HL Deb 24 July 1863 vol 172 cc1338-55
THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDE

said, that in moving an Address on the subject of the atrocities committed or threatened by Russians and Poles during the insurrection in Poland, he did not want to raise any discussion, whether it might or might not be possible for Poland to continue under the dominion of Russia with any guarantee or probability that that country would be pacified. But there was one part of the question upon which they ought to have fuller official information—namely, as to the atrocities and cruelties which were now going on in this lamentable civil war. It might or might not be true that these atrocities were all on one side, but it appeared to him, that having in- terfered on the ground of humanity, and having taken action with France and Austria, England was bound to see upon what foundation the statements which reached this country rested. It was entirely upon the ground of humanity that our Government had taken the course which they had taken, and were placed in the almost unprecedented position in which they now stood. The English and the French had never made so serious an attempt at intervention between Poland and her Russian subjects as at the present time. Any man who at the commencement of this year had predicted that we should find ourselves engaged with France and Austria in what practically was an intervention on behalf of Poland would have been deemed to have a very fertile imagination or else to possess very little political knowledge. The conscription had excited universal indignation both in France and England, and it was impossible for the two Governments to sit still and do nothing. Diplomatic representations were made, with what result everybody knew. The object of our interference had been to stop the effusion of blood and the perpetration of numberless atrocities; but the effect of it, so far as it had any effect, was that almost greater cruelties were committed. Since March, when our representations were first made, General Mouravieff bad been appointed, whose proclamations could not be read without horror and indignation. Few people knew the full extent of these proclamations. Among other things, women wearing mourning in the streets, no matter what bereavement they might have undergone, were to be treated like common women of the town, registered, and subjected to all the examinations to which that class were liable. He bad received many accounts of cruelties which had been committed, but would only mention one as a sample of the Russian rule. A priest who had administered spiritual consolation to a dying insurgent was first sentenced to death, and afterwards, as an act of mercy, that sentence was commuted to twelve years' exile. It was most discreditable to England and France, that after having taken this office upon themselves, such outrages as were reported should have been since committed. He did not think that the sneers and sarcasms of Prince Gortschak off at the reasoning of our Foreign Secretary would disturb him or the public, but it would be felt to be intolerable that Russia, while denying our right to remonstrate, should call for what was called "increased energy" in Poland, which meant fresh atrocities and increased severity, and should hold out no prospect of a mitigation. It was right to say that we did not mean to go to war; but the three Powers were bound, before God and man, to put a stop to these cruelties which were being perpetrated in Poland if they bad the power. He did not agree in the interpretation which in another place had been put on the words used by the Foreign Secretary on a previous occasion. He did not understand his noble Friend to say that under no circumstances would we go to war in this matter, but rather that these negotiations had not been commenced with a view of attacking or injuring Russia. Her Majesty's Government might not upon other grounds have a right to meddle in this matter, but they bad pledged themselves to interfere to put a stop to those unchristian and barbarous practices. Their Lordships ought to have full information in reference to what was now taking place in Poland, in order that they might see whether there had been any mitigation of the atrocities which had been practised in that country. He therefore begged to move That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty for, Copies of any Reports that may have been received from our Diplomatic or Consular Agents on the Continent of Atrocities committed or threatened by Russians or Poles since 1st May; And to inquire whether Her Majesty's Government had reason to hope that the civil war now raging in Poland would be henceforth conducted according to the usages of civilized warfare.

