russia to change her policy. The more we multiplied our guarantees the more we exposed ourselves to the danger of being involved in war in spite of ourselves. It was with regret he perceived that an approach to an engagement of this kind had been made; and if any expression of public opinion could be listened to at the present moment, he hoped it would produce a reconsideration, not only of the guarantee, but of the transfer to which it was annexed. It was with more than usual reluctance that he occupied a few minutes of their Lordships' time on this subject, but it was one of so much importance, and their Lordships were now on the eve of separating for so long a period, that he felt himself justified in taking the only opportunity open to him for expressing the opinions which he entertained.

EARL RUSSELL

My Lords, my noble Friend has a full title to be listened to at any period of the Session that he may think it his duty to make observations to the House. His distinguished services and his eminent talents, matured by experience such as few have enjoyed in modern times, must always give weight to any opinions expressed by him in his place in Parliament. Before the commencement of the Session, when I spoke to some foreign Ministers on the subject of the cession of the Ionian Islands and explained to them the views of Her Majesty's Government, it was said by certain parties that it was an outrageous and unprecedented proceeding for me to dispose of those Islands without the previous assent of Parliament. Those remarks were made in error; for, in point of fact, nothing was concluded before the Session of Parliament commenced, and nothing has been finally concluded even down to the present time. We have gone through a Session of about the usual length—it cannot be regarded as unusually short, though we have had fewer measures than usual—and yet, although it was open to noble Lords opposite, and to their political Friends in the other House of Parliament—although, it was open to my noble Friend or to any other noble Lord objecting to this arrangement—to propose any vote or Resolution by which the negotiation would have been altogether stopped, we find that neither in this nor in the other House of Parliament was any Motion of the kind brought forward. We are therefore acquitted, at all events, of having set at defiance the deliberate opinion of Parliament and of the country. Whether we are liable to the observations of my noble Friend behind me or not, I believe the transfer to be one which meets the general approbation of the country. I will not, therefore, go into the arguments which I used on a former occasion in defence of the policy which has been adopted. My noble Friend has spoken of the guarantee proposed to be given to the Ionian Islands. I must remind my noble Friend that the guarantee to Greece is not given now any more than the other guarantees to which he referred. The guarantee to Greece was given in 1832, and all that the representative of France, the representative of Russia, and myself, as representing the Foreign Office of Great Britain, have done has been to transfer the guarantee from the arrangement of 1832 to that which is now proposed to be made in 1863—that is to say, the present King of Greece stands in the same relations towards those electing him as King Otho did, the Ionian Islands having been added to Greece and comprehended within his territories. If the guarantee to the Kingdom of Greece was likely to lead us into embarrassment, it remains; but I do not think the addition of the Ionian Islands can add much to that danger. My noble Friend says that the Ambassadors of Austria and Turkey object to this union. It is quite true that at first they did not regard the proposition with favour; but, at least, I think I may fairly say that they do not now make any opposition whatever to the union of the Ionian Islands to Greece. There is a technical question with regard to the presence of the Turkish Ambassador as one of the acceding Powers; but, in the first place, Turkey never formally acceded to the Treaty of 1815 in reference to these Islands, and, in the second place, the validity of their transfer to Great Britain was not affected by that circumstance. With respect to the present state of Greece, I am very sorry to agree with my noble Friend that there have been military troubles and disorder in that kingdom. I am not sure, that when George I. ascended the English throne, we should have been perfectly free from tumult, if it had not been for some Dutch troops previously brought to this country and, even as it was, there was a period of civil war, when more than one eminent person lost his head on the scaffold, before the throne of George I. was established If that were the case where a King acceded to the throne immediately, if it more surprising that a country torn by party dissensions, and left with out an acknowledged monarch for many months, from October to the present time, should witness the breaking out of hostilities? It will be the work of the young Prince who has accepted the throne, and of his advisers, to endeavour to control these tendencies and to establish a free constitutional monarchy in that country. I am happy to say that the young Prince is well disposed to undertake that task, and Count Pahlen, who is a man of as much experience and political wisdom as any in Denmark, is quite willing to take his part as the adviser of the Prince in the execution of this work. As I have said before, I am disposed to hope rather than to despair with reference to subjects of this kind, and the greater prospect there is that the young Prince will be able to establish a constitutional monarchy, the more I rejoice that there is a Prince to be found in Europe, who has the courage, and who is disposed rather to take the part which William the Silent, Prince of Orange, took in the affairs of Europe, than to shrink from the splendid prize which is offered him, and from the duty of becoming the head of what is certainly a troublesome and troubled kingdom. My noble Friend does not entertain the sanguine hopes which I do with regard to the future of Greece. When Parliament meets again, we shall see whose opinion is the sounder, and I am sure that all your Lordships will rejoice to see Greece making progress in constitutional freedom. I agree generally with what my noble Friend has said as to guarantees and political influence, and I am glad that I do so, because his opinion upon such subjects must be of more weight than mine, The influence of this country ought to be maintained, and, if posble, increased, because it will always be exerted in favour of the freedom and independence of countries. I admit that there is considerable danger in multiplying guarantees. However, political circumstances may prevail over these general maxims. These guarantees were given, some in 1832, and others in 1856. I believe that the political circumstances of both those periods justified the giving of these guarantees. But, at the same time, I fully admit that we ought not unnecessarily to multiply such guarantees, because, when you have given a guarantee, you are not free to take either side which the interests of the country may require—to be active or entirely passive as your interests may demand—but must, as a matter of honour, carry out the guarantee Which you have given. These are, however, questions of times and circumstances. The must dogmatic philosopher who ever wrote upon politics, Rousseau, said that it was not an exact science, but one of times and opportunities, modifications and changes. I did not understand my noble Friend to lay down any exact rule which the Government ought, in his opinion, to follow with respect to such a question as that of Poland. He left every question to be decided, as I think every man must leave it to be decided in the first instance, by the aspect of the circumstances of the time and the view which Her Majesty's Government may take of those circumstances. I should certainly be very sorry to add to the difficulties both of the Government and the country by laying down any positive rules with regard to such questions.

