Lords Sitting of 11 April 1862

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS.—1aQueenstown Improvement.
Royal Assent.—Officers' Commissions Mutiny; Marine Mutiny; India Stocks Transfer; Bleachfields (Women and Children Employment); Industrial School Acts, 1861, Amendment; Australian Colonies Government Act Amendment; Sir John Soane's Museums Great Northern Railway (No. 1).

EDUCATION —THE REVISED CODE OF REGULATIONS.

  REVISED CODE WITH CHANGES PRESENTED.
  EARL GRANVILLErose for the purpose of fulfilling the pledge he made to the House the other night, to lay on the table the alterations proposed to be made in the Revised Code. (The noble Earl then presented, by command, the changes proposed to be introduced into the Revised Code of the Committee of Council on Education, as last printed.) He would very briefly state their substance, without entering into any arguments upon them. First of all,
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  with respect to the grant. What was not proposed was that 4s. a year should fee given to the schools in virtue of the average attendance of the scholars at the school, and that the rest of the grant should depend on individual examination, the school being entitled to 8s. for every child who should have attended 200 times, and on examination in reading, writing, and arithmetic, not fail, in any one. On failure in any one of these elementary branches a third of the 8s. would be deducted. With regard to the mode of examination, the grouping by age was given up and what Was now proposed was that, instead of four standard examinations, two should be added, making six standard examinations altogether, and the children were, to be., examined according to those standards in the manner in which the managers or masters should present them. But the school was riot to receive any grant—and he, was sure their Lordships would not think this condition reasonable—in virtue of children only passing the standard examination which they had succeeded in passing in the previous year. With regard to the obligations of the managers towards existing pupil-teachers the question would be arranged thus—in case, under the operation of the Revised Code the grants received by the managers should not suffice to meet the existing payments to the pupil-teachers, the central office would undertake that their full salaries should be provided for them during their period of service, so that no burden on that account would be thrown upon the managers. These were the changes to which the Government were prepared to agree. His own individual opinion of the modifications which had been assented to was that they were not improvements, because their tendency would be to diminish the economical working of the system, and in some measure to weaken the stimulus by which they wished to correct the defects pointed out by the Royal Commission. The Government had endeavoured fully and fairly to meet the general feeling exhibited in another place. For, thank God, we did not live under an absolute Government, and therefore the general feelings and opinions of all parties could be consulted. At the same time he was bound to say, that if any further relaxations were made, the scheme itself would not, in his opinion, be worth continuing; but he hoped and believed, that even with the present concessions, enormous advantages would be derived

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  from the plan now to be carried out, because it would enable them to get rid of all the complications so much complained of, and in favour of which no one had said a single word. It would simplify the arrangements between the Privy Council Office and the managers, and would give a great stimulus to the education of the labouring population. There was one other point on which he was desirous of saying a word. He had been appealed to by a good many of Her Majesty's Inspectors of Schools to defend them from aspersions which had been cast upon them. Some of those gentlemen he did not know, beyond that he had the pleasure of corresponding with them; others were old and valued friends. Now, he thought their Lordships would bear him out in saying that, in any thing that he had said in that House he did not remember one word otherwise than in just praise of the meritorious exertions of that valuable body of men in carrying out the existing minutes of the Privy Council. He had also read very carefully the speeches of the Vice President in another place, and he could not find in them any aspersions whatever upon the Inspectors; nor did the Report of the Royal Commission contain remarks which could be construed into anything of the kind. Some individual charges had been made in another place by a right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Adderley), who had addressed that House with very great ability with regard to the Roman Catholic Inspectors; but a correspondence had taken place between that right hon. Gentleman and the senior Roman Catholic Inspector, and he was sure that that correspondence would be perfectly satisfactory to the parties concerned. The noble Lord on the back bench (Lord Belper) had, indeed, the other night stated that if the Report of the Commissioners was correct, the Inspectors must have deceived the public. But his noble Friend, he apprehended, had used that expression only argumentatively, and did not intend to draw from the Report any inference of, that kind. He did not speak after the noble Lord, or he should have alluded to that remark at the time; but his noble Friend the Lord Privy Seal pointed out the very different duty imposed upon the Inspectors and the Assistant Commissioners. The inference, indeed, could not possibly be correct, because the Royal Commissioners founded the greater part of their charges with regard to deficiency; in reading upon the reports of the In-
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  spectors, there being no less than seven Inspectors whose reports had a bearing upon that point. Her Majesty's Inspectors were a most faithful body of very able men, who had acted most efficiently under the existing system, and under the instructions which they had received. Those instructions applied to the examination of pupil-teachers, but not with the same strictness to the examination of individual scholars. He therefore begged to bear his testimony that the Inspectors had discharged their duty in the honourable manner which might have been expected.
  LORD BELPERbegged to say, that nothing could have been further from his intention than to cast any imputation on the Inspectors; so far from that, his argument was intended to have quite a contrary bearing. When the Inspectors reported that in the case of 80 or 90 per cent of the scholars reading and writing had been well taught, and the Commissioners reported so very differently, he expressed his regret that the Inspectors themselves were not called upon to explain what they meant, instead of having the explanation put into their mouth. Had they been asked, they would probably have been able to give an explanation which might have reconciled this apparent contradiction.
  EARL STANHOPEsaid, he was glad that the modifications had been laid in a tangible form before the House; but any comments upon them would be better postponed until the papers were printed. There was one point, however, to which he wished to call attention, and that was with reference to a pledge which had been given in another place—which was indeed embodied in Mr. Walpole's 12th Resolution—that in future years no changes should be made in the system of public education without being first brought by the Government of the day under the cognizance of Parliament. He should be glad to learn from the noble Earl, that if any changes in future should be made, they would be laid before Parliament in the beginning- of the Session.
  EARL GRANVILLEwas understood to say that the whole matter would come on for discussion on an early day after the Easter recess.

