HL Deb 28 July 1862 vol 168 cc882-901
EARL GREY

, in moving for Copies or Extracts of Correspondence explaining the arrangements that have been made for permitting Officers in the Naval or Military Service of Her Majesty to accept employment under the Government of China, said,—My Lords, the permission to which I allude seems to me a measure of no ordinary importance, inasmuch as it implies a great change in the policy hitherto pursued by Her Majesty's Government with respect to the present distracted state of China, as explained in the Papers laid before Parliament by Her Majesty's command; and it appears to me fit, before separating for the recess, that we should obtain some explanation from Her Majesty's Government, of the reasons for that change of policy, and the extent to which it is to go. My Lords, I have said that this measure implies a material change in the policy hitherto pursued by Her Majesty's Government towards China. I say so, because your Lordships must remember that hitherto that policy has been declared to be one of strict neutrality between the Imperial Government and the Taeping rebels. There was an exception to that neutrality, as far as regarded the part we took in the defence of Shanghai, in the commencement of last year. In January, 1861, Mr. Bruce expressed his opinion that the defence of Shanghai should only be a temporary measure, or until the power of the insurgents was established in the district, and that the protection should not be extended to the other treaty ports. This view taken by Mr. Bruce seems to have been approved by Her Majesty's Government, and in the month of May last year the Admiral, acting under the instructions he had received, formally announced to the Taeping authorities at Nankin that Her Majesty's Government intended to remain neutral between the Imperial Government and the rebels, and that the authority of the rebels would, with certain limitations, be recognised in those places in which they were in actual possession. Again, in the August of last year the Secretary of State, writing to Mr. Bruce, stated that it was the desire of Her Majesty's Government to maintain as hitherto a strict neutrality between the contending parties; and it was not until the month of March last that the Secretary of State so far relaxed this rule as to authorize the protection by British forces of other ports besides Shanghai. Very soon after the neutrality of this country was formally announced to the Taepings, we find that heavy guns were mounted at Ningpo for the Imperialists, and that the men were instructed by British officers how to use them, and, as the Admiral said, everything was done to assist the Imperialists in defending the town, except the actual employment of British forces against the rebels. Now, it certainly appears to me that this was a line of conduct hardly consistent with the strict neutrality which had been expressly promised. Notwithstanding, however, the just ground of complaint we had given to the Taepings, there was nothing in their conduct to us with which we could find fault. Some time after the capture of Ningpo it was reported by Mr. Harvey, the Consul there, that the Taeping authorities had strictly performed their promises, and had shown the utmost desire to remain on good terms with us. On the 17th of December Mr. Parkes wrote to the same effect. But, notwithstanding these declarations of our Consuls, and without any explanation laid before Parliament, we know from despatches published in the Gazette, and from other less authentic sources of information, that we have really engaged in a regular war with the rebels. In the first place, we find our forces have been employed in protecting other treaty ports besides Shanghai; and then that British and French forces, in conjunction with a person named Colonel Ward, at the head of a disciplined body of Chinese, retook the city of Ningpo, and afterwards undertook to drive the insurgents from the posts they occupied within a certain distance of Shanghai. It appears that the operations which followed were successful, but not without some resistance on the part of the Taepings, inasmuch as the French Admiral was killed. In the month of May last year we had as far as possible discouraged the employment of Europeans by the Imperialists, and Mr. Bruce reported the measures taken to enforce the surrender both from Imperialists and Taepings of British subjects, and he spoke in somewhat contemptuous terms of Colonel Ward. He described him as a man of the name of Ward, an ex-Californian filibuster, a person of United States origin, though he did not claim the privilege of a United States citizen, apparently on account of the severity of the law of that country against such of their citizens as should engage in the military service of foreign Powers. Notwithstanding his having been thus spoken of by our Minister little more than a year ago, the gentleman so described is now acting in command of a body of disciplined Chinese, in concert with the French and English military officers. Such having been the change that has taken place in our policy, I am anxious to know upon what grounds it has taken place. It is not my object now to endeavour to show that the English authorities upon the spot have been in error in the course they have pursued. However doubtful I may be of that policy, I am not sufficiently informed of the circumstances to have any right to condemn it. I confess I am not surprised, in the extreme difficulties in which they are placed, that our diplomatic agents and naval and military officers should have thought fit to take the course they have taken, in spite of the strong objections to which it is open. My Lords, by our past policy, we had unfortunately rendered the Imperial Government totally unable to put down the rebels. By the war with us, that Government had been disgraced, beaten, and reduced to so feeble a state that it was wholly incapable of protecting itself or its subjects against the Taepings, who were becoming more and more formidable. In the papers before us, I find that a captain in Her Majesty's service (Captain Drew) was quite surprised at the steadiness and organization shown by the rebels. He stated, that when compelled to retire by the French fire, they did so in perfect good order. In his Report to the Admiralty, another officer stated that the measures taken by the Taepings exhibited a marked contrast in point of energy and decision to the miserable weakness of the Imperial authorities. This is not quite consistent with the assertions we have heard, that the Taepings are nothing but robbers and murderers, and