THE EARL or AIRLIE, in moving for Returns on the subject of the national expenditure on the Defences of the Kingdom, said, it was desirable, in his opinion, that a question like this, which was greatly agitating the public mind, should be discussed in that House, where many noble Lords could throw light upon it and speak with authority from their professional and official experience. He was aware that his own opinion could not carry any weight with it, and that it could only be of value when supported by facts. He should endeavour, therefore, to confine his remarks to those points in which he was supported by the evidence and Report of the Commissioners which had been laid before Parliament. It appeared to him that the 1075 conclusions to which the Commissioners had arrived were borne out by the evidence, so far as regarded that part of their scheme of fortifications which was intended to put the dockyards in a state of defence against an attack by sea. He was not competent to go into the details, or to say whether the particular fortifications which they recommended were the very best that could be devised; but as regarded the broad principle he thought the Commissioners had given very good reasons for their opinion that the dockyards could be more cheaply and more efficiently defended against an attack by sea by a combination of forts and floating batteries, rather than by floating batteries alone. But there was another class of fortifications, on which the Commissioners had recommended a very large expenditure. In their first Report the Commissioners went at considerable length into the question of the defence of the country against invasion. They stated that this country could not now rely on her fleets alone to repel invasion; that, owing to the application of steam to navigation, and from other causes, there were now greater facilities than in times past for throwing an invading army on our shores; and the Commissioners therefore recommended the construction of certain works for the purpose of protecting our dockyards against an attack by land. The works proposed were very extensive, and he believed they would cost more than £2,000,000, without including the money expended in the purchase of land. For the money spent in the construction of a fort, if the fort turned out inefficient, they got nothing. But for money laid out in the purchase of land they did, at some time, get some return, large or small. The recommendation of the Commissioners that defensive works should be constructed being based on the assumption that at the present time the facilities for attack were greater than those which formerly existed, it seemed to follow that if, since their first Report was issued, any change had taken place tending to make an attack by a naval force more difficult, dangerous, and expensive, the necessity for these works was, pro tanto, diminished. It appeared that ships cased with iron, in a great degree impenetrable by shot, would in future be the class of vessels used for war; and it appeared to him that the effect of this change in naval warfare would be to render the invasion of this country a more expensive, a more hazardous, and a more difficult undertaking than 1076 heretofore. He would assume, for a moment, for the sake of argument, that ironclad vessels were invulnerable. It was clear, in that case, that such vessels might approach as near as they chose to the harbours in which the enemy was collecting his transports; they would not themselves suffer from the fire of his fortifications, and though they could not injure the enemy's ships of war, which by the hypothesis were invulnerable, yet they could destroy all the transports which were not protected by iron plates. Now, let any one conceive the expense of casing with iron all the transports which would be required for conveying an invading army to this country, and let him judge whether such a proceeding would be practicable. He knew that iron-clad ships were not absolutely invulnerable, but he had argued on this assumption for the purpose of showing that the tendency of the adoption of iron-clad ships was to make invasion more difficult. Iron-clad ships, he admitted, were not absolutely invulnerable. We had now got a gun which had penetrated, or very nearly penetrated, a target that represented a section of the Warrior at a distance of 200 yards. A Return had been moved for in the other House on this subject, but the Government refused to give it, though they stated at the same time that they had no objection to answer any question as to these experiments. It was important that they should know what was the actual result of these experiments, because Sir W. Armstrong stated in his evidence that he assumed the result produced at 200 yards as the standard of efficiency, and that he hoped to produce a gun which should have the same amount of penetration at 1,000 yards. It had been stated at first, both in that House and elsewhere, that the shots from the new gun had gone right through the target, but it afterwards appeared, from the statement of the hon. Member for Wakefield (Sir John Hay) and of other persons who had examined the target, that when the supports of the target were removed, it was found that the shots had not penetrated the inner skin. But even supposing that the most sanguine expectations of the Commissioners were realized, and that a gun was produced which was capable of penetrating iron-cased ships at 2,000 yards, even then it appeared that it would be in the power of such vessels to inflict severe damage on wooden vessels lying within an enemy's harbour, while themselves keeping at such a distance from his batteries as not to be injured by their fire. 1077 The Commissioners had given it as their opinion that a dockyard, or ships lying in harbour, would not be safe from bombardment at a less distance than 8,000 yards. If that were so, it seemed to follow that iron-cased vessels might he off at such a distance as not to be injured even by the guns which the Commissioners anticipated would in course of time be made, and that they might still destroy wooden vessels lying within 6,000 yards of the outer works of the harbour. Of the eminent professional men who had given evidence upon this question, Sir John Hay, Chairman of the Iron-plate Committee, was of opinion that a large fleet of iron-cased ships was better than fixed fortifications, as they were available for offensive as well as defensive purposes, and thus possessed a double power. He was asked whether it was possible to insure the fleet being at Portsmouth on the very day when that place was attacked; to which he replied that the fact that preparations were going on was always known beforehand, and that the proper course in such a case would be to attack the French fleet while it was preparing. But, even supposing that the invading fleet eluded our own, they had still to be landed, and it was a great mistake to suppose that this operation was an easy or a rapid one. On this point we had some experience eight years ago, when we threw an invading force on the shores of the Crimea; and though we then had command of the sea, and though the weather was fine and we had every facility; yet, with all these advantages, it took the better part of two days to land 30,000 men. As to the difficulty of getting together our ships in case of attack upon a certain point, Captain Hewlett, of the Excellent, said that you could collect them by telegraph in the course of ten or twelve hours. The question was not whether our dockyards should be defended, but how they should be defended—whether by fixed defences, which would absorb a large number of men to garrison them, or whether by floating fortresses, which could be called into requisition at any point in a very short time. Woolwich Arsenal had an important bearing upon this part of the question. The Commissioners appeared to think that Woolwich was so accessible that you could not possibly defend it by any scheme of fixed fortifications; and, accordingly, they recommended the establishment of an inland arsenal less easily accessible. The Govern- 1078 