FORTIFICATIONS AT SPITHEAD.

  QUESTION.
  LORD VIVIAN, in rising, according to notice, to ask Her Majesty's Government

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  what are their Intentions with respect to the Fortifications at Spithead, said, that after the very important debate which had just occurred in another place, nothing short of the extreme anxiety created by recent events would have induced him to bring the question under the notice of their Lordships. Now he understood that the result of that discussion amounted to no more than this—that it was the intention of the Government to re-open the whole question of the consideration of the Report of the Defence Commission. He for one wished that the Government had gone a step further, and had pledged themselves to have withheld their hands from proceeding with those fortifications until the result of experiments which were now being made was accurately known. On a matter of such vast importance he conceived that that was the only course which they could adopt. We were now in a transition state. So rapid were the changes now being made in artillery that it was impossible to form a judgment as to how far science could be carried in that direction. Ships and forts might be constructed to-day which might be supposed to be impregnable and invulnerable, and which to-morrow might be proved to be worth nothing. Within the last few days an experiment had been made on a target similar in all respects to the side of the Warrior at a distance of 200 yards, which proved that such iron plates could not resist the enormous projectile force of some descriptions of cannon. He was told that the constructor of the gun which pierced the target said that when rifled it might be made to penetrate a similar target at a distance of 800 or 1,000 yards. Until that was proved, however, this question of the Spithead forts was of little moment. The anchorage which a hostile fleet might take up before those forts for the attack of the dockyard could be at a distance not short of 1,000 yards, and therefore until the experiment of the efficiency of guns at that range had been tested the question of forts was nothing worth. Now that the minds of scientific men were occupied with the question of attack and defence, it was impossible to say what aspect it might ultimately assume. He thought it not improbable that after a considerable expenditure of labour and of money we should return to the point from which we had started, and that we should find that the power of attack was, as it had heretofore been, somewhat greater than the power of
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  defence. But be that as it might, he ventured to think that guns of any calibre could not be used so successfully on board a ship as in batteries. Not, however, for for the reason assigned by the noble Earl (the Earl of Hardwicke) who had the other night pointed out so lucidly the difference in warfare which must prevail hereafter, and suggested a doubt whether storage could be found for the increased charges of powder and the larger shot which must be used for fighting the largest classes of guns. But the noble Earl probably forgot that while the quantity of powder for each gun would be greatly increased, the number of guns on board any particular ship would be greatly diminished, so that storage for the powder and shot might be as easily found as at present. But apart from the question of floating batteries and forts, it was desirable to ascertain what would be the condition of a dockyard when the fleet was all converted into iron ships. It should be remembered, that if such a change were effected, the requirement for timber, and masts, and cordage, would be greatly decreased; and he believed that a sum far less than that which it was proposed should be incurred in fortifications and forts would then be sufficient to secure such stores against any attack from a hostile fleet; He wished, however, to confine himself simply upon that occasion to the question of which he had given notice; and he therefore begged to ask the Government, Whether or not they were about to proceed with the forts at Spithead; or whether it was to be understood that they had abandoned for the moment all intention of proceeding with those forts; and whether they were directing their attention exclusively to the construction of an iron fleet, which, in his opinion, was at present a question of far greater importance than the question even of the construction of forts at Spithead?
  EARL DE GREY AND RIPONsaid, he was glad that this subject had been brought under the notice of their Lordships, in the special aspect in which his noble Friend had introduced it. The point to which his noble Friend had directed their attention, and which had hardly been touched upon in the course of the very interesting discussion raised by a noble Earl (the Earl of Hardwicke) the other evening, was one of very considerable importance, and he could assure their Lordships that Her Majesty's Government were very glad to find that it had been