unable to form a regular army. It is far from my object to censure the conduct of the officers in command of Her Majesty's forces in China; but I think that what has occurred makes it necessary we should have a distinct explanation of the ulterior intentions of Her Majesty's Government, and how far they mean to go in support of the Imperial Government in China. Because, my Lords, I consider, that in undertaking to support the Imperial forces, and to throw the weight of our arms in the scale against the Taepings, we are incurring a very serious responsibility. Any territory that Her Majesty's forces can occupy within twenty or twenty-five miles of Shanghai, will do very little for the maintenance against the Taepings of that great city and its inhabitants, increased as they are by the refugees who have taken shelter there from other places; and, above all, will do nothing for the benefit of our trade. The provinces which supply the silk that forms so valuable a part of our trade are already in their power, and we shall therefore make things worse rather than better, if, having declared hostilities against the Taepings, we do nothing for the protection of these provinces and the trade we carry on with them. The tea districts are also in danger; so that if this policy of hostility to the Taepings is to be pursued, with the necessity of defending against them the territory from which we draw supplies for our trade, we shall have to extend our protection over a wide area. It will not be a few hundred, or even a few thousand men that will then answer the purpose, and we must lay our account to having a war of gigantic proportions on our hands. It is possible, no doubt, that the war will not extend to these dimensions. It is possible, that by our undertaking to protect certain forts within the reach of our naval force, so that a small land force may also act in conjunction with it, and by giving the Chinese Government the assistance of British officers to drill and organize their forces, the Imperial authorities may be able to recover their territory and re-establish tranquillity. But if British officers in the Chinese service are to be supported by our diplomatic agents, and are to fall back in the last resort on the British forces for assistance in driving back the Taepings, this will be only British interference in another form. If, on the other hand, these British officers in the Imperial service are merely to do what they can individually to assist the Chinese Government, I confess, that judging from what we know of Oriental nations, I very greatly doubt whether they will have any decided success in putting an end to the war. Supposing, however, that the Imperial Government are enabled by their means to put down the rebellion of the Taepings, nothing will still be done to cure that inveterate corruption, weakness, and dishonesty on the part of the Imperial authorities of which Mr. Bruce and all our agents in that country complain. Her Majesty's Government are, I believe, disposed to augur favourably of the Government of the person who, by a quasi revolution, has succeeded to supreme power in China. I doubt very much, however, whether any change of that kind in the supreme authority can correct the inveterate and long-standing evils to which I have referred, or cure the corruption and misconduct of the subordinate authorities. The general character of Oriental Governments is that of a despotism tempered by the power of resistance in the governed. The rulers are too commonly corrupt and oppressive; but having no well organized force at their disposal, when oppression passes the point of endurance, a successful rebellion generally gives relief to their subjects. This being the case, experience proves that the consequence of leaving the character of an Oriental Government unaltered, but increasing its strength, by giving it the advantage of European intelligence and skill in creating an efficient armed force, is to establish a system that is perfectly intolerable. In India it is invariably found, that in the native States under our protection, which have subsidiary forces under European officers to carry out their orders, such a grinding tyranny is created that it is impossible for the Indian Government to leave those native Princes unchecked to manage their own affairs. Having once interfered to give these powers, the Government are obliged to interfere still further, and to check these native rulers in the mode in which they exercise them. You are compelled to check them at every turn; and this is found to be the case—that a native Government, interfered with by British advice, yet not altogether directed by it, is practically as bad a Government as is possible. The result is, that you are almost invariably compelled in such cases to assume the administration of the Government. The latest instance of our interference in a case of this kind was in the case of the intolerable tyranny of Oude. Is there not, I would ask, great danger that these evils will re-appear in China, and produce a state of things in that great empire infinitely worse than that which would have arisen if we had left the Imperialists and the Taepings to fight out the matter between them? My object is not, however, to censure the Government, but to ask for information as to the grounds on which Her Majesty's Government have acted, and as to their future intentions. I think it most necessary that they should be able to show us the course which they have chalked out for their own guidance, and the guidance of the servants of the Crown who have gone to China. I think the Government should show that they are acting upon some clear and definite system, to be steadily and consistently pursued—that their policy is not a hand-to-mouth policy, sufficient merely from day to day to deal with difficulties as they may arise, without much concern as to the future. My Lords, if we fail to look carefully into the whole situation of affairs—to take a comprehensive view of the actual condition of China, and of the means by which that condition may be improved—if we neglect to do this, I am persuaded that we shall incur the utmost risk—I would almost say the certainty—of drifting into a costly and fruitless war, and becoming involved in responsibilities and embarrassments which will press with a heavy load on the nation for many years to come. The noble Earl concluded by moving an Address for— Copies of Extracts of any Correspondence explaining the Arrangements that have been made for permitting Officers in the Naval or Military Service of Her Majesty to accept Employment under the Government of China.