ment, however, had taken no steps for the establishment of another arsenal; and knowing how expensive it would be, he could hardly blame thorn for that resolve. But did not this furnish a strong argument in favour of floating defences, which could be made available at any point of the coast? The subject of iron-cased ships was dealt with by the Commissioners in 1860, but the question was then on a very different footing to what it was now. At that time the French had but one iron-cased ship, and we had but one building. Doubts were entertained as to those vessels, and the highest authority in gunnery, the late Sir Howard Douglas, gave a decidedly adverse opinion. Some authorities believed that the introduction of these iron-plated vessels endangered our maritime supremacy; but he thought that anything which tended to increase our defensive power must be advantageous to a country which had a preponderating power at sea. If, however, our superiority in iron-plated ships was to be maintained, it could only be done by a great expenditure, for every country was building such ships, not only France and Russia, but even Turkey. We should therefore have a sharp competition to encounter, and we must maintain a fleet calculated in relation to all these countries. With respect to the proposed works for defence, he reminded their Lordships that they were in different stages of progress. Upon some there had been large expenditure, while upon others little had been expended, and with respect to several no contracts had been entered into. Under these circumstances he thought the Government ought to give Parliament a detailed statement of those works, so as to afford them an opportunity of properly considering the question. For instance, at Milford Haven there were two works; upon one there had been considerable expenditure, while upon the other there had been none. It was placing Parliament in a false position to tell them that they must either agree to or reject the works as a whole, and that if they rejected any works for which no expenditure had been incurred, they would incur responsibility of rejecting those works upon which there had already been a considerable outlay. That was an argument which he could hardly have expected to come from the Government, especially when he considered what had been their course in respect of the Spithead forts. Those forts were recom- 1079 mended by the Commissioners to whom the question was twice referred, but nevertheless the Government had decided not to proceed with those works at present. It was sometimes said, as an argument in favour of proceeding with the projected works, that large expenditure had already been incurred upon them, and that if no further steps were taken, the money already spent would be entirely lost. That might be admitted within certain limits, but it did not apply to those cases in which there had been no outlay and no contracts. The works at Chatham, the north-east defences of Plymouth, and at Milford Haven, involved an outlay of £900,000, and therefore the question was one of great importance. The prudence of proceeding with works upon which money had already been expended, was a question of degree, because they should look not only at the amount expended, but also to the probable amount that would be required to complete them, and the benefits that would be derived from them when completed. If they were simply to go on with all works upon which there had been any expenditure, there was no limit to the expense. As an illustration, he would refer to the case of Alderney, where certain works were begun, which at the time were expected to be of great benefit, and the cost of which would be comparatively small. But year after year it appeared that the probable advantage of those works was diminishing, while the cost was increasing, and now the country was invited to expend two millions, because if those works were left unfinished, they would be positively injurious to us. He did not, by the remarks he had made, intend to cast any undue blame upon the Government, because Parliament was equally responsible for what had been done. Parliament had sanctioned the works which the Government had suggested to protect the dock yards. That was a wise measure at the time it was adopted, but since then there had been a change of circumstances, which rendered it expedient to modify the original plan. The noble Earl concluded by moving an Address for—
Returns showing how the Loan which Parliament authorized to be raised for Expenditure on the Defences of the Kingdom has been appropriated and expended down to the 31st Day of March, 1862:Showing, under the Head of each Station, the Names of the Works contemplated in each District, and their estimated Cost exclusive of Artillery Armament:1080Whether any Lands have been purchased for the Works in each District, and the Cost of such Land:Whether any Contracts have been entered into for the Execution of the Works in each District respectively, and the Amount expended hereon to the 31st Day of March, 1862:And, of the Total Amount expended to the 31st Day of March, 1862, chargeable to the Defence Loan for Officers, Surveyors, Clerks, Draughtsmen, and others employed in designing and superintending the Works:Showing also whether the Demolition of any previously existing Works forms Part of the Plan of Defence now decided upon; and, if so, the Date of the Construction of any Works to be demolished, together with their Cost, if erected within the last Twenty Years.
EARL DE GREY AND RIPONsaid, he lad listened with great interest to the able speech of the noble Earl, who had addressed the House in a spirit and tone worthy of the serious question with which he was dealing. The main argument of his noble Friend appeared to rest upon his opinion that the result of recent changes and improvements in iron-cased ships would be to render this country almost unassailable by sea, and he objected to works of defence on land on that ground. His noble Friend, in objecting to the scheme of the Defence Commissioners, said, he did not do so from any want of interest in the defence of the country, or from any belief that it was an unimportant subject, but because, in his judgment, an invasion of our shores had now become so improbable, that it was only to the sea defences of our arsenals, and their protection from a bombardment of short duration, that we ought to direct our attention. His noble Friend rested part of his argument in support of his view on an hypothesis which he afterwards admitted to be a great over-statement of the actual case. He began by assuming that we had vessels which were invulnerable—a state of things at which we had not at all arrived yet; and he then asked how it would be possible for any Power, intending to invade this country, to do so without first collecting a large number of transports for the purpose at some point on his own coast, at which point, owing to the extended range of the new ordnance, we could bombard them from sea. According to his noble Friend, all that we should have to do would be to send forth our fleet of iron-plated and invulnerable ships, to attack and destroy the transports so collected by an enemy. Now, 1081 he conceived that it was by no means necessary that the transports which an enemy might prepare for invading this country should be accumulated by him in an exposed position, which would render them liable to bombardment by sea. They would rather be got together higher up the estuaries or rivers of the hostile Power, where they would probably have the shelter of fortifications, or be protected by a fleet similar to that which might be brought against them. No doubt the attacking party had a great advantage; he had the power of choosing where he would prepare his transports, and of concentrating the whole of his iron-plated fleet on one spot, so as to be ready to defend them. On the other hand, if we were to concentrate our iron-plated fleet in order to make a dash against the enemy's transports, we should leave our coasts defenceless—unless, indeed, we were to maintain an enormouse force of floating