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  made the subject of so much inquiry and consideration, both in Parliament and among the public out of doors. He was not surprised at the effect which had been produced in the public mind by the intelligence which had recently arrived in this country of the naval action in the Hampton Roads. It might be true that those who had given their attention to this subject, and who possessed a scientific and professional acquaintance with its details, had not learned much that was new from the accounts of that engagement. It had, however, brought before the eyes of the unscientific public in a striking and practical shape the great changes which had taken place in naval warfare, and the altered conditions under which in future it must be conducted. It was no wonder that the public mind should have been startled by the intelligence. Their Lord ships would, however, agree with him that it was not desirable Her Majesty's Government should take any hasty action founded upon a single event, however important and striking it might be. It was their duty, on the contrary, to endeavour, by careful consideration and inquiry, to ascertain what was the real bearing and importance of that event, to weigh it in connection with the experiments recently instituted, and not to abandon too hastily a course adopted by the Government and approved by Parliament after full discussion. He would explain to their Lord ships as briefly as he could what was the present position of the matter. Their Lordships were aware that the Government, in submitting the plan which they had adopted, in pursuance of the recommendation of the Defence Commissioners, included in their works the erection of three forts at Spithead. Parliament sanctioned the proposal, and the Government subsequently entered into a contract for the building of the foundations of these forts. The contract was by measurement, founded on a fixed scale of prices, and the cost of the works to be erected under it was to be £230,000. The contractors had commenced their operations. At the Horse Sand a staging had been erected, and an iron cylinder had been sunk in the bottom of the sea to a considerable depth. At the second fort a similar staging had been made, and a cylinder also sunk. At the third point, No Man's Land, although a stage had been erected, it had not been completed. But little had been actually done, but the con-
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  tractor, with the view of executing his contract, had got together a considerable plant, together with stone for the foundation and other materials. He had possessed himself of steamers for carrying workmen and materials from the shore, and a pier had been built in Stokes Bay to facilitate the work. Considerable expense had, therefore, been incurred in carrying out the contracts, when the news arrived from America. The intelligence of course immediately attracted the attention of the Government, as it had done that of both Houses of Parliament. Finding that there was an evident wish on the part of the Legislature and the public that the question of the construction of these forts should be very carefully reconsidered by the light of recent events in America, and having no desire to adhere obstinately to the course previously determined upon, Her Majesty's Government had determined, as had been already announced, to refer the question of the construction and erection of these forts back to the Defence Commissioners. The fact was, however, that the question, had attracted the notice of the Government at an earlier period, and the question had been referred back to the Commissioners-last year by the late Secretary of State for War, and they had then made a special and very able Report on this particular branch of the subject. The matter would now be reconsidered, and, in order to obtain the best scientific and professional advice, Her Alajesty's Government had determined to add to the Commission one or two naval and military officers, whose attainments would give additional weight to their recommendations. It would be the duty of that Commission to examine the question anew from a scientific point of view, and to report their opinion to the Government. When that Report was made, it would be for the Government, on their responsibility, to weigh the facts of the case and the opinion of those officers, and to determine for themselves what course they thought it their duly to recommend to Parliament. Meanwhile, and pending the reconsideration of the question, the Government had determined to suspend the works that were going on at these three forts. Of course some expense would be incurred in the shape of compensation to the contractors; but the Government thought it better, in order to leave themselves freedom of action, to suspend the works. The cost of these forts had been estimated at £840.000, the sum of £230,000 being the coat of the

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  foundations. Their Lordships must not, however, imagine, that if these works were suspended, there would be left out of the sums voted by Parliament any considerable surplus which could be applied to any other purpose—such, for instance as the building of iron ships. Their Lordships would remember that the sum proposed by the Commissioners in their Report to be expended for fortifications, exclusive of floating defences and armaments, was between £10,000,000 and £11,000,000. Of this Bum an outlay of £5,000,000, in round numbers, for new works received the sanction of Parliament two years ago. In order to put themselves in a position to at once carry out a portion of the works which had been sanctioned, the Government, two years ago, obtained from Parliament powers to raise on loan a sum of £2,000,000. This was the only sum at the present moment in the hands of the Government available for that purpose. Of the £2,000,000 a sum of £900,000 had already been expended for land and works; a further sum of £700,000 would be required immediately for the purchase of land, and the balance of the £2,000,000 would be expended before the end of July next, on works actually in progress. Under these circumstances, their Lordships would see that the suspension which had taken place of the works at Spithead would not give any important or appreciable sum to the Government for any other purpose than that for which the £2,000,000 had been voted. It would be for the Government when the Commission had reported, and when they came to Parliament —as they would have to do in the present Session—to ask for means to continue works already sanctioned, but for the continuation of which money had not yet been voted—it would be for the Government to say then what course they would take.
  That was the present state of the question as regarded those forts at Spithead; hut, as the whole subject of our national defences was one of very great importance, he would ask permission of their Lordships to refer to one or two of the wider topics touched on in the speech of his noble Friend. In the first place he would observe—because there seemed to be considerable misapprehension in the minds of many persons on this point—that the only question really raised by the recent events in the American waters was one which related to the forts at Spithead—that was, to
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  isolated forts in the sea. They heard some persons say that the question was one involving the consideration of an expenditure of £11,000,000—that it was a question of stopping all fortifications as land and sea defences, and substituting for them vessels of the description of the Monitor. But he was sure that none of their Lordships took this view of the matter. He knew that such was not the opinion of his noble Friend who had introduced the subject that evening, and he was happy to say that he could quote, in support of his own view of the question, the opinion of a distinguished and able naval officer, who was one of the most determined opponents of the forts at Spithead—namely, Captain Coles. He was sure that the other opponents of the Spithead forts would accept that gallant officer as an authority; and, in his second pamphlet, it would be found that his objection was limited to the forts in the sea. Now, as regarded those forts, their Lordships would recollect that in their Report the Commissioners recommended that forts and floating defences should be combined together. The Commissioners did not say, "You ought to have nothing but those forts." They said, "You should have them to aid and assist floating defences;" and although Her Majesty's Government had not included floating defences in the works for which they had obtained powers to raise the loan, yet there could be no doubt, after the speech of his noble Friend at the head of the Admiralty the other night, that the question of the efficiency of these defences had for a very considerable time engaged, and was still engaging, the attention of the Government. The view of the Government, when coming to Parliament for authority to raise the loan, was that when money was to be borrowed it was better to confine the application of the borrowed money to the building of permanent works. Some persons might be disposed to question the soundness of that opinion; but he mentioned it for the purpose of assuring their Lordships that it was only in consequence of that view that no sum for the building of floating defences had been included in the amount originally asked for by the Government. We were now told that forts were of no use, and that we ought to have nothing but floating defences for our dockyards and arsenals. But if we adopted this advice we should, he believed, be liable to incur those very dangers which the fortifications were intended to guard against, and which formed