THE EARL OF DERBY

My Lords, I hardly think that the noble Earl (Earl Russell) was justified in taunting the noble Viscount, or noble Lords who are not supporters of Her Majesty's Government, with the circumstance that this cession is brought before your Lordships at the very close of the Session. It is quite true that no Motion has been made in either House of Parliament upon the subject of the cession of the Ionian Islands, but the noble Earl will recollect, that when the subject was first discussed in the House of Commons, the noble Viscount at the head of the Government (Viscount Palmerston) laid down very distinctly and strongly the extraordinary doctrine—to which it appeared to me that the noble Earl (Earl Russell) did not entirely assent—that this was a question with which Parliament had nothing to do. If, at any period of the Session, the subject had been brought before either House of Parliament, or any attempt had been made to elicit their opinion upon the merits of the case, we should certainly have been met with the answer, "You are speaking at a very unreasonable time—a period when nothing definitively is arranged. You are anticipating what may be the course of proceedings, and it is very unusual and very inconvenient for the public service that questions which are still under discussion should be made the subject of discussions in Parliament." Therefore, I do not think that there is any imputation upon those who disapprove the policy which Her Majesty's Government have pursued for forbearing to raise any debate or take any vote as to the merits of an uncompleted transaction. On the other hand, it was almost impossible that the noble Viscount (Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe), with his great experience, particularly in the affairs of that part of the Continent, with the knowledge which he possesses and the interest which he takes in the concerns of Greece and Turkey, should not draw your Lordships' attention before you separate for five or six months to the actual position in which Greece stands at present, and in which it is proposed to cede to it the Ionian Islands. I entirely concur with a great deal of what the noble Viscount said with regard to the impolicy of multiplying guarantees. The noble Earl admitted the general impolicy of such a course, but his sense of it does not, it seems, prevent him, under present circumstances, from entering into another guarantee, and one which I humbly think may lead to very inconvenient results. I agree also with the noble Viscount in the general objection which he has taken to the cession of the Ionian Islands in the interest of England, in the interest of the Ionian Islands themselves, and in the interest of the peace of Europe. I think that it is one of the most gratuitous cessions, not of territory, but of protectorate, possibly weakening the power of this country and strengthening that of others, which I ever recollect. And if anything could add to its impolicy, it would be the condition of the country to which we are about to cede these Islands and the circumstances in which it at present stands. The noble Earl, in the early part of this correspondence, proposed to cede these Islands, with the consent of the other Powers, when a constitutional monarchy should be established, when he should be satisfied that no aggressive notions were entertained by the Greeks, and should have reason to hope that their constitution was about to work satisfactorily. The noble Earl, upon being satisfied of these things, proposed to refer the question of the cession, first to the Ionians, and then to a Conference. Now, as I understand it, Her Majesty's Government propose to invert the order in which these steps are to be taken. It appears from the statement of the noble Viscount at the head of the Government, as I understand it, that after the Conference has decided that the Ionian Islands are to be ceded to Greece, you are to consult the Ionians as to whether they are willing to be ceded or not. I do not attach much importance as to which step should have precedence. I think that the latter is, to a great extent, a matter of form. But the question whether the Ionian Islands ought, under present circumstances, and with the present prospects of the establishment of an un aggressive constitutional monarchy, to be united to