defences, which were not only exceedingly costly at the outset, but which required constant repairs —a source of annual expense from which, considered broadly, fortifications might be said to be entirely free. But what if, by some of those many accidents which were not improbable since the invention of steam, an enemy's fleet and transports reached our shores without being prevented from crossing by the operations of our iron-plated ships? In the first place, time would be required for the concentration of our iron-plated squadron, and, in the next place, the enemy's transports would be covered by his own iron-plated ships; the two fleets might engage each other, and under cover of that engagement the invading troops might be landed. His noble Friend had referred to the authority of Sir John Hay to show that we should always have warning when an attack was to be made upon us. True, we might know beforehand that a hostile fleet was being collected at Cherbourg, for instance; but how were we to know that it would make an attack upon Portsmouth? Might the enemy not make a feint upon Torbay, while the real attack was directed to the mouth of the Thames? While admitting that the Government were bound to devote the utmost attention to the changes going on in respect both to artillery and iron-plated vessels, yet he thought it would be a very dangerous error to suppose that the invention of iron-plated vessels gave us any such security from invasion as would 1082 enable us safely to neglect our whole land defences. Reference had been made by his noble Friend to the late experiments at Shoeburyness. It was perfectly true that every person present at those experiments on the occasion in question, shared the belief that the shot from the Armstrong gun had gone entirely through a target of the side of the Warrior; but what really happened then was, that the 150-pound shot, at 200 yards, pierced the outside plate of 4½ inches thick, entirely went through the 18 inches of teak inside, and then bent the skin of the ship, though it did not entirely pierce it. His noble Friend had quoted the evidence of Captain Coles, to the effect that that officer could make vessels for harbour defence that would carry plates nine inches thick. But it should be remembered that the vessels there referred to were not sea-going vessels. His noble Friend had also cited the opinion of Admiral Robinson on this point. Now, it should be borne in mind that Admiral Robinson stated in his evidence that the manufacture of a ten-inch iron plate that would at all stand shot had never been effected, and was still very problematical; and that, indeed, we had not yet got an iron plate 5½ inches thick that would resist shot. His noble Friend alluded to the announcement made in another place, that it was not the intention of the Government to take any further steps at the present moment in regard to the provision of a central arsenal. Her Majesty's Government had determined originally to take measures for the establishment of a central arsenal, because there were various reasons for moving the stores from Woolwich; but they thought it better for the present to suspend that operation, without having abandoned the idea. Danger to Woolwich might arise not only from attacks of ships in the river, but from an invading army, if not guarded against by fortifications, such as the lines of Chatham and other defences, which were intended to enable us to place a considerable force on the flank of an enemy marching towards Woolwich. With reference to the concluding observations of his noble Friend, the Government were ready to give the fullest information as to their intentions and the details of the works they might propose. He believed his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State would be prepared to lay any Returns on the table of the other House 1083 which might be necessary to give complete information on the subject. He believed he had now touched briefly on the various topics alluded to by his noble Friend. They related to questions far more of a naval than a military kind; but whatever the importance — and no doubt the importance was very great—of the changes that were taking place in naval construction, and the force and power of artillery, he ventured to think their Lordships would be of opinion that those changes were not of such a character as gave that immunity from invasion on which his noble Friend based his statement, and which alone justified the conclusion to which he came. He could not sit down without saying one word in behalf of the Defence Commissioners. They had been the objects of very bitter and not very scrupulous attack. It was due to the gentlemen who undertook this duty, and who were selected for it on account of their eminent qualifications, that he should on the part of the Government express to them their thanks for the manner in which they had discharged their duty, and for the care and attention they had devoted to the complete investigation of the subject. Two years ago the question was brought before Parliament. It was then fully and carefully considered. The proposals of the Government were questioned in the other House. Divisions were taken on the subject, always with a very small minority against the proposals of the Government and that minority on each succeeding division was reduced in amount. The subject had been inquired into by the Commissioners, and carefully considered by the Government, and the policy they recommended had been adopted. If, as his noble Friend thought, iron-clad ships gave complete immunity from invasion, then he agreed with him that these proposals should be departed from; but he did not think that was the fact, and therefore he trusted Parliament would not depart from the course on which they had deliberately entered two years ago, and show to other nations that this country, having undertaken great works not for the purpose of aggression, but because they were considered absolutely necessary to home defence — after those works had been in progress of construction, and we had got very little for our money—was prepared lightly and on insufficient grounds entirely to abandon them. There was not the slightest objection to lay the Returns moved for on the table.
§ EARL GREYMy Lords, the House is indebted to my noble Friend for having brought this subject under discussion, since it is one of great importance, on which it is desirable that your Lordships should have the opportunity of expressing an opinion before the Votes connected with it have passed the other House of Parliament. I am the more anxious to avail myself of this opportunity, because, having been out of England, two years ago, when the Bill passed for commencing these defences, it was not in my power to give it that opposition which, had I been in my place, I should undoubtedly have offered. My noble Friend the Under Secretary for War seemed to think it highly desirable that this country should not exhibit the spectacle of lightness of determination which would be displayed by the abandonment of a scheme which had been so lately formed. But I venture to think it is of still greater importance, that if we have taken a false step and embarked in a wrong course, we should not recklessly persevere in it to the detriment of the country. It is my conviction that, in passing the Fortifications Bill, Parliament made a great mistake, and I do not abandon the hope, that having now a fair opportunity, it will yet pause and not persevere in carrying on these works to the full extent that was intended. I do not underrate the importance of making this country secure. No one is more convinced than myself that it is the duty of Government and Parliament to take every possible means to render the country secure against any attack to which it may be exposed. It is impossible to overrate the importance of measures directed against the possibility of a hostile force landing in this country. I also agree in the opinion, that although it is true we can expect such an attack but from one Power—namely, France—it implies no improper suspicion of the intentions of