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  the main foundation of the Commissioners, recommendations, and of the sanction which their Lordships' House, he believed unanimously, and the other House of Parliament almost unanimously, had given to the proposal of the Government. The argument then used was based on the fact of the facilities possessed by steam vessels for running into any particular harbour on which it might be proposed to make an attack, at a time when our Channel fleet was not present; but if we had only a limited number of these Monitors—say twenty or thirty as proposed by Capt. Coles—round our coast, and there was not time to concentrate them at the point of attack, we should be open to the same danger as that to which under the old system of naval warfare the absence of our Channel fleet from the point that was immediately threatened would expose us; so that if we wanted security by means of floating defences alone, we should have to provide at each of our ports and arsenals a great permanent fleet of those floating defences. That would be a proceeding involving an immense cost; and, in addition, it would have the effect of tying up at those particular points a large naval force that might otherwise, to a great extent, be available for various important operations. It would, in fact, reduce us very much to the condition described in the discussion two years ago by his noble Friend the late Lord Herbert, of whom he would say in passing that nut the least of his claims to the grateful remembrance of his countrymen was the aid he had given in carrying through Parliament to a successful issue the system of defences which had met with such general approbation. Lord Herbert had observed, that if we defended our dockyards because they contained our fleet, and kept our fleet there for the purpose of defending our dockyards, we might as well abolish both dockyards and fleet altogether. That was a reductio ad absurdum; but it served to illustrate the difficulty in which those who would trust to floating defences alone were placed by their own argument. It appeared to him that what was required for our defence was a combination of floating and fixed defences. They had been told only a few days before that vessels of the description of the Monitor were invulnerable — that they could not be injured by anything which might be brought against them, and that they would pass harmless by our forts. That notion of their invulnerability had been put an end to by the recent experiments.
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  His noble Friend (Lord Vivian) had asked him to give some description or account of what had taken place at Shoeburyness within the last few days on an occasion when he was present; but it would be superfluous of him to occupy their Lordships' time at any length on this point after the very able and graphic description which had appeared in The Times newspaper, for the accuracy of which description he was prepared to vouch. He did not wish to press the results of those experiments a step further than they really went; but thought they at least showed this—that whereas it had hitherto been supposed that at 200 yards it was not possible to pierce a target made on the model of the Warrior's side, it was now clear that at such distance a shot from a smooth-bore gun would perforate that target as if you had drilled a hole through it. This showed what artillery we already possessed, and he believed that we had not yet reached the limit of the power of artillery. If what had been done at Shoeburyness had been effected at only 200 yards, it did not follow that the same result might not be obtained at 400 yards. He might say that he had every reason to believe that such a result could be had at a greater distance than 200 yards. The gun from which the shot had been fired was made for a 300 lb. shot; and there was every likelihood that a shot of that weight would have at 400 yards a momentum sufficient to produce the same result as the lighter shot had produced at 200. But, more than this, scientific men, gunmakers, and others, were of opinion that a much more powerful gun than the 300-pounder could he made. Sir William Armstrong—a cautious man in speaking of anything which had not had the test of experience—had assured him that day, that although he would not speak with certainty on the point, he had no doubt in his own mind that a gun could be made which would be effective at the mean range between the two forts at Spithead. One day it was believed that the plate would heat the gun; the next day a gun was made which pierced the plate. They had been told that a 1801b. shot had failed to go through the side of the Monitor: when it came to the test, it was ascertained that it had not done so because too low a charge of powder had been used. The same experiment had been tried the other day, a 2001b. shot being fired with 101b. of powder without any effect; and even the 300lb. gun, with a charge of 401b. of powder failed to pierce

