§ THE EARL OF CARNARVON moved for Copies of Correspondence between Her Majesty's Government and the Consul General of Egypt, and of any other Communications that have passed between Her Majesty's Government and the Governments of Turkey and France, relative to the proposed Construction of the Suez Canal. The noble Earl said, that there appeared to be a prevailing opinion that the scheme had been practically abandoned, and it was because this was not the case, however justly it might be looked upon as a failure for commercial purposes, that he had ventured to draw their Lordships' attention and the attention of Her Majesty's Ministers to it. He would not 1551 trouble the House with any history of the canal, which would be perfectly in the recollection of every one who had paid any attention to the subject. It would be enough to say that it had been for centuries past an object of ambition to various great sovereigns and princes; and no wonder, for there, perhaps, never was a scheme which more enlisted the sympathy or appealed to the imagination than the construction of this great work. The union of the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, the connecting of the east and the west, the realization of hopes which the Pharoahs dreamt of, and which Alexander half-accomplished, the possible stimulus to commerce, to civilization, and even to Christianity, were enough to invest the scheme in glowing colours. But between the projection and the realization of such a scheme there was a very wide distance, and very serious objections, both commercial and political, could he raised against it. With regard to the engineering difficulties which lay in the way of the successful execution of the undertaking, he must speak with very great diffidence, and from an unprofessional point it was impossible to do more than just glance at it. But the scheme in its outline was no new one, and the difficulties that existed in former years existed in spite of the advance of science in the present day. But assuming for the moment that it would be possible to construct the canal, and carry out a scheme which every engineer in England of established reputation had declared to be impracticable, or at all events one that could not be carried out except at such an enormous expense that there would be no satisfactory return for the capital expended—assuming the possibility of constructing such a canal, the real difficulties would only commence at that point, for the drifting sands and mud of the Mediterranean and Red Sea would be constantly choking up the mouth of the works, and the sands of the desert, drifting in heavy masses, would threaten a similar fate to the bed of the canal itself, and thus there would be a perpetual undoing of all that had been accomplished at the expenditure of great labour and great capital. But the mode in which this mercantile scheme must necessarily be accomplished was a matter worthy of their Lordships' attention. All these works in the East must be accomplished, not by voluntary labour, not by the system of labour which was in practice in this country and in Europe, but by a system of forced 1552 labour. They had already had ample evidence of the system and results of forced labour in the east, and the construction of the Mahmoudieh Canal by Mehemet Ali where 10,000 workmen perished, was a yet recent illustration of the certain sacrifice of life in such a work; nor could it be argued that this was a consideration which Parliament should exclude in estimating the purposes of a great commercial undertaking. There was another circumstance that must always be borne in mind. It used to be believed that there was a difference of level between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea; but this had long since been disproved, such a passage would be, in fact, only a wet ditch without such a force of water as would be sufficient to keep it clear and open. Again, the canal, which was to be nearly 100 miles long and not 300 feet across, therefore, could not be expected to afford navigation for sailing vessels. This might be obviated to some extent by the employment of steamers, but that would impose additional expense. But if the objections to the scheme were simply of a mercantile character, however much he might regret to see English money embarked in a mere bubble, he should still think it hardly a question which he could venture to bring before their Lordships. But if he could show that the question was one of very considerable importance in a political point of view—a question affecting the interests of Turkey, Egypt, and Europe generally, and this country in especial—he thought he was justified in asking of the Government explanations of the policy they had hitherto pursued. Turning to the political considerations involved, he would first of all ask of his noble Friend opposite under what sanction it was that the construction of this great work had been proceeded with? He knew that the Viceroy of Egypt had granted permission to M. Lesseps and his company to construct this canal; but he need not tell the House that the Viceroy of Egypt was not an independent Prince in any sense, but was a vassal and tributary of the Porte. Now, the permission given by the Viceroy had never received the ratification of the Porte, but, on the contrary, though the scheme had been distinctly brought under the notice of the Porte, the Porte had distinctly refused its consent, on the ground that it would be prejudicial to the interests of Turkey, and tend to the dismemberment of the empire. But, moreover, it should be remembered that by the terms of the 1553 concession M. Lesseps was not merely authorized to construct the canal, but was allowed to take the territory on either side to the extent, as it was understood, of a mile or a mile and a half; and thus a foreign company, and, through the company, a foreign Government might one day become the owner of very considerable property in the very heart of Egypt. There was no doubt that this canal might be converted into works of a purely military character. M. Lesseps would of course contend that it was a purely commercial undertaking; but unfortunately the last act he had undertaken was entirely contradictory to that assertion. For what had he done? He had persuaded the Viceroy of Egypt to subscribe a sum of 90,000,000 of francs, equal to about £3,500,000 of our money, to this undertaking. But the revenues of Egypt were not at this moment £5,000,000 a year; it was, therefore, impossible such a liability could be defrayed out of them, and thus a lien would be imposed by way of public debt on the whole of Egypt. It might, indeed, be said that if the liability were personal the mischief would be confined to the life of the present Pacha; but if the liability