France — nothing which can justly give offence to the French Government or nation—if we adopt measures for securing ourselves. While France maintains an army so largely exceeding our own in numbers, I think it is necessary that we should be in such a situation, that in the event of a rupture between the two countries, that rupture should not lead to our being exposed to the calamity of a successful attack. It is impossible not to feel that with two nations so high-spirited, and so over-disposed to take offence as both England and France, in my opinion, have fre- 1085 quently shown themselves to be—with two nations, moreover, in such close proximity, a rupture is possible; and that, consequently, while it is desirable we should remain on the best terms with our powerful neighbour, and while we have every reason at present to believe that such is the desire of France also, still we must all agree that measures of precaution are not superfluous. But the real question is, are the measures which are proposed to Parliament and the country really calculated to increase our strength, or are they likely to afford an advantage proportionate to the enormous cost which they must entail upon us? I firmly believe, that if we embark in the course which is recommended to us, an amount of money far larger than the largest estimate which has yet been publicly avowed will not cover the whole expense which must be incurred. I have lived too long, I have sat too many years in Parliament, not thoroughly to distrust all estimates of this kind. I can remember the celebrated case of the Rideau Canal, in which a moderate grant of £100,000 ran up to £1,500,000 or £2,000,000. I can remember the recent case of Alderney; I can remember many other cases of the same kind; but I can remember none—no, not one—in which a great scheme of this description has been begun, and the expense originally proposed has not been far exceeded. The question of expense with respect to the security of the country is very material. It was a saying of old times that money afforded the sinews of war. If that was true formerly, how infinitely more true it is in our own times, when each succeeding year brings to our notice some new agent of destruction of fearful power and of enormous cost, so that war really becomes every day more and more expensive. Looking at the manner in which inventions are increasing, and considering their direct tendency to augment the costliness of war, we may be certain that in future, infinitely more than heretofore, the power of every country will depend, not merely upon the number and bravery of its people, but also upon its resources, the amount of its accumulated capital, the progress of the arts of industry, and the means which it possesses of availing itself in the shortest possible time of all those appliances which science is daily bringing to light to aid the purposes of war. Therefore whatever tends to check the progress and the wealth of the country, whatever 1086 tends to check the increase of its general resources, necessarily tends to diminish its real power; and, consequently, to make it less capable of defending itself against an enemy when danger arises. If this is true —and I am persuaded none of your Lordships will dispute its truth—it is clear that undue naval and military expenditure really diminishes the security and strength of the; nation; and, that being so, I ask any man j who has carefully considered the subject, who has calmly and dispassionately looked; at our present prospects, whether the enormous amount of our naval and military expenditure does not appear to him calculated to excite considerable uneasiness. Can we doubt that the amount of that expenditure has now risen to such a height that it must seriously interfere with the power of accumulation on the part of the nation; that it must tend to check the rapidity of that progress by which of late years our resources and our wealth have been increased; and that it tends to place our finances in a situation which would be found extremely dangerous on the breaking-out of war? Apart, therefore, from all considerations of the general wealth of the country, I say it is the bounden duty of Parliament—especially at a time like the present, when such distress is afflicting a large portion of the kingdom—and when, I fear, we are but at the beginning of that distress, which, if it continues, must necessarily affect every branch of our industry and every interest within the nation—to take care that we do not allow expenditure to be unduly increased for naval and military purposes. Taking that principle for our guidance, I wish to ask your Lordships whether the works which are now in progress, or in contemplation, are likely to afford an advantage proportionate to their enormous cost. My noble Friend who commenced the debate (the Earl of Airlie) made an apology as a civilian for expressing an opinion upon these points. I am quite aware that it is our duty as non-professional men to form our judgment with caution; but I by no means admit that these are questions upon which men of ordinary sense and intelligence, even though they do not happen to be professional soldiers or sailors, may not form a very fair opinion; and I think so the more because we have the assistance of a full discussion on the part of professional gentlemen. We have not only the Defence Commissioners on one side, but we have very distinguished officers on the other, 1087 and we have consequently before us all the reasons for and against the proposed scheme, For my own part, I have taken what pains I could to make myself master of the question, and to consider the reasons which have been adduced on both sides; and I must say that the advantage in reason and in argument seems to me to rest entirely with the opponents of the scheme. The opinions of Sir Frederic Smith, Colonel Boxer, Captain Coles, and others, appear to me to be supported by arguments much more strong than those brought forward on the other side. I must add that my confidence in the Commissioners is not a little shaken by the fact that their Reports are by no means consistent with one another. In their various Reports I cannot help observing that when they are pressed in argument they shift their ground; that there is a want of consistency in their arguments; that their reasoning is frequently and obviously fallacious; and, above all, as the minutes of their proceeding show but too clearly, that their inquiry was not conducted in a spirit which was likely to lead them to sound conclusions. It appears to me, that having adopted opinions which they were at a loss to defend against the objections by which they were pressed, they gradually got heated with the controversy, and were led to maintain their original conclusions rather in the spirit of partisans than in that of persons calmly and deliberately endeavouring to determine what truth there was in what was urged against them, and in what respect their views might require reconsideration. These remarks apply especially to the examination of Captain Coles. I must say—and I am sure such of your Lordships as have read the minutes of evidence will agree with me, that that examination was conducted with a want of decorum, with a want of fairness, and in such a spirit as to destroy my confidence in the judgment of the Commissioners. If this question is to be decided by the weight of authority, I must also observe that the decision of the Commissioners is opposed, not merely by several men of high professional eminence, but almost unanimously by the junior members of both services. This is a very important fact. As men advance in life and rise to high rank in their profession, whatever it may be, they are generally averse to any great changes in the system to which they have been accustomed; and when we find that the plan of the Government is condemned by the junior 1088 members of the army and navy, we may reasonably believe that it is founded on antiquated views, and is not adapted to the existing state of science. But apart from what has been written for or against this particular scheme of