Lords Sitting of 10 May 1861

MINUTES.
PUBLIC BILLS.—2a Passengers (Australian Colonies); Marriages Validity.

THE UNITED STATES—THE CIVIL WAR —PRIVATEERING.
THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords I have given notice to my noble Friend the
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President of the Council that I would put a question to him upon a subject of considerable importance and urgency. That question may now, perhaps, be considered comparatively unnecessary, inasmuch as it was raised elsewhere in the course of yesterday, and Her Majesty's Government gave some intimation of the course they meant to pursue, but the matter is one of so much importance that I hope my noble Friend will forgive me if I ask for some explanations with respect to it in your Lordships' House. Your Lordships are aware that the unfortunate dispute which has existed for some time between the Northern and the Southern portions of the United States of America has at last resulted in what I am afraid must be considered a civil war. I am not going to ask the noble Earl any question with respect to the manner in which this country may be affected by the possible consequences of that war. I understand the Government have already come to the conclusion—of which I do not complain—that both the Northern and the Southern sections of the United States are entitled to be considered as belligerent Powers, and to have our relations with them regulated by the rules which apply to belligerent Powers. I understand further that the Government have under their consideration, and have referred to the law officers of the Crown, several important and delicate questions touching the extent and character of those belligerent rights. Upon that subject, therefore, I do not at present ask for any expression of opinion on the part of the Government; but there is one point with respect to which it is highly important they should furnish immediate information. Your Lordships are aware that among the measures adopted or threatened by the Southern Confederation is that of sending forth letters of marque and resorting to the system of privateering for the purpose of attacking the commerce, of the Northern States. Your Lordships are aware, on the other hand, that the Northern States have signified their intention to regard the issue of such letters of marque and such privateering as piracy, and to treat them as such. I do not stop to inquire how far this course of proceeding is consistent with the strong declarations made on the part of the United States at the time of the Congress of Paris, when the system of privateering was abandoned by the Powers of Europe, but when a different resolution was adopted by the United States and they alone of all

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the important maritime States refused to abandon that system. The point to which I wish to call the attention of your Lordships and the Government is the position in which British seamen may probably be placed in consequence of the announcements made by the Southern and the Northern States. If there is one mode of warfare which has more attractions for seamen than another it is precisely the system of privateering. Privateering is a sort of sea-poaching, and is peculiarly attractive to the more reckless and dissolute class of sailors. It combines ninny inducements—a certain amount of daring, a certain amount of risk, and considerable chances of profit—inducements which, coupled with drink, apart from any question of distress or poverty, which I believe does not form an element in more than one case out of a hundred, are precisely those that lead to poaching on land, and are also precisely those that would lure seamen into poaching by sea—or privateering. But unfortunately the maritime game-laws are of a rather stringent character, and visit offenders with nothing short of capital punishment. It is, therefore, important to those British seamen who are liable to be attracted by the various inducements of privateering that they should know upon what footing they stand with respect to their rights as British subjects. I need not say that the offence of entering upon this privateering service is an offence against the Foreign Enlistment Act; but that Act does not impose any penalty so severe as that of capital punishment, and if a British seaman who has entered one of the Southern privateers should be captured by a Northern ship of war and condemned to death—if he is entitled to claim any protection even for his life from his own Government, I cannot conceive anything more certain to involve us in most serious and embarrassing complications with the United States, or more likely to render us, almost necessarily, parties in that unhappy contest, from which I cordially join with the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office in the earnest desire that we may continue to stand aloof. On the other hand, if a British seamen by entering a Southern privateer does forfeit his right to claim the protection of his own Government—which I apprehend he would do—it should be distinctly and publicly made known to him on the part of the Government that if he is led into such a criminal undertaking from any temptation whatever, and if he is
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there by exposed to the most serious consequences—even to the loss of his life by judicial sentence—in that case his blood will be on his own head, and he must not expect the slightest interference on the part of this country to save him from consequences, however deplorable, provoked by his own act. I understand that a Proclamation is about to be issued by Her Majesty's Government on the subject of privateering and of belligerent rights. I hope that in that Proclamation—or in some other way—a most distinct and emphatic warning will be given to all seamen in the service of Her Majesty as to the conditions upon which they will engage, if they choose to enter upon such hazardous enterprise—in the system of privateering. There should be no doubt left on their mind, but the fullest and plainest intimation should publicly be made to them whether, if they do engage in such a service, they will, or will not, in extremity, be entitled to expect any protection or any interference on the part of this country. I hope my noble Friend will state to your Lordships whether the Government have come to any conclusion upon this question; and, if so, whether they are prepared forthwith to issue a public and emphatic notification of the course they intend to pursue, and the consequences likely to result to British seamen from a disregard of their warning?
EARL GRANVILLE: The noble Earl, by the manner in which he has approached the subject, has evinced a becoming appreciation of the difficulties which may arise to ourselves from the unfortunate state of things in the United States. With respect, however, to the question of the belligerent rights of the parties now engaged in that unhappy contest, the noble Earl has not asked for any expression of opinion on the part of the Government, and, therefore, I am absolved from entering into a discussion of that most important, difficult, and delicate subject. But the noble Earl has inquired whether it is our intention to issue a Proclamation warning the subjects of Her Majesty against in any manner departing from that neutrality which Her Majesty herself is so desirous to observe. To that question, as the noble Earl has stated, an answer has already been given in "another place"—namely, that it is the intention of the Government, according to precedent, to issue a Proclamation giving such warning to all the subjects of Her Majesty. The precise wording of the Proclamation is a matter