Greece is a question of much more importance. That is the condition which the noble Earl laid down, and to that I wish him to adhere. I hope that he will separate two questions which are entirely distinct, although brought together in the speech of the noble Viscount—the present condition of Greece and the policy of ceding the Ionian Islands—except so far as the present state of Greece is an additional argument against a cession which might, under some circumstances, have been less objectionable than I consider it to be. The noble Earl has spoken, not perhaps with great confidence—that would be too strong a word—but very sanguinely with regard to the political prospects of Greece. He has admired, and I think very justly admired, the courage of the young Prince who, under present circumstances, has undertaken to obtain for himself what the noble Earl calls "a splendid prize." I confess that I have some little doubt as to the splendour of the prize which is to be attained; and though I do not question the courage of the young Prince who, at the age of seventeen, is about to throw himself among these discordant elements, to carve out of these unmanageable materials a possible constitutional monarchy, I must say—with all respect to that illustrious person, and sharing the satisfaction which the noble Earl expressed that any Prince could be found in Europe with sufficient courage to undertake such a task—that I give him more credit for the courage than for the discretion he has shown. I hope that the attempt may succeed, but I hope, I confess, against hope; and certainly the present state of affairs in Greece is not such as to offer any very reasonable ground for the sanguine expectations or the sanguine hopes which have been expressed by the noble Earl. At the commencement of our sitting this evening, I observed that the noble Earl had received Her Majesty's commands to submit to us papers upon some very important questions, and, among others, Correspondence upon the acceptance of the throne of Greece by Prince William, and Papers connected with the state of Athens and Greece. I took up the papers with the anxious desire to ascertain what they contained, but from circumstances with which my noble Friend is acquainted, I did not derive from the inspection any important information, nor did I add much to my stock of knowledge. But, my Lords, the position of Greece has been very recently a cause of the greatest anxiety. Much blood has been shed, and I believe it is the fact that peace was only restored by the landing of a certain number of marines and seamen from the fleets of the protecting Powers. I have seen, I may add, a document, with respect to the authencity of which I hoped to have been able to derive some information from the papers which have been laid upon the table; and I should wish to know from the noble Earl opposite whether it is genuine. It is a diplomatic protest, said to have been issued at Athens on the 3rd of July 1863, by the Ministers of the protecting Powers, and I will read from it, as it has been placed in my hands, the following extract:— The undersigned Ministers of France, Great Britain, and Russia, in pressing upon the heads of both parties of the combatants the cessation of hostilities, only obey a primary duty. The further duty still remains to them to address the Assembly in a manner in which their sympathy for Greece must not diminish the just severity. They do not hesitate to affirm that, according to their judgment, the horrors of this fratricidal struggle cannot find a justification by attributing its origin to misunderstood sentiments of patriotism, which often arm the natives of the same soil against each other. The undersigned unanimously declare that it is their decided conviction these sentiments do not exist, and that there is to be found nothing but the most criminal personal ambitions, of which there is no attempt to conceal the contemptible character; and these ambitions are disputing an ephemeral power at the risk of plunging the whole nation into an abyss in which their future destinies will be engulfed. Perhaps the noble Earl can inform me, before I go any further, whether that is or is not a genuine document.

EARL RUSSELL

I cannot answer at this moment as to every word of the extract, but it certainly contains the sense of the protest.