THE DUKE OF SOMERSET

My Lords, I am not surprised that the noble Earl should have called your attention to the state of affairs in China; because, considering our relations with that country, and the expense to which we went in establishing those relations, and also considering the difficulties connected with the administration of affairs in China, it is natural that your Lordships should be anxious to hear not only what Her Majesty's Government have done, but likewise what are the measures which we are now taking in connection with the maintenance of British commerce in the Chinese Empire. My noble Friend has stated fairly enough, that up to the beginning of this year our policy has been neutrality as between the two parties in China. In the despatches of my noble Friend the Foreign Secretary will be found directions that force should not be used against the rebels, but that a strict neutrality should be maintained by our officers. Vice Admiral Hope speaks in the same manner and expresses a hope that some sort of agreement may be come to with the Taepings, by which any interference with our trade may be prevented. Mr. Parkes, with Vice Admiral Hope, did come to a certain agreement with them, to the effect that they should not approach within 100 le, or about thirty-four miles, of Shanghai. That arrangement was considered necessary, because the outposts of the Taepings consisted of marauders who plundered the villages and murdered the inhabitants; and in consequence the unhappy Chinese sought refuge in Shanghai. The Chinese authorities employed Colonel Ward—who since his arrival there has, I believe, behaved very well—to drill a Chinese force to meet the marauding parties. With this state of things the difficulty of protecting British interests came on. Connected with the Taepings who acted on land were a great number of pirates, who acted on the various rivers of China; and, what was worse, in every town to which the Taepings came, there was a European banditti of the worst character, who took advantage of any disturbance. Such being the state of things, it is said that the interference of the British authorities will make matters worse. I regret, my Lords, to be oblige to express an opinion, that between the Imperialists and the rebels nothing can make matters worse in China. Your Lordships may have read of some of the atrocities which have been committed by the Taepings, including the destruction of an old and important town, containing many thousand inhabitants, in which the Taepings, for a period of four days, kept slaughtering the people. The Chinese flee to Shanghai, carrying their property with them; so that there is now in that town a large number of natives as well as British merchants. Shanghai is at present a place of importance, and it promises to become much more important. Officers who have returned from China tell me that in a few years it would become the New York of China—a great commercial capital; but the progress of trade must necessarily be interfered with by the proceedings of those marauders on land and of the pirates in the rivers. That being the state of affairs, the Chinese Government made an offer to a naval officer who has had great experience in China, that he should organize a naval force to enable them to put down these pirates. On the matter being brought to the attention of Her Majesty's Government, I thought the object contemplated was so far desirable as that we should give him liberty. It was not our duty to say, "You shall be prevented from accepting the offer. We know the miseries caused by the acts of those pirates; but we shall not allow the Chinese Government to take advantage of the experience of one of our naval officers." We have great interests in China. For very many years we have been acting as the police of those waters; and if the pirates were to continue their operations, we should be obliged to keep a force in the rivers for the protection of our commerce. I do not think that there is the objection which the noble Earl has urged to our strengthening the Government of China. On the contrary, I am of opinion that it would be desirable that that Government should have greater strength. Indeed, some of Lord Elgin's despatches went to this effect—that the most dangerous consequences of its contest with the Europeans would be that the Chinese Government would be so weakened that it would not be able to put down the rebellion, and to stop the desolation which was going on. It is true that the Government of China is a very bad one; but the Taepings have been ten years in China, fighting and destroying, but have established no Government and no order. There is no organization of any kind. If your Lordships look at the state of things at Nankin, you will find that they reject all trades except the trade in arms, putting persons to death who engage in others; and that they will have no sort of organized society, except a camp for the purposes of war. They say that when they have conquered all China, then will be the time to organize a social system, and that at present they must go on as a camp. From our experience of ten years, and from their own statements now, that is the prospect for the future. More than this—they have broken their compact with us. They agreed not to come within a certain distance of Shanghai; but they violated that agreement and attacked Hoo-Sing, from which they were driven off by the French and English forces. We cannot hold Shanghai except by force; and unless we are prepared to withdraw from China altogether, we must hold that place. We cannot allow it to be taken. We tried that experiment at Ningpo; but, instead of the Taepings establishing anything like order there, they were