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of considerable importance and difficulty, requiring some deliberation, and we have thought it right to obtain the best advice in framing it; but I may state that the Government are anxious to make it as plain and emphatic as possible.
THE EARL OF DERBY: Perhaps the noble Earl will inform your Lordships whether, in the event of the Northern States acting upon their expressed intention to treat privateering as piracy, and British seamen being sentenced to death, it is to be distinctly understood that such persons will not be entitled to claim protection from their own country.
EARL GRANVILLE: I should prefer not to enter into any detailed explanation until the Proclamation shall have been issued. It is plain that the natural result of such a Proclamation must be that no British seaman will be entitled to claim the official protection of his Government.
LORD BROUGHAMsaid, the noble Earl had limited his observations to seamen in Her Majesty's service, when it was quite clear that he meant them to apply to any British subject taking part in privateering. Privateering of this description was piracy by the law of nations. Any interference in a foreign war, by fitting out, manning, and going on board ships to take part in the war, was a crime by our law, and it was most expedient that those parties who chose to commit the offence in this case should be left to suffer the penalty they incurred. The war in America was a most lamentable affair on all accounts, and for the sake of liberal principles, and for the sake of humanity itself, he fervently trusted that the folly which had given rise to it—possibly not confined to one side—would not be attended with the calamities which always accompanied civil war. If disruption was inevitable, he trusted the new States would form themselves without bloodshed.
THE EARL OF HARDWICKEwas anxious that the House should not enter too strong a protest against that which was a natural consequence of war—namely, that vessels should be fitted out by private individuals under letters of marque. That was, no doubt, privateering; but it did not by any means follow that privateering was piracy. He believed that if privateering ships were put in the hands of proper officers they were not engaged in piracy any more than men-of-war. He thought that a feeble State engaged in a war with a powerful one had a right to
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make use of its merchant vessels for the purpose of carrying on the contest, and there was no violation of the law of nations in such a proceeding.

SYRIA AND TURKEY.—RESOLUTIONS MOVED.
VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFErose to move the following Resolutions (of which he had given notice) on the affairs of Syria and Turkey—

"1. That this House would view with deep regret any circumstances leading to a continuance, however brief, of the occupation of Syria by foreign troops beyond the 5th of June next ensuing, the period now fixed for their complete withdrawal by the Convention agreed to at Paris on the 15th of March.

"2. That this House considers the late calamitous events in Syria as not to be attributed to causes exclusively local, but also, and chiefly, to the general state of the Turkish Empire, more especially in point of revenue and administration.

"3. That this [loose is deeply impressed with the urgency of obtaining from the Ottoman Porte a prompt adoption and strict enforcement of such measures as may best afford, in the spirit of the Sultan's Ilatt-homayoon of 1856, a reliable security against the recurrence, from any cause whatever, of those sanguinary conflicts."

The noble Viscount said, this was a subject which possessed so little novelty, and was so little recommended to himself by the simplicity of its character or the facility of solution of the difficulties by which it was surrounded, that he should have shrunk from bringing it forward if he had not borne in recollection the indulgence that on more than one occasion had been shown to him, and if he had not also borne in mind the importance to our national interests of this subject; and if he had not also felt that a duty had been imposed upon him by his long residence in Turkey and his experience in its diplomacy. The Resolutions which he proposed to submit to their Lordships were of a character not calculated, he thought, to raise any difference of opinion in that House, still less to occasion any division of opinion. They had a twofold object in view. They were directed, in the first instance, to the question of the settlement of Syria; and, secondly, they were directed, by the natural connection between the two subjects, to our interest in the maintenance of the Turkish Empire, notwithstanding all its defects, and more particularly in consequence of the necessities under which it laboured. In bringing it under the notice of that House, simultaneously, but accidentally, with the discussion of it in the

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other House of Parliament, he had felt that advantage might be derived to the great interests involved by a discussion in both Houses of Parliament. He conceived that where there was no special reason on the part of the Government to apprehend embarrassment from a discussion of a subject, great advantage sprung from its discussion in both the Legislative Assemblies of the nation—advantages not confined to the Houses themselves, but extending to the countries interested, from their attention being thus forcibly drawn to questions involving their interests; and he hoped he had not misjudged in affording their Lordships an opportunity of considering the merits of this question. It was now six weeks since the abundant Correspondence laid on the table by the Foreign Office had been under their Lordships' consideration. The subject, therefore, could hardly be considered as brought forward without sufficient time having been afforded for its consideration. It was not his intention to go into the details of the Correspondence. He had naturally looked over it; and the general result of his inspection was, that in the midst of great difficulties, those who bad been employed on the spot had shown an intelligent attention to the great interests of the question in Syria; and that particularly the Commissioner sent by Her Majesty's Secretary for Foreign Affairs had shown that he was worthy of the selection; for without much diplomatic experience he had exhibited an attention not only to the interests of the country to which he was sent, but to the great principles of humanity, that did credit to himself and honour to his country. This was a difficult and complicated question, especially in connection with the interests of the Turkish Empire at large and the great European interests involved. In Syria itself they had a practical issue, and one of very great importance not only to Europe at large, but it might be said more particularly in respect to our own British interests. It was one which presented circumstances of great delicacy and great urgency, and which offered difficulties of solution which it was his desire to bring under their Lordships' notice. Syria, as they all knew, had been from the earliest times of great importance and the deepest interest in every sense; and the occupation of it by foreign troops involved political considerations that could not be passed over without the decpest anxiety. At the time when it was decided that foreign troops should be
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sent there, and that our neighbours, the Government of France, should be authorized to send an expedition to act in the common name, he felt the difficulty of the situation. He considered that Her Majesty's Government were fully justified in accepting the offer of France, with a positive assurance, still more with a positive engagement, that the employment of the troops in Syria should not extend beyond a short period of duration. It had since become known that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government circumstances had arisen which justified the prolongation of that occupation. The French expeditionary force still occupied that country, but under a renewed engagement of a very positive description to evacute the country on the 5th of next month. It would be, he conceived, a matter of deep concern if any circumstance were to arise which should involve further difficulty in the execution of that engagement. He himself entertained no doubt of the intentions of the French Government to act on their engagement. He could not for a moment suppose that any interest peculiar to themselves would induce them to put into doubt the engagement they had entered into with this country and the other European Powers. It was not, therefore, from any apprehension of their departing from that engagement that he had brought that part of the subject under their Lordships' consideration. But circumstances might arise, and it might depend on the force of those circumstances—how far that legitimate interest which that Government had for its own religion in Syria—which might induce them to press for a further extension of time. Under these circumstances it was of great importance that the evident intentions of Her Majesty's Government should be supported by the voice of Parliament, so that not only no change should take place with regard to the period of occupation, but that those necessary measures should be pressed forward, as well as judiciously selected, which the inhabitants of those countries should look to in future for their protection—that protection which they had hitherto derived from foreign bayonets. It certainly did appear that, whatever support a foreign army gave to the Turkish Commission, their presence was not essential to the restoration and maintenance of tranquillity. This much at least did appear from the papers presented, that the troops which had accompanied the Turkish Commis-