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  the target; but when the charge was increased to 50lb. the shot went through. In the opinion of the most competent scientific men the result of the experiments had shown, upon the whole, a steady average superiority of the gun over the plates. At all events there was a limit, which, in the opinion of the best scientific authorities, must be nearly attained, to the thickness of armour plating that could be put upon a seagoing vessel, while the power of artillery was capable of development to a point which was much more distant. Great difficulties and great expenditure necessarily attended a period of transition like the present, and it was, of course, desirable to take no steps which further experience might force them to reverse. But in the mean time it was absolutely impossible to stand still. The country must be defended, and they should take care, while in this state of transition, that the security of the country was not endangered. He believed it would be a most unwise proceeding hastily to suspend or abandon the erection of these forts. Care had been taken to render the foundations of those in process of construction sufficiently strong to bear any weight of iron with which the superstructure might be defended. Upon a fort plates of such thickness could be laid as to make it absolutely invulnerable, and guns could be mounted of any size that science might produce. These would have the advantage of resting on a solid platform, instead of the moving platform of a ship's deck—a consideration which ought not to be overlooked in discussing the question. It was also proposed that floating defences should be combined with forts; and if these could only detain the enemy for a short time under the fire of guns such as they had seen the other day, or the still more powerful artillery which might yet be produced, he ventured to say that a very good account would be given of any iron fleet in the world. Forts, also, were of great value to the floating defences, as points upon which to advance or retire. Many of those who paid great attention to the details of the recent naval engagement in America seemed to have overlooked the fact, that when the Merrimac retired under the guns of a fort, the Monitor, although she was stated to have been uninjured in the contest, did not venture to pursue her. He did not wish to lay undue stress on this circumstance, but it ought not to be lost sight of.
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  Having consulted persons whose opinions were of the very highest importance, he was led to believe that the final result of the experiments would leave the relative position of ships and forts very much where it was previously. The question was one of importance not only to this country, but to Europe generally, and he knew that the proceedings of the British Government were watched with great interest by foreign nations. Their Lordships, therefore, might like to hear an extract from the letter of a distinguished foreign officer, Captain Brialmont, The author of an excellent life of the Duke of Wellington—
  "I have just read in the papers that, by order of the Government, the works at Spithead have been suspended, and that you are returning to Dundas's old idea of substituting iron-plated ships for iron-plated towers. I think this very absurd; for the famous battle of the Monitor and the Merrimac has proved nothing that you did not know already; and your experiments at Shoeburyness are in my eyes much more conclusive. I can hardly believe that your, engineers will consent to have fixed iron-plated batteries replaced by movable iron-plated batteries, which are twice as expensive, and twice as uncertain in their fire."
  Under these circumstances their Lordships, he hoped, would not hesitate to approve the course which Her Majesty's Government had taken. This was not a question on which they ought to act hastily. The Government desired to consider it in the fairest possible spirit, and with that object they had now referred the matter to a Commission of scientific and practical men. The Government were not wedded obstinately to any particular scheme, but when the Report of that Commission was issued, they would feel it their bounden duty, after mature deliberation, to recommend those measures which they conceived to be necessary for the defence of our ports and arsenals, and in that course they hoped to receive the same support from Parliament which had been given for the same object two years ago.
  THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE: My Lords, I feel some hesitation in prolonging the discussion which was raised by the question of the noble Lord, and which, I think, has been fully and effectually answered by my noble Friend. But, perhaps, it may be right that I should make some few observations on this important military and naval question, which occupies the attention not only of your Lordships' House and the other House of Parliament, but, I may

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  say, the country at large. In my recollection there has been no military or naval question which of late years has so entirety engrossed the public attention as, on the one hand, the power of resistance by iron plates, whether for ships or forts, and, on the other, the power of attack by the artillery of the present day. It appears to me that in considering this question circumstances have been introduced which lead to some confusion; and among others the valuable opinion of my late friend, Sir Richard Dundas, has given to the discussion an appearance different from what it really ought to present. I must explain to your Lordships that there are two distinct bodies in existence. One, the Defence Commission, was established with a view of giving to the country their advice and opinion upon the national defences. The other, the Defence Committee, was a Committee formed, I may say, within the Government, and from my position as Commander-in-chief I happen to be its President. The details contained in the Report of the Defence Commission having been submitted to the Defence Committee, in order that they might communicate their opinion to the Government, I was, of course, aware- of the opinion entertained by the late Sir Richard Dundas. Indeed, I may state, that when this question of the forts of Spithead was first brought under the notice of the Defence Committee, I very much agreed with the lute Sir Richard Dundas in thinking that we should be acting unwisely if we only looked at the forts and did not at the same time pay attention to floating defences. I believe the noble Duke the First Lord of the Admiralty can corroborate my statement that when Sir Richard Dundas wrote that strong letter on the subject of iron-plated ships he in no respect wished to convey that his opinion was unfavourable to forts; he only wished to assert that forts would not be ready in sufficient time, and therefore that ships ought to be prepared pari passu with forts. In that opinion I fully coincided; and it was after considering the question and agreeing with reference to it, that my gallant Friend the late Admiral wrote that letter. With regard to what has happened in America, I think it bears out the opinion expressed by my gallant Friend, that it is only by combined defences of forts and ships that an important roadstead, such as Spithead, can be and ought to be defended. Indeed, I cannot help feeling a strong conviction, particularly after what has happen-
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  ed at Shoeburyness, that, so far from retrograding, we ought to continue the course which was originally contemplated— that of combining ships with forts for this special purpose. Look at what happened at Shoeburyness. I believe that we have: not nearly arrived at the limit of the power of the artillery which can be produced. I, like my noble Friend, have communicated with: that distinguished and able man Sir William Armstrong to-day; and although he never likes to express an opinion unless he knows: by experiment that he can produce what he says he will, still he has the strongest conviction that he can make a gun of a calibre of 600lb., which, if rifled, will throw a shot which at 2,200 yards will produce an effect equal to, if not greater than that produced at 200 yards on Tuesday. This meets one objection which is brought against the result of the experiment at Shoeburyness. It is said, "Oh, look at the range; it was only 200 yards, and no ship would come within that distance of a fort." If the range could not be extended, that argument would be worth a great deal; but I am convinced that the range can be greatly enlarged: and if we got only half of what Sir William Armstrong promises, or 1,100 yards, these Spithead forts would at once become invaluable. The forts would also be of the greatest importance in supporting a fleet, which I apprehend will be composed of ships very different from sea-going vessels. I take it that the floating defences of Spithead will be vessels somewhat analagous to the Monitor, and which, although very powerful, must require a certain amount of support. That support they will find in the forts; and I suppose that if an attack is ever expected, they will be concentrated round the forts, ready to rush out, in the manner of a sortie on land, against any naval force which may be attacking the entrance to Spithead. There is also another consideration. We can all foresee that artillery may be greatly improved and its power extended; but I have great doubts—of course, not being a naval man, I speak with all diffidence—but I have great doubts whether you can much increase the thickness of the plates to be placed upon your ships. We have got to 4½ inches, and I think that the noble Duke the other night said something about trying 5½ inches, but I doubt whether he will go much beyond that. We know that that thickness of plate has already been pierced with facility, and therefore it seems to be unlikely that you will be able to make your