guilty of such sanguinary actions and horrible crimes that the missionaries were obliged to leave it. Not only, however, have the Taeping violated their agreement as to not approaching Shanghai, but their "Heavenly King," as they call him, has proclaimed that it is time that they should take Shanghai, and has required us to repent and submit. We must, therefore, either "repent and submit" to the conquest of Shanghai, or we must defend it. I think that the feeling of this country will be, that considering that we have the right to trade there, and that it contains so much British property, we should not be justified in giving up Shanghai in order to gratify the rapacity of these people. I think that is a clear line to draw. I do not say that we are bound to protect, or can protect, all the fourteen ports with which we have a right to trade; but where there are large stocks of British property and important British interests it is our duty and our obligation to defend them. I do not even say that the lines which are drawn round Shanghai are precisely those which ought to have been fixed; but that is a question which must be decided by the naval and military officers there, whose decision must depend a good deal upon the lines of the various canals, and upon the nature of the country round Shanghai. What is certain is, that we must not allow these marauders to come close to that town and interfere with our trade and our peaceful occupations. Your Lordships will see, from the papers which are upon your table, that the merchants have been compelled to form "a Committee of Safety," and, instead of attending to their own affairs, to parade the town night and day, as volunteers, to defend their property and even their lives from the attacks of these men. The mode in which the Taepings act is this:—They approach a town, driving in the inhabitants of the country—those who escape being murdered—and among them they send in some of their own followers. These men take the first opportunity of setting fire to the town in various places, and thus create a confusion, which enables those outside to take the place. When they had to deal only with Chinese, these tactics were generally successful, as at Ningpo, when, although there was a Mandarin in command of a large force, who declared that no Taepings could ever come near him, and that if they did, he would destroy them, yet as soon as they appeared he scrambled over the wall on the opposite side of the town and took refuge in an English gunboat. With such a people as this it is no wonder that the Taepings should succeed; and if we are to allow these things to go on, we shall have no alternative but to give up the advantages of trade and to retire from the coast to some of the islands in the neighbourhood. With the Taepings it is clearly impossible to come to any arrangement. We have endeavoured to maintain neutrality in China. We have tried over and over again to deal with the Taepings. Their chief has, according to his own ac- count, no authority to punish any marauding band which acts in violation of promises that he may have given, and it is therefore idle to hope that we can come to any understanding with him. What we ought to do is to take measures for the defence of Shanghai, and of other places where we have important interests. We have a large trade at Hangkow, on the Yang-tze-Kiang, and it will be very desirable that we should, if we can fairly do so without running too great a risk, protect that place from the rebels. We ought to give all the security that we can to places where we have trade, and to warn persons who carry on trade with places which we cannot defend that they do so at their own risk. My noble Friend says that he does not think that any good can be done by a British officer taking the command of a Chinese force. I entirely differ from him upon that point. I think that a British officer organizing a small fleet of gunboats will establish order and peace; will put an end, at least upon the sea, to much of the wholesale murder and robbery which is now going on; will do much which we have hitherto been obliged to do ourselves, but which ought not to be done at the charge of this country, and will enable us to reduce the force which we now have in the Chinese waters, and which is kept up mainly for the purpose of putting down piracy in those seas. We must provide one or two vessels for the use of the Admiral and chief officers, but the real employment of most of the small vessels that are now there is to put down piracy, and I should be very glad if I could see a chance of the Government being so strengthened as to be enabled to undertake the performance of this duty for itself. So far from thinking that we shall make things worse by this interference, I am of opinion that the state of things is so bad that we cannot make them worse. I believe that in giving this leave to Captain Osborne we have taken that which is a right and a safe course, and it is one which we have adopted in other cases. In the case of Turkey and other instances we have allowed officers to take service under foreign Powers and to organize their navies, and I think that what we have done there we may do to some extent in China. I admit that the Imperialists have often been as cruel as the Taepings; I do not mean to say that they have always been right and the Taepings always wrong; but the proof that the Imperialists are the better of the two is, that when a place is taken by the Taepings, the people run away; and when the rebels are driven out by the Imperialists, they return in crowds—showing that they have confidence in the one party and not in the other. There was a striking instance of this at Ningpo. The European