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sioner were sufficient to produce a cessation of hostilities between the contending parties, and that there was no necessity for the French expeditionary force to proceed as far as Damascus: that, in fact, their operations had been very much confined to those bearing the character of police. It could not be concealed that operations of that kind were not unaccompanied by subjects of regret—unavoidable, but still subjects of regret—inasmuch as they were attended by increased excitement on the part of the Christian population, and a necessary depression on the part of the Druses, who, however guilty they might have been of sanguinary conflicts and atrocious massacres, had, as shown by the published Correspondence, been provoked to those acts by the Maronites, and those who supported them from a distance. He did not mean, in so saying, the French Government itself, but those religionists in France who had taken Syria under their protection, and whose constant intercourse with that country had on more than one occasion caused disputes which had terminated in those atrocities which every one so much lamented. If any force, whatever it might be, of some other Power than France, were to remain in that country, attracted in the first interest of religion, he would put it to the House whether it would suit our interest or the fair requirements of Europe that such an army should continue to occupy a country which was well known to be, in a military sense, the key of Egypt. Those were very powerful reasons why that House and the House of Commons, before the die was cast, should express an opinion as to the fulfilment of the engagement that had been entered into, and to encourage Her Majesty's Government to take those steps and adopt those measures which were advised and considered urgent, not only for the security of the tranquillity of Syria, but for securing it consistently with the integrity of the Turkish Empire—with the independence of that Empire which we had formally guaranteed. These were no trifling considerations. It was true that previously to that treaty we had been very much implicated, both commercially and politically, in Turkish affairs. We had frequently interfered, both by arms and money, to maintain the independence of the Turkish Empire; but now that we had actually bound ourselves by treaty, we could not, without a departure from good faith—without a change of circumstances justified our own change—withdraw from giving the required
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support to the independence of the Turkish Empire, should the occasion arise. We had already had deep and dear-bought experience as to what it cost to maintain the integrity of Turkey. Long before we entered on our treaty obligations the natural connection between this country and Turkey led us to take an interest in the wars and negotiations with neighbouring Powers, in which, it was proved that they were over-matched. In the course of this century, as their Lordships knew, some eight or ten times we had been driven into negotiations of the most complicated kind with Turkey on account of its interests. We had on several occasions, as many as six or eight in the present century, sent our fleets, and sometimes even our army, for the purpose of protecting her. If, then, those dangers were incurred and those sacrifices made at a time when we were only bound to Eastern affairs by a sense of interest, how was it now, when we were engaged in the most formal manner to guarantee the independence and integrity of that empire? Surely they could not but consider this as a subject which deserved their serious attention at a time when the whole of Europe, and not only Europe, but America, was thrown into the most disastrous confusion, with very doubtful results; and they could hardly shut their eyes to the consideration that circum stances might suddenly arise which might involve them in their consequences. Some of the movements taking place on the Continent, not only politically, but in a military sense, came in contact with the Turkish Empire; therefore there was at least a chance that the Porte, by reason of its weakness, might be brought into a position which might excite the appetite of soma other country to take advantage of her situation, and throw on us the necessity of stepping forward to avert that danger. When such was the case he was justified in saying that we were bound to be careful as to what was done in Syria. It was of the utmost consequence that we should have a correct notion of the causes that had led to the disturbances and massacres that had taken place in that country. No doubt there were causes connected with local circumstances. There was the old dominion of the Porte to be maintained, and there was a constant appetite on its part to extend its power into the mountainous parts of the province. There were the old conflicting animosities of race and creed. But, in addition to these, it might be truly and justly said that the more im-