fortifications, we find that the whole policy of trusting to works of this description has been condemned by very high authority. Captain Coles, in one of his pamphlets, quotes the opinion of Lord Dundonald, to the effect that immovable stations of defence against an invasion are costly and of doubtful utility; and further, that numerous fortifications are a source of national weakness, because they split up into detachments the army which should be concentrated to meet the enemy in the field, There is scarcely any opinion on such a question which deserves greater consideration than that of Lord Dundonald, and this almost appears to have been written by anticipation against the very scheme now before us. It is impossible to find words bearing more directly on a scheme which, as Sir Frederic Smith has shown, involves the erection of works extending over a distance of seventeen miles at Portsmouth and of nearly the same extent at Plymouth, requiring a garrison of 30,000 men in the former case, and 25,000 in the latter, and absorbing altogether a very large force, which ought to be left disengaged for other operations. When I am told that the Government has abandoned the proposal of iron forts at Spithead, but still adheres to the other works at Plymouth, Portsmouth, and elsewhere, it seems to me that it has abandoned the least objectionable portions of its measures of defence. [The Duke of ARGYLL said the Government had not abandoned the forts at Spithead.] The noble Duke says the Government has not abandoned the Spithead forts. It is right to bear that in mind. If Parliament can ever be found in a yielding mood, capable of being coaxed into granting the money, these forts, against which such irresistible arguments have been brought forward, are to be resumed. They are abandoned, however, for the present. My own opinion is, that the force of reason and argument against the project of these Spithead forts is too strong to be overborne, and that neither Parliament nor the country will ever be persuaded to entertain it again. But while I agree with those who contend that no advantage at all in proportion to their enormous cost would be derived from these sea forts, they do not appear to me 1089 to be so utterly useless, or even worse than useless, as the projected land defences of our arsenals. The only object I have ever heard suggested as likely to be answered by these land works is that of preventing an enemy who had landed in considerable force marching through the country and destroying our dockyards from a distance on the land side. But as to the works at Portsmouth and Plymouth, if you are to have garrisons of from 20,000 to 30,000 men stationed there, there will be no need of fortifications to enable them to cope with a smaller force. 1 assume, therefore, that the works are intended to guard against danger from a powerful French army carrying artillery of the largest and heaviest kind, which should land at a distance from the points in question, march through the country until it came within range of either, and then shell the dockyard. Now, an army sufficiently strong to resist any force which in twenty-four hours we might be able to collect against it must, of course, be very numerous, and would require constant and considerable supplies. But in order to obtain supplies it must have the command of the water. In that event, would the enemy resort to so difficult and dangerous an operation as an attack upon Plymouth or Portsmouth by land, which would involve a long march across the country, and the conveyance of very heavy artillery to the high ground commanding our positions? Such an army, with the necessary supplies, could never land and march to the attack of our dockyards without having the command of the water. If they did, they would be even more benighted in the art of war than the Chinese. And if they have the command of the water, what is to prevent them from adopting the easier mode of an attack by sea? With the power of long-range ordnance they could destroy the dockyards in a few hours. Moreover, the disembarkation of a large army is anything but an easy operation. No one supposes it is practicable to bring over such an army in iron-plated ships. For that purpose wooden transports would be required, and these could not be congregated without some warning, and a fair opportunity would be had of attacking the fleet before it started. It had been suggested that they might be collected up a river, but he was not aware that there was suitable accommodation of that kind on the coast of France. At any rate, if that course were taken, it would necessitate the 1090 use of vessels so limited in size as to be incapable of making a rapid passage or of encountering safely the dangers of a stormy sea. Is it not clear that the enemy must have a most complete command of the Channel before he could venture to expose a large body of troops in vessels of this description? Even although we might have a doubtful and difficult battle to fight with the iron-plated ships which served as a convoy, it would be difficult for the enemy to prevent our mailed ships from attacking and destroying the transport vessels, and producing a scene of destruction and slaughter fearful to contemplate. Did any one, however, really believe, that if the enemy had once established their ascendancy at sea, they would think it necessary or desirable to attack the fortifications at Portsmouth and Plymouth? Does any one doubt that it would attempt to strike a mortal blow by marching on London and dictating a peace in the metropolis? It appears to me these arguments are completely conclusive against incurring the expense of these works. And there is another consideration. All these works are planned according to the old system, the old school of military engineering; and according to that system, no doubt, they were well adapted for their purpose. But that system has passed away—it is among the things become obsolete, and the system must be changed. Can we suppose that all the complicated works by which towns have hitherto been defended, calculated on the range of the only artillery formerly known, will be the system to be relied on for the future? It must be changed. The iron cupola, with its guns, is as capable of being used on land as at sea, and we must alter our whole system of land fortification. Then is it wise, when that old system is obviously condemned and a new one is taking its place, to commence these enormous fortifications, to be constructed on the most approved ancient plans? We need look back but for a short time to show how impolitic is this course. Only three years ago the Queen's Speech contained a paragraph calling on Parliament to provide for the reconstruction of our navy by building screw line-of-battle ships. At that time I warned your Lordships that, in consequence of the improvements made in naval artillery, those screw line-of-battle ships would never be useful. At an earlier period I objected to the construction of sailing vessels of war, because they were 1091 likely to be superseded by steam vessels; in 1859 I objected to the construction of screw line-of-battle ships, that they would be equally superseded. I said it was not wise to proceed with the construction of a class of vessels that in all human probability would be obsolete before they were finished. The result has fulfilled to the letter everything I predicted. We know that these screw line-of-battle ships, constructed at such enormous expense, cannot, with common justice to the brave men who would form their crews, be sent to sea to face an enemy, against the improved vessels now constructed. It is notorious that these screw line-of-battle ships are now useless, and that measures are in progress for converting them—some of them before they are finished—into iron-cased ships. Yet we are going on to build these fortifications in precisely the same manner. In 1860, Parliament was recommended to sanction the construction of a fort at Spithead, that was to be built of granite. Already it is found that granite will not do, and 10-inch iron plates are to be substituted.