location was divided from that town by a narrow channel, and the French and English officers warned the Taepings that they must not approach or disturb that location. For a time they acted in deference to this warning; but when they saw that all the property and wealth was leaving their side of the creek and crossing to ours, they became dissatisfied, and fired at our ships; upon which the officer in command told them, that unless they desisted, and removed the guns from the part of the wall which commanded our position, he should fire upon them. They declined to do so, and, accordingly, a body of men was sent to take the guns from them. It was curious, we are told, to observe how within three days the Chinese flocked back to the dwellings which they had deserted; thus showing that they had confidence when a regular rule was established. The Government of the place was, of course, handed over to the Imperial authorities, and, I believe, Colonel Ward sent down a Chinese force to protect it. Well, that is the state of things in China. I hold it to be most unsatisfactory, but I deny that Her Majesty's Government is in any way responsible for it. We have endeavoured, so far as possible, to practise neutrality between the two parties. We have told them that we seek no land, that we desire no benefit for ourselves; that all we want is the safety of the lives and the security of the property of our countrymen, according to the terms of the commercial treaty. But when we found that our people were fired at and murdered, and that our property was plundered by the Taepings, it became necessary for us to take measures to check those outrages. We attempted to accomplish that object by an agreement with the Taeping chiefs, but to no purpose. We were therefore driven to take the matter into our hands. Unless we are prepared to "repent and submit," as the Taepings bade us, we must for the future defend ourselves against those marauders. I regret that we should be obliged to take such a course, but we cannot avoid it, unless we mean to retire altogether from China. If, with the assistance of the force under English officers, the Chinese can establish any sort of Government in Central China, it will be, in my opinion, a great blessing, not only to that country, but to all the other nations who have communication with it, and, indeed, to mankind generally. I believe it may lead to the introduction of a real Christianity, instead of that spurious mockery of religion which is professed by the Taepings. There is no objection to produce the papers for which the noble Earl has moved.

VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE

said, the question appeared to be mainly what was due to the great commercial interests which were involved in China. They must all deplore the position to which the Chinese empire had been reduced, and it must be especially matter of regret that the course we lately took had tended to aggravate the weakness of the Imperial Government. But whatever regret we might feel as to the past, it was too late to return to the old principle of neutrality; and on that very account we ought to look with additional favour on the Chinese Government in connection with the interests of our trade. Under any circumstances, the interests of those who had been induced to invest their capital in China must be attended to. On this principle we were bound to adhere to those who were most likely to support the lights which we held by treaty; and it was evi-evident from the papers that had been laid on the table that Her Majesty's Government had been anxious to maintain the rights of British subjects in China, and he believed the majority of their Lordships would be of opinion that they were right in so doing. The two parties now engaged in conflict in China did not present to his mind any feature so similar as to justify us in placing them on an equal footing. He put it to any one who had perused the published papers on the subject whether there was anything in the character and conduct of the Taepings to justify us in paying them such a degree of respect as would interfere with our interests and with the duty which we owed to a friendly Power. It seemed to him that the course of the Taepings amounted to an indiscriminate violation of every moral principle. There was no reason to believe that they acted on any principles capable of producing a beneficial effect on the Chinese empire. If there were faults on the part of the Imperial Government which occasioned discontent among the numerous population of the country, on the other hand the conduct of the Taepings was marked by the total absence of everything calculated to obtain the confidence of the people, and could not fail to disgust those sober-minded and moderate men whose support would be a real source of strength. We were placed as it were between hammer and anvil in China, and it was rather hard that we should be called upon at such a time to compromise our national honour or to abandon the interests of our trade. The merchants who invested their capital in the commerce of that country were entitled to look to their respective Governments for protection. He thought the agents of the English Government had acted in a very proper manner. As long as it was possible they had scrupulously respected the principle of neutrality; and when it became absolutely necessary to deviate in some degree from that principle, they had acted with vigour, prudence, and humanity. At a time like the present, when the expenditure of the Government was necessarily so great, we were especially bound to protect those commercial establishments which contributed to the wealth of the country and were based on the faith of treaties.