were to be held to be binding on his successors, from that moment the Government of Egypt would no longer be free agents. These were no light objections, but they were all objections of a political nature. Everything forbade the assumption that this was an ordinary company, in any sense of the word. He did not wish to say anything in disparagement of the French Government; but it was obvious that in the course of time the action of this company might become the action of the French Government; and if so, it was highly objectionable, in point of policy, that any European Power should occupy such a position in the Egyptian state. He had no wish to obstruct the development of French commerce and French trade in these parts of the world. It had been said that we had an advantage in the existing state of things; that it was advantageous to us that foreign nations should be excluded from the Red Sea; but such an advantage, he thought, if it existed, would be dearly purchased by the odium which such an exclusion deliberately maintained, would entail upon us. He denied, however, that any such advantage existed. In the natural course of things he believed that the growth of commerce in one country, reacted upon and stimulated the commerce of all others; and, therefore, if 1554 this canal were thrown open, we, as being the largest traders in the world, must, in the long run, reap the greatest benefits. He could not, therefore, entertain any great apprehension as to the results which were likely to follow in any part of the world from the opening of the canal. In a commercial point of view, he had no wish to obstruct French trade, nor did he wish to obstruct French action in a political point of view provided always that it was not such as to undermine or prejudice English interests, and was not undue and illegitimate. He regretted very much—as much for the sake of France as for our own—the system of foreign policy pursued by French authorities in the east. It was a bad and expensive system using subordinate agents, men often reckless as to the ends they had in view, and as to the means they employed for the attainment of their ends, who frequently placed the French Government in a false and humiliating position, and falsified the acts of that Government in the eyes of Europe. This was a system not only bad and costly, but dangerous. Such, however, as it was we had no right to quarrel with it. It was most prejudicial to France, and it was for the French to look to that themselves. He thought, nevertheless, that we were bound to see that no steps were taken, no measures adopted, no influence created, which could in any way prejudice the neutrality of Egypt. It was a vital question with us so long as we held the empire of India. The French in other parts of the world were in situations in many respects similar to our own, and he might confidently appeal to the good sense and magnanimity of the French nation not to allow men who, for their own interests and speculations represented themselves as the exponents of their policy to create dissensions at points where we, of necessity, must be jealous and sensitive. Therefore, he had no wish whatever to draw a bill of indictment against French policy, or the French Government in this case; nor did he wish to complain of that large number of Frenchmen—much larger than in former years—who were at this moment in Egypt. What he did complain of was the tone and conduct which had been assumed on behalf of M. Lesseps' company by those who professed themselves to be the agents of the French nation, the representatives of her Government, and the exponents of her policy. The object of this company manifestly was to identify every act of theirs with the 1555 French Government, to involve the French Government in all their proceedings, to creep under its shelter, and to gain every advantage they could from the use of the French name. He would point only to a single illustration. He knew himself that English travellers had been turned back by the French officials of this company, not only from an inspection of the works then in the course of construction, but from the line of country through which the canal was proposed to traverse. So that this company was not merely occupying the ground, it was rapidly claiming an exclusive right of territorial power and jurisdiction. Regular reports of the progress of this company were from time to time laid before the French public, from which they were led to suppose that by the month of October next the canal would be so far open as to admit of the passage of small vessels from one end to the other. It was perfectly obvious what all that meant—it was to create a prestige which had no real foundation. His hope was that the good sense of the French Government would not allow them to be drawn into partnership with a bankrupt company in order to vamp up a commercial speculation which was as gross and delusive a bubble as was ever launched on the sea of commerce. It was difficult to gather from the past what would be the 'future policy of her Majesty's Government on this question. When the subject was last under discussion in the House of Commons four Members of the present Cabinet took part in the debate. Lord Palmerston maintained that the project went to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, and was adverse to all the interests and the traditional policy of this country. He (the Earl of Carnarvon) was not prepared to go entirely along with the grounds on which the noble Lord rested such a conclusion even if he affirmed the conclusion itself. But the noble Lord's opinion was clear, unqualified, and unmistakeable. He was followed by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer. The right hon. Gentleman took a line directly opposite. He denied the existence of the danger which the noble Lord had pointed out, and—to use his own words—condemned the absurd and vicious policy of which the noble Lord was the originator. In this view he was supported by the President of the Board of Trade, Mr. Milner Gibson. The noble Lord the Foreign Secretary, without entirely agreeing with either Lord Palmerston or Mr. Gladstone seemed to say that 1556 in time of peace there could be no danger from the opening of the canal, and that the apprehensions of danger in time of war which had been expressed were chimerical. Without disparaging the harmony that so notoriously prevailed in her Majesty's Government, there was in this a certain difference of opinion; and such widely differing statements having appeared on the authority of Members of Her Majesty's Government, he (the Earl of Carnarvon) thought that he might not unreasonably inquire the policy which at this moment being pursued. The noble Earl concluded by moving for the correspondence.