THE EARL OF DERBY

Then I must naturally assume that the utmost state of confusion prevails in Greece, and that all these discordant elements and all this personal ambition exist at a moment when a young Prince of seventeen is about to step on the scene. That, however, is not a question so much for us as for Denmark. It is, however, a question for us whether we ought to adopt the course of attaching to a State in such a position the Ionian Islands, of which we have taken upon ourselves the protectorate, and over the welfare of which we are bound to watch—for this was one of the consequences the protectorate threw upon us. Can we assume the responsibility of such a step in their case, whether they desire it or not? Does that strong feeling of nationality, which I do not deny exists among the Ionian people, justify us in doing so? For my own part, I must contend, that whatever may be the policy of ceding the Ionian Islands—and I believe that cession to be most impolitic—it is a course which, under the circumstances in which Greece is at present placed, involves a crime of the gravest character. The noble Earl stated in the course of his arguments that he felt persuaded public opinion, if appealed to, would be found to be in favour of the cession; and it is very likely, that if persons who know little about the case, and who see in our protectorate of these Islands only a subject of embarrassment and of constant disputes with other Powers, were consulted upon the point, it would turn out that our possession of them may not be in accordance with the wishes of a large portion of the population of this country. There are, no doubt, a number of persons who would say, "The Ionian Islands have involved us in very considerable expense. We wish we were well rid of them, and that we had never had anything to do with them." That, however, was not the light in which the question ought to be viewed by statesmen. A statesman ought to consider, whether it is, on the whole, for the benefit of the Ionian people, for the advancement of British interests, and for the maintenance of British power—or by any Power which might desire to occupy that one of them which is worth anything in a military point of view—and authority, that these Islands should be ceded to a nation so distracted in itself and so liable to be overborne by other Powers as is this new and hardly formed Kingdom of Greece. I saw it stated in the papers—I do not know whether it is true or not—that within the last two months, during the recent tumults, the Ionian subjects in Athens had applied for the protection of the British Government, and that they were told, that being now subjects of the King of Greece, they were no longer entitled to the protection of this country. If that he so, there has been a most extraordinary anticipation of an event which has not actually taken place, and which even now I would venture to hope may not take place while Greece continues in her present distracted condition. I see nothing but mischief in the cession of the Ionian Islands under such circumstances, and I concur with the noble Viscount opposite in thinking that that cession is likely to be a source of embar- rassment to Greece herself, and to add to the difficulties which the new King of Greece will have in maintaining an un-aggressive policy—because the Ionians themselves have in the most formal manner declared that they looked upon this cession but as an instalment of that which they hoped to achieve, and for the future attainment of which to look to receive support from the moral influence of Great Britain. On all these grounds I look upon the giving-up of these Islands at this moment to be a most unfortunate and a most imprudent step, and I rejoice that the speech of the noble Viscount has at the close of the Session given me an opportunity of once again recording my opinion as to the unhappy consequences which are likely to result from such a course.

EARL RUSSELL

said, there were two points as to which there seemed to be some misapprehension. His noble Friend (Viscount Palmerston) had been represented to have said that Parliament had nothing whatever to do with the cession of the Ionian Islands to Greece. This, however, must have been a mistaken representation of what his noble Friend had said. He might have said that the Ionian Islands were not a possession of the Crown, and therefore could be alienated without the consent of Parliament; and when it was strongly urged that the Islands were an appendage of the British Crown, the obvious answer was that they were a free and independent State, under our protectorate, and that any contract made with regard to them did not require the sanction of the Legislature. But when his noble Friend was represented as saying that Parliament was not entitled to make the fullest investigation and inquiry into a cession of this kind, that was a statement which his noble Friend could not possibly lave made. He (Earl Russell) hoped that those Gentlemen who were impressed with the belief that the Ionian Islands were a possession of the Crown had read the Treaty of 1815; they would then see that this was not the case. The noble Earl asked whether some Ionians at Athens tad been refused the protection of our naval and diplomatic authorities. He (Earl Russell) had seen the rumour in the newspapers, but he had treated it as a mere rumour, and the letters and despatches he had since received contained no allusion to the matter. The noble Earl said he considered the cession of the Ionian Islands to be a crime of the deepest dye, but he trusted that the noble Earl would find an occasion to alter his opinion.

VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE

said a few words in explanation.