EARL RUSSELL

My Lords, my noble Friend has asked us to produce the reports of our diplomatic and consular agents relating to atrocities committed or threatened by the Russians and Poles. In answer to my noble Friend, I have to state that it is very disadvantageous to our diplomatic servants abroad to produce to Parliament, and thereby to publish to all the world the communications which they make from time to time to Her Majesty's Government. Of course, it is essential that Her Majesty's Government should have all the information that can be collected on such subjects as those referred to by my noble Friend, and that such information should be of the most authentic character possible; but our diplomatic agents say, and I believe rightly, that they find great difficulty in obtaining in- formation if it is supposed that it is to be laid upon the tables of the Houses of Parliament and published to the world. There are certain cases in which that objection must be overcome and papers from our diplomatic agents be produced; but I do not think there is anything in the present case that ought to make us depart from the general rule. The statements made to our diplomatic agents are, of course, liable to question. What Lord Napier says, being himself far away from the scene of the insurrection, he hears from the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs or derives from the Gazette of St. Petersburg, which is open to all the world; and, on the other hand, Her Majesty's Consul at Warsaw reports from time to time accounts which come from different parts of Poland; but these accounts, some of them accurate, must be liable to question, because they refer to matters which do not take place within the immediate neighbourhood of Warsaw, but come from various parts of the country. It would, therefore, be inconvenient, not only to Her Majesty's Government—who would get less information, and information less trustworthy—but also to Parliament itself to produce Reports which, on further examination, might not turn out to be strictly correct. My noble Friend has spoken of the acts of General Mouravieff with reference to a proclamation respecting the wearing of mourning. It was published in the newspapers, and has never been officially contradicted, and may be regarded as perfectly authentic. When Lord Napier asked Prince Gortschakoff what bad taken place, he said it was quite true that pecuniary penalties had been inflicted on women who had worn mourning, that fines to the amount of £110 or £120 had been paid, and that the consequence had been that the custom of wearing mourning as a patriotic badge and political manifestation had been discontinued. With respect to the more general question, my noble Friend says that we ought not to have begun any negotiations at all unless we were determined to obtain that for which we set out. I will not enter into a controversy with my noble Friend on that point; but I may observe that my opinion differs from that of my noble Friend. I think it is very often expedient to make representations to different Governments as to their conduct, without being determined to push the controversy to the extent of war. I must, however, notice what is evidently and cer- tainly a great misrepresentation of that which I said on a former occasion. It appears that somehow or other Mr. Horsman has made a statement, which is so important, and so evidently contradictory of what I did say, that I must call your Lordships' attention to it. I find he has said that a statement which I was supposed to have mode was, "that however much the honour and interests of England may demand it, and however much the safety of Europe may require it, England will on no account draw the sword for Poland." Now, my Lords, that statement is so absurd, it is impossible I could have made it. I beg to call your Lordships' attention to the nature of my argument. I said that where the honour and independence of England are in question there can be no calculation of consequences—you must defend your honour whatever the consequences; but when the question is one of general humanity—when it is one of the balance of power, and the bearing of a certain treaty, it then becomes the Government before it takes any course, and becomes Parliament before it comes to any decision, to see clearly what the object is which you have in view, and whether you have the means and whether there is a probability of effecting it. There was no question, then, as to the honour of the country, the independence of the country, or the safety of the country; but the national consideration was whether you were likely to obtain the object in view, and especially whether that object was a definite one. Without going over the reasons on which I based that argument, I am persuaded that there is sound reason for saying that you ought not to engage in hostilities without having a clear object in view, and without having clearly in view the means by which that object is to be effected. There is another statement made in the same speech of a very different character. It is there attributed to me that I said, "If Poland obtain its independence, it will be not only without the goodwill, but contrary to the judgment, the wish, and the desire of England." Something like that interpretation was put on my speech by a noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby); but I submit that that it is not a fair construction of my words—it certainly is not a just construction of my meaning. I stated elsewhere and some time ago my opinions regarding the independence of Poland, and expressed a hope that one day or other that independence would be restored. What I was arguing against was an independence which should be established by a foreign Power—whether France, or Austria, or England—which I said might become an element of disorder in Europe. It appears to me that that is not only a fair argument, but that it is exactly what would happen. If Poland were able to establish her own independence, it would be an element of order and peace in Europe; but if foreign Powers were to establish an independent Kingdom of Poland, which could not subsist of itself—if Poland were exposed to continual contention and conflict with Russia in order to maintain her independence or to extend her territory—if France and England were continually to be called in to support the kingdom which they had artificially created—such a kingdom would be a source of disorder, and not of order to Europe. That was my argument. I think it is a very plain one, and I do not believe that men generally will dissent from it. With regard to what is going on in reference to the Polish question, Her Majesty's Government have received a very important communication from Russia, which has been laid before the House. All I have to say to that communication is, that the only practical part of it is a recommendation on the part of Russia that Austria should combine and place herself in conceit with Prussia and Russia, that there should be a conference between the three, that they should settle the details of what should be done with regard to "the six points," and that when they had come to an end of their labours—when they had decreed certain details and certain measures—England and France should have the benefit of being informed of the result. That is the only practical proposal contained in that communication; and I am glad to say that no sooner had it reached the Austrian Government than they at once telegraphed to St. Petersburg declining the proposition. I have had placed in my hands by the Austrian Ambassador a very able and straightforward despatch, in which Austria entirely refuses to be a party to such a conference. I have only to add, that as far as the communications have gone, France, Austria, and England are entirely of accord as to the course which they will take, and I hope that concert will continue, and will be followed by good results. At present, I certainly should not be justified in entering further into the subject.

VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE

said, the House must have heard with deep interest, if not with equal satisfaction, the explanations which had been given by his noble Friend. It was difficult for him to conceive that under present circumstances the Secretary of State should have gone so far out of his way as to exclude himself from the possibility of following up any negotiations which Her Majesty's Government might have embarked in, even at the risk of producing a more complicated state of relations than any that had hitherto existed on the subject before their Lordships. The conduct of Austria on this occasion must have been regarded by the House with great satisfaction. If Austria had not taken a line completely in harmony with the two Western Powers, it was difficult to conceive how any practical result could have followed from the negotiations. The course which Austria had taken was not only important as it affected Poland, but it showed that the Austrian Government had really and sincerely made up its mind to that line of policy which many of its recent acts had led them to expect. Austria was no longer the oppressor of Italy and the opponent of every liberal opinion connected with social progress; she had chosen the better part, and we might henceforth have the satisfaction, not only of seeing maintained the good understanding which from an early period had existed between that country and England, but we might look upon Austria as an efficient co-operator in those matters which affected the interests of Europe in a political as well as in a commercial sense. He could not entirely agree with the noble Marquess (the Marquess of Clanricarde) that the Polish question was one which rested exclusively on considerations of humanity. No doubt, those considerations had materially influenced Her Majesty's Government, and produced a strong impression, not only in this country, but in other parts of Europe. But there were others of equal importance which must have had no trifling weight in the councils of Her Majesty's Government—nor could they, indeed, be lost sight of by Parliament. It required none of those painful details which we had read so frequently of late in the public journals, and which had been so fully confirmed by official correspondence, to show us the nature of this war. On the one side, by a long series of unjust and oppressive acts, a great nation of several millions of men had been reduced to the necessity of risking everything against a Power of far greater magnitude, and consequently, by the desperate nature of her position, was compelled to resort to the most unusual and distressing extremities. On the other side, that same spirit of injustice and oppression which had been too manifest in the proceedings of Russia for the last fifty years, had made her assume the character of an exterminator, and plunged her into measures of the most violent and outrageous severity. How, indeed, could it be otherwise? Cruelty and unlimited violence must, of necessity, mark every act of warfare on both sides; and he confessed it was comparatively indifferent to him whether the blame could be brought home either to Russia or to Poland. Where-ever it originated, its effects could be no other than such as he had described; and in those effects we might read a most important lesson, a clear admonition of what it was our duty to do in order to assist in putting an end to a state of things so contrary to every principle of humanity, and so well calculated to endanger the peace of Europe. It could not be denied, up to the present time the negotiations had not been attended with the success which Her Majesty's Government had seemed to expect. The despatch which his noble Friend had laid upon the table some few days ago must have struck their Lordships as not less remarkable for the skilfulness of its composition than for being destitute of everything which could afford hope of a satisfactory solution. The spirit by which it was too evidently pervaded appeared as remote from the establishment of a good understanding as anything that could well be conceived; and, except that it offered some insight into the real intentions of Russia, it could only excite feelings of regret that a paper devoted to such important and delicate interests, and proceeding from a Government standing so high among the Powers of Europe, should have been marked by a tone of sarcasm so little in keeping with its subject-matter, and so far from being, in that respect, creditable to the Premier who had signed it. If Russia would reconcile us to the vigorous system of measures by which she was labouring to suppress, she would have best consulted her own interests by the use of a more courteous style of correspondence, even if she could not go the length of holding out some hope of a satisfactory solution. But, however painful it might be that diplomacy on this occasion had obtained so little success as to be reduced to the necessity of either stopping short in its humane exertions, or continuing negotiations under circumstances of greater risk, it was but fair to consider the conduct of Her Majesty's Government with reference to the difficulties under which they had been called to act, and which it was impossible to disguise. No one who looked back to the part which England had taken in the transactions respecting Poland could fail to be convinced that a certain amount of