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portant causes—those which were necessary to bring on the catastrophe—were the administration of the Turkish Empire and the corruption which entered deeply into the cause of what we had to lament. Another cause was the weakness of the Turkish army—an army which, he believed, stood at 150,000 men on paper, but which, he understood from competent authorities, did not really amount to more than between 50,000 and 60,000; and that with an immense territory, with the difficulty of passing troops, the badness of roads, and the inconvenience attending operations in that country. Another circumstance which stood at once pre-eminent amongst the causes of the Syrian calamities, and which gave immediate cause of weakness to the Turkish Empire was the embarrassed state of the Turkish finances—embarrassed as he understood to a degree which in that country of unsettled finance had never before been equalled. Unless some remedy were applied it would be impossible to guarantee Syria against a recurrence of those calamities from which it was only gradually escaping. It was impossible for us to guard against the consequences of the engagements which we had incurred; and if we wished to do justice to the country more particularly under consideration, and to the whole Turkish Empire itself, it must be by assisting them to get out of their present slate of weakness by affording them any assistance, either moral or otherwise, that the interests of our own country could allow of; and, above all things, by urging upon them the necessity of, and by giving them sufficient motives for, exerting their own energies, and thus be the means of contributing to the preservation of their own independence and integrity, by calling upon them to carry out those reforms which they themselves had admitted to he necessary to their safety, which they had proclaimed over and over again, and which they had recorded in that treaty of peace as to the motive which induced us to enter into that guarantee which for the first time formed part of our alliance with Turkey. There were other causes which had operated, in his apprehension, to produce that state of things existing in Syria, and which should be borne in mind in coming to any conclusion. On the part of the Porte it was difficult, perhaps, to bring this matter to a permanent and satisfactory settlement. It was very desirable to secure the privileges of the inhabitants of the Mountain, of
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which promises had been given, and at the same time to maintain the supreme sovereignty of the Sultan. It was also difficult to secure those districts from a repetition of those occurrences which had hitherto operated so fatally upon its prosperity; and at the same time to induce the Turkish Government to enter seriously and in good faith upon that system of reform to which they had been so frequently pledged. On a former occasion, when, in execution of the promise given to the inhabitants of the Mountain, the Allied Powers, at the instigation of this country, entered into the question which terminated in a diplomatic settlement, a difficulty was felt of reconciling those several things, and it unfortunately turned out that, although the Druses and the Christians were both disarmed, they had, from circumstances which were not yet sufficiently cleared up, been brought into the circumstances which terminated in the calamities of last year. He thought that it was a subject of regret—he would not presume to say of censure—that more settled and persevering exertions had not been made to keep the Turks steady in the progress of reform. We knew ourselves in this country how much had been done in the last thirty years by both parties in the State vigorously applying themselves to remedy those evils which time had introduced. He bad heard it made a matter of boast—and he agreed a matter of just boast—that what had thus been dune had drawn forth the resources of this country in a manner which was unexampled before; and it was our hope that whatever the confusion into which other countries might fall we might promise ourselves a still greater increase of prosperity. Since, then, there were circumstances connected with Turkey which had interested our sympathies and had induced us to make those sacrifices and incur those risks to which he had just referred, for it appeared to him—and, owing to the circumstances in which he had been placed, perhaps more to him than to any other Member of their Lordships' House—that this was not a fanciful or speculative subject. It was not one which we could hope or desire to postpone from year to year, because it was one which was knocking at our doors, which was threatening us with danger of the most positive kind, especially in the present state of the world, and which would probably surprise us by a catastrophe when we least expected it. He asked their Lordships whether we could stand idly by and

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witness the partition of the Turkish Empire? For what was the Turkish Empire? Discredited though it might be by the religion of its people, it covered that part of the world in which had been seen the greatest events, and the greatest men, and the greatest developments of power that existed from the earliest time; it was a country which came into contact with the most important parts of Europe; and which afforded increasing motives and allurements for conquest. Could we, then, afford to stand by arid witness the partition of that empire of which there was now more reason to apprehend than at any earlier period? Could we in such a ease maintain our non-intervention as, fortunately, we had maintained it in other cases? Would we not be called on by every consideration—by the commercial interests of the country—by the natural political jealousy of the country—to come forward at every risk to do what the interests of England and of Europe would demand? In introducing his Resolutions he had confined himself to touching on the most material points of the subject. He had not gone into details, for his purpose was merely to recall to their Lordships' recollection circumstances which must be known to them all, and which could not be left out of consideration when a discussion took place in respect to the settlement that ought to follow the evacuation of Syria by foreign troops. He understood that this subject was in progress of discussion in the other House of Parliament also, and he was anxious that it should be well considered by the Legislature. He trusted that in the manner in which he had treated those difficult topics there was no danger of any unpleasant results. He hoped that neither he nor any noble Lord who shared his views would express his opinions in a way that could he the cause of embarrassment to Her Majesty's Government, or of annoyance to the Government of any other Power. He had framed the Resolutions which he should have the honour to propose to their Lordships in such a spirit as would, he hoped, save them from meeting with any opposition. He asked their Lordships, viewing the spirit in which they were dictated, and the object of genera! interest to which they were directed, to treat them with consideration and indulgence. He should regret to be the cause of any division in that House, and he should be exceedingly sorry if his introduction of the subject were to cause any
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discredit or doubt to be thrown on the opinions which he had endeavoured to embody in the Resolutions which he should conclude by proposing. He had stated frankly and fully the motives which had led him to bring this subject before their Lordships, and had endeavoured, he hoped not without some effect, to show the urgency of the question as affecting Syria, and its inseparable connection, not only with the destinies of the Turkish Empire, but also with the most important interests of Europe. He trusted that their Lordships would not withhold their support from the views which he had expressed. Whatever might be the decision of the House he could only thank their Lordships for the patience with which they had listened to him, and resume his seat with the consciousness that he had discharged a duty imposed on him by the circumstances of the case. The noble Viscount then moved the Resolutions.
LORD WODEHOUSEsaid, he was sure that the House could not fail to listen with attention to all the opinions which had been expressed by his noble Friend, who was probably more intimately acquainted with Turkish affairs than any other Member of their Lordships House. He was also sure that Her Majesty's Government had no reason to complain of the noble Lord, either for having brought forward the question, or for the manner in which he had done so; for his language had been temperate, and his views were in many respects very similar to those which had been avowed by the Government in the papers on the table. It was, moreover, but natural that after the voluminous papers which had been laid on the table in relation to Syria, that the noble Lord should take an opportunity of calling attention to the subject. While, however, he agreed with a great deal that had fallen from his noble Friend, and believed that the Resolutions contained much to which the House would find no difficulty in assenting, he trusted that he should be able to show good reason why it was desirable that such an expression of opinion ought not to be pressed on the House at the present moment. The Resolutions of his noble Friend referred to three subjects, which were to a certain extent distinct. The first was directed against a prolongation of the foreign occupation of Syria, and expressed an opinion that the House would view with deep regret any prolongation of that occupation, however brief. But any one who had read the printed papers must