LORD WODEHOUSEsaid, he was not at all surprised that the noble Earl who, he, understood, had recently been travelling in the East, should wish to call attention to a question of so much importance as the Suez Canal. He trusted, however, that the noble Earl would not, after the explanation he should endeavour to give, press for the papers, since it would be injurious to the public service that the correspondence should be produced for which the noble Earl had moved. He was glad to assure the noble Earl that no discord prevailed in Her Majesty's Government on this subject, and that their policy in respect to the Suez Canal had been in no respect changed. They continued to think that the scheme, for the reasons which his noble Friend had pointed out, was impracticable in itself, and that other considerations existed which rendered it necessary to watch the project with great care. He quite agreed with his noble Friend that this country could never for a moment think of opposing itself to a mere commercial scheme, by whomsoever originated; but at the same time we had to look to the relation in which we stood towards the Turkish empire, and to the engagements we had come under by the Treaty of 1856, to maintain the integrity and independence of that empire, as well as the engagements which in 1841 we entered into with regard to the position of the Pasha of Egypt. His noble Friend had alluded to the actual construction of certain works, and to the condition in. which the Canal Company stood at the present moment. He believed the state of the facts to be as follows:—M. Lesseps, as the House knew, had in 1854 obtained a concession from the Pasha of Egypt, under which he was entitled to carry out his scheme for the construction of a canal and to acquire a large amount of land.
1557 After some time M. Lesseps found that it would be necessary to obtain a concession from the Sultan. That concession, however, as his noble Friend had truly stated, the Sultan had never given. Without positively stating that in no circumstances would it consent to the formation of a canal to connect the Mediterranean with the Red Sea, the Porte said that before consenting to such a scheme it ought to receive certain guarantees which would secure the integrity of the empire and the due observance of its laws. His noble Friend had alluded to one law which existed in the Turkish empire, and which would be probably violated if the scheme were carried out. He meant the law by which forced labour was not permitted. The scheme for the construction of a canal could only be carried out by a large amount of labour, and in such a country as Egypt it would probably be by forced labour. The Sultan might also naturally object to the acquirement of a large amount of land by a company connected with a foreign country. It must also be admitted that a considerable amount of danger might accrue to the position of Egypt as a por-of the Ottoman empire by the establishment of so important an undertaking in Egypt, dividing a section of the country from the Turkish empire, and establishing in it a compact body of foreigners with special privileges, entitled not only to the protection of the consuls, but to exemption from the jurisdiction of the country. These were obviously great dangers, and Her Majesty's Government had not concealed their opinions on the subject. They had stated, as the Government of the noble Earl opposite (the Earl of Derby) had done, and as the former Government of Lord Palmerston had also done, that they objected to the scheme on the grounds which he had now explained to the House. The position of another great and friendly Government—that of France—with regard to the scheme had naturally made it necessary for Her Majesty's Government to proceed with great circumspection; but they had not concealed from that Government the objections which they entertained to the undertaking. As the matter at present stood the Sultan had signified to the Pasha of Egypt that the concession not having been granted by him the scheme ought not to be proceeded with. M. Lesseps had, however, in the meantime obtained leave from the Pasha to make some preliminary arrangements for the carrying 1558 out of the undertaking, and he had actually commenced his works. He (Lord Wodehouse) did not think, however, they need be under very much alarm as to the progress made in the scheme. As far as Her Majesty's Government were informed, the silting up of the harbour, the drifting of the sand, the scarcity of water, the want of labour, and other causes had had their full effect. In point of fact the most difficult part of the scheme seemed to be the establishment of a port or harbour. As soon as a jetty was constructed with the view of making a harbour the excavation was choked up by the drifting of the sand round the coast. The operation, indeed, reminded him of the fabled labour of Sisyphus in rolling the stone up the hill. He felt great commiseration for the un fortunate shareholders