And let us consider how much all this question of the probability of these works now proposed being superseded by others of a new description, bears on the question of the mode of providing for the expense of their construction. In 1860 Parliament was called on to sanction the plan of meeting that expenditure by a loan; and, to the astonishment of everybody, that sanction was asked by the same Chancellor of the Exchequer who had contended so eloquently against a loan, even to meet the cost of a great European war. Parliament—unwisely, I think —consented that the expense of the fortifications should be met by a loan. The only pretext was that, the works being of a permanent character, it was perfectly fair to throw part of the expense on the future. I always thought this an exceedingly bad argument. It appears to me there are always works of a permanent character in progress in this country, in which it may always be said that those who are to come after us have as much interest as ourselves. It encourages the disposition to throw off the burden of the expense. "Borrowing dulls the edge of husbandry." The burden of having to provide for the present payment for such works is a wholesome check on extravagance. If you establish the opposite principle, it will be difficult to place any 1092 limit to your expenditure. The same argument was used in reference to the cost of the Harbours of Refuge; the House of Commons was told that the expense could easily be met by a loan. And the impolicy of this course is not diminished by the loans being raised by way of annuities; on the contrary, I think it is an aggravation of that impolicy. Money is raised on worse terms when we sell annuities than when we sell ordinary stock; there is an advantage in the market in favour of Consols. The only effect of raising money on annuities is to pledge future Parliaments to pay off the debt by instalments. But the existing Parliament has no means of compelling its successors to practise the economy and self-denial it does not practise itself. It is quite in vain to provide that these loans shall be raised by annuities, unless future Parliaments, as a rule, keep up an effective surplus income, out of which these annuities can be paid. If we go on as we have during the last two years, wilfully incurring a deficit, our annuities will only add to the expense of borrowing with one hand the money we pay away with the other. We know how utterly futile are attempts to bind future Parliaments. Only a few years ago Exchequer bonds were invented. We were told there would be a great advantage in these bonds over Exchequer Bills, as they would pledge Parliament to pay them as they fell due, and that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, two, four, or six years hence, would no doubt honestly provide for their payment. We all know in how short a time—as soon, indeed, as the bonds became due— first one Chancellor of the Exchequer, then another, including the deviser of the bonds himself, concurred in renewing those that had been so issued, and no security whatever is given for the speedy payment of the debt. The only pretext for defraying the cost of these works by loan is that they are for permanent improvements: I now ask you what becomes of that pretext when you see every reason to believe that at no distant period these works will require to be replaced by something founded upon newer principles and later discoveries? I have already given you some instances to show how likely that is to he the case. But another case of great importance may be cited—I mean that of Dover. Now, we are at this moment actually finishing the fortifications of Dover; and when we ask what the 1093 advantage of these fortifications is, I have hitherto found nobody able to give an intelligible explanation. The only plea urged for proceeding with them is because we have spent so much money upon them already. It is said that the fortifications defend a point of the coast at which an enemy might land. But on either side of Dover there are plenty of places where an enemy might land with exactly the same advantage, and these fortifications would not have the smallest tendency to prevent such an operation. In case of invasion the effect of the fortifications at Dover would simply be to compel you to leave 6,000 men there—because, while they are of little advantage to us as means of defence, they would be invaluable to any enemy who had established himself on shore, in order to keep up his communications with France, and obtain reinforcements and provisions. Lest Dover, therefore, should be carried by a coup de main, you would be absolutely compelled to defend it; and, to prevent such a necessity, we may very likely see some new Secretary for war, in the course of a few years, proposing to the House of Commons a Vote of £5,000 or £6,000 to defray the expense of removing the fortifications. I firmly believe that such a Vote would be a much wiser one than most of those now proposed. The noble Earl (Earl De Grey) has expressed his opinion that these works have gone too far to be suspended; and I understand that my noble Friend (the Earl of Airlie) merely asks for information which will enable Parliament to form a fair judgment which of these works should be suspended, and which finished. I quite admit that, however unwise the original undertaking of these works may have been, they have now gone so far that probably it may be expedient not entirely to discontinne them. There may be some which, upon the whole, it will be right to complete; but in order to judge how far they may be desirable we ought to know, as we should know from the Returns now asked for, what is the real state of the case. Our true policy would probably be to finish any works that are in a very advanced state, and which, if now suspended, could not be resumed without great additional cost; but, wherever it is possible, to discontinue works which may even have been commenced, provided that can be done without prejudice to their future resumption; and, above all, to avoid embarking in any new works. Where the land only has been bought, we might re- 1094 tain that land, but ought not to expend any money upon new works there. If the Bill introduced into the other House is to go forward, I am not quite sure how far, according to the privileges of the other House, your Lordships would be able to amend it; but should we have the power to amend it, I hope, if the House of Commons neglect so proper a precaution, your Lordships will insert in the Bill some stringent clause to prevent any portion of the money from being spent upon new works. I have ventured to say so much because, if this Bill reaches us at all, it will do so at a time when it will be almost impossible to discuss it properly; and I therefore felt justified in troubling your Lordships now with these remarks upon a most important question.
§ THE DUKE OF SOMERSETMy Lords, if the discussion to-night had been limited to the terms of the Motion, I should not have thought it necessary to trouble your Lordships; but the noble Earl who has just spoken (Earl Grey) has entered upon so much wider a field that it is necessary I should make a few observations in reply. I shall not follow the noble Earl into all the questions which he has discussed, from the works at Alderney down to Exchequer Bonds. But he said that all our armaments are on much too large a scale.
§ EARL GREYI beg the noble Duke's pardon. I never said anything of the kind, I said that the expense is too much; but I do not think that our means of defence are too great.