moral obligation had devolved upon us in common with our allies. There was, no doubt, a duty which neither they nor we could easily shake off. Though diplomatic negotiations could hardly be pursued without risks more or less serious, he would venture to say that affairs in Poland could not go on as they had done without occasioning a chronic danger, not only to the peace of Europe, but to those interests which in England were closely connected with the maintenance of tranquillity, and were of the utmost importance to her industrial and commercial population. He did not think the conscience of this country would be satisfied till every exertion, short of plunging the country into war, had been made; and he, for one, should be sorry to see it laid down as a rule that the policy of a great country like England was to be determined by the fear of war. No great country could retain its high position in the councils of Europe without fulfilling the conditions of its greatness; and by shrinking in any one instance from the performance of an essential duty it might do an irreparable injury to its character, and perhaps only postpone the evil hour, laying the materials of future war upon a broader foundation. Were we to be deterred from redeeming our pledges by so unworthy a sentiment, we might as well throw up our Commission as a first-rate Power at once, and fall back into that secondary position which might be maintained at less cost and perhaps with more dignity. England might still have measures at her disposal, and a sense of duty might prescribe the adoption of them—measures to which we might fairly resort, which are recognised by the law of nations, and which would not entitle Russia to seek redress by a declaration of war. He admitted that a policy of the nature he referred to could hardly be carried out without exposing us to some unpleasant contingencies; but if the circumstances now before us involved our credit and the future tranquillity of Europe, not only were we entitled to pursue that policy, but called on to do so with a pressure which it was difficult to resist. After all, perhaps the danger was not so great as some persons conceived. Russia was not the Russia of ten years ago; she had felt the reaction of that injurious system she had so long pursued—the effects upon her own internal prosperity of the losses of war which she had more than once entailed upon other nations. She had herself experienced the pernicious effects of an offensive war, and found those losses which she had so often inflicted on other nations brought home to her own bosom. With these circumstances borne in mind, ought we to permit ourselves to entertain an exaggerated alarm? He might be told that it would not be generous to take advantage of the weakness of a friendly Power, or to press our demands upon her acceptance so forcibly as to cause her any embarrassment or serious inconvenience; but in this, as in other cases, an exception was to be observed. But was Russia entitled to this delicacy? Were we at liberty to sacrifice humanity and justice to mere courtesy? Was it true that the policy of Russia and her conduct towards surrounding States had been one of almost continual encroachment? Had it been such as to justify the general distrust of Europe? If it were so, he must say that it comported well with the interests of Europe and with our own rights not to be too delicate in our proceedings on the present occasion towards Russia. In employing these arguments, nothing was further from his thoughts than any desire to recommend a course of diplomatic action not fully warranted by the suggestions of prudence and the obligations of duty. His opinions were not even coloured by any feeling of hostility to Russia. Such was by no means the spirit in which he addressed their Lordships. At the same time, he thought that the measure of our proceedings in the present case could only be found in a conscientious discharge of our duty on the grounds of humanity, of treaty, and of the general tranquillity; and moreover, that the principles of action they pointed to forbade the negotiations to be left where they stood at present. From the line which the Austrian Government had taken, we might feel additionally justified in the course on which we had entered; and Russia herself, if she would only take a hint from the strong feeling expressed throughout Europe at her conduct to Poland, might find an opportunity of relieving herself from much of that mistrust and irritation which her former policy had occasioned on all sides. What adjacent country was there, which, either by negotiation or by war, had not been forced to subscribe largely to the grandeur of that empire? Russia, no doubt, was destined to play an important part in Europe; her territory and her resources Were almost unlimited; but just in proportion to her magnitude and importance was it expedient that the spirit of enlightenment which led to the late emancipation of the serfs should strengthen and develop it self, till it resulted in the adoption of a more considerate and less encroaching policy towards her neighbours. Then, indeed, would Russia be a really great Power. Instead of remaining an object of jealousy, distrust, and anxiety to Europe, she would take her proper place in that great union of civilized Governments, which, with all its errors and imperfect views, taken on the whole, does honour to the nineteenth century.

THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH

As the state of the question now is very different from what it was when I last addressed your Lordships five or six weeks ago on the subject of Poland, I trust I may be permitted to express the opinion I entertain under the change of circumstances which has taken place. I do not find fault with the Government for having endeavoured to obtain a diplomatic solution of the difficulties which have arisen in Poland. On the contrary, I said then, and I think still, that it was the duty of Her Majesty's Government to endeavour to place itself at the head of public opinion in this country. But this answer of Prince Gortschakoff I regard as a practical termination of all attempts, with any hope of usefulness, to continue diplomatic discussion with Russia; to go further in that course would be perfectly idle. It is said that there has been no result from these interchanges of diplomatic notes. I think there has been this valuable result, that we know exactly where we are; we know that by diplomacy we shall obtain nothing from Russia, as she insists on continuing the same course she has been pursuing so long. This first act being entirely over, it is for Her Majesty's Government to consider what they shall now do. I do not think it would be expedient for me to enter on that subject. It is one demanding, and I have no doubt undergoing, the gravest consideration at the hands of the responsible advisers of the Crown. I do not think I should assist them, or do the public any service by endeavouring to state the arguments in favour of one course or of the other. The noble Marquess who introduced this discussion spoke with the gravity which it is impossible not to feel on such a subject of the atrocities said to have been committed by the Russians. I do not ask for letters from Warsaw or any other part of Poland to substantiate the statement of the atrocities which the noble Marquess has adverted to. The proclamations of General Mouravieff in themselves are an atrocity. The state of things they produce, of general persecution, of confiscation of property, of want of private and public security, are in themselves an atrocity as yet unknown in Europe; and I feel convinced every day more and more, that be the prudence of Cabinets what it may, desirous as they may be to prevent the spread of war in Europe, their efforts will be altogether vain if these atrocities are continued. The feelings of the people of Europe will overcome the prudence of their governors. I do trust that the Russian Government will seriously consider the position in which it stands. It has had the same opportunities of making the Kingdom of Poland useful to it as have been possessed by Austria in Galicia, and by Prussia in Posen. There is no difference. In the two provinces which are in the hands of Austria and Prussia we see great prosperity, and, to a great extent, content. For thirty-three years the Kingdom of Poland has been in a constant state of dormant or active insurrection. The cause is bad government, and bad government alone. It arises from that brutal contempt for the feelings of persons whom they consider their subjects against which human nature revolts. I do trust, I say, that Russia will really consider the position in which she stands. We are not enemies of Russia. We desire the continuance of the state of things which was established at Vienna. It was not what we then desired. We acquiesced in it; Europe has become accustomed to it, and would to a great extent be broken up if it was materially altered; and to avoid the difficulties and dangers of a change, we had rather that it should be retained than altered. Russia, if she proceeds in the course upon which she has entered, will render its retention impossible. Let her look at what Poland has been to her for the last thirty-three years. Has she derived any advantage from it? Has it not, on the contrary, cost a great deal more than it has produced, and occupied a large portion of her army? Has she derived any prestige from the possession of Poland? Quite the contrary. Prestige arises from a succession of victories, from success in all operations. In Poland hers has been a continual failure during the life of man—a failure because she has been persisting in that which is wrong. I wish that the Emperor, who speaks through his ministers, against what he calls revolution, attributing to revolutionary feelings in France and other countries that which takes place in Poland, would consider that he is himself at this moment the first revolutionist in Europe. He is placing himself at the head of the emancipated serfs against their late masters, and against the proprietors of land in every part of Poland. It is a popular insurrection against property, and the Emperor is at the head of it. My Lords, it never answers for an Emperor to adopt that line. He may depend upon it that he and his family will suffer for the confusion and the danger which they are exciting in Poland. Is it possible for him not to know, if he looks through any portion of history—more especially that of Eastern countries, with which he is greatly more connected than with the West—is it possible for him not to know that justice and generosity on the part of a man in the possession of great power are more efficacious in the management and government of nations than the greatest severities that can be exercised; that severity may, for an instant, create an apparent calm, but that that calm is delusive, and is always followed by a reaction which produces a state of things more dangerous than that which preceded the calm? My Lords, there have been atrocities mentioned arising out of the proclamations with respect to the treatment of women, which it appears to me impossible that any one who lives in civilized Europe should at any time have sanctioned. The man who outrages a woman makes mankind his enemy, and exposes himself to all the consequences of the loathing which he excites. And yet it is impossible to doubt that under the orders of Mouravieff—and Mouravieff is at this time apparently the favourite agent of the Russian Government—these atrocities are committed. I will say no more. I leave the matter in the hands of Her Majesty's Government. I will not in any way increase the difficulties of which I recognise the existence. I do trust that the Government will most gravely consider what shall be the next step; but if it be a further step in such negotiation as they have had with Russia, it will fail like the last.