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be convinced that Her Majesty's Government were fully persuaded of the importance of bringing that occupation to a termination at as early a period as possible. There could be no doubt that the occupation, although sanctioned by England and the other Powers of Europe at a time when there prevailed a feeling of a strong commiseration for those who had suffered in the massacres of last spring, was an anomaly, and a danger to the Empire upon whose territory the foreign troops were quartered. They were, however, bound to admit that nothing which had taken place in connection with that occupation would justify them in expressing a doubt that the Convention on the subject would not be duly and fully observed by all the Powers which had signed it. The French Government was not the only party to that part of the contract; for although French troops represented the European occupation of Syria, it should be recollected that any of the Powers who were parties to the Convention were at liberty to take part in the occupation, but that it had been agreed among them that it would be most convenient that France should furnish the whole quota. They had, therefore, no ground for jealousy on that score. More than that, although the conduct of the troops in occupation had been called in question, he thought that it had, on the whole, been marked by moderation and a desire to respect the independence of the Sovereign of the territory. It was quite true—and it appeared in the papers on the table—that there had been considerable discussion as to the prolongation of the occupation. It had been held to be desirable that it should be continued for a short period, but Her Majesty's Government saw no reason to doubt that it would be terminated on the 5th of June, the time fixed for the Convention. Under these circumstances it would be very inexpedient at that moment that their Lordships should pass a solemn Resolution on this matter, which did not seem very courteous to the other Powers interested, and more especially not to the Power whose troops were in occupation. The next Resolution referred rather to a matter of history. His noble Friend was of opinion that the late calamitous events in Syria were attributable, not exclusively to local causes, but "chiefly to the general state of the Turkish Empire, more especially in point of revenue and administration." He (Lord Wodehouse) could not admit that that Resolution was entirely in accordance
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with the facts stated in the papers which had been laid on the table. His own opinion was that the events in question were due partly to Turkish maladministration, but chiefly to local causes. Evidence was given in the printed papers that the disturbances originated with the Maronites, who were anxious to revive their ancient disputes with the Druses. The Druses, indeed, on the other hand, showed no reluctance to renew the ancient feud, and engaged in it in a bloodthirsty manner which excited the horror of Europe. He did not deny that the Turks were also to blame. There could not be the slightest doubt that, while some excuse might possibly be found for the proceedings of the Druses and Maronites, who were animated by historical feelings of hatred, there was no such excuse for the Turks, who were bound to maintain order in their dominions, and there could not be the slightest doubt that the Turkish troops had committed excesses in the district of Damascus and elsewhere more fearful than those of the contending tribes. At the same time the Turkish Government had atoned for their previous faults by the vigour with which they had punished those who bore the chief part in those disturbances. The Mushir of Damascus, the Commander-in-Chief, the colonel of a Turkish regiment at Hasbeya, and 57 other persons, many of whom occupied posts of eminence, were put to death, and altogether nearly 500 persons were subjected to various punishments. The Druses had also suffered heavy retribution at the hands of the Maronites, in addition to the punishment awarded to them by the authorities. He should say, therefore, that there was a considerable doubt whether the facts were precisely as his noble Friend had stated them, and be did not see that there was any advantage in expressing a positive opinion on a matter which at least admitted of different conclusions. The last of his noble Friend's Resolutions had a wider scope than the others, and referred, in point of fact, to the whole condition of the Ottoman Empire. His noble Friend had very justly expressed his sense of the importance of that question, and had spoken of the danger which menaced its existence. In one sense it might be said that the Turkish Empire was always in great danger, at any rate during the last thirty or forty years, the Turkish Empire had been in continued danger. This state arose from various causes. It was but half-civilized; it was