engaged in this speculation. It would be a fortunate thing if the expenditure of money was confined to the shareholders; but M. Lesseps had succeeded in the most ingenious manner in persuading the Pasha of Egypt to take upon himself the liability of one-half of the shares of the company. The Pasha was thus placed in an unfortunate dilemma. If the scheme went on he would probably lose all the money for which he had made himself liable; and if it were abandoned it was not impossible that claims might be made upon him for compensation. Her Majesty's Government considered that the question was one properly for the consideration of the Porte. The Porte was still in communication with the Pasha of Egypt on the subject, and he (Lord Wodehouse) trusted that the scheme, which he believed to be impracticable, would either be abandoned, or, at least, that such guarantees would be insisted on as would give security to the Porte, and to all the European Powers who had interests in that part of the world, that the proposed line of communication would not be used in a manner injurious to those interests, and, especially, that in the event of hostilities no exclusive advantages should be enjoyed by any Power.
LORD STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFEsaid, their Lordships were indebted to the noble Earl who had brought forward this subject for giving them an opportunity of expressing their opinions regarding it, and stating their views in such a way as would animate Her Majesty's Government in pursuing a right course of policy, and in preventing what might be a very serious mischief to the interests of the Turkish 1559 empire as well as to the Pasha of Egypt. He must say, from all the information he had received from persons engaged in engineering, and from officers who had been employed in surveying the coast, that the opinions of those most to be relied upon were unfavourable to the practicability of this speculation. If we could be certain that the scheme were one merely of a commercial character, and one that might be made advantageous to the commerce of the world, he could not conceive that, from any feeling of jealousy, it would be opposed by this country, which would be sure in such a case to derive the greatest share of benefit from it when carried out. When he was resident at Constantinople his opinion as to the real state of the case was referred to; and, knowing what the general views of Her Majesty's Government were, he felt bound to express himself in a manner to induce the Turkish Government to weigh with great attention all those circumstances which ought to be considered in connection with the scheme. Upon the whole, he believed that the matter might be safely left in the hands of Her Majesty's Government; and as no dissent had been expressed to the policy which they were pursuing, he hoped it would go forth to the world that Her Majesty's Government would be supported by their Lordships in any measures which they might adopt to give more complete effect to the objections which they had already expressed.
THE EARL OF ELLEN BOROUGHsaid, that his opinions on the subject might be expressed in a very few words. We had already had trouble enough with one Bosphorus; he believed that the scheme now under consideration was an attempt to create another Bosphorus and place it in the hands of the French. At the outset he might state his conviction that the attempt would fail—for he quite agreed with the noble Earl that the scheme was perfectly impracticable; but what would be its effect if it succeeded? Why, by means of this canal, the French would be able to place a squadron on the eastern seas in five weeks, while we could not do so in less than twelve. In the event of a war with France—and may God forbid that any such occurrence should take place—those workmen, as they were called, could come down on Suez and cut off the communication, via Egypt between England and India; so that Egypt would cease to be neutral. As matters now stood, there were 1560 two things which ought to be done by the Government. How many other things ought to be done he did not know, but there were two which ought to be done at once—first, the Government ought to establish, and establish in perfect security, a telegraphic communication between India, Aden, and the Island of Perim. Every point at which attack on this communication might be apprehended ought to be protected by works capable of resisting satisfactorily any ordinary attack. That was a work within our own means, and no Power in the world could prevent us from accomplishing it. The other measure to which he referred was that we should have in Egypt, what certainly we had not when he passed through that country, a very numerous and able body of consular agents. These gentlemen would give the Government the fullest information on all points, and afford them the means of acting on the feelings and opinions of the people of Egypt.
§ Motion, by leave of the House, with-drawn.