THE EARL OF MALMESBURY

My Lords, your Lordships will, I think, feel that we are again placed in the position which was described by my noble Friend behind me (the Earl of Derby) the other night. We are struggling between our feelings and our judgment. Our feelings did not require the eloquence of the noble Earl who has just sat down, of the noble Earl near me (the Earl of Shaftesbury), who addressed your Lordships on the subject of Poland on a previous occasion, or of the noble Marquess who commenced the present debate, to rouse them. The noble Viscount (Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe) has gone even further, because he has not only expressed the feelings which every man must entertain with regard to a gallant nation struggling for its liberty, but he has gone perhaps a little too far in attacking the Russian Cabinet. I shall not detain your Lordships by defending the Russian Emperor or his instruments. I only beg that you will not let your judgments be overthrown by your feelings. I have never, since the end of the Session of 1853, felt so much apprehension with respect to the state of Europe as I do now, and I much fear that many things which have been said this evening are not calculated to remove the difficulties under which Her Majesty's Government are now labouring. Those difficulties are entirely to be attributed to Her Majesty's Government having left the safe course of non-intervention. When they entered office, they promised that they would follow that road; and so long as they have followed it, they have maintained peace. They followed that road in a case almost analogous to that of Russia and Poland—I mean America—and we all, I believe, admit the wisdom of the course which they have pursued. Your Lordships must have had even stronger feelings when you saw the blood of your own relations, I may say, shed in torrents in America than those which you entertain with regard to Poland, and yet your judgment got the better of your feelings. You declared that you would not interfere on any occasion, and even refused to propose an armistice when the Emperor of the French proposed to join with you to stop that cruel war, and to put an end to cruelties quite as revolting—even against women—as are committed in Poland. I must say I think that you were wise to subdue the feelings of anger and horror which must have been excited by these acts, and to recollect that you were not poets or sentimentalists, or even humanitarians, but that you were politicians and statesmen, and that you had your own country to consider before you regarded the feelings and interests of others. Why have not Her Majesty's Government followed the same course with respect to Poland?—and what has been the result of their deviating from the course which they adopted in America? It has been said by the noble Marquess and the noble Viscount that we are drifting into a war. The noble Viscount said that he would not willingly go to war, but that if our honour became involved, we must not hesitate for a moment, but must take the lead in Europe. The noble Earl also told us that we ought to take the lead in Europe. That system of taking the lead in Europe, which used to be so rife at the Foreign Office, is one of the most dangerous that can possibly be followed. It is averse to the present state of civilization in this country, to its social state, and to its political interests. At the beginning of this century circumstances were quite different. England was obliged to take the lead every where, and keep it everywhere: but the conviction of this country now is that our safety, our dignity, and our happiness depend upon a policy of non-intervention. When you leave that course, you are not safe for a moment. At the beginning of the century we were not strong enough to follow that policy. We are strong enough now. From our tower of strength we may look down without losing any dignity or any of our power, upon what takes place around us, without meddling with the affairs of others, or interfering with the most dangerous questions which can arise. What is the position in which we stand? First of all we gave advice, and then we made positive propositions. These have been refused:—and what follows? The controversy will be continued by angry arguments, which will gradually drift into reciprocal recrimination, and possibly end in a war. That is what we have to apprehend. When the noble Earl who last spoke (the Earl of Ellenborough) says that the course which Her Majesty's Government have taken shows us where we are, he will not say where we shall be three months hence. I think that this position of things is extremely alarming. I think that by entering upon this Polish controversy we have followed the impulse of our feelings rather than of our judgment. I think we might have interfered innocently and with dignity by simply letting Russia know what was our opinion of her government in Poland, of her breach of treaties, and of the cruelty with which she is prosecuting this war. You might have done what you did in the case of the King of Naples. You might have withdraws your Ambassador, and thus shown that you would no longer have any relations with a Power so uncivilized, so uncertain in its faith, and whose acts are so revolting to the feelings of the people of this country. You might have done that without being placed in a position derogatory to your honour, and without jeopardizing peace, as there is a risk that you may do by the policy you have adopted. It is natural that we should feel respect for a brave nation which has been defending itself as Poland has; but our duty is this—to consider well what we owe to our own country, and to take care that we do not lead it into a war which, if it does take place, we can have but little interest in prosecuting. When you speak of the question of the duty of England with regard to Poland, you have to consider what are the causes for which a nation interferes on behalf of another nation. You probably make it depend on one or two general considerations. You may advocate interference on her behalf on the score of humanity. But how, let me ask, if you involve England in a war with Russia, will it further the cause of humanity that thousands of your countrymen should be slaughtered, and their blood added to that which has already been shed in Poland? Again, you may seek to justify interference on the score of national interest. But is there any national interest involved which should induce us to embark in a struggle like this? Putting the question on the lowest footing, is there any commercial interest at stake? For my part I see none. It cannot, I may add, be contended that there are associations which bind us to Poland. We know that she sent the best of her soldiers to fight against us in the armies of Napoleon, nor do I recollect any act, epoch, or circumstance which has tended to bring the two countries into friendly association, or has left behind it any of those feelings which are naturally produced when two nations have been acting together for centuries. I can, I confess, see no excuse for Her Majesty's Government having taken the active steps which they have taken in this instance. They might have taken steps less active, which could not be pronounced measures of interference. Friendly communications on our part might have been made showing what the leading countries of Europe thought of the government of Poland and the conduct towards her of Russia. If you had so acted, you would have kept yourselves free from trammels which you can now hardly escape. If you go hand-in-hand with France on this question, you will find that your interests are not identical—that they are at variance with those of France—and that the war in which you engage will end as other wars have ended within the last five or six years, by giving to France a material advantage at its close.