§ THE DUKE OF SOMERSETI am glad that the noble Earl does not think that our army and navy are too large, although he is of opinion that they ought to be maintained at a less expense. No doubt, all defensive measures are expensive, whether in the shape of an army, a navy, or fortifications. But if, on the other hand, you leave the country to husband its resources and increase its wealth, in order that when the time comes it may put forth its power, I want to know where the country would be in case of sudden attack? Its wealth then, instead of affording the means of defence, would be an attraction to the enemy. My noble Friend was not here in 1860, when the subject of these fortifications was discussed; and I regret that he was not, because he would then have known the course which was taken upon this question. For many years, Government after Government had been pressed to provide some additional 1095 means of defence. In 1858, the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) appointed a Commission to inquire into the question of the naval defence of the country. The Commission sat at the Treasury, in the Chancellor of the Exchequer's room—the very sanctuary of economy. That Commission comprised the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Anderson, and the Accountant General of the Navy—all men who looked naturally to economy. They recommended an immediate increase in the fleet, so that by the end of the year 1860 we might be in possession of fifty-eight line-of-battle ships. When the present Government came into office, they found that proposition before them; the recommendation of the Commissioners had received the approval of Parliament, and we were repeatedly urged to carry out that programme. We did, accordingly, by the end of 1860 complete fifty-seven line-of-battle ships. But then the noble Earl says that we ought to have done nothing of the kind, for that we ought to have seen that new engines of destruction were being invented daily. I grant the fact; but I wish to know, if we are to wait until these new weapons of warfare are brought to final perfection before we construct our defences, what is to become of the country in the mean while? I certainly will not take upon myself the responsibility of leaving the country unprotected on this ground. No doubt the ships we are now building may hereafter be improved upon; but is that a reason why we should build none? The only plan is to keep up our armaments in the best way we can, adopting the latest scientific improvements. In defence of the late and of the present Government equally, I am prepared to show that what has been done in the direction of our national defences has been done as far as possible on the most economical principles. We did not build any new ships, but we adapted the old ones to the new improvements and inventions. The new ships of the line laid down were only three in number, and they were only in frame, and we have now adapted them for iron-plated ships, so that little additional expense has been incurred. The noble Earl said, "Look at your fortifications; you are making them all upon the old system." That again is quite contrary to fact. The fortifications at Gosport are upon the most improved plan, and they have been constructed with great skill and ability. 1096 "But," says the noble Earl, "you always exceed the estimates." Now, at Gosport, the estimate was £300,000, and a contractor had undertaken to do the work for less, so that these works will be finished within the estimate. That is a specimen of the manner in which the noble Earl strikes out blindly right and left. Then as to Portland. I say the works there will be completed within the estimate, and when finished will be one of the finest works in the country. It is not fair to the Government nor to Parliament to throw out these general accusations. Of course, in sonic of these works there will be excess. With docks and breakwaters, and wherever you have doubtful foundations, there will occasionally be excess beyond the estimate; but that has not been the case at Portland. The noble Earl then referred to Alderney as an instance of great expenditure; but that has been going on for years, and he himself was a Cabinet Minister while this expenditure was going on, and is therefore, with others, responsible for it. I went to Alderney when I first came into office, not having any particular regard for the works there; I went in company with my late friend Lord Herbert, and we took the opinions of the naval and military authorities as to what was best to be done. There were five forts, nil completed, and there was a small harbour, which I was told was not safe, without additional outlay, even for small vessels. Therefore if we did not improve the harbour, we should expose troops in the forts to the danger of starvation, because the small vessels which should bring their supplies would be unable to reach the harbour in rough weather. It was necessary therefore either to blow up the forts or to complete the harbour. I was so anxious upon the subject, which had excited much feeling in the country, that 1 said, "We will only agree to a certain part of the work; so that if we go out of office, the succeeding Government may not be hampered in its judgment upon the matter by any large existing contracts." Then says the noble Earl, "You ought not to scatter your fortifications all over the country." I admit that; but are we not to defend our arsenals? The noble Earl says, "Your arsenals require such extensive defences." No doubt of it. Formerly Portsmouth and Plymouth were fortified within a narrow area, but the progress of invention in artillery has made it necessary either to give up fortifying them at all, or to do so effectually against the new projectiles 1097 by carrying the fortifications to a greater distance. The obvious question for the Government to consider was, shall Portsmouth and Plymouth be defended? The Government came to a decision which I think every Government would come to— that the great arsenals ought to be defended. But that is not scattering our defences over the country. Now, as to the Spithead forts. When these forts were first proposed, it was intended that the superstructure above the foundations should be granite, or granite armed with iron— for the Americans had even then embrasures of stone faced with iron. But all that was considered desirable to be done then was to make the foundations. When the great question of the necessity of building iron-cased ships came under the notice of the Government, it appeared to us, that if any works were to be suspended for a time, and thus give Parliament another opportunity of again considering the subject, it was advisable to suspend these works. The vessels which the Government are building are, undoubtedly, of various kinds, and necessarily must be so, because we do not know exactly what sort of vessel will be the best, and the only way to enable the public and Parliament, and naval officers, to judge which is the best kind of vessel, is to have some of various kinds. We are not largely embarked in any one kind of vessel. The most we have are those to which the noble Earl has referred—wooden vessels which we propose to plate with iron, and the first of which was, I believe, launched at Pembroke this very day. They will not be of a very expensive character, but I believe they will be effective vessels; and when we have one or two other kinds, we shall be able to form an opinion. I hope, therefore, that your Lordships will not be carried away by the statements which my noble Friend has somewhat hastily and carelessly made. The noble Earl quoted the Earl of Dundonald; but Lord Dundonald found his most awkward enemy in a Martello tower. Forts have been found most effective in many cases. At the present time no iron ship could stand long against iron forts. Any one who has seen as I have, the results of firing at iron plates will know that after a very few shots the plates are fractured, the bolts of the plates are shaken, and the plates come bodily off the ship, which in such a case would be in a worse position than a wooden vessel. We must observe all these things 1098 in experiments, for at present we really know nothing practically of this matter in actual war. We hear one day about the Merrimac and other iron-cased ships being impervious to shot or shell, and only the other day I saw a letter from a naval officer in America in which he stated that the Galena iron gunboat went up to a fort, and that the shot and shell went through her as if she were a wooden ship. You can have opinions any way; and as for plans, why the opinions of inventors are such that one will tell you it is possible to destroy a fleet in Cherbourg by operations conducted on the Isle of Wight, and will wonder how it is the Government are so blind as not to see the feasibility of the plan. Many of the inventions submitted to us are ingenious, and some are ridiculous beyond conception; but all have to he considered and are considered. My noble Friend says he hopes that no new works will be sanctioned; but where the fortifications on one side are complete, would he advise us to defend one side but not the other—I think we ought prudently to complete works in progress, and that we should do so according to the newest inventions; but in respect to new works, by which I mean entirely now fortifications, the House of Commons will properly exercise caution by calling upon the Government to give reasons for any new work that may be proposed.
§ THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGEMy Lords, I am sorry to prolong this discussion, but there are one or two observations of the noble Earl (Earl Grey) upon military points which I feel bound to notice. With respect to the policy of the Government, it is not for me to defend it; but I must say, as a Member of this House, that I entirely agree with the course that has been adopted by the Government upon this occasion. I think, under all the circumstances, and considering the difficulties in which this question from various causes has been involved, that they have come to a wise conclusion in suspending—not giving up, but suspending—for a period the construction of the forts at Spithead, and going on as far as they are able with the other works that have been commenced, and are now in various stages of progress. The noble Earl has alluded to the works at Portsdown Hill. I think that any military man who considers the position of Portsmouth will come to the conclusion, that unless Portsdown is occupied, Portsmouth is entirely at the mercy of anybody 1099 who can occupy that position. Well, if Portsdown is to be occupied at all, is it to be occupied by works or by an army? I say by works, because by that means you will require a much smaller force, in order to hold the position effectually, than if you occupied it by an army. If Portsmouth is to be defended, and it is admitted that Portsdown is the key of the position of Portsmouth, as I hold it to be— and I believe the same will be found to be the opinion of most military men—then it would require a much larger force to defend Portsdown without forts than to defend it with troops and forts combined. The objection as to shutting up your troops there is quite untenable. Who are the troops that would be so shut up? Why, the raw levies of the country. And pray remember, if we were to have an invasion —and recollect that the whole question turns upon that, because if it is to be assumed that there can be no invasion, then I agree that these works are useless —but if you have before you the possibility of an invasion, there is no doubt that it would come upon us suddenly, unexpectedly, and at very short notice. Then the levies you would have to aid your regular troops would be so raw and inexperienced in the first instance, so far as the field is concerned, that they would be valuable to you only when in forts—it would only be when they had the protection and support of such works that you could make thorn generally useful. The argument which has been used in another place, that it was derogatory to the English soldier to fight behind walls, is the most extraordinary I can conceive. It is the first time in my life I ever heard that it was derogatory to us to use the resources of science and art in order to make a small force more available; and yet, I regret to say, such an argument came from a military man. Now, let us see what we require at Portsmouth, We require for occupying those forts the Militia and such of the Volunteers as may not be thought sufficiently drilled and trained to take the field. You will then have an available force of, say, 10,000 or 20,000 men who can issue from Portsmouth and fall upon the flank or rear of any enemy who may have landed on your shores and be advancing on London. But Portsdown Hill does not stand alone. There is Dover, which my noble Friend says he has never heard a reason for fortifying. My noble Friend will recollect that the 1100 late Duke of Wellington, who surely may be fairly quoted on such a matter, always said that Dover was one of the most important points on our coast, and that its defence ought to come within the system of defences for the whole country. The reason the Duke of Wellington gave for that opinion was this—that the works at Dover were not at all meant for defending the harbour. There is no harbour to defend. Dover is an intrenched camp, the only intrenched camp that we have along that whole line of coast, and a very vulnerable line it is. It is the only position in which you can place military stores and military assistance of every kind for the army that may be defending your shores. There you have a point d'appui for a great stretch of coast which is very vulnerable. And, if you have an available army of 30,000 or 40,000 men between Portsmouth and Dover, I contend that no hostile army, even if it effected a landing, could with safety or security move upon London. I maintain, then, that the defence of your capital lies very much in your occupying and strengthening Dover and Portsdown Hill. Recollect, also, that on the whole of that line of coast there are very few harbours indeed, and none at all that can be entered without difficulty. But at Dover you have a magnificent landing-stage, where, under favourable circumstances, the largest line-of-battle ships can run alongside, and land men and stores. Only consider what a benefit that would be to an invading enemy. And, remember, it is situated at the very point of your coast which is at the shortest distance from the nearest Power which could ever land on your shores as an enemy. I trust, my Lords, that that may never occur; but still it may occur at some time or other, and surely it would be very injudicious for us to do what the noble Earl spoke of— namely, vote £5,000 or £6,000 to be spent in blowing up the works at Dover. I should extremely regret to see any such proposal made either in this or the other House of Parliament. I believe that what the Government have done at Dover has been wisely done, and will be valuable for the general defence of the country. My Lords, we cannot disguise from ourselves the fact that we have a very small army to defend a very great empire; that only a very small force can at any time be at homo; and that we must mainly rely upon the raw levies which we can bring out at 1101 any period for the support of that nucleus of regular troops. Let us, then, put those raw levies in a position where they can be made available. The only position where for a long time they can he made available is within works, where they will get confidence and efficiency. It is said that we have not artillery force to man these works. I can assure your Lordships that we have a very valuable body of artillery; that the Militia artillery have, within a short time, made very considerable progress, and we have a great many volunteer gunners; and, with a sprinkling of the ordinary artillery of the army, they would make most excellent gunners for manning all these works. If, on the other hand, you were to put those men in the field without the assistance of works, you would certainly have a poor chance of making them available. But place them in forts and they would prove most useful, and that, too, without in the smallest degree interfering with the strength or efficiency of your field artillery. Let me turn for a moment to another point. I have stated that you might have an available army of 40,000 men between Dover and Portsdown, to net against any enemy landing in this country. It may be said, that if you were to scatter your troops like that, you would have no force for the defence of London. I deny that. You have great facilities for j moving troops by railway. The other morning 20,000 men were taken down to Brighton by rail in the course of four or five hours, and that too, recollect, in addition to the whole of the ordinary traffic of the country. Indeed, not only was the ordinary traffic carried besides the volunteers, but an extraordinary traffic also; because special trains ran at the same time to convoy the public to see the review; and all this was done with great facility and regularity. In the event of an invasion, of course the whole transport by railway would be taken up by the Government. The troops could come up by two lines of rail from Portsmouth, and two railroads would also bring them up from Dover. The field artillery and the cavalry might be concentrated at Reigate, or some other suitable place. The force, then, in these detached forts would form one army under one command, and would be regarded as detached for the purpose of hanging upon the flanks of the enemy. I have referred, my Lords, to these military points because I thought they had not been sufficiently considered to-night, and because noble 1102 Lords who have spoken have, perhaps, not entered as fully into military details as may be desirable. I do not pretend that my opinion is as valuable as that of many others, but still it is the same as was entertained by the Duke of Wellington, and not entertained by that great man alone, but—as was mentioned elsewhere the other day by a right hon. Friend of mine—by Napoleon the First also. The evidence of a gallant and distinguished Friend of mine has been quoted against the works in progress at Portsdown Hill; I refer to Sir John Burgoyne. But in the blue-book which contains the questions put by General Peel to a certain number of officers as to the effect of the new rifled gun upon works, Sir John Burgoyne states that he considers Portsdown Hill ought to be occupied—that it ought to be occupied by ten works, and that there should be three works between Portsdown Hill and Gosport alone; whereas the present proposal of the Government is that there should be six works for the whole of that line. And what does Sir John Burgoyne say in his evidence before the Defence Commissioners? Why, that if he had the men to defend the works at Portsdown Hill, he should be all for occupying them; but that he does not recommend the construction of those works at present, and he gives, as his sole reason for that recommendation, "the want of men to defend them." He adds, that if it were in France, he would recommend them to be occupied, but in England he would not. That appears to me a singular argument, and I refer to it because the opinion of Sir John Burgoyne has been much relied upon by those who are opposed to these works. My Lords, at this period of the evening I will not enter further into this subject, and I have only to thank your Lordships for your kindness in listening to me.
§ Motion agreed to.
§ House adjourned at quarter past Eight o'clock, till To-morrow half-past Ten o'clock.