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  ships invulnerable. But that does not apply to forts. Upon them you may, if you please, place a foot of iron; and therefore the increased power of artillery, although it may prove fatal to ships, will by no means so entirely dispose of forts. Another very important question is as to the possibility of carrying these heavy guns on board ships. I questioned many naval men upon the subject the other day, and the general opinion seemed to be that it would be possible to carry this 3001b. gun, which weighs twelve tons, on board ship; but we had a proof of the difficulty which might be experienced in working it in the fact that it required 200 artillerymen to move it over a portion of the ground at Shoeburyness which was rather soft. In a battery Sir William Armstrong says that he could, by means of machinery, work one of these heavy guns with only five men; but on board ship, although, no doubt, some machinery might be employed, yet the very motion of the vessel would render its application more difficult than in a stationary fort. Therefore I think it is very questionable whether a ship can carry much heavier guns than those with which they are now armed. I have no doubt that within twelve months we shall have a gun of twice the calibre of the 300-pounder which has done such feats at Shoeburyness. Nor do I expect that we shall stop there, if it is thought necessary to have still heavier ordnance. These great guns, it must he remembered, require very large charges; and as a ship is required to carry ammunition for a long voyage, it becomes a question how you can find storage for the large supplies required for her large guns. On Tuesday we tried charges of 401b. and 50 lb. for the 300-pounder gun, and for the 600-pounder we hear talk of charges of 80 lb. and 100 lb. How are you in a small ship to stow away the enormous amount of ammunition which would be required for the service of such guns as these? In the case of forts no such difficulty would arise. In them you can make any arrangements you like, and store up as much ammunition as you please. Therefore, although I would on no account overlook the importance of the experiments which we have witnessed, and of the actual occurences which have taken place in America, yet all these circumstances lead me, and I think ought to lead the country, to the conclusion that the Government have been right in inking the course which they have hitherto adopted, and that it would have been very
  848
  wrong for them to have suddenly altered their whole arrangements on account of what has occurred. In making so great a change as is by some persons desired we ought not to be carried away by the impulse of the moment. A week ago everybody was saying, "There is an end of forts —the thing is absurd; you have now arrived at invulnerable ships." A week has elapsed, further experiments have taken place at Shoeburyness, and every one now says, "Every ship is vulnerable; there is no question upon that point." Thus within a fortnight at least a portion of the public have entirely changed their opinions. I will not say which of those opinions is the right one. I have always been of one opinion, and that is that the original plan, although it might be open to modifications, was the right one and ought to be adhered to. I think that Her Majesty's Government is wise not to give up that plan, but to pause, and to give to the country another opportunity of expressing an opinion upon it. Still I do hope that that pause is not to be a prolonged one, but that before long we may come to some decision. I will tell you why. Because, while we are pausing we shall be defenceless, and that of all arrangements would be the most unfortunate one that could be adopted. Let us proceed steadily, consistently, and without hesitation in one uniform course of action— that course of action, of course, which is most advantageous to the best interests of the country—and let us not be biassed by any accident which may give to the gun or the ship the preponderance for the hour. That is not the way in which to decide so important a question, and I hope that it will not be the course which Her Majesty's Government will adopt; indeed, I feel sure that it will not. I believe, that if ever it was proved to the satisfaction of military and naval men that a combination of defences was essential in such a position as that of Spithead, such has been fully and fairly demonstrated by the last experiments at Shoeburyness, and I venture to think even by what happened the other day in America. Because what my noble Friend said is fully borne out by the newspaper report, namely, that when the Merrimac was to a certain extent injured by the Monitor she retired under the cover of the forts, and the Monitor did not pursue her or venture to expose herself at close quarters to the guns of those fortifications. After the experiments at Shoeburyness people have been much surprised