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composed of different and discordant nations, opposed, not merely in origin, but religion. It was, therefore, not in a condition such as was usually regarded as betokening permanence in a State. But he feared they were rather prone sometimes to exaggerate the danger of that Empire, and the reports from the consuls, which were exceedingly interesting, and reflected great credit on the ability and industry of the gentlemen by whom they had been forwarded, exhibited a picture of the Turkish Empire somewhat different from that which was usually drawn. Nearly all the consuls agreed that some improvement had taken place, and they pointed out that it was not so much the laws which were defective as the power of administering them. One of those gentlemen used a phrase which was very apt, and at the same time, truly described the condition of the country, when he said it was easier to frame good laws in Turkey than to find honest persons to carry them into operation. In point of fact the Turkish Empire was in many respects in the possession of good laws; it enjoyed a measure of toleration larger than existed in some civilized States; while liberty of trade, as far as laws were concerned, was not greatly hampered or restricted. But there was so much corruption among the higher officials, and such a want of knowledge in the administration of these laws, that they were never fully and efficiently carried out. His noble Friend, who was desirous at all times to urge on the Porte the adoption of reforms, was anxious that Her Majesty's Government should find a remedy for these evils; but, for his own part, he (Lord Wodehouse) thought the British Government could scarcely adopt any other course than they had hitherto pursued—namely, to advise the Porte to adopt wise and sensible measures, and to give her such support, by counsel, as was essential when she was in difficulties. One of the most important points in which reform could be introduced in Turkey was with regard to finance; and Her Majesty's Government, feeling how vital this question was to the existence of the Empire, had recently sent out two gentlemen to advise the Porte with respect to fiscal affairs. If the Porte would listen to the advice of those gentlemen and would really carry out some systematic reform of the ordinary administration of the State, as regarded the expenditure of the different departments and the accounts which those departments had to
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render, much greater benefits would be secured to the country than by taking up reforms with more sounding names. More than that he did not think it was competent for any foreign Government to do; and he certainly did not believe that any formal expression of opinion on the part of their Lordships' House would be attended with any advantage. His noble Friend had not referred to the change a which it was proposed to make in Syria; but before sitting down he should like shortly to place before their Lordships the actual state of affairs. A Commission to inquire into the condition of Syria and its present organization had been sent out by the different Governments of Europe, and the question of the future settlement of the Lebanon would have to be decided by them. In the papers presented to the House it would be seen that a great variety of views had been expressed. His noble Friend had not stated his own view with regard to these various schemes, but it was obvious that the difficulty of choosing between them must be very considerable. Whatever might be the ultimate decision of Her Majesty's Government, they would be most anxious to pay due attention to the just privileges of the inhabitants of the Lebanon, and at the same time they would not consent to anything which would weaken the Sovereign authority of the Porte in those provinces. Without entering further into the subject at present, he would express his obligations to his noble Friend for the favourable manner in which he had spoken of the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government. It was their desire that foreign occupation should cease at the date specified by a Convention recently concluded, and they had no reason to suppose that it would be prolonged beyond that time. The attention of Her Majesty's Government had been constantly fixed on the necessity of reforms being carried out in Turkey, and the advice which they had tendered was such as would be cordially approved of by his noble Friend, who had taken so active a part in the affairs of that part of the world.
THE MARQUESS OF CLANRICARDEexpressed his regret that her Majesty's Ministers did not think it advisable to put upon record the opinion of this House on this matter by adopting their Resolutions. The question really was what were our engagements with Turkey, and how far were we to be brought into the consequences which those engagements might lead to,

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without our making an effort to avert them? With regard to the first Resolution to which the noble Lord (Lord Wodehouse) had taken an exception, the intention of which was to impress on the Government the great desire of this House that the French troops should be removed from Syria, he believed that the French Government was perfectly sincere in its expressed readiness to remove those troops, and that they would be removed in the course of the coming month. But the next Resolution went further, and distinctly pointed to the circumstances under which those troops were there, and the noble Viscount expressed a hope that no circumstances now existed that would prevent the recal of those troops. He thought that was a matter of great difficulty, upon which their Lordships might fairly express an opinion. They knew not what information Government might have, and could only judge of the existing state of things in Syria from the papers laid on the Table, and among the last of these reference was made to a demand countenanced, if not put forward by the Christian bishops for the execution in cold blood of 1,200 persons. Assuming that the allied Powers were justified in their original interference, was the state of things disclosed in the official correspondence such as to justify their withdrawal? He thought not. They had nothing in any document at present to show that the French troops acting on behalf of the allied Powers could safely be recalled, but they were too happy to take the assurance of the Government, and he thought they would be perfectly justified in expressing their opinion in the very guarded language which his noble Friend had used in the Resolution. Then his noble Friend (Lord Wodehouse) said the second Resolution was not quite justified, because it pointed, as the real source of these disorders, not to local circumstances, but to the general condition of the Turkish Empire, and more especially as regarded revenue and administration. The noble Lord spoke of the state of the Turkish troops and the conduct of the Turkish Governor as being what he considered a local cause of these unfortunate occurrences and as being the occasion of the occupation by foreign troops. Why, that was precisely the reason why, as he understood, his noble Friend (Viscount Stratford) had brought forward these Resolutions. He (the Marquess of Clanricarde) said that the condition of the troops and the administration, as it
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was carried on, were the causes—the proximate and not the remote causes—of all that had taken place. Why, some of those papers showed that the Pacha of Damascus had been drawing money from the central Government at Constantinople for the maintenance of a regiment which it turned out never existed. What was that but faulty administration? Those troops, if they had actually existed, might have been instrumental in repressing the outbreak. But what did he do? When inquiry was made into his conduct he emptied the gaols of ruffians and convicts and pressed them into the ranks in order to make a show of military strength. When we considered our engagements towards Turkey and its condition he thought it must fill us with dismay. His noble Friend (Lord Wodehouse) seemed to think we could pursue no other course than that of tendering good advice, it was that course which had led us into wars in the course of the last thirty years. In 1841 British blood was shed to drive the Egyptians out of Syria; yet it was the testimony of travellers that, when Syria was governed by Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim Pacha, its condition was far better than it was now under the Government of the Porte. The question really was the fearful condition of Turkey, of which we were bound to maintain the independence. At this moment attacks were made upon her by Montenegro which she was unable to repel, and it was reported, and he believed truly, that she was unable to send a squadron of ships into the Adriatic, because she had not money to pay the sailors. In fact, the whole number of regular troops that could be brought together by a Power that was essentially a military despotism did not exceed 50,000 or 60,000 men. It was not for him to say what ought to be done, but he heartily wished that we were out of our engagements, and he hoped that we should never enter into any more of a similar kind. He did not think that the case was to be met by sending out clerks and financial expert? What was wanted was some solid assistance in the shape of a loan. That was the long and the short of the matter. Then, were we prepared to give that? No, we were not. The Minister who should propose it he thought would not be likely to be Minister long. He trusted, however, and he believed that her Majesty's Government would assist the Turkish Government by every means in their power; but what they could do if they could not give a loan, or a security