EARL RUSSELL

I think my noble Friend (Earl Grey) was well entitled to raise this question, and that Parliament may justly expect some statement from the Government concerning it. I should myself prefer to have laid on the table the despatches containing an account of what has been done, and the instructions which had been given to Her Majesty's Minister. But the Session is now drawing to a close, and I think it is necessary that Parliament should be informed of the views which Her Majesty's Government take of the present state of affairs in China. That is the more incumbent on us because our course has been in some degree changed. That neutrality which was proclaimed last year, and which we informed the Taepings would be observed, has been deviated from. It is therefore advisable that we should explain—at least, your Lordships may well call on us to do so—why we have done anything which is inconsistent with the principles of the strict neutrality we formerly professed. By virtue of the Treaty of Tien-tsin (which was formally ratified after events which are well known to your Lordships) we are entitled to certain ports for the purposes of trading; and as far as the Government of China is concerned, they have been acting in perfect good faith towards us. Communications have been carried on in a thoroughly satisfactory manner, and, as would appear from Mr. Bruce's despatches, the Government of China have met us in a spirit of fairness, and with the desire to maintain friendly relations with this country. As far, therefore, as the Chinese Government are concerned, we have no reason to complain. We have, then, to consider the value of the trade carried on with China. It is a very growing trade, as I will show your Lordships. The trade in British and foreign vessels to Shanghai was, in 1855. £7,500,000. In 1857 it was in round numbers £14,000,000. The trade in British vessels only to Shanghai amounted, in 1858, to £10,000,000. The whole trade of Shanghai in British and foreign vessels was, in 1856, £13,000,000; in 1858, £15,500,000; and in 1860, £18,000,000. Besides this there is other trade not included in any returns; so that the whole commerce at Shanghai must be £29,000,000 or £30,000,000. It is not only an increasing trade, but it is an important trade, a large part of it consisting in such valuable articles as tea and silk, which enter largely into European consumption. Having, therefore, by treaty a trade with China, and that trade being in a flourishing state, it is not a matter of light importance whether or not that trade shall be maintained, and whether or not the British Government shall be able to protect it. My noble Friend said, very rightly, that for a considerable time, while the Taepings were carrying on hostilities against the Imperial Government of China, Her Majesty's Government remained neutral, and took no measures against them. This was so much the case, that when Ningpo was attacked, no resistance was offered. But two questions of most serious importance have arisen. One is whether the Taepings will, if successful, continue the trade, and give us the same advantages which the Government of China is bound to give us. The second is whether the Taepings can form a Government with which foreign Powers can form treaty relations. My noble Friend has told us that Admiral Hope entered into a formal agreement with the Taepings at Ningpo, by which they were to agree not to interfere with the ports, not to come within a certain distance of Shanghai, and not to molest our trading vessels. There was an apparent consent given to this agreement; but everything which has happened of late shows that the Taepings, far from observing such an agreement, were determined to disregard it. They approached very near to Shanghai; junks belonging to British owners were seized; the crews were imprisoned; one European was murdered, and every determination was shown to interfere with the British trade of that port. Accordingly, in the month of February a change took place in the views of the persons intrusted with the management of British and French interests in China. By the papers which have been produced it is evident that in February there was a disposition on the part of Mr. Bruce and others to look more closely into the matter, and to see whether trade could possibly continue if the Taepings were allowed to ravage the country. Mr. Bruce came to the opinion that it was impossible, and that our trade must be extinguished if we did not defend Shanghai, and perhaps some other ports. Upon this conviction being forced upon him, communications took place, and it is curious that at the same time almost all the chief persons representing the British and French Governments seemed to have formed the same opinion. Mr. Bruce, General Mitchel, Admiral Hope, Admiral Protet, and General Staveley, all thought it necessary to check the attempts of the Taepings to destroy the trade of Shanghai. Accordingly, they began to act, and on several occasions were successful, with a very small loss, in routing and driving off the Taepings. The other question to which I alluded is whether there is any chance, that supposing the Taepings consented not to annoy us any longer, and we made peace with them, they could form a regular Government; and upon this point we have the most convincing testimony. Mr. Roberts, a missionary, was for a long time in hopes that they might form a Government, and that some form of Christianity might be established; but he admits that he was entirely undeceived by what he saw passing around him. He found that their pretended Christian religion was nothing but blasphemy. He found that one chief pretended to be the brother of Jesus Christ, and that he and his son formed "the Heavenly Kingdom." He found, that if any one of them suffered the least contradiction, the person offending was instantly murdered, and that a boy in his own service was murdered by one of these men without the slightest reason. The evidence of Mr. Harvey, the British Consul at Ningpo, was to the same effect. He declared that the Taepings, when they took possession of a place, instead of establishing new authorities, began by giving up all the women