  849
  that in America the ships were so little injured: but I should be inclined to suppose that this arose from the American guns being all shell guns, and throwing nothing but hollow shot; while the shot with which such great effects were produced at Shoeburynesson Tuesday were solid shot. Nor ought we to overlook the charges of powder that were used in the two cases. When we used charges of 40 lb. of powder, the target resisted the shot; but when we used a charge of 50 lb. of powder with a shot of 150 lb., the effect was, as we know, very remarkable. The Americans, on the other hand, used only 121b. or 141b. of powder to a shot of 180 lb. The result was, that the American guns were comparatively useless. It is clear, therefore, that the amount of powder for the charge is a very important element in the question. I have thought it right, my Lords, to go into some detail on this subject, because I think that such an important question as this should be thoroughly sifted, and that the country should clearly understand it. This is no mere party question, but a question of vital importance to the security of the country, and it cannot be too much discussed. We ought to give it the most careful and deliberate consideration, and having once made up our minds, we ought to act with energy and steadily adhere to our course. In conclusion, I trust the Government will come as soon as they can to a decision as to the steps they are prepared to take in regard to the fortifications.
  THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH: My Lords, the speeches of the illustrious Duke and of the noble Earl the Under Secretary for War have left hardly a word for any one to say on this subject, so fully have they entered on every point of importance. I owe an apology, therefore, to your Lord ships for the few observations which I wish to make, because I take a very strong interest in the question. It appears to me, that if the Ministers were right last year when, with the general acquiescence, they determined to build the three forts, there is nothing whatever in the events which have recently taken place in America, or in the experiments which have been made here, which should induce them to change their opinion. They may be very right in not proceeding hurriedly in the matter, but I do trust they will not proceed tardily. Somehow or other it was managed that all the fine weather of last year was lost to this work. I hope another summer will
  850
  not be thrown away, but that during the fine weather, whenever it comes, the Government will proceed with these forts. And what is to be the cost of these works? Why, my Lords, they will not cost more than three iron ships. You have to decide whether you will have three forts carrying some 300 guns—a permanent and lasting defence—or three ships carrying 30 or 36 guns, of which the duration cannot be exactly calculated, but would not probably exceed ten or fifteen years. The state of the question in regard to the iron ships seems to me to be this:—I think it is ascertained that a ship can be made invulnerable against large shot thrown with a small charge, or against ordinary shot with a large charge; but if a large shot be thrown with a very large charge, it can penetrate the side of any ship which has yet been constructed. It appears to be consistent with reason that whatever advance may be made in strengthening the sides of ships, equal or greater advances can be made in augmenting the power of the attacking force. So that we may consider it a proved and almost admitted fact that no side of a ship can be built which is not to be perforated by shot. But, observe, there is a necessary limit to the strength which can be given to the side of the ship, and, further, that there is a necessary limit to the weight of the guns which a ship can carry, and which can be worked on hoard. But there is no assignable limit whatever to the strength which can be given to an iron fort or to the power which can be given to the guns with which the fort may be mounted. It is by means of these forts that we desire to resist the inferior and unequal attacks of iron ships. Your Lordships must bear in mind that this is more a naval than a military question. I hold that the Government have done extremely well in placing a naval officer on the Committee which is to consider the subject. For my own part, if I were in the situation of the noble Duke, I should go to Sir William Parker or Sir George Seymour, as the two best seamen we have; and also, perhaps, to the efficient officers who have successively commanded the Excellent in Portsmouth harbour, because I think we could not obtain sounder information or more intelligent opinions anywhere else, and it is always well to go direct to the best source. The advice which the wise have given is that before proceeding to action on any matter we ought to consider all the difficulties and objections

  851
  connected with it, and to balance them carefully; but that when once we have, come to a decision, we ought not to allow any event which shall occur, unless of the gravest importance, and one which could not before have been at all contemplated, to divert us from our purpose, I trust the Government will follow that rule in the course which they adopt on this subject. If, we could always be sure we should possess a superior fleet, no doubt we could dispense with the forts at Spithead. A superior fleet lying there would not be attacked in all probability, or, if attacked, would be able: to defeat the enemy. But the advantage of possessing forts is that it is no longer necessary to keep, so large a fleet at hand. Your ships become available for other purposes, and the forts afford at all times a refuge and protection to an inferior or crippled force. I cannot understand how any one, looking at the comparative smallness of the cost and the immense value of the, forts, can hesitate for a moment as to the course which should be pursued. As to Portsmouth will say nothing, because it is not necessary connected with the question of these forts; but I will say a few words upon another point which is strongly impressed upon my mind, and to which a noble and gallant, Friend of mine has already drawn attention. It is not only the application of steam to navigation, but yet more the invention, of these iron men-of-war, which has entirely altered our position relatively, to other States. In former wars we derived vast advantages from, the possession of a great maritime, commerce, which furnished us with a supply of; skilful seamen. But these iron ships can be navigated by landsmen, who, in the course of two or three weeks, can acquire their "sea legs" as well as the best seaman who ever trod the quarter-deck of a man-of-war. There is, consequently, no country on the Continent which is not capable of putting forth a navy, and they all appear desirous of at once doing so. The engineer is not a seaman, the gunner is not a seaman. We stand, therefore, on equal terms with all the nations of the Continent, who are each striving, in a spirit of rivalry, to obtain a fleet. It is only by instant action, by using our superior financial means and the advantages which our manufactures and the possession of iron give us—it is only by doing this at once and with a will, that we can possibly maintain that position of preeminence which we have hitherto enjoyed.
  852
  I heard with great interest the noble Duke at the head of the Admiralty speak the other night of the iron ships which the Government are disposed to build. I confess, however, I did not infer from his speech that he and; the Government; were fully alive to the circumstances of difficulty and danger in which, we stand. This is not a time when we can be satisfied with mere ordinary measures, or with doing, only that to which no one can very strongly object. We are in a position in which it is absolutely necessary for us to make, a great effort, be the cost what it may; and place ourselves at once in a position of maritime superiority. It was justly said by Lord Palmerston some years ago that the application of steam to navigation; had made a, bridge between this country and the Continent. This, no doubt, materially altered our position in relation to the Continent; but the invention of iron ships is much worse; and unless we apply all our energies to uphold our predominance at sea, our position is reversed, and our commerce is at the mercy of those who may become our enemies, and may deprive us of the little security which remains to us, and of that which how enables us to keep our shores from invasion. For years it has been my conviction that, ultimately, we shall be compelled to fight for our homes upon the soil of England, and all the events which are taking place only strengthen that belief in my mind. I will not ask the illustrious Duke what his opinion may be as to our present state of preparation; but as an individual Member of this House I may express my opinion that our means of defence are utterly inadequate, and that we ought at once to turn our attention to the provision not merely of maritime means of defence, but of those means of defence which we must use in the event of an invasion of our shores having been effected.
  THE DUKE OF SOMERSET: My Lords, there are one or two observations which I wish to make. I wish to confirm the statement made by the illustrious Duke in reference to the opinion of my late Friend Sir Richard Dundas, because his opinion was quoted as being very adverse to the forts at Spithead, and as desiring to do away with them, and to substitute floating defences. In the early part of 1861 I had naturally several conversations with him upon this question of defence, as well as with other officers; and he then stated to me that he thought it very desirable to