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for a loan, it was not very easy to say. But the Government had sent out clerks to advise. Why the Sultan had been taking advice ever since he was on the throne, and the only person who bad made that advice effectual was his noble Friend and relative who had moved these Resolutions. For these reasons he was glad that his noble Friend had brought forward these Resolutions, and he should have been still more pleased had the House adopted them. He should have liked the Parliament of this country to have said at once that these embarrassments were owing to the condition of the administration of the Turkish Empire. How far we were liable to maintain that empire through any course of mal-administration he did not wish distinctly to argue, but he thought it would be a good thing if the House could express its sense that the embarrassments of the empire were owing to the mal-ad-ministration of its Government.
THE EARL OF MALMESBURYsaid, he was not aware whether, at the present moment, Turkey was unable to subdue the Montenegrins, but if it were not that was not from its own intrinsic weakness, but from what had been the bane of Turkey—the perpetual interference of foreign Governments. Only within three years Turkey had had positive orders from France not to attack the Montenegrins, and not to cross the frontier. Russia had issued similar orders, and had constantly interfered in the same way. Both those Powers long ago, and again lately, had set themselves up as the protectors of Montenegro against Turkey, and he must say that his experience while in office convinced him that nothing could be more atrocious and more unprovoked than the attacks of the Montenegrins on the inhabitants of the frontiers. He believed it was in 1846 that Omar Pacha, the best general in the Turkish army, disposed 25,000 men in a semicircle before Montenegro, and he was on the point of bringing the Montenegrins to certain conditions, which Europe would have settled, when Russia interfered to prevent him. Since that time, the French Government by constant intrigues, for reasons best known to itself, had sustained that nation of savages, and had supported them in all their attacks upon the Turkish empire. Now, that was only one corner of the Turkish empire; but he was not going to occupy their Lordships' time by reminding them how extremely analagous were the attacks that
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had been made in others. In his opinion, a great deal too much advice was tendered to Turkey, and there was a great deal too much interference with her. That constant advice, constant interference, and constant threatening was, he believed, the original, and continued to be the chief cause of the condition of the Turkish Empire.
VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFEcould not agree with the noble Earl with respect to the state of the military force of Turkey. Small as the army of Turkey was, and ill-provisioned and ill-paid as it might be. she was able generally to bring into the field a sufficient force, and to concentrate it in such a manner as to repress outbreaks. This system, however, was ruinous, wearing down the district which was the scene of action, and exhausting the resources of the Porte. He might be allowed to add that he could not agree with his noble Friend as to the peculiar vices of the Turkish Government. His experience told him that the Turks wanted unity of action—that they suffered from divisions among themselves—that they displayed want of energy in carrying out the reforms which it was so necessary to have effected. It was his firm conviction that if they were not kept to a sense of their duty, if they did not redeem their pledges, and if they did not carry out an effective system of reform, the time was not distant when the Turkish Empire would either fall to pieces, or would suffer from some of its provinces being appropriated by neighbouring Powers; and then we might be called upon to make greater sacrifices than we bad yet done. If the present state of things in Turkey was not improved, and more persistent efforts were not made to execute the promised reforms, he felt great apprehensions for the future of that empire.
EARL GREYthought that the prophecy of the noble Viscount was very likely to be fulfilled. He was convinced that Turkey was likely to fall to pieces if she went on as at present, and he was equally convinced that she could not be propped up by advice forced upon her by different nations, and nations jealous of each other. He agreed with the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Malmesbury) that the present condition of Turkey was very much to be attributed to the system of Government which now existed there, and next, to the unfortunate interference on the part of European nations in the international ma-