to the fury of the soldiery; in the next place, they seized all property as plunder, and they finished by murdering indiscriminately men, women, and children. One of their laws, it was said, was that marriage was not to be allowed, and another that any person trading without specific authority should be put to death. It must, therefore, be clear to your Lordships that it is quite impossible anything like civil relations can be established with the Taepings, or that they can govern the Chinese empire, or conduct relations with foreign countries upon that footing of amity upon which alone peace can be preserved. When the Taepings attacked our vessels, and endeavoured to kill the people on board, Captain Drew knew no other alternative to adopt but to return their fire; and the result was that Ningpo was taken. It appeared clear from this that there was no chance of our being able to maintain any relations of amity with the Taepings; and, as they seemed determined to destroy us, or to take possession of the territory we occupy, all that we could do was to protect our trade and the lives of our merchants. On the 7th of this month I wrote to Mr. Bruce the following despatch:— I have received your despatches Nos. 41 and 43 of the 21st and 23rd of April, explaining the policy you have been pursuing in China. Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of that policy. If we were to attempt to establish relations with the Taepings, we should find no settled authority among them with which any secure engagements could be contracted, and we should be unable to obtain secure trade and the rich productions of China from a rabble who understand nothing but plunder, and are a scourge to every place of which they obtain possession. On the other hand, if we were to undertake to put down the Taeping rebellion, we should soon be engaged in an extensive war, while the Chinese Government would only look on, and leave the burden and expense of it to us. The rational course for us to pursue is to defend our own trade, to protect the treaty ports, and to encourage the Chinese Government to arm a sufficient force of artillery, infantry, and cavalry to overcome the rebels, and reduce them to subjection. Should this plan fail, graver questions will arise, upon which it is not at present necessary to enter. You will arrange for the stay of the troops at Shanghai so long as that settlement is menaced by the rebels. Ningpo ought to be recovered by the Imperialists; and when they have force sufficient for the purpose, they should undertake vigorous operations against Nanking. The Taepings appear to be a rope of sand, and have no cohesion or permanency. Their number forms their strength; but when the chiefs are defeated, the multitude of followers will be dispersed with case. That is an indication of the policy which Her Majesty's Government propose to pursue. They do not propose to give to the Chinese Government the whole force of the British Empire for their support; but they desire to encourage them to arm a sufficient force for themselves, by furnishing them with such arms as they may require, and by advising them as to the formation of the force which they might stand in need of. On the other hand, it is evident that this course must place us in a state of hostility to the Taepings; but whenever any attempt should be made to destroy our treaty ports, where British merchants are established, we should do our best to support those merchants. Having formed with China a treaty which the Government of China have faithfully carried into effect; and having encouraged merchants to settle in the treaty ports, and carry on trade there, we do not think it right to leave those merchants at the mercy of a band of marauders and murderers. With regard to Shanghai and some other ports, it is very possible that the naval forces of Her Majesty which happen to be there, assisted by whatever other force should be on the spot, will be entirely adequate for the purpose of this protection. No doubt, in the course of these hostilities the Taepings may occasionally succeed in taking possession of a city; but I do not think that that is any proof that these Taepings can form a Government, or are able to organize a military force. Pirates very often conduct the ship which they man with admirable skill and discipline for the purpose of carrying on their trade of plunder and murder, and robbers frequently form their bands most efficiently. In like manner these Taepings act, and they seem to be nothing else but an immense body of men determined to live only by plunder. That is so much the case, that after occupying a town for a certain time they quit it for some other town, because they find all trade, commerce, and society abandon the place they occupy; and thus they go on destroying one place after another. It is impossible to make peace with such people. The noble Earl says that the Government of China is corrupt. No doubt of that; and, unfortunately, many Governments in the world are corrupt; but still the Chinese Government is the Government which in that country shows the greatest desire for civilization, and seems the best able to maintain it. My noble Friend (the Duke of Newcastle) has very truly said, that the people of China evince, whenever they have the opportunity, a preference for the Imperial Government over the rule of the Taepings, and that whenever the Taepings leave a place, the people flock back again, returning to their former houses and shops. Such is the state of things in China, and such as I have just explained is the policy which Her Majesty's Government propose to pursue. No man can say that these Taepings may not carry their desolation completely over China, and in that case, no doubt, we should not enter into a great war to form a Government in China; but if we can assist the Imperial Government, and enable them by their own industry—and no people are more industrious than the Chinese—to restore a civilized condition of things, I think it would be the duty of the Government to pursue that policy. At all events, we should not allow the trade and commerce of our merchants to be destroyed without some effort on our part to protect them.