  853
  press more on the Defence Committee the importance of floating defences, and that he was very desirous to put that forward if, by so doing, he would not embarrass the Government. I told him at once that my wish was—and I was sure it was the wish of the Government—before we entered into such a large expenditure, to have the matter fully discussed on every side, and that I thought he was quite right, as a naval officer in a high position, to state his views as strongly as possible, in order to bring them before the attention of the Defence Committee, and to have them thoroughly sifted. It was with that intention that he wrote the letter of the 8th of February, 1861, which, when it was received at the Horse Guards, was referred to the Defence and Fortifications Committee for their report. They went into an investigation at some length, although upon some points I regret that the matter was not gone into at greater length. I should have liked some officers to have been called who were not called, and to have had the evidence of Captain Cowper Coles on that occasion; because I think the Report would have been more satisfactory to the public than it has been since considered. With regard to the general question of these forts and defences, the House will allow me to say that there are two great objects to be attained by these defences— one is to defend the country against the attack of an enemy, and the other is to defend it against panics at home. We have really had so many panics within the last few years that some means of thorough defence are absolutely necessary. Some years ago these defences were commenced, not merely to prevent an invasion, but to prevent the alarm of an invasion. A few weeks ago, as soon as the news arrived from America of the engagement between these two iron vessels, another panic spread through the country, and great alarm arose, and the opinion was expressed, that as our naval means of defence were entirely gone, we should have to look to some other means of defence for our shores. I think it most desirable, whether by floating defences or by forts, or by both combined—which I believe to be best—we should guard not only against foreign invasion, but against sucli continual panics at home. With regard to what the noble Earl (the Earl of Ellen-borough) has said—that he does not think the Government is going quite fast enough in getting these means of defence—I will just observe that in 1859 we were told the
  854
  same thing. We were not going fast enough then in having more wooden line-of-battle ships, line-of-battle ships and fast frigates being then considered the best means of defence. We pressed on the wooden ships, and we began iron ships; and I would have gone faster if I had had confidence in our mode of constructing them. But it was very properly said. "It is a new plan First try what you have built. See how you can improve them. Do not involve the country in immense expenditure for more, costly ships until yon know whether they will answer." I did not quite take that advice. Seeing what was going on abroad, we did not wait to that extent. We had fifteen iron ships in course of preparation before one had been tried. I think that was quite as fast as I could justify. I think now that we have had further experience, we can advance faster; and accordingly last year we commenced plating five wooden ships, with a view to giving those additional means of defence. We are also now providing a vessel upon another plan, for the purpose of defending our ports and harbours Of course that is experimental. Nothing has yet been done very satisfactory in that way. But I believe we can make a vessel which will be a most formidable opponent to anything which can be brought against us, although I do not believe that it will be a vessel which can proceed conveniently far beyond the Channel. I believe we can make vessels for service in the Channel far more effective than anything which has yet been made. There are two ways of building—one in our own dockyards, the other by employing contractors. We find that the contractors are more inexperienced in building these iron ships than the naval men in our dockyards. When we try to build by contract, the contractors undertake to furnish the ships in ten, twelve, or eighteen months. They try hard to do it, and in some cases they may have lost money in their efforts to complete their contract. But they are unable to do it. The novel construction and the enormous pieces of iron required interfere with the progress of the work. There are very few contractors capable of constructing these iron-plated ships, and they are not able rapidly to meet the wants of the Admiralty. With regard to our dockyards, I have ordered in each one ship at least to be built, and one at least to be plated, in the year. I did not think that if we tried to do more we should advance much further, because the men whom we

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  want to overlook this novel work cannot give attention to more than one ship building at a time; and if we had attempted to do more, we should have failed, and brought discredit, perhaps, upon this class of vessels. I will not trouble your Lordships any longer, but I think I have explained why we have not gone so fast as is wished.
  THE EARL OF ELLENBOROUGH: What I think is, that the Government makes these ships a great deal too large. We hear that the Warrior can hardly enter Portsmouth harbour. These enormous vessels are unnecessary for the purpose for which they are intended, and their expense is enormous.
  THE DUKE OF SOMERSET: One day we are told the ships must carry larger guns. Another day we are told they must go very fast. If they are to carry great weight and to go very fast, they must be enormous vessels. The only way to carry heavy armaments is to give up somewhat of the speed we have endeavoured to obtain.
  House adjourned at Seven o'clock, to Tuesday, the 29th instant, Four o'clock.