EARL GRANVILLE

My Lords, I do not think it is desirable that the Government, following the invitation given them in the singularly able speech made by the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Ellenborough), should enter more fully into this question at a moment when the gravest consideration ought to be given as to the course which we should adopt. I rise, therefore, simply to make a few remarks on the extraordinary speech which we have just heard. I can perfectly well understand that the noble Earl who made it should have felt himself called upon to disapprove of the terms of approbation in which the noble Earl near him has spoken of the policy pursued by the Government; but what is incomprehensible to me is that he, while insisting, very much in the same way as a noble Earl not now in his place (Earl Grey), that this country should not in the slightest degree interfere—even to the extent of entering into diplomatic negotiations—in the struggle going on in Poland, and while talking of our "looking down from the tower of our strength with dignity, and without any loss of prestige," doing nothing while troubles were accumulating all over Europe—what, I repeat, is utterly incomprehensible to me is, that the noble Earl should then proceed to say we might have entered into diplomatic negotiations of a peculiar character which he described, and that we might even go so far as to withdraw our Ambassador from the Russian Court—a step ten times stronger than any which the Government have yet taken. For my part, I deny that there has been, in the course which we adopted, any departure from the principle of non-intervention. We have simply, in conjunction with the great Powers of Europe, employed our moral influence, based on treaty rights and international law, to point out the course which, in our opinion, Russia ought to take at the present moment. To do less would not, I maintain, be consistent with that dignity and prestige to which the noble Earl alluded; but I am quite sure that to have done more, and to break off, as he suggests, all diplomatic relations with Russia, would have been to interfere in a much graver way than we have done, and to take a step which would much more surely lead to those disastrous results which I trust may yet he averted by the course pursued by my noble Friend (Earl Russell).

THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDE

said, that after what had fallen from the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, he should not press his Motion.

Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.

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