EARL GREY

in reply said, that though the Taepings were charged with the violation of an agreement, he thought it would be judicious not to enter into too strict an inquiry as to which party had most fairly executed the agreement. It appeared, besides, that from the first the promise of the Taepings was of a temporary kind. We had not said to the Americans that they were not to carry on the war in their country because it would interfere with our trade. But Mr. Bruce's claim was, that an English subject who might buy in the interior of China a Chinese ship laden with Chinese produce, might claim for that ship a free passage to Shanghai. But had we ever claimed a free passage for the cotton bought in New Orleans for our manufacturers? Of course not, as it would entirely interfere with the ordinary exercise of belligerent rights. That was the reason why the Taepings had resisted, and he must say they had a right to resist. It was said that Captain Sherard Osborne had only leave of absence, and that he was acting for himself in accepting employment from the Chinese Government. But he begged to call attention to this fact—that by the Foreign Enlistment Act no British subject could take service under any foreign Power without the authority of an Order in Council, or the licence of Her Majesty under the sign manual. Well, but that was not leave of absence. But it was said we had a right to do what was best for our trade. The state of China was now most miserable; and, unhappily, we were reaping what as a nation he must say we richly deserved—the fruit of that seed which we had so carefully sown. When we began our wars with China, that empire had a Government, which though in many respects very bad and very corrupt, yet was able to maintain order and security, and which, by the testimony of Lord Elgin and of every one of our naval and military officers, had brought a large part of China to the highest state of improvement. Unfortunately, we thought that we might extend our trade by force, and hence the first war of 1840. That war was the beginning of the mischief, and from it came the first shock to the Imperial Government. The mischief done in 1840 was, however, comparatively partial, and for several years, when the noble Earl the Secretary for Foreign Affairs was at the head of the Government, the most severe and stringent instructions were issued, many of which he himself (Earl Grey) had the honour of writing, against the adoption of any course which should bring us into collision with China. But, by and-by came a change over the spirit of our policy—by-and-by came the disgraceful lorcha affair, which again brought us into collision with the Chinese, and of which the war lately concluded might be considered the continuance. By the last war, as he found it recorded in the despatches of all our diplomatic agents, the Chinese Government had their strength exhausted, their money absorbed by the indemnity which we claimed, and were rendered incapable of protecting their subjects. In the present state of things it was most difficult to say what ought to be done—it would require a far more intimate acquaintance with affairs in China than they possessed to express an opinion. But, taking as a guide what was best calculated to promote the extension of our trade in China—namely, a state of tranquillity and peace, he could not help entertaining serious doubts of the wisdom of the policy which Her Majesty's Government were now pursuing. It might be right to say that we ought to protect our treaty ports; but how were we to prevent the Taepings cutting off the supplies of the goods which were to be brought up to those ports? His noble Friend said we were not to undertake a war of any magnitude, to become defenders of the Chinese Empire, or to give the Imperial Government a right to expect the support of the whole of the forces of the British Empire. But what then were we to do? To give them a sort of modified assistance, partly by the operations of our naval and military forces acting within a limited range, and partly by encouraging our officers to take service with them? But would not all that encourage the Chinese Government to rely upon us; would it not tend to lower that Government in the eyes of its subjects, and render it less efficient for the performance of its duties? That was the opinion of Mr. Bruce a short time ago. It appeared to him that the whole matter required to be looked at with a more enlarged survey than had been taken by Her Majesty's Government, and with reference to more distant prospects. However, he had done his duty in calling attention to the subject.

Motion agreed to. [Parl. P. 1544.]