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nagement of the country during the last twenty-five years. He was persuaded it was a blunder to suppose that by compelling a corrupt Government to pass good laws they could secure good Government:—Turkey wanted what Mr. Canning once called the "executory principle." He could not help thinking that the best chance of reforming the state of that country was by leaving it to reform itself; and if European nations had left things to themselves, a remedy would have been found one way or the other. Probably the evil of misgovernment would have been so great, that either the corrupt and miserable Government would have been destroyed, and something better substituted, or the Government would have been compelled to reform itself. But they could not secure reform in a country by the efforts from without of foreign nations; it must come from within; and the only effect of interference on our part to govern as it were the whole world would be to impose enormous burdens on the people of this country, and to lead us into all kinds of misfortunes. Was there any man who could say that the Crimean war, which had entailed an expense of three or four millions a year upon us, had done much to extend the probable duration of the Turkish Empire? Of what use was it to give advice, to introduce reforms to a country with an army on paper, an empty treasury, and a corrupt administration, and with no man to be trusted in any one department? As well might they give advice to a man on his deathbed to get up and walk about his room and imagine he could do so, as to expect that the advice he had mentioned could have any effect upon the Turkish Government. On the contrary, it would only aggravate the evils complained of. He hoped and trusted we were not going to carry further the vicious policy we had adopted during the last twenty-five or thirty years, and which had been fraught with such miserable results; he, therefore, objected to the Resolutions, because they seemed to imply that we should take such a course. As regarded assistance to the Turkish Government, he trusted no Minister would venture to make such a proposition to the House of Commons. Rash and extravagant as that House had of late years shown itself, he was sure it would never sanction the expenditure of a single shilling in a vain and fruitless attempt to prolong the existence of Turkey. He objected altogether to our guarantee of the integrity of the Turkish
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Empire; but he trusted it was not quite so bad as some noble Lords seemed to suppose. Our guarantee, in his opinion, simply meant that Turkey should not be pulled to pieces by her neighbours. Not that, if she were to fall to pieces by her own inherent weakness, we were to be called upon to endeavour to prop up so rotten a fabric. He thought the noble Marquess had pushed rather too far the meaning of our guarantee of the independence of the Turkish Empire, because he seemed to suppose that this country was under some pledge to maintain Turkey against intestine dangers and her own weakness. He trusted we had not been so impolitic as to have done that.
VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFEsaid, he could not concur in the observation of the noble Earl that our advice had not produced any good effect on the Turkish Empire. Under the directions of our Government, at least ten great and important measures had been adopted, and every one of them would now be in complete execution from one end of the country to the other if there were not that weakness and want of attention to advice of which he had already complained.
EARL GREYsaid, the noble Lord had illustrated what was precisely his (Earl Grey's) argument—namely, that they might have a number of good laws, which would do a great deal of good if they were enforced; but if unfortunately they were not enforced, as was the case in Turkey, they would do no good whatever. If European nations, in attempting to compel the Turkish Government to enforce the measures they recommended, interfered with the administration in every corner and every village of the country, they would destroy the whole strength and power of the Empire.
EARL GRANVILLEsaid, he hoped the House would not resolve itself into a Committee to discuss the internal affairs of Turkey. He did not rise to prolong the debate, but to second the appeal made by the Under Secretary of Stale for Foreign Affairs, and supported generally by the House, to the noble Viscount—that he would be good enough to withdraw the Resolutions, and not force them on the adoption of the House. The whole course of the debate had shown the most conclusive reasons why it was desirable that the House should not adopt them. Their Lordships, no doubt, were thankful that the noble Viscount, speaking with such knowledge and authority, had given them

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his views on so important a question; but no practical good could arise from the adoption of the Resolutions. With regard to the third Resolution, there was no reason to apprehend that the French Government would break the solemn engagement into which they bad entered. The French Government had said they felt considerable alarm and responsibility in leaving Syria in its present state, but nothing had occurred to show that they intended to do otherwise than to fulfil honourably their engagement. With respect to the second Resolution, he must say that it was necessary that they should brush up their historical knowledge as to the Turkish Empire before they proceeded to deal with abstract Resolutions of that nature. The third Resolution was one of a more important character, but he disagreed in much that had been said upon the subject to which it related. He disagreed in what the noble Earl (Earl Grey) had said in reference to giving advice to the Turkish Government. It was not possible for any Government in this country to completely ignore the Turkish Empire, to shut their eyes against that country, to treat it as an isolated part of Europe, and to allow matters to go on as they were, without using any efforts to influence the course of events. The general opinion of the House and the country had been that the integrity of the Turkish Empire was an object of some importance as regarded the whole state of European affairs. If that Empire fell to pieces it was impossible to foresee a satisfactory solution to the difficulties which would arise in consequence, or what evils might flow from any settlement which might be arrived at under such circumstances. He agreed that advice and interference coming from divergent sources and different nations was likely to cause great difficulty, and he also thought that advice injudiciously urged, or ostentatiously paraded, would never be of any use; but this country, whether rightly or wrongly, had expended its blood and its treasures for the purpose of preserving the integrity of the Turkish Empire; and having done that, and being under a certain engagement with other European Powers with regard to that Empire, he thought that when advice was likely to be of any use it would be culpable on the part of the English Government if they did not use their efforts to induce the Ottoman Porte to strengthen their Government. He must say that the Turks themselves were aware that in giving advice the
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English Government were actuated by a sincere desire to maintain that Power, of which they did not feel so certain in respect to other European nations, and that very fact gave to our advice a weight which did not attach to that of other Governments, He thought that if we gave them advice in a friendly way, if when they come to us for advice and support when any great difficulties arose we pointed out to them a possible way of saving themselves and their finances, we would have a great chance of succeeding; but we should weaken our advice and do no good if we came forward in the manner proposed by the noble Viscount, and gave it in the most offensive way in which it could be tendered. He trusted the House would not think the Government were acting in opposition to those Resolutions; on the contrary, they did not wish to see the occupation of Syria by any foreign Power prolonged, and they wished to see reforms carried out in the internal administration of Turkey, but they thought that their hands would be weakened rather than strengthened if their Lordships agreed to the Resolutions.
VISCOUNT STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFEsaid, he should not persevere with the Resolutions, as it seemed to be the general wish of the House that he should withdraw them. As he, however, believed that the result of the discussion would be to make an impression on this country and foreign nations in the sense he desired, he attached less importance to withdrawing them than he would otherwise have done.
Motion (by leave of the House) withdrawn.
House adjourned at Half-past Seven o'clock, to Monday next, a quarter before Five o'Clock.